The Adverse Effects of Sunshine: A Field Experiment on Legislative Transparency in an Authoritarian Assembly

dc.contributor.author

Malesky, EJ

dc.contributor.author

Schuler, P

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Tran, A

dc.date.accessioned

2018-12-10T04:02:01Z

dc.date.available

2018-12-10T04:02:01Z

dc.date.issued

2012-11

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2018-12-10T04:02:00Z

dc.description.abstract

An influential literature has demonstrated that legislative transparency can improve the performance of parliamentarians in democracies. In a democracy, the incentive for improved performance is created by voters' responses to newly available information. Building on this work, donor projects have begun to export transparency interventions to authoritarian regimes under the assumption that nongovernmental organizations and the media can substitute for the incentives created by voters. Such interventions, however, are at odds with an emerging literature that argues that authoritarian parliaments primarily serve the role of co-optation and limited power sharing, where complaints can be raised in a manner that does not threaten regime stability. We argue that under these conditions, transparency may have perverse effects, and we test this theory with a randomized experiment on delegate behavior in query sessions in Vietnam, a single-party authoritarian regime. We find no evidence of a direct effect of the transparency treatment on delegate performance; however, further analysis reveals that delegates subjected to high treatment intensity demonstrate robust evidence of curtailed participation and damaged reelection prospects. These results make us cautious about the export of transparency without electoral sanctioning. © 2012 American Political Science Association.

dc.identifier.issn

0003-0554

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1537-5943

dc.identifier.uri

https://hdl.handle.net/10161/17753

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Cambridge University Press (CUP)

dc.relation.ispartof

American Political Science Review

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10.1017/S0003055412000408

dc.subject

Transparency

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Authoritarian Institutions

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Parliament

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Legislature

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Experiment

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Randomized

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Field Trial

dc.title

The Adverse Effects of Sunshine: A Field Experiment on Legislative Transparency in an Authoritarian Assembly

dc.type

Journal article

duke.contributor.orcid

Malesky, EJ|0000-0001-5737-9195

pubs.begin-page

762

pubs.end-page

786

pubs.issue

04

pubs.organisational-group

Trinity College of Arts & Sciences

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Duke

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Political Science

pubs.publication-status

Published

pubs.volume

106

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