Public Opinion and Congressional Responsiveness in Policy Making

Abstract

Many factors affect responsiveness of elected policy makers to public opinion. While a full understanding of this topic is not possible without decades of careful research, this dissertation examines a few important areas. In particular, I look at the effects of party competition on legislator responsiveness, the dynamics of interest group politics and the ability of some voters to obtain disproportionate representation, and the nuances of how to interpret public opinion itself for a specific policy.The first two chapters, on party competition and interest groups, make use of secondary data generated by the government, other scholars, and various relevant organizations. The chapters employ data on the behaviors and characteristics of members of Congress, election results, campaign finance data, and population and demographic information. Using appropriate econometric models, I find in chapter 1 that significant competition between the two major parties does serve to increase responsiveness to the public at the level of the individual legislator, with effects at the aggregate level being somewhat weaker. In recent years, it is difficult to estimate these effects because of the generally high levels of party competition and low variance across district.Using similar data and methods, the exploratory analysis in chapter 2 suggests a relationship between unorganized groups of voters and the positions their elected officials take, independent of party, district average public opinion, and organized interest group contributions. The results also suggest that context matters a great deal in determining which groups will be influential.Chapter 3 examines the nature of public opinion itself, using the Affordable Care Act as a case study. I conducted a survey experiment to assess how the distribution of opinions on the Affordable Care Act might change in response to priming different design features of the law. My findings indicate that opinion on the ACA is malleable and depends on what pieces of the law people think about at the time of response. In the real world, this implies that which parts of the ACA are highlighted and how it is discussed publicly will affect its future. Policy pork, as defined in the chapter, can build up support, but wedge provisions in the law can serve to entrench the opposition further. These implications can also be applied to other complex, highly visible reform bills.A final concluding chapter attempts to apply these findings, as well as other political science research, to the case of the Medicare Access and CHIP Reauthorization Act (MACRA). Based on my assessment of the political context of this act, which was hailed as a permanent resolution to a longstanding debate over Medicare provider payments, I argue that the debate is not actually over, and that group interests, the design of the law, and broader contextual factors will ensure the debate continues.