The ranking of alternative tariff and quota policies in the presence of domestic monopoly
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1977-01-01
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Bhagwati demonstrated the nonequivalence between tariffs and quotas in the presence of monopoly. This paper also assumes domestic production to be monopolized and shows that giving import licenses or tariff revenues to the domestic producer may raise or lower the welfare cost of protection and the price paid by consumers from the price under other tariff and quota arrangements which maintain the same market share for the domestic producer. However, if the monopolist realizes that commercial policy is an instrument used to maximize the policymaker's welfare function, instead of being a goal in itself, the equivalence of tariffs and quotas re-emerges. © 1977.
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Sweeney, RJ, E Tower and TD Willett (1977). The ranking of alternative tariff and quota policies in the presence of domestic monopoly. Journal of International Economics, 7(4). pp. 349–362. 10.1016/0022-1996(77)90052-6 Retrieved from https://hdl.handle.net/10161/1960.
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Edward Tower
Professor Tower specializes in finance, computable general equilibrium modeling, macroeconomics, development economics, microeconomics, and managerial economics. He conducts a majority of his research within the study of trade and development, exploring a variety of variables from tariffs, quotas, and time zone arbitrage, to equities, mutual funds, and index mutual funds. Since he began publishing his work in 1965, he has contributed over 130 articles to leading academic journals and has had several books, chapters, and papers appear in print. Some of his more recent writings include, “School Choice: Money, Race, and Congressional Voting on Vouchers,” completed in collaboration with O. Gokcekus and J. Phillips; “Rational Pessimism: Predicting Equity Returns by Tobin’s q and Price/Earnings Ratio” with M. Harney; and “Predicting Equity Returns for 37 Countries: Tweaking the Gordon Formula” with K. Reinker. Much of his work pertaining to U.S. trade policy has been used to determine congressional voting on protectionist issues based on campaign contributions. His work on financial issues has also played an important role in determining the value of the U.S. stock market. His latest studies involved an investigation of congressional voting on importation of ethical drugs and predicting returns on both foreign and U.S. equity.
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