# Tough Talk, Cheap Talk, and Babbling:

## Government Unity, Hawkishness and Military Challenges

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Dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of
the requirements for the degree of Doctor
of Philosophy in the Department of
Political Science in the Graduate School
of Duke University

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# ABSTRACT

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# Abstract

A number of puzzles exist regarding the role of domestic politics in the likelihood of international conflict. In particular, the sources of incomplete information remain under-theorized and the microfoundations deficient. This study will examine the role that the unity of the government and the views of the government towards the use of force play in the targeting of states. The theory presented argues that divided dovish governments are particularly likely to suffer from military challenges. In particular, divided governments have difficulty signaling their intentions, taking decisive action, and may appear weak. The theory will be tested on a new dataset created by the author that examines the theory in the context of international territorial disputes. A number of significant findings emerge from the data. First, divided governments are significantly more likely to face challenges and increasing government unity markedly decreases the likelihood of a challenge. Second, unified hawkish governments were far less likely to be the targets of challenges than divided dovish governments. Finally, the substantive impact of key variables was much greater than that of the control variables. The causal process postulated in the theory is examined in eight case studies, two for each of the four government types. These case studies show that government type not only impacts the signaling of democratic states but also influences the perceptions of potential challengers.

For Kimberly, who can always make me laugh.

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# Chapter 1

## Introduction: The Paradoxes of Democratic Politics

This study explores why democratic states are targeted in international conflicts. To explain this phenomenon, I will present a theory that focuses on the role played by two key domestic factors: the unity of the government and its views on the use of force. The basic argument is that divided governments cannot effectively signal their interests in a disputed issue, that they fail to take decisive action when challenged, and may appear weak. These factors lead them to appear vulnerable to potential challengers, increasing the likelihood of an attack.

Studying the causes of war is one of the cornerstones of international relations, but the targeting of democracies presents scholars with a particularly interesting problem. Although democratic states have been found to not fight with one another[1] and win the wars they do fight, they are disproportionately targeted in international conflict.[2] Rousseau et al., found that democracies were 20% more likely to experience militarized threats or uses of force than authoritarian states, and a number of other scholars have made similar findings.[3] Further, Grieco found that among states involved in ongoing disputes, democracies were much more likely to face repeated challenges than autocratic regimes.[4] Finally, Gelpi and Greico found that a state's democracy score is positively correlated with the likelihood of escalating a challenge in an interstate crisis.[5]

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[1] See Michael Doyle, "Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs," *Philosophy and Public Affairs* Parts I and II (1981/1983); Bruce Russett, *Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post-Cold War World* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993); Bruce M. Russett, and John R. Oneal, *Triangulating Peace : Democracy, Interdependence, and International Organizations* (New York: Norton, 2001); Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, et al., "An Institutional Explanation of the Democratic Peace," *American Political Science Review* 93 no. 4 (1999).

[2] Dan Reiter and Allan Stam, "Democracy, War Initiation, and Victory," *American Political Science Review* 92, no. 2 (1998); Bruce Russett, *Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post-Cold War World* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993); Ajin Choi, "Democratic Synergy and Victory in War, 1816-1992," *International Studies Quarterly* 48, no. 3 (2004).

Thus the fate of democracies in international politics is somewhat paradoxical: they tend to perform well in wars, but despite this strength, they are more frequently targeted. This puzzle is particularly interesting given the ascendant role of democracies and democratization in international politics. The rising number of democracies across the globe has given hope to democratic peace theorists who believe that the world is coming closer to fulfilling Kant's "Perpetual Peace".[6] At the same time, evidence has arisen that certain autocratic regimes are unlikely to fight with one another, further focusing the scope of conflict on relations between democratic and autocratic states.[7] This has sharpened the relationships between powerful democratic states and particular autocracies. The perceived triumph of democracy has given way to anxiety about the remaining threats to democratic states.

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[3] David Rousseau, Christopher Gelpi, and Paul Huth, "Assessing the Dyadic Nature of the Democratic Peace, 1918-88," *American Political Science Review* 90, no. 3 (1996).
[4] Joseph Grieco, "Repetitive Military Challenges and Recurrent International Conflicts, 1918-1994," *International Studies Quarterly* 45 (2001).
[5] Christopher Gelpi and Joseph Grieco, "Attracting Trouble: Democracy, Leadership Tenure, and the Targeting of Militarized Challenges, 1918-1992," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 45, no. 6 (2001).
[6] Immanuel Kant, "To Perpetual Peace: A Philosophic Sketch " in *Perpetual Peace and Other Essays* (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1795 [1983]); Lars-Erik Cederman, "Modeling the Democratic Peace as a Kantian Selection Process," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 45, no. 4 (2001).
[7] Mark Peceny, Caroline Beer, and Shannon Sanchez-Terry, "Dictatorial Peace," *American Political Science Review* 96, no. 1 (2002).

The success of the democratic peace theory has projected its findings beyond academia to play a significant role in the foreign policy of many states, particularly the United States. The practical limitations of the theory are less often discussed in policy circles, and much of the criticism that does exist, focuses on the process of democratization.[8] However, the fact that democracies are disproportionately targets of international conflict is another important caveat to the democratization project, particularly for those states that exist in areas with a significant number of autocracies. In light of the current U.S. democratization projects in Iraq and Afghanistan, this information appears to be less of a caveat and more a significant policy problem.

Despite the focus of democratic peace theories on domestic politics, much of the work in this field relies on untested assumptions about the role of democratic politics in international relations. In order to uncover the microfoundations of democratic peace, and particularly the explanation for democratic targeting, theories must move beyond examining differences between democracies and autocracies and look for ways that democracies systematically differ from one another. Uncovering which domestic factors matter in international relations and how they matter remains a significant and unfinished project.

The core question of this dissertation is why democracies are targeted in international conflict. While a number of theories have been put forward that cite particular democratic attributes to explain this problem, the theory proposed here differs by focusing specifically on democracies.  The Government Type theory proposed in this dissertation examines the role that government unity and hawkishness play in the signaling of democratic states and ultimately, the likelihood they will be targeted in international conflict.

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[8] See Edward Mansfield and Jack L. Snyder, "Democratization and the Danger of War," *International Security* 20, no. 1 (1995); Edward Mansfield, and Jack L. Snyder, "Democratic Transitions, Institutional Strength, and War," *International Organization* 56, no. 2 (2002).

## The Theory

The transparency that many international relations scholars hail as beneficial for democratic states is not without its problems.  Most notably, the free press, intraparty politics, and differentiation of responsibilities leads to conditions that violate one of the basic tenets of international relations theory: that states are unitary actors on the international stage.  This study argues that the degree of unity that states present is variable and that this has important implications for states' abilities to signal.

The core of the theory posits a causal chain premised on the unity of the government in question.  Governments' levels of unity and hawkishness influence the signals democratic states send to potential challengers.  In particular, government unity influences three facets of ongoing disputes between states.  First, unified governments can clearly signal their views on the stakes involved in a dispute while divided governments cannot.  The inability to clearly signal the stakes involved creates problems regardless of whether the government seeks to negotiate or simply maintain the status quo.  Lack of clarity in the stakes hinders negotiations because it makes it impossible to establish a baseline for bargaining. Even if the state simply wishes to maintain the status quo, lack of agreement on the stakes raises questions over the extent to which the state will go to keep the territory.

Second, divided governments lack the ability to take decisive action in crises. Specifically, divided governments are likely to take confused or contradictory actions. Once again, regardless of the preferred path the state wishes to take, inability to take decisive action increases the likelihood of a military challenge. In negotiations, states that cannot take decisive action are likely to be viewed as incredible partners, causing the potential challenger to become disillusioned about the progress of negotiations and increasingly likely to see military action as a more effective means for achieving their goals. On the other hand, for states that choose to take a hard-line and refuse to negotiate, inability to take decisive action can embolden challenging states. If a challenger launches minor provocations against the target state and there is no clear response, the challenger is likely to believe that the target state will not be able to adequately respond to more serious attacks.

Finally, divided and dovish governments are likely to be perceived as weak by potential challengers. Divisions within the government and contradictory statements on disputed territories lead potential challengers to believe that the target country's leadership is weak and raises questions over how effective the country's response will be to an attack. Similarly, dovish governments are often portrayed as weak, and their desire to negotiate or make concessions may be taken by challengers to signal weakness and vulnerability. Potential challengers may believe that an attack will lead to more concessions.

These two variables can be combined to generate four government types. Unified hawks will be the least likely to be challenged, as their unity will allow them to signal effectively while their hawkishness will prevent them from being viewed as weak. Also unlikely to be attacked are unified doves, who similarly can clearly signal their intentions, although they may occasionally be viewed as weak and thus susceptible to attack. Much more likely to be targeted are divided hawks, who cannot effectively communicate their views. Finally, the most vulnerable states are divided doves which are doubly impacted by their inability to signal and the perception that they are weak.

This ordering of government types shows two things. First, both unified hawks and doves find their own ways to avoid conflict. Unified hawks can do this through clear signaling of strength and power, while unified doves may do this through negotiations. While their preferences are different, they are similar in their ability to prevent attacks. The second point is that government unity is a more significant variable than hawkishness. Thus, unified hawks and doves have much more in common under this theory than divided and unified doves. The clarity and credibility of the message, as determined by government unity, takes precedence over hawkishness.

The first two steps in the causal chain posited in this theory have focused on the target country and examined the relationship between government unity and hawkishness and the influence these variables have on how the target state is perceived. The third and fourth links in the causal chain shift the focus from the target state to the potential challenger. The question is not only what signals are being sent by the target state but also how those signals are perceived by the potential challenger.

The first issue from the perspective of the potential challenger is how they perceive the target government's statements and actions. To what extent are divisions within the government visible to the challenger? The final critical link in the causal chain is the extent to which the challenger's perceptions of the target government influence its decision making. It is critical to not only show that the target state is sending mixed signals, but that these mixed signals play a significant role in the decision of the challenging state to attack.

The theory of Government Type was tested alongside several competing theories of military attacks. The first theory is Kenneth Schultz's previously mentioned study of government and opposition unity and division, which posits that extended deterrence is most likely to fail when the opposition fails to back the government.[9] According to Gelpi and Grieco's theory of leadership tenure, longer serving leaders are less likely to be challenged militarily.[10] A third theory extends existing work on public opinion and audience costs. According to this theory, hawkish public opinion regarding a disputed territory is likely to act as a deterrent, while more dovish opinion could raise the likelihood of an attack. The final alternative theory is a balance of capabilities argument that as the balance of power shifts in favor of the potential target state, the likelihood of an attack will rise as the challenger seeks to attack while the democracy is still relatively weak.

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[9] Kenneth Schultz, *Democracy and Coercive Diplomacy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 2001).
[10] Gelpi and Grieco, "Attracting Trouble".

## Alternative Explanations

A number of competing explanations exist for the targeting of democracies. Some of the theories deal directly with targeting, while in other cases the logic of the theory can be extended to apply it to cases of targeting. The primary focus is on theories that, like mine, deal with domestic political explanations, although one materialist theory is included as well. The ability of these competing theories to explain targeting will be examined in both the statistical chapter and the case studies.

The first alternative theory deals with the role of the opposition in signaling to potential challengers, as proposed by Kenneth Schultz.[11] In an elegant formal model, Schultz shows that democratic governments are more credible than autocratic because a second player exists that provides a check on government statements. By having the opportunity to offer support to or dissent from the government, the opposition provides a key signal, according to Schultz, of the government's true intentions. Should the opposition not back the government's threats in a dispute, a potential challenger could infer that the government's rhetoric was 'cheap talk' and attack. On the other hand, if the opposition supports the government's claims, the statements are more credible and deterrence is more likely to obtain. Schultz tests his theory on cases of extended deterrence, but the logic transfers to the targeting of democracies for the purposes of this study, which focuses on territorial disputes.

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[11] Schultz, *Democracy and Coercive Diplomacy*.

Chris Gelpi and Joseph Grieco offer a second alternative theory for the targeting of democracies that focuses on the tenure of governments.[12] In a dataset comparing democratic and autocratic regimes, Gelpi and Grieco found that the higher likelihood of targeting of democratic states was due to the fact that democratic leaders have shorter tenures on average than autocrats. This is significant, according to their theory, because leaders will be more likely to make concessions earlier in their tenure, allowing time to pass and minimize such acts before the next election. With this knowledge, potential challengers will target young governments for attack in order to extract their desired ends. Since democracies replace their leaders more frequently than autocratic regimes, there are more young leaders looking to strike a deal and hence more attacks.

The final domestic politics theory tested in the dissertation looks at the role of public opinion in targeting. A number of international relations scholars put significant weight on the role that public opinion plays in the decision making of democratic leaders.[13] Although these scholars do not directly address the issue of democratic targeting, the logic of their theory can be extended to the signaling arguments examined here. If the public is strongly in favor of negotiations or the status quo with respect to a particular disputed territory, the government is likely to follow this line in its dealings with other states. Thus, a particularly hawkish or dovish public could signal to potential challengers the likelihood that an attack will allow them to meet their political goals.

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[12] Gelpi and Grieco, “Attracting Trouble”.

[13] Dan Reiter and Allan Stam, *Democracies and War* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002); Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, et al., *The Logic of Political Survival* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2003).

Finally, a number of realist theories posit that changes in the balance of power between two states make war more likely. Organski and Kugler theorize that a shift in the balance of power between two states is a harbinger for future conflict. More specifically, Van Evera posits that shifts in power create windows of opportunity, which may make an attack likely from the state that sees its (relative) power diminish. For the purposes of this study, we would expect that as democracies grow relatively stronger, an attack should become more likely.

In the statistical tests and the case studies, the relative merits of these existing theories will be compared to those of the Government Type theory. By using multiple methods, I will try to determine whether or not these theories are correlated to attacks on democracies and if the predictions of the theories correspond to the actual thinking of leaders. Further, I will show whether or not these theories play a role in democratic targeting, as well as how their explanatory powers compare to each other.

## Organization of the Dissertation

The next chapter introduces the theory of the dissertation and the two key variables, government unity and hawkishness. The chapter begins with an analysis of the state of existing theory on two issues: the relationship between domestic politics and international relations and causes of targeting states for international conflict. The chapter explains the theory and its predictions for international conflict behavior. It concludes with an analysis of competing theories that will be tested in the dissertation.

Once the theory of the dissertation is introduced, the third chapter offers statistical tests of the theory. The chapter begins by taking the general theory presented in the previous chapter and extracting concrete hypotheses from it. This is followed by a discussion of how the concepts introduced in the theory will be operationalized and the method of analysis. The focus then shifts to testing both for the statistical significance of the variables, as well as their substantive impact on the likelihood of targeting in international relations. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the meaning of the results and how the statistical results relate to the theory presented.

The following four chapters offer a different set of empirical tests for the theory by examining a series of case studies. The case studies were selected on the basis of the four different government types: divided doves, divided hawks, unified doves, and unified hawks. For each of these different types, two different cases are investigated, yielding a total of eight case studies.

The case studies move beyond the correlations presented in the statistical chapter to trace the causal argument made in Chapter 2. Each case study begins with an examination of the ongoing dispute in question and a brief history of relations between the two countries in question.  This is followed by an in-depth analysis of the coding of the two key independent variables – government unity and hawkishness – to justify the categorization of the particular case.  The implications of these variables for three signaling factors – intentions, weakness, and decisive action – are then discussed.  The focus then shifts from the target country to the potential challenger to examine the extent to which the challenger was aware of the domestic issues influencing the target and how this awareness shaped the challenger's actions.  Each case study concludes with a discussion of how the alternative theories fare in explaining the outcome of the case.

Besides representing each of the different government types, the cases vary on a number of dimensions: states involved, type of democratic government, location, military balance of power, and era.  Perhaps most interestingly, both India and Israel are studied at different times during their recent history, which offers contrast in the government type while holding many other factors constant.  The first case studies, Chapter 4, look at the United States and North Korea under the Truman administration and India and Pakistan during Shastri's government.  Both these states (the U.S. and India) had divided dovish governments, which led them to be targets of military aggression.  Chapter 5 includes two divided hawkish governments, Israel under Meir and India under Vajpayee, that were also targets of military challenges. As with the divided doves, the domestic problems plaguing these governments contributed significantly to their targeting.

The final two case studies shift the focus from divided governments to the two types of unified governments. These are, for the most part, cases of “dogs that did not bark,” as I move from trying to explain why states were targeted to why they were not. For Chapter 6, the unified dovish governments of Nehru in India and Rabin in Israel offer insights into how doves avoid conflict with neighboring states. The united hawkish governments of Ben Gurion in Israel and Nixon in the United States provide evidence for how hawks can avoid war through positions of strength.

The dissertation ends with a concluding chapter that reiterates the motivating questions and theory. The chapter then moves on to discuss the findings of the study and its implications, with a particular focus on policy relevant issues raised by the empirical results. Particular emphasis is placed on situating the findings in the context of the democratization movement and the limits on the benefits of government unity.

## Chapter 2

## Government Types and Signaling: The Domestic Cacophony

"Politics is war without bloodshed while war is politics with bloodshed."
-Mao Zedong, 1938

In 1979, Margaret Thatcher and the Conservatives took power in Britain and inherited negotiations with Argentina over the Falkland Islands that had been ongoing since 1966. The initial approach of the new government was to continue negotiating with the Argentineans on a permanent settlement to the issue. On December 2, 1980, Nicolas Ridley, the foreign office minister responsible for the Falklands, delivered a speech in Parliament discussing leasing the islands back to Argentina.[1] Although the statements by the MPs following the speech showed a general lack of knowledge about the subject, the speech received a very cold reception.[2] Further, the British Foreign Secretary Lord Carrington also favored further discussions with the Argentineans, despite the fact that negotiations themselves were going nowhere. At the other end of the spectrum in the Conservative government was a small but influential group known as the Falkland Islands Lobby that thoroughly rejected turning the islands over to Argentina.[3]

The Argentines themselves were growing frustrated with what they perceived as British foot-dragging. By January of 1982, the Junta's plans to invade the islands had become so explicit they were published in a series of articles in the newspaper *La Prensa*.[4] Despite these warning signs, in early February the British government decided to withdraw the HMS *Endurance* ice-breaker from the islands, a move widely perceived by the Argentineans as a reduction in British commitment to the islands.[5] Despite the growing tensions, in late February Deputy Foreign Secretary Richard Luce met with his Argentine counterpart Ernesto Ros in New York to discuss sovereignty for the islands.

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[1] G. M. Dillon, *The Falklands, Politics, and War* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1989), 25.
[2] Ibid.
[3] Michael Charlton, *The Little Platoon: Diplomacy and the Falklands Dispute* (New York, NY: B. Blackwell, 1989).

The month of March saw continued crises and inconsistent behavior on the part of the British. On March 5th, Carrington refused to send a submarine patrol off the coast of the Islands. On March 19th, Argentine workers hoisted an Argentine flag over the British Arctic Survey base on the island of South Georgia. The British government sent the *Endurance* and 24 Marines to the island, but when they arrived, their orders to remove the Argentine workers are rescinded. By the end of the month British intelligence was warning that an invasion of the islands was imminent, but this was ignored by the government.[6]

At 4:30 in the morning on April 2nd, Argentinean Special Forces begin to put Operation Rosario into action when they landed on the Falklands. The landing of Argentinean troops brought to an end months of confused signaling by the British government. The government paired negotiations over sovereignty with harsh criticism of the negotiations when ministers reported on the progress of the talks. Although the stakes for the talks were high for the Argentinean Junta that desperately needed a foreign policy success to divert domestic criticism, the British government was never seriously engaged and unwilling to make the compromises necessary to strike a real agreement. It is unsurprising that the Argentines lost faith in the process and sought to achieve their objective through military action.

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[4] Dillon, *The Falklands, Politics, and War.*
[5] Ibid, 35.
[6] The Stationary Office, *War in the Falklands, 1982* (London: The Stationary Office, 2001), 103.

However, even once it became clear that the Argentines were willing to retake the islands with military force, the Thatcher government continued to send mixed signals. The events of February and March 1982 presented the British with repeated occasions to display their commitment to keep the islands in British hands. However, these opportunities were met with contradictory actions by the British: actions showing both interest in the islands and neglect. Certainly these weak responses would not serve as a credible deterrent to the Argentine Junta that had placed significant value on the Falklands issue.

The Argentine landing on April 2nd was followed by a raucous session of Parliament the following day in which speaker after speaker called for a hard-line with the Argentines in nationalistic rhetoric.[7] Labor leader Michael Foot was unequivocal in his support for military action and where the fault for the invasion lay:

> We have a moral duty, a political duty and every other kind of duty to ensure that [British] association to the Falklands is sustained. We are paramountly concerned . . . about what we can do to protect those who rightly and naturally look to us for protection. So far, they have been betrayed. The responsibility for that betrayal rests with the government. The Government must now prove by deeds – they will never be able to do it by words - that they are not responsible for the betrayal and cannot be faced with that charge.[8]

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[7] Max Hastings and Simon Jenkins, *The Battle for the Falklands*, 1st American ed. (New York: Norton, 1983), 78.

[8] Quoted in Lawrence Freedman, *Britain and the Falklands War, Making Contemporary Britain* (New

The opposition Labor Party saw the 'surprise' invasion as a chance to embarrass the conservatives. They supported military action as the last recourse for United Kingdom following a series of diplomatic blunders by the government. Further, MPs called for the resignation of John Nott, the Secretary of State for Defense, and Lord Carrington, both members of government who advocated negotiations with the Junta.[9] At this point the government's course of action was clear: it must defend the islands or risk serious domestic political consequences. What followed was a relatively brief but bitter war that ended with Britain maintaining sovereignty over the Falklands.

## Four Democratic Puzzles

A crisis between the United Kingdom and Argentina today seems much less likely to escalate to all out war due to the fact that both states are now stable democracies. The role of democracies in international relations is ascendant. While the international system was once dominated by authoritarian regimes, recent surveys have shown that democracies outnumber autocracies in the international system. There is a clear trend since the Second World War towards democracy, and in 2006 Freedom House counted 123 democracies (65% of all states), up from 40% in the

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York: B. Blackwell, 1988), 84-85.

