Rousseau and the Role of Pity in Shaping Political Society

Abstract

Allan Bloom observes that the “Enlightenment wished to convert the selfishness of man in the state of nature into the enlightened self-interest of man capable of joining civil society.” Amidst this backdrop of philosophers championing self-interest as man’s only true desire and reason as man’s most effective moral tool, Rousseau emerges as their greatest contrarian. Rousseau is adamant that there is not one but two principles of nature: self-preservation and pity. These two principles work together in tandem for the benefit of mankind. Pity is what naturally restrains us from unduly harming each other in the pursuit of our individual desires—it is what makes men more than “monsters.” According to Rousseau, there was a de facto state of equality in nature, and the moral problems of society are actually the result of the interplay between reason and self-interest which make men establish and crave artificial inequalities (like wealth and power). In the Social Contract, Rousseau argues that well-ordered societies are those that tend to the general will, which refers to the collective desires of the state, or the body politic. The general will exists on account of the social pact in which each member of state has equal sovereignty. Although Rousseau does not make explicit mention of pity in the Social Contract, this paper examines the literature more wholistically in order to draw connections between pity and the general will. These connections point to how pity should be considered more seriously as a moral and social tool to remedy society. Whereas the history of Western philosophy tends to focus on self-interest and individualism, Rousseau’s emphasis on pity and the general will presents a fruitful avenue of exploration for those looking for alternative (and more collectively-oriented) solutions.