Institutionalized Rent Seeking: The Political-business Revolving Door in China
| dc.contributor.advisor | Malesky, Edmund J | |
| dc.contributor.advisor | Manion, Melanie Frances | |
| dc.contributor.author | Li, Zeren | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2021-09-14T15:08:56Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2022-09-13T08:17:16Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2021 | |
| dc.department | Political Science | |
| dc.description.abstract | Scholars contend that in a weak institutional context, firms enter the political marketplace primarily through bribery or entrepreneurs running for public office. My dissertation challenges this conventional understanding by arguing that revolving-door channels have become a prevalent means of rent-seeking when within-government career opportunities are rare for public officials and the private sector is profitable. This dissertation proposes a theoretical framework for understanding the emergence of revolving-door officials in authoritarian regimes and tests this framework through a rigorous inquiry of firms in China. The three papers that constitute this work analyze the pattern, formation, and economic outcome of hiring revolving-door officials. I show the distortionary impact of post-government career concerns on public resource allocation, a mixed revolving-door recruitment strategy adopted by firms seeking both political power and regulatory expertise, and the salient signaling effect of revolving-door connections on financial investors. | |
| dc.identifier.uri | ||
| dc.subject | Political science | |
| dc.subject | Authoritarianism | |
| dc.subject | Corruption | |
| dc.subject | Political economy | |
| dc.subject | state-business relations | |
| dc.title | Institutionalized Rent Seeking: The Political-business Revolving Door in China | |
| dc.type | Dissertation | |
| duke.embargo.months | 11.934246575342465 |