

**Evaluating the Differential Effects of Alternative Welfare-to-Work Training Components:
A Re-Analysis of the California GAIN Program***

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Abstract

In this paper, we propose and implement non-experimental matching/regression-adjustment methods in an attempt to isolate one of the potentially important reasons for across-program differences in training effects, namely that programs differ in the mix in and assignment of different types of training to the participants in its programs. The latter source of treatment heterogeneity and its potential consequences for across-program differences in training effects has been noted by Hotz, Imbens and Mortimer (2005) and others who have evaluated the effectiveness of training programs. We show how non-experimental matching and/or regression-adjustment methods can be used to estimate such differential effects and how data for a control group generated by random assignment can be used to partially assess the validity of such methods. Substantively, we use these methods and tests to re-analyze data from the MDRC Evaluation of California's welfare-to-work program in the 1990s, namely the Greater Avenues to Independence (GAIN) program. This experimental Evaluation found that, compared to other counties that stressed Human Capital Development (HCD) training strategies, Riverside county's GAIN program, which stressed getting program participants into jobs quickly through a Labor Force Attachment (LFA) training strategy, had relatively larger effects on post-random assignment employment, labor market earnings, and welfare participation. We apply matching/regression-adjustment methods and implement the partial tests of these methods noted above to these data to directly assess the short- and long-term differential impacts of these two training strategies and, thus, previous conclusions about the reasons for the success of the Riverside GAIN program.

1. Introduction

This paper has two objectives. First, it seeks to explore non-experimental evaluation methods that exploit experimental and non-experimental methods for evaluating the differential effects of alternative components of training programs. In a recent paper, Hotz, Imbens and Mortimer (2005) investigate the problem of predicting the average effect of a new training program using experiences from previous program implementations. For example, state or local policy makers may be contemplating the implementation of a job training program and seek to use information on the effectiveness of other programs, conducted in different time-periods and /or locations, to assess the likely impacts of such programs in their locality with its prevailing populations and economic conditions. As these authors note, addressing this prediction question amounts to sorting out the sources of differences in the variation of average treatment effects across programs and/or localities. They examine two distinct sources of difference: (a) distributions of characteristics of the populations of participants in different programs/locations may differ and (b) programs, while nominally the same (e.g., welfare-to-work programs), may differ in the training components they employ.

Hotz, Imbens and Mortimer (2005) analyze data from random assignment evaluations of job training programs conducted during the 1980s on Work INcentives (WIN) welfare-to-work programs in several states. They use non-experimental matching and propensity score methods to assess the extent to which the above sources of differences contribute to the differences in estimates of average treatment effects across programs/localities. Two important findings emerge. First, matching on, or controlling for differences in, personal characteristics and pre-random assignment outcomes eliminates the differences in post-random assignment outcomes across the (experimentally-generated) control groups across any two programs/localities. That is, non-ex-

perimental matching methods appear to adequately account for the differences in program populations across programs when estimating average treatment effects. Second, Hotz, Imbens and Mortimer (2005) find that substantial differences across programs/localities in the post-random assignment outcomes of trainees remain, even after matching was employed. That is, it appears that the second source of potential differences in treatment effects across localities, i.e., program heterogeneity, exist in the WIN data.

That the welfare-to-work programs analyzed in Hotz, Imbens and Mortimer (2005) appear to differ in their program components is neither surprising nor a new finding.¹ Since the 1970s, if not before, state and, in some cases, local program administrators have varied their welfare-to-work programs to account for factors such as the characteristics of their disadvantaged populations, their local labor markets and political considerations.² As Grogger and Karoly (2005) note, the recent trend in the design of Welfare-to-Work programs at the state and local levels is towards greater program heterogeneity as policy makers implement a variety of different program components—e.g., job search, vocational training, on-the-job training as well as combining these training components with different financial incentives, case management strategies, etc.—to reach its goals of encouraging work and reducing dependence on welfare. Such designs give rise to program heterogeneity across locations.

Despite these trends, most of the empirical training and evaluation methods literatures have focused on estimating the effect of receiving of any training services on the outcomes of trainees, rather than on the estimation of differential effects of program components.³ The focus

¹ Dehejia (2003) considers this issue, using a version of the data employed in this paper.

² See Mitnik (2004a) for a political economy model of how program administrators assign potential trainees to alternative treatment components for welfare-to-work programs. Also see Heckman, Heinrich, and Smith (2002) who consider the role of performance standards on training program enrollment decisions.

³ An important exception in the use of an experimental design in the analysis of the differential effects of alternative types of training in three sites of the National Evaluation of Welfare-to-Work Strategies (NEWWS) which will be

on the former is understandable for a number of reasons. With respect to using experimental designs, random assignment of subjects to alternative treatments is more intrusive to the operation of on-going programs, is more difficult to implement, and can increase the likelihood of subjects dropping out and/or “crossing over” to other training programs they were denied when they are (randomly) assigned to a treatment they do not want or find suitable. With respect to the use of non-experimental designs, estimating differential effects of alternative treatments typically requires the maintenance of stronger assumptions which may not hold in particular applications and are, in general, not testable.⁴

In this paper, we explore ways of combining experimental data and non-experimental methods to estimate the differential effects of components of training programs. In particular, we show how data from a multi-site experimental evaluation in which subjects are randomly assigned to any treatment versus a control group who receives none can be combined with non-experimental matching and regression methods to estimate the differential effects of particular types of training programs, where the latter vary across sites and across subjects within a site who were randomly assigned at different points in time. As we discuss below, the availability of these experimental data allow us to test, in part, the plausibility of our matching/regression methods for eliminating selection biases that result from non-random assignment of program components to trainees in the various sites. The use of strategies for adjusting for background and pre-program variables, including matching, and validating these methods by using data for experimentally-generated control groups is similar in spirit to the approaches taken in Lalonde

discussed below. Also see Lechner (2002), who examines the differential effects of alternative labor market and training policies using (non-experimental) propensity score matching methods, and Mitnik (2004b), who also uses non-experimental methods to estimate the differential effects of treatment components of welfare-to-work programs in California.

⁴ Imbens (2000) and Lechner (2001) characterize the assumptions required for the validity of using matching methods for estimating multiple treatment effects.

(1986), Heckman and Hotz (1989), Friedlander and Robins, (1995), and Heckman, Ichimura, and Todd (1997, 1998a, 1998b), and Dehejia and Wahba (1999).

The second objective of this paper is to use the above approach to re-examine data from the Evaluation of California's Greater Avenues to Independence (GAIN) welfare-to-work program conducted in the 1980s and 1990s by the Manpower Development Research Corporation (MDRC). Over the last three decades, as the United States has sought to reform its welfare system, states have sought to design their mandated welfare-to-work programs in order to reduce dependency on welfare and promote work among disadvantaged households. Over this period, states differed in the components, or approach, they emphasized in these programs.

One approach, the "Human Capital Development" (HCD) approach, emphasizes education and vocational training programs, such as GED and English as Second Language (ESL) programs and vocational training in the health care industry. The HCD approach seeks to improve the basic and job-related skills of welfare recipients. Advocates of this approach argue that acquiring such skills are necessary for adults on welfare to "get a job, especially one that is relatively stable, pays enough to support their children and leaves them less vulnerable during an economic downturn."⁵

The other primary approach used in designing welfare-to-work programs is the "Labor Force Attachment" (LFA), such as job clubs, which teaches welfare recipients how to prepare résumés and interview for jobs, and assistance in finding jobs. The LFA approach seeks to move adults on welfare quickly into jobs, even if they are low paying jobs. Supporters of the LFA approach "see work as the most direct route to ending ... the negative effects of welfare on families

⁵ Gueron and Hamilton (2002).

and children.”⁶ The advocates of the LFA approach also argue that it is a better than the formal classroom training stressed in the HCD approach to build the skills of most low-skilled adults.

While many welfare-to-work programs have and continue to use a mixture of these approaches, a key issue was the relative impacts of the LFA and HCD approaches. The MDRC GAIN Evaluation was one of the first most influential evaluations that shed light on the impacts of these two approaches. Welfare recipients in six California counties were randomly assigned to either a “treatment” group that was to receive services in a county based and designed “welfare-to-work” program, or to a “control” group to which these services were denied. Under the GAIN program, California’s counties had considerable discretion designing their welfare-to-work programs and what services program participants received. Thus, the MDRC study conducted separate evaluations of the programs run by and populations served in each of their sample counties.

Based on an analysis of data for a three-year follow-up period, MDRC found that the largest effects on participants were for Riverside County’s GAIN program. Among female heads of households on Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) in Riverside’s GAIN program, the number of quarters in which recipients worked were 63 percent higher than those for the control group, and trainees’ labor market earnings were 63 percent higher over the three-year evaluation period. Riverside County’s GAIN program emphasized the LFA approach with tightly focused job search assistance, as well as providing participants with the consistent message “that employment is central and should be sought expeditiously and that opportunities to obtain low-paying jobs should not be turned down.”⁷ In contrast, the GAIN participants in the three largest of the other counties in the MDRC Evaluation (Alameda, Los Angeles and San Diego counties), which placed much greater emphasis on HDC, only experienced a 21 percent increase in quarters

⁶ Gueron and Hamilton (2002).

⁷ Hogan (1995).

of work and a 23 percent increase in earnings relative to the outcomes for the control group members in these counties. The LFA, or “work-first,” approach of Riverside received national (and international) acclaim for its success⁸ and has become the model for welfare-to-work programs across the nation. While the MDRC researchers who conducted the evaluation of GAIN made clear in their reports that their evaluation did not ensure that the Riverside LFA would work in all places or necessarily be better than the use of HCD training components on all subgroups on welfare, it did not stop many, welfare-to-work program administrators and policy makers from concluding that the use of the LFA training approach was preferred over the HCD approach, based on the Riverside results from the MDRC GAIN Evaluations. For example, the State of California strongly encouraged all of the state’s counties to adopt the Riverside LFA approach in its GAIN programs.

As Hotz, Imbens and Mortimer (2005) caution, it can be misleading to conclude that the differences in program impacts across programs and localities are due solely, or primarily, to the differences in the program components. In addition to differences in the populations in these programs, these authors also note that differences in treatments can result from the economic environment and labor markets as well.⁹ Furthermore, as noted above and as MDRC made clear in its reports on its evaluation, the experimental design employed, namely random assignment of subjects in each county to a trainee and control group, does not allow one to directly draw inferences about the *differential* impact of alternative types of welfare-to-work components such as LFA and HCD.

Furthermore, the formal MDRC GAIN Evaluation was based on experimental estimates

⁸ For example, the Riverside GAIN program was awarded the Harvard Kennedy School of Government’s “Innovations in American Government Award” in 1996.

⁹ Also see Bloom (2005) for a discussion of this point.

of program impacts for a three-year post-randomization period.¹⁰ Extrapolating from such short run estimates of social program impacts to what will happen in the longer run can be misleading, as Couch (1992) and Friedlander and Burtless (1995) have noted. This is especially true for assessing the effectiveness of HCD relative to LFA training approaches, since HCD training components tend to be more time-intensive treatments and typically take longer to complete relative to LFA programs. As such, there is a strong presumption that results from short-term evaluations will tend to favor work-first programs over human-capital development ones.¹¹ Estimates of program effects over a longer post-enrollment period are needed to fairly assess the relative long-run benefits of these alternative welfare-to-work strategies.

To address the above substantive concerns, we apply the matching/regression-adjustment methods to estimate both the short- and long-term differential effects of the LFA versus HCD training components in a re-analysis of the data from the MDRC evaluation of California's GAIN program. We focus our analysis on four of the six California counties (Alameda, Los Angeles, Riverside and San Diego counties) analyzed in original GAIN Evaluation¹² and estimate differential effects for the post-random assignment employment, labor market earnings, and welfare participation outcomes of participants in this evaluation. We make use of data on these outcomes for a period of nine years after random assignment, data that was not previously available. We exploit the data for the control groups in this Evaluation to implement the tests of some of the assumptions that justify the use of non-experimental matching/regression-adjustment meth-

¹⁰ An unpublished MDRC report presents estimates for the first five years after randomization.

¹¹ A similar point is made by Mincer (1974) in his model of schooling decisions. Therein, Mincer notes that at early ages the earnings of individuals who choose additional schooling will be lower than those who choose to go to work at early ages, simply because attending school inhibits going to work, even if all alternative activities yield the same present value of lifetime earnings. See also Ham and LaLonde (1996).

¹² We omit the two rural counties included in the original MDRC evaluation, (Butte and Tulare), because these rural economies are quite different from the four urban counties.

ods. Finally, we consider the extent which inferences about the temporal patterns of training effect estimates are sensitive to post-randomization variation in local labor market conditions. As we establish below, our re-analysis of the MDRC GAIN Evaluation data leads to a substantively different set of conclusions about the relative effectiveness of LFA versus HCD training components compared to the common interpretation of the findings noted above for the Riverside GAIN program.

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we provide a brief description of California's GAIN program and the original MDRC evaluation. In Section 3, we characterize several alternative treatment effects, including average differential treatment effects of two different treatment components, consider the conditions for their identification and discuss alternative strategies for estimating each. In Section 4, we present estimates of the effects of being assigned to receive some training component for four of the six counties in the MDRC GAIN Evaluation for a nine-year post-randomization follow-up period. We then present short- and long-term estimates of the average differential effects of LFA versus HCD training components using matching/regression-adjustment methods on these data and the results for tests on control group data that provide a partial assessment of the validity of these methods for estimating average differential treatment effects. Finally, we offer some conclusions about the implications of our findings in Section 5.

2. The GAIN Program and the MDRC GAIN Evaluation

In this section we provide a brief description of the structure of the GAIN program and how it was implemented in the four urban counties we consider in this paper. We also describe the structure of the MDRC GAIN Evaluation.

The GAIN program began in California in 1986 and, in 1989, became the state's official

welfare-to-work or Job Opportunities and Basic Skills Training (JOBS) Program, authorized by the Family Support Act.¹³ As a part of an initial (or continuing) eligibility for welfare, all adults on welfare were required to register in their county-of-residence GAIN program, except for female heads with children under the age of 6.¹⁴ Each registrant was administered a screening test to measure a registrant's basic reading and math skills, with the same test being used in all counties. Registrants with low test scores and who did not have a high school diploma or GED were deemed "in need of basic education" and targeted to receive HCD training components, such as Adult Basic Education (ABE) and/or English as a Second Language (ESL) courses. Those judged not to be in need of basic education were to bypass these basic education services and either move into LFA, such as job search assistance, or HCD, such as vocational or on-the-job training, components within their county's GAIN program. Decisions about which activities GAIN registrants received were under the control of county GAIN administrators. In fact, the legislation that established the GAIN program gave California's 58 counties substantial discretion and flexibility in designing their programs, including the types and mix of training components they offered to GAIN registrants.¹⁵

MDRC conducted a randomized evaluation of the impacts and cost-effectiveness of the GAIN program in six research counties (Alameda, Butte, Los Angeles, Riverside, San Diego, and Tulare). Beginning in 1988, MDRC randomly assigned a subset of the GAIN registrants in

¹³ The legislation that created the GAIN program represented a political compromise between two groups in the State's legislature with different visions of how to reform the welfare system. One group favored the "work-first" approach, i.e., use of a relatively short-term program of mandatory job search, followed by unpaid work experience for participants who did not find jobs. The other group favored the "human capital" approach, i.e., a program providing a broader range of services designed to develop the skills of welfare recipients. In crafting the GAIN legislation, these two groups compromised on a program that contained work-first as well as basic skills and education components in what became known as the GAIN Program Model. See Riccio and Friedlander (1992) for a more complete description of this model.

