

Gendered Associations:
How Congruity Shapes Expectations, Perceptions, and Decision-making in Interaction

by

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Defense Date: January 30, 2025

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Dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor
of Philosophy in the Department of Sociology in The Graduate School of
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ABSTRACT

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Abstract

In this dissertation, I present a series of survey experiments that contribute to our understanding of gender congruity and its impacts on perceptions and decision-making in interaction. In Chapter 2, I explore individuals' perceptions of male and female actors' gender congruent and incongruent interactions. I ask participants to rate the likelihood of a series of interactions, randomly assigning them to see a male or female actor in each. I also collect other participants' ratings of the "genderedness" of these same interactions, or expectations for the gender of the individual involved. I find that gender congruity strongly shapes perceptions of women's interactions: feminine interactions with female actors were rated as particularly likely while masculine interactions with female actors were rated as particularly unlikely. Men's interactions, however, were rated neutrally, neither likely nor unlikely, regardless of whether they were perceived to be more masculine or feminine. This has implications for the way interaction partners and observers respond to men and women in interpersonal settings. Where reactions to men's congruent and incongruent interactions seem to be somewhat indifferent, women may face stronger negative or positive responses to their behavior depending on whether it is gender congruent or not.

In Chapter 3, I explore how gender shapes interaction in a particular context: jury deliberation. In particular, I investigate the impact of gender and gender congruent or incongruent emotion expression on jurors' ability to have influence on fellow jurors. I ask participants to review trial evidence and engage in mock deliberation with pre-scripted jurors, experimentally manipulating the gender and emotion expression of one dissenting juror. I find that in deliberation, participants perceive a female juror to be less influential than a male juror, but are actually influenced equally regardless of juror gender. Further, female participants remained more confident in their original verdicts across deliberation while male participants were influenced more by the dissenter. Neither form of influence was affected by the juror's emotion expression. I

suggest that because the trial depicted domestic violence, which is culturally associated with female victims, women may have had more influence and greater confidence in their verdicts in this situation than they typically would. I test for this possibility in Chapter 4 by manipulating whether participants see evidence for a murder trial involving intimate partner violence or not involving intimate partner violence (IPV). I find that women are more likely than men to vote guilty across all trial evidence, but are particularly likely to vote guilty for IPV trials. Men are especially likely to vote not guilty for IPV trials. Further, participants were more likely to vote guilty when they anticipated deliberating with a male juror. Juror influence was low overall and did not vary by gender or trial content. Together, these studies have implications for how the gender composition and task content of groups may impact decision-making.

Contents

Abstract.....	iv
List of Tables	x
List of Figures.....	xi
Acknowledgements.....	xii
1. Introduction	1
2. Role Congruity or Overall Male Agency?: Indifference to Men’s One-Time Interactions	3
2.1 Gender Role Congruity or Overall Male Agency?	4
2.2 Measuring (Gendered) Meaning	6
2.2.1 Affective Meaning	6
2.2.2 Cognitive Meaning.....	9
2.3 Current Study	11
2.4 Methods and Data	14
2.4.1 Participants.....	14
2.4.2 Event Construction.....	14
2.4.3 Measures	15
2.5 Results	17
2.5.1 Distribution of Deflection and Likelihood by Actor Gender.....	18
2.5.2 Using Affective and Cognitive Meaning to Predict Event Likelihood.....	20
2.6 Discussion	24
2.6.1 Gender Congruence or Overall Male Agency?.....	24
2.6.2 Affect Control Theory.....	26
2.6.3 Limitations	27

2.7 Conclusion.....	28
3. Juror Gender and Influence in a Domestic Violence Trial	29
3.1 Gender as a Status Characteristic	30
3.1.1. Gender and emotion stereotypes	31
3.2 Jury Decision Making	32
3.3 Study 1	33
3.3.1. Hypotheses	34
3.3.3 Methods.....	35
3.3.4 Results	39
3.4 Study 2	41
3.4.1 Hypotheses	42
3.4.2 Methods.....	43
3.4.3 Results	45
3.5 Discussion	47
3.5.1 Gender, emotion, and social influence.....	47
3.5.2 Difference Post #MeToo.....	48
3.5.3 Perceived and Actual Influence	49
3.5.4 Limitations	51
3.6 Conclusion.....	52
4. Gendered Meaning, (Un)certainty, and Institutional Frames in Group Decisions	54
4.1 Gender and Meaning-Making	54
4.1.1 Intimate Partner Violence	55
4.2 Opinion Distribution and Certainty.....	56
4.3 Current Study	57

4.4 Methods.....	59
4.4.1 Participants.....	59
4.4.2 Experimental Design.....	60
4.4.3 Materials.....	60
4.4.4 Procedure	62
4.4.5 Analytic Strategy.....	63
4.5 Results	63
4.5.1 Initial Verdict	63
4.5.2 Influence.....	66
4.6 Discussion	69
4.6.1 Gender and Task Content.....	69
4.6.2 (Unwarranted) Certainty	71
4.6.3 Institutional Framing.....	72
4.6.4 Limitations and Future Directions	73
4.7 Conclusion.....	74
5. Conclusion	76
Appendix A: Additional Materials for Chapter 2	78
A.1 Visualizations by Identity Pair	78
A.2 Selected OLS Models by Identity Pair.....	79
A.4 Events Presented to Participants	80
Appendix B: Additional Materials for Chapter 3	85
B.1 Study 1 Deliberation Scripts.....	85
B.1.1 Script 1, Participant Votes Not Guilty.....	85
B.1.2 Script 2, Participant Votes Guilty.....	87

B.2 Study 2 Deliberation Scripts.....	90
B.2.1 Script 1, Participant Votes Not Guilty.....	90
B.2.2 Script 2, Participant Votes Guilty.....	93
B.3 Alternative Models with All Predictors.....	97
Appendix C: Additional Materials for Chapter 4	100
C.1 Deliberation Script.....	100
C.2 Alternative Models with All Predictors.....	101
References.....	103

List of Tables

Table 1: Comparison of OLS Regression Models Predicting Likelihood Ratings.....	24
Table 2: Study 1 Descriptive Statistics on Actual Influence	39
Table 3: Study 1, Actual Confidence.....	41
Table 4: Study 2, Descriptive Statistics on Actual (Change in Confidence) and Perceived Influence	45
Table 5: Study 2, Perceived Influence.....	46
Table 6: Study 2, Actual Influence	47
Table 7: Proportion Voting Guilty (.38 Overall).....	64
Table 8: Predictors of Voting Guilty	66
Table 9: Predictors of Confidence (Dissenter Influence)	67
Table 10: Predictors of Likelihood Rating by Actor Identity Pairing	79
Table 11: Study 1, Predictors of Actual Influence	97
Table 12: Study 2, Predictors of Perceived Influence	98
Table 13: Study 2, Predictors of Actual Influence	99
Table 14: Predictors of Initial Guilty Verdict.....	101
Table 15: Predictors of Dissenter Influence	102

List of Figures

Figure 1: Distribution of Likelihood Difference and Deflection Difference.....	19
Figure 2: Comparison of Selected Events on Deflection Difference, Likelihood Difference, and Event Femininity	20
Figure 3: Deflection Scores by Event Femininity	21
Figure 4: Likelihood Ratings by Event Femininity	22
Figure 5: Experimental Design.....	38
Figure 6: Effect of Participant Gender on Change in Confidence.....	40
Figure 7: Proportion of Participants Initially Voting Guilty by Participant Gender and Evidence Type.....	65
Figure 8: Effect of Initial Verdict on Changes in Confidence.....	67
Figure 9: Deflection Scores by Event Femininity in Four Identity Pairs	78
Figure 10: Likelihood Ratings by Event Femininity in Four Identity Pairs	78

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1. Introduction

Gender shapes interaction in myriad ways, impacting the self-sentiments individuals bring to interaction, their impressions of others, and their reactions to interaction partners. Importantly, it does so not only through individuals' gender identities, but through the level of congruence these identities have with those individuals' roles and behaviors. Previous research has clearly established a strong impact of gender congruence on perceptions of and reactions to women (Eagly and Karau 2002); however, the evidence regarding men is mixed. In fact, some work suggests a tension between a possible effect of gender congruence for men and a perception of men as universally agentic (Manzi 2019). In chapter 2 of this dissertation I aim to better understand how gender congruence impacts perceptions of men's one-time interactions, and how this compares to its impact on perceptions of women's one-time interactions. My results suggest that while gender congruence does strongly pattern perceptions of women, it matters far less for perceptions of men. I further incorporate predictions from affect control theory, a social psychological theory of interaction, to show how affective and cognitive meaning around gender may diverge for some interactions, with affective meaning over-emphasizing men's higher perceived agency.

In Chapters 3 and 4, I focus on particular manifestations of gender (in)congruence in a specific context. First, in Chapter 3, I consider the effect of gender (in)congruent emotion expression on jurors' influence in deliberation. Gender stereotypes link women to higher emotion expression generally, and particularly to certain emotions such as sadness and fear, while men are linked to emotions such as anger and pride (Ellemers 2018). When expressed in group settings, emotion may reinforce women's already lower status, leading group members to undervalue their contributions, without having the same effect on men's contributions. However, this literature focuses primarily on negative emotions, leaving open the possibility that a positive, gender-congruent emotion expression could raise up women's voices. I explore this possibility in two

separate data collections, but find that neither juror gender nor emotion expression impact the influence a juror has on fellow jurors, although female jurors are perceived to be less influential. However, the trial content I used was itself strongly connected to gender due to its intimate partner violence (IPV) content, raising the question of how this may have impacted the results.

I aim to answer this question in Chapter 4, which includes a similar experiment that uses both IPV and non-IPV trial stimuli. Previous work demonstrates gender differences in meaning-making (Childress and Friedkin 2012; Christin 2012; Lizardo 2006), particularly for topics that are in some way connected to gender, including intimate partner violence (IPV) (Delgado-Alvarez and Sanchez-Prada 2022). I find dispositional gender differences in the adjudication of IPV cases—women are especially likely to vote guilty for these cases compared to others, while men are especially likely to vote not guilty. I do not find evidence that these differences impact the meaning that emerges across group deliberation; in other words, juror influence did not vary by trial type or juror gender. However, juror influence in this study was low overall, leaving open the question of how juror gender and trial content may affect meaning in situations in which influence is occurring.

Taken together, these three studies enhances our understanding of gender and gender congruence in interaction. They have implications for individuals' reactions to men and women engaging in everyday exchanges and group decision-making generally, and for the outcomes of criminal-legal cases specifically.

2. Role Congruity or Overall Male Agency?: Indifference to Men's One-Time Interactions

When men in female-dominated occupations ride the glass escalator to promotions and pay raises (Williams 1992), are they being rewarded for their perceived competence, or pushed out of roles that they are not seen as qualified to inhabit? Research on the precarity of masculinity, gender policing of men, and men's frequent movement out of female-dominated occupations would suggest the latter (Hochschild 2012; Mittleman 2023; Torre 2018; Vandello et al. 2008). However, work on tokenism and the glass escalator highlights the rewards men in feminine occupations receive based on individuals' perceptions of them as more competent than their female counterparts (Williams 1992, 2023; Yoder and Kahn 2003).

The gender congruity effect for women is well-documented and well-understood, but perceptions of men's participation in feminine roles are less so (Manzi 2019). Although much of the research in this tradition focuses on roles (in particular, occupations), the current study applies these ideas to simple one-time interactions across a variety of contexts. Further, I consider basic perceptions of the normativity of these interactions rather than the rewards or discrimination that may result from these perceptions. By better understanding how men engaging in feminine interactions are viewed, and how this may differ from the way women engaging in masculine interactions are viewed, I hope to add some context for the perceptions that may drive men's experiences in feminine roles.

I use affect control theory, a social psychological theory of interaction, to measure affective meaning in the interactions. The mathematical predictions of this theory would suggest that men have an overall agency advantage, as I will show in this article; however, prior work has demonstrated the importance of cognitive meaning in further shaping individuals' impressions (Kelly 2023; Rogers 2021). I investigate how gendered affective and cognitive meaning together shape impressions of male and female actors in gender congruent and incongruent interaction. My

results support the well-documented gender congruity effect for women but suggest neither a role congruity nor overall agency effect for men.

2.1 Gender Role Congruity or Overall Male Agency?

Role congruity theory has been used to explain prejudice towards women in leadership or other stereotypically masculine occupational roles (Eagly and Karau 2002). Essentially, women tend to be assessed as less capable of filling these roles than men, and their enactment of these roles is viewed more negatively than that of their male counterparts. This theory is well supported by research on the glass ceiling and backlash against female leaders (Rudman et al. 2012; Schein and Davidson 1993) and work related to discrimination against women in male-dominated fields such as computer science, engineering, and physics (Cheryan et al. 2017; Heilman, Manzi, and Braun 2015).

However, studies on the effects of role congruity for men in feminine occupational roles are somewhat more mixed in their conclusions. Some support the role congruity hypothesis—for example, research shows that men in female-dominated college majors and occupations tend to leave these spaces at much higher rates than their female counterparts, and typically transition into gender-balanced or male-dominated spaces, even when this requires accepting lower earnings (Riegle-Crumb, King, and Moore 2016; Torre 2018). Additional work indicates that men are perceived as lacking the qualities necessary to excel in traditionally feminine roles such as nursing and caregiving (Clow, Ricciardelli, and Bartfay 2015; Hochschild 2012; Warming 2013). Further, research on the precariousness and highly-policed nature of masculinity may suggest that men would be regarded even more negatively for being in a gender-incongruent role than would women (Mittleman 2023; Vandello et al. 2008).

On the other hand, the robust body of research on tokenism and the glass escalator effect suggests that men benefit from their numerical minority status in female-dominated occupations. Williams (1992, 1995, 2023) argues that deeply embedded gender beliefs

lead masculine qualities to be associated with success, across all contexts. She finds that men in feminine occupations are disproportionately rewarded with promotions and pay raises compared to their female counterparts. In fact, as the proportion of women in a given occupation increases, so does the likelihood that men in that occupation will be promoted to supervisory positions (Maume 1999). This relationship seems to primarily hold true for white men, with analyses of racial differences in the glass escalator effect finding that men of color experience little to no benefit (Wingfield 2009; Woodhams, Lupton, and Cowling 2015). Although this study will not explore differences by race, this is important to keep in mind when interpreting the results and will be discussed in the limitations section.

At first glance, the glass escalator effect appears to be a reward for (white) men's higher perceived competence in these positions. This seemingly rules out a gender congruity effect in favor of an overall agency effect for men, with men's higher agency generally leading them to be seen as more competent in any role, masculine or feminine. However, the glass escalator may not be entirely incompatible with a role congruity account (Manzi 2019). The roles men in female-dominated occupations tend to be promoted or channeled into are often more stereotypically masculine (Levanon and Grusky 2016), suggesting that the glass escalator could in fact be a tool used to push men out of feminine roles into more gender-congruent roles.

Much of the literature on gender role congruity focuses on rewards and discrimination in occupational roles. However, the context of employment in general is one in which men are seen as particularly competent, as compared to other contexts such as domestic work in which women may be viewed as the more competent authority (Mendoza-Denton, Park, and O'Connor 2008; Williams and Chen 2014). Manzi (2019) argues that an overall agency effect for men may therefore exist for occupations, but not necessarily other contexts. Further, focusing on rewards and discrimination may limit our ability to determine which process (role congruity or overall agency) is primarily driving these outcomes. This suggests a need for work that can expand these

ideas to a more general assessment of norms and expectations for men and women across contexts, absent this relationship between occupational gender segregation and prestige.

2.2 Measuring (Gendered) Meaning

We can think of cultural meaning as having two components: affective (evaluative reactions) and cognitive (content) meaning. For example, culturally shared affective meanings around gender suggest that men are more powerful and women are more good; shared cognitive meanings around gender associate blue with boys and pink with girls (Hasenour and Smith-Lovin, *Forthcoming 2025*). In terms of the role congruity vs overall agency for men debate, we might expect the overall agency explanation to hold true if individuals primarily rely on affective meaning, which portrays men as more powerful, active, and generally competent than women. By contrast, a role congruity account would suggest that individuals heavily incorporate cognitive meaning into their judgments, determining whether the specific content of a scenario is sufficiently consistent with male gender to seem normative.

Affect control theory (ACT), a social psychological theory of interaction, allows for (among many other things) the prediction of people's affective impressions of interactions involving male and female actors. By contrast, cognitive meaning is far more dimensionally complex, and there is no formalized way of measuring cognitive meaning across concepts. Below I will describe how affect control theory measures affective responses to events and how the theory can be used to study gender. Then, I will discuss one way to conceptualize and measure cognitive meaning as it relates to gender.

2.2.1 Affective Meaning

ACT is a computational theory of sociology that relies on the existence of shared meanings, or the fact that different people generally understand the same behavior, identity, or so forth in the same way (Heise 2010). In ACT, these meanings are represented by Osgood et al.'s (1957) universal dimensions of affective meaning: evaluation (good-bad), potency (powerful-

weak), and activity (lively-inactive). Across cultures, individuals understand meaning in social situations along these dimensions, and they are fundamental to communication and interaction (Scholl 2013).

ACT “dictionaries” contain lists of identities and behaviors that have been rated on these three dimensions by large samples of participants. As such, each term has a numerical value ranging from -4.3 to 4.3 on each dimension, with higher values on evaluation, potency, and activity indicating greater positivity, more power, and greater liveliness respectively. The result is a three number EPA profile, or EPA, and this EPA reflects the fundamental sentiment for that particular identity or behavior. For example, the EPA for mother is (3.05, 2.66, .76), which means that people fundamentally think of mothers as good, powerful, and slightly active (Smith-Lovin et al. 2016).

However, people also have more situational, flexible ideas created in specific contexts, which ACT calls transient impressions (Heise 2007, 2010; Robinson and Smith-Lovin 2018). Although people generally view mothers as good and caring, for example, a mother who is abusing or neglecting her child would be seen more negatively. In other words, while the fundamental sentiment is about the idea of *a* mother in general, the transient impression is about *that* mother in a particular situation.

Affect control theory further explains how fundamental sentiments and transient impressions may be used to predict people’s affective reactions to events. In affect control theory, “events”, at the most simple level, take the form of actor-behavior-object: for example, *mother hugs child*. Generally, people are most comfortable when their fundamental sentiments are confirmed by these events—in other words, when fundamental sentiments and transient impressions align (Heise 1979; Rogers 2021). When they do not align, the inconsistency created is known as deflection. Deflection essentially measures how well a specific situation aligns with affective expectations, with greater deflection indicating a greater mismatch.

A deflection score can be calculated from these EPA ratings using impression formation equations estimated empirically (Rogers 2018; Smith-Lovin and Heise 1982). For the event *mother hugs child*, the EPAs for *mother*, *hugs*, and *child* can be used in these equations to calculate the deflection: 1.82. By contrast, the deflection for the event *mother kicks child* is much higher, at 31.20. Essentially, a mother who hugs her child is confirming her fundamental sentiment, or acting in accordance with people's shared expectations of a mother, while one who kicks her child is not. As such, deflection can be thought of as an indicator of how affectively normative an event is.

ACT predicts that people are motivated to avoid deflection, and will attempt to reduce deflection when it occurs (Heise 1979). If possible, they will respond to deflecting events with an action of their own that brings sentiments back in line with their expectations. However, when they are unable to take action, people will instead redefine the event. For example, in the event *mother kicks child*, perhaps that *kick* was actually more of a *nudge*, or an accident during play, or perhaps the mother is not a normal mother, but rather an *abusive* mother or a *lunatic*. These redefinitions would reduce deflection and the mental discomfort it causes for the observer.

