Supplement to: 'Foundations for Cooperation in the Prisoners’ Dilemma'

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2014-05-07

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Abstract

We establish that in the Prisoners’ Dilemma, the model of Daley and Sadowski (2014) is logically distinct from three models that employ well-known forms of other regarding preferences: altruism (Ledyard, 1995; Levine, 1998), inequity aversion (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999), and reciprocity (Rabin, 1993). The paper "Foundations for Cooperation in the Prisoners’ Dilemma" to which this Supplement applies is available at the following URL: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2331579

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