[9] Thatcher defended Lord Carrington against these attacks, worried that she would need his advice in the coming war; see Hastings and Jenkins, *The Battle for the Falklands*. However, two days after the uproar in Parliament, Carrington resigned his post and was replaced by the Leader of the House of Commons Francis Pym.

mid-1980s.[10] As democracies replace autocracies not just in Europe, but in Latin America, Africa, and Asia,[11] the question for scholars of international relations should shift to examine the numerous differences between states with the same regime type. Making this shift recognizes both the empirical fact that democracies are becoming more numerous as well as the theoretical gap that exists in our understanding democratic foreign policy.

Scholars of international and comparative political economy have already developed an extensive research program that emphasizes differences between democratic states. These scholars have examined the role that left-versus-right governments,[12] presidential versus parliamentary systems,[13] veto points,[14] and district size[15] play in economic policy-making.[16] In such studies, these sub-components of democratic systems are repeatedly shown to have significant influence on economic policy outcomes. If these characteristics of democracy exert important influence on economic issues, it is reasonable to believe that this will be true for security policy as well.

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[10] Freedom House, *Freedom in the World* (New York: Freedom House, 2006).

[11] A trend highlighted in Samuel Huntington's 1991 book *The Third Wave*.

[12] Milner and Judkins ("Partisanship, Trade Policy, and Globalization") argue that because the left and right represent different domestic constituencies, they should have divergent preferences on trade.

[13] There is a substantial debate between those that see presidentialism as positively related to economic outcomes (Shugart and Carey, *Presidents and Assemblies)* and those who view it negatively (Linz et al., *The Breakdown of democratic regimes*).

[14] George Tsebelis, *Veto Players: How Political Institutions Work* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2002).

[15] Gary W. Cox, *Making Votes Count: Strategic Coordination in the World's Electoral Systems*, Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997).

[16] Persson and Tabellini (*Political Economics*), offer an overview of the interaction of domestic institutions and economic policy outcomes.

The Falklands War demonstrates a rather curious outcome for students of international politics: must a democratic state, clearly committed to a particular area, fight a war to demonstrate its interest? In fact, the behavior of democratic states in international crises raises four interrelated puzzles for scholars of international relations. The first puzzle involves the sources of incomplete information in relationships between states. Scholars argue that incomplete information and the inability to credibly reveal information is a key reason why bargains break down and states go to war.[17]

Theorists of international relations have long viewed armed conflict as an outgrowth of political processes. Clausewitz's famous dictum that "war is simply a continuation of political intercourse, with the addition of other means" demonstrates a clear link between the process that occurs before a conflict and those that follow the first shots.[18] Similarly, Thomas Schelling argues that "war is always a bargaining process."[19] Finally, Wagner states that "fighting must be considered as part of the bargaining process and not an alternative to it."[20] There exists, then, a general view that the political and military are not separate realms, but rather that war represents a new means to achieve existing political goals.

In a seminal 1995 article, James Fearon presents the argument that if war is costly and states are aware of this fact, then they should be able to bargain a solution to the conflict and avoid warfare.  Of course, as Fearon points out, the puzzle exists in the fact that the international system has witnessed many costly conflicts despite the rationale for bargaining.  To resolve this discrepancy, Fearon argues that wars can occur under two conditions: when states have incentives to misrepresent their private information and when states fail to commit to uphold the bargain.

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[17] James Fearon, "Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes," *American Political Science Review* 88, no. 3 (1994).

[18] Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, trans. Michael Eliot Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1976).

[19] Thomas C. Schelling, *Arms and Influence* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1966).

[20] R Harrison Wagner, "Bargaining and War," *American Journal of Political Science* 44, no. 3 (2000).

Fearon’s work leaves the important puzzle of how and why incomplete information is generated.  Particularly surprising is the fact that conflicts are likely in territorial disputes and enduring rivalries where both sides are well versed in the claims and stakes involved.[21]  In this context the puzzle is why at times states are able to negotiate and prevent conflict with a particular challenger but cannot avoid conflict other times.  Is there a way to systematically understand this difference?

The second puzzle is related to the first but focuses on why democracies so often end up in conflicts when, through the transparency of their institutions, democratic states are thought to provide better information to other states about their intentions and the stakes involved.  According to bargaining models of international conflict, asymmetric information is the root of conflict.[22]  Under conditions of perfect information, states can clearly identify both the stakes of the conflict and the resolve of the other state to either alter or maintain the status quo.  However, incomplete information leads states to look for ways to demonstrate their interest in a particular issue.

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[21] Paul F. Diehl, *The Dynamics of Enduring Rivalries* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1998).  The authors also show that the majority of international conflicts occur within the context of such rivalries.
[22] Fearon, "Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes."

Scholars in this field argue that a clear difference between democracies and autocracies is the ability of democracies to better signal their intentions through the generation of audience costs.[23] This scholarship highlights the inability of autocratic states to make their private information public in a credible manner. However, this literature has failed to effectively engage the microfoundations of these processes, particularly as they relate to the creation of incomplete information. While democracies may have some mechanisms to overcome information problems, it seems that such advantages are most evident in relationships with other democracies.[24]

The advantages for democracies in international disputes generally focus on two foundations. Both explanations center on the problem of bluffing in international negotiations. The first is outlined by Kenneth Schultz, who argues that the presence of opposition parties in democratic states allows them to better signal their intentions than other types of regimes. This means that one way to reduce the likelihood of bluffing is to add a second player that has incentives to provide more objective views on the stakes of the potential conflict. This is analogous to having someone looking over your shoulder at the poker table and confirming or refuting your claims of having a great hand. Other players will place more credence in those claims that are independently verified.

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[23] See for example, Fearon, "Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes," Alastair Smith, "Fighting Battles, Winning Wars," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 42, no. 3 (1998); Kenneth Schultz, "Do Democratic Institutions Constrain or Inform? Contrasting Two Institutional Perspectives on Democracy and War," *International Organization* 53, no. 2 (1999).

[24] Charles Lipson, *Reliable Partners: How Democracies Have Made a Separate Peace* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2003).

For democratic states, the parliamentary opposition may act as a check on the statements of leaders. If the opposition supports the leader’s claims with regards to the issue at hand, the other states may correctly infer that the leader is serious. However, if the opposition fails to support the leader’s statements, other states may infer that the leader is bluffing and that the stakes are actually significantly lower for the territory in question.

The second reason democracies should be better able to signal in international disputes is the presence of audience costs. Since democratic leaders must make their pronouncements before an audience of voters, they will avoid making statements they cannot backup. Since voters can sanction leaders who fail to live up to their word, once again democratic leaders will be less inclined to bluff in international crises. In crisis bargaining over a particular issue, the ability of democracies to generate audience costs should allow them to clearly articulate the stakes of a particular issue for them.[25]

In a recent paper, Tomz uses experiments to show that citizens do care about the promises their leaders make.[26] His results show that citizens are concerned with the reputation of their country and their country’s leader. The findings lend support to Schultz’s work by providing micro-level support for his assumptions regarding audience costs. Tomz's innovative work indicates that people hold leaders accountable for their proclamations and sets parameters for the conditions in which democratic threats may be particularly effective.

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[25] There exists a substantial literature on the ability of democracies to establish audience costs. See for example Fearon, "Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes, "Fearon James Fearon, "Signaling Foreign Policy Interests: Tying Hands Versus Sinking Costs," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 41, no. 1 (1997); Thomas C. Schelling, *The Strategy of Conflict* (Cambridge,: Harvard University Press, 1960); Robert Pahre, "Endogenous Domestic Institutions in Two-Level Games and Parliamentary Oversight of the European Union," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 41, no. 1 (1997); Smith, "Fighting Battles, Winning Wars"; Schultz, "Do Democratic Institutions Constrain or Inform?”

[26] Michael Tomz, "Domestic Audience Costs in International Relations: An Experimental Approach," *International Organization* 61, no. 4 (2007).

In theory, both of these arguments point to democratic states being able to clearly signal their interests in international negotiations and refrain from bluffing. However, this brings us back to the puzzle with which we began: if democracies are such excellent signalers, why are they so often attacked? The logic of the institutional argument would lead us to believe that when democracies are being targeted by other states they should be better able to prevent an attack. On the other hand, when democracies are in crisis situations where they are the aggressor, they should also be better able to meet their goals without having to resort to force. Further, theories that focus on differences between regime types cannot explain important differences between democracies in their ability to deter attacks and meet their foreign policy goals without fighting. While democracies may systematically differ from autocracies in their ability to signal, are there also systematic differences *between* democracies in their ability to communicate their resolve?

Dissenting views on the democratic advantages in international disputes highlight two significant problems faced by democracies. First, in a critique of the audience costs literature, Slantchev points out that democracies cannot be assumed to generate audience costs.[27] According to Slantchev's model, democratic leaders do not automatically generate audience costs, but instead audience costs will only be generated under particular conditions, essentially in cases where the action taken by the leader will be particularly costly, due to significant differences with the opposition. While Slantchev's critique generates a number of interesting hypotheses, by focusing on audience costs it fails to account for other potential sources that may allow states to overcome incomplete information problems.

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[27] Branislav Slantchev, "Politicians, the Media, and Domestic Audience Costs," *International Studies Quarterly* 50 (2006).

The second critique leveled against the argument that democracies provide potential opponents with more information states that transparency provided by democratic regimes may not necessarily be a good thing when it comes to international conflict. Finel and Lord argue that transparency is a double-edged sword.[28] While more information may help to signal a democracy's intentions, the sheer amount of information may create a cacophony that is impossible for foreign leaders to understand. On balance, Finel and Lord reach the pessimistic conclusion that increased levels of transparency tend to lead to a 'negative logic of transparency' that is more likely to exacerbate crises than diffuse them. However, Finel and Lord's focus is on transparency and not incomplete information. Theoretically they cannot explain variation in the ability of transparent states to provide meaningful signals to potential challengers. Their argument fails to examine the microfoundations of incomplete information, and as the authors admit, the focus on transparency also makes testing more difficult.[29]

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[28] See Bernard Finel and Kristin Lord, "The Surprising Logic of Transparency," *International Studies Quarterly* 43, no. 2 (1999); Bernard Finel and Kristin Lord, *Power and Conflict in the Age of Transparency* (New York: Palgrave, 2000).

[29] Finel and Lord, "The Surprising Logic of Transparency," 336.

A third puzzle exists in the literature regarding the role of domestic politics and international conflict: how do we reconcile the constraining and informing role of parliaments with rally-round-the-flag effects? While both Schultz and Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman offer formal models to demonstrate the importance of parliaments in international conflict, the empirical results are decidedly mixed.[30] In Schultz's own work he finds that in 84% (26 of 31) of the cases of extended deterrence involving a major power democratic ally, the opposition supports the government.[31] While such results show that dissent does occur, these results can also be interpreted to demonstrate that the opposition supports the government in the vast majority of cases.

Schultz's empirical results demonstrate the tension between claims about the significance of the opposition and rally-round-the-flag effects in conflict. If it appears that the opposition rallies to the side of the government in the vast majority of cases, it is difficult to say that the opposition will have a dramatic signaling effect. These issues boil down to a single point: when does the opposition matter in crises? Is there a systematic manner to determine when the stance of the opposition will play a determinate role in the crisis and when its actions are irrelevant?

To these three puzzles we will add a fourth. A number of scholars have argued that hard-line leaders are particularly fortunate in international relations, being both less likely to be attacked and more likely to find peace.[32] In fact, the assumed desire of doves to imitate hawks is a cornerstone of many formal models of international relations. In a 2005 article, Schultz argues that hawkish and dovish politicians try to signal their types to domestic audiences. For dovish politicians, seeking cooperation will peg them as extremists and harm their electoral chances. However, for hawkish politicians, working for peace will label them as moderates and enhance their electoral chances. If doves only wish to be perceived as hawks, why are there any doves at all setting foreign policy? Of course, empirically a broad range of views exist among foreign policy leaders regarding the use of force.

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[30] Kenneth Schultz, *Democracy and Coercive Diplomacy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 2001). Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and David Lalman, *War and Reason: Domestic and International Imperatives* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992).
[31] Schultz, *Democracy and Coercive Diplomacy*, 164.

If hard-liners are particularly adept at finding peace and preventing attacks, we would expect that they should also be able to credibly avoid conflict through negotiations to prevent the outbreak of violence. However, empirically, we see that hawkish leaders are often subject to attacks in international crises. Such notable hard-line politicians as Margaret Thatcher, Atal Vajpayee, and Golda Meir were all in power when their respective states were targets of international conflict.

This chapter will proceed as follows. The next two sections will examine the importance of crisis bargaining and democratic states in international disputes. These sections will be followed by a discussion of the role of domestic politics in international disputes highlighting the findings and shortcomings of previous studies. This will lead to an explanation of the theory and the two principle components: unity of government, and its views on the use of force. The chapter will conclude with a discussion and analysis of alternative theories explaining the behavior of democratic states in international crises.

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[32] A few examples include Fred Charles Iklé, *Every War Must End* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1971); Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman, *War and Reason*; Kenneth Schultz, "The Politics of Risking Peace: Do Hawks or Doves Deliver the Olive Branch?," *International Organization* 59 (2005).

## Democracies and International Disputes

While studies focusing on regime type have had a tremendous impact on our understanding of international relations,[33] the theoretical explanations for these outcomes remain incompletely understood.[34] A growing literature in international relations has shifted the focus away from regime type generally to specifically look at differences between democratic states, and in so doing, better isolates the causes of regime behavior. While still in its infancy, there is a developing literature on the role of democracies' domestic politics in international conflict. Gaubatz finds that democracies are less likely to become involved in international conflicts directly before elections.[35] He argues that as elections approach leaders become more attuned to public opinion and thus less likely to become entangled in international conflicts. On the other hand, democracies are significantly more likely to become involved in wars directly after elections.

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[33] Some examples include the success of democracies in international conflict (Reiter and Stam, *Democracies and War*), the peace between democratic states (Doyle, "Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs"), more reliable alliance behavior (Choi, "Democratic Synergy and Victory in War, 1816-1992"), and adherence to international agreements (Martin, *Democratic Commitments*).

[34] There have been extensive critiques of the theoretical underpinnings of the literature on regime type, see S. Chan, "In Search of Democratic Peace: Problems and Promise," *The International Studies Review* 41 (1997).

[35] See Kurt T. Gaubatz, "Election Cycles and War," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 35, no. 2 (1991); Kurt T. Gaubatz, *Elections and War: The Electoral Incentive in the Democratic Politics of War and Peace* (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 2000).

In a specific test of this hypothesis, Reiter and Tillman find that greater participation in elections is related to a lower probability of militarized dispute involvement.[36] Clark and Nordstrom produced similar findings regarding participation, as well as finding that higher levels of parliamentary constraint lead to lower probability of conflict participation.[37] Looking at territorial disputes, Huth and Allee find that both election timing and level of government control of parliament are significantly related to the decision to escalate a dispute.[38] In the case of established democracies, Leblang and Chan find that proportional representation regimes are less likely to become involved in conflicts, arguing that such regimes encourage consensual rather than conflictual relationships.[39]

Looking at the U.S. case, McCormick and Wittkopf discover that despite perceptions of bipartisanship in foreign policy, ideology and partisanship tend to determine outcomes.[40] Howell and Pevehouse find that the strength of the President’s party in Congress had a significant positive relationship with conflict behavior until 1973, when the War Powers Act was introduced, after which no relationship existed.[41] On the other hand, Gowa, using Alesina's model for two party competition, finds that domestic politics has no relationship with U.S. uses of force abroad.[42] Similarly, Moore and Lanoue argue that domestic factors have little to do with the probability of U.S. foreign involvement, which is largely based on the level of hostility being shown by other governments.[43]

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[36] Dan Reiter and Erik Tillman, "Public, Legislative, and Executive Constraints on the Democratic Initiation of Conflict," *Journal of Politics* 64, no. 3 (2002).

[37] David Clark and Timothy Nordstrom, "Democratic Variants and Democratic Variance: How Domestic Constraints Shape Interstate Conflict," *Journal of Politics* 67, no. 1 (2005).

[38] Paul K. Huth and Todd L. Allee, *The Democratic Peace and Territorial Conflict in the Twentieth Century* (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002).

[39] David Leblang and Steven Chan, "Explaining Wars Fought by Established Democracies: Do Institutional Constraints Matter?," *Political Research Quarterly* 56, no. 4 (2003). This argument is an extension of the norms argument (see Doyle, “Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs,” and Owen, “How Liberalism Produces Democratic Peace”) that domestic politics in democracies encourages consensual views on international politics.

[40] See James M. McCormick and Eugene R. Wittkopf, "Bipartisanship, Partisanship, and Ideology in Congressional-Executive Foreign Policy Relations, 1947-1988," *Journal of Politics* 52, no. 4 (1990); James M. McCormick, Eugene R. Wittkopf, and David M. Danna, "Politics and Bipartisanship at the Water's Edge: A Note on Bush and Clinton," *Polity* 30, no. 1 (1997).

These studies of the role of domestic politics in influencing the conflict behavior of democratic states point towards several possible theories. The first line of argument focuses on the role that individual voters play in democratic politics. This logic is captured by two different models, the first being the Contemporary Consent Model, as outlined by Reiter and Stam in their book *Democracies and War*. According to the authors, politicians choose whether or not to go to war based on public opinion prior to the conflict. If the citizens are looking for a fight, the politicians will declare war; however, in the event that people are pacific, there is nothing the politicians can do to drag them into a war they do not want. According to this model, party politics is of little import, as politicians scramble to do the bidding of the populace.

A related though distinct view on the role of citizens in democratic conflict behavior is offered by Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and his colleagues who focus on the electoral connection between citizens and their leaders.[44] The primary difference between this model and that of Reiter and Stam is the timing of consent. Instead of worrying about public opinion at the outbreak of the conflict, according to the Bueno de Mequita, et al., model the key consideration for leaders is how the public will view the decision to enter or not enter a conflict at the time of the next election. According to this logic, leaders are always operating today with an eye on the next election: they will take actions which will enhance their chances for reelection in the future and avoid decisions that will harm their ability to stay in power.

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[41] William G. Howell and Jon C. Pevehouse, "Presidents, Congress, and the Use of Force," *International Organization* 59 (2005).
[42] Joanne Gowa, "Politics at the Water's Edge: Parties, Voters, and the Use of Force Abroad," *International Organization* 52, no. 2 (1998).
[43] Will H. Moore and David J. Lanoue, "Domestic Politics and U.S. Foreign Policy: A Study of Cold War Conflict Behavior," *Journal of Politics* 65, no. 2 (2003).

The model presented by Bueno de Mequita, et al., is based on the desire of democratic leaders to provide public goods. While authoritarian leaders may be able to ride out a defeat in war by paying off their narrow winning coalition, this is not an option for democracies. Instead, according to their model, democratic leaders, worried about being removed from office in the case of military failure, will select less difficult targets for their military campaigns. In so doing, they are able to provide their state with the public benefit of a military victory.

While both of these models have certain advantages, they are also inadequate for the purposes of this study. The notions of the winning coalition and office seeking politicians are useful for distinguishing between autocratic and democratic regimes, but much less compelling if one wishes to differentiate between democracies. While there is some signaling in this model, as democracies realize that fighting one another will be costly, it generally doesn’t have much to say about influence of domestic political differences and the message it sends to potential challengers.  Further, coalition size has been empirically investigated for democracies and the results have been mixed.

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[44] Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, et al., *The Logic of Political Survival* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2003).

Reiter and Stam's Contemporary Consent Model faces its own set of challenges.  First, the authors dismiss theories regarding rally effects and diversionary war despite the fact that the research on these theories is far from settled.  There have been a number of studies that have shown rally-effects to boost public support for a conflict[45] and leaders struggling with domestic crisis to be more likely to involve their states in diversionary wars.[46]  According to such a model, politicians are little more than vassals for public opinion with little ability or desire to lead the public when they believe it is important.

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[45] Although there is disagreement on the size of the rally effect, a number of studies have found rally effects the US President: George III Edwards and Tami Swenson, "Who Rallies? The Anatomy of a Rally Event," *Journal of Politics* 59, no. 1 (1997); Suzanne Parker, "Toward and Understanding Of "Rally" Effects: Public Opinion in the Persian Gulf War," *Public Opinion Quarterly* 59, no. 4 (1995); Benjamin I Page and Ronald Y Shapiro, "The Rational Public: Fifty Tears of Americans' Policy Preferences,"  (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992); Matthew Baum, "Sex, Lies, and War: How Soft News Brings Foreign Policy to the Inattentive Public," *American Political Science Review* 96, no. 1 (2002); Alan Rosenblatt, "Aggressive Foreign Policy Marketing: Public Response to Reagan's 1983 Address on Lebanon and Grenada," *Political Behavior* 20, no. 3 (1998).  In a contrasting view, see William Baker and John Oneal, "Patriotism or Opinion Leadership?: The Nature and Origins of The "Rally 'Round the Flag" Effect," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 45, no. 5 (2001).

[46] See Chris Gelpi, "Democratic Diversions: Governmental Structure and the Externalization of Domestic Conflict," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 41, no. 2 (1997); Jeffrey Pickering and Emizet Kisangani, "Democracy and Diversionary Military Intervention: Reassessing Regime Type and the Diversionary Hypothesis," *International Studies Quarterly* 49 (2005); Karl DeRouen, "Presidents and the Diversionary Use of Force: A Research Note," *International Studies Quarterly* 44 (2000). For dissenting views, see Geoffrey Blainey, *The Causes of War* (New York,: Free Press, 1973); James Meernik and Peter Waterman, "The Myth of the Diversionary Use of Force by American Presidents," *Political Research Quarterly* 49, no. 3 (1996).

A second issue with the theory is that it ignores findings that public opinion is substantially driven by elites and particularly elite unity and disunity.[47] Research comparing elite and mass opinion has also uncovered substantial divergence between elite perceptions of public opinion and the actual views held by the public.[48] Ultimately, public opinion research only seems to take us one step back in the chain of events with little clear causal understanding. The action of democratic states may be controlled by public opinion, but what causes the public to call for blood in some instances and extend the olive branch at others? Finally, the theory seems to downplay the significant role that agenda setting plays in international conflicts. In the fall 2002 run-up to the second Iraq War, surveys showed that Iraq was not a top issue for the vast majority of Americans.[49] Similarly, there is little evidence that the Israeli public collectively decided in invade Lebanon in June of 1982. Rather, certain members of the Israeli cabinet devised an invasion plan and presented this to the public. At this point, with far less information than policymakers, citizens had the choice of supporting a plan they were told was in Israel's best interest or opposing it.[50]

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[47] John Zaller, *The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992). Further, Page and Shapiro (*The Rational Public*) find that public views move to mirror changes in US foreign policy.

