Great apes distinguish true from false beliefs in an interactive helping task.

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2017

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Abstract

Understanding the behavior of others in a wide variety of circumstances requires an understanding of their psychological states. Humans' nearest primate relatives, the great apes, understand many psychological states of others, for example, perceptions, goals, and desires. However, so far there is little evidence that they possess the key marker of advanced human social cognition: an understanding of false beliefs. Here we demonstrate that in a nonverbal (implicit) false-belief test which is passed by human 1-year-old infants, great apes as a group, including chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes), bonobos (Pan paniscus), and orangutans (Pongo abelii), distinguish between true and false beliefs in their helping behavior. Great apes thus may possess at least some basic understanding that an agent's actions are based on her beliefs about reality. Hence, such understanding might not be the exclusive province of the human species.

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Published Version (Please cite this version)

10.1371/journal.pone.0173793

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Buttelmann, David, Frances Buttelmann, Malinda Carpenter, Josep Call and Michael Tomasello (2017). Great apes distinguish true from false beliefs in an interactive helping task. PLoS One, 12(4). p. e0173793. 10.1371/journal.pone.0173793 Retrieved from https://hdl.handle.net/10161/14224.

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Tomasello

Michael Tomasello

James F. Bonk Distinguished Professor

Major research interests in processes of social cognition, social learning, cooperation, and communication from developmental, comparative, and cultural perspectives. Current theoretical focus on processes of shared intentionality. Empirical research mainly with human children from 1 to 4 years of age and great apes.


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