2.1.1.1 ACT and Gender

ACT captures some information about gender through the gendered identities included in its dictionaries. For example, the EPA profiles for male (0.97, 2.01, 1.09) and man (1.10, 1.63, 0.62) are lower on evaluation, higher on potency, and higher on activity than the EPAs for female (1.86, 1.20, 0.86) and woman (1.75, 1.14, 0.46), reflecting general cultural beliefs that portray men as powerful and active and women as good (Langford and Mackinnon 2000). We can further use ACT to understand people's affective reactions to gender by comparing deflection scores produced by these gendered identities. For example, we can calculate the deflection for *man fights coworker* (10.65) and *woman fights coworker* (13.63), and subtract the former from the later to calculate the gender gap in deflection (2.98). Previous studies have used these gender gap

scores to determine whether events were seen as more normative for male or female actors (Boyle 2023; Kroska and Cason 2019).

Using this method, I will show that the majority of events produce less deflection—in other words, are more expected—with the identity *man* as the actor than with the identity *woman* as the actor. The greater potency and activity scores for man lead this identity to be less deflecting in the actor position—higher potency and activity are consistent with acting, as opposed to being acted upon or withdrawing from interaction. This is directionally consistent with broader cultural understandings of gender; however, this relationship holds even in situations where we might not expect it to. For example, *woman gossips with friend* produces more deflection (13.70) than *man gossips with friend* (11.91), despite cultural stereotypes linking gossip more strongly to women. This suggests that an additional component of meaning—beyond just affect—is impacting people’s interpretations of events. This additional component has to do with how gender is represented in cognitive meaning.

2.2.2 Cognitive Meaning

Previous research has identified institutional congruence¹ as an important locus of cognitive meaning. This research has found that specific content of an interaction and its institutional context can make the interaction seem more or less likely than it would given affective content alone. This work generally finds that events with institutionally clear identities (such as familial or occupational role-identities), and, particularly, events involving identities from the same institution (institutionally congruent events), are perceived as more likely than deflection alone would predict (Heise and Mackinnon 1987; Kelly 2023; Rogers 2021).

¹ This previous research generally uses the term “concordance” rather than “congruence”. I use “congruence” throughout to capture essentially the same idea while maintaining consistency with the terminology of my theoretical frame, gender role congruity.

For example, Kelly (2023) assessed participants' qualitative explanations for their ratings of event likelihood. These explanations provide an example of how the cognitive meaning of specific labels may affect perceived likelihood separately from affective information. When justifying their ratings for events that were high deflection but also institutionally congruent, participants used the institutional cues provided by the event to reinterpret and reframe the content of the event. Events that were high deflection but also institutionally discordant did not offer this framing for participants to use in deflection reduction, and participants were unable to reinterpret these events and instead rated them as unlikely (Kelly 2023).

These studies focus on a very specific type of congruence. For example, congruent events might include identity pairings such as *policewoman* and *suspect* or *teacher* and *student*—identities that are quite clearly involved with each other more frequently than with most other identities and that occur in a very specific institutional context. Certain institutional frames, however, are quite broad in that they apply across all social interaction, but do not carry the same level of specificity. The focus of this study, gender, is associated with a multitude of behaviors and objects generally, but not necessarily with a specific organizational setting. This type of frame is particularly important to understand both because it impacts meaning making in virtually every interaction, and because it is a major locus of inequality which is in part perpetuated through determinations of which behaviors are normative or acceptable for men and for women (West and Zimmerman 1987).

2.2.2.1 Gendered Cognitive Meaning

Cultural associations with gender can make certain pairings of identities in an interaction seem more or less congruent. For example, we might see an interaction between a man and a mechanic as more congruent than an interaction between a woman and a mechanic because of the way gender structures expectations for these identities, not in terms of affect but in terms of content—men are more associated with interest and skill in car repair than are women. Similarly,

certain behaviors may seem gendered in the sense that we may expect them to be more likely to be carried out by a man or a woman. Sometimes, gendered affective meaning and gendered cognitive meaning will align; however, in some instances they may be inconsistent. For example, the behavior *slap*, although affectively aligned with masculine identity in that it is quite powerful and active, is likely to be seen as more characteristic of a female actor (particularly as compared to affectively similar behaviors such as *punch* or *slug*).

To measure gendered cognitive meaning, I will use participants' assessments of the genderedness of the event (how masculine or feminine most people are likely to perceive the event as generally) and the gender identity of the actor in the event to determine gender congruity. A masculine event with a male actor or feminine event with a female actor would be considered gender congruent while a masculine event with a female actor or feminine event with a male actor would be gender incongruent.

2.3 Current Study

In this study I analyze a series of interactions, constructed as actor-behavior-object events. Each event appears in two different versions: one with a male actor and one with a female actor. For each, I calculate a predicted deflection score using affect control theory. I also collect participant ratings of each event's likelihood (how likely or socially normative it seems overall). Finally, I ask participants to rate (with "person" as the actor) the event's genderedness (how masculine or feminine each event is perceived as in society generally). As a result, I have a score indicating how deflecting ACT predicts the event to be with a male actor and with a female actor, a score indicating how likely participants perceive the event to be with a male actor and with a female actor, and a score representing how masculine or feminine the event seems to participants. The later measures allow me to determine whether an event is gender congruent (a masculine event with a male actor or feminine event with a female actor). I examine how the relationships

between deflection, likelihood, and event genderedness vary depending on the gender of the actor in the event. My predictions are as follows.

First, predicted deflection and participant likelihood ratings measure a similar concept (normativity), albeit in opposite directions (higher deflection means less normative while higher likelihood means more normative). As such, they should be inversely related, as previous work has shown (Kelly 2023; Rogers 2021).

Hypothesis 1: Predicted deflection and likelihood will be negatively correlated.

Second, many of the higher deflection (more unexpected) events in this study tend to include powerful, negative behaviors, which are more consistent with masculine stereotypes. I expect this relationship to be reflected in participants' ratings of event genderedness.

Hypothesis 2: More unexpected (lower likelihood, higher deflection) events will be perceived as more masculine than less expected events.

Following the large body of work that demonstrates a gender role congruity effect for women (Eagly and Karau 2002; Heilman et al. 2015; Rudman et al. 2012), I predict an interaction between actor gender and event genderedness such that female actors seem relatively normative in feminine events but less normative in masculine events.

Hypothesis 3: Events with female actors will be more expected (lower deflection, higher likelihood) if they are perceived as feminine events compared to if they are perceived as masculine events.

Some research suggests that this role congruity effect may also hold for male actors (Hochschild 2012; Mittleman 2023; Warming 2013), leading to my fourth hypothesis of a role congruity effect for men.

Hypothesis 4: Events with male actors will be more expected (lower deflection, higher likelihood) if they are perceived as masculine events compared to if they are perceived as feminine events.

However, in line with other work that shows that men may be seen as capable (perhaps even more capable than women) in feminine roles (Maume 1999; Williams 1992, 2023), I advance an overall male agency hypothesis.

Hypothesis 5: Events with male actors will be more expected (lower deflection, higher likelihood) than events with female actors.

Finally, I will note that hypotheses 4 and 5 are not mutually exclusive. It is possible that men experience both a role congruity effect in that their interactions are seen as more normative when those interactions are more masculine, and that they experience an overall agency effect in that their interactions always seem more normative than women's interactions. It is also possible that neither hypothesis is supported—for example, perhaps perceptions of men's interactions are unaffected by gender congruence, and only some of these interactions are seen as more normative than women's interactions. This study will test for any evidence of gender role congruity and/or overall agency for men.

2.4 Methods and Data

2.4.1 Participants

Participants took part in this study via a Qualtrics survey on Prolific. 4 participants were removed from the sample due to failing an attention check instructing them to select 2.5 for that rating, resulting in a sample size of 196. Participants were 60% male, 37% female, 3% other; 79.5% white, 8.5% black, 2% Hispanic, 7% Asian, 3% other. The mean age was 41.

2.4.2 Event Construction

I created the list of events using identities and behaviors from ACT's 2015 gender-combined US Full Surveyor dictionary, which contains the EPA ratings of both men and women (Smith-Lovin et al. 2016)². The actor for each event was one of eight possible identities: *man, woman, mother, father, businessman, businesswoman, waiter, or waitress*. I chose these identities because they already have gender embedded in them (rather than having to include *male* or *female* as a modifier, as I would with identities like *cousin* or *engineer*) and because they represent general, recognizable roles in both occupations and family. I combine all four identity pairs in the results. See Appendix A for visualizations of the pattern of results in each identity pair and selected OLS models.

When compiling the list of behaviors and objects, I aimed to include variation in regards to the EPA profiles of these terms and how they were combined into events. For example, I wanted to be sure to include some behaviors that were high on potency and some that were low on potency. Some of these high potency behaviors should also be high on evaluation, while others should be low on evaluation, and the same goes for the low potency behaviors. Further, they should all vary on activity as well, and should be combined with objects that also encompass

² See <https://affectcontroltheory.org/> for more information on ACT dictionaries, equation sets, and programs for calculating deflection.

variation on evaluation, potency, and activity. To achieve this variation, I used a Graeco-Latin square to cross all possible within-event combinations of positive and negative EPA profiles for the behaviors and objects. This method, outlined by Heise (2010), maximizes the variation included in the set of events by prioritizing those combinations of evaluation, potency, and activity that have been found to be most crucial to determining deflection. This resulted in 32 combinations, four of which included an EPA profile for behavior which no terms in the dictionary matched (E+P-A+). As a result, I was left with 28 combinations of behavior-object EPA profiles from which to construct the final list of events.

I selected behaviors and objects to match these profiles, prioritizing terms that seemed more likely to appear together in everyday life. For example, *shushes child* was chosen over *cripples child*. This is not to say that some combinations were not still unusual or unlikely in everyday life (*sweet-talks vagrant*)—choosing events that are high deflection involves (theoretically) choosing some weirdness. This process resulted in 208 behavior-object pairs. I then combined these pairs with the selected actor identities—with each behavior-object pair displayed twice, once with a male actor and once with the equivalent female actor—resulting in a total of 416 items (see Appendix A).

2.4.3 Measures

2.4.3.1 Predicted Deflection

I used the *r* package *actsims* (Castro Araújo, Maloney, and Combs 2024) to calculate the predicted deflection of each event when the actor is male (male deflection) and when the actor is female (female deflection)³. As such, each event pair (male vs female actor) has a predicted male

³ Exact deflection scores are relative to the ACT dictionary and equations used to calculate deflection. In this study, I use EPA scores from the 2015 Full Surveyor Dictionary, which includes ratings from both men and women. I use the 1978 equations—these equations include a set of coefficients which were estimated using male participants' ratings, and a set estimated using female participants' ratings. I conducted all analyses twice, once with each set, and found no notable differences in results. All results reported here use the coefficients estimated with male participants' ratings.

deflection score and a predicted female deflection score. These scores convey information about how actor gender impacts the affective meaning represented in the event.

2.4.3.2 Likelihood

Each participant rated a random subset of 26 out of the 416 items on how likely or socially normative the event seemed overall (likelihood) on a seven point scale, from “not at all” likely to “extremely” likely. Each subset included both male and female actors across different events, but none included both the male and female version of the same event (i.e. if they saw *mother nags principal* they would not also see *father nags principal*). This provided a total of 12-13 ratings per item,⁴ meaning 12-13 ratings of the event’s likelihood when the actor was male and 12-13 ratings of the event’s likelihood when the actor was female. By comparing the average rating across versions, I can explore how actor gender impacts participants’ perceptions of the likelihood of these events occurring. For example, participants rated the likelihood of *man kisses hero* as 3.05 on average (a bit unlikely), while they rated *woman kisses hero* as 5.04 on average (somewhat likely), meaning that they see this event as being more likely with a female actor than with a male actor.

Event deflection scores and participant ratings of how likely the events seem share some similarity in that both measure an aspect of how unusual or non-normative an event is perceived as. As such, we should expect them to be negatively correlated (more deflecting events will be rated as less likely). However, the two are also distinct in two important ways. First, deflection can only take into account the affective information of how good, powerful, and active the identities and behaviors in the event are, while likelihood ratings also include reactions to the specific labels used in the event—this is beneficial for this study as it allows me to examine

⁴ The number of ratings per event is relatively low, making my test a conservative test.

affective and cognitive meaning. Second, deflection measures how unusual an event is only in terms of how (affectively) disturbing or upsetting it is, while participants' judgments of an event's likelihood may also be impacted by how common an event is. In some cases, an event may be unalarming and therefore low deflection, but so statistically rare that it is nonetheless unexpected and rated as unlikely. This should not be a major concern for this study—in fact, this may be part of the variation that cognitive meaning (including gendered cognitive meaning) is able to explain where affective meaning is not.

2.4.3.3 Event Genderedness

To collect ratings of event genderedness, I presented each participant with a second subset of 26 events (i.e. they did not rate any of the same events on both likelihood and genderedness), this time with *person* as the actor—for example, *person soothes child*. They were instructed to indicate, on a seven point scale ranging from “definitely male” to “definitely female,” whether they think most people in society would be more likely to assume the person to be male or female. This resulted in 24-26 ratings for each event. I use the average rating for each event as an indicator of general cultural expectations around how feminine or masculine a given event seems. *Person soothes child*, for example, was rated as a more feminine event on average (5.74). I then use this average rating to determine whether an event is gender congruent for a male or female actor—in this case, *woman soothes child* would be gender congruent (a female actor in a feminine event or a male actor in a masculine event) while *man soothes child* would be gender incongruent (a male actor in a feminine event or a female actor in a masculine event).

2.5 Results

I performed two sample t tests to compare likelihood ratings ($t = -.245, p = .806$) and event genderedness ratings ($t = .758, p = .449$) across participant gender, finding no significant

differences⁵. The results I report thus include the ratings of all participants, not distinguished by the gender of the rater. I begin by reporting results across all four identity pairs, aiming to make general conclusions about gendered identities as a whole. Likelihood, deflection, and event genderedness are standardized for all analyses.

2.5.1 Distribution of Deflection and Likelihood by Actor Gender

First, I look at the difference in deflection scores across actor gender, and compare this to the difference in likelihood ratings across actor gender. To calculate deflection difference, I subtract the deflection scores of events with male actors from the deflection scores of the same events with female actors. As such, a positive deflection difference indicates that the event is predicted to cause more deflection when the actor is female than when the actor is male, and a negative deflection difference indicates the opposite. Because the meaning communicated by a likelihood rating is directionally opposite that of a deflection score (more likely = more normative, while more deflecting = less normative), I calculated likelihood difference in the reverse. I subtracted likelihood ratings for events with female actors from likelihood ratings for events with male actors. As a result, likelihood difference directionally carries the same type of meaning as deflection difference: for both, positive values mean the event is seen as more normative (less deflecting, more likely) with a male actor.

Figure 1 below shows the distribution of deflection difference and likelihood difference. From this, we can better understand how the gender of the actor affects how much affective and cognitive disturbance is produced across a variety of interactions. The majority of events in this study (about 82%) have a positive deflection difference, meaning they are predicted to produce more deflection with a female actor than with a male actor. By contrast, about half of the events

⁵ I additionally tested for effects of race, age, and political party on likelihood and event genderedness ratings and found no significant effects.

have a positive likelihood difference, meaning the number of events that were rated as more likely with a male actor is roughly equal to the number that were rated as more likely with a female actor. In other words, predicted deflection suggests that most events should seem more normative when the actor is male as opposed to female. Likelihood ratings, on the other hand, suggest that while some events will seem more normative when the actor is male, an approximately equal number of events will seem more normative when the actor is female.




Figure 1: Distribution of Likelihood Difference and Deflection Difference

Figure 2 below uses two example events—*waiter/waitress punches truant* and *waiter/waitress slaps divorcee*—to illustrate how affective and cognitive information may conflict. The terms *punch* (-2.55, 1.34, 2.39) and *truant* (-.69, .03, .26) have EPA profiles that are quite similar to the EPA profiles of *slap* (-2.50, .92, 2.43) and *divorcee* (-.87, .05, .17). Because of this, these two events produce similar levels of deflection. Both produce significantly more deflection with *waitress* as the actor than *waiter*—in other words, both are predicted to seem more affectively normative with a male actor. However, when participants rate these interactions, they only rate one of them (*waiter/waitress punches truant*) as more normative with a male actor.

In fact, participants found *waiter/waitress slaps divorcee* to be more normative when the event was presented with a female actor. This directly maps on to the way participants rated the genderedness of these events: for *person punches truant*, participants believed most people were likely to assume that *person* was a man, whereas for *person slaps divorcee* they believed people would assume *person* was a woman. Though affectively quite similar, the terms used in these events are cognitively associated with gender in different ways.




Figure 2: Comparison of Selected Events on Deflection Difference, Likelihood Difference, and Event Femininity

2.5.2 Using Affective and Cognitive Meaning to Predict Event Likelihood.

I next seek to better understand how gendered affective information and cognitive information relate to perceptions of an event’s likelihood. Figure 3 below shows the relationship between predicted deflection, event genderedness, and actor gender. Events that were rated as more feminine tend to be predicted to produce lower deflection than events that were rated as masculine. Further, most events are predicted to produce more deflection when they involve a female actor than when they involve a male actor. Considering this affective information alone seems to support an overall male agency hypothesis (hypothesis 5)—men are just seen as more

normative when acting in virtually any interaction, regardless of whether the interaction itself seems masculine or feminine.




Figure 3: Deflection Scores by Event Femininity

If we consider both affective and cognitive information via participants' likelihood ratings, however, we begin to see a different story. Figure 4 below depicts the relationship between likelihood ratings, event genderedness, and actor gender. Gender congruence appears to have a substantial impact on participants' judgments of the likelihood of events with female actors, supporting hypothesis 3—feminine events were rated as relatively likely while masculine events were rated as relatively unlikely. However, this gender congruence effect does not seem to hold for events with male actors, which are rated as somewhat neutral in terms of likelihood regardless of where the event falls on genderedness. This fails to support a gender congruence account for men (hypothesis 4); however, it does not seem to indicate overall male agency either (hypothesis 5). An overall male agency hypothesis would suggest that all events with a male actor should be rated as fairly likely, and in fact more likely than most equivalent events with a female actor. Instead, these male actor events were rated neutrally, and the more feminine events were

rated as less likely with a male actor than with a female actor. Event genderedness matters significantly for participants' perceptions of how likely events with female actors are, but has little impact on perceptions of events with male actors.




Figure 4: Likelihood Ratings by Event Femininity

Below (Table 1) I use ordinary least squares regression to assess predictors of participants' likelihood ratings, using a Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) to assess model fit. I find that deflection is significantly negatively correlated with likelihood (model 1), meaning events that are predicted to produce more deflection are rated as less likely. This is as expected (hypothesis 1)—more affectively disturbing, or non-normative events are seen as less likely. Further, event genderedness (model 2) is positively correlated with likelihood—more feminine events were rated as more likely on average than were more masculine events, confirming hypothesis 2. According to BIC, model 1 is perhaps a slightly better fit, meaning that predicted deflection is a better predictor of event likelihood ratings than is event genderedness.

Accounting for actor gender in addition to event genderedness, and the interaction between the two (model 3), does not noticeably affect model fit compared to model 2. This model

does, however, reveal an interaction between actor gender and event genderedness. Feminine events with a female actor were rated as particularly likely as compared to masculine events with a female actor or events with a male actor. This supports a gender role congruity effect for female actors (hypothesis 3). In fact, this model suggests that much of the association between higher likelihood and feminine events is attributable specifically to feminine events with female actors—events with male actors were rated similarly regardless of whether those events were perceived as more masculine or feminine. This fails to support a role congruity effect for men (hypothesis 4). The data also fail to support an overall male agency hypothesis (hypothesis 5) given that only masculine events were seen as more normative with male actors, while feminine events were seen as less normative with male actors.

In model 4, I include both affective (deflection) and cognitive (event genderedness, actor gender, and their interaction) meanings, which does improve fit relative to models 1-3. Overall, these findings suggest that knowing where an event falls in terms of gender norms—in particular, the gender of the actor and whether the interaction they are embedded in is gender congruent—gives us important information about how likely people will perceive the event to be. However, the models suggest that it is most useful to consider both gendered cognitive meaning and affective meaning when predicting individuals' reactions to events.

