Learning from Incredible Commitments: Evolution and Impact of Bilateral Investment Treaties

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Date

2016

Authors

Minhas, Shahryar Farooq

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Ward, Michael D
Remmer, Karen

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Abstract

Ostensibly, BITs are the ideal international treaty. First, until just recently, they almost uniformly came with explicit dispute resolution mechanisms through which countries could face real costs for violation (Montt 2009). Second, the signing, ratification, and violation of them are easily accessible public knowledge. Thus countries presumably would face reputational costs for violating these agreements. Yet, these compliance devices have not dissuaded states from violating these agreements. Even more interestingly, in recent years, both developed and developing countries have moved towards modifying the investor-friendly provisions of these agreements. These deviations from the expectations of the credible commitment argument raise important questions about the field's assumptions regarding the ability of international treaties with commitment devices to effectively constrain state behavior.

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Citation

Minhas, Shahryar Farooq (2016). Learning from Incredible Commitments: Evolution and Impact of Bilateral Investment Treaties. Dissertation, Duke University. Retrieved from https://hdl.handle.net/10161/12238.

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