¹⁴ See Riccio, *et al.* (1989) for a more complete description of the criteria for mandated participation.

¹⁵ See Riccio and Friedlander (1992), chapter 1.

these counties, either to an experimental group, which was eligible to receive GAIN services and subject to its participation mandates or a control group, whose members were not eligible for GAIN services or mandates but could seek (on their own initiative) alternative services in their communities. Control group members were embargoed from GAIN services until June 30, 1993 and, for two years after this date they were allowed, but not required, to participate in GAIN. MDRC collected data on experimental and control group members in the research counties, including background and demographic characteristics and pre-random assignment employment, earnings, and welfare utilization. Originally, MDRC gathered data on employment, earnings and welfare utilization,¹⁶ for a three-year post-randomization period and reported on the findings for these outcomes in their primary GAIN Evaluation reports.¹⁷

Descriptive statistics and sample sizes for the participants in the MDRC evaluation in the four analysis counties (Alameda, Los Angeles, Riverside and San Diego) are provided in Table 1. We focus on GAIN registrants who were members of single-parent households on AFDC—which are referred to as AFDC Family Group or AFDC-FG households—at the time of random assignment.¹⁸ Such households constitute over 80 percent of the AFDC caseload in California and the nation and almost all are female-headed.¹⁹ As shown at the bottom of Table 1, in all but Alameda county, the counties assigned a larger (and varying) fraction of cases to the experi-

¹⁶ Most of these data were obtained from state and county administrative data systems.

¹⁷ See Riccio and Friedlander (1992) and Riccio, *et al.* (1994). In an unpublished paper, Freedman, *et al.* (1996) present impact estimates for five years post-randomization period, based on additional outcomes data gathered from administrative data sources.

¹⁸ The samples we utilize for three of the four counties (Alameda, Riverside and San Diego counties) are slightly smaller than the original samples used by MDRC due to our inability to find records for some sample members in California's Unemployment Insurance Base Wage system (administered by the California Economic Development Department) or because we were missing information on the educational attainment of the sample member. The number of cases lost in these three counties is very small, never larger than 1.1 percent of the total sample, and does not differ by experimental status.

¹⁹ Descriptions and results for the much smaller group of two-parent households on AFDC (AFDC-U cases) are given in the working paper version of the paper (Hotz, Imbens and Klerman, 2000).

mental group. Finally, we provide, in Table 1, T-statistics for the differences between experimental and control group means for the background variable. In most cases, there are no statistically significant differences in these variables by treatment status. The one exception is the year and quarter in which cases were enrolled into the MDRC GAIN Evaluation. In particular, there are rather large and statistically significant differences in the proportions of experimental and control cases enrolled by quarter in Los Angeles and San Diego counties.²⁰ These were the result of changes in the rates of randomization to the control status over the period in these counties as MDRC attempted to meet targeted numbers of control cases in these counties.

Table 1 reveals notable differences in the demographic and pre-randomization characteristics of the cases enrolled in the GAIN registrants across counties. These differences are due, in part, to differences across counties in their AFDC caseloads. But they are also the result of differences in the strategies counties adopted in which cases were registered for GAIN from their existing caseloads. In particular, the GAIN programs in Riverside and San Diego counties sought to register all welfare cases in GAIN while the programs in Alameda and Los Angeles counties focused on long-term welfare recipients. For example, Alameda County, which began its GAIN program in the third quarter of 1989, began by registering cases that had been receiving AFDC since 1989, subsequently registering more recent recipients. The GAIN program in Los Angeles County initially only registered those cases that had been on welfare for 3 consecutive years. The consequences of these differences in selection criteria can be seen in Table 1. In Alameda and Los Angeles, over 95 percent of the cases had been on welfare a year prior to random assignment; in San Diego and Riverside, fewer (for some cells much fewer) than 65 percent had been.

These differences in selection criteria also contributed to substantial differences in the

²⁰ There are smaller discrepancies between fractions of experimentals and controls by year and quarter in Riverside County.

employment histories and individual characteristics of the registrant populations across these four counties. As shown in Table 1, the registrants in Alameda and Los Angeles counties had, on average, much lower levels of earnings prior to random assignment relative to those in Riverside and San Diego. Furthermore, the registrants in Alameda and Los Angeles were, on average, older, had lower levels of educational attainment, and were more likely to be assessed as “in need of basic education” when they entered the GAIN program than the average registrants in Riverside and San Diego.

The counties in the GAIN Evaluation also differed with respect to the conditions in the labor market immediately prior to random assignment and these differences may account, in part, for the across-county differences in the Evaluation subjects displayed in Table 1. Figures 1-4 display the time series of two sets of measures of labor market conditions for each of the four counties in the GAIN Evaluation. Figure 1 plots the county-level ratio of total employment to the adult population and Figure 3 displays the average annual earnings per worker for those employed.²¹ These measures provide indicators of the across-county and over time differences in the labor markets for the four counties analyzed in the MDRC GAIN Evaluation in the years prior to random assignment. Figures 2 and 4 display the corresponding employment-to-population ratios and average annual earnings per work for those employed in the retail trade sector, a sector of the economy in which many low-skilled workers are employed.²² In the periods prior to random assignment, overall employment and employment in retail trade were increasing in all

²¹ These county-level measures were constructed from data from the Regional Economic Information System (REIS) maintained by the Bureau of Economic Activity (BEA) in the U.S. Department of Commerce. We note that Hoynes (2000) uses versions of both of these measures in her analysis of the effects of local labor market conditions on welfare spells for the California AFDC caseload during the late 1980s and early 1990s. See her paper for a discussion of these and other county-level measures of local demand conditions.

²² Another sector of the economy which employs low-skilled workers is the service sector. Based on measures comparable to those in Figures 2A and 2B, similar trends and differences across counties were found for this sector as those for the retail trade sector.

four counties, although employment had begun to stagnate in many of the counties. Furthermore, one notes substantial differences across the four counties in these ratios, with Riverside county having a much lower total employment to adult population ratio than the other three counties.²³ Over this same period, average annual earnings per worker was increasing in all but Alameda county (Figure 2), while earnings per worker in the retail trade sector was declining (in real terms) in all four counties (Figure 4). Moreover, one sees that overall earnings, as well as earnings in the retail sector, were higher in Alameda and Los Angeles counties relative to Riverside and San Diego counties. Towards the end of the next section, we shall comment further on the post-randomization trends in these Figures.

Finally, as we noted above, the four analysis counties in the GAIN Evaluation differed in the way they ran the programs and in the training components they emphasized. In Table 2, we display the proportions of GAIN registrants in the four analysis counties that participated in various training components during the period in which subjects were enrolled in the MDRC GAIN Evaluation.²⁴ One can see that Riverside county placed less of its GAIN registrants in HCD training components than did the administrators of the GAIN programs in the other four counties during the period of enrollment into the MDRC Evaluation. This is especially true relative to the proportions of GAIN registrants enrolled in the MDRC Evaluation that were deemed “In Need of Basic Skills,” presumably the group in greater need of HCD training components. (The proportions of these groups, by year/quarter of enrollment into the MDRC Evaluation, are found in the last column of Table 2.) As a crude indicator of the relationship between HCD services relative to those registrants in need of basic skills, one can take the ratio of the last two columns of Table

²³ This difference reflects, in part, the fact that many people residing in Riverside county commute to other counties, especially Los Angeles, for their employment compared to residents of the other four counties.

²⁴ The shaded quarters in this—and the next—table show the quarters in which the random assignment of registrants into the MDRC experimental evaluation were conducted for each of the four counties.

2. By this measure, the GAIN programs in San Diego, Los Angeles and Alameda counties appear to provide HCD training services roughly in a 1-to-1 proportion with the fraction of registrants in need of basic skills in their counties. In contrast, the corresponding proportion for Riverside county's GAIN program is 2-to-3.

The estimates in Table 3 provide a clear indicator of what was a major finding of the MDRC GAIN Evaluation, namely that Riverside's GAIN program had a decidedly "work-first" orientation, especially relative to the other three counties in the Evaluation that we analyze here.²⁵ In contrast, program staff in the other research counties placed less emphasis on getting registrants into a job quickly. For example, Alameda's GAIN managers and staff "believed strongly in 'human capital' development and, within the overall constraints imposed by the GAIN model's service sequences, its staff encouraged registrants to be selective about the jobs they accepted and to take advantages of GAIN's education and training to prepare for higher-paying jobs."²⁶

3. Alternative Treatment Effects and Estimation Strategies

In this section, we consider the identification of alternative treatment effects and strategies for estimating them. We begin with a review of binary treatment effects which characterize

²⁵ There were other indicators of Riverside's emphasis on getting GAIN registrants quickly into jobs and on using LFA relative to HCD training components. For example, Riverside staff required that their registrants that were enrolled in basic skills programs continue to participate in Job Club and other job search activities. In a survey of program staff conducted by MDRC at the time of its evaluation, 95 percent of case managers in Riverside rated getting registrants into jobs quickly as their highest goal while fewer than 20 percent of managers in the other research counties gave a similar response. In the same survey, 69 percent of Riverside case managers indicated that they would advise a welfare mother offered a low-paying job to take it rather than wait for a better opportunity, while only 23 percent of their counterparts in Alameda county indicated they would give this advice. See Riccio and Friedlander (1992) for further documentation of the differences in distribution of training components and other features of the full set of six counties in the MDRC GAIN Evaluation. As Riccio and Friedlander (1992) concluded from their study of the implementation of GAIN programs by the various counties in the MDRC Evaluations, "What is perhaps most distinctive about Riverside's program, though, is not that its registrants participated somewhat less in education and training, but that the staff's emphasis on jobs *pervaded* their interactions with registrants throughout the program." (Riccio and Friedlander, 1992, p. 58)

²⁶ See Riccio, *et al.* (1994), p. xxv.

the effect of receiving *some* training component for enrollees in a welfare-to-work program. Such effects were the focus of the experimental design of the MDRC GAIN Evaluation. We then define and consider the estimation of average differential treatment effects (ADTE). The latter effects are the focus of our re-analysis of the GAIN data. We examine the identification of and strategies for estimating ADTEs when the econometrician has information on which treatment components each subject was assigned and when such subject-level information is not known. (The latter case is true for the MDRC GAIN Evaluation data we re-analyze and is true for many data sources used to evaluate training programs.) Finally, while we show that experimental data on subjects that are randomly assigned to some versus no treatment component is not sufficient to identify (or consistently estimate) ADTEs, we show how such data can be exploited to assess the validity of non-experimental methods for estimating the latter effects.

3.1 Alternative Average Treatment Effects

We begin by defining some notation. Let D_i be an indicator of the program/location of a training program in which subject i is enrolled (registered). In the MDRC GAIN Evaluation, D denotes a county-run welfare-to-work program, d . Let s denote the period (year) after a subject would be enrolled in a welfare-to-work program. Let \tilde{T}_i denote the *training (treatment) component* to which subject i is assigned, with $\tilde{T}_i \in \{0, 1, \dots, k, \dots, K\}$ and where $\tilde{T}_i = 0$ denotes the null (no) treatment component. Let T_i denote the assignment of the i^{th} subject to *some* treatment component, i.e., $T_i = 1\{\tilde{T}_i \geq 1\}$. Finally, Let $Y_{is}(W = w)$ denote subject i 's *potential outcome* as of s periods after enrollment that is associated with the subject being assigned to treatment W , where $W = T$ or \tilde{T} . Thus, $Y_{is}(T = 0)$ is the potential outcome associated with the receipt of no treatment, $Y_{is}(T = 1)$ is the potential outcome associated with the assignment to some treatment

component and $Y_{is}(k) \equiv Y_{is}(\tilde{T} = k)$ is the potential outcome associated with the assignment to treatment component k .

The focus of the MDRC GAIN Evaluation, and many other training evaluations, was on estimating the *average treatment effect* on the treated (ATET) associated with assignment to some treatment component in program/location d . This treatment effect is defined as

$$\begin{aligned}\alpha_s^d &\equiv E\left(Y_{is}(1) - Y_{is}(0) \mid T_i = 1, D_i = d\right) \\ &= E\left(\Delta_{is} \mid T_i = 1, D_i = d\right),\end{aligned}\tag{1}$$

where Δ_{is} is subject i 's “gain” in outcome Y from being assigned to some training component.²⁷

Analogously, the *average treatment effects* associated with assignment to treatment component k for those assigned to this component is given by

$$\begin{aligned}\alpha_s^d(k) &\equiv E\left(Y_{is}(k) - Y_{is}(0) \mid T_i = 1, D_i = d\right) \\ &= E\left(\Delta_{is}(k) \mid T_i = 1, D_i = d\right)\end{aligned}\tag{2}$$

As noted in Hotz, Imbens and Mortimer (2005), α_s^d may differ across programs/locations (d), due to differences in: (a) the populations treated; (b) treatment heterogeneity (differences in the distribution of treatment components); and/or (c) differences in economic conditions (“macro effects”). In the case of treatment heterogeneity, one typically wishes to distinguish between the impacts of alternative treatment components—such as the LFA and HCD training components—in order to isolate this source of differences in α_s^d across programs and to isolate why some programs are more effective than others. As noted in the Introduction, and as will be documented in Section 4, the impacts of the Riverside GAIN program were markedly different from, and more

²⁷ One also can define versions of α_s^d that condition on some set of exogenous variables, X ,

$$\begin{aligned}\alpha_s^d(X) &\equiv E\left(Y_{is}(1) - Y_{is}(0) \mid T_i = 1, D_i = d, X_i\right) \\ &= E\left(\Delta_{is} \mid T_i = 1, D_i = d, X_i\right).\end{aligned}$$

Conditional versions of the other treatment effects defined in this subsection can be defined similarly.

effective than, those in the other counties of the MDRC GAIN Evaluation. Accordingly, consider the *average differential treatment effect* (ADTE) of two treatment components, k and k' , among those who are treated (i.e., those assigned to receive some treatment) which is defined as:

$$\begin{aligned}\gamma_s(k, k') &\equiv E(Y_{is}(k) - Y_{is}(k') | T_i = 1) \\ &= E(\Delta_{is}(k) - \Delta_{is}(k') | T_i = 1)\end{aligned}\tag{3}$$

where the second equality in (3) follows from the definition of $\Delta_{is}(j)$ in (2). Note that $\gamma_s(k, k')$ is defined for subjects assigned to receive some treatment, i.e., for subjects characterized by $T_i = 1$. For reasons that will be made clear below, conditioning on this expansive set of subjects is appropriate for our re-analysis of the MDRC GAIN Evaluation data. Imbens (2000) and Lechner (2001) consider alternative definitions of differential treatment effects, including conditioning on those subjects who would otherwise receive either treatment components k or k' . In general, differences in such conditioning imply different treatment effects. Also note that we have not conditioned (3) on a particular program/location (d), as our interest is in estimating the differential effects of treatment components that are available—and comparable—across county welfare-to-work programs included in the MDRC GAIN Evaluation.