[48] Steven Kull and Clay Ramsay, "Elite Misperceptions of U.S. Public Opinion and Foreign Policy," in *Decisionmaking in a Glass House: Mass Media, Public Opinion, and American and European Foreign Policy in the 21st Century*, ed. Nacos, Shapiro and Isernia (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2000).

[49] CBS News. "CBS News Poll, Nov 2-4, 2002." CBS News. A CBS News Poll showed 10% of the population thought Iraq mattered most when choosing their representative, compared to 28% who cited the economy and 13% who cited terrorism.

[50] Ze'ev Schiff and Ehud Ya'ari, *Israel's Lebanon War*, trans. Ina Friedman (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1984, Chapter 3-6. Of course, in this case the information available to most of the cabinet ministers was quite limited as well, as defense minister Ariel Sharon tried his best to manage information to his advantage.

An alternative theory to those focusing on the role of the citizens of the state might look instead at the role that parliaments play in democratic conflict behavior. This line of research has led to some sharp debates between those that argue that parliament is critical to decision making and those who believe it is superfluous. Schultz (2001) makes one of the most compelling arguments for the relevance of the legislature in determining the behavior of democratic states in times of conflict.

As discussed above, in a formal model Shultz demonstrates that having opposition parties makes it much more difficult for democratic leaders to bluff in international crises. Having a leader who consistently tells the truth is like playing poker with someone who cannot bluff; if they up the ante, we can reasonably infer that they have the hand to back it up. Similarly, democratic leaders' rhetoric will tend to reflect their actual views on the topic. From his formal model, Schultz argues that because democracies can more clearly signal their intentions, they are more likely to be able to successfully deter challengers in international crises.

While Schultz's work is significant for proposing a clear logic for why a legislative opposition might impact international crises, it also suffers from a number of limitations. First, much like the work of Reiter and Stam and Bueno de Mequita, et al., the research is solidly focused on differences between democratic and autocratic states. Once again, the question is how this might help us to distinguish between democratic regimes. As Schultz's empirical results show, the great tendency among democracies is that the opposition supports the government in extended deterrence situations. Thus it may well be the case that the signals offered by a parliamentary opposition are important, but how and when they are important has yet to be discovered.

The second problem with Schultz's study and many others focusing on the role of the legislative opposition is that it assumes that the role of the legislature is uniform across all cases. In fact, it may be this assumption that helps to generate the disparate and conflicting results in this field. As will be discussed in more detail below, there are a number of reasons to believe that legislative influence is highly variable and situation contingent. If this is the case, we should be interested in discovering what conditions increase and decrease the role of the legislature in the decision making process.

## Theory

In this survey of the literature on foreign policy in democratic states we have seen that the existing state of the field leaves a number of key questions unanswered. As the field moves from examining differences between regime types to differences among regime types, we edge closer to understanding the domestic mechanisms behind state behavior. This study will focus on two factors influencing the behavior of democratic states in international disputes. The first element, which has been relatively neglected in the study of international relations, is the role that government unity plays in conflict behavior. This will be combined with a second factor, the preferences of the government regarding the use of force in foreign relations. In final analysis, this study will argue that both these factors will interact to determine the outcomes of international disputes for democratic states.

The view of the state as a unitary, rational actor is an ideal type challenged by the theory presented below. In this theory, states vary in the degree to which they are unified, at times speaking with a single voice and other times issuing a confused cacophony. At the same time, while states may be rational, they are also driven by the preferences of their leaders, meaning that different governments will respond to similar events based on their own unique views. The end effect of adding these two variables to the traditional international relations mix is that the strictures of the international system will elicit different, yet predictable responses.

### *First Factor: Unity*

One of the basic assumptions of much international relations scholarship is that states speak with a single voice. States as unitary actors is one of the principle tenants of realist theory, and many neoliberal scholars view states as coherent entities. The unitary nature of states is a simplifying assumption and ignores important differences that can exist between states and within states over time. This study will challenge this assumption and show that these differences have important implications for foreign policy outcomes.

There is substantial evidence that government unity varies significantly over time and across states. Some governments are relatively tolerant of internal dissent while others place a premium on unity. In other cases the leader may be unable to maintain uniformity despite her best attempts, while under other conditions cabinets that are ideologically diverse may be unified on a particular issue. The British Conservative government under Eden greatly favored conformity on international issues,[51] while the Truman administration in the United States was divided over the proper approach to take in East Asia.[52]

The unity or division of a government signals to potential challengers for a number of different reasons. First, by presenting a single message, the state can clearly show challengers how it will respond in the case of an attack. Whether the state seeks negotiations or takes a hard-line, the position it chooses will be consistent and clear. On the other hand, divisions within the government may lead a potential challenger to question the position of the government. The Israeli government under Golda Meir suffered from this problem in the early 1970s when the message of hard-liners like Meir was confused by the dovish stance taken by Foreign Minister Eban, who pursued negotiations with Arab states.

Unity among top government officials reinforces the stakes of the issue at hand, while disunity raises questions about the government's commitment to the territory.[53] Lack of unity may lead the challenger to believe that if they take action the divided government of the target state will not be sure how to respond. Divided governments can appear confused and fail to clearly signal their intentions on a particular issue. Prior to the Korean War, the fierce anti-Communism of U.S. President Truman was offset by confusion within his government over how to approach East Asia. U.S. Secretary of State Acheson famously remarked that Korea didn't fall within the U.S. security perimeter.[54] These conflicting views prevented the U.S. from signaling its commitment to Korea.[55]

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[51] Sue Onslow, Backbench Debate with the Conservative Party and Its Influence on British Foreign Policy, 1948-57 (New York: St. Martin's, 1997).

[52] Rosemary Foot, *The Wrong War: American Policy and the Dimensions of the Korean Conflict, 1950-1953* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1985), Chapter 2.

[53] The logic of this proposition is similar to that of Schultz (*Democracy and Coercive Diplomacy*) regarding the role of opposition parties in the legislature.

Second, challengers may also see internal divisions as a sign of weakness, particularly from the target state's leadership. The challenger may believe that this presents them with a novel opportunity to attack the target while the target is weak. Internal governmental squabbling may lead a potential challenger to believe that the government is so distracted that it will not be able to react adequately to an attack. Such considerations played a role in the Kargil war in 1999 when India was governed by a lame-duck interim coalition comprised of 18 parties. The diversity of the parties in the coalition and the failure of the government to win a vote of no confidence led Pakistani military leaders to view the Vajpayee government as little more than paper tigers.[56]

Finally, internal division may prevent governments from taking the steps necessary to avoid conflict. Inability to take decisive action may prohibit governments from effectively negotiating a compromise to prevent a crisis from developing in the first place. Inability to agree may block governments from taking concrete steps towards preventing conflict, either through clear military actions or effective negotiations. As the crisis over the Falklands developed in 1982 and Argentina signaled intentions to take the islands by force the British government chose to withdraw the HMS *Endurance* ice-breaker over the objections of the foreign minister. As Foreign Secretary Lord Carrington was well aware, but others in the Thatcher government ignored, this move was interpreted by the Argentineans as signaling a lack or resolve on the part of the United Kingdom to defend the islands.[57]

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[54] William Stueck, *The Korean War: An International History* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995), 30.
[55] For more on the Korean War case, see Chapter 4.
[56] J. N. Dixit, *India's Foreign Policy, 1947-2003* (New Delhi: Picus Books, 2003), 451.

### *Second Factor: Views on the Use of Force*

Preferences matter in international relations. Two general schools of thought exist in dealing with adversaries in international relations: hawks and doves.[58] Hawkish governments favor taking a hard-line in dealings with other states, offering few concessions and demanding more from the opposing state in order to reach an agreement. In general, hawks tend to be more skeptical about the efficacy of negotiating settlements to crises and will tend to have a lower threshold for the use of force. The other ideal type is a dovish government, which approves of taking a softer-line in negotiations in order to avoid possible conflict. Practically, this means that doves both favor negotiations with adversaries and are more willing to make concessions in order to achieve an agreement. Doves will tend to have a much higher threshold for the use of force than hawks.

When governments are unified in their approach to an international crisis, the second consideration for state leaders is the preferences of the government towards the use of force. If the government is soft-line, its approach to the crisis will tend to reflect its desire to reach a negotiated solution and avoid conflict. Soft-line governments will reflect the interests of their supporters and thus make negotiations the first priority in disputes. This preference for negotiations means that soft-line governments will make concessions much more readily than other governments. The last thing that soft-line governments want to do is escalate the crisis and make military conflict more likely. The problem that unified dovish states face is that their preference for negotiations may lead some adversaries to believe they are weak. The unfortunate result for such governments is that while their behavior may normally lead to negotiations, it also makes them more vulnerable to attack from the other state in the crisis.

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[57] G. M. Dillon, *The Falklands, Politics, and War* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1989), 35.

[58] As hawkish views are associated with taking a hard-line in international negotiations and dovish views a soft-line, these terms will be used interchangeably.

Hard-line governments have a much different set of preferences and likely outcomes from soft-line regimes. Due to the nature of their supporters, whose concern is that the state not appear weak, hard-line governments will be much more likely to hold firm to their demands in negotiations. Such governments are less likely to make concessions to potential challengers, which greatly decreases the likelihood of reaching a negotiated settlement. However, the hawkish nature of the government also means that the challenging state is unlikely to launch an attack both because it can be sure of the response and because it is unlikely to yield concessions.

### *Taken Together: Government Unity and Views on the Use of Force*

Both the factors described in this theory do not exist solely separately from one another. Rather, states simultaneously receive values along both of these axes: a level of unity and hawkishness. Combining these factors generates four ideal types of governments: unified hawks, unified doves, divided hawks and divided doves (see Table 2.1). Each of these governments has unique characteristics that influence the likelihood that it will be challenged in international relations.

Governments that receive high unity and hawkishness scores have a number of factors that work in their favor in signaling to a potential challenger. In terms of making their intentions known, they present both a unified front that makes their message more credible and are able to clearly present their message. The signal is both clear and credible. The additional advantage that these governments enjoy over other states is that their hawkish nature makes their claims regarding retaliation more credible.

Governments that are unified but dovish enjoy most of the same benefits that unified hawkish governments experience. As with unified hawks, unified doves send clear and credible signals to potential challengers, even if the preferences of the government are different. These governments are less likely to be challenged than divided hawkish governments because the clarity and credibility of their message trumps their views on the use of force. Dovish governments have a number of ways to avoid conflict, most notably entering into negotiations with the potential challenger and seeking long-term solutions to the particular issue. Short of this, unified dovish governments may work for agreements in other issue areas, propose interim agreements, or seek outside mediation. In and of itself, being dovish is not a handicap for most governments. However, as noted above, dovish views do make governments more vulnerable to challenge since this may be interpreted as a sign of weakness.

Divided hawkish governments are vulnerable to challenge since they cannot credibly communicate their views and send mixed signals to potential competitors. For this reason they are more susceptible to challenge than unified hawks. However, their hawkishness may deter some challengers who fear a militaristic response.

The worst of all worlds is reserved for divided dovish governments that combine the dangers of divided governments with the perceived weakness of dovishness. As with divided hawks, these governments cannot effectively signal due to their lack of credibility and the mixed message. Further, their dovishness means that they are perceived as a potentially weak target. In sum, this means that these governments will be the most likely to be attacked.

**Table 2.1: Summary of Government Types and Outcomes**

| | | **Government Unity** | |
|---|---|---|---|
| | | **Divided** | **Unified** |
| **Government Hawkishness** | **Dovish** | Most likely to be challenged | Unlikely to be challenged |
| | **Hawkish** | Likely to be challenged | Least likely to be challenged |

One potential critique of this typology is that while it may be possible to categorize unified governments, divided governments are simply at odds, and these divisions overwhelm any preferences that they might have. To some degree this is true, and the basis for the problems that these states have in international disputes. However, except for the most broad and deeply divided governments, it is still possible to ascertain the government's preferences. This is because even in divided governments there is generally a more dominant faction, party, or ideology that is undercut by divisions.

## Alternative Explanations

The causes of war have arguably been the most studied topics in international relations. Not surprisingly, the general study of conflict has yielded a number of theories that might also provide different rationale for the actions of democracies facing potential challengers. Although a multitude of theories exist, I will focus on four theories that might be more narrowly applied to the case of democratic states: strength of the domestic opposition, leadership tenure, public opinion, and balance of capabilities.

### *Strength of Domestic Opposition*

In examining alternative explanations, this study will begin by looking at the theories at are most similar to the theory presented in this paper and move to those that are less similar. A number of studies have focused on the power of the opposition to hold the government accountable. The general logic underlying such studies is that governments with a weak domestic opposition have decreased audience costs and thus cannot signal effectively. If the opposition is strong, government proclamations are more credible because the likelihood of losing power is greater.

Most theories that focus on the importance of the opposition study the role of the opposition in conflict initiation. In a cross-sectional time-series study of territorial conflicts, Huth and Allee found that higher levels of government control in the parliament increased the probability of initiation.[59] Looking at the United States over time, Howell and Pevehouse found that the control of the president's party in Congress increased the chances for a militarized dispute.[60] Significantly, this relationship disappears after the 1973 War Powers Act was passed by Congress.

However, a number of empirical studies have also contested these findings.[61] It is perhaps not surprising that the field has reached conflicting conclusions about the role of the domestic opposition in international conflict since the models tend to remain underspecified. One critical shortcoming of these studies is that the opposition is assumed to both influence the government and resist military action, two assumptions that this study will contest.

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[59] Huth and Allee, *The Democratic Peace and Territorial Conflict in the Twentieth Century.*

[60] Howell and Pevehouse, "Presidents, Congress, and the Use of Force."

[61] In a cross-sectional analysis, Reiter and Tillman (*Democracies and War*) emphasize the importance of participation in elections, while Gowa ("Politics at the Water's Edge") and Moore and Lanoue ("Domestic Politics and U.S. Foreign Policy") reject the importance of domestic politics for the US case specifically.

Schultz’s work on the importance of the opposition in signaling to potential challengers is the more relevant competing explanation.  However, Schultz’s study faces a number of significant limitations.  First, the credibility that the opposition can remove the government if the government bluffs remains an untested assumption. The significance of a minority government facing opposition over its position is much different from that of a government with a several hundred seat majority facing the same opposition.

A second problem facing the opposition is that they have a significant information asymmetry with respect to the government.  Through its control over defense, diplomacy, and intelligence information channels, the government can be selective about the information it chooses to make public.  In addition to being kept in the dark, the opposition must worry about the fact that many international crises move at such a rapid pace that the government may simply bypass the legislature.  At the most basic level, governments must always be ready to deal with foreign crises, while legislatures may be out of session or simply involved in domestic business.  These factors significantly diminish the role that the legislature may play in a dispute.

The final problem with opposition theories is the assumption made by previous studies is that the opposition’s stance is principled.  Schultz’s signaling game is premised upon the opposition acting as a neutral arbiter of a state’s foreign policy.  This assumption also faces two critical problems.  In fact, the actions of the opposition are just as likely to be motivated by domestic calculus as the “national interest”.  On the one hand, the opposition may support a tough line in negotiation because they are hawkish or fear that not doing so will lead them to be labeled as traitors. Schultz's own evidence tends to point to the fact that the opposition will generally come to support the government.[62] On the other hand, the opposition may oppose a tough line for domestic political gain or because it is generally dovish and wants to prevent war. Either way, it is unclear whether or not a challenging state can view the actions of the opposition as credible. Combining these three objections, we see that there is little reason why foreign governments might take the opinions of the opposition into account when targeting a state. The opposition lacks direct control of foreign policy and any attempt at signaling must be heavily discounted.

The contradictory results found in previous studies might be eliminated through a more nuanced approach which could distinguish between the types of cases discussed above. As Barbara Geddes has argued, the answer to the problem may lie in disaggregation.[63] This study aims to make critical distinctions between cases that were previously treated as similar.

### *Leadership tenure*

Another explanation for why democratic states might be attractive targets for military challenges is the tenure of their leaders. The research in this area has tended to focus on differences between democratic states and autocracies, but the logic of the argument should hold for differences between democratic leaders. Chris Gelpi and

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[62] As noted previously, Schultz (*Democracy and Coercive Diplomacy*) finds that the opposition supports the government in the vast majority of cases.

[63] Barbara Geddes, *Paradigms and Sand Castles: Theory Building and Research Design in Comparative Politics*, Analytical Perspectives on Politics (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2003).

Joe Grieco argue that the relative lack of experience of democratic leaders makes them attractive targets for international disputes.[64] The regular leadership turnover ensured by democratic elections means that while autocratic leaders may stay in power for decades, such consistency is highly unlikely among democratic states. Gelpi and Grieco find that the longer a leader is in power, the less likely they are to be challenged.

There are two possible reasons why this might be the case. The first, proposed by Gelpi and Grieco, is that democratic leaders tend to be relatively inexperienced in international relations, and this takes the form of making concessions more attractive for them while the value of resistance increases over time. The second possible explanation is that new leaders are viewed as unknown commodities by potential foreign aggressors. New leaders have yet to build up an international reputation, and this may make them attractive targets for aggressive leaders. When applied to democratic behavior in international disputes, we would expect that the longer leaders are in office, the less likely they will be to receive military challenges.

As this theory was developed to differentiate democratic states from autocratic states, there are two potential problems when it is applied to differentiate democracies in international crises. The first problem with the theory is that it assumes that leaders will derive a higher utility from making concessions early in their tenures. This assumption does not cover the fact that leaders in particular situations might well stand to benefit from escalating an international crisis since this might be viewed favorably by their domestic constituents. Therefore, while concessions might be an attractive solution for a unified dovish government, they would be viewed skeptically by a hawkish government that might be abandoned by its supporters if concessions are made.

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[64] Gelpi and Grieco, “Attracting Trouble.”

The second shortcoming the theory faces when applied solely to democratic states is that it assumes that the views of democratic leaders are necessarily those of the government as a whole. A leader's wish to make concessions to end a crisis may be undercut by other members of the cabinet who wish the state to take a hard-line. As has already been discussed, governments may often lack a unified response to international crises for a number of reasons. Thus, the course of action which generates the greatest utility for the leader may not be followed due to internal governmental divisions.

### *Public Opinion*

Many theories of democratic conflict behavior draw on Kant's view that "if (as must inevitably be the case, given this form of constitution) the consent of the citizenry is required in order to determine whether or not there will be war, it is natural that they consider all its calamities before committing themselves to so risky a game."[65] The root of such explanations is the fact that democratic leaders must consider the views of their publics, who will ultimately bear the costs of war, before launching a conflict. The broad range of people who must pay the costs of a conflict in a democracy means that democratic states will be more cautious in their conflict behavior and avoid wasting their citizens' money and lives in unnecessary wars. There are two general theories on how public opinion might impact democratic decision-making in conflicts: prior to launching the conflict and leadership retention.

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[65] Kant, *To Perpetual Peace*, 113.

Reiter and Stam provide an alternative theory for the role that public opinion plays in democratic societies when conflict is being contemplated by the state's leadership.[66] Their theory, the contemporary consent model, views public opinion as driving state decisions in democracies as leaders gauge the support for various policies and then act according to the preferences of the public. When the public is in a bellicose mood, such as the American public prior to the Spanish-American War, leaders will authorize the use of force. However, when the public fails to support military action, as the United States public did during World War II prior to the bombing of Pearl Harbor, leaders must refrain from using force. Reiter and Stam use this model to explain why democracies are better at selecting their targets for international conflict than authoritarian regimes. At the same time, we could imagine that leaders would follow public opinion in international crises to guide their decision to escalate, negotiate, or stand pat.

While the contemporary consent model focuses on the public's views prior to a conflict, a model developed by Bueno de Mesquita and his colleagues highlight the role that elections play in leader's decision-making. According to this model, publics should reward leaders who are successful in conflict and punish those who fail by reelecting leaders following victorious wars and removing leaders following defeats.[67] Knowing this, democratic leaders will be selective about the sorts of conflicts in which they involve their countries. They will seek out conflicts where they have a high probability of success and negotiate in those situations where the probability of defeat is too high.

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[66] Reiter and Stam, *Democracies and War*.

Neither Reiter and Stam nor Bueno de Mesquita explicitly address the connection between domestic public opinion and targeting in international conflict. However, extending the logic of both arguments bridging this divide is relatively straightforward. If public opinion acts as the constraint that both sets of scholars view it as, then foreign challengers would do well to take the public's mood into account when considering an attack. If the public shows interest in the issues at stake and reacts militantly to threats, this should signal to the potential challenger than an attack is ill-advised. On the other hand, if the public is concerned with other issues and relatively pacific, a challenge might appear successful.

Theories that look to public opinion to explain democratic behavior in international disputes have a number of critical limitations. Perhaps the most important fact is that there is extensive research that argues that individual opinions are not formed completely endogenously. Instead, there is significant evidence that elite discourse on the topic has an impact on citizen opinion.[68] In addition, there is evidence that the position of the opposition influences the views of the public on the issue.[69]

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[67] Bueno de Mesquita, et al. (*Political Survival and International Conflict*) find that losses in international conflict harm the tenure of democratic leaders, however, Chiozza and Goemans' ("International Conflict and Tenure of Leaders") results show no benefits or costs for democratic leaders regardless of the outcome of the conflict.

[68] John Zaller, *The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992).

