Supplement to a Strategic Model of Magical Thinking: Axioms and Analysis

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Sadowski, P

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Daley, B

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2016-12-01T18:47:06Z

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2014-09-26

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We establish that in the Prisoners' Dilemma, the model of Daley and Sadowski (2014) is logically distinct from three models that employ well-known forms of other-regarding preferences: altruism (Ledyard, 1995; Levine, 1998), inequity aversion (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999), and reciprocity (Rabin, 1993). The paper "A Strategic Model of Magical Thinking: Axioms and Analysis" to which this supplement applies is available at the following URL: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2507377

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https://hdl.handle.net/10161/13083

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Economic Research Initiatives at Duke (ERID) Working Paper

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Prisoners' dilemma

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coordination games

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magical thinking

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cooperation

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Supplement to a Strategic Model of Magical Thinking: Axioms and Analysis

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Journal article

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174

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Source info: Economic Research Initiatives at Duke (ERID) Working Paper No. 174

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Duke

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Economics

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Fuqua School of Business

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Trinity College of Arts & Sciences

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