Table 1: Comparison of OLS Regression Models Predicting Likelihood Ratings

<i>Model</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>3</i>	<i>4</i>
Intercept	-.003 [-.048, .054]	-.114*** [-.142, -.086]	-.133*** [-1.72, -.093]	-.030 [-.086, .026]
Deflection	-.146*** [-.197, -.095]			-.132*** [-.184, -.081]
Event Femininity		.076*** [.047, .104]	.020 [-.020, .060]	.008 [-.033, .048]
Actor Female			.035 [-.021, .092]	.050 ⁺ [-.006, .107]
Event Femininity: Actor Female			.109*** [.053, .165]	.110*** [.054, .166]
<i>BIC</i>	13543	13547	13549	13532

⁺*p*<.1 **p*<.05, ***p*<.01, ****p*<.001

Note: Likelihood ratings, deflection, and event femininity are standardized—coefficients represent the average predicted change, in standard deviations, associated with a one standard deviation increase in likelihood ratings. The 95% confidence interval for each coefficient is presented in brackets.

2.6 Discussion

2.6.1 Gender Congruence or Overall Male Agency?

This study applies ideas from gender role congruity theory to perceptions of simple interactions across a variety of institutional contexts. This broadens the application of the theory from its usual context (occupations) and turns the focus to general perceptions of normativity rather than the downstream consequences of (dis)approval of (non)normative role-taking and behavior. The interactions take the form of actor-behavior-object events found in affect control theory, allowing me to use ACT to consider differences between affective and cognitive meaning related to gender. By also showing participants events with *person* as the actor, I was able to measure their expectations for whether each given interaction seems more likely to have a male or female person as the actor, or event genderedness.

I find the expected clear evidence that perceptions of women in the types of interactions I describe are shaped by gender congruence—when an event seems more feminine, a female actor in that interaction confirms that expectation, leading the interaction to be seen as normative. On the other hand, when an event seems more masculine, a female actor disconfirms the interaction,

leading it to be seen as non-normative. This pattern of results is the same for both affective and cognitive meaning and is consistent with the large body of research on gender role congruity (Eagly and Karau 2002).

Affectively, male actors seem to have an overall agency advantage—most events, masculine or feminine, were predicted to cause less deflection when the actor is male compared to when the actor is female. However, adding cognitive meaning changes the picture. Based on participants' likelihood ratings, events with male actors are seen as relatively neutral in normativity regardless of whether the events are masculine or feminine. This means that events with male actors seem more likely than those with female actors when the events are masculine but less likely when the events are feminine, ruling out an overall agency effect. However, given that likelihood ratings of events with male actors were essentially the same regardless of event genderedness, I do not find evidence of gender role congruity effect for men either.

These findings suggest that individuals tend to be more indifferent to whether men's interactions are gender congruent or not—while women are not expected in masculine interactions, and particularly expected in feminine interactions, expectations for men are neutral regardless of gender congruency. This has implications for reactions men and women receive in interpersonal settings as men are given more leeway for their interactions where women may face stronger negative or positive responses to their behavior depending on whether it is gender congruent or not.

These results speak specifically to one-time interactions—it is possible that men involved in one feminine interaction may seem normative, while men frequently engaging in feminine behavior or taking on feminine roles may be judged as nonnormative and face backlash. Future work should explore how the results of this study may differ for repeated behaviors and ongoing roles in comparison to the interactions analyzed here. Future work should also further investigate what types of interactions are seen as masculine or feminine. For example, are most interactions

in the occupational sphere seen as inherently masculine? Or do perceptions of these interactions generally fall along the lines we would expect if we account for gender variations in the workforce of different occupations?

2.6.2 Affect Control Theory

My results also have theoretical implications for studies using ACT. I provide concrete evidence that the genderedness of interactions impacts participants' interpretations across a wide variety of events, depending on the gender of the actor in those events. This is important to studies using ACT as the gender composition of these studies' events will inform participants' reactions to them. Researchers should account for this, either by explicitly incorporating event genderedness as a factor in the study, or by ensuring a mix of both masculine and feminine events and male and female actors.

Future work in ACT should also take advantage of the modifier feature. The most basic event in ACT takes the form Actor-Behavior-Object; however, we can also add a modifier to any identity. A modifier will impact the identity's EPA profile and thereby the deflection created by the event. For example, if we modify *mother* with the term *abusive*, the once highly-deflecting event *mother kicks child* (31.2) becomes much less deflecting as *abusive mother kicks child* (3.8). This is because *abusive mother* is much lower on evaluation and a bit higher on activity than *mother*, and is more confirming of our sentiments in this scenario. If we were to add a modifier to *woman* to create an actor identity with an EPA profile very similar to that for *man* (or vice versa), then the gender gap in deflection would disappear. However, observers' ratings of the likelihood of these events would still be impacted by gender. Using the modifier feature of ACT, future work could study how gender impacts impressions of events even when the gendered identities are essentially the same affectively, although this work should be careful to account for how modifiers may affect impressions of femininity and masculinity as well.

Finally, affect control theorists have been collecting data on cultural impressions of identities and behaviors for decades. Future research should use this to explore if and how cultural change occurs both for affective and cognitive meaning. Such work could investigate whether people change their cognitive views of the world to maintain consistency with their affective sentiments and if or when new cognitive associations spur changes in shared affective sentiments.

2.6.3 Limitations

The lack of a clear sampling frame for the behaviors and objects included in my events leaves open the possibility that my results could in part be a function of the identities and behaviors I chose. Further, many of the events in this study are relatively low-probability events, which may impact the way participants assessed their likelihood. Additional research with a wider range of terms involving more common, everyday interactions could help confirm my results. Further, such research should take into account forms of institutional congruence studied in previous work as part of the research design. Institutional congruence is an important source of variation in judgments of event likelihood that is likely related to gender congruence.

Additionally, this study includes only binary gender identities, and measures them on a single continuum. I do this in order to force participants to choose between the two rather than identify an event as both masculine and feminine (androgynous) or neither (undifferentiated). However, masculinity and femininity do not exist on a single continuum (Bem 1981; Spence and Helmreich 2014 [1978]) and are not necessarily mutually exclusive—nor is an event being one unit “more masculine” than another necessarily the same difference as an event being one unit “less feminine” than another. Future work could test the relationships found in this study using a scale that measures binary gender on two separate dimensions. Additional studies should also investigate these processes in relation to nonbinary gender identities, aiming to better understand

how people make sense of interaction when structuring binary gender information is not available as a cognitive guide.

Previous research shows that the effect of occupying a gender-incongruent role may be different for white men and women than it is for nonwhites (Rosette et al. 2016; Wingfield 2009; Woodhams et al. 2015). The race of actors in the events in this study was unspecified, but given that almost 80% of participants were white, most participants may have assumed white actors. As such, further research is necessary to determine whether the results of this study also apply to nonwhites. This future work should expand these analyses to explore how gender frames general expectations for and judgments of interaction at its intersection with race—it is possible that stereotypes or status effects associated with race may result in varied understandings of interaction normativity.

2.7 Conclusion

From this data, it does not appear that men's one-time interactions are held to a particular gender congruency standard; however, neither are they seen as more normative in these interactions across the board than are women. We might think of variation in perceptions of men and women's interactions as primarily being driven by role congruency for women. Masculine interactions are particularly unexpected for women, while feminine interactions are particularly expected; meanwhile, men's interactions are seen neutrally regardless of their genderedness.

This work extends ideas about gender role congruity to a somewhat different context: one-time interactions rather than roles, which occur across a variety of institutions in addition to occupations. It has implications for the way interaction partners and observers respond to men and women's gender congruent and incongruent exchanges as women seem to be more strongly pigeonholed into certain types of interactions. Future research should prioritize understanding what types of interactions are seen as masculine or feminine and how this process plays out across successive repeated interactions or ongoing role.

3. Juror Gender and Influence in a Domestic Violence Trial

In task-oriented groups, status hierarchies pattern interaction such that higher status actors (such as men) tend to have greater influence than lower status actors (such as women). Some work indicates that emotion expression may also impact actors' relative status positions, particularly when status is conferred by gender (Shelly 2001; Tiedens 2001). Strong stereotypes link gender to emotion expression (Ellemers 2018), and evidence shows that women are disadvantaged in group interaction by at least certain types of emotion expression (Salerno and Peter-Hagene 2015; Salerno, Peter-Hagene, and Jay 2019; Tiedens 2001). In two studies, I explore the effect of gender and emotion on how influential jurors are during deliberation, investigating whether female jurors' arguments are as seriously considered as male jurors' and whether various types of emotion expressions in these arguments are used to discredit or elevate their contributions. I discuss how the domestic violence content of the court case may create an atypical situation in which women's viewpoints are valued more highly than they otherwise would be—particularly after the Me Too movement—comparing my research to two earlier studies (Salerno and Peter-Hagene 2015; Salerno et al. 2019) using the same court case.

This work builds on the already robust research in status characteristics theory and provides more information on how emotion expression may confirm—or fail to confirm—status positions conferred by gender. These processes are important to discussions of gender representation and inequality at the interactional level. They have implications for women's ability to influence group decision making and be credited as competent and influential in a wide variety of contexts. This study uses the specific context of jury deliberation to examine these generally applicable processes. While excluding or underrepresenting female jurors undeniably creates a partial jury (Fowler 2005), merely including female jurors may not be enough if their voices are not actually heard and valued. Male and female jurors may differ on conviction and sentencing opinions, at least for some types of cases (Fowler 2005). If female jurors are less

likely to express these differing viewpoints and have them seriously considered, this could impact deliberation outcomes and undermine the court's values of impartiality and fairness.

3.1 Gender as a Status Characteristic

Early research shows that in group interaction, inequalities in opportunities to participate, actual participation, subsequent evaluation, and influence emerge (Bales and Slater 1955). These inequalities are organized by status characteristics—external status afforded by characteristics such as race, gender, or occupation is mirrored in the group hierarchy. Status advantages emerge regardless of whether the status characteristic confers any valid information about competence, and regardless of whether individual group members personally believe the higher status state to be preferable. This is because people are less attuned to their personal (first order) beliefs or any specific other actor's (second order) beliefs, and are instead concerned with the third order inference of what *most people* are likely to believe (Ridgeway 2019). Group tasks create pressure to coordinate with others to make the best decision; status beliefs give order to that coordination by using common cultural knowledge to provide expectations about how other actors are likely to behave. By acting in accordance with these expectations, people to some extent create a self-fulfilling process (Ridgeway 2019).

Research demonstrates that both men and women form status beliefs that favor males, even when they express beliefs in gender equality (Rashotte and Webster 2005). Peer evaluations of female group members tend to be generally lower than evaluations of comparable male group members (Walker et al. 1996), and multiple studies have demonstrated men's greater influence in small groups (Ridgeway 2019; Strodbeck, James, and Hawkins 1957; Walker et al. 1996). Status hierarchies therefore disadvantage women both in terms of the recognition they are given for their part in accomplishing tasks and their ability to impact decision-making and have their views represented in the outcome.

3.1.1. Gender and emotion stereotypes

Stereotypes convey information about the comparative standing of one group relative to another. Gender stereotypes of women as too emotional organize beliefs about gender, competency, and appropriate gender role (Shields et al. 2007). However, certain types of emotions are associated more with masculinity. Anger is seen as appropriate for men while emotions such as sadness and fear are seen as congruent for women (Cheshin 2020; Ellemers 2018).

Emotion is often used as a gender-neutral explanation to justify a preference for male group leadership and men's task contributions (Brescoll 2016), reifying the existing status hierarchy. High status (male) anger expression bars challenges from low status actors; low status (female) sadness and fear expressions confirm their position in the hierarchy (Tiedens, Ellsworth, and Mesquita 2000). Women who express the non-congruent emotion of anger may be evaluated more negatively as a result of this violation of gender norms (Salerno and Peter-Hagene 2015; Salerno et al. 2019; Tiedens 2001). Men who express non-congruent emotions are also violating gender norms and potentially spurring negative sentiments; however, Shelly (2001) argues that when status and sentiment information are incompatible, actors default to status information to form performance expectations. As such, men expressing “feminine” emotions still retain their high status relative to women (Lewis 2000; Salerno and Peter-Hagene 2015; Salerno et al. 2019).

Emotions such as sadness and fear, though gender-congruent for women, are also generally negative, and the effect of more positive feminine emotions on women's status positions is understudied. The question remains as to whether a positive emotion expression that aligns with warm, group-oriented feminine stereotypes (such as compassion or surprise) may have the potential to interrupt this status organizing process and increase women's position on the status hierarchy. Prevailing cultural conceptions of women as overly emotional are difficult to combat, slow to change, and often used as seemingly gender-neutral justifications for discrediting women.

Understanding how women may be able to increase their own influence through the way they express themselves could provide an important, if only short-term, solution to this inequality in interaction.

3.2 Jury Decision Making

Strodtbeck et al. (1957) demonstrates a gendered status hierarchy in juries, finding that male jurors are more likely to be elected as foreman and likely to participate more in deliberation than female jurors. More recent research on the racial and gender composition of capital juries finds that the numbers of white and black males on a jury impact sentencing recommendations more strongly than the numbers of white and black females, indicating that men may have more influence on the jury's decision (Bowers, Steiner, and Sandys 2001). Similarly, Lynch and Haney (2009) find that the race effects in their study are driven primarily by white men, not women, and that female and nonwhite jurors tended to shift more in favor of the death penalty (white male jurors' recommendation) after deliberation. However, some research calls this male influence advantage into question, finding similar levels of influence between male and female jurors (York and Cornwell 2006), and non-capital juries may differ importantly from capital juries, making this an important area for further investigation.

Two studies in particular have explored the effect of gender and emotion expression on the social influence of a holdout juror—the sole dissenting juror. Salerno and Peter-Hagene (2015) measure actual influence as the extent to which the holdout decreases participants' confidence in their initial verdict. They find that while male jurors are more influential when expressing anger as opposed to no emotion, female jurors are less influential when expressing anger. They find that fear has no effect on actual influence for either men or women. Salerno et al. (2019), measuring perceived influence, find that female jurors are rated as less influential when expressing anger or fear as opposed to no emotion, but find no effect of either emotion on the perceived influence of male jurors. It is important to understand how women's voices may be

underrepresented in interaction due to intersecting gender and emotion stereotypes, and jury deliberation, which is likely to elicit strong emotion due to the intensity of the task at hand, provides an interesting and impactful context for studying these processes.

3.3 Study 1

I seek to replicate Salerno and colleagues' (2015; 2019) work and extend it by testing additional emotions, including sadness and two understudied emotions—compassion and surprise—which are more positive orientations that are more gender-congruent for women. Further, in my second study, Like Salerno and colleagues' previous studies, I specifically investigate the influence of a holdout juror. A holdout is the last remaining roadblock to a unanimous verdict and the end of deliberation. For this study, investigating a single holdout affords maximum control in terms of manipulating and pinpointing the effects of gender and emotion expression and allows for the study of influence during disagreement.

I assess influence as an indication of an actor's status, hypothesizing that high status actors will be more influential than low status actors. I use both a measure of perceived influence, conceptualized as participants' self-reports of how influential they found a fellow juror to be, and actual influence, conceptualized as to what degree their opinion was actually swayed in the direction of this fellow juror's. Both have implications for status and inequality in interaction. Actual influence determines actors' impact on decision-making and outcomes. Those with lower actual influence will have their interests underrepresented in the institutions they are a part of. Perceived influence, on the other hand, provides information about what people believe to be true about the interactions they participate in; it can have important consequences to real life scenarios involving any evaluation of performance or skill.

3. 3.1. Hypotheses

In study 1, I focus on actual influence as a measure of the impact a holdout has on fellow jurors. Due to men's higher status compared to women (Ridgeway 2019), I expect men to have greater influence than their female counterparts.

Hypothesis 1: A male holdout will be more influential than a female holdout.

Previous research offers mixed evidence as to whether anger expression increases male influence (Salerno et al. 2018; Salerno and Peter-Hagene 2015) or has no effect on male influence (actual or perceived) (Brescoll and Uhlmann 2008; Salerno et al. 2019). The effect of compassion expression on influence has not been studied, but, in line with Shelly (2001), I expect that observers will default to status information when confronted with a male expressing gender-incongruent emotion. As such, I expect that a male expressing anger will confirm (but not increase) his already high status, and a male expressing compassion will retain high status despite this gender incongruent expression, as in previous research on other stereotypically feminine emotions (Lewis 2000; Salerno and Peter-Hagene 2015; Salerno et al. 2019).

Hypothesis 2: A male holdout will be similarly influential regardless of emotion expression.

Previous research has established that women are disadvantaged by displaying emotions that are gender incongruent or associated with higher status (Salerno et al. 2019; Tiedens 2001), and anger is one such emotion (Ellemers 2018).

Hypothesis 3: A female holdout will be less influential when expressing anger as opposed to no emotion.

Finally, I seek to investigate the previously unexplored question of how a more positive emotion that is gender congruent for women and associated with lower status will affect women's position in the group hierarchy and resulting influence.

Hypothesis 4: A female holdout who expresses compassion will be more influential than a female holdout who expresses no emotion.

3.3.3 Methods

3.3.3.1 Participants and Design

Participants were workers monetarily compensated through Amazon's Mechanical Turk. Participants who incorrectly identified the holdout's gender (71), suspected they were not interacting with real people (11), or showed a lack of attention in the deliberation comments (3) were removed from the sample. Additionally, I removed the few participants (6) who changed their verdict three or more times over the course of deliberation, which seemed to indicate random response rather than genuine consideration. This resulted in a sample of 326 participants. An a priori power analysis (power = .8, effect size = 0.2, alpha = .05) indicated a need for 324 participants. The sample was 56% male and 44% female; 59% white, 18% black or African American, 18% Asian, 5% other. The average age was 36 (sd = 10.78, range = 18–71).

I used a 2×3 design, with holdout gender (male, female) and holdout emotion expression (anger, compassion or no emotion) varying between participants. The dependent variable,

participant's confidence in their verdict, was measured at five separate times throughout the study, after each round of deliberation.

3.3.3.2 Materials

Participants viewed the same trial evidence used by Salerno and colleagues (2015, 2019), which is based on an actual murder case (*R. v. Valevski*, 2000). The evidence consisted of written defense and prosecution arguments, opening and closing statements, testimony from eyewitnesses and expert witnesses, and photographs of the crime scene, presented in slideshow format with a total of 21 slides. The prosecution claimed that the defendant (Michael) killed his wife (Stacey) following an argument in which she threatened to leave him, with Michael later pretending that she had locked herself in her room and having a neighbor call the police to check on her in order to make himself look less guilty. The defense argued that Stacey's threat to leave was in fact a threat of suicide, that she took her own life, and that Michael is innocent. As noted by Salerno and Peter-Hagene (2015), the trial evidence does not suggest a clear “correct” verdict, which allows for plausible variation in participants' confidence levels.

Participants viewed a deliberation script which is nearly identical to that used by Salerno et al. (2019), with the one major difference being that the fear condition in their study was replaced with a compassion condition. The scripts appeared to include comments from five other participants in the study. Four of the jurors agreed with the participant's verdict while one (the holdout) disagreed. The scripts (see Appendix B) were programmed into the survey along with short waiting periods—ostensibly so that fellow jurors could finish making their comments—to increase the realism of the experience. The scripted comments from all 5 fellow jurors were presented on one screen for each round of deliberation. Participants were instructed to provide their own comments to their fellow jurors for each round.

The holdout, as indicated by their username, was either male (BrianM) or female (JessicaM). All other jurors were given gender neutral usernames such as “JJohnson” or

“syoun96.” In the first baseline round of deliberation, the holdout expressed no emotion, but in each subsequent round, the holdout expressed either anger, compassion, or no emotion. The holdout made the same main argument regardless of emotion expression, but short statements were inserted for the anger (“It’s pretty aggravating I’m the only one who sees that!!!”) and compassion (“I think we as a group need to really think about this or we could risk putting an innocent man behind bars”) conditions to indicate these orientations. The object of the holdout juror’s compassion varies based on the outcome they are arguing for (guilty or not guilty), but compassion statements are otherwise held as constant as possible.

