Supplement to a Strategic Model of Magical Thinking: Axioms and Analysis

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2014-09-26

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Abstract

We establish that in the Prisoners' Dilemma, the model of Daley and Sadowski (2014) is logically distinct from three models that employ well-known forms of other-regarding preferences: altruism (Ledyard, 1995; Levine, 1998), inequity aversion (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999), and reciprocity (Rabin, 1993). The paper "A Strategic Model of Magical Thinking: Axioms and Analysis" to which this supplement applies is available at the following URL: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2507377

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Prisoners' dilemma, coordination games, magical thinking, cooperation

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