Uniqueness in symmetric first-price auctions with affiliation
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2007-09-01
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The first-price auction has a unique monotone pure strategy equilibrium when there are n symmetric risk-averse bidders having affiliated types and interdependent values. © 2006 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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McAdams, D (2007). Uniqueness in symmetric first-price auctions with affiliation. Journal of Economic Theory, 136(1). pp. 144–166. 10.1016/j.jet.2006.07.002 Retrieved from https://hdl.handle.net/10161/1941.
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David McAdams
David McAdams is Professor of Business Administration at the Fuqua School of Business, Duke University. He is also Professor of Economics in the Economics Department at Duke. He earned a B.S. in Applied Mathematics at Harvard University, an M.S. in Statistics from Stanford University, and a Ph.D. in Business from the Stanford Graduate School of Business. Before joining the faculty at Duke, he was Associate Professor of Applied Economics at the MIT Sloan School of Management. He has also worked as Special Assistant to the Director, Bureau of Economics, Federal Trade Commission.
Professor McAdams' primary research interests are microeconomic theory and game theory, with a special focus on strategic interactions between buyers and sellers, including auctions, pricing, negotiations, and relationships. His work has been published in the leading journals of economics, including Econometrica, American Economic Review, Review of Economic Studies, Journal of Political Economy, Journal of Economic Theory, and Journal of Econometrics. Currently, he is an associate editor of Journal of Economic Literature, International Journal of Industrial Organization, and International Journal of Game Theory.
Professor McAdams is author of "Game-Changer: Game Theory and the Art of Transforming Strategic Situations" (W.W. Norton, 2014).
Professor McAdams teaches the economics elective "Game Theory for Strategic Advantage" in the Daytime MBA program at Fuqua, as well as the PhD elective "Market Design I: Auctions" in the Economics Department.
Professor McAdams' consulting work focuses on two areas: (i) “market design / bidding strategy consulting” for those designing or participating in an auction market (e.g. FCC spectrum auctions, electricity procurement auctions, B2B exchanges); and (ii) “game-theory consulting” for firms (from startup to Fortune 50) facing mission-critical strategic challenges or opportunities.
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