Ties that Bind: Connections, Institutions and Economics in the People’s Republic of China
| dc.contributor.advisor | Malesky, Edmund J | |
| dc.contributor.author | Kearney, David | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2019-06-07T19:48:03Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2020-05-21T08:17:12Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2019 | |
| dc.department | Political Science | |
| dc.description.abstract | This dissertation will contend that China’s paramount leader, the General Secretary, in order to compete with rival elites, in the face of strong institutional constraints and limitations upon how they can engage in that competition, manipulates the distribution of state fiscal resources to benefit their political clients in the provinces. This newly empowered client network aid their political survival in office and is constitutive of their political influence both while in office and after they have left it. Specifically, the dissertation expects that the General Secretary will direct greater amounts of intergovernmental transfers into provinces which are run by their political clients. More narrowly, it expects that the effect will be found only for specific- purpose transfers, which are largely under the discretion of the incumbent General Secretary, and will not be found for general-purpose transfers, the allocation of which is less subject to political manipulation by the incumbent. These transfers, in turn, generate additional taxable economic activity in the provinces into which they are directed. This augmented taxable economic activity leads to increased collection of fiscal revenue in the provinces of incumbent clients. This, in turn, makes these clients more promising candidates for future advancement within the party, because fiscal revenue collection is a core metric for the advancement of elites at the provincial level, as adjudicated by the CCP’s organization department. Consequently, incumbent General Secretaries are able to push forward the careers of their provincial clients, and thus advance their own political interests, through systematic favoritism in their ivdistribution of specific purpose intergovernmental transfers. Importantly, one of the key theoretical results of this work is the finding that Chinese central leaders are institutionally constrained to make their clients measure up and that the artificial augmentation of the provincial fiscal revenues of clients are a key means by which they ensure that their clients ”make the grade” in the eyes of the organization department. | |
| dc.identifier.uri | ||
| dc.subject | Political science | |
| dc.subject | China | |
| dc.subject | Intergovernmental Transfers | |
| dc.subject | Political economy | |
| dc.subject | Public finance | |
| dc.title | Ties that Bind: Connections, Institutions and Economics in the People’s Republic of China | |
| dc.type | Dissertation | |
| duke.embargo.months | 11 |
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