Missile Defense within the Context of Extended Deterrence: The Uncertain Security Commitments in the Korean Peninsula

Abstract

Previous research examining the deterring effect of a missile defense has asserted thatsuch a missile defense|damage-limiting capability |decreases the vulnerability ofthe United States(US) and enhances its security guarantee to allies. However, thepuzzle of how to convince the potential challenger of the credibility of the threatinherent in an extended deterrence remains unsolved. In this paper, I present a game-theoretic model of the deployment of a missile defense which I use to demonstratethe gap between the resolve of the US as inferred from that deployment and theactual security commitment of the US to the region in which the missile defense isinstalled. Such a discrepancy weakens the credibility of the US security umbrellaand consequentially lowers the likelihood of success of a policy based thereon whichis intended to compel the behavior of an opponent. This finding suggests that adamage-limiting force actually undermines the credibility of the deterrence threat inan extended deterrence setting.