The Economics of Breakdowns, Checkups, and Cures
| dc.contributor.author | Taylor, Curtis R | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2010-03-09T15:37:36Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2010-03-09T15:37:36Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 1995 | |
| dc.description.abstract | A market in which the owner of a durable good, X, contracts with an expert for diagnostic and treatment services is studied. Good X may be in one of three states: health, disease, or failure. Only experts can determine whether X is healthy or diseased and perform treatment. The owner cannot tell whether recommended treatment is really needed. This creates an information-based demand for health insurance by risk-neutral consumers. Imperfections in the market for spot insurance may give rise to free diagnostic checks, strategic procrastination, and long-term health maintenance agreements. Copyright 1995 by University of Chicago Press. | |
| dc.format.extent | 1956354 bytes | |
| dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | |
| dc.identifier.uri | ||
| dc.language.iso | en_US | |
| dc.publisher | Journal of Political Economy | |
| dc.subject | Breakdowns | |
| dc.subject | Checkups | |
| dc.subject | Cures | |
| dc.title | The Economics of Breakdowns, Checkups, and Cures | |
| dc.type | Journal article |
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