Words Arranged Thesiswise (A Defense of Mereological Nihilism)

dc.contributor.advisor

van Inwagen, Peter

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Shenot, Julia

dc.date.accessioned

2023-05-02T21:44:20Z

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2023-05-02T21:44:20Z

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2023-04-24

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Philosophy

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As part of what may be called our common sense, intuition, universal belief, or folk ontology, we hold certain ordinary objects like chairs, ships, and ourselves to exist. Some potential objects, on the other hand, do not exist. What is our rule for determining when parts compose a whole? Any common-sensical restricted mereological theory introduces various metaphysical problems, especially those surrounding vagueness and causal redundancy. The best solution to these problems is adopting mereological nihilism. Nihilism asserts that only simples, or partless objects, exist and ordinary objects are nothing more than arrangements of simples. It is coherent with our folk ontology, which is correct in the ordinary sense but untrue in the fundamental sense. Nihilism simplifies metaphysics in various ways and solves many problems and paradoxes surrounding ordinary objects. Nihilism’s biggest philosophical problem is that it entails that humans and organisms don’t exist (at least if they are material objects), and we generally take our own existence as knowable a priori. Organicism holds that organisms are the only composite objects and may be an attractive alternative, but nihilism remains plausible.

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https://hdl.handle.net/10161/27325

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en_US

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Metaphysics

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mereology

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ontology

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materialism

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Words Arranged Thesiswise (A Defense of Mereological Nihilism)

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Honors thesis

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