3.2 Identification and Estimation of α_s^d

As is well understood, the identification (and thus consistent estimation) of α_s^d in (1) requires additional conditions to be met. In general, non-random and selective assignment of potential trainees to training programs and/or the use of non-comparable comparison groups to measure $Y(0)$ gives rise to problems in identifying (and obtaining unbiased estimates of) such treatment effects.²⁸ In the context of the MDRC GAIN Evaluation, the identification problem is “solved by design” in that this evaluation randomly selected a group of the GAIN registrants to a

²⁸ See, for example, Heckman, LaLonde and Smith (1999) for a survey of the evaluation literature.

control group in which subjects, who would otherwise have been assigned to some welfare-to-work activity, were embargoed from receipt of treatment. That is, design of this evaluation assured that the following condition holds:

$$\text{(RANDOM ASSIGNMENT)} \quad T_i \perp (Y_{is}(0), Y_{is}(1)) | D_i = d, \quad (\text{C-1})$$

for all d , where $z \perp y$ denotes that z is (statistically) independent of y . Condition (C-1) insures the identification of α_s^d as it implies that

$$E(Y_{is}(0) | T_i = 1, D_i = d) = E(Y_{is}(0) | T_i = 0, D_i = d), \quad (\text{C-1}')$$

i.e., the mean value of $Y(0)$ for those who receive some treatment component in county d is equal to the mean value of the outcomes as of period s for control group members in that same county.

As a result, (C-1) implies that the ATET associated with program/location d is identified by

$$\alpha_s^d = E(Y_{is}(1) | T_i = 1, D_i = d) - E(Y_{is}(0) | T_i = 0, D_i = d) \quad (4)$$

and can be consistently estimated by using sample analogues to the conditional expectations in

(4), i.e., $\bar{Y}_s(t) = \sum_{i \in \{i | T_i = t\}} Y_{is} / N_t$ for all s , where N_t is the sample size for the $T_i = t$ group, $t = 0, 1$. In

Section 3, we present county-specific estimates of the ATET for a range of post-randomization outcomes for each of the nine years after random assignment.

3.3 Identifying Average Differential Treatment Effects

We now turn to the identification (and estimation) of the average differential treatment effect, $\gamma_s(k, k')$. For now, we assume that we know (and can condition on) the treatment components to which each subject was assigned. Below, we consider the case in which a subject's treatment component assignment is unknown. Random assignment of subjects to $T_i = 1$ or 0 [Condition (C-1)], the condition that holds in the MDRC GAIN Evaluation, is not sufficient to identify ADTEs. To see why, consider the following characterization of the differences in ex-

pected potential outcomes for treatment components, k and k' :

$$\begin{aligned}
& E\left(Y_{is}(k)\middle|\tilde{T}_i = k, D_i = d\right) - E\left(Y_{is}(k')\middle|\tilde{T}_i = k', D_i = d'\right) \\
&= E\left(Y_{is}(0) + \Delta_{is}(k)\middle|\tilde{T}_i = k, D_i = d\right) - E\left(Y_{is}(0) + \Delta_{is}(k')\middle|\tilde{T}_i = k', D_i = d'\right) \\
&= \left\{ E\left(\Delta_{is}(k)\middle|T_i = 1, \tilde{T}_i = k, D_i = d\right) - E\left(\Delta_{is}(k')\middle|T_i = 1, \tilde{T}_i = k', D_i = d'\right) \right\} \\
&\quad + \left\{ E\left(Y_{is}(0)\middle|T_i = 1, \tilde{T}_i = k, D_i = d\right) - E\left(Y_{is}(0)\middle|T_i = 1, \tilde{T}_i = k', D_i = d'\right) \right\},
\end{aligned} \tag{5}$$

for all $k, k', k \neq k'$, and all d, d' . While (C-1) implies that $E\left(Y_{is}(0)\middle|T_i = 1, D_i = d\right) = E\left(Y_{is}(0)\middle|T_i = 0, D_i = d\right)$, it does not imply that the last term in braces in (5) equals zero, even for the same program/location (i.e., $d = d'$). Furthermore, (C-1) implies nothing about the first term in braces. As such, the mean difference between the outcomes of those receiving treatment component k and those receiving k' does not, in general, equal $\gamma_s(k, k')$. Additional assumptions are required. In particular, we require:

$$E\left(Y_{is}(0)\middle|T_i = 1, \tilde{T}_i = k, D_i = d\right) - E\left(Y_{is}(0)\middle|T_i = 1, \tilde{T}_i = k', D_i = d'\right) = 0, \tag{A-1}$$

i.e., there is no difference in $Y(0)$, the no-treatment outcome, for subjects that were assigned to treatment components k and k' , in a given program/location, and

$$E\left(\Delta_{is}(k)\middle|T_i = 1, \tilde{T}_i = k, D_i = d\right) = E\left(\Delta_{is}(k)\middle|T_i = 1, \tilde{T}_i = k', D_i = d'\right) = E\left(\Delta_{is}(k)\middle|T_i = 1\right), \tag{A-2}$$

for all $k, k', k \neq k'$, and all d, d' , i.e., the expected gross treatment effects for treatment component k is the same for those assigned to components k and k' .²⁹ Given (A-1) and (A-2), it follows that the difference between $E\left(Y_{is}(k)\middle|\tilde{T}_i = k, D_i = d\right)$ and $E\left(Y_{is}(k')\middle|\tilde{T}_i = k', D_i = d'\right)$ in (5) is equal to $\gamma_s(k, k')$. Note that potentially weaker versions of (A-1) and (A-2) in which these assumptions hold only within a program/location ($d = d'$) could be assumed, although then only program-spe-

²⁹ We ignore the possibility that both (A-1) and (A-2) are violated with off-setting biases.

cific $\gamma_s(k, k')$'s would be identified. In short, the random assignment design used in evaluations, such as the MDRC GAIN Evaluation, is not sufficient to identify ADTEs.

In order to secure identification (and a consistent estimator) of $\gamma_s(k, k')$, we consider the use of non-experimental methods which imply that (A-1) and (A-2) hold under some set of circumstances. We focus on the use of matching and/or regression-adjustment methods in conjunction with data in which subjects are randomly assigned to receive some treatment or a control group. Matching methods and regression adjustment methods assume that by controlling (adjusting) for a set of pre-treatment characteristics, Z_i , conditional versions of (A-1) and (A-2) will hold.³⁰ More precisely we assume that there exists a vector, Z_i , such that:³¹

$$\text{(UNCONFOUNDEDNESS)} \quad Y(0), Y(1), \dots, Y(k), \dots, Y(K) \perp \tilde{T} | Z, \quad \forall k \text{ and } \forall d. \quad (\text{C-2})$$

That is, the potential outcomes associated with treatment components are independent of the assignment mechanism for these components conditional on Z . It follows from (C-2) that

$$E_Z \left[\left(Y_{is}(0) | T_i = 1, \tilde{T}_i = k, D_i = d \right) - E \left(Y_{is}(0) | T_i = 1, \tilde{T}_i = k', D_i = d' \right) | Z_i \right] = 0 \quad (\text{A-1}')$$

and

$$E_Z \left[\left(\Delta_{is}(k) | T_i = 1, \tilde{T}_i = k, D_i = d \right) - E \left(\Delta_{is}(k) | T_i = 1, \tilde{T}_i = k', D_i = d' \right) | Z_i \right] = 0, \quad (\text{A-2}')$$

for all $k, k', k \neq k'$, and all d, d' . It follows that assumptions (A-1') and (A-2') imply that the difference between the conditional (on Z) versions of $E \left(Y_{is}(k) | \tilde{T}_i = k, D_i = d \right)$ and $E \left(Y_{is}(k') | \tilde{T}_i = k', D_i = d' \right)$ identify $\gamma_s(k, k')$ and justify the use of matching methods—and, in certain cases, parametric regression techniques—to (consistently) estimate this ADTE.

³⁰ See Rubin (1973a, 1973b, 1977, 1979) for the initial formalization of the use of matching methods to reduce bias in causal inference using non-experimental data. See also Heckman, Ichimura, Smith and Todd (1997, 1998a) for further refinements on these methods.

³¹ See Imbens (2000) and Lechner (2001) for formal treatments of matching methods in the context of multiple treatments.

Condition (C-2)—and, thus, (A-1') and (A-2')—is not directly verifiable, at least not for situations in which treatment components are not randomly assigned. As such, matching and/or regression adjustment methods are inherently more controversial than reliance on a properly designed random assignment experiment. Nonetheless, recent studies by Dehejia and Wahba (1999), Heckman, Ichimura, Smith and Todd (1997, 1998a), and Hotz, Imbens and Mortimer (2005) suggest that such adjustments, with sufficiently detailed pre-treatment characteristics, can produce credible non-experimental estimates of average treatment effects.³² Here we extend the use of these methods to estimating the differential effects of alternative treatment components.

The availability of data for a randomly assigned control group that receives no treatment, such as is the case with the MDRC GAIN Evaluation, does provide scope for assessing the validity of assumption (A-1') in the case where there are only two treatment components, k and k' .

In this case, it follows that (C-1) can be written as

$$\begin{aligned}
E(Y_{is}(0)|T_i = 0, D_i = d) &= E(Y_{is}(0)|T_i = 1, D_i = d) \\
&= E(Y_{is}(0)|T_i = 1, \tilde{T}_i = k, D_i = d)P_d^k + E(Y_{is}(0)|T_i = 1, \tilde{T}_i = k', D_i = d)[1 - P_d^k] \\
&= \left[E(Y_{is}(0)|T_i = 1, \tilde{T}_i = k, D_i = d) - E(Y_{is}(0)|T_i = 1, \tilde{T}_i = k', D_i = d) \right] P_d^k \\
&\quad + E(Y_{is}(0)|T_i = 1, \tilde{T}_i = k', D_i = d),
\end{aligned} \tag{C-1''}$$

for all d , where $P_d^k \equiv \Pr(\tilde{T}_i = k | D_i = d)$ is the proportion of subjects receiving treatment component k in program/location d . It follows from (A-1') [and (C-1)] that the term in square brackets after the last equality in (C-1'') is equal to 0, for all d . That is, the mean of Y for the control group should not depend on (vary with) P_d^k . Thus, to test (A-1'), one can regress the outcomes, Y , on

P_d^k , exploiting the variation in the mix of treatment components across programs/locations, and

³² See Smith and Todd (2005) for a critical re-analysis of Dehejia and Wahba (1999). Smith and Todd conclude that matching methods *can* be used to estimate simple treatment effects, but care must be taken as to what pre-treatment characteristics are used in the matching.

where the regression conditions on Z_i , either parametrically or non-parametrically using matching methods, and test whether the coefficient on P_d^k equals zero for all d . We implement this test in our empirical analysis to assess the validity of (A-1') with the MDRC GAIN Evaluation data.³³

A similar test of the validity of (A-2') is not available. Thus, this assumption must be maintained when using matching (regression adjustment) methods to estimate ADTEs. Nonetheless, the validity of such methods in the estimation of ADTEs is more plausible, although not guaranteed, if (A-1') is shown to hold in the data.

Until now, we have assumed knowledge of the treatment component assignments (\tilde{T}_i) to each subject who actually receives treatment. This is not the case for the MDRC GAIN Evaluation data that we use to analyze the differential effects of LFA and HCD treatment components. Individual-level treatment component assignments are unknown in these data. Lack of treatment component assignment information is a common situation in other data sources used to evaluate the effects of training programs. However, one may have information on the *proportions* of subjects that received various treatment components (P_d^k) for particular programs. For the GAIN programs in California, we have information on these proportions for the four counties we analyze from the MDRC GAIN Evaluation. In fact, we have it at the quarterly level for the quarters in which GAIN registrants were randomly assigned to treatment or control status.

As first noted by Heckman and Robb (1985), and subsequently extended by Mitnik (2004b) to the case of differential treatment effects, estimation of causal effects in the case of unknown treatment status at the subject level can still proceed with data on treatment component

³³ For other examples of assessing the validity of non-experimental methods with data from experimental data, see Lalonde (1986), Heckman and Hotz (1989), Rosenbaum (1995), Dehejia and Wahba (1999), Heckman, Ichimura, Smith and Todd (1997, 1998a), Hotz, Imbens and Mortimer (2005) and Smith and Todd (2005).

probabilities under certain assumptions and with sufficient variation in these probabilities across programs and/or subgroups. Assumptions (A-1') and (A-2')—and, thus, (C-2)—are sufficient to allow one to estimate $\gamma_s(k, k')$ with only data on treatment assignment proportions, rather than individual-level treatment assignment status, since conditional on Z , the identification (consistent estimation) of $\gamma_s(k, k')$ only requires identifying (consistently estimating) the mean differential of outcomes for trainees who receive treatment components k and k' . Furthermore, we exploit the variation in P_d^k across counties, as well as across entry cohorts, to consistently estimate these conditional mean differences.

3.4 Estimating Average Differential Treatment Effects

In the empirical analysis presented below, we make use of parametric regression methods, rather than non-parametric matching techniques, to condition on the Z 's as implied by assumptions (A-1') and (A-2')³⁴ to estimate the average differential treatment effect of the LFA versus HCD treatment components. For sake of clarity, we need to augment the notation used above. Let $Y_{is,dc}$ denote the outcome of GAIN registrant i for post-randomization period s that is located in county d and entered the MDRC Evaluation in quarter c ; $T_{i,dc} = 1$ if this GAIN registrant located in county d and from entry cohort c was (randomly) assigned to the experimental group and equal to zero otherwise; $\tilde{T}_{i,dc}$ denote the treatment component to which a GAIN registrant is assigned, where the components in the GAIN context are ℓ for the LFA treatment component and h for the HCD treatment component; $Z_{i,dc}$ denote the vector of pre-randomization characteristics for this subject; and P_{dc}^ℓ denote the proportion of trainees—those for which $T_{i,dc} =$

³⁴ While not presented herein, we also used non-parametric matching techniques, controlling for the same set of X 's listed above, to estimate the differential treatment effects between Riverside and the various comparison counties. The estimates, especially the inferences drawn, are quite similar to the regression-based estimates reported below.

