Social pressure, transparency, and voting in committees
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2019-09
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Name-Correa, AJ, and H Yildirim (2019). Social pressure, transparency, and voting in committees. Journal of Economic Theory. pp. 104943–104943. 10.1016/j.jet.2019.104943 Retrieved from https://hdl.handle.net/10161/19355.
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Huseyin Yildirim
Professor Yildirim joined Duke Economics in 2000 after receiving a Ph.D. from the University of Florida. He is an applied microeconomic theorist with broad interests. He has written on such varied topics as dynamic procurement auctions, charitable fundraising, committee design, and, most recently, career concerns in teamwork and tournaments. His work has appeared in top economics journals, including American Economic Review, Review of Economic Studies, Journal of Economic Theory, and RAND Journal of Economics.
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