Supplement to: 'Foundations for Cooperation in the Prisoners’ Dilemma'
| dc.contributor.author | Daley, B | |
| dc.contributor.author | Sadowski, P | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2016-12-01T18:37:13Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2014-05-07 | |
| dc.description.abstract | We establish that in the Prisoners’ Dilemma, the model of Daley and Sadowski (2014) is logically distinct from three models that employ well-known forms of other regarding preferences: altruism (Ledyard, 1995; Levine, 1998), inequity aversion (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999), and reciprocity (Rabin, 1993). The paper "Foundations for Cooperation in the Prisoners’ Dilemma" to which this Supplement applies is available at the following URL: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2331579 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | ||
| dc.relation.ispartof | Economic Research Initiatives at Duke (ERID) Working Paper | |
| dc.title | Supplement to: 'Foundations for Cooperation in the Prisoners’ Dilemma' | |
| dc.type | Journal article | |
| pubs.issue | 155 | |
| pubs.notes | Source info: Economic Research Initiatives at Duke (ERID) Working Paper No. 155 | |
| pubs.organisational-group | Duke | |
| pubs.organisational-group | Economics | |
| pubs.organisational-group | Fuqua School of Business | |
| pubs.organisational-group | Trinity College of Arts & Sciences |