1—that were assigned the LFA treatment component ($\tilde{T}_{i,dc} = \ell$) component.

One potential strategy for estimating $\gamma_s(\ell, h)$ would be to estimate the following regression model using *only* data on GAIN registrants in the *experimental group* ($T_{i,dc} = 1$):

$$Y_{is,dc} = \beta_{0s} + \gamma_s(\ell, h)P_{dc}^\ell + \beta'_{1s}Z_{i,dc} + \varepsilon_{is,dc}, \quad (6)$$

where $\varepsilon_{is,dc}$ is a stochastic disturbance assumed to have mean zero and the coefficient on P_{dc}^ℓ is the ADTE of interest, $\gamma_s(\ell, h)$. (The elements in $Z_{is,dc}$ are listed in the Notes to Table 5.) Estimating (6) with the experimental subsample will generate consistent estimates of $\gamma_s(\ell, h)$ if *both* assumptions (A-1') and (A-2') hold. We present estimates of $\gamma_s(\ell, h)$ based on only using data for the experimental group of the MDRC GAIN Evaluation in Table 6 below.

To test assumption (A-1'), one can estimate the regression specification in (6) using data for the subsample of *controls* in the four counties of the MDRC GAIN Evaluation and then test the hypothesis that $\gamma_s(\ell, h) = 0$. We present results for this test in Table 4 below. A potentially more rigorous version of this test allows for the possibility that $\gamma_s(\ell, h)$ varies across counties, i.e., estimating the following regression specification in place of (6),

$$Y_{is,dc} = \beta_{0s} + \sum_{j \in \{A,L,R,S\}} \gamma_s^j(\ell, h)P_{jc}^\ell I_i^j + \beta'_{1s}Z_{i,dc} + \varepsilon_{is,dc}, \quad (6')$$

where I_i^j denotes the indicator function for $D_i = j$ and the four values for j are A for Alameda county, L for Los Angeles county, R for Riverside county and S for San Diego county. In this case, we test the null hypothesis that $\gamma_s^A(\ell, h) = \gamma_s^L(\ell, h) = \gamma_s^R(\ell, h) = \gamma_s^S(\ell, h) = 0$, where now the alternative hypothesis is that $\gamma_s^d(\ell, h)$ can be non-zero in any county. We also present results from this second test of (A-1') in Table 4 below.

In one sense, finding that we cannot reject the null hypotheses in the above tests justifies

the maintenance of assumption (A-1'), and, thus, the reliance on the estimator of $\gamma_s(\ell, h)$ derived from estimating (6) with data for registrants that were randomly assigned to the experimental group in the MDRC GAIN Evaluation. But, as is always true, the results from such tests are subject to estimation error. That is, the power of any test may not be sufficient to avoid Type II errors, i.e., failing to reject null hypotheses when they are false. To guard against this possibility, we also present results from a “difference-in-differences” (DID) estimator of $\gamma_s(\ell, h)$ that relies on using data for experimental *and* control groups in estimation. In particular, this DID estimator of $\gamma_s(\ell, h)$ is formed by estimating the following regression function:³⁵

$$Y_{is,cd} = \theta_{0s} + \theta_{1s}P_{dc}^\ell + \theta_{2s}T_{i,dc} + \gamma_s(\ell, h)P_{dc}^\ell T_{i,dc} + \theta'_{3s}Z_{i,dc} + \theta'_{4s}Z_{i,dc}T_{i,dc} + v_{is,dc}, \quad (7)$$

Using (7) to estimate $\gamma_s(\ell, h)$ with data for the experimental and control groups in the MDRC GAIN Evaluation still relies on assumptions (A-1') and (A-2') to hold but allows the data on “controls” to empirically adjust for across-program differences in populations and treatment component assignment mechanisms to help isolate a consistent estimate of $\gamma_s(\ell, h)$. Furthermore, the DID estimator allows for any estimation error that may affect the tests of (A-1') described above to explicitly affect the precision of the estimate of $\gamma_s(\ell, h)$, which is not the case for the estimator of $\gamma_s(\ell, h)$ based solely on data for experimentals. Accordingly, we view the DID estimator as a more “conservative” method for estimating $\gamma_s(\ell, h)$. Estimates based on this DID estimator are presented in Table 5 below.

3.5 Accounting for Post-Randomization Variations in Labor Market Conditions

To this point, we have implicitly assumed that the variation in treatment effects, be they ATETs or ADTEs, with s , reflect the age, or life cycle, patterns of “returns” to training GAIN

³⁵ Non-parametric versions of (7), based on matching methods, also are possible.

registrants received at earlier ages. For example, the effects (returns) might diminish with age due to the depreciation or loss with age of skills acquired from job search assistance services or an English-as-Second-Language (ESL) or vocational training course received at an earlier age. But, temporal variation in average effects of training, both within and across programs, may be due to other factors, such as changing labor market conditions over time. For example, the demand for less-skilled workers might change, due to economic recessions and recoveries, and confound the ability to detect age-related depreciation in the skills from the post-treatment temporal patterns in estimated values of α_s^d and/or $\gamma_s(\ell, h)$.

As we have already discussed, labor market conditions did vary temporally and across the counties in the MDRC GAIN Evaluation prior to random assignment. For this reason, we include pre-random assignment values of these two measures in Z_i when estimating $\gamma_s(\ell, h)$. But, as the data presented in Figures 1-4 for the 9-year period following random assignment, there were also substantial temporal changes in labor market conditions in the four counties we analyze. Most notable is the fact that overall employment declined markedly in the first three to five years after random assignment in all four counties (Figure 1) and did not recover until years 6 through 9 after enrollment in all of the counties. This relative sharp decline in employment reflects the recession that California experienced in 1990 and 1991 and the vigorous recovery that the state experienced in the latter half of the 1990s. A similar pattern occurred in the retail trade sector over the post-randomization period for most of the counties (Figure 3), especially in Los Angeles county. The notable exception was Riverside county with an average growth in employment of one percent per year in the retail sector over the entire 9-year period following randomization. Recall from the Introduction (and as will be documented in Section 4), the GAIN program in Riverside County showed the largest 3-year effects on employment and labor market earnings of

any of the counties analyzed by MDRC. Furthermore, Los Angeles and Alameda counties, which stressed HDC training components in their GAIN programs and had relatively weak experimental effects in the 3-year MDRC Evaluation, experienced amongst the largest declines in employment in the retail trade sector.

Despite the recession and recovery that California experienced over the 1990s, real earnings per worker in Alameda and Los Angeles counties increased for most of the post-randomization period, while it declined throughout this period in Riverside county (Figure 2). (Earnings per worker in San Diego county was relatively constant over this period.) With respect to the retail trade sector, a sector which employs a sizeable fraction of low-skilled workers, real earnings per worker declined during the first 5-6 years after randomization, but started to grow after year 6 (Figure 4). Moreover, the largest rates of increase in these later years occurred in Alameda county, one of the counties that stressed HDC training in its GAIN program. As noted in the Introduction, the primary MDRC Evaluation of the GAIN programs in California was limited to the first 3 years after randomization and conducted a more limited analysis for the first 5 years after random assignment.

These temporal and across-county differences in labor market conditions in the years after random assignment in the MDRC Evaluation may account for some of the temporal and across-county variation in estimates of either α_s^d or $\gamma_s(\ell, h)$. Below, we examine how estimates of the latter effects change after one controls for post-randomization labor market conditions that prevailed in the four counties in the MDRC GAIN Evaluation. While there are a variety of specifications one might use to account for labor market conditions, we focus on a relatively straightforward modification of the regression models in (6) and (7). For the DID estimation strategy based on (7), we estimate the following specification:

$$Y_{is,cd} = \delta_{0s} + \delta_{1s}P_{dc}^{\ell} + \delta_{2s}T_{i,dc} + \gamma_{Ms}(\ell, h)P_{dc}^{\ell}T_{i,dc} + \delta'_{3s}Z_{i,dc} + \delta'_{4s}Z_{i,dc}T_{i,dc} + \delta'_{5s}M_{ds} + \delta'_{6s}M_{ds}T_{i,dc} + \nu_{is,dc}, \quad (8)$$

where M_{ds} denotes the vector of labor market variables presented in Figures 1-4. Now the ADTE of interest is $\gamma_{Ms}(\ell, h)$, which measures the differential effect of LFA versus HCD training components in period s *net of* differences in *labor market conditions* across counties and over time. (An analogous version of the specification in (8) estimated on only data for the experimental groups removes the main and interaction terms involving $T_{i,dc}$.) We present estimates of $\gamma_{Ms}(\ell, h)$ in Tables 5 and 6 below.

4. Re-Analyzing the Effects of the California GAIN Welfare-to-Work Program, the MDRC Evaluation and GAIN Evaluation Counties

4.1 Estimates of Nine-Year, County-Specific GAIN Impacts

In this section, we present estimates of the short- and longer-run impacts of being assigned to some GAIN training component (α_s^d) for AFDC-FG derived from the county-specific experiments of the MDRC GAIN Evaluation.³⁶ We present impact estimates for five different outcomes: (1) ever employed during year; (2) number of quarters worked per year; (3) annual labor market earnings; (4) whether the registrant received AFDC benefits—or benefits from AFDC’s successor program, the Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF) program, that began in California in 1998—during the year; and (5) the number of quarters in the calendar year that she received AFDC/TANF benefits.³⁷ Mean differences between the experimental and con-

³⁶ We also generated experimental estimates of GAIN impacts separately for AFDC-FG cases determined to be in need and not in need of basic education. The inferences drawn from these results, which are available from the authors upon request, do not differ materially than those drawn from the estimates derived from the full AFDC-FG sample that are presented below.

³⁷ The employment and earnings outcomes were constructed with data from the State’s UI Base Wage files provided by the California Employment Development Department (EDD). These data contain quarterly reports from employers on whether individuals were employed in a UI-covered job and their wage earnings for that job. These quarterly data were organized into four-quarter “years” from the quarter of enrollment in the MDRC GAIN evaluation. The “Ever Employed in Year” outcome was defined to be = 1 if the individual had positive earnings in at least one quarter during that year and = 0 otherwise. The “Annual Earnings” outcome was the sum of the four-quarter UI-covered

trol groups for these outcomes for 3-year averages for years 1-3, 4-6 and 7-9 are found in Table 3. As noted above, MDRC has published estimates for a similar set of outcomes for first 3 years after post random assignment and released estimates based on 5 years of post-random assignment data in a working paper.³⁸ While the actual estimates presented in Table 3 are similar to the MDRC 5-year results, our estimates differ slightly due to slight differences in the samples used and, more importantly, the use of a different “dating” convention when calculating the measured outcomes.³⁹ Given that these shorter-term estimates have been thoroughly discussed in MDRC publications, we focus most of our discussion on the longer-term impacts for 5 through 9 years after random assignment.

Consider first the estimated GAIN impacts on employment outcomes. Regardless of whether one uses annual employment rates or the number of quarters employed in a year, the estimated impacts of Riverside’s program are consistently larger, and more likely to be statistically significant, compared to the effects for the other three counties over the first three years after random assignment. Over this period, the GAIN registrants in Riverside had annual employment rates that were, on average, 13.6 percentage points (39 percent) higher than members of the control group and worked 0.43 more quarters per year (48 percent) higher than did control group

earnings recorded for an individual in the Base Wage file. All income variables were converted to 1999 dollars using cost-of-living deflators.

The AFDC/TANF variables were constructed using data from the California statewide Medi-Cal Eligibility Data System (MEDS) files, which contain monthly information on whether an individual received AFDC (before 1998) or TANF (starting in 1998) benefits in California during a month. These monthly data were organized into 3-month “quarters” from the quarter of enrollment in the MDRC GAIN evaluation and then organized into “years” since enrollment, as was done with the employment and earnings data. The “Ever Received AFDC/TANF Benefits in Year” variable was defined to be = 1 if the individual received AFDC or TANF benefits in at least one month during that year and = 0 otherwise.

³⁸ See Riccio, *et al.* (1994) for 3-year impact estimates and Freedman, *et al.* (1996) for estimates based on five years of follow-up data.

³⁹ In their analysis, MDRC defined the first year of post-random assignment to be quarters 2 through 5, year two as quarters 6 through 9, etc. In our analysis, we define year one as quarters 1 through 4, year two as quarters 5 through 8, etc. This difference in definitions results in relatively minor differences between our years 1 through 5 estimates relative to those produced by MDRC.

members. The employment impacts of the GAIN programs in the GAIN programs of the other three counties are considerably smaller in magnitude and often are not statistically significant. This apparent relative success of the Riverside GAIN training components in improving the employment outcomes of its registrants contributed to why this program, and its work-first orientation, has been heralded nationally as a model welfare-to-work program.

In the longer run, however, the impacts on employment for the Riverside GAIN program diminished in magnitude and in statistical significance. In years 4 through 6 after random assignment, Riverside's GAIN registrants experience a 6.9 percentage point annual average gain in annual rates of employment (down from 13.6 percentage points) and 0.25 quarters worked (down from 0.43 quarters) over their control group counterparts. For years 7 through 9, the Riverside GAIN registrants have an average annual gain of only 1.5 percentage points in annual rates of employment and 0.08 quarters worked per year relative to the control group and these latter impacts estimates are no longer significantly different from zero.⁴⁰ The employment effects of the GAIN programs in Alameda and San Diego also decline in magnitude and statistical significance and the impacts attributable to GAIN in these counties remain substantially smaller than those for Riverside. In contrast, the estimated GAIN impacts for the Los Angeles program increased in magnitude in years 4 through 9 relative to those in the first three years for both measures of employment. On average, the GAIN program in Los Angeles was estimated to increase annual employment rates 3.3 (3.8) percentage points per year and the number of quarters worked by 0.10 (1.3) per year in years 4 through 6 (years 7 through 9) after random assignment. These later-year estimate impacts for Los Angeles are all statistically significant and are larger than the effects found for the first three years after random assignment. Recall that the Los Angeles county

⁴⁰ We also note that the average employment rates and quarters worked per year for experimentals in Riverside consistently decline in magnitude over the nine-year. This is in contrast to the other 3 counties, where comparable outcomes for experimentals in each of the other three counties increased over the nine-year follow-up period.

GAIN program concentrated its services on long-term welfare recipients at the time our sample members were randomly assigned. Further recall that this program assigned the highest proportion of its registrants to HCD training components of the four counties we analyzed from the MDRC GAIN Evaluation.

The impacts of GAIN programs on annual earnings also are displayed in Table 3. As with the impacts on employment, the effects of receiving some training component on annual earnings for the Riverside and San Diego GAIN programs were sizeable—\$1,416 per year in Riverside and \$411 in San Diego—and statistically significant in the first 3 years after random assignment. But, as we found for the estimated impacts on employment, the effects in these two counties both declined in magnitude and statistical significance over time. In contrast, the effects of the GAIN programs in Alameda and Los Angeles counties were not large in magnitude in any of the periods after random assignment and were never statistically significant.

