Ties that Bind: Connections, Institutions and Economics in the People’s Republic of China

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2019

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Abstract

This dissertation will contend that China’s paramount leader, the General Secretary,

in order to compete with rival elites, in the face of strong institutional constraints

and limitations upon how they can engage in that competition, manipulates the

distribution of state fiscal resources to benefit their political clients in the provinces.

This newly empowered client network aid their political survival in office and is

constitutive of their political influence both while in office and after they have left it.

Specifically, the dissertation expects that the General Secretary will direct greater

amounts of intergovernmental transfers into provinces which are run by their political

clients. More narrowly, it expects that the effect will be found only for specific-

purpose transfers, which are largely under the discretion of the incumbent General

Secretary, and will not be found for general-purpose transfers, the allocation of which

is less subject to political manipulation by the incumbent. These transfers, in turn,

generate additional taxable economic activity in the provinces into which they are

directed. This augmented taxable economic activity leads to increased collection of

fiscal revenue in the provinces of incumbent clients. This, in turn, makes these clients

more promising candidates for future advancement within the party, because fiscal

revenue collection is a core metric for the advancement of elites at the provincial level,

as adjudicated by the CCP’s organization department. Consequently, incumbent

General Secretaries are able to push forward the careers of their provincial clients,

and thus advance their own political interests, through systematic favoritism in their

ivdistribution of specific purpose intergovernmental transfers. Importantly, one of the

key theoretical results of this work is the finding that Chinese central leaders are

institutionally constrained to make their clients measure up and that the artificial

augmentation of the provincial fiscal revenues of clients are a key means by which they

ensure that their clients ”make the grade” in the eyes of the organization department.

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Kearney, David (2019). Ties that Bind: Connections, Institutions and Economics in the People’s Republic of China. Dissertation, Duke University. Retrieved from https://hdl.handle.net/10161/18655.

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