Monopoly Money: Foreign Investment and Bribery in Vietnam, a Survey Experiment

Malesky, EJ

Gueorguiev, DD

Jensen, NM

2018-12-10T03:37:39Z

2018-12-10T03:37:39Z

2015-02

2018-12-10T03:37:39Z

©2014, Midwest Political Science Association. Prevailing work argues that foreign investment reduces corruption, either by competing down monopoly rents or diffusing best practices of corporate governance. We argue that the mechanisms generating this relationship are not clear because the extant empirical work is too heavily drawn from aggregations of total foreign investment entering an economy. Alternatively, we suggest that openness to foreign investment has differential effects on corruption even within the same country and under the same domestic institutions over time. We argue that foreign firms use bribes to enter protected industries in search of rents, and therefore we expect variation in bribe propensity across sectors according to expected profitability. We test this effect using a list experiment embedded in three waves of a nationally representative survey of 20,000 foreign and domestic businesses in Vietnam, finding that the effect of economic openness on the probability to engage in bribes is conditional on policies that restrict investment.

0092-5853

1540-5907

https://hdl.handle.net/10161/17733

English

Wiley

American Journal of Political Science

10.1111/ajps.12126

Corruption

Bribery

Rents

Foreign Direct Investment

Multi-National Corporations

World Trade

Organization

Restrictions

List Question

FDI

MNC

UCT

WTO

Monopoly Money: Foreign Investment and Bribery in Vietnam, a Survey Experiment

Journal article

Malesky, EJ|0000-0001-5737-9195

419

439

2

Trinity College of Arts & Sciences

Duke

Political Science

Published

59