Finally, Table 3 presents estimates of the impacts of the GAIN programs on welfare participation over the nine years after random assignment for AFDC-FG GAIN registrants. Over the 9-year post-randomization period, GAIN participants in each of the counties consistently have lower rates and quarters of welfare participation than their control group counterparts and these differences are statistically significant in most of this period. The welfare reductions associated with the Riverside program were the largest, with an average impact of 5.8 percentage points in AFDC/TANF participation in the first three years after random assignment and a 4.8 (3.2) percentage point differential in years 4 through 6 (years 7 through 9). While smaller than those in Riverside, the estimated impacts of the San Diego county GAIN program on welfare participation were statistically significant. Finally, the impacts of the GAIN programs in Alameda and Los Angeles counties on welfare participation were smaller than those for either Riverside or San

Diego counties and tended to be less reliably estimated, especially in the last two three-year periods of the follow-up period.

A closer inspection of Table 5 indicates that the mean “economic” outcomes (i.e., the employment and earnings outcomes) for the control groups are improving more rapidly over the nine-year period than they are for the experimental group in all counties but Los Angeles. In fact, in Riverside County both of the employment outcomes decline over time for the experimental group.⁴¹ In particular, in all but Los Angeles County, the declines and/or stagnation in the experimental experimental impacts on economic outcomes after Years 1 through 3 result from more rapid improvements of the control group outcomes relative to those for the experimental group. Moreover, the economic outcomes for the experimental group in Riverside County actually declined after Year 3. In contrast, the means economic outcomes for the experimental group in Los Angeles county improved relative to this county’s control group after Year 3.

The fact that the economic outcomes of the control groups in Alameda, Riverside and San Diego Counties were improving more rapidly than the experimental group raises the possibility that our longer-run impacts are “contaminated” because the control groups benefited from GAIN services after the embargo on these services was lifted for this group. (Recall that the prohibition of eligibility for any GAIN services to control group members was lifted on June 30, 1993 and cases in this group could elect, but were not required, to participate in GAIN until July 1, 1995.) Depending on when they were enrolled into the MDRC evaluation, control group members were eligible to participate in GAIN activities anywhere from 3 to 4.5 years after their enrollment in this evaluation and actually were subject to a GAIN mandate from 5 to 6.5 years after enrollment *if* they were on AFDC. Thus, the decline in the Riverside experimental impacts in

⁴¹ This also is true for the annual employment outcome in San Diego.

Years 4 through 9, for example, could be the result of some of the Riverside controls receiving GAIN training components after their embargo from services was lifted. This same source of “contamination” could afflict our long-term estimates of GAIN impacts for the other three counties.⁴² If this occurred at sufficiently high rates among the control groups in these counties, it could compromise the interpretation of the estimated impacts for Years 4-6 and 7-9 presented in Table 3 as long-term impacts of GAIN.

In the Appendix we examine whether the improvements in control group economic outcomes is likely to be explained by control group members being “contaminated” in Years 4 through 9 by the fact that they received GAIN services after their embargo expired. While we cannot rule out this explanation, the calculations presented in the Appendix (see Table A-1) cast doubt upon its affect on the longer term experimental training effect estimates. We also note that, unlike the economic outcomes, the mean estimates for experimentals and controls decline over time in all four counties which is not consistent with the control group contamination explanation.

In summary, our examination of the long-term experimental estimates of the impacts of the GAIN programs in these four counties indicate some noticeable differences between the estimated experimental effects in the years immediately following random assignment (years 1 through 3) compared to those at longer intervals after randomization (years 7 through 9). Furthermore, the longer run impacts of Riverside’s GAIN program are somewhat less supportive of the view that the Riverside’s program, which placed greater emphasis on LFA versus HCD training components, dominated the training strategies in the other three counties, especially in the

⁴² The possibility of this “control group contamination” is quite salient, given that the early findings for Riverside County from MDRC’s evaluation led other counties in California to re-orient their GAIN programs towards the Riverside work-first approach. For example, in 1995 Los Angeles County re-oriented its GAIN program to a “work-first” program, attempting to model its program after Riverside’s.

longer run. However, drawing the latter conclusion, while tempting, is subject to the flaw noted in the Introduction and Section 3, namely that the MDRC GAIN Evaluation experimental design does permit direct inferences about the *differential* effects of LFA versus HCD training components. In the next section, we present evidence that attempts to shed light on such differential effects.

4.2 *Estimates of Differential Effects of LFA versus HCD Training Components*

In this section we present estimates of the average differential effects of LFA versus HCD training components ($\gamma_s(\ell, h)$) for the same set of outcomes considered in the previous section with the data from the MDRC GAIN Evaluation. To better examine their temporal patterns, we present year-by-year estimates of $\gamma_s(\ell, h)$ for the 9-year post-randomization period in this section.

We begin by examining the results for the various tests of assumption (A-1') using data for the control groups in the four MDRC GAIN Evaluation counties. The results of these tests are presented in Table 4. For each outcome, we present estimates of $\gamma_s(\ell, h)$, and their standard errors, based on data pooled for all four counties (columns labeled “Four County Ave. $\gamma_s(\ell, h)$ ”) as well as P-values for the year-specific tests of whether all of the county-specific estimates of $\gamma_s(\ell, h)$ equal zero (columns labeled “P-Value, $\gamma_s^d(\ell, h) = 0$ for all d ”). The first two columns for each outcome contain results from regressions that do not adjust for control variables, while the third and fourth columns contain results that control for Z using regression specifications in (6) and (6'), respectively. Results for employment and earnings outcomes are displayed in Panel A and those for participation in AFDC/TANF in Panel B.

Several consistent patterns emerge from these tests for the various outcomes in Table 4.

First, with no controls for background characteristics or pre-random assignment outcome variables, the test for whether the differential effects of LFA versus HCD are zero is always rejected for the All County estimates of $\gamma_s(\ell, h)$ and typically rejected when we allow for county specific effects of $\gamma_s(\ell, h)$. Recall that these tests are being conducted on data for members of the controls groups, who did not receive any GAIN training component for at least the first three years after random assignment. As such, there should be, in principle, no differential effects of one training component over another for these groups. The results of these tests provide clear evidence that there were selective differences in the populations and/or strategies for assigning LFA versus HCD training components across counties which imply that assumption (A-1) does not hold across counties.

Second, after controlling for background characteristics and pre-random assignment outcome variables, we are not able to reject that the All County $\gamma_s(\ell, h)$'s equal zero for any of the employment or earnings outcomes and the same is true for most years for the county-specific estimates of $\gamma_s(\ell, h)$ for these outcomes. That is, the test results in Panel A of Table 4, after controlling for Z , provide substantial support for the validity of assumption (A-1') for the employment and earnings outcomes. As such, these findings provide some justification for the application of the matching/regression-adjustment methods to estimate the differential effects of LFA versus HCD training on these outcomes. The evidence for the validity of assumption (A-1') when estimating the differential effects of LFA versus HCD training on welfare participation outcomes is less compelling. While the results in Panel B of Table 4 for the tests of the All County and county-specific values of $\gamma_s(\ell, h)$ equal zero are typically not rejected, there are many more rejections of these tests, especially in years 8 and 9 after random assignment, than for the employment and earnings outcomes. Thus, it is less clear that using the matching/regression-

adjustment methods to estimate the differential effects of LFA versus HCD training is appropriate for the latter set of outcomes. Therefore, one must be cautious in interpreting the estimates of $\gamma_s(\ell, h)$ for the set of outcomes that are presented in Table 5 and especially those in Table 6.

Given the test results in Table 4, especially for the employment and earnings outcomes, we now turn to the estimates of the average training effects of LFA versus HCD training components derived from matching/regression-adjustment methods. In Table 5, we present the Difference-in-Differences (DID) version of our estimates of $\gamma_s(\ell, h)$ derived from estimating the regression specification in (7) with data from the experimental and control groups of the MDRC GAIN Evaluation. Corresponding estimates based on estimating the regression specification in (6) using only data for the experimental groups are presented in Table 6. As we noted above, the DID estimates in Table 5 represent, in our view, more conservative estimates of the average differential effects of LFA versus HCD training and, accordingly, we pay more attention to them in our discussion. Where appropriate, however, we do discuss some of the differences in the estimates across these two tables. In both Panels of each Table, we present three sets of estimates for each outcome. The first set, in the first column, does not adjust for Z , the second set, in the second column, adjusts for Z , and the third set, in third column, adjusts for Z and post-random assignment values of the county-specific labor market condition variables displayed in Figures 1-4.

Consider the estimates of $\gamma_s(\ell, h)$ for annual employment and earnings outcomes in Panel A of Table 5. Without controlling for Z , the estimates of $\gamma_s(\ell, h)$ for all three outcomes are positive and statistically significant in the first four to five years after random assignment, with the positive (and significant) estimates of $\gamma_s(\ell, h)$ persisting through year 6 for the annual earnings outcome. In the later years (after random assignment), the estimates turn negative and statistically insignificant for the annual employment and annual number of quarters worked outcomes

and become statistically insignificant for the annual earnings outcome, although the latter effects remain positive. Note that these unadjusted DID estimates of $\gamma_s(\ell, h)$ implicitly assume that assumptions (A-1) and (A-2) hold without any adjustments for population and/or training assignment differences across counties, *and* that labor market conditions are comparable over time and across counties. Based on these estimates, one would conclude that being assigned to LFA training components initially had stronger effects on these outcomes than did being assigned to HCD training components, but that the advantage of LFA relative to HCD training largely vanishes in the longer run. Furthermore, these results appears to lend credence to the common, if technically unjustified, interpretation of the county-specific experimental estimates from the MDRC GAIN Evaluation noted at the end of Section 4.1, namely that welfare-to-work programs stress LFA training, like the one in Riverside county, are more effective in improving the economic outcomes of those in welfare-to-work program relative to those that stress HCD training. Furthermore, the persistence of this relative advantage of LFA training components for a fairly long (four to six years) post-randomization period is notable from a training policy perspective. Finally, we note that the unadjusted estimates of differential effects of LFA versus HCD training for employment and earnings outcomes in Panel A of Table 6, which are estimated using only experimental group data, are much larger in magnitude, especially in the initial years after random assignment, and statistically significant in each of the nine years after random assignment, although the estimated differential impacts appear to be unreasonably large in magnitude.

With respect to the unadjusted (for Z) DID estimates of the differential effects of LFA versus HCD training on welfare participation presented in Panel B of Table 5, we find weaker evidence of the relative advantage LFA versus HCD training. With the exception of the first two years after random assignment, there is little evidence of the relative advantage of the former

type of training compared to the latter type of training in reducing post-training rates of participation in AFDC/TANF welfare programs by the GAIN registrants in the MDRC GAIN Evaluation. In contrast, the corresponding estimates of $\gamma_s(\ell, h)$ in Panel B of Table 6, which are based on using only data for experimental groups, suggest much larger relative and statistically significant gains from LFA versus HCD training in reducing welfare participation than were found for the corresponding DID estimates in panel B of Table 5.

We now turn to the estimates of $\gamma_s(\ell, h)$ which adjust for the background and pre-random assignment variables in Z . Recall that our tests of assumption (A-1') using control group data provided evidence in support of adjusting for these variables to remove cross-county differences in population and treatment assignment heterogeneity. Relative to the unadjusted estimates just discussed, adjusting for Z leads to substantively different estimates of the relative impacts of LFA versus HCD training on the post-random assignment employment and earnings outcomes, especially in the longer run. Consider the estimates in the second columns for each outcome in Panel A of Table 5. While the differential effects of LFA versus HCD training has positive and statistically significant effects on all three of these outcomes in the first three years after random assignment, the effects become insignificant after Years 3 or 4, turn negative for the last three or four years after random assignment and are statistically significant in the case of annual employment. That is, a different conclusion emerges from this second set of estimates of the relative advantages of LFA versus HCD training on the employment and earnings of welfare-to-work participants, especially in the longer run. While the relative benefits of HCD training appear to take a while to emerge, based on this set of estimates, it does emerge at least for employment rates. Moreover, the relative advantages of HCD training appear to grow with time. A similar set of conclusions about the longer term advantages of HCD over LFA training of differential effects

are also found for employment outcome after adjusting for background and pre-random assignment outcomes based on using only experimental group data (see Panel A of Table 6). We also find statistically significant estimates in favor of HCD relative to LFA training for annual earnings starting six years after random assignment.

With respect to the estimates of $\gamma_s(\ell, h)$ on the AFDC/TANF participation outcomes, we find few differences between the DID unadjusted estimates (first columns) and the corresponding adjusted (for Z) estimates (second columns) in Table 5. A very similar pattern is found for the estimates of $\gamma_s(\ell, h)$ based on only experimental group data presented in Panel A of Table 6, at least with respect to the signs and statistical significance of the estimates. This lack of differences in the estimates for post-randomization welfare participation outcomes across these two sets of estimates may indicate that controlling for Z simply does not do an adequate job of eliminating the population and training assignment differences across counties as was the case for the employment and earnings outcomes. The latter interpretation is consistent with, although not definitively established by, our test results on welfare outcomes for control group members presented in Table 4.

Finally, we consider how adjusting for post-randomization temporal and across-county differences in labor market conditions affects one's inferences about the differential effects of LFA versus HCD training on employment, earnings and welfare participation outcomes. Estimates of $\gamma_{Ms}(\ell, h)$, derived from estimating the regression specification in (8) with data for the experimental and control groups and a revision of (8) that excludes the terms involving the experimental-control status indicator, T , are presented in the third columns for each outcome in Tables 5 and 6, respectively. These estimates of $\gamma_s(\ell, h)$ adjust for both Z and year-by-year post-

random assignment labor market conditions.⁴³ Consider first the DID estimates for employment and earnings outcomes in Table 5. There are two notable differences between the estimated differential effects of LFA versus HCD effects on these outcomes with and without the additional controls for post-randomization labor market conditions. (Compare estimates in the third column with those in the second column for each outcome.) First, for both measures of employment and the annual earnings outcomes, one finds that the initial post-randomization estimates of $\gamma_s(\ell, h)$ that control for post-randomization labor market conditions are reduced in absolute value and are no longer statistically significant. Second, the longer term estimated negative effects of LFA versus HCD training, seven to nine years after random assignment, for all three outcomes are almost twice the size (in absolute value) of the estimates that just control for Z and, for *both* measures of employment outcomes, are statistically significant. With respect to the estimates of $\gamma_{M_s}(\ell, h)$ using only data on experimental groups, we find similar patterns, although the adjustments for labor market conditions tend to produce much smaller changes (in absolute value) in the longer term estimates relative to those estimates that only control for Z . In short, adjusting for both temporal and across-county differences in post-randomization labor market conditions provides even further evidence of the longer run advantages of HCD over LFA training for the post-training employment and earnings outcomes of participants in the GAIN welfare-to-work programs.