3.3.3.3 Influence Measure

Following Salerno and Peter-Hagene (2015), I operationalized influence as the extent to which participants changed their confidence level in their initial verdict. Although many previous studies have focused on actual change in verdict, I look at change in confidence due to the more complex nature of the task in this study and the low motivation for verdict change given that the majority of group members agree with the participant. Previous research using this design demonstrates the importance of fluctuations in privately-held confidence levels (Salerno & Peter-Hagene, 2015).

After reviewing the trial evidence but before deliberation, participants provided their initial verdict and confidence level in this verdict. After each round of deliberation, participants again provided a verdict and confidence level. Any change in confidence would be a measure of the holdout juror’s influence. For example, influence would be high for a participant who markedly decreased their confidence in their own verdict or who switched to the holdout’s verdict. Some participants (7%) did change their verdict, and I multiplied those confidence levels by -1 to account for the fact that the confidence level is at that point reflecting their confidence in the holdout’s verdict rather than their own original verdict.

3.3.3.4 Procedure

Participants viewed the trial evidence and were then shown five usernames and told that these were other participants in the study that they were paired with to form a mock jury. In reality, they were simply shown pre-scripted comments. Participants provided a verdict, a confidence level in this verdict, and comments or explanations to share with their supposed fellow jurors. At this point, participants read the first round of pre-scripted comments. In this baseline round, the (male or female) holdout displayed no emotion. Starting in the second round of comments, the holdout expressed either no emotion, anger, or compassion and continued to express this in subsequent rounds. Participants read four rounds of comments in total and were asked for their verdict, confidence level, and comments after each (See Figure 5 for a visual representation of this procedure.).




Figure 5: Experimental Design

3.3.3.5 Analytic Strategy

I used multilevel modeling to account for the 5 timepoints at which confidence levels were measured, nested within participant, as well as the between-participant variation of holdout gender. Because emotion was not manipulated until the second round of deliberation, I analytically treated this as a within-participant variable that was no emotion for all participants at timepoints 1 and 2 and either continued to be no emotion or switched to anger or compassion for

timepoints 3–5. My outcome is participants’ confidence level in their initial verdict, with lower levels of confidence indicating higher influence. To guard against overfitting, I used a Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) to select the preferred model. BIC provides a straightforward way of evaluating the relative merit of multiple models, identifying the one that best fits the data and is most likely to be predictive of patterns in the larger population (Mulder and Raftery 2022).

3.3.4 Results

Table 2 below reports the descriptive statistics of the dependent variable, actual influence, broken down by holdout gender. Participants became less confident in their verdict over the course of deliberation regardless of holdout gender, but were slightly more confident when the holdout was female (however, this difference is not significant.) 67% of participants initially provided a guilty verdict. Verdict choice varied by participant gender, with about 77% of female participants and 59% of male participants voting guilty. Only 24 (7%) changed their verdict over the course of deliberation. I used multilevel models to look for predictors of verdict-switching but found no main effects or interactions, likely due to a lack of statistical power.

Table 2: Study 1 Descriptive Statistics on Actual Influence

	<i>Mean</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>Range</i>
<i>Male Holdout</i>	-8.72	44.53	-200 to 63
<i>Female Holdout</i>	-10.60	46.98	-167 to 43

The model in Table 3 includes the participant's initial confidence level, prior to deliberation, as a covariate. Results show no difference in predicted confidence levels based on holdout gender or emotion expression. However, the model does show an effect of participant gender: male participants' predicted confidence was nearly 9 percentage points lower than female participants’—despite controlling for initial confidence levels. This indicates that male participants were influenced more than female participants. This relationship is evident in Figure

6 below, which shows the progression of male and female participants' confidence levels across deliberation.




Figure 6: Effect of Participant Gender on Change in Confidence

Finally, the model shows that participants who initially voted guilty were influenced more by the holdout than those who initially voted not guilty. I tested for interactions between variables—participant gender, holdout gender, emotion expression, initial verdict—and found no significant results. I have included a model in Appendix B with all variables, interactions, and controls relevant to testing my hypotheses. The patterns in this model match those in the preferred model—male participants and participants who initially voted not guilty were influenced more, and holdout gender and emotion expression had no effect on influence.

Table 3: Study 1, Actual Influence

	<i>Estimate</i>	<i>Std. Error</i>	<i>p</i>	<i>95% CI</i>
<i>Intercept</i>	5.071	6.339	.424	[-7.35, 17.50]
<i>Initial Confidence</i>	0.884***	0.076	<.001	[.734, 1.03]
<i>Participant Female</i>	8.860***	2.645	<.001	[3.66, 14.06]
<i>Initial Verdict Guilty</i>	-8.530**	2.788	.002	[-14.01, -3.05]

* $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$

These findings are generally counter to my hypotheses and to what we would predict using an status characteristics framework (Berger, Rosenholtz, and Zelditch 1980; Shelly 2001). Further, my results do not replicate previous work using a similar protocol (Salerno et al., 2019; Salerno & Peter-Hagene, 2015). One possible explanation for this discrepancy could be the nature of the trial evidence, which describes the death of a woman, potentially at the hand of her intimate partner. Adjudicating a case of alleged domestic violence may be a task for which women are perceived to have higher competence, especially post Me Too. Before further discussing this possibility, I will present the results of a second study using this same protocol.

3.4 Study 2

Given these unexpected findings, I conducted a second data collection with a few improvements to the design to further explore these effects. I further stressed to participants that they were to come to consensus as a group and improved the compassion manipulation. Where the compassionate statements in the deliberation script for study 1 varied by the participant's original verdict, due to the victim or defendant being the object of compassion, I used more general compassion statements in study 2 that were kept constant across participant verdict, such as “my heart goes out to [the victim and defendant's] families right now.”

I expanded the study to test not only anger and compassion, but also fear, sadness, and surprise. I also added a measure of perceived influence similar to that used by Salerno et al.

(2019). Although I was primarily interested in actual influence in study 1, measuring perceived influence allows another important comparison point to previous research. Finally, I made the minor change of using JasonS/AliciaS as the holdout names to match the names used by Salerno and colleagues (2015, 2019).

3.4.1 Hypotheses

Given research that seems to suggest that perceived and actual influence may in fact be closely related (Thomas-Hunt and Phillips 2004), I predict that (*H1*) perceived and actual influence will be positively correlated. As such, I expect gender and emotion expression to have the same effect on both. Specifically, (*H2*) a female holdout will have less actual influence and lower perceived influence than a male holdout. Previous literature suggests that men are unlikely to be penalized in terms of influence for emotion expression (Salerno et al., 2019; Tiedens, 2001). As such, (*H3*) emotion expression will have no effect on a male holdout's perceived and actual influence. Women, on the other hand, are penalized (Salerno et al., 2019; Salerno & Peter-Hagene, 2015; Tiedens, 2001), although it is unclear whether this is likely to occur for all emotions or primarily those that are stereotypically masculine, negative, or both. (*H4*) Anger, as a stereotypically masculine emotion, will decrease a female holdout's perceived and actual influence. Negatively-valued stereotypically feminine emotions, (*H5–H6*) fear and sadness, will have no effect on a female holdout's perceived and actual influence, and positively-valued stereotypically feminine emotions, (*H7–H8*) compassion and surprise, will increase a female holdout's perceived and actual influence relative to when she is expressing no emotion.

3.4.2 Methods

3.4.2.1 Participants and Design

The study was administered and participants were monetarily compensated on Prolific. I included a manipulation check that asked participants to rate to what extent the holdout juror expressed each of two emotions during deliberation (one of which was the emotion I manipulated). Participants rated the manipulated emotion significantly higher in every emotion condition, indicating that the emotion expression manipulations were successful. I excluded any participants who incorrectly identified the holdout's gender (21), suspected they were not interacting with real people (55), or showed a lack of attention in their deliberation comments (6), or changed their verdict 3 or more times (3), resulting in a sample size of 531. An a priori power analysis (power = .8, effect size = 0.2, alpha = .05) indicated a need for 432 participants. This sample was 41% male, 57% female, and 2% other; 82% white, 6% black or African American, 7% Asian, and 5% other. The mean age was 39 (sd = 13.46, range = 18–81).

I employed a 2×6 design, with holdout gender (male, female) and holdout emotion expression (anger, compassion, fear, sadness, surprise and no emotion) varying between participants. Additionally, as in study 1, I measured verdict confidence after each round of jury deliberation—at five separate timepoints.

3.4.2.2 Materials

I used the same trial evidence and deliberation scripts from study 1 (and Salerno et al., 2019) with the above mentioned revisions to the compassion condition and addition of the fear (also used in Salerno et al., 2019), sadness, and surprise conditions. I tested to ensure that the persuasiveness of the holdout did not vary according to which verdict they were arguing for by

confirming that participants' ratings of holdout influence did not vary across verdict. See Appendix B for the full deliberation scripts for study 2.

3.4.2.3 Influence Measures

In this study, I measure both perceived and actual influence. Similar to Salerno et al. (2019), I ask participants to rate the holdout juror on a five-point scale on their competence, persuasiveness, credibility, influence, and argument quality. I combine these ratings to produce a single measurement of perceived influence. I also use Salerno and Peter-Hagene's (2015) measure of actual influence (change in verdict confidence), as I did in study 1.

Procedure. Participants completed a Qualtrics survey via Prolific following the same protocol used in study 1: viewing trial evidence, reporting their initial verdict and confidence level, reading pre-scripted comments which they believed to be deliberation comments from other participants. Participants were additionally asked to rate the holdout juror on the perceived influence scale after deliberation had ended.

3.4.2.4 Analytic Strategy

To analyze predictors of perceived influence, I used an exploratory factor analysis to reduce participants' ratings of the holdout juror's competence, persuasiveness, credibility, influence, and argument quality to a single summary variable. I then used linear regression to explore factors affecting perceived influence. In respect to actual influence, I employed the same analytic strategy described in study 1, using multilevel models to account for the 5 timepoints at which confidence levels were measured and the manipulated variables of holdout gender and holdout emotion expression. I again use BIC to select the preferred models.

3.4.3 Results

3.4.3.1 Preliminary Analyses

Table 4 below reports the descriptive statistics of the dependent variables, actual and perceived influence, broken down by holdout gender. Participants became around 9% less confident in their verdict over the course of deliberation. Participants rated both the male and female holdout a bit below an “average” (3) level of influence on the scale, with female holdouts rated as slightly less influential than male holdouts. This lower score reflects the holdout's position as a distinct minority in the group. After reviewing the evidence, 53% of participants provided a guilty verdict. Male participants voted guilty at a rate of about 40% and female participants voted guilty at a rate of 62%. Only 4 (<1%) changed their verdict over the course of deliberation. Counter to my predictions, I found no correlation between perceived and actual influence using Spearman's rank correlation ($\rho = -0.022$, $p = .661$).

Table 4: Study 2, Descriptive Statistics on Actual (Change in Confidence) and Perceived Influence

	<i>Mean</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>Range</i>
<i>Actual Influence</i>			
<i>Male Holdout</i>	-9.79	12.34	-30 to 65
<i>Female Holdout</i>	-8.69	30.28	-127 to 100
<i>Perceived Influence</i>			
<i>Male Holdout</i>	2.79	.90	1 to 5
<i>Female Holdout</i>	2.64	1.01	1 to 5

3.4.3.2 Perceived Influence

I used linear regression to test for main effects of holdout gender, emotion expression, and participant gender on perceived influence, as well as interactions between these variables, using initial verdict as a control. The best fit model according to BIC, presented in Table 5, shows a main effect of holdout gender: participants perceived a male holdout to be slightly—two-tenths

of a percentage point, or about 5%—more influential than a female holdout. There were no significant effects of participant gender or holdout emotion and no interactions. These results support my prediction that the female holdout would be perceived as less influential than the male holdout (*H2*), but do not support my predictions related to emotion expression (*H3–H8*). Appendix B includes a model with all variables and interactions necessary to test my hypotheses—in this model, the effect of holdout gender drops slightly below the level of significance ($p = .07$), likely due to the relatively small effect and the large number of parameters in the model.

Table 5: Study 2, Perceived Influence

	<i>Estimate</i>	<i>Std. Error</i>	<i>p</i>	<i>95% CI</i>
<i>Intercept</i>	2.781***	.062	<.001	[2.66, 2.90]
<i>Holdout Female</i>	-.174*	.086	.04	[-.34, -.005]

* $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$

3.4.3.3 Actual Influence

I used multilevel models to assess the predictors of actual influence, testing for main effects of holdout gender, emotion expression, and participant gender as well as interactions between these variables. The best fit model, presented in Table 6, shows no effect of holdout gender, emotion expression, or interactions on actual influence. Unlike study 1, it also shows no effect of participant gender, but it does indicate that participants who initially voted guilty decreased their confidence, or were influenced, slightly (about 2.5 percentage points) more than participants who voted not guilty. A model with all variables and interactions necessary to test my hypotheses can be found in Appendix B, and the patterns in this model match those described here.

Table 6: Study 2, Actual Influence

	<i>Estimate</i>	<i>Std. Error</i>	<i>p</i>	<i>95% CI</i>
<i>Intercept</i>	25.242***	1.547	<.001	[22.21, 28.27]
<i>Initial Confidence</i>	.786***	.021	<.001	[.75, .83]
<i>Voted Guilty</i>	-2.520**	.871	.004	[-4.24, -.81]

p<.05, **p<.01, *p<.001*

These findings are generally counter to my hypotheses but partially replicate the findings from study 1—holdout gender and emotion expression do not seem to impact actual influence (study 1 and 2), but a participant's gender might (according to study 1, but not study 2) impact the degree to which they are influenced. Overall, my findings are unexpected in the context of previous work, but present mostly consistent results across two data collections and should be evaluated seriously.

3.5 Discussion

3.5.1 Gender, emotion, and social influence

The unexpected null effects of holdout gender may be related to the gendered nature of the trial evidence, as it depicted the alleged murder of a woman by her husband. Cultural conceptions link domestic violence victimization to women, who may therefore be perceived to have more competence in these issues than men. Previous research on expert testimony provides support for this possibility. For topics such as battered woman syndrome, child custody, and child sexual abuse (topics often seen as within women's realm of expertise), the testimony of female experts was seen as more credible and had more influence on juror leniency than that of male experts (Schuller, Terry, and McKimmie 2001). Further, my finding that male and female holdouts exerted roughly equal influence on participants seems in line with previous findings which show that demonstrating the superior expertise of a low status group can lead this group to be equally influential as the high status group (Cohen and Roper 1972; Lucas 2003).

This could also account for why female participants in study 1 were influenced less than male participants as women feel more confident and empowered to speak up on the topic of violence against women now than ever (Keplinger et al. 2019). However, this finding was not replicated in study 2 and thus requires further investigation. Finally, the female-typed nature of the task may be responsible for the null effects of emotion expression for the female holdout. Women may have been neither penalized nor rewarded for emotional displays simply because, due to their task-specific competence, their contributions were already being accepted.

This has important theoretical implications for how we think about the (gendered) nature of the task when studying status processes, a consideration that is absent from most studies. Further, it has implications for emotion stereotypes in that it suggests that the “emotional female” stereotype may primarily be used as a post-hoc justification for giving women lower consideration, not as a motivator for doing so. Practically, these results offer some hope for reducing gender inequality if there are in fact certain decisions for which women can achieve influence equal to men's. However, women likely have very little control over which decisions they can exert influence on; it is possible that the majority of tasks are masculine-typed or neutral (in which case men may still have a status advantage).

3.5.2 Difference Post #MeToo

I argue that my findings above are heavily influenced by the content of the court case. However, Salerno and Peter-Hagene (2015) and Salerno et al. (2019) use the same court case, and my results differ from theirs, particularly in regards to the effect of emotion expression, which their studies suggest decreases female influence. Additionally, where I found that female participants remained more confident (study 1) or equally confident (study 2) in their original verdict compared to male participants, in Salerno and Peter-Hagene (2015), male participants retained higher confidence. Perhaps my mTurk sample, which had an older average age (35) differs from Salerno and Peter-Hagene's (2015) undergraduate sample (average age 19), or

perhaps something about coming to the lab in person strengthened the salience of the gender and emotion manipulations in their study as opposed to my online study. Salerno et al.'s (2019) study was also conducted on mTurk, however, and although I did replicate their main effect of gender, I did not replicate their effects of emotion expression.

A second explanation for the divergence in findings is related to the time elapsed between their studies and mine, and the emergence of #MeToo and other movements which might have produced cultural shifts in attitudes around violence against women (Even the later study—Salerno et al. 2019—was first received by the journal in July 2016, meaning data collection for this study did occur prior to the Me Too movement.).

Research has demonstrated the success of MeToo in changing attitudes about violence against women. The reporting of sex crimes in countries with a strong Me Too movement (but not in those with a weak Me Too movement) increased, even though actual incidence decreased in these countries (Levy and Mattsson 2022). A significant portion (51%) of men report changing their behavior and making a concerted effort to listen to women (Psychology Today 2019), while women report feeling better supported and empowered to speak up on the topic (Keplinger et al. 2019). Given this apparent cultural shift in attitudes, it is perhaps unsurprising that my results differ from those of a study conducted prior to Me Too.

I cannot conclusively say exactly why my findings differ from those of previous studies, and this bears further investigation. My results serve as a reminder that these patterns are not fixed in stone, but are culturally contextualized. Future work in the social movements literature should continue to investigate the various implications of Me Too and the specific social processes that were affected by it.

3.5.3 Perceived and Actual Influence

In both studies, participants who initially voted guilty were influenced more by the holdout than those who voted not guilty. Participants may have been responding to the idea of

reasonable doubt embedded in the US criminal justice system. Several participants referred to this in their open-ended comments, with participants who voted not guilty indicating resistance to changing their stance due to not being convinced “beyond a reasonable doubt,” while participants who voted guilty only had to be convinced that there was some amount of doubt.

In study 2, I found that even though participants perceived the male holdout to be more influential than the female holdout, the male holdout did not actually sway their opinion more. This shows that perceived and actual influence measure two distinct concepts, both of which may be important practically and theoretically. Actual influence measures an actor's ability to impact decisions around them. Perceived influence is a measure of an individual's evaluation of another actor that can have consequences for real-life scenarios such as hiring, performance evaluations, and critic appraisals. Even if an individual has influence in a given scenario, whether or not they receive credit for that influence is important, both practically to their own well-being and advancement, and theoretically as perceptions impact subsequent performance expectations and status hierarchies.

This discrepancy between perceived and actual influence falls in line with previous research on the negative appraisals and backlash faced by women who display high status, counter-stereotypical behaviors (Brescoll 2016; Rudman et al. 2012). In this study, I argue that the female holdout achieves influence equal to her male counterpart's due to her cultural connection to domestic violence. However, she still suffers the backlash of negative appraisals, as represented by participants' lower assessments of her influence. This provides an interesting example of the backlash women may face not only for behaving counter-stereotypically, but for simply being in a situation in which their competence, or status, is assumed to be higher than would be typical.

3.5.4 Limitations

I chose to conduct this study online to allow for the utmost experimental control, particularly in regards to maintaining consistency in the arguments expressed by the holdout and the way they expressed emotion. Additionally, an in-person design would have necessitated several trained confederates who could be present concurrently for many rounds of deliberation, which was not feasible financially or logistically. Finally, the online format was necessary to maintain consistency with earlier online work that I was attempting to replicate (Salerno et al., 2019). However, this format may have created a less realistic emotion expression—it did not allow for nonverbal cues or back-and-forth discussion, which are important components of realistic group interaction and relevant to the status processes operating in groups (Ridgeway 2019). This study has established these results as a baseline in conditions with the most experimental control, and they now need to be replicated in more realistic in-person settings. Additionally, sample size was limited, particularly in terms of detecting interactions in study 2, which aims to test several different emotion expressions. Ideally, the emotions that are of greatest theoretical interest should be investigated in a higher-powered study, preferably with an in-person design.