Many of the shortcomings of public opinion theories are similar to those of opposition theories. Importantly, theories of public opinion tend to reject rally-round-the-flag and diversionary war explanations. If the public is likely to support the government at the outset of any conflict, this is a serious problem for Reiter and Stam’s contemporary consent model. Even if these effects are relatively mild, we are forced to assume that government advantages over information and agenda setting do not allow them to have a significant impact on public perceptions, an argument made by a number of scholars.[70]

Public opinion arguments also assume a direct transfer of citizen preferences into government policy. There are a number of reasons why this might not be the case. One would be that, as Mancer Olsen famously argued, the question is not the number of people who support a given policy but rather their ability to overcome collective action problems to effectively pursue their goal.[71] Students of comparative and American politics have provided extensive theories to explain the surprising power of small groups to exert their policy preferences, often against the will of the majority. In many conflicts there are well-organized groups that have strong preferences about the decisions of the government, like the Suez Group and Falkland Islands Lobby in Britain, the *Pieds Noirs* in France, and the China Lobby in the United States. In each of these cases these pressure groups played an important role in the decision by their respective governments to go to war.

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[69] This is true both at the national level (Page and Shapiro, *The Rational Public*) and at the level of individual (Druckman and Nelson, “Framing and Deliberation: How Citizens’ Conversations Limit Elite Influence; Druckman, “Political Preference Formation: Competition, Deliberation, and the (Ir)Relevance of Framing Effects).

[70] Views on this subject include arguments about outright manipulation of the public by elites, see Jon Hurwitz, "Presidential Leadership and Public Followership," in *Manipulating Public Opinion: Essays on Public Opinion as a Dependent Variable*, ed. Michael Margolis and Gary Mauser (Pacific Grove, CA: Brooks/Cole Publishing Company, 1989); Benjamin and Robert Shapiro Page, "Educating and Manipulating the Public," in *Manipulating Public Opinion: Essays on Public Opinion as a Dependent Variable*, ed. Michael Margolis and Gary Mauser (Pacific Grove, CA: Brooks/Cole Publishing Company, 1989); John Zaller and Dennis Chiu, "Government's Little Helper: U.S. Press Coverage of Foreign Policy Crises, 1946-1999," in *Decisionmaking in a Glass House: Mass Media, Public Opinion, and American and European Foreign Policy in the 21st Century*, ed. Nacos, Shapiro and Isernia (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2000). Others cite expert salesmanship, see Alan Rosenblatt, "Aggressive Foreign Policy Marketing: Public Response to Reagan's 1983 Address on Lebanon and Grenada," *Political Behavior* 20, no. 3 (1998). Still others argue that education is the key, see Philip J. Powlick, "The Attitudinal Bases for Responsiveness to Public Opinion among American Foreign Policy Officials," *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 35, no. 4 (1991).

A second reason that citizen preferences may be ignored is that particular leaders may not feel bound by public opinion. One explanation for this might be the fact that they are very popular or unpopular.[72] Another might be that they simply misperceive the views of the public and believe their stance is the popular one to take when, in fact, it is not.[73] All of these reasons give us grounds to believe that under many circumstances leaders will not be following public opinion in their decision-making in foreign policy.

### *Balance of Capabilities*

Finally, realist scholars offer an explanation for challenges in international disputes that has nothing to do with domestic politics: relative capabilities. Structural realism, as championed by Kenneth Waltz, holds that the structure of the international system is the key to understanding state behavior.[74] The critical factor determining a country's actions according to this theory is the distribution of capabilities among states. Realist scholars have long argued that shifts in relative capabilities between two states make conflict more likely although there is disagreement about exactly how this will influence state behavior.

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[71] Mancur Olson, *The Logic of Collective Action; Public Goods and the Theory of Groups* (New York: Schocken Books, 1971).
[72] Brandice Canes-Wrone and Kenneth W. Shotts, "The Conditional Nature of Presidential Responsiveness to Public Opinion," *American Journal of Political Science* 48, no. 4 (2004).
[73] Kull and Ramsay, "Elite Misperceptions of U.S. Public Opinion and Foreign Policy."

Power transition theory, as proposed by Organski and Kugler posits that conflict is most likely in the international system when states have relatively equal capabilities.[75] In particular, shifts in power (and the rate of such shifts) are viewed as harbingers of impending conflict. For the purposes of this study, a challenge to a democratic state is most likely when the balance of capabilities shift in favor of the challenging state.

This view is echoed by Van Evera when he argues that windows of opportunity make conflict more likely.[76] From Van Evera's perspective, declining states have a particular incentive to go to war now rather than later, as the passing of time only serves to weaken them relative to their opponent. Thus, democracies are particularly likely to be challenged when they are a rising state and their potential challenger is in decline.

Finally, from a static perspective, Huth, Gelpi, and Bennett argue that dyadic relations and interests determine whether or not a crisis is escalated.[77] According to this theory, defenders that enjoy a great military advantage over their challenger are less likely to experience escalation. Further, the greater value that the challenger places on the issue at stake, the more likely it is that they will escalate the dispute.

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[74] Kenneth Neal Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1979).
[75] A. F. K. Organski and Jacek Kugler, *The War Ledger* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980).
[76] Stephen Van Evera, *Causes of War: Power and the Roots of Conflict*, Cornell Studies in Security Affairs (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999).
[77] Paul Huth, Christopher Gelpi, and D. Scott Bennett, "The Escalation of Great Power Militarized Disputes: Testing Rational Deterrence Theory and Structural Realism," *American Political Science Review* 87, no. 3 (1993).

Certainly the material capabilities of the states involved in international crises have a significant impact on the decision-making of the governments involved. However, without rehashing a vast literature challenging realist theory, a few points will suffice to indicate some theoretical shortcomings. Perhaps most significantly, there are numerous anomalies where states with inferior capabilities attacked more powerful adversaries. Why did Finland attack the Soviet Union in 1941? What led the Khmer Rouge to intercept the SS Mayaguez on its way to Sattahip, leading to a costly US intervention to free the ship and crew? Why did Argentina attempt to capture the Falkland Islands from the United Kingdom? While the balance of military capabilities is undoubtedly important, states often ignore the daunting odds and attack more powerful states.

A second critical issue that material theories have difficulty explaining is why escalation occurs at a particular time. In general, material capabilities do not change very rapidly, and such changes do not often lead to immediate conflict. Israel had a longstanding dispute with Egypt, and despite numerous Egyptian arms procurements, the dispute escalated to full-scale war three times in a seven year span. In a similar vein, the United States had a long-running dispute with Iraq that simmered throughout the mid- and late-1990s but only erupted into full-scale war in 2003. Materialist theories tend to focus on parsimonious explanations for international outcomes and as such tend to yield rather general predictions. Theories including domestic politics sacrifice some parsimony for explanatory value.

## Conclusion

This chapter has introduced a new international relations theory that seeks to explain the conditions under which democratic states are most likely to be attacked. The theory focuses on two factors that explain the likelihood of a military challenge: government unity and hawkishness. Governments that are internally divided create incomplete information that makes war more likely. Mixed signals, contradictory actions, weakness, and lack of credibility all harm governments that are internally divided. On the other hand unified governments can avoid conflict whether or not they are hawkish or dovish. Hawkish governments offer credible threats and take decisive action, while dovish governments are reliable negotiating partners and can deliver compromises.

Having explained the basic propositions of this theory, I will move on to test it in two different ways. The next chapter offers a test using statistical methods. In this chapter the operationalization of the variables will be discussed as well as how competing theories will also be tested. The tests will show that the theory presented in this chapter offers the best explanation for why democratic states are targeted in international conflict.

The following chapters test the theory in a more fine-grained manner focusing on particular case studies.  The cases for each chapter were selected based on the values of the two key independent variables (government unity and hawkishness) yielding four different conditions.  Each chapter contains two different case studies and analyzes four key steps in tracing the causal logic of the theory.  First, the coding of the particular case in terms of government unity and hawkishness is analyzed.  Next, the effect of these outcomes on the ability to signal is discussed.  The studies then turn to how the potential challenger viewed the government.  Finally, I will examine how these views influenced the challenger government's decision to act or not act.  Each case study will also discuss the value of competing theories in explaining the outcomes of the case.

# Chapter 3

## Statistical Tests

The theory presented in the previous chapter focuses on the role that two domestic political variables play in the creation of incomplete information and signaling. Specifically, the theory argues that government unity and hawkishness influence the likelihood that states will be targeted for militarized interstate conflict. Most work in international relations examines the reasons states decide to go to war, while less attention has been paid to the reasons states are attacked. However, the factors involved in the targeting of states is one of the most critical questions in international relations and has recently received more scholarly attention, particularly focusing on domestic influences.[1]

Further, international relations theories of conflict have given particular importance to the role played by information problems in preventing negotiations from succeeding. Fearon argues that asymmetric information is the root of bargaining failure leading to war.[2] Other scholars have employed this logic to argue that democracies and autocracies differ in their ability to credibly reveal information.[3]

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[1] See Kenneth Schultz, *Democracy and Coercive Diplomacy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 2001); Christopher Gelpi and Joseph Grieco, "Attracting Trouble: Democracy, Leadership Tenure, and the Targeting of Militarized Challenges, 1918-1992," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 45, no. 6 (2001); Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and David Lalman, *War and Reason: Domestic and International Imperatives* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992).

[2] James Fearon, "Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes," *American Political Science Review* 88, no. 3 (1994).

[3] See Alastair Smith, "International Crises and Domestic Politics," *American Political Science Review* 92, no. 3 (1998); Kenneth Schultz, "Do Democratic Institutions Constrain or Inform? Contrasting Two Institutional Perspectives on Democracy and War," *International Organization* 53, no. 2 (1999);

The focus of these studies has been on the ability of democratic states to use domestic institutions to provide better information than autocracies.

While credibility problems may be a significant contributor to international conflict, this study argues that sending mixed or unclear signals is an even more significant issue. Thus, there is little meaning to the credibility of the signal if it is ambiguous or unclear. At the heart of the bargaining problem may be something deeper than credibility: a basic lack of understanding of what each side wants. As the previous chapter explained, divided governments cannot signal clearly or credibly and are thus particularly likely to be subject to military challenges.

This chapter will take the theory presented in the previous chapter and make it explicit, operationalize it, and test it. The first step in this process is to draw specific hypotheses from the theory. The next section will discuss the data more precisely: how it was collected, variable definitions, and the tests to be run. This will be followed by the results, including statistical significance tests, substantive effects, and model fit tests. The final section will discuss the findings and draw conclusions about how the theory stands up to empirical tests.

## Hypotheses

Of the two concepts introduced by the theory, government unity is anticipated to have a more significant impact on signaling behavior. The null hypothesis is that

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Charles Lipson, *Reliable Partners: How Democracies Have Made a Separate Peace* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2003).

government unity has no impact on the likelihood a democracy will be challenged. This view prevails not only among those that focus on materialist causes of war but also among those who study signaling but emphasize credibility problems in bargaining.

$H_0$: *The unity of the government has no impact on the likelihood of challenge.*

The theory presented in the previous chapter argues that government unity plays a significant role in signaling to potential challengers. Divided governments face a difficult task when it comes to deterring potential challengers. Such governments have problems related to two issues: message substance and credibility. In terms of credibility, internally divided governments send the contradictory signal that the government does not support a single particular position on the issue at hand. As scholars have long argued, such divisions are likely to reduce the credibility of all the views presented.

However, for divided governments, a deeper problem exists in the content of their message. The dominant scholarship in international relations assumes that states, particularly governments, behave in a *unified* rational manner. When states do not act in this way or when the reality is that they are not unified, it is difficult for potential adversaries to understand what they are trying to communicate, let alone whether this communication is credible. Under these conditions, bargaining failure is particularly likely.

As bargaining theories of war demonstrate, the inability to reach a compromise over a particular issue is a key factor leading to war. Since war is a costly and risky undertaking, states are not likely to enter into it lightly. Bargaining is a preferable outcome and would achieve a mutually satisfactory result were it not for incomplete information and the inability of leaders to effectively communicate their preferences and resolve. This line of argument leads to the hypothesis that divided governments are particularly susceptible to challenge.

$H_1$: *Higher levels of government unity will decrease the likelihood of receiving military challenges.*

Scholars have speculated that a government's views on the use of force influenced how it was viewed in negotiations. Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman (1992) go so far as to argue that dovish states are more likely to initiate conflicts for fear that their dovish nature will be exploited by potential challengers.[4] Schultz argues that hawks are able to strike more lasting peace agreements because of how they are viewed domestically, while Smith posits that hawks' willingness to endure higher costs in conflict means they are more likely to have opponents back down.[5]

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[4] Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman, *War and Reason*.

[5] See Kenneth Schultz, "The Politics of Risking Peace: Do Hawks or Doves Deliver the Olive Branch?" *International Organization* 59 (2005); Alastair Smith, "International Crises and Domestic Politics," *American Political Science Review* 92, no. 3 (1998).

The result is that most studies point to the advantages that accrue to hawkish governments in international disputes.[6]

Based on these previous theories, I share in the expectation that hawkish governments will be less likely to be attacked. On the other hand, dovish governments, which may be viewed as weak by potential challengers, may be particularly likely to be targeted. This theorizing leads to a further hypothesis based on the government's views on the use of force.

> $H_2$: *Higher levels of hawkishness will decrease the likelihood of receiving military challenges.*

While each of these variables independently contributes to signaling failure, the theory explicitly deals with the combined impact of these factors. Merging these two variables creates a typology scale where different types of countries can be ordered based on their placement along both axes. The theory presented argues that of the two factors, government unity is the more significant as it determines whether or not other states can interpret the signaling by the government. Based on the previously stated hypotheses, the type of government least likely to be challenged is unified and hawkish. Also unlikely to be challenged are unified dovish governments. Divided hawkish governments are likely to be targeted for international conflict, while divided dovish governments are the most likely to be challenged (see Table 3.1).

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[6] One empirical puzzle this raises is why dovish governments exist (the results of this study show them to be numerous) in the face of such daunting odds.

**Table 3.1: Government Typologies**

| | | **Government Unity** | |
|---|---|---|---|
| | | **Unified** | **Divided** |
| **Hawkishness** | **Hawkish** | *Least likely* to be challenged | *Likely* to be challenged |
| | **Dovish** | *Unlikely* to be challenged | *Most likely* to be challenged |

The rationale for this ordering is further justified when looking at the signals sent by each of the particular types. Unified hawkish governments will be able to clearly signal their hard-line nature to potential challengers. They can credibly show their willingness to defend the issue at stake and back this up with action. Unified doves can clearly signal their intentions but will receive more challenges due to their dovish nature. Still, their unified nature will allow them to clearly and credibly negotiate settlements and avoid conflict in many cases.

However, among divided governments, doves are especially likely to receive challenges due to their combined weaknesses of dovish nature and inability to effectively signal. These governments lack credibility, send unclear signals, and are viewed as weak. Finally, divided hawks will also be likely to receive challenges, but slightly less likely than doves due to their bellicose nature. This rank ordering of different government types generates two further hypotheses.

$H_3$: *Unified hawkish governments will be less likely to receive military challenges.*

$H_4$: *Divided dovish governments will be more likely to receive military challenges.*

Finally, the theory also makes predictions about the relative importance of the variables. In terms of the two key variables, government unity should have more explanatory power than hawkishness, as it contributes more to signaling confusion and credibility. As previously noted, unified governments, whether hawkish or dovish, can avoid conflict. This means that the impact of hawkishness should be the greatest when government unity is low. Further, changes in government unity and hawkishness should have a more significant substantive impact on war targeting than variables from competing theories.

$H_5$: *Government unity will have a more significant impact on war targeting than hawkishness.*

$H_6$: *The impact of hawkishness on war targeting is contingent on government unity and will have the most significant impact when unity is low.*

$H_7$: *Government unity and hawkishness will have a greater substantive impact on targeting than any other variables.*

## Methods

### *Data and Cases*

The theory presented in the previous section focuses on the role that domestic politics plays in the international relations democratic states. Since the theory is concerned with instances of bargaining failure by democratic states, I constructed a dataset specifically tailored to answer this question. As this newly constructed dataset is particularly important to the empirical results, how it was constructed will be discussed in some length below.

The theory presented in the previous chapter implies limits to the scope of potential dyads that may be included in the study (see Figure 3.1). The study will focus on significant dyads, where government signaling will be particularly relevant and there is an ongoing bargaining process. Governments signal each other under many different circumstances. However, of particular interest are situations where governments are bargaining with one another over an extended period of time. This means focusing on a subset of cases where signaling is likely to be significant – territorial disputes. In this set of cases there is a clear issue at stake between the two countries, and both sides are sensitive to the actions and statements of the other. Territorial disputes have the additional advantage that they are a significant source of disagreement between states. Indeed, Paul Huth argues that territorial disputes are a central cause of international conflict, and a number of other scholars have made similar findings.[7] Of the 21 wars fought since World War II, territorial disputes were the primary cause in 14 cases, and Brecher and Wilkenfeld found that territorial disputes were the cause of nearly 50% of the crises in their dataset.[8] I used Huth's dataset on territorial disputes, selecting those dyads with at least one democracy.[9]

Focusing on territorial disputes rather than on a broader definition of conflict has additional advantages from the research design standpoint. Unlike other disagreements in the international system, politicians and political parties take positions on territorial disputes before taking office, and these disputes are visible to the populations of the states involved, even when there is no violence. Even those disputes that are not regularly in the public eye, such as Britain's relationship to the Falkland Islands, still maintain the interest of top foreign policy officials. Moreover, territorial disputes create iterated interactions which give rise to important dynamics within the dyad. This iteration means that relations often move between attempts to resolve the issue through negotiation and efforts to revise the status quo through force. This means that territorial disputes serve as a particularly useful lens through which to examine bargaining theories of war, as all of the disputes examined involved extended periods of bargaining.

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[7] See Paul Huth, "Why Are Territorial Disputes between States a Central Cause of International Conflict?," in *What Do We Know About War?*, ed. John Vasquez (New York: Rowman and Littlefield, 2000); John Vasquez, *The War Puzzle*, Cambridge Studies in International Relations (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1993); Russell Leng, "Reciprocating Influence Strategies in Interstate Crisis Bargaining," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 37, no. 1 (1993).

[8] Paul Huth, *Standing Your Ground: Territorial Disputes and International Conflict* (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan, 1996); Michael Brecher and Jonathan Wilkenfeld, *A Study of Crisis* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1997).

[9] Huth, *Standing Your Ground*.

**Figure 3.1: Case Selection Process**


Dyads with territorial disputes
Dyads with democracies
Territorial disputes receiving significant scholarly attention

Furthermore, and perhaps most importantly, territorial disputes have an underlying possibility of violence which is absent from most other dyadic relationships. Since the dispute is an ongoing thorn in the side of the participants, states will constantly be looking for ways to resolve the conflict, which may result in the use of force.[10] Thus, while signaling may not play a continuously significant role in many dyads, in territorial dispute dyads, both states are keenly aware of the messages sent by the other side. Finally, examining dyads based on territorial disputes has additional benefits from a research design viewpoint in that it holds a number of important factors constant. In all of these disputes, the stakes for both sides are significant: there is a clear revisionist state which seeks to alter the status quo, and the disputants are contiguous (or proximate).

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[10] For more on this relationship, see scholars listed in Footnote 8.

The second parameter used in constructing the dataset was the presence of at least one democratic member in the dyad, based on the Polity IV scale.[11] Although the logic of the theory also generally applies to non-democracies, concentrating on democracies has a number of theoretical and practical advantages. Significantly, democratic institutions offer clearer delineations of responsibility within the government than some autocratic regimes and make public differences of opinion more visible. Moreover, democratic societies are both more tolerant of dissent than autocratic ones, and media organizations are much more likely to make governmental divisions public. Finally, the extensive research into the democratic peace has produced a number of assumptions about democratic behavior upon which this study hopes to shed light.

The final criterion is that there is enough information on the dispute that the independent variables could be coded. Lack of scholarly attention to particular dispute, dearth of materials in English, or lack of government or public attention to the dispute discounted most of the dyads.

As a result of these facts, the dataset includes significant variation among all the variables. Most importantly, there is variation on the dependent variable. Thus, there are dyads that experience multiple interstate wars and those that experience none. There are also dyads with many militarized disputes short of war and those that have none. Further, there are states that have several simultaneous disputes and those that have only one. Finally, there are states where one dyad escalated to war while other dyads did not.

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[11] Monty and Jaggers Marshall, Keith, *Polity IV: Political Regime Change and Transitions, 1800-2001* (College Park, Md.: Integrated Network for Societal Conflict Research (INSCR) Program, University of Maryland, 2001). Following norms in the international relations literature, any state scoring seven or higher on the combined Polity scale is considered a democracy.

The result is nineteen dyads that span the period from 1950 until 2000.[12] The democratic states included are Germany, Israel, India, Japan, Turkey, the United States and the United Kingdom.[13]

### *Dependent Variables*

Two dependent variables will be used to study challenges and government signaling. The first dependent variable is challenges that result in high levels of violence: *war target*. For the purposes of this study, *war target* will be defined as being challenged in an international dispute where high-level force is employed. The instances of military challenge are drawn from the MIDs dataset and include only those cases where the level of force reached five (the highest measure) on the conflict hostility scale.[14]

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[12] For a complete list of the dyads, see Appendix B

[13] For summary statistics on the dyads, see Appendix C.

[14] Meredith Reid Sarkees, "The Correlates of War Data on War: An Update to 1997," *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 18, no. 1 (2000). Some important changes were made to the MIDs war codings. First, for the Indian-Pakistan dyad, the 1965 Kashmir War is listed as Indian initiated which runs counter to the historical record and the extensive evidence that Pakistan infiltrated fighters into the region in the hopes of starting a conflict (see Chapter 3). In addition, the MIDs dataset includes a war between India and Pakistan in 1993 of which there is no record, while not coding the 1999 Kargil War (see chapter 4). Finally. in the case of the Turkish-Greek dyad, MIDs lists Turkey as the initiator of the conflict, even thought the initial hostilities were undertaken by Greeks and Greek Cypriots. Removing this case from the dataset does not substantially change the results.

