UN Peacekeeping Stance and Civil Conflict Duration

Abstract

This study investigates how the United Nations' (UN) "stance" in civil conflicts affects war duration. Moving beyond the common assumption of institutional neutrality, this research introduces a key conceptual distinction: while traditional "bias" is often viewed as an a priori favoritism rooted in external interests, "stance" represents a purposive, reactive, and asymmetric pressure intentionally imposed by the UN as an independent political agent after observing battlefield behavior. Rather than focusing on the subjective perceptions of local actors, this research analyzes "stance" as a conscious strategic choice manifested in UN Security Council resolutions. The paper argues that neutral peacekeeping is more effective at shortening conflicts than any non-neutral intervention. The proposed mechanism is that neutrality facilitates conflict termination by allowing the UN to serve as a credible informational and relational mediator. In contrast, the imposition of asymmetric pressure, regardless of its normative motivation, tends to disrupt strategic balances and impede communication between belligerents. Using a Cox proportional hazards model on 210 civil conflicts (1946-2015), the empirical results strongly support this hypothesis: neutral UN involvement is significantly associated with shorter conflict duration. Conversely, the intentional adoption of a "stance" that is inclined toward the state or inclined toward rebels generally tends to prolong the conflict.