My experiments also deviated somewhat from a real jury experience. My sample may have included some non-citizens, felons, and occupational groups exempt from jury service. However, these groups are likely to be a small part of my sample because they represent a small part of the population; further, there is no reason to expect that these groups would differ on average from jury eligible individuals in terms of their susceptibility to the general status processes examined in this study. Additionally, participants were not given standard jury instructions. Research suggests that jury instructions may effectively eliminate some types of bias towards defendants and victims (Pfeifer and Ogloff 1991), making this a potential concern. However, there is no evidence to suggest that instructions would have the same effect on bias

towards fellow jury members. In fact, we may expect them not to, given that jury instructions focus on the case and those involved in the alleged crime. Other deviations include the size of my mock juries (6 individuals, half the number used in real criminal cases), and that participants were not made to reach actual consensus as deliberation stopped after 4 rounds. Finally, they were not actually rendering a life-changing verdict and thus likely experienced less pressure than real jurors would.

Zelditch (1969) makes a classic argument in support of the validity of using a lab setting to study theoretical processes that guide individuals' behavior in real-life contexts. More recent work has echoed this argument and extended it to online studies (Manago, Mize, and Doan 2021). I do not claim to have approximated a real jury in this study; however, I do argue that I have used a controlled setting to examine important theoretical processes that impact real jurors' behavior, as well as the behavior of many different actors in a variety of group decision-making contexts.

3.6 Conclusion

The findings from this study point to a possible cultural shift in attitudes around violence against women and women's perceived influence in adjudicating such matters. Performance expectations for women are greater than what we would typically predict in situations dealing with domestic violence. However, it also indicates that women face backlash in the form of negative perceptions. More research is necessary to better understand the scope and strength of this phenomena and whether it applies to other status characteristics. Whether women's voices are equally considered has important implications for gender equality in various contexts, as well as implications for the fairness and impartiality of decision-making in contexts such as jury deliberation.

In addition to research using an in-person design and larger sample sizes, future research should test additional tasks, including tasks related to domestic violence and other topics that are feminine-typed as well as neutral or masculine tasks. Future work should also further investigate

the relationship between perceived and actual influence to understand when status characteristics affect people's perceptions of others and when they affect actual decision making.

Finally, researchers should use an intersectional perspective to better account for the complexity of social interaction, taking into account the multiple social locations of the perceiver as well as well as the actor(s). Salerno et al. (2019) have already moved in this direction, finding that black men, who were perceived as less influential when expressing anger, do not share in white men's apparent gender advantage when it comes to emotion expression. This important line of work should consider whether these other status characteristics may also be linked to task content in some way.

4. Gendered Meaning, (Un)certainty, and Institutional Frames in Group Decisions

Public discourse tends to place high value on open dialogue among those who disagree, with the idea that such dialogue will lead to a more wholistic consideration of the problem at hand and better decision-making as a result. This view is supported by research on echo chambers and how they reinforce already-held beliefs (Cinelli et al. 2021; Levy and Razin 2019). However, other work questions the extent to which individuals can productively engage with counter-arguments (Berland and Lee 2012), and some research suggests that individuals and groups may tend to move to more extreme versions of their pre-existing beliefs when presented with opposing arguments (Bail et al. 2018; Sunstein 2000). In this study, I will use a mock jury experiment to explore how exposure to an opposing viewpoint from a dissenting juror impacts participants' degrees of confidence in their initial verdict decisions. Further, I will investigate how gender frames this process, both in terms of the gender of mock jurors and the way trial content is culturally connected to gender. Research demonstrates sociodemographic differences in meaning-making, including differences along the lines of gender (Childress and Friedkin 2012; Christin 2012; Lizardo 2006). These differences appear to be particularly strong for topics that are themselves in some way related to gender (Childress and Friedkin 2012). I argue that intimate partner violence is one such topic, and that its strong cultural connection to gender may impact patterns of influence in mock juries such that female jurors achieve influence equal to or greater than their male counterparts.

4.1 Gender and Meaning-Making

Many studies have documented the segregation of meaning along sociodemographic lines (Cerulo 2018; DellaPosta, Shi, and Macy 2015; Shively 1992). Rawlings and Childress (2021) use book club discussions to show that these sociodemographic differences are both dispositional and situational, meaning that differences already exist prior to group interaction, and processes

during group interaction among similar others lead shared meanings to emerge. These differences exist for multiple sociodemographic characteristics, including gender (Childress and Friedkin 2012; Christin 2012; Lizardo 2006).

Childress and Friedkin (2012) argue that a given sociodemographic difference is likely to be particularly explanatory of variations in meaning-making when a cultural object (in the case of their study, a text) is culturally connected to that characteristic. In other words, there is likely to be more gender difference in the meaning derived from a text that involves issues related to gender than a text that focuses on gender-neutral issues. For group tasks that are related to gender such that women are seen as having more knowledge or competence to speak on the topic, influence patterns may be impacted as well (Correll and Ridgeway 2003). Although men typically have more influence on the group than women, for these feminine type tasks, women may achieve influence equal to or even greater than their male counterparts. If this topic is also one for which sociodemographic differences along the lines of gender are likely to exist, this may in turn impact group outcomes.

4.1.1 Intimate Partner Violence

In the case of intimate partner violence (IPV), research supports the idea that there are gender differences in meaning making. Specifically, when assessing situations of IPV, women are less likely to ascribe blame to the victim compared to men and are more likely to place higher blame on the perpetrator (Delgado-Alvarez and Sanchez-Prada 2022; Russell, Ragatz, and Kraus 2009). Intimate partner violence is culturally connected to women due to its gender disparity in victimization, with women being battered by their male partners far more often than men are battered by their female partners (De Coster and Heimer 2021). Because of this connection to gender, I argue that adjudicating a case of IPV is one task for which we might expect to see an influence advantage for women in groups. Previous research on expert witness testimony supports this idea, finding that female expert witnesses were seen as more credible than male

expert witnesses when giving testimony on battered women syndrome, which testifies to the psychological effects experienced by female victims of IPV (Schuller et al. 2001). Further, in Chapter 3 I found female jurors to be equally influential as male jurors during deliberation (Hasenour 2023); however, because I did not use a comparison non-IPV trial, it is unclear whether this was due to the content of the trial.

4.2 Opinion Distribution and Certainty

When people are confronted with an opposing opinion, do they carefully consider this viewpoint and moderate their own belief, or do they discount it and hold to their original belief even more firmly? Research suggests that for groups of three or more, the distribution of opinions in the group may play an important role in answering this question. People often look to others' opinions to confirm their own and selectively value arguments consistent with their position (Epley and Gilovich 2016). Individuals express greater certainty under high social consensus, when their position is largely shared by those around them (Petrocelli, Tormala, and Rucker 2007; Savage and Melamed 2022; Tormala and Rucker 2007). Increased consensus in a group reduces uncertainty about the "correct" decision, leading group members to be less susceptible to influence. In fact, this effect is so strong in groups with high consensus that it may overshadow other well-documented influence effects in group decision-making, such as the effect of status characteristics (Melamed and Savage 2016; Savage and Melamed 2022), virtually wiping out patterns of influence that would likely occur in a group with a wider distribution of opinions.

Recent research on uncertainty has demonstrated the importance of differentiating between two distinct forms of uncertainty across a population or group (Combs, *working paper*). In group interaction, within-individual uncertainty may arise when a group member is themselves uncertain about the meaning behind the situation, such as when an individual is unable to settle on a private definition of the situation or considers a wide range of meanings to be possible. Alternatively, group members may hold widely different meanings, in which case uncertainty

manifests in the group in the form of disagreement (Combs, *working paper*). Certainty in a private opinion may be strong even under conditions of high disagreement, such as when group members hold vastly different opinions, but each has high confidence in their respective opinion. In such conditions, the “correct” answer for the group as a whole remains unclear. A person’s certainty, however strongly expressed, is not necessarily a good measure of their accuracy—in fact, individuals report high certainty in incorrect answers with relative frequency (Fischhoff, Slovic, and Lichtenstein 1977; Lundeberg, Fox, and Punčcohař 1994). As such, we must attend to uncertainty at both the individual and group level when studying group decision-making.

4.3 Current Study

The current study uses a mock jury deliberation to study gender, meaning-making, and group decision-making. A jury is a useful context for studying group processes generally as it is a situation that participants will readily understand as a context in which they are to listen to each others’ viewpoints and work towards a group decision, and it is a group for which no particular expertise is necessary for membership. In this study, I track participants’ certainty in their verdict decision on a murder trial across three rounds of deliberation with fellow jurors. I use three separate trial stimuli—each concerning a defendant who allegedly murdered 1) his wife, 2) his female roommate/business partner, or 3) his male roommate/business partner—to directly test the effect of trial content on initial verdict choice and on certainty and influence during deliberation. Including two non-IPV trials—one with a male victim and one with a female victim—will allow me to determine whether any differences in participants’ reactions are primarily due to the presence of IPV, not just the gender of the victim. Each mock jury will consist of the participant, one (pre-scripted) fellow juror who agrees with the participant, and one (pre-scripted) dissenting juror. The dissenting juror will be either male or female, allowing me to test for interactions between the dissenting juror’s gender and trial content. I seek to determine how trial content, dissenter gender, and participant gender affect initial verdict choices and how confidence in these

choices fluctuate over deliberation. I use participants' open-ended answers to questions regarding the role their fellow jurors' comments played in their decision making to further explore the process of influence.

Three previous studies have used a protocol similar to the one used in the current study to explore the effect of gender on the influence of a sole dissenting juror. Importantly, these studies all use intimate partner violence (IPV) trial evidence that describes a male defendant who allegedly murdered his wife—case content that is strongly culturally connected to gender. These studies generally find that the dissenting juror has similar levels of influence regardless of gender (Hasenour 2023; Salerno and Peter-Hagene 2015; Salerno et al. 2019), although two find that the female dissenter is *perceived* as less influential (Hasenour 2023; Salerno et al. 2019). In Chapter 3 I suggest that these results may be shaped by the IPV content of the trial (Hasenour 2023), and I set out to test this possibility in the current study.

Due to the gender disparity in victimization (De Coster and Heimer 2021), intimate partner violence is culturally connected to gender. I predict that this will lead women, who disproportionately suffer IPV, to adjudicate IPV cases differently than they do non-IPV cases.

Hypothesis 1: Women will be more likely to vote guilty in the IPV trial than they will in the non-IPV trials.

Research shows that women are more likely to place blame on the perpetrator in IPV contexts, while men are comparatively more likely to blame the victim (Delgado-Alvarez and Sanchez-Prada 2022). I therefore expect to find a gender difference in initial verdicts.

Hypothesis 2: Women will be more likely than men to vote guilty in the IPV trial.

Previous research on group process has well established a gender difference favoring men in influence in groups.

Hypothesis 3: The male dissenter will have more influence than the female dissenter in the non-IPV trials.

However, this effect may be somewhat dependent on the nature of the group task and how it is connected to gender. Previous research on expert witnesses finds that female expert witnesses testifying to the psychological effects of IPV were seen as more credible than male expert witnesses testifying on the same subject (Schuller et al. 2001). However, past work on jury deliberation that uses IPV trial content finds that male and female jurors have similar levels of influence (Hasenour 2023; Salerno and Peter-Hagene 2015; Salerno et al. 2019), and I expect to replicate these findings.

Hypothesis 4: The male and female dissenters will have equal levels of influence in the IPV trial.

4.4 Methods

4.4.1 Participants

I collected data from 846 users on Prolific. I screened participants' open-ended comments for attentiveness and suspicion. I additionally employed a manipulation check ensuring that they noticed the gender of the dissenting juror and a funnel debriefing that assessed their commitment to the task and consideration of their fellow group members' comments. The responses of participants who failed the manipulation check (155), indicated that they did not put their best effort into the task (2), or indicated that they did not give their fellow jurors' comments

consideration (79) were removed from the dataset. While some participants' comments did showed a lack of attention, all of these participants had already been removed from the sample due to one of the reasons listed above. This resulted in a final sample size of 610 participants, 45% of whom were male, 53% female, and 2% nonbinary/other. They were 65% white, 13% black, 9% Hispanic, 8% Asian, and 5% other. The mean age was 41 (SD=13).

4.4.2 Experimental Design

I used a 2x3 design, with both dissenter gender (male, female) and trial content (male victim, female victim, female IPV victim) varying between participants. The first dependent variable, participant's initial guilt rating, was measured directly prior to the first round of deliberation, after they had seen the usernames of their fellow jurors but before they were made aware of those fellow jurors' verdict opinions. The second dependent variable, confidence in their verdict (a measure of influence), was measured at three separate times throughout the study, pre-deliberation and after each round of deliberation.

4.4.3 Materials

4.4.3.1 Trial Evidence

Participants were randomly assigned to see one of three sets of trial evidence, presented in video format. The first set (female IPV victim), described the alleged murder of a young woman by her husband. The evidence, which included opening and closing statements, prosecution and defense arguments, and testimony from eyewitnesses and expert witnesses, was based off of a real 2000 case (*R v. Valevski*) in which the defense argued that the woman committed suicide.

The second set of evidence, (male victim), differed on only two key factors. First, the victim in this trial was the male roommate and business partner of the defendant, who threatened to take the business and leave (rather than take the kids and leave). Second, the key witness was the brother of the defendant rather than the parents of the defendant, as was the case in the IPV

trial. All other major details such as the weapon used, the timeline of events, how the murder or suicide might have occurred, forensic evidence, and content of expert and eyewitness testimony remained the same across trial evidence. The third set of evidence (female victim) was identical to this second set of evidence aside from the victim's gender.

The photographs used to represent the victim in each set of trial evidence were taken from the Chicago Face Database, which includes norming data that allowed me to ensure these faces were similar on perceived attractiveness, gender stereotypicality, race stereotypicality (all victims were white, as was the defendant), and emotion expression (Ma, Correll, and Wittenbrink 2015). The same image was used for the female IPV victim and the female victim.

4.4.3.2 Deliberation Scripts

The deliberation script included mock juror comments used in previous studies (Hasenour 2023; Salerno and Peter-Hagene 2015; Salerno et al. 2019). Each script appeared to include arguments from two other participants in the study, one of whom agreed with the participant and one of whom (the dissenting juror) disagreed. The dissenting juror was either male (jake) or female (rachel) and had either a more masculine (red racecar) or feminine (pink flamingos forming a heart) avatar, depending on the condition the participant was randomly assigned to. The other juror had a gender-neutral username (syoun936) and avatar (dog). Juror comments were nearly identical regardless of which trial evidence the participant saw, with minor necessary changes such as the name and pronouns of the victim. This script can be found in Appendix C.

Participants were asked to select an avatar and provide their own username to represent them to their fellow group members. They were prompted to make comments explaining their verdict for fellow jurors to read in each round, and given a limited amount of time to do so—ostensibly to keep deliberation flowing smoothly. Additionally, short waiting periods were programmed into the deliberation portion as if fellow participants' comments were being

compiled. These steps were taken to increase the realism of the experience and lead participants to be more likely to believe they were indeed interacting with other participants.

4.4.3.3 Dependent Measures

My first dependent variable is participants' initial verdict choice, which they make after reviewing the trial evidence and being "matched" with fellow jurors but before deliberating with or seeing the verdict choices of these fellow jurors. The second dependent variable assesses to what degree participants were influenced by the dissenting juror. Participants provided their confidence level in their initial verdict and updated this confidence level after each round of deliberation. I track how much participants' confidence in their initial verdict is swayed over the course of deliberation as a measure of influence¹. Influence would be high for a participant whose confidence notably decreased during deliberation or who switched their verdict entirely and low for a participant who showed an increase or little change in confidence level.

4.4.3.4 Open-ended Responses

Participants were required to provide open response arguments explaining their verdict choice in each round of deliberation. In addition, as part of a funnel debriefing, participants were asked to provide short responses to a few questions about how they felt their group performed during deliberation and how they used their fellow jurors arguments when deciding on their own verdict.

4.4.4 Procedure

Participants were randomly assigned to review trial evidence describing the alleged murder of either a male victim, a female victim, or a female IPV victim. They were then told that

¹ Due to the complexity of this task and the low motivation for the participant (who is in the majority) to change their verdict entirely, I follow previous studies using this design to look at changes in confidence (Hasenour 2023; Salerno and Peter-Hagene 2015; Salerno, Peter-Hagene, and Jay 2019) rather than changes in the actual verdict decision.

they were being matched with two other participants in the study to form a mock jury, although they would in reality be shown the pre-scripted comments described above. They were asked for their initial verdict, confidence level in that verdict, and rationale to share with their fellow jurors. After this, participants entered the first round of deliberation, seeing the pre-scripted comments with one agreeing juror with a gender neutral username and one dissenting juror who was either male or female. Participants saw two rounds of deliberation total and gave their verdict, confidence level, and rationale after both. Finally, they completed the funnel debriefing, manipulation and suspicion checks, and demographic questions.

4.4.5 Analytic Strategy

I use logistic regression to analyze predictors of participants' initial verdict choice. I use multilevel modeling to analyze predictors of dissenter influence in order to account for nesting, as participants' confidence was measured at three separate timepoints. In each case, I used an Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) to assess model fit. Information criterion provide a straightforward way of comparing model fit and identifying the model that is most likely to be predictive of patterns in the population (Mulder and Raftery 2022). As such, the models I present include the variables that are most relevant to predicting these broader trends, not necessarily every variable and interaction. Models including these other variables and interactions can be found in Appendix C. Because I found no significant differences in verdicts or influence between the female victim trial and the male victim trial, I collapsed these into one category, "non-IPV trial" and present comparisons between this category and the IPV trial.

4.5 Results

4.5.1 Initial Verdict

While about 38% of participants initially voted guilty overall, this initial verdict varied by participant gender, with more female participants (45%) voting guilty than male participants (31%). (See Table 7 for the proportion of participants who voted guilty by participant gender,

evidence type, and dissenter gender. See Table 8 for the logistic regression results confirming these relationships.) Although it at first appears as if the presence of IPV in the trial evidence had no impact on verdicts, taking into account participant gender across trial type reveals that this was not the case. In fact, the gender gap in guilty verdicts was significantly wider for the IPV case than the non-IPV cases, with women voting guilty at an especially high rate (49%) and men voting guilty at an especially low rate (25%). In other words, women were particularly inclined to rule the events described in the evidence as an act of murder when said murder constituted intimate partner violence, and men were particularly inclined to rule these events as suicide in this case (as compared to their verdicts for a murder case not involving IPV). This relationship is depicted in Figure 7 below, and these results support hypotheses 1 and 2.

Table 7: Proportion Voting Guilty (.38 Overall)

Participant Gender	<i>Male</i>	<i>Female</i>
	.31	.45
Evidence Type	<i>Non-IPV</i>	<i>IPV</i>
	.39	.37
Evidence Type: Participant Gender	<i>Male</i>	<i>Female</i>
<i>Non-IPV</i>	.35	.43
<i>IPV</i>	.25	.49
Dissenter Gender	<i>Male</i>	<i>Female</i>
	.42	.34




Figure 7: Proportion of Participants Initially Voting Guilty by Participant Gender and Evidence Type

Further, participants who had been told they would be deliberating with rachel and syoun936 voted guilty at a lower rate (34%) across all three trial types than those who had been told they would be deliberating with jake and syoun936 (42%). At this timepoint, when giving their initial verdict, participants only saw the usernames and avatars of their fellow jurors, not those jurors' verdicts. As such, they can infer the gender of the dissenting juror, but do not yet know that juror will be disagreeing with them. It is unclear whether this finding results from expectations about their fellow jurors' likely verdicts and an effort (conscious or not) to bring their own assessments in line with these verdicts, a desire to manage their own image, or some other factor, and this finding bears further investigation. Regardless, this demonstrates that information about future interaction partners can impact initial decision-making, before interaction even begins. Given that participants overwhelmingly stuck to these initial decisions, this information may in some cases by extension impact eventual outcomes.