In order for a war to be coded as *war target*, two criteria must be met. First, the challenging state must initiate the hostilities. Second, this initiation must include a full mobilization of military forces. In most instances, military challenge is relatively straightforward to code: Israel was clearly attacked by Egypt and Syria in 1973, and Argentina invaded the Falklands in 1982. The only truly ambiguous case is that of the initiation of the Six-Day War in 1967.[15] There is widespread belief that Israel attacked preemptively in this case because it had sufficient evidence that it was about to be attacked. Due to this ambiguity, this case will not be included in the analysis.[16]

Although *war target* is the primary variable of interest in the study, the relative infrequency of interstate conflict means that results may not be robust. In order to strengthen confidence in the results, a second dependent variable will be tested which includes many more positive event outcomes on the dependent variable. The second dependent variable sets the threshold for violence lower to include all MIDs that lasted more than one week. The justification for this coding procedure is that while very short-term MIDs challenges may be epiphenomenal, longer conflicts represent legitimate military threats.[17] Most importantly, we can be reasonably sure that threats lasting one week or more will include government involvement which is crucial for signaling arguments. The MIDs coding for initiation was used to determine target and challenger. This dependent variable will be called *militarized dispute target*.

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[15] The MIDs dataset codes this conflict as Israel initiated.

[16] Including the very divided Israeli government of 1967 as a war target in the study would only strengthen the findings.

[17] Huth (*Standing Your Ground*) makes a similar argument in the case of Israel's disputes with its neighbors, where a large number of cross-border incidents occur, but many are not government directed.

*Key Independent Variables*[18]

As the theory makes clear, there are two factors of interest to explain when democratic states will be challenged: *government unity* and the government's level of *hawkishness*.[19] Since *government unity* is not a conventional variable in international relations literature, some time will be spent explaining how this variable is constructed. Democratic governments are founded upon the disagreement and debate between and within parties. Even the most unified governments will at times have disagreements, and even when there is general agreement on a particular issue, there are politicians to be found who will behave in contrarian manner. In order to create a meaningful understanding of dissent, it is necessary to develop straightforward metrics for measuring government unity.

For the purposes of this study, *government unity* will be coded based on three indicators. The first indicator is the strength of the chief executive. The stronger the chief executive, the less disagreement will occur. The second indicator is the regularity of disagreement within the government. Do disputes often occur within the government or are they infrequent? The final indicator is the level of disagreement between the actors. Are the positions staked out radically different from one another or are the differences minute? Thus, a government with a weak chief executive and frequent, divergent public disagreements would receive a low unity score. *Government unity* ranges from 2, completely unified, to -2, completely divided.

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[18] More information on the coding of the independent variables can be found in Appendix A.
[19] Complete information on the coding of individual governments can be found in Appendix C.

In addition to these criteria, in order for dissent to be coded, a number of further criteria must be met. Perhaps most significantly, the disagreement must be signaled to the potential challenger. This action must be expressed in some public manner: a statement to the press, press reports, or contradictory policy actions.[20] Waiting to express opposition until writing one's memoirs or until the action taken goes horribly awry does not count. In the lead up to the joint action by Britain, France, and Israel against Egypt in 1956, the British Defense Minister Walter Monckton opposed the operation and spoke out against it in closed door cabinet meetings. However, Monckton never broke publicly with the government and shortly before the war was launched, he was moved to the post of Paymaster-General so the more supportive Anthony Head could take over at Defense.[21]

A second critical factor in determining disunity is based on where the relevant actors sit. Once again, from the perspective of a potential challenger the opinion of the foreign minister carries a great deal more weight than the musings of a legislator. The relevant opinions for the purposes of this study lie with those actors who have the ability to affect policy in the area of potential conflict. Generally, this means the head of state, foreign and defense ministers, and liaisons such as diplomats or special envoys. During the Presidency of Lyndon Johnson, he faced criticism from members of his own party over his policy towards Vietnam. However, at the key posts within the government, there were high levels of unity, as both Secretary of State Dean Rusk and Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara firmly supported Johnson's policies.[22]

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[20] Divisions may also come to the potential challenger's attention through third party sources or intelligence, but this knowledge must be documented.

[21] See Keith Kyle, *Suez: Britain's End of Empire in the Middle East* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2003), 86; Anthony Gorst and Lewis Johnman, *The Suez Crisis* (New York: Routledge, 1997), 43; John Barnes, "The Prime Minister's Role in Foreign Affairs and Economic Policy: Creeping Bilateralism in Action?," in *British Politics since 1945: The Dynamics of Historical Change*, ed. Simon James and Virginia Preston (New York: Palgrave, 2001), 98.

The final factor to consider when examining the unity of a government is the nature of difference in opinion. Two elements are critical in determining difference in opinion: stakes and possible policy responses to escalation. Clear disagreement on the stakes at hand is considered disunity. If the prime minister considers the territory in question critical to the state's territorial integrity and the foreign minister believes that it might be bargained with, then a disagreement exists over the stakes. The Israeli cabinet prior to the 1973 war with Egypt exhibited this sort of disagreement over the significance of the Sinai Peninsula, with some members of the cabinet, such as Foreign Minister Abbas Eban, openly advocating bargaining with the land, others, such as Defense Minister Dayan, pushing for a partial withdrawal, and Prime Minister Meir calling for holding the entire Sinai.[23]

In addition, differences in views on how to settle a territorial dispute also signal divergent opinions. One leading government politician may seek negotiations while another wants more troops. The approach of Margaret Thatcher's government to the Falklands issue signaled such divisions within the cabinet. Both Foreign Secretary Lord Carrington and the foreign office minister responsible for the Falklands Nicolas Ridley believed that negotiations with the Argentines over the Falklands were critical and that Britain should be prepared to make serious concessions. This approach differed significantly from Thatcher and many of her Conservative colleagues' strong support for the status quo.

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[22] Henry F. Graff, *The Tuesday Cabinet; Deliberation and Decision on Peace and War under Lyndon B. Johnson* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.,: Prentice-Hall, 1970), Chapter 1; Fredrik Logevall, *Choosing War: The Lost Chance for Peace and the Escalation of the War in Vietnam* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1999), Chapter 3; Gary Hess, *Presidential Decisions for War: Korea, Vietnam, and the Persian Gulf* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001), 82; David Kaiser, *American Tragedy: Kennedy, Johnson and the Origins of the Vietnam War* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press/Harvard University Press, 2000), 287; Cecil Crabb Jr. and Kevin Mulcahy, *Presidents and Foreign Policy Making: From FDR to Reagan* (Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University Press, 1986), 213.

[23] David A. Korn, *Stalemate: The War of Attrition and Great Power Diplomacy in the Middle East, 1967-1970* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1992), 142; Avi Shlaim, *The Iron Wall: Israel and the Arab World* (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 2000), 286; The Insight Team of the London Sunday Times, *The Yom Kippur War* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday and Company, 1974), 64.

What are not coded as disagreements are cases where the government agrees on a general course of action (i.e. negotiations) but disagrees on how to conduct them. For Yitzhak Rabin's government in 1992, while there was broad agreement on the importance of pursuing peace with Israel's enemies, the exact nature of the approach differed between Rabin and his Foreign Minister Shimon Peres. The particulars of which party to pursue first for peace or the elements of the negotiations varied, but the goal was always to begin negotiations to achieve a lasting peace.

The second variable corresponds to the views of the government towards the use of force. The disposition of the government is based upon public pronouncements, party platforms, and historical judgments of their foreign policy views. In general, this study will put the most weight on historians' assessments of foreign policy views, some on the views of potential challengers, and the least on party positions. Hawkish governments emphasize hard-line positions on disputes and rely on deterrence or military strength to either preserve or overturn the status quo. For this study, where the point of potential conflict between governments centers on territorial disputes, hawkish governments will resist negotiated solutions and when forced to negotiate will take tough or inflexible bargaining positions. At the other end of the spectrum, dovish governments prefer negotiations to military confrontation. These governments are both more willing to enter into negotiations and more likely to take a conciliatory line once in negotiations. *Hawkishness* is also based on a five point scale ranging from -2, very dovish, to 2, very hawkish.

For the purposes of this study, hawkishness is assessed within the dyad in question and not the overall stance of the government. Just as with government unity, the coding for hawkishness is based on how the government was perceived at the time, not retrospectively. Thus, although Lal Bahadur Shastri was viewed as a hawkish leader after the success of the Indian military in the war with Pakistan in 1965, this does not match perceptions prior to the outbreak of hostilities.[24] On the other hand, hawkish leaders who sign peace treaties, like Israel's Menachem Begin are not coded as dovish prior to the treaty signing.

The theory presented also implies a hierarchy among the different typologies of governments. Since *government unity* is seen as the predominant independent variable, it is expected to have more influence than *hawkishness* when they are combined (see discussion above). This allows us to create a rank order where unified hawks receive a score of three, unified doves a two, divided hawks a one, and divided doves zero. This combined variable, *government type*, captures the hierarchy of the different types of governments.

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[24] For more on this case, see Chapter 4 on divided dovish governments.

This rank-order variable is different from and superior to an interaction term for several reasons.[25] In the first place, the theory presented implies that governments are of types, meaning that the two key independent variables interact in different ways depending on their values. Thus, how a government's dovishness affects its foreign policy depends greatly on the extent to which it is unified or divided. Unified dovish governments have both credibility and coherence in their signaling, while divided governments lack both.

The second reason for using a rank-order variable rather than an interaction term is that by simply interacting the terms, values are generated that lack internal validity with respect to the theory. In coding these variables, it is important that the values generated are consistent with those implied by the theory. For example, a government receiving a unity score of negative one and a hawkishness score of one would receive a negative one overall, while a government receiving a unity score of one and a hawkishness score of negative one would also receive a negative one. The problem here is that the theory states that a unified government, regardless of its hawkishness or dovishness, will communicate its intentions more clearly and credibly than a divided government. This means that the latter, more unified government should receive a higher score than the former more divided government.

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[25] Separate rare events logistic regressions were run for war target, which included an interaction term (hawkishness*government unity). Government unity remained significant and negative, while the interaction term was also negative and statistically significant.

### *Control Variables*

By limiting the dataset to dyads with territorial disputes, a number of potential complicating factors are already controlled: the stakes of the dispute are high for both sides, the states are generally contiguous, and there is often a history of conflict over the territory in question. In addition to the key independent variables, I controlled for a number of other factors that are likely to affect the risk of a state being targeted militarily. First, using the standard country Composite Index of National Capability (CINC) scores, I included *balance of capabilities*. A state's CINC score is composed of six underlying measures: energy consumption, iron and steel production, military expenditures, military personnel, urban population, and total population. CINC scores come from the National Material Capabilities (NMC) dataset.[26] These factors are summed and then converted to the country's total as a share of the international system. This is a common means to measure the military balance that exists between two states. This variable is computed as a ratio between the two sides from the perspective of the democratic state in the dyad, meaning that higher scores reflect a relatively stronger democracy and lower scores a stronger challenger. Generally, if the democracy is stronger, an attack should be less likely, while a stronger opponent should make a challenge more likely.

Looking at the domestic processes in the potential target state, *government tenure* in office is another important control. This variable comes from the Database of Political Indicators (DPI) and is supplemented by the author using national government data.[27] A number of theories have posited that at different points during their tenure, governments may be more prone to conflict. Gelpi and Grieco argue that those leaders who have been in office for shorter periods are more likely to be challenged because they are more willing to make concessions when elections are further in the future.[28] *Government tenure* is the number of years the government has been in power under the same chief executive. Based on previous research, the likelihood of challenge is highest early in the government's term in office, so as this variable increases, the likelihood of challenge should decline.

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[26] J. David Singer, "Reconstructing the Correlates of War Dataset on Material Capabilities of States, 1816-1985," *International Interactions* 14 (1987). NMC version 3.02.

Additionally, I controlled for the *government strength* relative to the opposition in the legislature. This variable is the ratio of the government's seats in the legislature to those of the opposition. This data also comes from the DPI and was supplemented with data collected by the author.[29] The higher the ratio, the greater the government's ability to act and the less constrained it may feel. One possible argument that could be advanced is that governments with lower ratios are weaker than those with higher ratios, and thus more likely to be subject to attack. Generally, I expect that the higher the ratio, the less likely it is that the state will be attacked.

Moreover, the likelihood that a state will be attacked could be related to the strength of its *alliance portfolio*. States with more powerful allies might appear less attractive to a potential challenger than states that have no such backing.[30] To test this I have included an alliance portfolio variable that sums the capabilities of all the states with whom the country in question has a defensive alliance against the potential challenger. This data comes from the ATOP dataset.[31]

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[27] Thorste Beck et al., "New Tools in Comparative Political Economy: The Database of Political Institutions," *The World Bank Economic Review* 15, no. 1 (2001).
[28] Christopher Gelpi and Joseph Grieco, "Attracting Trouble: Democracy, Leadership Tenure, and the Targeting of Militarized Challenges, 1918-1992," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 45, no. 6 (2001).
[29] Beck et al., "New Tools in Comparative Political Economy."
[30] Brett Ashley Leeds, "Do Alliances Deter Aggression? The Influence of Military Alliances on the Initiation of Militarized Interstate Disputes," *American Journal of Political Science* 47 (2003).

Finally, to minimize the problems created by temporal dependence noted by Beck, Katz, and Tucker, a *peace years* variable was added.[32] This is a count variable that tracks the number of years between conflicts. In addition to adding the *peace years* variable, also in line with Beck, Katz, and Tucker's recommendations, three cubit splines were added to the regressions. *War target* is (thankfully) a rare event, which King and Zeng have shown leads to errors in traditional logit analysis, specifically that such models tend to significantly underestimate their occurrence.[33] To minimize the standard errors, a rare events logistic model was run with *war target*. When *militarized dispute target* is the dependent variable, cross-sectional time-series logistic regressions were run.

Thus we have four equations that will be estimated:

$$\textit{War Target} = \beta + \beta_1 (\textit{government unity}) + \beta_2 (\textit{hawkishness}) + \beta_3 (\textit{balance of capabilities}) + \beta_4 (\textit{government tenure}) + \beta_5 (\textit{government strength}) + \beta_6 (\textit{alliance portfolio}) + \beta_7 (\textit{peace years})$$

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[31] Brett Ashley Leeds, et al., "Alliance Treaty Obligations and Provisions, 1815-1944," *International Interactions* 28, no. 3 (2002).

[32] Nathaniel Beck, Jonathan N. Katz, and Richard Tucker, "Taking Time Seriously: Time-Series-Cross-Section Analysis with a Binary Dependent Variable," *American Journal of Political Science* 42, no. 4 (1998).

[33] Gary King and Lengsch Zeng, "Explaining Rare Events in International Relations," *International Organization* 55, no. 3 (2001). Analysis performed using Relogit software from Tomz, King, and Zeng, (*Relogit: Rare Events Logistic Regression*). The results are generally similar when logit is used, although standard errors are larger.

*War Target* = $\beta + \beta_1$ (*government type*) + $\beta_2$ (*balance of capabilities*) + $\beta_3$ (*government tenure*) + $\beta_4$ (*government strength*) + $\beta_5$ (*alliance portfolio*) + $\beta_6$ (*peace years*)

*Militarized Dispute Target* = $\beta + \beta_1$ (*government unity*) + $\beta_2$ (*hawkishness*) + $\beta_3$ (*balance of capabilities*) + $\beta_4$ (*government tenure*) + $\beta_5$ (*government strength*) + $\beta_6$ (*alliance portfolio*) + $\beta_7$ (*peace years*)

*Militarized Dispute Target* = $\beta + \beta_1$ (*government type*) + $\beta_2$ (*balance of capabilities*) + $\beta_3$ (*government tenure*) + $\beta_4$ (*government strength*) + $\beta_5$ (*alliance portfolio*) + $\beta_6$ (*peace years*)

## Results

Having examined the variables involved, how they are operationalized, and the models, it is time to test the theory. This section will begin by looking at cross tabulations to give the reader a sense of the data and correlations between the key independent variables and the dependent variables. The first table looks at whether a significant difference exists between unified and divided governments and war targeting (see Table 3.2).[34] The fact that ten of the eleven wars occurred under divided governments shows a significant difference does exist. Table 3.3 replaces government unity with hawkishness. Here, although the finding is less strong, there is still a statistically significant relationship between hawkishness and the likelihood of attack, with dovish governments being more likely to be attacked. The final table using war target as the dependent variable (Table 3.4) shows that different government types also have statistically significant differences in their likelihood of being involved in a war.

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[34] For these cross tabulations, the independent variables (government unity and hawkishness) have been dichotomized with values zero and above receiving a one and values below zero receiving a zero.

**Table 3.2: War Target by Level of Government Unity**

| **War Target** | **Government Unity** | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| | **0** | **1** | **Total** |
| **No** | 268 (96.4%) | 425 (99.8%) | 693 (98%) |
| **Yes** | 10 (3.6%) | 1 (0.2%) | 11 (2%) |
| **Total** | 278 | 426 | 704 |

Pearson chi2(1) = 12.4 Pr = 0.000
Note: For this table, government unity is dichotomized with values of -2 and -1 set equal to zero and values zero and great set equal to one.

**Table 3.3: War Target by Level of Hawkishness**

| **War Target** | **Hawkishness** | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| | **0** | **1** | **Total** |
| **No** | 147 (96.7%) | 547 (98.9%) | 693 (98%) |
| **Yes** | 5 (3.3%) | 6 (1.1%) | 11 (2%) |
| **Total** | 151 | 553 | 704 |

Pearson chi2(1) = 3.8 Pr = 0.05
Note: For this table, hawkishness is dichotomized with values of -2 and -1 set equal to zero and values zero and great set equal to one.

**Table 3.4: War Target by Government Type**

| War Target | Government Type | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Divided Dove | Divided Hawk | Unified Dove | Unified Hawk | Total |
| **No** | 63 (94%) | 205 (97.2%) | 83 (98.8%) | 342 (100%) | 693 (98%) |
| **Yes** | 4 (6%) | 6 (2.8%) | 1 (1.2%) | 0 | 11 (2%) |
| **Total** | 67 | 211 | 84 | 342 | 704 |

Pearson chi2(1) = 16.2 Pr = 0.001

The next set of cross tabulations involves the relationship between the key independent variables and the dependent variables *militarized dispute target*. Table 3.5 once again confirms that there is a statistically significant difference between unified and divided governments in terms of being targeted in a militarized dispute. The next table (Table 3.6) shows that no significant relationship exists between hawkishness and being a militarized dispute target. Finally, Table 3.7 illustrates a significant difference between government types and the likelihood of targeting, although unified hawkish government receive more challenges than would be expected.

**Table 3.5: Militarized Dispute Target by Government Unity**

| Militarized Dispute Target | Government Unity | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| | 0 | 1 | Total |
| **No** | 227 (81.7%) | 378 (88.7%) | 605 (86%) |
| **Yes** | 51 (18.3%) | 48 (11.3%) | 99 (14%) |
| **Total** | 278 | 426 | 704 |

Pearson chi2(1) = 7 Pr = 0.008

Note: For this table, government unity is dichotomized with values of -2 and -1 set equal to zero and values zero and great set equal to one.

**Table 3.6: Militarized Dispute Target by Hawkishness**

| Militarized Dispute Target | Hawkishness | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| | 0 | 1 | Total |
| No | 133 (88.1%) | 472 (85.3%) | 605 (86%) |
| Yes | 18 (11.9%) | 81 (14.7%) | 99 (14%) |
| Total | 151 | 553 | 704 |

Pearson chi2(1) = 0.7 Pr = 0.39
Note: For this table, hawkishness is dichotomized with values of -2 and -1 set equal to zero and values zero and great set equal to one.

**Table 3.7: Militarized Dispute Target by Government Type**

| War Target | Government Type | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Divided Dove | Divided Hawk | Unified Dove | Unified Hawk | Total |
| No | 53 (79%) | 174 (82.5%) | 80 (95%) | 298 (87%) | 605 (86%) |
| Yes | 14 (21%) | 37 (17.5%) | 4 (5%) | 44 (13%) | 99 (14%) |
| Total | 67 | 211 | 84 | 342 | 704 |

Pearson chi2(1) = 16.2 Pr = 0.001

These cross tabulations give an intuitive sense that the theory has empirical support. There appears to be a relationship between the key independent variables and the dependent variables, and government unity seems to have a particularly strong correlation. However, to increase our confidence that the theory has merit, it is necessary to move beyond cross tabulations and control for other factors that might influence the outcomes of interest. To do this, I ran rare events logistic regressions with both *government unity* and *hawkishness* as independent variables and *war target* as the dependent variable. The results of Model 1 show the significant relationship that *government unity* has with war targeting: higher levels of *government unity* correspond to lower incidences of targeting. While hawkishness is not statistically significant, several of the control variables are statistically significant. Interestingly, more favorable *balance of capabilities* and longer *government tenure* are all related to increased likelihood of war targeting. The strength of one's *alliance portfolio* is marginally related to a decrease in the likelihood of targeting.

**Table 3.8: Likelihood of War Targeting**

| | **Model 1**<br>**War Target** | **Model 2**<br>**War Target** |
|---|---|---|
| **Hawkishness** | -0.238<br>(0.318) | |
| **Government Unity** | -0.762<br>(0.230)** | |
| **Government Type** | | -1.391<br>(0.269)** |
| **Balance of Capabilities** | 0.041<br>(0.018)* | 0.046<br>(0.019)* |
| **Government Strength** | 0.162<br>(0.104) | 0.162<br>(0.104) |
| **Government Tenure** | 0.299<br>(0.148)* | 0.329<br>(0.219) |
| **Alliance Portfolio** | -6.762<br>(3.536)+ | -8.369<br>(4.407)+ |
| **Peace Years** | -0.260<br>(0.287) | -0.414<br>(0.269) |
| **Constant** | -4.494<br>(1.442)** | -2.037<br>(1.633) |
| **Observations** | 702 | 702 |

Robust standard errors in parentheses; Three cubic splines run in both regressions but not included in results.
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%

The results of Model 1 provide the first indication that *government unity* has an impact on the signaling of democracies and subsequent targeting for military challenges. To further refine the analysis, Model 2 replaces the *government unity* and *hawkishness* with the rank order variable *government type*, while keeping the dependent variable *war target*. Once again, a rare event logistic regression was run to minimize estimation errors.

The results of the regression can be seen for Model 2 on Table 3.8. The results are strikingly similar to the first model. In this case, *government type* is statistically significant and negative, while the same control variables are significant. Since government type is a rank-order variable, this means that unified hawkish governments are the least likely to be attacked, followed by unified dovish and divided hawkish governments, with divided dovish governments being the most likely to receive a challenge. Again, *balance of capabilities* is statistically significant and positive, while *alliance portfolio* is marginally significant and negative. None of the other control variables are statistically significant.

