Essays on Microeconomic Theory and Matching

Abstract

This dissertation consists of three essays on microeconomic theory and matching markets. The first essay studies a career concerns game with voluntary information disclosure. It characterizes the optimal disclosure rule in equilibrium and analyzes its impact on the incentive to invest in ability at the first stage.The second essay, co-authored with Atila Abdulkadiroğlu and Adam Rosen, introduces an econometric model of rank-order choice with latent consideration sets. We provide sufficient conditions for the point identification of both the consideration set formation process and random utility parameters. Furthermore, we propose two estimators based on ranking probabilities, which demonstrate favorable performance in Monte Carlo simulations.The third essay investigates how a social planner can allocate subsidies in a budget-constrained matching market under incomplete information. We fully characterize robust subsidy policies that can improve aggregate welfare relative to the observed outcome. Rather than eliciting preferences, our approach infers the underlying information structure from observed outcomes to identify these robust policies, offering a novel method for addressing informational constraints.