Table 8: Predictors of Voting Guilty

	<i>Estimate</i>	<i>Std. Error</i>	<i>p</i>	<i>95% CI</i>
Intercept	.385***	.029	<.001	[.328, .443]
Participant Female	.083*	.034	.015	[.016, .150]
Dissenter Female ²	-.075**	.028	.007	[-.130, -.020]
IPV Victim	-.097*	.043	.025	[-.182, -.013]
Participant Female: IPV Victim	.154**	.060	.01	[.037, .271]

* $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$

4.5.2 Influence

Multilevel models showed no significant effects or interactions of dissenter gender, evidence type, or participant gender on dissenter influence. The AIC preferred model (Table 9) indicates that participants' confidence in their original verdicts increased over time, from pre-deliberation to after the final round of deliberation. This pattern of results fails to support hypotheses 3 and 4, which specifically predict an interaction between trial content and dissenter gender. Because participants were not actually influenced in this study, I suggest that these results are inconclusive.

The model also reveals an interaction between time and initial verdict: participants who initially voted guilty increased their confidence less (their confidence levels remained relatively stable over the course of deliberation) than those who initially voted not guilty (whose confidence levels increased by about 7 percentage points over deliberation). This relationship is depicted below in Figure 8. This effect of initial verdict is directionally in line with my findings in Chapter 3 (Hasenour 2023) and likely reflects participants' assumptions about the "reasonable doubt" standard in the US court system³. In fact, over 20% of participants expressly used the phrase

² At this point, participants are aware of the gender of this juror but not aware that this juror will disagree with their own verdict.

³ Dissenting jurors' comments varied across participant verdict to always be in opposition to the participant. As such, it is possible that the dissenting juror for participants who voted guilty genuinely seemed more persuasive than the dissenting juror for participants who voted not guilty, resulting in this finding. However, I collected participant ratings of their fellow jurors' persuasiveness, and a t test shows that

“reasonable doubt” at some point in the study, either in their comments to their fellow jurors or in the debriefing, and many more indirectly referenced this idea, not wanting to convict the defendant unless they were completely sure he was guilty.

Table 9: Predictors of Confidence (Dissenter Influence)

	<i>Estimate</i>	<i>Std. Error</i>	<i>p</i>	<i>95% CI</i>
Intercept	64.63***	1.143	<.001	[62.40, 66.87]
Time	3.444***	.489	<.001	[2.486, 4.402]
Initial Verdict Guilty	2.934	1.849	.113	[-.692, 6.561]
Time: Initial Verdict Guilty	-2.914***	.791	.0002	[-4.464, -1.364]

* $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$ |




Figure 8: Effect of Initial Verdict on Changes in Confidence

Participants in this study were largely resistant to influence. In fact, participants on average increased their confidence level by about 4.7 percentage points from pre-deliberation (m=65.4, sd=21.5) to after the second (final) round of deliberation (m=70.1, sd=27.4), and only

participants perceived the dissenting juror as similarly persuasive [$t(534.29) = -.600, p = .549$] regardless of their initial verdict, suggesting that this was likely not the case.

3% changed their verdict entirely. When asked about how they used their fellow jurors' arguments in their decision-making process, participants generally reported serious consideration of these comments; however, this consideration does not appear to have gone so far as to lead them to allow themselves to be influenced by the dissenting juror. Many noted their ultimate trust in their own judgment as an explanation for this, making comments in the debriefing such as "I still chose to follow my gut instinct" and "overall I trusted my process".

As expected, consensus seemed to increase certainty, which may in turn have led to the lack of dissenter influence in this study. Many participants noted the one fellow juror who did agree with them as confirming their opinion. It does not appear to be the case that participants paid attention to this juror more, ignoring the dissenter, but rather that they paid attention to both but judged the agreeing juror's comments as intelligent and valid and the dissenting juror's as weak or ineffectual. In fact, in the debriefing, participants on both sides of the guilty/not guilty debate expressly pointed to weaknesses in the dissenter's arguments as bolstering their own position. For example, one participant who voted not guilty found the dissenter's arguments to be "unconvincing" and "contain conjecture rather than fact," while another participant who voted guilty stated that their dissenter's arguments were "superficial" and "not compelling". Importantly, the agreeing juror for a participant who voted not guilty made the exact same comments as the dissenting juror for a participant who voted guilty, and vice versa. In other words, when one side refers to their agreeing juror's comments as valid and intelligent and the other side refers to their dissenter's comments as superficial and unconvincing, they are in fact referencing the same argument. Participants' perception of the dissenting juror's arguments as weak gave them increased confidence in their position, as another participant noted: "I found syoun936 [the agreeing juror] also had a good reason to vote for not guilty. Although I was certain of the not guilty verdict, their reasoning bolstered my own. Interestingly enough, so did

jakes' [the dissenting juror] reasons for voting guilty. As in, the reasons jake gave for voting guilty made me think the defendant was definitely innocent.”

4.6 Discussion

The results of this study suggest that task content (in particular, the gendered nature of that content) and the gender of interaction partners, if known, can impact people’s initial positions on a task. However, once those positions are stated, individuals who hold the majority opinion tend to be resistant to influence from interaction partners who disagree. Instead, they value positions consistent with their own and disregard those that are inconsistent to further affirm their certainty in their own opinion. These processes are institutionally situated and shaped by the cultural context in which they occur.

4.6.1 Gender and Task Content

Female participants were more likely than male participants to initially vote guilty across all three trial types. Previous work investigating gender differences in guilt ratings shows that these differences vary widely based on case content, with women being more likely to vote guilty for cases involving sex crimes or child victims and men being more likely to vote guilty for capital cases and cases of female victims of IPV who kill their abusers (Devine and Caughlin 2014). This study found that women were more inclined to vote guilty for murder cases; however, this gender difference could be patterned by other factors such as the level of violence involved in the crime or defendant characteristics. This should be further investigated as it has implications for how the gender composition of juries may impact trial outcomes.

This gender gap in initial verdicts was particularly stark for the IPV case—almost twice as many women voted guilty for this case as compared to men. IPV is culturally connected to gender due to the much higher victimization of women compared to men, and past work has shown that women construct different meaning from IPV situations than do men, being likely to place more blame on the male perpetrator and less on the female victim (De Coster and Heimer

2021). The magnitude of the difference found in this study is striking and has implications for group discussion on “feminine” tasks generally as well as the adjudication of IPV cases specifically, given that the jury’s initial orientation towards these types of cases may vary substantially depending on the gender composition of the jury. Further, it has implications for how gender may shape public opinion on and judgment of IPV victims more generally.

The gender of anticipated interaction partners also impacted participants’ initial verdicts, across all trial types. Those who saw they would be deliberating with a male fellow juror were more likely to vote guilty than those who were to deliberate with a female fellow juror. The reason for this difference is unclear—perhaps participants, consciously or not, expected a man to be more likely to lean towards a guilt verdict and adjusted their verdict in line with this assumption. Alternatively, stereotypes that depict women as gentle and nurturing may have impacted participants, leading them to be less likely to frame the events in the trial as murder when anticipating deliberating with a woman. More research is necessary to understand this result. Regardless, though we often study influence in group decision-making in terms of what happens in groups during discussion, these findings underscore the importance of additionally accounting for how the anticipation of having to confer with other group members may impact decision-making that begins prior to the group convening. To the extent that in some groups these initial decisions may persist across group discussion, this in turn impacts eventual outcomes.

The dissenter’s gender and the trial content did not, however, impact the degree to which participants were influenced by the dissenter. This is likely due to participants simply *not* being influenced by the dissenter—with no influence to be had in the first place, we cannot meaningfully measure variation in levels of influence. As such, these findings do not necessarily suggest that there is no effect of dissenter gender or IPV content on influence in juries.

4.6.2 (Unwarranted) Certainty

Once deliberation actually began and participants were made aware of their fellow jurors' verdicts (and believed their own verdict decisions were shared with these jurors), participants overwhelmingly retained high certainty their initial verdicts despite being presented with a counter opinion. Nevertheless, the case used in this study is certainly not the type of "easy" case to adjudicate that we might expect would motivate such certainty. In fact, this trial evidence has been shown in multiple studies to produce high *uncertainty*, or disagreement, across individuals, with previous studies reporting guilty/not guilty splits as close as 53/47 and 43/57 (Hasenour 2023; Salerno and Peter-Hagene 2015). In other words, there is no clear correct verdict, yet participants report high confidence in the verdict they chose, be it guilty or not guilty. When faced with a conflicting opinion, they stick firmly to their original verdict, in some cases becoming even more confident in this verdict. This is likely due to the distribution of opinions in the mock juries—participants were in the majority of the three-person jury, creating a situation in which they experienced less uncertainty as to the "correct" verdict. This finding is consistent with previous research on influence and certainty (Melamed and Savage 2016; Savage and Melamed 2022).

Whether participants' high certainty is truly warranted is questionable. The trial evidence used is fairly ambiguous in regards to guilt, as evidenced by high disagreement on the correct verdict. Further, participants' initial verdicts were affected by factors entirely extraneous to or only minimally related to the alleged crime itself, such as the gender of the juror they would later deliberate with, and whether the victim was the wife of the defendant (IPV victim) or the business partner (female victim and male victim). As such, participants' reported high levels of certainty in their verdicts are not necessarily motivated by factors pertaining to the case itself, but rather by these broader social processes related to opinion distribution and resistance to change. Finally, participants selectively value the arguments of jurors that agree with their verdict. I argue that

participants' high confidence is, to an extent, false confidence, and that it arose largely as a result of their position in the majority opinion and their repeated, public declarations of their verdict. This serves as an important reminder that certainty is patterned by social processes in interpersonal situations and does not necessarily signal accuracy.

4.6.3 Institutional Framing

A final important theme that arose from this study is the impact of institutional framing. This particular study of group decision-making took place in the form of a mock jury, and participants seem to have pulled from their knowledge and assumptions about juries and criminal justice trials to orient themselves to the task. This is evidenced in the high number of participants who independently referenced the reasonable doubt standard despite this not being mentioned in any instructions. (This is in addition to many more participants who expressed a similar idea without using the term reasonable doubt, such as the sentiment that the jury could only find a guilty verdict if the defendant was “for sure guilty”.) This sentiment is consistent with broader shared cultural values—most people find the idea of allowing one guilty person to go free preferable to the idea of imprisoning one innocent person (Halvorsen 2004). Reasonable doubt is, in reality, a specific legal concept that would be explained to the jury by the judge. As such, participants were likely referencing their own assumptions about this concept rather than accurately referencing the legal term itself. Regardless, the standard for being swayed from not guilty to guilty clearly differs from the standard for being swayed in the opposite direction. This institutional framing oriented participants to the task in such a way that likely produced more “not guilty” verdicts than we might have seen absent this framing, in a context in which the evidence and certainty necessary to defend either side would be equal.

The institutional framing may also have influenced participants to report being open to the influence of their fellow jurors despite overwhelmingly rejecting this influence. Jurors are *supposed* to hear each other out and work together; this is seen as a necessary and key aspect of a

fair trial. One participant summed up this sentiment perfectly, saying “Ultimately, the goal of jury deliberation is to reach a fair and just verdict through open dialogue and collaboration among jurors, considering all available evidence and viewpoints.” On the other hand, however, people are particularly hesitant to change a position that they have declared publicly and repeatedly (Holland, Verplanken, and van Knippenberg 2003; Petrocelli et al. 2007), and the high-stakes nature of a murder trial may only amplify this reticence to appear, or in fact be, uncertain or irresolute. Such context may lead participants to report openness to influence despite actually being quite resistant to said influence. Ultimately, this serves as a reminder that group decision-making is institutionally situated and that meaning making is framed contextually.

4.6.4 Limitations and Future Directions

I did not manipulate the distribution of opinions in the mock juries (all participants saw 1 agreeing juror and 1 dissenting juror). Therefore, I cannot conclusively say that the lack of status effects directly resulted from participants’ position in the majority, although this would be consistent with prior experimental research (Melamed and Savage 2013, 2016; Savage and Melamed 2016, 2022). Future research should investigate this possibility, studying participants’ interactions with the group and the dissenter’s influence on participants when the participant is in the minority as opposed to majority, in different sized majorities or minorities, and in larger groups (such as the standard 12-person jury). If dissenter influence is in fact higher when participants are not in the majority, such studies could also investigate the effect of dissenter gender (and its interaction with task content) on said influence. The lack of effects of dissenter gender and trial type on influence found in this study may simply be due to the lack of any influence occurring. As such, this work leaves open the question of how men and women’s influence will compare on feminine type tasks.

Additionally, it is possible that participants were resistant to influence not only because they were in the majority, but also because they had already publicly (to their fellow jurors) stated

their positions and may have felt pressure to justify these positions rather than change their mind and thereby suggest that they were initially wrong. Future work could test for this possibility by creating group tasks which participants could collaborate on without revealing their position to fellow group members, allowing for an experimental manipulation of whether these positions were made public or kept private. This work could have implications for how to make group tasks more collaborative across a variety of spheres.

This study established that participants' verdict choice differed depending on the gender of the fellow juror they were about to interact with. Future research should explore this finding in more depth, investigating how knowledge about future interaction partners' social characteristics impacts initial decision-making, and how this shapes later outcomes. This work should investigate race in particular as a social characteristic shown to produce self-monitoring, particularly for whites interacting with nonwhites (Shelton and Richeson 2006; Stevenson et al. 2017), as well as the intersection of race and gender.

In these types of group-based tasks, manipulations such as the dissenter's gender are likely to be more salient in person. Further, in-person interaction involves important components such as nonverbal cues and tone that are difficult or impossible to replicate online. As such, future studies might consider an in-person design to further explore these findings or a mixed design that would allow for a comparison of online group decision-making with in-person group decision-making.

4.7 Conclusion

This study uses a mock jury context to document gender differences in meaning making, particularly for content that is culturally connected to gender (intimate partner violence). Men and women vary in their tendency to infer guilt across trial types in this study, but this gender gap is especially large for the IPV case, for which women are even more likely to vote guilty and men are even less likely to vote guilty. Further, participants adjust their initial verdicts depending on

the gender of the juror they anticipate deliberating with, voting guilty at higher rates when they are to deliberate with a male juror as compared to a female juror. This has implications for the way a group's gender composition shapes decision making, particularly on topics that are culturally connected to gender. It also provides context for how factors outside of the group discussion itself, such as the content of the task and prior knowledge of interaction partners, may impact initial orientations to a task and, to the extent that these orientations persist, final group decisions.

By tracking participants' confidence in their verdicts over deliberation, I highlight people's strong resistance to changing or being influenced by a counter opinion, at least on an already-stated majority opinion, and their tendency to judge others' argument quality in ways that bolsters their own position. I argue, however, that their high certainty is unwarranted, as is evidenced by ambiguous trial evidence and high disagreement on the correct verdict. This serves as a reminder that certainty is impacted by factors extraneous to the task at hand, such as the group opinion distribution and whether members have publicly declared their opinions. High certainty does not necessarily signal high accuracy. Future work should explore patterns in certainty and influence in groups with different-size majorities and minorities and investigate how certainty and group outcomes differ depending on whether initial opinions are kept private or made public. As shown in this study, group decision making is contextually situated, and institutional framing such as ideas about reasonable doubt and the role of a juror in the criminal justice system shape group interaction.

5. Conclusion

Gender powerfully shapes interaction and meaning-making, and gender congruity in interaction perhaps particularly affects impressions of women. In chapter 2, I explore this process through participants' ratings of the likelihood of various interactions with male or female actors, and participants' evaluations of whether those interactions are more masculine or feminine. I find that interactions with female actors are viewed quite differently depending on these gendered perceptions—specifically, the masculine interactions are viewed as particularly unlikely, while the feminine interactions are viewed as particularly likely. Interactions with male actors, on the other hand, are viewed neutrally regardless of whether they are feminine or masculine interactions. In other words, at least for one-time interactions, observers appear to be relatively indifferent to the types of interactions men engage in, while this is not the case for women.

In chapters 3 and 4, I investigate the effect of gender and gender congruence in a particular context: jury deliberation. First, in chapter 3, I focus on the way jurors express themselves, displaying either gender congruent or gender incongruent emotions. I find that gender and emotion expression have no effect on a juror's ability to actually influence fellow jurors, but that individuals perceive female jurors as less influential than male jurors. Further, female participants remained confident in their verdicts across deliberation, while male participants were influenced more by a dissenting juror. However, the trial content used in the study depicted intimate partner violence, which is uniquely connected to gender due to the higher incidence of victimization of women by men, raising the possibility that these results may differ with a different trial stimulus. I explore this possibility in chapter 4. I find that juror influence does not vary by trial content or juror gender, but verdicts do. First, participants who anticipate deliberating with a male fellow juror were more likely to initially vote guilty. Additionally, female participants were more likely than male participants to vote guilty across all trials, and particularly likely to vote guilty in the IPV trial. On the other hand, male participants were

particularly likely to vote not guilty in the IPV trial. IPV trial content is clearly connected to gender in a way that shapes individuals' adjudication of the evidence.

This dissertation highlights the role of gender in shaping individuals' understanding of and reaction to interaction. Further, it stresses the role of congruence: we must consider both an individual's gender identity and the role or situation they are embedded in relates to gender, particularly for women. I first demonstrate how this impacts perceptions generally across a wide variety of simple, one-time interactions, and then show how it plays out in the specific group interaction context of jury deliberation. This work contributes to the literature on gender role congruity, affect control theory, group processes, and social psychology of the law; further, it has practical implications for how men and women are viewed in interaction and the outcomes of group decision-making.

Appendix A: Additional Materials for Chapter 2

A.1 Visualizations by Identity Pair




Figure 9: Deflection Scores by Event Femininity in Four Identity Pairs




Figure 10: Likelihood Ratings by Event Femininity in Four Identity Pairs

A.2 Selected OLS Models by Identity Pair

Table 10: Predictors of Likelihood Rating by Actor Identity Pairing

	Man/Woman		Father/Mother	
Intercept	.281*** [.166, .398]	.085* [.005, .164]	-.008 [-.131, .116]	-.145*** [-.226, -.064]
Deflection	-.299*** [-.448, -.150]		-.089* [-.170, -.008]	
Event Femininity	.008 [-.071, .088]		-.0002 [-.082, .082]	
Actor Female	-.007 [-.121, .106]		.048 [-.068, .163]	
Event Femininity: Actor Female	.067 [-.044, .179]		.188** [.071, .304]	
	Businessman/Businesswoman		Waiter/Waitress	
Intercept	.042 [-.072, .155]	-.159*** [-.235, -.083]	.066 [-.059, .192]	-.306*** [-.384, -.229]
Deflection	-.306*** [-.456, -.155]		-.509*** [-.681, -.337]	
Event Femininity	.002 [-.077, .081]		.069 + [-.009, .147]	
Actor Female	-.017 [-.125, .091]		.113* [.003, .224]	
Event Femininity: Actor Female	.128* [.018, .237]		.064 [-.047, .174]	

+ $p < .1$, * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$

Note: Likelihood ratings, deflection, and event femininity are standardized—coefficients represent the average predicted change, in standard deviations, associated with a one standard deviation increase in likelihood ratings. The 95% confidence intervals for each estimate are presented in brackets.