Having regressed the key independent variables on war target, I now move to test the models on *militarized dispute target*, which sets the inclusion threshold for violence lower. While *war target* is a rare event, occurring only eleven times in the dataset, *militarized dispute target* occurs 99 times, meaning that a regular time-series logistic regression will be performed. The *militarized dispute target* dependent variable offers a robustness check on the theory presented. Although the theory was designed to address high-level conflict, lowering the threshold for violence tests the general applicability of the model. As above, in Model 1 on Table 3.9 the key independent variables are *government unity* and *hawkishness*, and the control variables remain the same.

The results of Model 1 once again show *government unity* is negative and statistically significant. In addition, hawkishness is negatively related to the outcome, although it does not reach standard levels of statistical significance. Of the control variables, only *government tenure* is marginally significant, showing a positive relationship to targeting.

**Table 3.9: Likelihood of Militarized Dispute Targeting**

| | **Model 1 Militarized Dispute Target** | **Model 2 Militarized Dispute Target** |
|---|---|---|
| **Hawkishness** | -0.237<br>(0.151) | |
| **Government Unity** | -0.190<br>(0.093)* | |
| **Government Type** | | -0.341<br>(0.120)** |
| **Balance of Capabilities** | -0.018<br>(0.014) | -0.016<br>(0.013) |
| **Government Strength** | -0.010<br>(0.094) | -0.014<br>(0.091) |
| **Government Tenure** | 0.086<br>(0.051)+ | 0.073<br>(0.049) |
| **Alliance Portfolio** | -0.908<br>(5.842) | -1.082<br>(5.739) |
| **Peace Years** | 0.081<br>(0.108) | 0.047<br>(0.104) |
| **Observations** | 584 | 584 |
| **Number of Dyads** | 13 | 13 |

Robust standard errors in parentheses; Three cubic splines run in both regressions but not included in result
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%

Finally, in Model 2, Table 3.9, the dependent variables remain constant while *government unity* and *hawkishness* are replaced by *government type*. The results are broadly the same as Model 1. *Government type* is significantly and negatively related to *militarized dispute targeting*, while none of the other variables is significantly related to the dependent variable.

Turning from the statistical significance of the relationships between the key independent and dependent variables, Tables 3.10 and 3.11 offer information on the substantive effects. Table 3.10 lists the impact of changes in the dependent variables on the likelihood of *war targeting*. Not surprisingly, the change in the probability of war targeting itself is small for all the variables, since war is a rare event. However, looking at the changes in the relative risk of war targeting shows that the key independent variables all have a substantial impact. For all of them, increasing values correspond to a significant decrease in the likelihood of targeting. Of the control variables, only *government tenure* and *alliance portfolio* have substantial influence on the change in relative risk.

**Table 3.10: Substantive Effects for War Targeting**

| | Change in Explanatory Variable | Change in Probability of War Targeting | Change in Relative Risk of War Targeting |
|---|---|---|---|
| **Government Unity** | -1 (Moderately Divided) to 1 (Moderately Unified) | -0.8% | -85% |
| **Hawkishness** | -1 (Moderately Dovish) to 1 (Moderately Hawkish) | -0.3% | -41% |
| **Government Type** | Divided Dove to Unified Hawk | -5.4% | -99% |
| **Balance of Capabilities** | 25% to 75% | 0.01% | 3% |
| **Government Strength** | 25% to 75% | 0.03% | 9% |
| **Government Tenure** | 25% to 75% | 0.4% | 311% |
| **Alliance Portfolio** | 25% to 75% | -0.7% | -93% |

Note: Relative risk is calculated based on the probabilities based on Model 1 from Table 8 (with the exception of Government Type, which comes from Model 2). In each case while the values of one variable are manipulated, the rest of the variables are held at their means or modes.

Table 3.11 tells a similar story for militarized dispute targeting. While the absolute changes in likelihood remain relatively small, the relative risk is again substantial. In particular, increases in both *government unity* and *government type* are related to large declines in the likelihood of militarized disputes. However, unlike war targeting, in this case changes in either *government tenure* or *hawkishness* does not have particularly substantial impact on the likelihood of targeting. There is a larger impact for *alliance portfolio*, but since the variable is not statistically significant, the range of the actual impact is substantial.

**Table 3.11: Substantive Effects for Militarized Dispute Targeting**

| | Change in Explanatory Variable | Change in Probability of Militarized Dispute Targeting | Change in Relative Risk of Militarized Dispute Targeting |
|---|---|---|---|
| **Government Unity** | -1 (Moderately Divided) to 1 (Moderately Unified) | -5.6% | -33% |
| **Hawkishness** | -1 (Moderately Dovish) to 1 (Moderately Hawkish) | 1.3% | 10% |
| **Government Type** | Divided Dove to Unified Hawk | -10% | -49% |
| **Balance of Capabilities** | 25% to 75% | 0.1% | 1% |
| **Government Strength** | 25% to 75% | -0.2% | -1% |
| **Government Tenure** | 25% to 75% | 1% | 10% |
| **Alliance Portfolio** | 25% to 75% | -3.6% | -22% |

Note: Relative risk is calculated based on the probabilities based on Model 1 from Table 9 (with the exception of Government Type, which comes from Model 2). In each case while the values of one variable are manipulated, the rest of the variables are held at their means or modes.

Finally, throughout this section, two different models have been used to explain targeting: Model 1 with two different independent variables (*government unity* and *hawkishness*) and Model 2 with a single ordinal variable (*government type*). While the results of both these models have been broadly similar, they may not fit the data equally well. To determine which model offer the better fit, contingency tables show the strengths and weaknesses of a model in terms of its predictions. The main results of the contingency table are summarized in Table 3.12.

**Table 3.12: Classification Table**

| | **Model 1 War Target** | **Model 2 War Target** | **Model 1 Mil. Dis. Target** | **Model 2 Mil. Dip. Target** |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Sensitivity**<br>**Pr (Classifying War \| War)** | 27.3% | 27.3% | 56.6% | 50.5% |
| **Specificity**<br>**Pr (Classifying Peace\| Peace)** | 97.7% | 96.7% | 65.5% | 66.1% |
| **Positive predictive value**<br>**Pr (War \| Classified as War)** | 15.8% | 11.5% | 21.2% | 19.7% |
| **Negative predictive value**<br>**Pr (Peace \| Classified as Peace)** | 98.8% | 98.8% | 90.2% | 89% |
| **Correctly classified** | 96.6% | 95.6% | 64.3% | 64% |

Sensitivity for war target set at 0.1; sensitivity for militarized dispute target set at 0.15

While contingency tables are informative, they are subject to the threshold chosen. For this reason, Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curves are a more useful measure for model discrimination. ROC curves plot the percentage of zeros correctly forecast against the percentage of ones correctly forecast at each possible prediction threshold. The area under the curve can be viewed as the proportion of correct forecasts across all possible thresholds.

The comparison of ROC curves in Figure 3.2 shows that both models provide relatively accurate predictions of war targeting. Model 2 (*government type*) predicts 93% of the conflicts and peace years correctly, while Model 1 (*government unity* and *hawkishness*) predicts 91% of the cases correctly. While the *government type* model is slightly better, the difference between the two models is not statistically significant. Figure 3.3 offers a comparison of the two models with militarized dispute target as the dependent variable. The model does less well overall predicting dispute targeting, with the Model 1 predicting 63% of the case correctly and Model 2 predicting 62%. Once again, the differences between the two models are minimal and not statistically significant.

**Figure 3.2: ROC Curve for War Target**



**Table 3.13: ROC Curve Area for War Target**

| | ROC Area | Standard Error | 95% Confidence Interval | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Government Unity and Hawkishness Model** | 0.91 | 0.02 | 0.87 | 0.96 |
| **Government Type Model** | 0.93 | 0.02 | 0.88 | 0.98 |
| | Chi2=1.23 p=0.27 | | | |

**Figure 3.3: ROC Curve for Militarized Dispute Target**



**Table 3.14: ROC Curve Area for Militarized Dispute Target**

| | ROC Area | Standard Error | 95% Confidence Interval | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Government Unity and Hawkishness Model** | 0.63 | 0.03 | 0.58 | 0.69 |
| **Government Type Model** | 0.62 | 0.03 | 0.56 | 0.68 |
| | Chi2=1.22 p=0.27 | | | |

## Discussion

The results of the statistical tests offer strong support for the theory of government unity. The cross-tabulations tables show that *government unity* in particular has a significant impact upon the likelihood of attack. Even after including all the controls in the multivariate logistic regression models, *government unity* acquits itself well. In tests with both dependent variables, *government unity* is the only variable that is significant in both tests. When *war target* is the dependent variable, *government unity* is highly significant, while it is somewhat less significant when *militarized dispute target* is the dependent variable.

The substantive impact of *government unity* is impressive as well. As the graph (Figure 3.4) shows, the probability of being attacked falls as government unity increases. Further, it falls most sharply at the lower end of the scale as unity increases from -2 to -1 and -1 to zero. The marginal impact of increasing unity is not as great as the marginal impact of decreasing disunity.

**Figure 3.4: Predicted Probability for Levels of Government Unity**



The marginal impact of *government unity* is underscored by the change in relative risk by increasing the variable from moderate disunity to moderate unity (-1 to 1), leading to an 85% drop in the likelihood of being targeted for war, while holding all other variables constant. The same change, with militarized disputes as the dependent variable, yield a 33% decrease in the probability of an attack. For the model in which it was run, *government unity* is the most consistently important variable both in terms of statistical significance and substantive impact.

The results for *hawkishness* are more mixed than *government unity*. While the cross-tabulations showed hawkish governments are significantly less likely to be attacked than dovish governments, these results were not replicated for the militarized dispute variable. Interestingly, when hawkishness is placed in a multivariate logistical regression these results reverse themselves. *Hawkishness* is not statistically significant when *war target* is the dependent variable, but is marginally significant in the expected direction for *militarized dispute target*.

The substantive effects of *hawkishness* are more modest than those of *government unity*. A change from a moderately dovish government to a moderately hawkish one yields a 41% drop in the probability of war but interestingly, leads to a 10% increase in the probability of militarized dispute. So, what explains the odd results for hawkishness: sometimes significant, other times not, sometimes positive, others negative? One factor which contributes to both puzzles is the fact that for MIDs, there are a large number of conflicts for moderately hawkish governments. This explains why the substantive impact is positive for militarized disputes. The reasons for these conflicts are not entirely clear but could lie in the nature of the MIDs dataset. What could be picked up in this data is that mildly hawkish governments are more aggressive than dovish governments and become involved in tit-for-tat skirmishes.

Further, there is evidence that the *government unity* variable supersedes the *hawkishness* variable as assumed in the creation of the *government type* variable. For war target, there are a number of hawkish governments that are attacked, but all of them are divided. Thus, while only 9% of all wars occur when governments are unified 55% occur while governments are hawkish. Still, it seems that *hawkishness* exerts its greatest impact when *government unity* is low, as depicted in Figure 3.5. This graph shows that as unity increases, the difference in the likelihood of attack between a very hawkish government and a very dovish one shrinks.

**Table 3.5: Predicted Probability for Levels of Government Unity by Hawkishness**



While the individual results of *hawkishness* and particularly *government unity* are important, the power of the theory is in the combination of these two factors and the typology that it creates. Once again, looking first at the cross tabulations for *government type*, we see that divided doves are the governments most likely to be attacked both in wars and militarized disputes, often at rates much higher than other governments. The second most targeted group is divided hawks, which although not as likely to be attacked as divided doves, are more likely to be targeted than either of the unified governments. Among the final two categories, unified hawks are the least likely to be attacked in war, while unified doves are the least likely to be attacked in militarized disputes. The results for militarized disputes may once again be influenced by the fact that hawkish governments may be more likely to engage in aggressive behavior leading to tit-for-tat attacks. The results of the multivariate logistic regressions show *government type* is significantly related to both war attacks and militarized dispute attacks. For its model, *government type* is the only variable across the two dependent variables that is significant both times.

**Table 3.6**



The substantive impact of *government type* is also noteworthy. For *war targeting*, moving from a divided dovish government to a united hawkish one decreased the probability of war by nearly 100%. While the results for *militarized dispute targeting* are not quite as impressive, the same movement still yields a nearly 50% drop in the likelihood of attack. The results for *war targeting*, as shown in Figure 3.6, show a distinct pattern among government types

Of the other variables in the models, several were significant in the *war target* models. The results for a number of the control variables are somewhat surprising. Contrary to my expectations, the more favorable the *balance of capabilities* for a state, the higher the likelihood it would be attacked. The fact that *balance of capabilities* is positively signed may result from the fact that in many of the cases the state that was stronger militarily held the disputed territory, and the challenger sought to overturn the status quo. While *balance of capabilities* and is statistically significant, it has little substantive significance, as the relative risk of less than 4%. On the other hand, states with a stronger *alliance portfolio* were marginally less likely to be attacked, and the substantive impact of those alliances is substantial. Establishing causality is difficult with alliances since this finding may also indicate states were unwilling to from alliances with states they believed would be likely to draw them into conflicts.

Finally, the longer that governments were in office, the more likely they are to be attacked. This finding may indicate that long-serving governments may become susceptible to forms of groupthink that make attacks more likely (for more on this point see chapter 5).[35] The government tenure variable is also of interest because unlike the other controls, it has substantive importance, at least for war targeting. Governments that have been in power five years are three times more likely to be attacked than governments that have been in power for only one year. It appears that much of this impact is derived from the fact that longer-serving unified governments are more likely to be attacked. Still, this finding provides an interesting caveat to Gelpi and Grieco's work on leadership tenure and attacks.[36]

**Table 3.15: Frequency of Government Types**

| | **Government Unity** | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| **Hawkishness** | **Low** | **High** | **Total** |
| **Dove** | 67<br>(9.52%) | 84<br>(11.93%) | 151<br>(21.45%) |
| **Hawk** | 211<br>(29.97%) | 342<br>(48.58%) | 553<br>(78.55%) |
| **Total** | 278<br>(39.49%) | 426<br>(60.51%) | 704<br>(100 %) |

Some interesting findings emerge from the dataset. The first regards the comparison between the variables under investigation. It is worth noting that these different government types are not equally represented in the dataset. Divided dovish governments, perhaps not surprisingly, are relatively rare, making up only 10% of the dataset, while unified dovish government only make up 12% (Table 3.15). Since the dataset focuses on territorial disputes, it is probably not surprising that there are not more doves. Government unity is less unevenly distributed with nearly 40% of the government classified as divided.

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[35] In separate tests run on this point, when an interaction term (government unity*government tenure) was inserted into Model 1, the interaction term was significant and positive (government unity remained significant and negative, while government tenure was not significant). Unified, long-serving governments may be particularly susceptible to groupthink and the related dangers that entails. This may also point to a limiting factor of unity – while beneficial over the short run, it may become problematic the longer the government remains in office. The impact and interaction may be similar to that of government power.

[36] Gelpi and Grieco, *Attracting Trouble*.

These results are particularly surprising given the focus both in the popular press and among scholars on the relative hawkishness of potential leaders, while paying much less attention to how unified their government will be. In this respect, it is worth noting that while divided dovish governments are the most likely to be attacked, 30% of all governments in the sample were divided hawks (three times as many as divided doves), and these governments are still more prone to attacks than unified governments. Thus, the focus of much of the scholarship on the desire of dovish governments to masquerade as hawks misses the point: dovishness and hawkishness are relatively unimportant next to government unity. In fact, there are no significant differences in the frequency of unified government, as 56% of all dovish governments are unified, as are 62% of all hawkish governments.

A second general finding is that the substantive significance of the go*vernment unity* and *government type* variables dwarfed the other variables in the study. Changes in these variables decreased the probability of attack by 85% and 99% for war and 33% and 50% for militarized disputes, respectively. None of the other variables come close to this impact. The only control variable with any significance is *government tenure*, and as the discussion above noted, it appears that much of its impact depends on *government unity*.

While these two variables dominated the results, their two separate models were relatively equal in their ability to predict the results. Although statistical testing does not offer a clear "winner" between the two models, theoretically, each one has its place. Model 1 shows the importance of *government unity* as a single factor that has significant explanatory value. On the other hand, Model 2 offers a complete independent variable, *government type*, that incorporates both axes of interest. Although the most important factor may be *government unity*, *government type* also shows the importance of sorting by *hawkishness* as well.

The results of the statistical tests offer strong support for the theory. The tests repeatedly confirm the significant relationship that exists between *government unity*, *government type*, and conflict targeting. The importance of these variables is not only statistically but substantively significant in the case of both tests: *war targeting* and *militarized dispute targeting*. The importance of these variables highlights the significant role played by domestic politics in ongoing disputes and the role that incomplete information creation has in conflict targeting.

# Chapter 4

## Divided Doves: India's 1965 Kashmir war and the Korean War

### *Divided Doves in Theory*

Governments that are characterized as divided doves suffer from a number of problems that increase the likelihood they will be challenged. Most importantly, these divided states' lack of unity means both that they cannot signal effectively and that the signals they do send are convoluted. Such governments cannot effectively signal their intentions, appear weak, and may be unable to act decisively. The dovish nature of these governments adds an element that may often be understood as weakness. The combination of these two factors makes them the most likely type of government to be targeted.

What makes divided dovish governments particularly susceptible to attack? The divergent foreign policy views in the government and the frequency with which they are expressed creates a number of problems regarding government intentions. First, such states cannot decide what they want, which means they cannot bargain effectively to avoid conflict. Second, challenger states have difficulty predicting the responses of such states, and the multiple messages sent allow them to focus on the rosiest scenarios possible.

An additional problem facing divided dovish governments is that weak leaders and the dovishness of the government are likely to lead challengers to believe that the state is weak and ripe for attack. Weak leaders encourage the perception by challengers that their inability to unify their own government signals deeper weakness. Such perceptions are reinforced when the weak leader is dovish and thus more likely to be viewed as weak.

Finally, combining both the divergent views in the government and weak leadership, such governments are prone to inaction or contradictory actions. As a dispute becomes a crisis government leaders have different views on what actions should be taken. Should the government return to the negotiating table, move troops to the border, or seek third-party intervention? Under this scenario governments get caught in one of two traps: they are paralyzed by internal conflict, or the competing factions take entrepreneurial action on different fronts. The weak leader heading the government cannot break deadlock in the government or may support a policy of logrolling to fulfill the competing factions' interests.

If my theory is correct, we should expect to see the factors listed above as key factors in the challenging state's decision to attack. This chapter will present three points in a causal chain. First it will provide evidence that these governments are in fact divided and dovish in their nature. Second, it will show how these factors influenced the ability of the government to signal its intentions, take decisive action, and demonstrate strength. Next the views of key policymakers in the challenging state will be examined to see whether or not they perceived the target state to be divided and dovish. The final step in the causal chain will show that these perceptions played a role in the decision of the challenging state to attack.

The chapter will also examine alternative explanations for the outcome. As noted in the theory chapter, four competing theories will be addressed. According to theories on the role of the opposition, challenges should be less likely when the opposition supports the government's policy.  On the other hand, theories of leadership tenure predict that governments are more susceptible to challenge early in their term.  While theories of public opinion do not directly address the likelihood of challenge we can expect that challenges will be less likely when the public pushes the government towards a more militaristic stance.  Finally, dyadic balance of power theories would lead us to believe that a shift in military capabilities will make conflict more likely.

This chapter will proceed as follows.  Both cases will begin with a short history of the conflict including the larger territorial dispute and the particular outbreak of hostilities that is the focus of this chapter.  This will be followed by an analysis of the unity and dovishness of the two governments prior to the outbreak of hostilities.  The next section will focus on a brief analysis of the impact that these factors had on the ability of the government to signal its intentions, take decisive action, and demonstrate strength.  Finally, both cases will conclude with an analysis of how these signals were interpreted and acted upon by the challenging state.

## Kashmir, 1965

### *The Conflict*

One significant quirk in the independence of India and Pakistan was that Lord Mountbatten did not inform the two countries of their respective boundaries until after their independence on August 15, 1947. Once the border decision was announced, Pakistanis were immediately upset that the British awarded East Punjab (Gurdaspur) to India in the decision. An already tense situation in the Punjab became inflamed by ethnic strife, complete with mass killings and population transfers on a massive scale. While the leaders of the two newly independent states attempted to combat the violence, the status of the princely state of Jammu and Kashmir remained undefined.

Meeting with the Maharaja before independence, Mountbatten asked that he follow the will of the people of the state and join India or Pakistan based on popular opinion, but the Maharaja refused. The violence in the Punjab soon began affecting the western and southern areas of Kashmir. There is evidence that Pakistan played a role in instigating unrest by employing tribal raiders to pressure Kashmir's accession to Pakistan.

As attacks worsened in Kashmir and the local military proved ineffective in stopping them, it appeared that the Maharaja's regime would likely be toppled. In addition, the Kashmiri military melted away in the face of the insurgents, and the Maharaja sought Indian assistance to prop up his weakened regime. India agreed to send troops to support the Maharaja on the condition that the State accede to India. On October 27, 1947, Kashmir formally acceded to India and the first airborne troops arrived in Kashmir.

The accession of Jammu and Kashmir to India is controversial for a number of reasons. First, the state is majority Muslim, and Pakistan believes that Kashmiris should join fellow Muslims in Pakistan rather than Hindus in India.  Second, the accession occurred while the Maharaja had a tenuous hold on power, and his close ties to India made him a poor representative for the interests of the citizens of Kashmir.  Third, the Maharaja took the decision to accede during a time of crisis and thus was pressured to make the decision.  Finally, for Pakistan it was another affront following the award of East Punjab to India.

Although the tribal raiding forces were competent fighters in the mountainous terrain of Kashmir, they were rapidly overwhelmed by the superior Indian army, which was able to bring the Kashmir Valley largely under its control by the end of the year.  The situation changed dramatically in April 1948 when Pakistan sent regular forces into Kashmir as a matter of self-defense against the advancing Indian forces.  War between the two countries raged for nine months until a ceasefire was declared on December 31.  At this point the conflict moved from a bilateral matter to the United Nations Security Council, and controversy over the territory has festered ever since.

