Party and Policy in Lineland: A Theory of Conditional Party Cartels

Abstract

We have two goals in this paper. First, we provide a unified account of several prominent institutional theories of the Congress, but especially present a model that is consistent with both the Cox-McCubbins theory of party cartels (2005; 2007) and the Aldrich-Rohde theory of conditional party government (1997; 2000; Aldrich, 2011; Rohde, 1991). We hope to demonstrate that, while these two theories might have developed independently, together they offer a unified account. Second, we develop a model of elections that includes party provision of campaign resources to provide electoral incentives for Members of Congress to vote on the floor for special rules that reflect positions away from their district median and towards the median of their party in the chamber. In this way we offer a theory that includes specific internal and external accounts to explain a wider array of MC behavior on the floor and in elections.