A.4 Events Presented to Participants

1. [Man/woman] guards best friend
2. [Man/woman] kisses hero
3. [Man/woman] befriends shopper
4. [Man/woman] hires switchboard operator
5. [Man/woman] praises defense attorney
6. [Man/woman] rewards referee
7. [Man/woman] adores babysitter
8. [Man/woman] compensates aide
9. [Father/mother] persuades pickpocket
10. [Father/mother] sweet talks killjoy
11. [Father/mother] educates burglar
12. [Father/mother] helps backstabber
13. [Businessman/businesswoman] gives raise to auditor
14. [Businessman/businesswoman] compliments spy
15. [Father/mother] cross examines robber
16. [Father/mother] lectures intruder
17. [Man/woman] excludes peer
18. [Man/woman] underpays dental hygienist
19. [Father/mother] frowns at dishwasher
20. [Father/mother] ignores undergraduate
21. [Waiter/waitress] brushes off psychoanalyst
22. [Waiter/waitress] unfriends tax preparer
23. [Waiter/waitress] scowls at priest
24. [Waiter/waitress] fibs to detective
25. [Waiter/waitress] eludes intruder
26. [Waiter/waitress] suspects robber
27. [Man/woman] pulls away from backstabber
28. [Man/woman] disbelieves burglar
29. [Businessman/businesswoman] deceives spy
30. [Businessman/businesswoman] embezzles from auditor
31. [Businessman/businesswoman] confines pickpocket
32. [Businessman/businesswoman] shuns killjoy
33. [Man/woman] intimidates socialist
34. [Man/woman] overworks probationer
35. [Waiter/waitress] slaps divorcee
36. [Waiter/waitress] punches truant
37. [Waiter/waitress] assails evildoer
38. [Waiter/waitress] frightens arsonist
39. [Man/woman] kicks rapist
40. [Man/woman] hassles mugger
41. [Man/woman] gossips with houseguest
42. [Man/woman] patronizes apprentice
43. [Father/mother] scolds infant
44. [Father/mother] restrains baby
45. [Waiter/waitress] sues employee
46. [Waiter/waitress] punishes laborer
47. [Father/mother] clubs gamer
48. [Father/mother] threatens telephone operator

49. [Father/mother] apologizes to custodian
50. [Father/mother] holds janitor
51. [Father/mother] tips blind person
52. [Father/mother] feeds something to disabled person
53. [Father/mother] washes hippie
54. [Father/mother] excuses pedestrian
55. [Businessman/businesswoman] examines tenant
56. [Businessman/businesswoman] contemplates passenger
57. [Man/woman] advises gambler
58. [Man/woman] marries punk
59. [Man/woman] loves schizophrenic
60. [Man/woman] protects klutz
61. [Businessman/businesswoman] cares for illegitimate child
62. [Businessman/businesswoman] trusts runaway
63. [Father/mother] competes with telemarketer
64. [Father/mother] tickles scatterbrain
65. [Waiter/waitress] teases Mormon
66. [Waiter/waitress] snarls at parking attendant
67. [Father/mother] restrains chauffeur
68. [Father/mother] scolds innocent
69. [Waiter/waitress] brawls with agnostic
70. [Waiter/waitress] chews out boarder
71. [Waiter/waitress] hushes receptionist
72. [Waiter/waitress] implicates taxpayer
73. [Man/woman] eludes liar
74. [Man/woman] suspects adulterer
75. [Waiter/waitress] pulls away from hothead
76. [Waiter/waitress] disbelieves blabbermouth
77. [Man/woman] deceives buffoon
78. [Man/woman] embezzles from fool
79. [Businessman/businesswoman] confines anti-semitic
80. [Businessman/businesswoman] shuns bigot
81. [Father/mother] bugs funeral director
82. [Father/mother] heckles golfer
83. [Businessman/businesswoman] harasses rabbi
84. [Businessman/businesswoman] makes fun of chemist
85. [Father/mother] bellows at catholic
86. [Father/mother] tells off conservative
87. [Father/mother] antagonizes author
88. [Father/mother] slugs detective
89. [Waiter/waitress] pursues blockhead
90. [Waiter/waitress] bargains with degenerate
91. [Waiter/waitress] congratulates smoker
92. [Waiter/waitress] giggles with vagrant
93. [Waiter/waitress] beams at cripple
94. [Waiter/waitress] debriefs mourner
95. [Waiter/waitress] emulates conformist
96. [Waiter/waitress] dotes on invalid
97. [Waiter/waitress] complains to slob
98. [Waiter/waitress] mimics grouch

99. [Man/woman] imitates dropout
100. [Man/woman] stammers at prisoner
101. [Businessman/businesswoman] ridicules coward
102. [Businessman/businesswoman] talks down to deadbeat
103. [Waiter/waitress] misjudges vagrant
104. [Waiter/waitress] scoffs at smoker
105. [Businessman/businesswoman] obeys bodyguard
106. [Businessman/businesswoman] waits on expert
107. [Waiter/waitress] yields to bulldozer operator
108. [Waiter/waitress] murmurs to flirt
109. [Waiter/waitress] obeys intruder
110. [Waiter/waitress] waits on robber
111. [Man/woman] yields to burglar
112. [Man/woman] murmurs to backstabber
113. [Man/woman] blames auto mechanic
114. [Man/woman] complains about brunette
115. [Father/mother] badgers employer
116. [Father/mother] nags principal
117. [Businessman/businesswoman] begs superior
118. [Businessman/businesswoman] sucks up to millionaire
119. [Man/woman] insults soldier
120. [Man/woman] mocks patriot
121. [Waiter/waitress] blames spy
122. [Waitress] complains about auditor
123. [Businessman/businesswoman] badgers killjoy
124. [Businessman/businesswoman] nags pickpocket
125. [Businessman/businesswoman] begs intruder
126. [Businessman/businesswoman] sucks up to robber
127. [Waiter/waitress] insults burglar
128. [Waiter/waitress] mocks backstabber
129. [Businessman/businesswoman] enchants critic
130. [Businessman/businesswoman] fixes opponent
131. [Man/woman] seduces divorce lawyer
132. [Man/woman] reforms warden
133. [Businessman/businesswoman] chooses gossip
134. [Businessman/businesswoman] financially backs bandit
135. [Waiter/waitress] studies cutthroat
136. [Waiter/waitress] pacifies brute
137. [Man/woman] desires fast food server
138. [Man/woman] shows something to assembly line worker
139. [Waiter/waitress] asks taxi driver about something
140. [Waiter/waitress] discusses something with street musician
141. [Businessman/businesswoman] consoles elementary school teacher
142. [Businessman/businesswoman] counsels youngster
143. [Businessman/businesswoman] soothes child
144. [Businessman/businesswoman] listens to kid
145. [Man/woman] follows pimp
146. [Man/woman] pities villain
147. [Man/woman] caves in to mobster
148. [Man/woman] submits to gunman

149. [Father/mother] evades unwed parent
150. [Father/mother] ogles accomplice
151. [Father/mother] envies thug
152. [Father/mother] fears psychopath
153. [Man/woman] borrows money from blind date
154. [Man/woman] hides from ticket taker
155. [Man/woman] misunderstands foreigner
156. [Man/woman] underestimates minority
157. [Waiter/waitress] babies stepchild
158. [Waiter/waitress] peeks at bisexual
159. [Father/mother] drones on at adolescent
160. [Father/mother] sneers at youngster
161. [Businessman/businesswoman] obeys scoundrel
162. [Businessman/businesswoman] waits on jerk
163. [Father/mother] yields to criminal
164. [Father/mother] murmurs to slob
165. [Father/mother] follows hipster
166. [Father/mother] pities ward of the state
167. [Businessman/businesswoman] evades library assistant
168. [Businessman/businesswoman] ogles librarian
169. [Man/woman] abandons file clerk
170. [Man/woman] discriminates against handicapped person
171. [Father/mother] avoids lobby attendant
172. [Father/mother] leers at applicant
173. [Businessman/businesswoman] imitates brat
174. [Businessman/businesswoman] stammers at jackass
175. [Businessman/businesswoman] babbles to malcontent
176. [Businessman/businesswoman] blabbers to cynic
177. [Father/mother] ridicules drunkard
178. [Father/mother] talks down to idiot
179. [Father/mother] misjudges delinquent
180. [Father/mother] scoffs at hypocrite
181. [Father/mother] considers scientist
182. [Father/mother] grins at researcher
183. [Businessman/businesswoman] confesses to scholar
184. [Businessman/businesswoman] lends money to confidant
185. [Businessman/businesswoman] pampers photographer
186. [Businessman/businesswoman] touches psychologist
187. [Businessman/businesswoman] forgives missionary
188. [Businessman/businesswoman] has a heart to heart talk with social worker
189. [Man/woman] excludes bonehead
190. [Man/woman] underpays halfwit
191. [Waiter/waitress] frowns at poser
192. [Waiter/waitress] ignores idiot
193. [Man/woman] brushes off dropout
194. [Man/woman] unfriends prisoner
195. [Father/mother] scowls at coward
196. [Father/mother] fibs to deadbeat
197. [Father/mother] misunderstands architect
198. [Father/mother] underestimates chemical engineer

199. [Businessman/businesswoman] caves in to conservative
200. [Businessman/businesswoman] submits to catholic
201. [Waiter/waitress] babies nonsmoker
202. [Waiter/waitress] peeks at missionary
203. [Waiter/waitress] envies scientist
204. [Waiter/waitress] fears researcher
205. [Businessman/businesswoman] obeys chainsmoker
206. [Businessman/businesswoman] waits on freeloader
207. [Businessman/businesswoman] yields to grouch
208. [Businessman/businesswoman] murmurs to slob

Appendix B: Additional Materials for Chapter 3

B.1 Study 1 Deliberation Scripts

B.1.1 Script 1, Participant Votes Not Guilty

[The bolded portions represent sections of the script that were manipulated to indicate either anger, fear, compassion, sadness, or surprise.]

Round 1 (No holdouts express emotion until Round 2):

JJohnson	NOT GUILTY	The defentant's timeline on the date and evening in question marks no holes even though he had significant time alone
[JessicaM/BrianM]	GUILTY	<i>No emotion control:</i> because of the intent and ruthlessness and the fact the victim had two wounds, across both vein and artery. <i>Anger condition:</i> because of the intent and ruthlessness and the fact the victim had two wounds, across both vein and artery. <i>Compassion condition:</i> because of the intent and ruthlessness and the fact the victim had two wounds, across both vein and artery.
Uic2011	NOT GUILTY	Stacy was known to have been having lots of depression, and depression leads to serious acts like this one.
syoun96	NOT GUILTY	the witnesses behind michael such as the neighbors, show favor in michael's case. seeing as he went to marriage counseling and sounding terribly worried about his wife, the evidence of her suicide seem probable.
Jfitzg5	NOT GUILTY	the fact that the parents were in the house with Michael and Stacy that Sunday night and Monday morning, and did not hear any acts of murder.

Round 2

JJohnson	NOT GUILTY	[JessicaM/BrianM]: yeah, she had two wounds, but there was no sign of blood on clothes, draining system or any of his clothes, it is very difficult not to get any blood on yourself
[JessicaM/BrianM]	GUILTY	<i>No emotion control:</i> michael's story doesn't make sense. for example, if he was too distressed, would he still call the police? he wasn't distressed enough to visit a counselor but he was too distressed to call the police? doesn't add up. <i>Anger condition:</i> Seriously, this just makes me angry... michael's story DOESN'T MAKE SENSE! for example, if he was too distressed, would he still call the police???? he wasn't distressed

		<p>enough to visit a counselor but he was too distressed to call the police? DOESN'T ADD UP!</p> <p><i>Compassion condition:</i> michael's story doesn't make sense. for example, if he was too distressed, would he still call the police? he wasn't distressed enough to visit a counselor but he was too distressed to call the police? doesn't add up. I just want to make sure we all leave confident we came to the best decision as a group.</p>
Uic2011	NOT GUILTY	even if stacy stevens was murdered, there is no empirical evidence pointing to michael stevens (dna evidence)
syoun96	NOT GUILTY	it was mentioned that there was not a lot of blood in the scene like if it were a murder
Jfitzg5	NOT GUILTY	there was no fingerprints taken of the murder weapon to link Michael directly to the crime so therefore I have a resonable doubt.

Round 3

JJohnson	NOT GUILTY	yeah, but there was no traces of blood in the sewage system, so micheal stevens did not wash off any blood
[JessicaM/BrianM]	GUILTY	<p><i>No emotion control:</i> sure, forensic stuff would be nice, but why would a mean "leave" the house in search for his wife, when he claims to be worried about her. he should have tried to open the door himself to see how she was doing</p> <p><i>Anger condition:</i> sure, forensic stuff would be nice, but WHY would a mean "leave" the house in search for his wife, when he CLAIMS to be worried about her. he should have tried to open the door himself to see how she was doing!! It's pretty aggravating I'm the only one who sees that!!!!</p> <p><i>Compassion condition:</i> sure, forensic stuff would be nice, but why would a mean "leave" the house in search for his wife, when he claims to be worried about her. he should have tried to open the door himself to see how she was doing. I think as a group we need to really consider how we could be endangering others if we let a murder walk free.</p>
Uic2011	NOT GUILTY	[JessicaM/BrianM]: I hear what you are saying, but that's all circumstantial.. there is no solid evidence that michael stevens did the act. the pathologists disagreed whether it was a suicide or murder
syoun96	NOT GUILTY	no blood found on michael stevens' clothes or in drainage...but [JessicaM/BrianM] does kind of have a point...
Jfitzg5	NOT GUILTY	there was not any hard evidence showing mr. stevens committed the murder (ie, fingerprints, shoe prints, bloody cloths or eyewitnesses)

Round 4:

JJohnson	NOT GUILTY	The defendant provided more adequate and plausible evidence
[JessicaM/BrianM]	GUILTY	<p><i>No emotion control:</i> Upon finding the bedroom door locked, michael stevens made no attempt to access the bedroom, and claims that he belived she was behind the locked door, yet called family and neighbors to attempt to locate him... why wouldn't he have tried to get in? There is no hard evidence it was suicide either</p> <p><i>Anger condition:</i> Ok, COME ON! Upon finding the bedroom door locked, Michael stevens made NO attempt to access the bedroom, and claims that he belived she was behind the locked door, yet called family and neighbors to attempt to locate him...Seriously?! why wouldn't he have tried to get in? There is no hard evidence it was suicide either. This is SO FRUSTRATING</p> <p><i>Compassion condition:</i> Upon finding the bedroom door locked, Michael stevens made no attempt to access the bedroom, and claims that he belived she was behind the locked door, yet called family and neighbors to attempt to locate him... why wouldn't he have tried to get in? There is no hard evidence it was suicide either...stacy's family needs closure now, and we as a group can give that to them if we are careful to make the right decision here</p>
Uic2011	NOT GUILTY	there is no evidence that he committed a murder
syoun96	NOT GUILTY	not sure
Jfitzg5	NOT GUILTY	forensic and crime scene evidence had shown that both scenarios were possible

B.1.2 Script 2, Participant Votes Guilty

[The bolded portions represent sections of the script that were manipulated to indicate either anger, fear, compassion, sadness, or surprise.]

Round 1 (No holdouts express emotion until Round 2):

JJohnson	GUILTY	He was scared that she was going to leave him and take away his kids and family
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[JessicaM/BrianM]	NOT GUILTY	<p><i>No emotion control:</i> first of all, there hasn't been a sure evidence that he murdered her. we need to have more evidence before we decide he is guilty or not (yet)</p> <p><i>Anger condition:</i> first of all, there hasn't been a sure evidence that he murdered her. we need to have more evidence before we decide he is guilty or not (yet)</p> <p><i>Compassion condition:</i> first of all, there hasn't been a sure evidence that he murdered her. we need to have more evidence before we decide he is guilty or not (yet)</p>
Uic2011	GUILTY	the motive that his wife was going to leave him can drive a man to kill
syoun96	GUILTY	She threatened to leave him and take their children

Round 2

Jfitzg5	GUILTY	Michael doesn't have any record of where he was between 6am and 10am, when he dropped his parents off and when he went to see the counselor (which he could have just done to provide himself an alibi)
JJohnson	GUILTY	if michael was truly worried about his wife, he would have immediately called the police instead of going to his neighbors. by michael going to his neighbors, it made me think that he was just trying to make his story sound believable.
[JessicaM/BrianM]	NOT GUILTY	<p><i>No emotion control:</i> the wound itself -- due to the cut was made -- if you were suicidal and right handed you would start the cut from the left... also how they are parallel and the blood was only found on her room and nowhere else</p> <p><i>Anger condition:</i> Seriously, this just makes me angry...the wound itself -- due to the cut was made -- if you were suicidal and right handed you would START THE CUT FROM THE LEFT... also how they are parallel and the blood was ONLY FOUND ON HER ROOM and nowhere else!!</p> <p><i>Compassion condition:</i> the wound itself -- due to the cut was made -- if you were suicidal and right handed you would start the cut from the left... also how they are parallel and the blood was only found on her room and nowhere else... I just want to make sure we all leave feeling confident we made the best decision as a group.</p>
Uic2011	GUILTY	the cuts on her throat would be too deep for her to cut it herself (it also might have been clever for him to cut it several times to cover up the evidence and make it look like she was trying to suicide)
syoun96	GUILTY	defendant was the only person that had access to the victim and there was a motive to cause harm

Round 3

JJohnson	GUILTY	threatened to have children taken from him by stacy
Jfitzg5	GUILTY	No one knows exactly if he was sleeping from the night until day.
[JessicaM/BrianM]	NOT GUILTY	<p><i>No emotion control:</i> I hear what you guys are saying, but michael did not know how to make it "look" like the door was locked on the inside, if the wife was murdered the parents in the house probably would've heard, and the argument was not a great enough reason for murder.</p> <p><i>Anger condition:</i> I hear what you guys are saying, but michael DID NOT KNOW HOW to make it "look" like the door was locked on the inside, if the wife was murdered the parents in the house probably would've heard, and the argument was not a great enough reason for murder!! It's pretty aggravating I'm the only one who sees that!!!!</p> <p><i>Compassion condition:</i> I hear what you guys are saying, but michael did not know how to make it "look" like the door was locked on the inside, if the wife was murdered the parents in the house probably would've heard, and the argument was not a great enough reason for murder. I think we as a group need to really think about this or we could risk putting an innocent man behind bars.</p>
Uic2011	GUILTY	he tried very hard on Monday morning to get many people to see him be worried and upset
syoun96	GUILTY	His morning and night activities were suspicious...but [JessicaM/BrianM] does kind of have a point...
Jfitzg5	GUILTY	no one else had access to her

Round 4

JJohnson	GUILTY	Nobody knew where husband was Monday morning
[JessicaM/BrianM]	NOT GUILTY	<p><i>No emotion control:</i> he would have to be a really smart to plan his day like he did.</p> <p><i>Anger condition:</i> Ok, COME ON! he would have to be a really smart to plan his day like he did. Seriously?! This is SO FRUSTRATING</p> <p><i>Compassion condition:</i> he would have to be a really smart to plan his day like he did. Michael and his family are relying on this group to work together to make the best decision here</p>
Uic2011	GUILTY	William took his parents away just before the incident. Since their marriage they probably have had similar encounters which does not explain why they had to be taken away.
syoun96	GUILTY	not sure
Jfitzg5	GUILTY	he left her alone in a room knowing of her problems

B.2 Study 2 Deliberation Scripts

B.2.1 Script 1, Participant Votes Not Guilty

[The bolded portions represent sections of the script that were manipulated to indicate either anger, fear, compassion, sadness, or surprise.]

Round 1 (No holdouts express emotion until Round 2)

JJohnson	NOT GUILTY	The defentant's timeline on the date and evening in question marks no holes even though he had significant time alone
[JasonS/ AliciaS]	GUILTY	because of the intent and ruthlessness and the fact the victim had two wounds, across both vein and artery.
Uic2011	NOT GUILTY	Stacy was known to have been having lots of depression, and depression leads to serious acts like this one.
syoun96	NOT GUILTY	the witnesses behind michael such as the neighbors, show favor in michael's case. seeing as he went to marriage counseling and sounding terribly worried about his wife, the evidence of her suicide seem probable.
Jfitzg5	NOT GUILTY	the fact that the parents were in the house with Michael and Stacy that Sunday night and Monday morning, and did not hear any acts of murder.