Finally, we note that the adjustments for labor market conditions make little difference in the magnitudes or statistical significance of the $\gamma_{M_s}(\ell, h)$ relative to corresponding estimates of $\gamma_s(\ell, h)$ that only adjust for Z . As already noted, this may be due to the limited success of controlling for Z for eliminating the cross-county differences in welfare-to-work populations and/or

⁴³ All of the post-randomization labor market conditions variables included in the regressions were measured as deviations from mean values for all four counties over the entire nine-year post-randomization period. Thus, the estimates of $\gamma_s(\ell, h)$ correspond to what would prevail at these average levels of labor market conditions.

treatment assignment strategies. Moreover, it may be that the decisions of those on welfare (at the time of random assignment) to stay on—or, for those that leave, to return to—welfare (after random assignment) are less sensitive to labor market conditions than are employment and earnings outcomes.

5. Conclusions

In this paper we propose and implement non-experimental matching/regression-adjustment methods in an attempt to isolate one of the potentially important reasons for across-program differences in training effects, namely that programs differ in the mix in and assignment of different types of training to the participants in its programs. The latter source of treatment heterogeneity and its potential consequences for across-program differences in training effects has been noted by Hotz, Imbens and Mortimer (2005) and others who have evaluated the effectiveness of training programs. We have demonstrated how one might isolate average differential treatment effects of different treatment components with one set of methods. Moreover, we have shown how one can exploit the presence of data on control groups—derived from an evaluation in which subjects are randomly assigned to control status or the receipt of some training component—in order to assess the validity of these matching/regression-adjustment methods. Finally, using data for which we have nine years of post-treatment outcomes for participants in a random assignment experiment, which allows us to estimate the longest term post-training effects of training programs of which we are aware, we have been able to investigate the longer, as well as shorter, run impacts of welfare-to-work training programs.

As for the substantive implications of our re-analysis of the MDRC GAIN Evaluation data, our estimates lead to a rather different set of conclusions about the relative advantages of LFA versus HCD training programs on the post-training outcomes, especially in the longer run,

than exists in the training evaluation literature. Recall from the Introduction that administrators of welfare-to-work programs across the country and welfare policy makers concluded from the success of the LFA-oriented Riverside GAIN program documented in the MDRC GAIN Evaluation that the LFA approach was more successful (and cheaper) than the HCD approach for participants in welfare-to-work training programs.

Based on our re-analysis of the MDRC GAIN Evaluation data using the matching/regression-adjustment methods developed above, we find that the LFA approach, at best, has only short-run advantages over the HCD approach with respect to the post-training employment and earnings outcomes for low-skilled participants in California's welfare-to-work program in the 1990s. Moreover, at least for employment, we present evidence that in the longer run (here some five to six years after training) HCD training components yield higher employment rates for its participants than does LFA training components. Finally, our estimates of the differential effects of LFA versus HCD training components indicate that the longer-term advantages of HCD versus LFA training components for economic outcomes can be sizeable. It follows that the extent to which welfare-to-work training programs care about more than quick fixes in their attempts to improve the self-sufficiency of its participants, our findings suggest that the use of training components that stress the development of work-related skills, rather than simply getting people jobs, needs to be reconsidered.

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Table 1: Background Characteristics and Pre-Randomization Histories of GAIN Evaluation Participants from AFDC Caseload

<i>Variable</i>	Alameda			Los Angeles			Riverside			San Diego		
	<i>Mean</i> ²	<i>Std. Dev.</i>	<i>P-Value</i> ³	<i>Mean</i> ²	<i>Std. Dev.</i>	<i>P-Value</i> ³	<i>Mean</i> ²	<i>Std. Dev.</i>	<i>P-Value</i> ³	<i>Mean</i> ²	<i>Std. Dev.</i>	<i>P-Value</i> ³
Age	34.69	8.61	0.034	38.52	8.43	0.668	33.63	8.20	0.431	33.80	8.59	0.911
White	0.18	0.38	0.806	0.12	0.32	0.621	0.52	0.50	0.533	0.43	0.49	0.263
Hispanic	0.08	0.26	0.045	0.32	0.47	0.233	0.27	0.45	0.937	0.25	0.44	0.089
Black	0.70	0.46	0.562	0.45	0.50	0.600	0.16	0.37	0.323	0.23	0.42	0.345
Other Ethnic Groups	0.04	0.20	0.400	0.11	0.31	0.663	0.05	0.22	0.700	0.09	0.29	0.473
Female-Head	0.95	0.22	0.978	0.94	0.24	0.043	0.88	0.33	0.633	0.84	0.37	0.349
Only One Child	0.42	0.49	0.458	0.33	0.47	0.743	0.39	0.49	0.079	0.43	0.50	0.530
More than One Child	0.57	0.50	0.391	0.67	0.47	0.976	0.58	0.49	0.093	0.53	0.50	0.621
Child 0 to 5 Years	0.31	0.46	0.340	0.10	0.31	0.353	0.16	0.37	0.922	0.13	0.34	0.778
Highest Grade Completed	11.18	2.52	0.921	9.54	3.55	0.548	10.68	2.53	0.938	10.66	3.04	0.373
In Need of Basic Education	0.65	0.48	0.885	0.81	0.40	0.982	0.60	0.49	0.615	0.56	0.50	0.362
Earnings 1 Qtr. before Rand. Assign. ¹	\$213	\$851	0.797	\$221	\$874	0.454	\$452	\$1,404	0.452	\$588	\$1,485	0.270
Earnings 4 Qtrs. before Rand. Assign. ¹	\$264	\$1,018	0.012	\$216	\$866	0.405	\$614	\$1,603	0.073	\$808	\$1,879	0.747
Earnings 8 Qtrs. before Rand. Assign. ¹	\$220	\$1,005	0.460	\$181	\$796	0.473	\$728	\$1,840	0.003	\$827	\$1,958	0.301
Employed 1 Qtr. before Rand. Assign.	0.14	0.34	0.531	0.12	0.33	0.469	0.22	0.42	0.664	0.27	0.44	0.118
Employed 4 Qtrs. before Rand. Assign.	0.14	0.34	0.000	0.13	0.33	0.634	0.25	0.43	0.976	0.29	0.45	0.926
Employed 8 Qtrs. before Rand. Assign.	0.13	0.33	0.896	0.11	0.32	0.565	0.27	0.44	0.044	0.28	0.45	0.149
AFDC Benefits 1 Qtr. before Rand. Assign. ¹	\$1,907	\$526	0.331	\$1,874	\$663	0.792	\$1,190	\$1,043	0.499	\$1,159	\$903	0.046
AFDC Benefits 4 Qtrs. before Rand. Assign. ¹	\$1,822	\$551	0.317	\$1,867	\$662	0.440	\$995	\$1,027	0.663	\$1,008	\$928	0.098
On AFDC 1 Qtr. before Rand. Assign.	0.98	0.14	0.692	0.99	0.10	0.341	0.77	0.42	0.837	0.73	0.44	0.086
On AFDC 4 Qtrs. before Rand. Assign.	0.96	0.19	0.982	0.98	0.14	0.765	0.63	0.48	0.973	0.60	0.49	0.102
Prop. Entered GAIN in 1988:Q3							0.11	0.31	0.085	0.15	0.36	0.000
Prop. Entered GAIN in 1988:Q4							0.18	0.38	0.073	0.24	0.43	0.000
Prop. Entered GAIN in 1989:Q1							0.17	0.38	0.631	0.24	0.42	0.000
Prop. Entered GAIN in 1989:Q2							0.17	0.37	0.299	0.21	0.41	0.205
Prop. Entered GAIN in 1989:Q3	0.26	0.44	0.944	0.56	0.50	0.000	0.13	0.34	0.699	0.16	0.37	0.000
Prop. Entered GAIN in 1989:Q4	0.21	0.41	0.767	0.26	0.44	0.000	0.13	0.34	0.746			
Prop. Entered GAIN in 1990:Q1	0.32	0.47	0.769	0.18	0.39	0.244	0.11	0.31	0.165			
Prop. Entered GAIN in 1990:Q2	0.21	0.41	0.578									
Number of Experimental Cases	597			2,995			4,405			6,978		
Number of Control Cases	601			1,400			1,040			1,154		
Total Number of Cases	1,198			4,395			5,445			8,132		
Fraction of Cases in Experimental Group	0.498			0.681			0.809			0.858		

¹In 1999\$.

²Mean (and standard deviation) for full sample (i.e., experimental *and* control groups).

³P-Value for test of difference between experimental and control group means.

Table 2: Distribution of Proportion of Participation in Various GAIN Training Components¹

<i>Yr:Qtr</i>	<u>Labor Force Attachment (LFA) Activities</u>			<u>Human Capital Development (HCD) Activities</u>				Prop. of GAIN Registrants deemed “In Need of Basic Skills”
	<i>Job Club & Job Search Activities</i>	<i>All Other Job Search Activities</i>	<i>All LFA Activities</i>	<i>Basic Education Program</i>	<i>Vocational Training</i>	<i>On the Job Training (OJT)</i>	<i>All HCD Activities</i>	
Alameda								
1988:Q3	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.00	0.00	1.00	
1988:Q4	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.00	0.00	1.00	
1989:Q1	0.21	0.00	0.21	0.53	0.26	0.00	0.79	
1989:Q2	0.34	0.02	0.36	0.37	0.27	0.00	0.64	
1989:Q3	0.35	0.02	0.37	0.36	0.27	0.00	0.63	0.700
1989:Q4	0.33	0.09	0.42	0.44	0.12	0.00	0.56	0.683
1990:Q1	0.29	0.05	0.34	0.44	0.22	0.00	0.66	0.624
1990:Q2	0.45	0.03	0.48	0.38	0.13	0.01	0.52	0.610
Los Angeles								
1988:Q3	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	
1988:Q4	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.08	0.92	0.00	1.00	
1989:Q1	0.14	0.00	0.14	0.72	0.14	0.00	0.86	
1989:Q2	0.23	0.01	0.24	0.61	0.15	0.00	0.76	
1989:Q3	0.22	0.02	0.24	0.68	0.08	0.00	0.76	0.797
1989:Q4	0.23	0.04	0.27	0.65	0.08	0.00	0.73	0.816
1990:Q1	0.19	0.07	0.26	0.63	0.12	0.00	0.75	0.818
1990:Q2	0.16	0.05	0.21	0.64	0.15	0.00	0.79	
Riverside								
1988:Q3	0.51	0.09	0.60	0.21	0.20	0.00	0.41	0.658
1988:Q4	0.62	0.07	0.69	0.20	0.10	0.00	0.30	0.597
1989:Q1	0.56	0.03	0.59	0.26	0.14	0.00	0.40	0.591
1989:Q2	0.63	0.05	0.68	0.20	0.12	0.00	0.32	0.599
1989:Q3	0.64	0.03	0.67	0.19	0.14	0.01	0.34	0.581
1989:Q4	0.45	0.02	0.47	0.32	0.21	0.00	0.53	0.574
1990:Q1	0.52	0.03	0.55	0.23	0.22	0.00	0.45	0.627
1990:Q2	0.52	0.01	0.53	0.24	0.23	0.00	0.47	
San Diego								
1988:Q3	0.41	0.01	0.42	0.28	0.28	0.01	0.57	0.567
1988:Q4	0.45	0.01	0.46	0.30	0.22	0.01	0.53	0.545
1989:Q1	0.41	0.01	0.42	0.30	0.24	0.02	0.56	0.585
1989:Q2	0.42	0.02	0.44	0.31	0.21	0.02	0.54	0.578
1989:Q3	0.28	0.05	0.33	0.42	0.23	0.01	0.66	0.528
1989:Q4	0.30	0.06	0.36	0.27	0.28	0.04	0.59	
1990:Q1	0.34	0.08	0.42	0.33	0.21	0.02	0.56	
1990:Q2	0.31	0.06	0.37	0.41	0.15	0.02	0.58	

¹Shaded entries denote quarters in which random assignment was conducted in the various counties.

²PREP stands for “Pre-Employment Preparation. This was California’s form of Workfare, i.e., it was unpaid work experience.

**Table 3: Experimental Estimates of Annual Impacts of GAIN
AFDC-FG Cases in MDRC GAIN Evaluation**

<i>Years after RA</i>	Alameda			Los Angeles			Riverside			San Diego		
	<i>Exper.</i>	<i>Control</i>	<i>Diff.</i>	<i>Exper.</i>	<i>Control</i>	<i>Diff.</i>	<i>Exper.</i>	<i>Control</i>	<i>Diff.</i>	<i>Exper.</i>	<i>Control</i>	<i>Diff.</i>
Annual Employment (%)												
1-3	30.8	28.1	2.7 (2.2)	26.1	24.5	1.7 (1.2)	49.0	35.3	13.6*** (1.3)	45.1	40.8	4.3*** (1.3)
4-6	37.0	34.7	2.3 (2.4)	29.2	25.8	3.3*** (1.3)	40.4	33.5	6.9*** (1.4)	40.8	38.2	2.6* (1.4)
7-9	45.3	45.3	0.0 (2.6)	36.9	33.1	3.8*** (1.4)	39.3	37.8	1.5 (1.4)	41.0	40.9	0.1 (1.4)
Annual Number of Quarters Worked												
1-3	0.80	0.75	0.05 (0.07)	0.71	0.67	0.04 (0.04)	1.33	0.90	0.43*** (0.04)	1.25	1.09	0.15*** (0.04)
4-6	1.12	1.02	0.10 (0.08)	0.87	0.77	0.10** (0.04)	1.23	0.98	0.25*** (0.05)	1.26	1.17	0.09* (0.05)
7-9	1.47	1.42	0.05 (0.09)	1.16	1.03	0.13*** (0.05)	1.23	1.15	0.08 (0.05)	1.32	1.28	0.04 (0.05)
Annual Earnings (1999\$)												
1-3	2,333	1,849	484 (302)	1,843	1,849	-6 (149)	3,668	2,253	1,416*** (208)	3,781	3,165	616*** (208)
4-6	4,069	3,342	727 (464)	2,615	2,493	122 (196)	4,363	3,201	1,162*** (283)	4,849	4,315	534* (283)
7-9	5,871	5,206	665 (563)	3,689	3,386	302 (236)	4,585	4,174	411 (308)	5,394	4,948	446 (308)

NOTES:

Standard errors in parentheses.

* denotes statistically significant at 10% level; ** denotes statistically significant at 5% level; *** denotes statistically significant at 1% level.