This conflict at the birth of two nations led to three wars, a nuclear arms race, numerous militarized disputes, and enduring hostilities between the two sides.  The ceasefire reached in 1948 set the stage for over a decade of generally peaceful coexistence between the two sides.  For seventeen years India and Pakistan refrained from large-scale violence against one another.  This brittle peace was shattered in 1965 when the countries engaged in two serious conflicts, including Pakistan's attempt to revise the status quo in Kashmir.

Before the Pakistanis launched a war with India over Kashmir, they first sought to test India's resolve in the Rann of Kutch, a marshy desert covering 7000 square miles on the India-Pakistan border between the states of Sind and Kutch.[1] The area had been in dispute since 1948 and Pakistan claimed that the border should run along the 24th parallel, which would have effectively divided the Rann in half. In January 1965, Indian soldiers discovered Pakistani border forces using a track located within Indian territory. India protested this action and the upper house of India's legislature, the Lok Sabha, was informed that Pakistan had violated the status quo. However, Pakistan set up two outposts in the disputed area. India sought meetings with the Pakistanis over the issue but failed to receive a response.[2]

In early April, fighting broke out between the two sides when Indian forces were discovered behind the new Pakistani lines. The initial Pakistani attack was successfully resisted by local Indian police forces, but they were soon overwhelmed by the larger and better armed Pakistani forces. Fighting continued sporadically throughout the month of April, with Pakistan able to make and hold substantial early gains in the poor terrain of the Rann. However, the fighting was never allowed to escalate to a full fledged war, and casualties on both sides are estimated at below 500.[3]

The hostilities in this desolate region led to heated political rhetoric from some members of the Congress Party. The Education Minister, M.C. Chagla said,

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[1] Lars Blinkenberg, *India-Pakistan. The History of Unsolved Conflicts* (Copenhagen: Munksgaard, 1972), 244.
[2] Ibid.
[3] Ibid.

"There were people and countries who only understood the language of strength and toughness. Pakistan is one of those."[4] Additionally, many politicians in India viewed the crisis in alarmist terms and urged tough action.[5] These attitudes, both within Congress and without, were in sharp opposition to Prime Minister Shastri, who sought mediation as a means to end the dispute. Despite significant pressure to follow a hard-line, Shastri took the novel step of agreeing to settle the dispute through an international tribunal. This step was particularly significant in the eyes of Pakistan, as internationalization of the conflict was precisely what Pakistan sought in Kashmir.[6]

Pakistan took India's limited response as an indication of general weakness, and the results of the limited probe served to embolden the hawks within the Pakistani political establishment. By the time a cease-fire was reached in the Rann of Kutch disputes, June 30th, planning was already well underway in Pakistan for the next war in Kashmir. The Pakistani plan known as Operation Gibraltar was based on fomenting rebellion in the Indian held territories of Jammu and Kashmir. This involved sending 3,000 plainclothes soldiers from Pakistani controlled Azad Kashmir across the border on August 5. To Pakistan's surprise a number of these soldiers were immediately captured and told the Indian military of the Pakistani plans.[7]

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[4] Ibid, 248.

[5] L. P. Singh, *India's Foreign Policy: The Shastri Period* (New Delhi: Uppal Publishing House, 1980), 62.

[6] In 1968 the tribunal awarded Pakistan only 300 square miles of the 3,500 that it claimed. In general, the award was accepted in both countries (Blinkenberg, *India-Pakistan*).

[7] Gowher Rizvi, "The Rivalry between India and Pakistan," in *South Asian Insecurity and the Great Powers*, ed. Barry Buzan and Gowher Rizvi (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1986), 112. Upon hearing that the soldiers had been captured and confessed, members of the Pakistani military elite saw these developments as a serious setback (Blinkenberg, *India-Pakistan*, 208).

While sporadic conflict occurred between the two sides during the month of August, Pakistan launched a full military assault on September 1, crossing the cease-fire line in Kashmir. Under intense domestic pressure to respond forcefully to the Pakistani attacks, Shastri approved a counterattack on September 3. Significantly, Shastri's plan to counter the Pakistani attack did not constitute meeting Pakistani forces in Kashmir, but instead launching a three-prong attack in the Lahore and Sialkot sectors. For the first time in Indian history, Indian forces were sent into Pakistani territory.[8]

What followed was a brief bloody war that quickly ground to a stalemate by mid-September. The ability of the Indian army to reach the suburbs of Lahore and Sialkot pressured the Pakistani government to seek a diplomatic end to the war. A joint U.S.-USSR cease-fire plan proposed in the UN Security Council was accepted by both sides and took effect on September 22nd. As a result of the conflict, India gained 720 square miles and Pakistan 320 miles, while approximately 3,000 soldiers died in the war.[9] The question this case study seeks to answer is why 1965 proved such an attractive time to launch an attack.

### *Divided Government and Mixed Signals*

It is difficult to imagine any Indian Prime Minister following on the heels of the larger-than-life Jawaharlal Nehru and not suffering by comparison. For Lal Bahadur Shastri the challenge was made greater by the fact that he was not a member of the illustrious Gandhi-Nehru bloodline that dominated Indian politics before and after independence. Whereas Nehru developed a reputation as a world statesman and served as his own foreign minister, Shastri had limited experience in foreign relations.[10]

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[8] C.P. Srivastava, *Lal Bahadur Shastri: A Life of Truth in Politics* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 228.

[9] Blinkenberg, *India-Pakistan*, 260.

However, Shastri's problems went deeper than just his lack of political pedigree and inexperience in international affairs. Nehru's death left the Congress Party unprepared for succession, and Shastri was chosen largely because he was seen as a compromise candidate in charge of a caretaker administration.[11] Just five days before his death, Nehru told a press conference that, "it is not for me to appoint a successor. And in any case my life is not going to end soon."[12]

Following Nehru's death, Congress Party President Kamaraj Nadar spent four hectic days mobilizing support for Shastri as a compromise candidate despite challenges from Morarji Desai and Jagjivan Ram.[13] Eventually, Nadar persuaded Desai to step aside, allowing for an easy confirmation process for Shastri. While Shastri was successful in the formal vote to succeed Nehru, deep rifts remained in the Congress Party. Shastri's ascension to Prime Minister was the first transfer of power in the history of independent India and there remained a number of potential challengers waiting in the wings.[14]

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[10] J. N. Dixit, *India and Pakistan in War and Peace* (New York: Routledge, 2002), 143.

[11] Rizvi, "The Rivalry between India and Pakistan," 108.

[12] Quoted in M.S. Jasra, *Memorable Episodes of the Great Little Son of India (Bharat Putra)* (New Delhi: Lilliputians, 2002), 50.

[13] Ibid, 51.

[14] Singh, *India's Foreign Policy*, 62.

Unfortunately for Shastri, while the Indian press received him with positive tones, the foreign press was less glowing in their reviews. In one particularly memorable commentary, *Time* magazine wrote of Shastri's "ineffable meekness," and a number of others noted his seeming weakness, particularly in comparison to Nehru.[15] Following Nehru's towering personality, Shastri was viewed both internally and externally as a meek figure.[16]

Shastri's handling of the cabinet was also significantly different from Nehru's. While Nehru dominated the cabinet during his tenure in office and exerted particular influence in the area of foreign relations, Shastri's approach was consensus based.[17] This also meant that while debate was rare under Nehru, Shastri encouraged ministers to speak their minds while searching for areas of agreement.[18] Upon assuming office, Shastri was urged by some to keep Nehru's cabinet, which he did with only minor alterations.[19] While Nehru served as his own foreign minister, Shastri appointed the first independent foreign minister in India's history. This move also reflected Shastri's inexperience in international relations.[20] Thus, for the first time in Indian history, open dissent was encouraged in the Cabinet and foreign policy was being set by someone other than the Prime Minister.

Beyond the cabinet and foreign policy, Shastri took power in India at a time of domestic political turmoil. Inflation was rampant and the nation was facing serious food shortages.[21] Moreover, when Shastri assumed office, it became clear that the Congress party was factionalized by the departure of Nehru and, “in complete disarray.”[22] The divisions within the Congress party were also reflected in the cabinet and further undercut Shastri’s authority.

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[15] Jasra, *Memorable Episodes of the Great Little Son of India*, 52.
[16] Blinkenberg, *India-Pakistan*, 239.
[17] See Jasra, *Memorable Episodes of the Great Little Son of India*, 52; Srivastava, *Lal Bahadur Shastri*, 99.
[18] Srivastava, *Lal Bahadur Shastri*, 99.
[19] Jasra, *Memorable Episodes of the Great Little Son of India*, 53.
[20] See Dixit, *India and Pakistan in War and Peace*, 143; Srivastava, *Lal Bahadur Shastri*, 134.

Divisions within the cabinet which the powerful Nehru had prevented from rising to the surface were now in full view under Shastri. Finally, the Congress Party in general was factionalized at a time of domestic unrest in India.[23] Specifically with respect to Kashmir the Indian government was divided. While some members of Congress remained deeply committed to maintaining Indian control over Kashmir, "Pakistan was encouraged by the assertions of some big public leaders in India like C. Rajagopalachari and Jayaprakash Narayan who advocated that India, being a large country should give away Kashmir to Pakistan to develop better relations with it."[24]

With this background, Shastri, who sought better relations with Pakistan, met with Ayub Khan in Karachi on October 12, 1964. The two leaders left the summit with very different impressions. Although Shastri was nervous about Pakistani foreign minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, he believed that Ayub Khan was a practical leader with whom India could deal.[25] Nehru had taken great personal interested in the Kashmir dispute and was working hard toward a new solution when he died.[26] The issue was considerably more complex for Shastri. Although he wanted to find a solution in Kashmir, he lacked Nehru's popular legitimacy and would not be able to garner that support until new elections were held in 1967.[27]

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[21] Jasra, *Memorable Episodes of the Great Little Son of India*, 65.
[22] Ibid, 65.
[23] Singh, *India’s Foreign Policy*.
[24] Hari Ram Gupta, *India-Pakistan War 1965* vol. 1 (Delhi: Hariyana Prakashan, 1967), 44.
[25] Srivastava, *Lal Bahadur Shastri*, 185.
[26] Blinkenberg, *India-Pakistan*, 240.

Not surprisingly, following India's success in the 1965 war with Pakistan, some scholars have recast Shastri as a powerful and decisive Prime Minister.[28] Had Shastri lived to conduct India's foreign policy after the Tashkent Agreement, perceptions of his government would likely have been significantly different. However, what matters for the purposes of this study is not how war changed perceptions of Prime Minister Shastri's government, but rather what those initial perceptions were. Most importantly, later in the chapter we will show that Pakistani views of Shastri's government match this assessment.

### *Dovish Government*

While Shastri's government was internally divided and viewed as weak, Shastri was generally consistent in his dovish approach to international relations, particularly those with Pakistan. Following Nehru's death an internal battle was waged within the Congress Party between those who favored the rightist candidate Morarji Desai and those who favored the left-leaning Shastri.[29] Only the Communist Party was more dovish than Congress, while the rest of the opposition generally pushed the government to take a harder-line in foreign relations.[30]

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[27] Ibid.

[28] Both Jasra (*Memorable Episodes of the Great Little Son of India*) and Dixit (*Makers of India's Foreign Policy*) makes claims along these lines. At the same time, their work also clearly shows how Shastri was perceived at the time.

[29] Srivastava, *Lal Bahadur Shastri*, 85.

[30] Nancy Jetly, *India-China Relations, 1947-1977* (New Delhi: Radiant Publishers, 1979), 70.

Most of the criticism that Congress received on foreign policy decisions came from the hawkish rightist parties in the Lok Sabha. In particular, the Jan Sangh and Socialist parties took more hawkish positions on foreign policy than Congress.[31] Although the opposition to Congress in the Lok Sabha was numerically weak, controlling only 150 seats to Congresses' 356, their vehemence on territorial issues made it more difficult for any government to solve the ongoing disputes with Pakistan and China. Thus, Shastri's political background indicated a more dovish line on foreign policy compared to those within Congress and the opposition.

Shastri also came to power at a time when the opposition was increasingly emboldened to challenge the government on its foreign policy decisions. Under Nehru, Congress established itself as the party of moderation and conciliation in foreign policy. In its dealings with both China and Pakistan, emphasis was placed on reaching mutually acceptable solutions rather than confrontation. Nehru's dominant position in Indian politics and generally peaceful relations during the 1950s limited the opposition's criticism of government foreign policy. This began to change with the Tibetan revolt in 1959, in which the government was criticized as overly conciliatory towards China, and accelerated following the 1962 Border War debacle.[32]

In his first address to the nation after assuming the position of Prime Minister, Shastri told the public:

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[31] Singh, *India's Foreign Policy*, Chapter 5.
[32] Jetly, *India-China Relations*.

> India and Pakistan are two great countries linked together by common history and tradition. It is their natural destiny to be friends with each other and to enter into close co-operation in many fields. Goodwill and friendship and mutual co-operation between these countries will not only be of immense benefit to them but will make a great contribution to peace and prosperity in Asia.[33]

The general foreign relations theme that Shastri set for himself was improved relations with India's neighbors and, in particular, Pakistan.[34] In his first major foreign policy address to the meeting of non-aligned states in Cairo, Shastri stressed the importance of world peace. While Shastri was nervous about Indian relations with China, following India's poor performance in the Border War of 1962, he believed that the outstanding issues between India and Pakistan could be settled amicably.[35]

Not surprisingly, following the 1965 war with Pakistan over Kashmir, some scholars have recast Shastri as a hard-line or at least realist politician.[36] This argument, much like the view that Shastri was a powerful and decisive leader, comes from his performance in the war, not from perceptions of him prior to the conflict. While the war certainly changed perceptions of Shastri, it is important to note that these opinions were significantly different from those that marked his time in office prior to hostilities. Whether or not Shastri was actually a hawk in dove's clothing is irrelevant to the extent that the signals he sent and the perceptions of him were dovish.

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[33] Quoted in Srivastava, *Lal Bahadur Shastri*, 184.

[34] Jasra, *Memorable Episodes of the Great Little Son of India*, 53.

[35] Ibid, 64.

[36] Dixit (*Makers of India's Foreign Policy*, 115) makes the claim that Shastri's term in office marked the beginning of an evolution in Indian foreign policy towards a more realist orientation.

### *The Impact of Disunity on India's Ability to Signal*

So what was the impact of India's mixed signals on the outbreak of war in 1965? The theory of government unity offers three potential results of government disunity, each of which we will explore in the case of the Kashmir War of 1965.

#### INTENTIONS

While government unity can make a countries' intentions in a dispute clear to a potential challenger, weak and divided governments cannot effectively convey such signals. Divided governments suffer from having multiple views expressed on a particular issue. In the case of Shastri's government, Indian intentions in Kashmir were unclear to the Pakistanis. On the one hand, Shastri's dovish nature and his expressed desire to reach a settlement with Pakistan sent positive signals for a peaceful settlement. As we have seen, in his first few months in office Shastri repeatedly expressed his desire to improve relations with Pakistan, which would necessarily mean working towards a settlement of the Kashmir issue. Shastri continued to hold this line even after the Rann of Kutch conflict.

Divisions within the government sent Pakistan mixed signals on India's intentions with Kashmir. At the same time that some members pushed for India to turn the state over to Pakistan, more hawkish ministers worked to extend Indian sovereignty over Kashmir.[37] In 1964, Home Minister Nanda announced that Kashmir would be subject to President's Rule, whereby the central government rules the state through local institutions. This was a critical step in reducing the sometimes ambiguous relationship between the Indian central government and the contested state. In addition, it was a clear signal that India was moving towards formally incorporating Kashmir into the Indian state. This strengthened the status quo and appeared to make a mutually acceptable settlement less likely. On the other hand, some leading Indian politicians, including the President, were willing to give up Kashmir in order to ensure peace with Pakistan.

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[37] Gupta, *India-Pakistan War 1965,* 44.

Shastri was trapped between his personal convictions and the realities of the constraints imposed on him by his government. His sincere efforts to improve relations between India and Pakistan were subverted by his inability to marshal support within his cabinet whose member were willing to oppose him on both instrumental and ideological grounds. Thus, Shastri’s person appeals for improved relations rang hollow since he, unlike the dominant Nehru, would not be able to carry them out.

While the decision to extend President’s Rule strengthened the status quo, it also appeared to go against talks with Nehru that led Pakistan to believe that India was open to negotiations over the disputed territory. This belief was given further fuel by Shastri’s early dovish remarks on Indo-Pakistani relations and by the remarks of several prominent politicians who downplayed Kashmir’s value to India. Broadly, India simultaneously took steps to increase control over the area while showing signs that it was amenable to altering the status quo.

## WEAKNESS

Divided dovish governments are particularly likely to give off signals that they are weak. Their weak leadership on important issues coupled with dovish reluctance to use force may be pounced upon by challengers as indicating that in a future conflict the target will not be able to adequately resist. On both theses counts the Indian government in 1965 can be viewed as sending weak signals.

Views on Shastri's weakness were fueled by his relative inexperience in international relations. While Nehru had been a world statesman of the first order, Shastri was viewed as untested. It was this inexperience that bolstered the Pakistani belief that 1965 would be a good time to test India regarding Kashmir. Even within India's foreign policy bureaucracy there were doubts about whether or not Shastri could effectively navigate the complex international problems India faced.

Beyond the perception that he was personally weak, Shastri's entire government appeared to be in crisis. Following the death of Nehru, deep divisions had emerged in Congress, and these were exacerbated by severe domestic political problems including food shortages and inflation. While top Congress officials jockeyed to succeed what they believed would be a brief period under Shastri's leadership, Shastri attempted to assert his power over the government.

In addition to his inability to overcome divisions in the government, Shastri's actions and words fed perceptions of his weakness abroad. The mixed signals sent by the Shastri government regarding the status of Kashmir made India's government appear more susceptible to pressure than it was. Shastri later told his press secretary

Kuldip Nayar: "Pakistan mistook my desire not to fight as a sign of weakness; it thought that I will never go to war and it tried to take undue advantage in Kashmir."[38]

## DECISIVE ACTION

Shastri's weak leadership and the divergent views in the government created an atmosphere that prevented India from taking decisive action. The first test of the decisiveness of the Shastri's government came in the spring of 1965 when conflict erupted between Indian and Pakistani forces in the Rann of Kutch. Indian public opinion would not tolerate another national humiliation like the Border War, and the chance to demonstrate this fact came with the Rann of Kutch invasion in April 1965. The Pakistani attack provided India with the opportunity to decisively defend the country's borders, but far from mounting a strong defense, India mobilized slowly, allowed Pakistan to take substantial territory, and acceded to demands to put the dispute before an international body.

When Shastri was presented with the opportunity to show the world that the Border War was an aberration, he demonstrated further indecisiveness. While he knew that India needed to respond to the challenge in the Kutch, he was concerned that a strong response might endanger future talks between the two sides. A clearer signal in the Kutch might have destroyed Shastri's hopes for peace between the neighbors, but it would also have sent a clear signal to the war mongers in Pakistan.

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[38] Quoted in Kuldip Nayar, *Wall at Wagah: India-Pakistan Relations* (New Delhi: Gyan Publishing, 2003), 170.

Further, Shastri's decision to subject the Rann of Kutch dispute to international arbitration gave Pakistan cause to believe that India might use this path in Kashmir. Since Pakistan had long been seeking arbitration on the Kashimir, this action on the Rann raised hopes in Pakistan that it might be able to employ a similar strategy in Kashmir. While Shastri saw the decision to subject the Rann dispute to arbitration as an act of good will to improve Indo-Pakistani relations, on the other side of the border it seemed to confirm Ayub's strategy.

Skeptics correctly point out that the Kutch is an isolated, sparsely inhabited region that one author called, "one of the most trivial areas in the world."[39] The marshy area floods during monsoon season and is rendered practically uninhabitable. Thus, unlike Kashmir, the stakes in the Rann might well have been very low for India. This would mean that India's poor response might have been a function of the objectively low stakes rather than indecisiveness on the part of the Shastri government.

This explanation does not sit well with the logic of territorial disputes that emphasize the significance of territory beyond material value. India's 1962 war with China included a number of areas that were also sparsely populated and of little economic value. The route that India suffered at China's hands in the conflict placed pressure on India's leadership to demonstrate India's military strength. However, Shastri's government was torn between the Prime Minister's personal desire to improve the political climate in the region and the desire of more hawkish ministers to teach Pakistan a lesson. It is not surprising that the hawks in Pakistan were able to selectively draw on Shastri's actions as grounds that a limited attack in Kashmir would achieve their objectives.

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[39] Blinkenberg, *India-Pakistan*, 243. Of course, fighting over desolate regions is not uncommon in the conflict between India and Pakistan, as the 1999 Kargil War shows.

### *The View from Pakistan*

Thus far the Shastri government side of the dispute has been analyzed to show both the nature of the government and the signals that this sent to potential challengers. Now it is time to shift the focus from the signals that India was sending to how these signals were interpreted by the Pakistanis. The dominant narrative that emerges from this study is that the Shastri government's divisions and dovishness provided ample information for Pakistani leaders to selectively use to make the case for an attack. This selection of information was privileged over evidence on the military balance, the difficult conditions in Kashmir, and India's desire to defend its territory.

There is a good deal of evidence, from both supporters and critics of Ayub Khan, that he made the decision to go to war with India in 1965 under pressure from hard-liners in his government.[40] Those arguing for war included Foreign Minister Bhutto, Foreign Secretary Aziz Ahmed, and Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) Agency head Riaz Hussein, who made two points in particular. The first was that India's military build-up following the Sino-Indian border war was increasing the military disparity between the two states. The increasing disparity meant that time was not on

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[40] See Mohammad Musa, *My Version: India-Pakistan War 1965* (Lahore: Wajidalis Limited, 1983); Abdul Ghafoor Bhurgri, *Zulfikar Ali Bhutto: The Falcon of Pakistan* (Karachi: Szabist, 2002); Stanley Wolpert, *Zulfi Bhutto of Pakistan: His Life and Times* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993).

Pakistan’s side. The second was that the Indian government was weak and indecisive under Shastri, making 1965 a fortuitous time to attack.