Round 2

JJohnson	NOT GUILTY	[JasonS/AliciaS]: yeah, she had two wounds, but there was no sign of blood on clothes, draining system or any of his clothes, it is very difficult not to get any blood on yourself
[JasonS/ AliciaS]	GUILTY	<p><i>Neutral condition:</i> michael's story doesn't make sense. for example, if he was too distressed, would he still call the police? he wasn't distressed enough to visit a counselor but he was too distressed to call the police? doesn't add up.</p> <p><i>Anger condition:</i> Seriously, this just makes me angry...michael's story DOESN'T MAKE SENSE! for example, if he was too distressed, would he still call the police???? he wasn't distressed enough to visit a counselor but he was too distressed to call the police? DOESN'T ADD UP!</p> <p><i>Fear condition:</i> michael's story doesn't make sense. for example, if he was too distressed, would he still call the police? he wasn't distressed enough to visit a counselor but he was too distressed to call the police? doesn't add up. It scares the shit out of me that this kind of thing happens</p> <p><i>Compassion condition:</i> michael's story doesn't make sense. for example, if he was too distressed, would he still call the police? he wasn't</p>

		<p>distressed enough to visit a counselor but he was too distressed to call the police? doesn't add up. I really feel for everyone involved in this.</p> <p><i>Sadness condition:</i> michael's story doesn't make sense. for example, if he was too distressed, would he still call the police? he wasn't distressed enough to visit a counselor but he was too distressed to call the police? doesn't add up. this whole thing is honestly so sad</p> <p><i>Surprise condition:</i>I'm honestly shocked I'm the only one who voted guilty...anyway, michael's story doesn't make sense. for example, if he was too distressed, would he still call the police? he wasn't distressed enough to visit a counselor but he was too distressed to call the police? doesn't add up.</p>
Uic2011	NOT GUILTY	even if stacy stevens was murdered, there is no empirical evidence pointing to michael stevens (dna evidence)
syoun96	NOT GUILTY	it was mentioned that there was not a lot of blood in the scene like if it were a murder
Jfitzg5	NOT GUILTY	there was no fingerprints taken of the murder weapon to link Michael directly to the crime so therefore I have a resonable doubt.

Round 3

JJohnson	NOT GUILTY	yeah, but there was no traces of blood in the sewage system, so micheal stevens did not wash off any blood
[JasonS/ AliciaS]	GUILTY	<p><i>Neutral condition:</i> sure, forensic stuff would be nice, but why would a mean "leave" the house in search for his wife, when he claims to be worried about her. he should have tried to open the door himself to see how she was doing</p> <p><i>Anger condition:</i> sure, forensic stuff would be nice, but WHY would a mean "leave" the house in search for his wife, when he CLAIMS to be worried about her. he should have tried to open the door himself to see how she was doing!! It's pretty aggravating I'm the only one who sees that!!!!</p> <p><i>Fear condition:</i>this story freaks me out...I'm going to have nightmares...anyway..sure, forensic stuff would be nice, but why would a mean "leave" the house in search for his wife, when he claims to be worried about her. he should have tried to open the door himself to see how she was doing.</p> <p><i>Compassion condition:</i> sure, forensic stuff would be nice, but why would a mean "leave" the house in search for his wife, when he claims to be worried about her. he should have tried to open the door himself to see how she was doing. my heart really goes out to stacy and michael's families right now.</p>

		<p><i>Sadness condition:</i> sure, forensic stuff would be nice, but why would a mean "leave" the house in search for his wife, when he claims to be worried about her. he should have tried to open the door himself to see how she was doing. it's really depressing to think that stuff like this actually happens</p> <p><i>Surprise condition:</i> sure, forensic stuff would be nice, but why would a mean "leave" the house in search for his wife, when he claims to be worried about her. he should have tried to open the door himself to see how she was doing. I'm just surprised no one else sees it that way</p>
Uic2011	NOT GUILTY	[JasonS/AliciaS]: I hear what you are saying, but that's all circumstantial.. there is no solid evidence that michael stevens did the act. the pathologists disagreed whether it was a suicide or murder
syoun96	NOT GUILTY	no blood found on michael stevens' clothes or in drainage...but [JasonS/AliciaS] does kind of have a point...
Jfitzg5	NOT GUILTY	there was not any hard evidence showing mr. stevens committed the murder (ie, fingerprints, shoe prints, bloody cloths or eyewitnesses)

Round 4

JJohnson	NOT GUILTY	The defendant provided more adequate and plausible evidence
[JasonS/AliciaS]	GUILTY	<p><i>Neutral condition:</i> Upon finding the bedroom door locked, michael stevens made no attempt to access the bedroom, and claims that he belived she was behind the locked door, yet called family and neighbors to attempt to locate him... why wouldn't he have tried to get in? There is no hard evidence it was suicide either</p> <p><i>Anger condition:</i> Ok, COME ON! Upon finding the bedroom door locked, Michael stevens made NO attempt to access the bedroom, and claims that he belived she was behind the locked door, yet called family and neighbors to attempt to locate him...Seriously?! why wouldn't he have tried to get in? There is no hard evidence it was suicide either. This is SO FRUSTRATING</p> <p><i>Fear condition:</i> Upon finding the bedroom door locked, michael stevens made no attempt to access the bedroom, and claims that he belived she was behind the locked door, yet called family and neighbors to attempt to locate him... why wouldn't he have tried to get in? There is no hard evidence it was suicide either ...the whole thing is creepy</p> <p><i>Compassion condition:</i> Upon finding the bedroom door locked, Michael stevens made no attempt to access the bedroom, and claims that he belived she was behind the locked door, yet called family and neighbors to attempt to locate him...why wouldn't he have tried to get in? There is no hard evidence it was suicide either. I just hope in time these people can heal and move on from this</p>

		<p><i>Sadness condition:</i> Upon finding the bedroom door locked, Michael stevens made no attempt to access the bedroom, and claims that he belived she was behind the locked door, yet called family and neighbors to attempt to locate him...why wouldn't he have tried to get in? There is no hard evidence it was suicide either...just thinking about this really gets me down</p> <p><i>Surprise condition:</i> Wow, I'm amazed at how difficult it is to decide on a verdict... Upon finding the bedroom door locked, Michael stevens made no attempt to access the bedroom, and claims that he belived she was behind the locked door, yet called family and neighbors to attempt to locate him...why wouldn't he have tried to get in? There is no hard evidence it was suicide either</p>
Uic2011	NOT GUILTY	there is no evidence that he committed a murder
syoun96	NOT GUILTY	not sure
Jfitzg5	NOT GUILTY	forensic and crime scene evidence had shown that both scenarios were possible

B.2.2 Script 2, Participant Votes Guilty

[The bolded portions represent sections of the script that were manipulated to indicate either anger, fear, compassion, sadness, or surprise.]

Round 1 (No holdouts express emotion until Round 2)

JJohnson	GUILTY	He was scared that she was going to leave him and take away his kids and family
[JasonS/ AliciaS]	NOT GUILTY	first of all, there hasn't been a sure evidence that he murdered her. we need to have more evidence before we decide he is guilty or not (yet)
Uic2011	GUILTY	the motive that his wife was going to leave him can drive a man to kill
syoun96	GUILTY	She threatened to leave him and take their children
Jfitzg5	GUILTY	Michael doesn't have any record of where he was between 6am and 10am, when he dropped his parents off and when he went to see the counselor (which he could have just done to provide himself an alibi)

Round 2

JJohnson	GUILTY	if michael was truly worried about his wife, he would have immediately called the police instead of going to his neighbors. by michael going to his neighbors, it made me think that he was just trying to make his story sound believable.
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[JasonS/ AliciaS]	NOT GUILTY	<p><i>Neutral condition:</i> the wound itself -- due to the cut was made -- if you were suicidal and right handed you would start the cut from hte left... also how they are parallel and the blood was only found on her room and nowhere else</p> <p><i>Anger condition:</i> Seriously, this just makes me angry...the wound itself -- due to the cut was made -- if you were suicidal and right handed you would START THE CUT FROM THE LEFT... also how they are parallel and the blood was ONLY FOUND ON HER ROOM and nowhere else!!</p> <p><i>Fear condition:</i>the wound itself -- due to the cut was made -- if you were suicidal and right handed you would start the cut from hte left... also how they are parallel and the blood was only found on her room and nowhere else...It scares the shit out of me that this kind of thing happens</p> <p><i>Compassion condition:</i> the wound itself -- due to the cut was made -- if you were suicidal and right handed you would start the cut from hte left... also how they are parallel and the blood was only found on her room and nowhere else... I really feel for everyone involved in this</p> <p><i>Sadness condition:</i>the wound itself -- due to the cut was made -- if you were suicidal and right handed you would start the cut from hte left... also how they are parallel and the blood was only found on her room and nowhere else. This whole thing is honestly so sad</p> <p><i>Surprise condition:</i>I'm honestly shocked I'm the only one who voted not guilty...anyway, the wound itself -- due to the cut was made -- if you were suicidal and right handed you would start the cut from hte left... also how they are parallel and the blood was only found on her room and nowhere else.</p>
Uic2011	GUILTY	the cuts on her throat would be to deep for her to cut it herself (it also might have been clever for him to cut it several times to cover up the evidence and make it look like she was trying to suicide)
syoun96	GUILTY	defendent was the only person that had access to the victim and there was a motive to cause harm
Jfitzg5	GUILTY	No one knows exactly if he was sleeping from the night until day.

Round 3

JJohnson	GUILTY	threatened to have children taken from him by stacy
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[JasonS/ AliciaS]	NOT GUILTY	<p><i>Neutral condition:</i> I hear what you guys are saying, but michael did not know how to make it "look" like the door was locked on the inside, if the wife was murdered the parents in the house probably would've heard, and the argument was not a great enough reason for murder.</p> <p><i>Anger condition:</i> I hear what you guys are saying, but michael DID NOT KNOW HOW to make it "look" like the door was locked on the inside, if the wife was murdered the parents in the house probably would've heard, and the argument was not a great enough reason for murder!! It's pretty aggravating I'm the only one who sees that!!!!</p> <p><i>Fear condition:</i> wow, this case really freaks me out...I'm going to have nightmares...anyway...I hear what you guys are saying, but michael did not know how to make it "look" like the door was locked on the inside, if the wife was murdered the parents in the house probably would've heard, and the argument was not a great enough reason for murder.</p> <p><i>Compassion condition:</i> I hear what you guys are saying, but michael did not know how to make it "look" like the door was locked on the inside, if the wife was murdered the parents in the house probably would've heard, and the argument was not a great enough reason for murder. my heart really goes out to stacy and michael's families right now</p> <p><i>Sadness condition:</i>I hear what you guys are saying, but michael did not know how to make it "look" like the door was locked on the inside, if the wife was murdered the parents in the house probably would've heard, and the argument was not a great enough reason for murder. it's really depressing to think that stuff like this actually happens</p> <p><i>Surprise condition:</i>I hear what you guys are saying, but michael did not know how to make it "look" like the door was locked on the inside, if the wife was murdered the parents in the house probably would've heard, and the argument was not a great enough reason for murder. I'm just surprised no one else sees it that way</p>
Uic2011	GUILTY	he tried very hard on Monday morning to get many people to see him be worried and upset
syoun96	GUILTY	His morning and night activities were suspicious...but [JasonS/AliciaS] does kind of have a point...
Jfitzg5	GUILTY	no one else had access to her

Round 4

JJohnson	GUILTY	Nobody knew where husband was Monday morning
[JasonS/ AliciaS]	NOT GUILTY	<i>Neutral condition:</i> he would have to be a really smart to plan his day like he did.

		<p><i>Anger condition:</i> Ok, COME ON! he would have to be a really smart to plan his day like he did. Seriously?! This is SO FRUSTRATING</p> <p><i>Fear condition:</i> he would have to be a really smart to plan his day like he did. the whole thing is creepy</p> <p><i>Compassion condition:</i> he would have to be a really smart to plan his day like he did. I just hope in time these people can heal and move on from this</p> <p><i>Sadness condition:</i> he would have to be a really smart to plan his day like he did...just thinking about this really gets me down</p> <p><i>Surprise condition:</i> wow, I'm amazed at how difficult it is to decide on a verdict...he would have to be a really smart to plan his day like he did.</p>
Uic2011	GUILTY	William took his parents away just before the incident. Since their marriage they probably have had similar encounters which does not explain why they had to be taken away.
syoun96	GUILTY	not sure
Jfitzg5	GUILTY	he left her alone in a room knowing of her problems

B.3 Alternative Models with All Predictors

Table 11: Study 1, Predictors of Actual Influence

	<i>Estimate</i>	<i>Std. Error</i>	<i>p</i>	<i>95% CI</i>
Intercept	5.071	6.339	.771	-7.35 to 17.50
Initial Confidence	0.884	0.076	<.001***	.729 to 1.03
Participant Female	8.860	2.645	<.001***	5.70 to 19.95
Initial Verdict Guilty	-8.530	2.788	.003**	-13.74 to -2.79
Holdout Female	7.749	4.769	.105	-1.63 to 17.12
Holdout Anger	2.679	4.230	.527	-5.64 to 10.99
Holdout Compassion	4.707	4.167	.259	-3.48 to 12.90
Holdout Female: Participant Female	-9.117	5.271	.085	-19.48 to 1.24
Holdout Female: Holdout Anger	-7.176	6.196	.248	-19.36 to 5.00
Holdout Female: Holdout Compassion	-7.237	6.343	.255	-19.71 to 5.23

*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001

Table 12: Study 2, Predictors of Perceived Influence

	<i>Estimate</i>	<i>Std. Error</i>	<i>p</i>	<i>95% CI</i>
Intercept	3.035	.230	<.001***	2.58 to 3.49
Initial Confidence	-.003	.002	.118	-.008 to .0008
Participant Female	-.019	.127	.878	-.268 to .229
Initial Verdict Guilty	.052	.092	.572	-.128 to .232
Holdout Female	-.421	.235	.074	-.883 to .040
Holdout Anger	.012	.216	.955	-.413 to .437
Holdout Compassion	-.058	.218	.790	-.487 to .370
Holdout Fear	.126	.217	.562	-.300 to .552
Holdout Sadness	-.129	.205	.528	-.532 to .273
Holdout Surprise	-.033	.208	.873	-.441 to .375
Holdout Female: Participant Female	.325	.176	.065	-.021 to .670
Holdout Female: Holdout Anger	-.085	.306	.780	-.686 to .516
Holdout Female: Holdout Compassion	.212	.297	.475	-.372 to .796
Holdout Female: Holdout Fear	-.287	.299	.338	-.874 to .301
Holdout Female: Holdout Sadness	.217	.294	.460	-.361 to .795
Holdout Female: Holdout Surprise	.171	.307	.578	-.432 to .773

*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001

Table 13: Study 2, Predictors of Actual Influence

	<i>Estimate</i>	<i>Std. Error</i>	<i>p</i>	<i>95% CI</i>
Intercept	24.262	2.189	<.001***	19.97 to 28.55
Initial Confidence	.790	.021	<.001***	.750 to .831
Participant Female	-1.165	.975	.233	-3.08 to .750
Initial Verdict Guilty	-2.524	.892	.005**	-4.28 to -.773
Holdout Female	-.081	2.228	.971	-4.46 to 4.29
Holdout Anger	2.033	2.120	.338	-2.13 to 6.20
Holdout Compassion	1.195	2.111	.572	-2.95 to 5.34
Holdout Fear	.397	2.125	.852	-3.76 to 4.57
Holdout Sadness	1.806	1.998	.367	-2.18 to 5.73
Holdout Surprise	.567	1.998	.777	-3.36 to 4.49
Holdout Female: Participant Female	1.714	1.415	.226	-1.06 to 4.49
Holdout Female: Holdout Anger	-4.371	2.989	.144	-10.24 to 1.50
Holdout Female: Holdout Compassion	1.185	2.893	.682	-4.50 to 6.87
Holdout Female: Holdout Fear	-.656	2.926	.823	-6.40 to 5.09
Holdout Female: Holdout Sadness	1.556	2.868	.588	-4.08 to 7.19
Holdout Female: Holdout Surprise	.931	2.970	.754	-4.90 to 6.76



*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001

Appendix C: Additional Materials for Chapter 4



C.1 Deliberation Script

[In this study participants read only two rounds of deliberation comments from two fellow jurors. Participants saw the same comments regardless of whether they voted guilty or not guilty. The only aspect that changed was which comments came from which fellow juror. For example, a participant who voted guilty and was assigned to deliberate with a male dissenter would have seen the following script (those who were assigned a female dissenter saw “rachel” and a pink flamingo avatar rather than “jake” and a red car). A participant who voted not guilty would have seen identical comments, but with jake and syoun936’s positions reversed (so that jake would be arguing for a guilty verdict while syoun936 would be arguing for a not guilty verdict.)]

Round 1

 [jake/rachel]	NOT GUILTY	the fact that Michael's brother was in the house with Michael and Felicia that Sunday night and Monday morning, and did not hear any acts of murder
 syoun936	GUILTY	the cuts on her throat would be too deep for her to cut it herself (it also might have been clever for him to cut it several times to cover up the evidence and make it look like she was trying to suicide)
[PARTICIPANT AVATAR AND USERNAME]	GUILTY	[PARTICIPANT COMMENTS]

Round 2

 [jake/rachel]	NOT GUILTY	there was no sign of blood on clothes, draining system or any of his clothes, it is very difficult not to get any blood on yourself. Plus there was no fingerprints taken of the murder weapon to link Michael directly to the crime so therefore I have a resonable doubt
 syoun936	GUILTY	Upon finding the bedroom door locked, michael stevens made no attempt to access the bedroom, and claims that he believed she was behind the locked door, yet called family and neighbors to attempt to locate her...why wouldn't he have tried to get in? There is no hard evidence it was suicide either
[PARTICIPANT AVATAR AND USERNAME]	GUILTY	[PARTICIPANT COMMENTS]

C.2 Alternative Models with All Predictors

Table 14: Predictors of Initial Guilty Verdict

	<i>Estimate</i>	<i>Std. Error</i>	<i>p</i>	<i>95%CI</i>
Intercept	-.314	.212	.139	[-.735, .099]
Female Dissenter	-.593*	.256	.020	[-1.095, -.093]
Female Victim	-.127	.267	.634	[-.650, .396]
Female IPV Victim	-.607*	.276	.028	[-1.151, -.068]
Female Participant	.108	.245	.661	[-.0372, .590]
Female Dissenter: Female Victim	.179	.293	.542	[-.396, .754]
Female Dissenter: Female IPV Victim	.231	.302	.446	[-.362, .824]
Female Dissenter: Female Participant	.233	.247	.344	[-.249, .717]
Female Victim: Female Participant	.264	.296	.373	[-.317, .844]
Female IPV Victim: Female Participant	.835**	.307	.007	[.235, 1.44]

* $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$ |

Table 15: Predictors of Dissenter Influence

	<i>Estimate</i>	<i>Std. Error</i>	<i>p</i>	<i>95%CI</i>
Intercept	7.305**	2.790	.009	[1.828, 12.782]
Initial Confidence	.938***	.028	<.001	[.883, .992]
Female Dissenter	1.336	2.500	.593	[-3.571, 6.243]
Female Victim	1.054	2.668	.693	[-4.183, 6.291]
Female IPV Victim	2.701	2.677	.314	[-2.555, 7.956]
Female Participant	1.239	2.449	.613	[-3.568, 6.046]
Female Dissenter: Female Victim	-2.413	2.919	.409	[-8.144, 3.318]
Female Dissenter: Female IPV Victim	-3.467	2.951	.240	[-9.260, 2.326]
Female Dissenter: Female Participant	.506	2.404	.833	[-4.214, 5.226]
Female Victim: Female Participant	-1.910	2.938	.516	[-7.678, 3.858]
Female IPV Victim: Female Participant	-4.133	2.966	.164	[-9.955, 1.689]

p*<.05, *p*<.01, ****p*<.001

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