Table 3: (Continued)

<i>Years after RA</i>	Alameda			Los Angeles			Riverside			San Diego		
	<i>Exper.</i>	<i>Control</i>	<i>Diff.</i>	<i>Exper.</i>	<i>Control</i>	<i>Diff.</i>	<i>Exper.</i>	<i>Control</i>	<i>Diff.</i>	<i>Exper.</i>	<i>Control</i>	<i>Diff.</i>
On AFDC/TANF in Year (%)												
1-3	86.0	87.6	-1.6 (1.4)	85.1	87.6	-2.5*** (0.8)	71.7	77.5	-5.8*** (1.0)	73.9	76.5	-2.5*** (1.0)
4-6	56.3	63.2	-6.9*** (2.6)	53.7	57.4	-3.7** (1.4)	39.8	44.6	-4.8*** (1.4)	41.3	44.5	-3.2** (1.4)
7-9	37.2	39.8	-2.6 (2.5)	33.4	35.6	-2.2 (1.4)	25.3	28.5	-3.2** (1.3)	26.2	28.9	-2.7** (1.3)
Number of Quarters on AFDC/TANF in Year												
1-3	3.14	3.33	-0.18*** (0.07)	3.13	3.30	-0.17*** (0.04)	2.39	2.71	-0.32*** (0.04)	2.54	2.68	-0.15*** (0.04)
4-6	2.05	2.37	-0.33*** (0.10)	1.92	2.12	-0.20*** (0.06)	1.34	1.56	-0.22*** (0.05)	1.44	1.57	-0.13** (0.05)
7-9	1.32	1.38	-0.06 (0.09)	1.18	1.28	-0.10* (0.05)	0.83	0.97	-0.14*** (0.05)	0.90	0.99	-0.09** (0.05)

NOTES:

Standard errors in parentheses.

* denotes statistically significant at 10% level; ** denotes statistically significant at 5% level; *** denotes statistically significant at 1% level.

**Table 4: Tests of Assumption (A-1')
AFDC-FG Control Group Cases from MDRC GAIN Evaluation**

Panel A: Employment and Earnings Outcomes

Year after Random Assignment	Annual Employment (%)				Annual Quarters Worked				Annual Earnings (1999\$)			
	Four County Ave. $\gamma_s(\ell, h)$	P-Value, $\gamma_s^d(\ell, h)$ =0 for all d	Four County Ave. $\gamma_s(\ell, h)$	P-Value, $\gamma_s^d(\ell, h)$ =0 for all d	Four County Ave. $\gamma_s(\ell, h)$	P-Value, $\gamma_s^d(\ell, h)$ =0 for all d	Four County Ave. $\gamma_s(\ell, h)$	P-Value, $\gamma_s^d(\ell, h)$ =0 for all d	Four County Ave. $\gamma_s(\ell, h)$	P-Value, $\gamma_s^d(\ell, h)$ =0 for all d	Four County Ave. $\gamma_s(\ell, h)$	P-Value, $\gamma_s^d(\ell, h)$ =0 for all d
Year 1	37.5*** (5.5)	0.3322	-21.8 (21.6)	0.4288	0.72*** (0.15)	0.1688	-0.83 (0.57)	0.3122	727 (522)	0.2937	-2,263 (1,828)	0.7950
Year 2	42.6*** (5.6)	0.6933	-5.0 (23.9)	0.4577	0.96*** (0.17)	0.5195	0.24 (0.71)	0.2980	2,755*** (718)	0.7372	2,448 (2,883)	0.2857
Year 3	44.1*** (5.4)	0.9856	-3.8 (24.7)	0.9826	1.14*** (0.17)	0.6009	-0.40 (0.76)	0.5694	3,376*** (760)	0.5741	193 (3,155)	0.2428
Year 4	41.1*** (5.5)	0.7877	-13.1 (24.6)	0.1693	1.14*** (0.18)	0.8604	-0.21 (0.80)	0.3774	4,241*** (826)	0.3899	248 (3,385)	0.6496
Year 5	29.0*** (5.5)	0.0337	-20.5 (24.3)	0.0848	0.89*** (0.18)	0.1321	-0.03 (0.82)	0.2912	3,401*** (879)	0.1106	1,790 (3,760)	0.5832
Year 6	23.1*** (5.6)	0.0131	-13.1 (25.6)	0.5829	0.77*** (0.19)	0.0119	-0.31 (0.86)	0.5393	3,796*** (923)	0.0471	3,225 (3,847)	0.2597
Year 7	25.8*** (5.7)	0.0326	-16.9 (26.0)	0.0735	0.79*** (0.19)	0.0111	0.07 (0.90)	0.1632	3,583*** (938)	0.0110	2,569 (4,267)	0.1020
Year 8	19.2*** (5.8)	0.0755	-30.2 (26.2)	0.6259	0.57*** (0.20)	0.0027	-0.55 (0.92)	0.5708	3,794*** (961)	0.0020	446 (4,753)	0.4018
Year 9	21.7*** (5.9)	0.3908	3.2 (26.5)	0.9573	0.55*** (0.20)	0.0310	-0.53 (0.93)	0.9511	3,814*** (1,075)	0.0143	-2,625 (4,947)	0.5829

Control for:

Personal/Family Characteristics	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Pre-RA Earnings, AFDC & Employ.	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes

NOTES:

- Standard errors in parentheses.
- All regressions are weighted by the size of the caseload in County of Residence in Year: Quarter enrolled in GAIN evaluation.
- Personal/Family Characteristics* are all measured at Random Assignment and include: Age, Age²; dummy variables for Hispanic, Black, Other Ethnic Group; Only 1 Child; Single, Some High School, High School Graduate, Some College, College Graduate, College Plus, Registered and Enrolled in GAIN in 1988:Q3, Registered and Enrolled in GAIN in 1988:Q4, Registered and Enrolled in GAIN in 1989:Q1, Registered and Enrolled in GAIN in 1989:Q2, Registered and Enrolled in GAIN in 1989:Q3, Registered and Enrolled in GAIN in 1989:Q4, Registered and Enrolled in GAIN in 1990:Q1, Resided in Los Angeles County, Resided in Riverside County, Resided in San Diego County; and Whether Classified as "In Need of Basic Education" by GAIN program; and Growth Rate in Real Earnings per Worker in County of Residence as of Quarter of Random Assignment and Growth Rate in Employment-to-Population in County of Residence as of Quarter of Random Assignment.
- Pre-RA (Random Assignment) Earnings, AFDC, Employment* variables include: dummy variables for Not Employed in Any of 8 Quarters prior to RA, Not Employed in Any of 10 Quarters prior to RA, Employed in Quarter X before RA, X = 1,...,10, and On AFDC in Quarter X prior to RA, X = 1,...,6; and Earnings in Quarter X prior to RA, X = 1,...,10 and Amount of AFDC Payment in Quarter X prior to RA, X = 1,...,4.
- County Labor Market Conditions* variables include: Ratio of Total Employment to Adult Population for County of Residence in Year t and Annual Retail Trade Earnings per Worker (in 1000s of 1999\$) for County of Residence in Year t.

* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

Table 4: Continued

Panel B: AFDC/TANF Participation Outcomes

Year after Random Assignment	On AFDC/TANF in Year (%)				Quarters on AFDC/TANF in Year			
	<i>Four County Ave.</i> $\gamma_s(\ell, h)$	<i>P-Value, =0 for all d</i> $\gamma_s^d(\ell, h)$	<i>Four County Ave.</i> $\gamma_s(\ell, h)$	<i>P-Value, =0 for all d</i> $\gamma_s^d(\ell, h)$	<i>Four County Ave.</i> $\gamma_s(\ell, h)$	<i>P-Value, =0 for all d</i> $\gamma_s^d(\ell, h)$	<i>Four County Ave.</i> $\gamma_s(\ell, h)$	<i>P-Value, =0 for all d</i> $\gamma_s^d(\ell, h)$
Year 1	-7.9*** (1.6)	0.2870	-11.5 (9.4)	0.6406	-1.09*** (0.10)	0.3183	-0.06 (0.54)	0.3570
Year 2	-42.5*** (4.5)	0.0304	-20.1 (22.7)	0.1695	-2.33*** (0.18)	0.0049	-0.92 (0.90)	0.1022
Year 3	-52.4*** (5.4)	0.0144	-60.9** (25.2)	0.0267	-2.28*** (0.21)	0.0040	-1.90** (0.95)	0.0187
Year 4	-48.1*** (5.9)	0.1201	-24.3 (26.2)	0.0164	-2.02*** (0.23)	0.0577	-0.74 (1.00)	0.0153
Year 5	-33.6*** (6.0)	0.1411	-22.1 (27.0)	0.2187	-1.53*** (0.23)	0.1276	-0.83 (1.01)	0.2609
Year 6	-33.4*** (6.0)	0.1755	-50.4* (26.3)	0.1451	-1.46*** (0.23)	0.1298	-1.31 (0.97)	0.3245
Year 7	-25.8*** (6.0)	0.0851	-35.6 (25.7)	0.3881	-1.13*** (0.22)	0.0959	-1.40 (0.96)	0.1711
Year 8	-19.4*** (5.7)	0.1357	-63.4** (25.0)	0.0623	-0.85*** (0.21)	0.1174	-2.13** (0.92)	0.0433
Year 9	-18.7*** (5.4)	0.1028	-55.3** (23.4)	0.0501	-0.78*** (0.19)	0.1385	-2.10** (0.82)	0.0299
Control for:								
Personal/Family Characteristics	No		Yes		No		Yes	
Pre-RA Earnings, AFDC & Employ.	No		Yes		No		Yes	

NOTES: See Panel A of Table 5.

**Table 5: Difference-in-Differences Estimates of Differential Effects of Labor Force Attachment (LFA) vs. Human Capital Development (HCD) Programs
AFDC Experimental and Control Group Cases from MDRC GAIN Evaluation**

Panel A: Annual Employment and Earnings Outcomes

Year after Random Assignment	Annual Employment (%)			Annual Quarters Worked			Annual Earnings (1999\$)		
$\gamma(\ell, h)$ in Year 1	35.6*** (6.5)	32.3*** (6.6)	10.9 (10.3)	1.04*** (0.18)	0.92*** (0.20)	0.23 (0.34)	3,168*** (613)	1,518* (815)	-931 (1,692)
$\gamma(\ell, h)$ in Year 2	34.1*** (6.5)	30.8*** (6.8)	10.2 (10.3)	1.24*** (0.20)	1.12*** (0.22)	0.45 (0.35)	4,842*** (837)	3,192*** (973)	648 (1,792)
$\gamma(\ell, h)$ in Year 3	19.3*** (6.3)	16.0** (6.7)	-0.8 (9.4)	0.80*** (0.20)	0.68*** (0.22)	0.16 (0.32)	4,305*** (899)	2,656*** (1,020)	1,050 (1,640)
$\gamma(\ell, h)$ in Year 4	13.0** (6.4)	9.7 (6.8)	-4.4 (9.0)	0.54*** (0.21)	0.42* (0.23)	0.00 (0.31)	3,431*** (963)	1,781* (1,074)	913 (1,586)
$\gamma(\ell, h)$ in Year 5	11.2* (6.5)	8.0 (6.8)	-5.1 (9.0)	0.40* (0.21)	0.28 (0.23)	-0.11 (0.31)	3,257*** (1,025)	1,607 (1,127)	641 (1,611)
$\gamma(\ell, h)$ in Year 6	-1.9 (6.6)	-5.1 (6.9)	-16.9* (9.0)	0.06 (0.22)	-0.07 (0.24)	-0.41 (0.31)	2,164** (1,077)	514 (1,182)	-195 (1,612)
$\gamma(\ell, h)$ in Year 7	-11.8* (6.7)	-15.1** (7.1)	-27.2*** (9.3)	-0.30 (0.22)	-0.42* (0.24)	-0.78** (0.32)	1,492 (1,098)	-158 (1,210)	-979 (1,674)
$\gamma(\ell, h)$ in Year 8	-9.3 (6.8)	-12.6* (7.1)	-25.2*** (9.2)	-0.20 (0.23)	-0.32 (0.25)	-0.69** (0.32)	441 (1,128)	-1,208 (1,241)	-2,113 (1,686)
$\gamma(\ell, h)$ in Year 9	-14.5** (6.9)	-17.8** (7.3)	-29.3*** (9.1)	-0.29 (0.24)	-0.42 (0.26)	-0.75** (0.32)	23 (1,250)	-1,627 (1,346)	-2,380 (1,716)
Control for:									
Personal/Family Characteristics	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Pre-RA Earnings, AFDC & Employ.	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Post-RA County Lab. Mkt. Cond.	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes

NOTES:

- Standard errors in parentheses.
- All regressions are weighted by the size of the caseload in County of Residence in Year: Quarter enrolled in GAIN evaluation.
- Personal/Family Characteristics* are all measured at Random Assignment and include: Age, Age²; dummy variables for Hispanic, Black, Other Ethnic Group; Only 1 Child; Single, Some High School, High School Graduate, Some College, College Graduate, College Plus, Registered and Enrolled in GAIN in 1988:Q3, Registered and Enrolled in GAIN in 1988:Q4, Registered and Enrolled in GAIN in 1989:Q1, Registered and Enrolled in GAIN in 1989:Q2, Registered and Enrolled in GAIN in 1989:Q3, Registered and Enrolled in GAIN in 1989:Q4, Registered and Enrolled in GAIN in 1990:Q1, Resided in Los Angeles County, Resided in Riverside County, Resided in San Diego County; and Whether Classified as “In Need of Basic Education” by GAIN program; and Growth Rate in Real Earnings per Worker in County of Residence as of Quarter of Random Assignment and Growth Rate in Employment-to-Population in County of Residence as of Quarter of Random Assignment. All of these variables are interacted with experimental status.
- Pre-RA (Random Assignment) Earnings, AFDC, Employment* variables include: dummy variables for Not Employed in Any of 8 Quarters prior to RA, Not Employed in Any of 10 Quarters prior to RA, Employed in Quarter X before RA, $X = 1, \dots, 10$, and On AFDC in Quarter X prior to RA, $X = 1, \dots, 6$; and Earnings in Quarter X prior to RA, $X = 1, \dots, 10$ and Amount of AFDC Payment in Quarter X prior to RA, $X = 1, \dots, 4$. All of these variables are interacted with experimental status.
- Post-RA County Labor Market Conditions* variables include: Ratio of Total Employment to Adult Population, the Employment-to-Adult-Population ratio for the Retail Trade Sector, the Annual Earnings per Worker in All Sectors (in 1000s of 1999\$), and Annual Retail Trade Earnings per Worker (in 1000s of 1999\$) for County of Residence in Year t . All of these variables are interacted with experimental status and, in designated regressions, they are interacted with experimental status and Proportion in LFA Activities based on Case’s County of Residence and Year: Quarter of Entry into GAIN.

* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

Table 5: Continued

Panel B: Annual AFDC/TANF Participation Outcomes

Year after Random Assignment	On AFDC/TANF in Year (%)			Quarters on AFDC/TANF in Year		
$\gamma(\ell, h)$ in Year 1	-2.5 (1.8)	-1.4 (4.2)	-0.8 (8.6)	-0.31*** (0.12)	-0.34* (0.18)	-0.27 (0.35)
$\gamma(\ell, h)$ in Year 2	-12.5** (5.3)	-11.4* (6.0)	-10.2 (9.8)	-0.44** (0.22)	-0.47* (0.24)	-0.37 (0.40)
$\gamma(\ell, h)$ in Year 3	-9.2 (6.4)	-8.1 (6.7)	-8.5 (9.5)	-0.39 (0.25)	-0.42 (0.26)	-0.40 (0.38)
$\gamma(\ell, h)$ in Year 4	-4.1 (6.9)	-3.0 (7.1)	-5.1 (9.4)	-0.15 (0.26)	-0.18 (0.27)	-0.23 (0.37)
$\gamma(\ell, h)$ in Year 5	-12.1* (7.0)	-11.0 (7.2)	-12.3 (9.5)	-0.32 (0.27)	-0.34 (0.28)	-0.35 (0.37)
$\gamma(\ell, h)$ in Year 6	-4.5 (7.0)	-3.3 (7.2)	-4.8 (9.5)	-0.03 (0.27)	-0.05 (0.28)	-0.07 (0.37)
$\gamma(\ell, h)$ in Year 7	-4.8 (6.9)	-3.7 (7.2)	-5.1 (9.6)	-0.14 (0.26)	-0.16 (0.27)	-0.17 (0.37)
$\gamma(\ell, h)$ in Year 8	-7.7 (6.7)	-6.6 (7.0)	-7.1 (9.4)	-0.25 (0.25)	-0.27 (0.26)	-0.25 (0.36)
$\gamma(\ell, h)$ in Year 9	-3.3 (6.3)	-2.2 (6.8)	-2.5 (8.7)	-0.13 (0.22)	-0.15 (0.25)	-0.12 (0.33)
Control for:						
Personal/Family Characteristics	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Pre-RA Earnings, AFDC & Employ.	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Post-RA County Lab. Mkt. Cond.	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes

NOTES: See Panel A of Table 6.

**Table 6: Estimates of Differential Effects of Labor Force Attachment (LFA) vs. Human Capital Development (HCD) Programs
AFDC Experimental Group Cases from MDRC GAIN Evaluation**

Panel A: Annual Employment and Earnings Outcomes

Year after Random Assignment	Annual Employment			Annual Quarters Worked			Annual Earnings		
$\gamma(\ell, h)$ in Year 1	73.1*** (3.3)	20.5** (9.2)	28.1*** (9.4)	1.76*** (0.09)	0.06 (0.33)	0.38 (0.33)	3,894*** (321)	-5,305*** (1,669)	-4,399*** (1,671)
$\gamma(\ell, h)$ in Year 2	76.7*** (3.3)	24.0*** (9.2)	32.0*** (9.4)	2.20*** (0.11)	0.51 (0.33)	0.79** (0.33)	7,597*** (428)	-1,603 (1,667)	-1,087 (1,661)
$\gamma(\ell, h)$ in Year 3	63.4*** (3.3)	10.8 (9.1)	11.9 (9.1)	1.94*** (0.11)	0.25 (0.33)	0.30 (0.33)	7,681*** (479)	-1,518 (1,669)	-1,371 (1,664)
$\gamma(\ell, h)$ in Year 4	54.1*** (3.3)	1.4 (9.1)	-2.5 (9.2)	1.68*** (0.11)	-0.01 (0.33)	-0.12 (0.33)	7,672*** (495)	-1,528 (1,674)	-1,510 (1,695)
$\gamma(\ell, h)$ in Year 5	40.3*** (3.4)	-12.4 (9.1)	-14.9 (9.2)	1.29*** (0.11)	-0.40 (0.33)	-0.50 (0.33)	6,658*** (526)	-2,542 (1,679)	-2,758 (1,694)
$\gamma(\ell, h)$ in Year 6	21.2*** (3.5)	-31.4*** (9.1)	-34.8*** (9.2)	0.83*** (0.12)	-0.86*** (0.33)	-0.99*** (0.33)	5,960*** (555)	-3,240* (1,686)	-3,498** (1,710)
$\gamma(\ell, h)$ in Year 7	14.1*** (3.5)	-38.6*** (9.1)	-40.9*** (9.2)	0.49*** (0.12)	-1.20*** (0.33)	-1.28*** (0.33)	5,074*** (570)	-4,126** (1,689)	-4,257** (1,704)
$\gamma(\ell, h)$ in Year 8	9.9*** (3.5)	-42.8*** (9.2)	-44.9*** (9.2)	0.37*** (0.12)	-1.32*** (0.33)	-1.41*** (0.33)	4,235*** (592)	-4,965*** (1,693)	-5,259*** (1,708)
$\gamma(\ell, h)$ in Year 9	7.1** (3.6)	-45.5*** (9.2)	-48.9*** (9.4)	0.26** (0.13)	-1.43*** (0.33)	-1.59*** (0.34)	3,837*** (637)	-5,363*** (1,715)	-5,962*** (1,744)
Control for:									
Personal/Family Characteristics	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Pre-RA Earnings, AFDC & Employ.	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Post-RA County Lab. Mkt. Cond.	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes

NOTES:

- Standard errors in parentheses.
 - All regressions are weighted by the size of the caseload in County of Residence in Year: Quarter enrolled in GAIN evaluation.
 - Personal/Family Characteristics* are all measured at Random Assignment and include: Age, Age²; dummy variables for Hispanic, Black, Other Ethnic Group; Only 1 Child; Single, Some High School, High School Graduate, Some College, College Graduate, College Plus, Registered and Enrolled in GAIN in 1988:Q3, Registered and Enrolled in GAIN in 1988:Q4, Registered and Enrolled in GAIN in 1989:Q1, Registered and Enrolled in GAIN in 1989:Q2, Registered and Enrolled in GAIN in 1989:Q3, Registered and Enrolled in GAIN in 1989:Q4, Registered and Enrolled in GAIN in 1990:Q1, Resided in Los Angeles County, Resided in Riverside County, Resided in San Diego County; and Whether Classified as "In Need of Basic Education" by GAIN program; and Growth Rate in Real Earnings per Worker in County of Residence as of Quarter of Random Assignment and Growth Rate in Employment-to-Population in County of Residence as of Quarter of Random Assignment.
 - Pre-RA (Random Assignment) Earnings, AFDC, Employment* variables include: dummy variables for Not Employed in Any of 8 Quarters prior to RA, Not Employed in Any of 10 Quarters prior to RA, Employed in Quarter X before RA, $X = 1, \dots, 10$, and On AFDC in Quarter X prior to RA, $X = 1, \dots, 6$; and Earnings in Quarter X prior to RA, $X = 1, \dots, 10$ and Amount of AFDC Payment in Quarter X prior to RA, $X = 1, \dots, 4$.
 - Post-RA County Labor Market Conditions* variables include: Ratio of Total Employment to Adult Population, the Employment-to-Adult-Population ratio for the Retail Trade Sector, the Annual Earnings per Worker in All Sectors (in 1000s of 1999\$), and Annual Retail Trade Earnings per Worker (in 1000s of 1999\$) for County of Residence in Year t .
- * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%


Table 6: Continued

Panel B: Annual AFDC/TANF Participation Outcomes


Year after Random Assignment	On AFDC/TANF in Year			Quarters on AFDC/TANF in Year		
$\gamma(\ell, h)$ in Year 1	-10.4*** (0.9)	25.2*** (8.6)	22.5** (8.8)	-1.40*** (0.06)	0.25 (0.33)	0.27 (0.34)
$\gamma(\ell, h)$ in Year 2	-54.9*** (2.9)	-19.4** (8.8)	-22.7** (8.9)	-2.77*** (0.12)	-1.11*** (0.34)	-1.15*** (0.35)
$\gamma(\ell, h)$ in Year 3	-61.6*** (3.4)	-26.0*** (8.8)	-26.4*** (8.8)	-2.67*** (0.13)	-1.01*** (0.34)	-1.01*** (0.34)
$\gamma(\ell, h)$ in Year 4	-52.2*** (3.6)	-16.7* (8.8)	-14.7 (8.9)	-2.17*** (0.14)	-0.51 (0.34)	-0.46 (0.35)
$\gamma(\ell, h)$ in Year 5	-45.7*** (3.6)	-10.1 (8.8)	-9.2 (8.9)	-1.84*** (0.14)	-0.18 (0.34)	-0.18 (0.34)
$\gamma(\ell, h)$ in Year 6	-37.9*** (3.6)	-2.3 (8.8)	-0.9 (8.9)	-1.48*** (0.13)	0.18 (0.34)	0.19 (0.35)
$\gamma(\ell, h)$ in Year 7	-30.6*** (3.5)	5.0 (8.7)	6.0 (8.9)	-1.27*** (0.13)	0.39 (0.34)	0.40 (0.34)
$\gamma(\ell, h)$ in Year 8	-27.1*** (3.4)	8.5 (8.8)	9.1 (8.9)	-1.10*** (0.12)	0.56* (0.34)	0.55 (0.34)
$\gamma(\ell, h)$ in Year 9	-22.0*** (3.2)	13.6 (8.7)	14.5 (9.0)	-0.91*** (0.11)	0.75** (0.34)	0.72** (0.35)
Control for:						
Personal/Family Characteristics	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Pre-RA Earnings, AFDC & Employ.	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Post-RA County Lab. Mkt. Cond.	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes

NOTES: See Panel A of Table A-1.


**Figure 1: Annual Ratio of Total Employment to Adult Population, All Sectors
[Weighted by AFDC-FG Caseload]**




**Figure 2: Annual Earnings per Worker, All Sectors
[Weighted by AFDC-FG Caseload]**



**Figure 3: Ratio of Annual Employment in Retail Trade Sector to Adult Population
[Weighted by AFDC-FG Caseload]**



**Figure 4: Annual Earnings per Worker, Retail Trade Sector
[Weighted by AFDC-FG Caseload]**



Appendix

Potential Contamination of Long-Term Experimental GAIN Estimates due to Expiration of Embargo from GAIN Services for Control Group Members

To investigate the potential importance of the possibility that the improvement in the control group outcomes over Years 4 through 9 after random assignment can account for the decline in the longer-term estimated impacts of GAIN on economic outcomes, we examine the extent to which the improvements in control group economic outcomes might be explained by control group members receiving and benefiting from GAIN services in Years 4 through 9. In Table A-1, we compare the trends in actual control group economic outcomes for each of the four counties with estimates of these outcomes based on the assumption that all control group members that were on AFDC experienced the mean outcomes for their county's experimental group, with a three year lag due to the initial embargo. The notes in Table A-1 explain exactly how we calculated these latter estimates. In that Table, we reproduce the actual mean outcomes for the control groups of each county from Table 3 and compare them with what we estimate their outcomes would have been if the fraction of these groups that were on AFDC in Years 4 through 6 experienced the mean outcome for the experimental group with a three year lag. As seen from Table A-1, we find that for most of the economic outcomes—especially for the earnings outcomes—and in most of the counties these estimated outcomes are, on average, less than the actual outcomes experienced by control group members. That is, it appears that only part of the improvement in the economic outcomes for control group members could be explained by the control group receiving and benefiting from GAIN services after their embargo from receipt of these services was lifted. The one exception to this conclusion is for the annual employment outcome in Riverside County, where the estimates based on this explanation either over-predict or slightly under-predict the actual rise for the control group in this county. We note that this exception is of some

importance, given that Riverside's GAIN program was demonstrated to be effective at increasing employment rates in the MDRC 3-Year study.

While we cannot rule out the "contaminated control group" explanation for the decline in the longer-term impacts of GAIN in Riverside County shown in Table 3, the calculations presented in Table A-1 certainly raise questions about its validity. As a final consideration, we note that we do not find any differences by experimental-control group status in the trends for the AFDC participation outcomes in Table 3. In particular, for both the Ever-Received AFDC/TANF and Number of Quarters on AFDC/TANF outcome measures, we find that the mean estimates for experimentals and controls decline over time at approximately the same rate in Riverside County as in the other three counties.

Table A-1: Comparison of Control Group Outcomes with Estimates under Assumption that Controls on AFDC had the Same Mean Outcomes as Experimental Group

Years after Random Assignment	Alameda			Riverside			San Diego					
	Observed (Mean Outcome)	Est. (Mean Outcome)	% Diff. (Est.– Obs.)	Observed (Mean Outcome)	Est. (Mean Outcome)	% Diff. (Est.– Obs.)	Observed (Mean Outcome)	Est. (Mean Outcome)	% Diff. (Est.– Obs.)	Observed (Mean Outcome)	Est. (Mean Outcome)	% Diff. (Est.– Obs.)
Ever Employed in Year (%)												
1-3	28.1	28.1	0.0%	24.5	24.5	0.0%	35.3	35.3	0.0%	40.8	40.8	0.0%
4-6	34.7	29.8	-14.3%	25.8	25.4	1.7%	33.5	41.4	23.7%	38.2	42.7	11.7%
7-9	45.3	31.6	-30.1%	33.1	26.1	-21.1%	37.8	36.8	-2.8%	40.9	40.8	-0.3%
Number of Quarters Worked in Year												
1-3	0.75	0.75	0.0%	0.67	0.67	0.0%	0.90	0.90	0.0%	1.09	1.09	0.0%
4-6	1.02	0.78	-23.3%	0.77	0.69	-10.4%	0.98	1.09	10.9%	1.17	1.16	-1.0%
7-9	1.42	0.90	-36.9%	1.03	0.74	-28.1%	1.15	0.99	-13.9%	1.28	1.14	-10.8%
Annual Earnings (1999\$)												
1-3	\$1,849	\$1,849	0.0%	\$1,849	\$1,849	0.0%	\$2,253	\$2,253	0.0%	\$3,165	\$3,165	0.0%
4-6	\$3,342	\$2,155	-35.5%	\$2,493	\$1,846	-25.9%	\$3,201	\$2,885	-9.9%	\$4,315	\$3,439	-20.3%
7-9	\$5,206	\$2,733	-47.5%	\$3,386	\$2,122	-37.3%	\$4,174	\$2,853	-31.6%	\$4,948	\$3,651	-26.2%

NOTES: The values for the “Est. (Mean) Outcome” are calculated as follows. In Years 1-3 ($t=1_3$), $\hat{Y}_{t=1_3}(0) = \bar{Y}_{t=1_3}(0)$ and for Years 4-6 and 7-9 ($t=4_6$ and 7_9),

$$\hat{Y}_t(0) \equiv P_{t-1}^{AFDC} \times \bar{Y}_{t-1}(k_d) + (1 - P_{t-1}^{AFDC}) \times \bar{Y}_{t=1_3}(0),$$

where $\bar{Y}_{t=1_3}(0)$ is the mean outcome for the control group in period Years 1-3; P_{t-1}^{AFDC} is the proportion of control group on AFDC in period $t-1$; and $\bar{Y}_{t-1}(k_d)$ is the mean outcome for experimental group in period $t-1$ ($t-1 = 1_3$ and 4_6 , respectively).