Synthesizing Theories of Authoritarian Elections: A Game-Free Analysis

Loading...

Date

2025-09-01

Journal Title

Journal ISSN

Volume Title

Citation Stats

Attention Stats

Abstract

Authoritarian regimes adopt ostensibly democratic institutions for undemocratic purposes. Existing research emphasizes five different functions of elections under authoritarianism, driven by idiosyncratic assumptions about the type of dictator and the structure of information. In this paper, we connect the different functions through a three-actor “game-free” model where all aspects of the regime are determined endogenously, assuming only that elections can reveal new information. Signaling, information acquisition, power-sharing, cooptation, and peaceful exit all emerge as special cases in our model. The framework also integrates the two goals of authoritarian power-sharing with other elites and authoritarian control of citizens. We illustrate the model with examples of elections and non-elections in Brunei, Singapore, USSR, Romania, Mexico, and Benin.

Department

Description

Provenance

Subjects

authoritarian politics, elections, game theory

Citation

Published Version (Please cite this version)

10.1177/00104140241302708

Publication Info

Leventoğlu, B, EJ Malesky and T Wen (2025). Synthesizing Theories of Authoritarian Elections: A Game-Free Analysis. Comparative Political Studies, 58(11). pp. 2359–2400. 10.1177/00104140241302708 Retrieved from https://hdl.handle.net/10161/34670.

This is constructed from limited available data and may be imprecise. To cite this article, please review & use the official citation provided by the journal.

Scholars@Duke

Malesky

Edmund Malesky

Oscar L. Tang Family Distinguished Professor of Political Science

Malesky is a specialist on Southeast Asia, particularly Vietnam. Currently, Malesky's research agenda is very much at the intersection of Comparative and International Political Economy, falling into three major categories: 1) Authoritarian political institutions and their consequences; 2) The political influence of foreign direct investment and multinational corporations; and 3) Political institutions, private business development, and formalization.


Unless otherwise indicated, scholarly articles published by Duke faculty members are made available here with a CC-BY-NC (Creative Commons Attribution Non-Commercial) license, as enabled by the Duke Open Access Policy. If you wish to use the materials in ways not already permitted under CC-BY-NC, please consult the copyright owner. Other materials are made available here through the author’s grant of a non-exclusive license to make their work openly accessible.