The change of leadership in India emboldened hardliners in the Pakistani government to push for an attack while they perceived India to be weak. Bhutto, Ahmed, and Hussein all favored striking India following the death of Nehru. Ayub Khan initially was able to hold off these calls for war. According to Altaf Gauhar’s account after Nehru’s death, “Bhutto and Aziz Ahmed both started trying hard to persuade Ayub to take advantage of India's vulnerability, but he refused to deviate from the path of negotiations."[41] Despite Ayub’s protestations, pressure continued from other members of the cabinet. At an Intelligence Committee meeting in mid-February of 1965, where Operation Gibraltar was first presented, Ahmed persisted, telling the group, "India . . . [is] in a highly vulnerable situation, as it suffer[s] from lack of leadership."[42] During the Tashkent negotiations, Shastri, playing on both his diminutive stature and the difficulty of following Nehru, told Ayub Khan, "General, you must appreciate my position. I have a very difficult job at home. I have stepped into the shoes of a giant and I am really too small for the job."[43] Skeptics, such as General Musa, who pointed to India’s military strength as a reason for restraint, were marginalized by those who focused on the perceived weaknesses of the Indian government.[44]

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[41] Altaf Gauhar, *Ayub Khan: Pakistan's First Military Ruler* (Lahore: Sang-E-Meel Publications, 1993), 313.

[42] Quoted in Gauhar, *Ayub Khan*, 320.

[43] Ibid.

[44] Musa, *My Version*.

What were the origins of this belief that Shastri was a weak leader? While some of the perceptions of Shastri stemmed from both Ayub and Bhutto's perception that his diminutive stature betrayed weakness, there were more concrete reasons for this judgment.[45] One of the most significant episodes came during the October 1964 meeting between Ayub and Shastri, at which Shastri told his host that he was not "strong enough" to carry India to a solution in Kashmir.[46] Singh argues that Ayub left this meeting with the belief that Shastri was weak and that by applying pressure Pakistan could extract concessions from him.[47] Further, Gupta argues that Ayub believed that Shastri's dovish nature would limit India's response in the event of an attack.[48] Foreign Minister Bhutto also believed that India's internal weakness meant that it could not "risk a general war of unlimited duration."[49] This meant that despite Shastri's rhetoric on better relations, Ayub Khan had good reason to doubt Shastri's ability to deliver on any promises. Any final settlement on Kashmir would have required an Indian Prime Minister who could rally public support on an issue that was sure to require some unpopular concessions by India. Shastri's domestic weakness meant that any settlement would have to be reached in the future, most likely after the elections of 1967.

Divisions within the Indian government also fed into Pakistan's misunderstanding of India's intentions. On the one hand, Pakistanis were incensed that India extended home rule to Kashmir and viewed this act as undercutting efforts to reach a peaceful settlement. However, this act was undercut by Indian politicians who downplayed the significance of Kashmir to India. When Bhutto visited India for Nehru's funeral in May 1964, he met with Indian President Radhakrishnan who, having grown up in southern India, was less committed to Kashmir than northern politicians. Radhakrishnan told Bhutto that an "honorable and equitable" solution in Kashmir would allow the two states to normalize their relations and take advantage of economic opportunities.[50] While negotiations between the two states foundered, such statements led Pakistan's hard-liners to argue that in the event of an attack, India might not mount a full defense and would negotiate.

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[45] Wolpert, *Zulfi Bhutto of Pakistan*, 83.
[46] Ibid.
[47] Singh, *India's Foreign Policy*, 57.
[48] Gupta, *India-Pakistan War 1965*, 44.
[49] Quoted in Wolpert, *Zulfi Bhutto of Pakistan*, 89.

Decisive action also played an important role in Pakistani calculus. Hari Gupta argues that one of the key assumptions that Pakistan made prior to the war was that the divisions within Congress and India's economic difficulties would prevent India from launching an effective response to an attack.[51] India's minimal response in the Kutch emboldened hard-liners in Pakistan like Bhutto who interpreted the response as a sign of weakness. Of course, this interpretation was a fundamental misreading of Indian public and elite opinion, which could ill afford another foreign policy disaster. Unfortunately, this misreading was encouraged by the Shastri government's tepid response to this probing action and tacit acknowledgement of Pakistani claims.

The divided dovish nature of India's government greatly influenced the Pakistani decision to attack in 1965. Characteristics of the Indian government led to three important expectations on the part of the Pakistanis: that the Shastri government was particularly vulnerable, that an attack was likely to bring about a favorable resolution for the Pakistanis, and that the Indian response would be limited. For hard-liners in the Pakistani government, the weakness of Shastri's government provided a window for Pakistani attack. Further, divisions in the government led Pakistani leaders to believe that the Indian response would be similar to that in the Rann of Kutch incident. Finally, weakness and government divisions in India led Pakistanis to believe that an attack would force India to negotiate.

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[50] Quoted in Wolpert, *Zulfi Bhutto of Pakistan,* 78.

[51] Gupta, *India-Pakistan War 1965,* 44.

### *Alternative Explanations*

The results of a divided dovish Indian government account for both the outcome of the Kashmir War case as well as the causal process. How do alternative theories fare in explaining this case?

### THE OPPOSITION

The Congress Party's opposition in the Lok Sabha was small but vocal. Congress's position in the legislature had been dominant since the state's inception, and at the time of the Kashmir War in 1965 Congress represented 356 of the body's 506 members, with the next largest party, the Communists, holding a mere 29 seats. The Communists were still reeling from the Border War with China, which created internal divisions in the party. The strongest opposition voices on foreign policy came from the Jan Sangh and Socialist parties, which were consistently more hawkish than Shastri's government.[52]

These facts demonstrate some of the shortcomings of theories that emphasize the role of the opposition. While leaders in Congress certainly took the opposition seriously, due to the overwhelming power Congress wielded in Indian politics, it seems unlikely that foreign leaders would have given them much notice. Further, the inability of these parties to affect any sort of political outcome would seriously diminish their influence on the calculus of foreign leaders. In fact, the opposition would not gain power in India until nearly 30 years after independence.

However, to the extent that opposition leaders did speak out about the crisis with Pakistan, it was to criticize the government for being overly conciliatory. When Pakistani forces invaded Indian territory in the Rann of Kutch, the right-wing Jan Sangh and Praja Socialist parties demanded that the government take action against Pakistan elsewhere. Following the Rann of Kutch conflict, the Jan Sangh heavily criticized the Shastri government for agreeing to international mediation, worrying that such a decision could set a precedent for Kashmir.[53] More generally, Shastri received harsh treatment from the opposition for his handling of the conflict.[54]

The opposition signaling in this case is fairly clear: India should take a harder line with Pakistan, particularly on Kashmir. The opposition repeatedly criticized Shastri for his dovish approach to Pakistan and condemned India's limited response in the Rann of Kutch.  In addition, it called for harsher responses to Pakistani challenges.  However, this clear signal was drowned out by confusion within the Congress party on the appropriate approach to take with Pakistan.

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[52] Singh, *India's Foreign Policy*, Chapter 5.
[53] Jean Alphonse Bernard, *From Raj to the Republic: A Political History of India (1935-2000)* (New Delhi: Har-Anand Publications, 2001), 260.
[54] Srivastava, *Lal Bahadur Shastri*, Chapter 15.

## LEADERSHIP TENURE

Superficially, there is general support for the leadership tenure theory in this case.  However, upon close examination of the causal relationships, this theory proves insufficient.  Lal Shastri was in office less than a year when he was first tested by the Pakistanis.  He was a new leader who was also relatively inexperienced in international relations.  Further, Shastri ruled in the long shadow cast by Nehru, both domestically and with world leaders.  There is also some support for the causal mechanism proposed by Grieco and Gelpi that new leaders are more likely to make concessions than those who have been in office for longer periods of time.[55]

However, when one examines the calculus involved in Pakistan's decision making and the nature of India's signaling, it appears that while leadership tenure contributed to the final outcome it was neither necessary nor sufficient.  Shastri's inexperience may have been a liability for him abroad, but it was an even greater liability for him at home and contributed strongly to his inability to unify his cabinet on key foreign policy issues.  However, in this instance it was far more than just Shastri's naiveté that contributed to creating a fractious cabinet.  More important was the power vacuum left by Nehru and the jostling among those who hoped to succeed what they viewed as a caretaker administration.

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[55] Ibid, 188.

Externally, India under Shastri made an attractive target for Pakistan because of the mixed signals coming out of his regime, not due to his inexperience. Ayub Khan thought they he could pressure Shastri not because he was new, but because he saw him as weak and perhaps willing to make substantial sacrifices for peace. India's weak response in the Rann of Kutch emboldened hard-liners in Pakistan to further challenge Shastri. Ultimately Shastri was unable to effectively negotiate for peace due to his domestic weakness that caused him to send conflicting signals to the Pakistanis. While being a new leader played a role in this, Shastri's character and the divided nature of his government were decisive.

## PUBLIC OPINION

Indian public opinion was deeply stung by the humiliating defeat in the Border War with China. Although public opinion continued to support Nehru after the defeat, the war harmed his public standing significantly. Upon assuming office Shastri could have played to the public by pushing a more militant agenda (as well as undercutting support for the opposition) but he chose not to pursue this route. Public opinion appears to have little impact on Shastri's decision making, as he seemed to constantly defy it, right up to his death in Tashkent.[56]

The Rann of Kutch incursion only served to further inflame Indian public opinion. The perception was that as in the Border War, Indian forces had been routed, allowing the other side to claim an easy victory.[57] Had Shastri heeded the public, following the Rann of Kutch he would have taken a harder-line against Pakistan, but instead he chose to pursue an agreement.

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[56] Singh (*India's Foreign Policy*, 104) notes that while the war itself increase Shastri's popularity, in the negotiations at Tashkent he made a number of concessions he promised not to make. However, his untimely death immediately following the conference minimized criticism in India.

As with the opposition parties, hawkish public opinion was partially obscured by Shastri's divided government. However, there is little to indicate that the Pakistanis were concerned about Indian public opinion when planning their attack. Their model was the Rann of Kutch probe which successfully yielded territory to Pakistan and brought the claim to an international forum. The key figure in Pakistan's calculus was Shastri and not the belligerent Indian public. Once Pakistan attacked in Kashmir, public opinion called for decisive action, but Shastri and his cabinet had already decided India needed to respond forcefully. If anything, the hawkish state of Indian public opinion should have deterred an attack, but this signal was either unheeded or, more likely, obscured by Shastri's divided government.

## BALANCE OF FORCES

The shifting balance of forces in the sub-continent appears to have played a role in the outbreak of hostilities. The embarrassing showing of the Indian military in the border war with China led India to substantially increase its military spending. The military budget increased from 2.1% of GDP in 1961-62 to 4.5% in 1964-65. Focusing the effort on its northern borders, India added ten new mountain divisions to the army and increased the size of its air force.[58] The results of India's increasing military power led to classic security dilemma fears in Pakistan.[59] While India's military increase was in response to the country's disastrous performance in the Border War and was done for primarily defensive reasons, Pakistan viewed the changes more ominously.

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[57] Bernard, *From Raj to the Republic*, 259.

India's increasing military power led Ayub Khan to view the window of opportunity as closing if he wished resolve the Kashmir conflict on terms favorable to Pakistan. In addition, Pakistan recently received new arms from the United States, such as the Patton tanks used in the Rann of Kutch conflict, which it believed would give it the technological edge in the upcoming conflict. The balance of forces was shifting in India's favor, but what is less clear is the impact this fact had on Pakistani action. First, the Border War occurred in 1962, and India's arms build-up began soon thereafter, but Pakistan chose to wait nearly three years to attack. Aid offered to India from the United States and the United Kingom during the war with China allowed them to pressure India to resolve the Kashmir dispute. This foreign pressure led to six rounds of talks under Nehru that ended in 1963 without a settlement. Thus, the end of talks between the two sides appears just as likely to have sparked the conflict as the shifting military balance.

A further problem for the balance of forces argument comes from the outcome of the Rann of Kutch dispute. Pakistan *was* concerned about India's military capabilities, which led to a conflict in the Rann that "could be used as a low cost test of India's will and capabilities."[60] India’s lackluster response to Pakistan’s probe paradoxically indicated to Pakistan that while India might be more powerful, Pakistan would be able to have success against them in a future conflict in Kashmir.

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[58] Sumit Ganguly, *Conflict Unending: India-Pakistan Tensions since 1947* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001), 37.

[59] Robert Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1976), 76.

Shifting balance of forces would have also made a greater contribution to the conflict had Pakistan planned a full-scale war with India. However, the evidence tends to indicate that Pakistan hoped to repeat its success in the Rann with a limited incursion into Kashmir where they could quickly secure territory to make an Indian counter-offensive impossible.[61] Based upon the results in the Rann, where the dispute forced international mediation, Ayub Khan hoped for a similar outcome in Kashmir. This mistaken thinking was a product of incoherent signals from the Shastri government and not a shifting balance of power.

## The Korean War

### *The Conflict*

United States President Harry S. Truman was still licking his wounds from the “loss” of China to communist forces and dealing with the McCarthy-led fallout from China when another conflict erupted in East Asia. In the early morning of June 25, 1950 (early afternoon on the 24th in Washington) North Korea launched an artillery and mortar attack against South Korea. Moving across the 38th parallel, North Korea surprised the South Korean forces to such a degree that the South Korean ambassador to the United States did not learn of the invasion until hours later, through a reporter.[62]

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[60] Blinkenberg, *India-Pakistan*, 246.
[61] Bernard, *From Raj to the Republic*, Chapter 9.

The years leading up to the Korean War showed rising tensions on the Korean peninsula. The conservative President of South Korea Syngman Rhee faced mounting discontent domestically. In October 1948 the uprising of an army unit sent to put down a communist revolt in the southeast led to intensive fighting and 1,000 deaths. Although Rhee won the presidency easily in the country's first election in May 1948, the election was boycotted by the left and Rhee remained deeply unpopular in rural areas as well as with the country's youth. Further, Rhee was under pressure from Acheson to maintain the fragile South Korean democracy.[63]

Externally, border clashes with the North were becoming more frequent. In 1949 Rhee provoked skirmishes along the border in order to justify continued U.S. military presence in the country and the need for military aid, particularly tanks and planes. Unfortunately for him, Rhee's actions led U.S. leaders to become more skeptical of their support for Rhee and worried that military assistance might embolden the South Korean leader to take the fight to the North.[64]

Rhee's self-serving and erratic behavior led to intelligence problems. In the spring and summer of 1950 the South Korean government began to warn American officials that an attack by the North was imminent. Although these warnings were also raised by some in the State Department, the moral hazard problems caused by Rhee's behavior undercut his government's warnings. Thus, despite the high level of tension along the border, U.S. officials greatly discounted the warnings of South Korean officials as ploys for more money.[65]

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[62] Max Hastings, *The Korean War* (London: Michael Joseph, 1987), 49.

[63] Hastings, *The Korean War*, Chapter 1.

[64] William Stueck, *The Korean War: An International History* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995), 28-30. This problem also led the United States to intentionally cripple the South Korean air force and resist providing more planes to inhibit Rhee from attacking the North (Halberstam, *The Coldest Winter*).

The North Koreans, with superior forces and weapons, rapidly swept into South Korea; by the third day of fighting the evacuation of Seoul was ordered and the city was captured the following day. By June 30, less than a week later, due to the deteriorating situation in South Korea, Truman authorized MacArthur to commit all forces necessary for the defense of the country save those required to defend Japan. During the initial invasion the United States also actively courted the support of the United Nations, obtaining a resolution providing for military sanctions against North Korea and requesting assistance for the South on June 27. Eventually, another UN resolution on July 7 created a unified UN force under the command of the United States, in which sixteen nations would eventually take part.[66]

When the North Korean attack came on June 25, Truman's response was rapid. The speed of the American response was a function both of the fear within the administration of potential attacks from the right for allowing a communist takeover of yet another Asian state and the relative ease with which the North Korean forces advanced south. Initially, the United States hoped that it might be able to counter the North Korean offensive solely through the use of airpower, but the extent of the

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[65] Ibid.

[66] Burton Kaufman, *The Korean War: Challenges in Crisis, Credibility, and Command* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1986).

North Korean advance by the end of June showed this to be wishful thinking. North Korean forces advanced at a rate of ten to fifteen miles a day in July. For the first two months of the conflict the American-led forces clung to a small piece of territory in the southeastern portion of the country. The "Pusan Perimeter" halted the North Korean advance and allowed the U.S. and its allies to reinforce their troops.[67]

The tide of the conflict turned on September 15 when U.S. General MacArthur landed Marines at the port city of Inchon just south of the 38th parallel. While the North Korean advance was rapid, it was also costly, as the North suffered approximately 60,000 casualties in the first six weeks of the conflict. The landing at Inchon combined with an offensive out of the southeast allowed the United Nations forces to rout the depleted North Korean forces in the South. By the end of September, Seoul was liberated and UN forces were moving towards the 38th parallel. Although the decision to invade the North was not without controversy, there was strong pressure (see below) on Truman to allow MacArthur to go on the offensive. On October 7, American forces crossed the 38th parallel and by the end of November United Nations forces controlled most of North Korea, as far as the Yalu River border with China in some cases.[68]

Unfortunately for the United States and its allies, the northward advance had triggered what some critics warned might happen: China entered the war. On October 16, Chinese forces crossed the Yalu River and less than two weeks later defeated a group of South Korean troops. As quickly as the U.S. and UN forces moved north, by late November they were rapidly retreating south. On December 31, 1951, Chinese forces were able to recapture Seoul. However, the Chinese became hamstrung by over-extending supply lines, and in January and February of 1952, the U.S. and its allies were able to once again push North Korean and Chinese forces back to the 38th parallel. The war was to drag on for over a year, but the battle lines remained relatively unchanged.[69]

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[67] Peter Lowe, *The Korean War* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000), Chapter 2.
[68] Ibid, Chapter 3.

The Korean War and handling of foreign policy in Asia gave the Republicans an opening through with to attack the Truman administration. Although the basic premises of Eisenhower's foreign policy did not vary significantly from those of Truman, during the campaign in 1952 Republicans were able to effectively attack Democrats over what they portrayed as overly conciliatory policies towards communist regimes. In fact, these were the same issues that dogged Truman prior to the Korean conflict, and the decision to intervene in the conflict was partially in response to these domestic criticisms.[70] Unfortunately for Truman, his administration's posture with respect to East Asia was convoluted and contributed significantly to the belief on the part of North Korea and its supporters in the Soviet Union that an attack on the South would be successful and that the United States would not intervene.

After just over three years later, following the deaths of 33,629 American soldiers, the war stopped with the signing of an armistice between the warring factions. The new American president Dwight D. Eisenhower made good on his campaign promise to bring the increasingly unpopular war to an end after a mere half a year in office. The results of the "century's nastiest little war," as General S.L.A. Marshall called it, was a division of Korea along the 38th parallel, essentially returning the border of the two states to the status quo ante. Despite the end of open warfare between the two sides, the Korean War never saw a formal peace treaty and the hostilities exhibited during the war have continued to manifest themselves in relations between the North, South and United States since the division of the peninsula.[71]

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[69] Ibid, Chapters 4 and 5.
[70] Ronald J. Caridi, *The Korean War and American Politics: The Republican Party as a Case Study* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1968).

### *Divided Government and Mixed Signals*

Although Truman, like Shastri, entered office following a dominant figure in the state's domestic and foreign policy, the difference was not nearly as pronounced as in the Indian case. Although Truman was not as powerful as Roosevelt, he still carried a great deal of weight within the government. Thus, the divisions within the Truman administration did not flow, as they did in the Indian case, from a weak leader unable to unite a government that included a number of ministers seeking to take the helm. Rather, the problems of the Truman administration stemmed from the government's inability to form a coherent policy with respect to Korea and the mixed signals various key officials sent with regard to the defense of South Korea.

It is difficult to discuss the U.S. problems in Korea without also discussing the situation in China. The conflict between Chaing Kai-Shek's Nationalists and Mao Tse-tung's Communists deeply divided the Administration over the correct role for the United States in the conflict. Some argued that the conflict was purely a Chinese matter and that Mao's forces were more nationalist than communist. On the other side were those who believed that Mao's victory represented just another step in the advancing communist threat. Thus, while the United States did not provide extensive military support to Chaing's forces, it did provide extensive funding.[72]

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[71] Hastings, *The Korean War*.

With the communist victory in China, Truman's administration came under heavy pressure from the "China lobby" in the Republican Party, which argued that the administration had not done enough to prevent the communist takeover. As the fear of communism grew in the United States, the question became "Who lost China?" and rabid anti-communist Joseph McCarthy pinned the blame squarely on the Truman administration and the State Department in particular. The loss of China put the administration on the defensive in its foreign policy, and it was reluctant to suffer another similar communist success. Unfortunately, while the administration sought to avoid such a predicament, the underlying differences over how to approach the Chinese civil war carried over into East Asian policy in general.

While Truman did not enter the same political vacuum Shastri did, he also took office lacking extensive foreign policy experience. His foreign policy background came primarily from his time as the head of the so-called Truman Committee investigating fraud and corruption in military spending during World War II. His lack of foreign policy experience meant that Truman was forced to rely heavily on his advisors, although once he was presented with options he was generally able to take a decisive stance on the issue.[73] Truman's reliance on his advisors made it all the more difficult for him to tamp down differences that existed on policy towards East Asia.

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[72] Tang Tsou, *America's Failure in China, 1941-50* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963). Chaing constantly pressured the administration for more funds and also used allies in the Republican Party to argue that if the administration could find money for Greece and Turkey to stem communism, money could also be found to 'save' China.

One of the most significant problems facing the United States in forming a coherent policy towards East Asia was the high level of turnover at the top of the State Department. Upon taking office following Roosevelt's death, Truman inherited Roosevelt's Secretary of State Edward Stettinius. Truman quickly replaced Stettinius with his own choice, James Byrnes from South Carolina. During Byrnes' 18 months as Secretary of State he often clashed with Truman, who felt that Byrnes had become overly independent in his conduct of U.S. foreign policy and had taken to informing Truman of decisions after the fact.[74] As the gap between the two men widened, Byrnes was forced to resign his cabinet position and Truman filled the vacancy with the esteemed but aging George Marshall who was extremely loyal to Truman. Then in 1949 Truman replaced Marshall with Dean Acheson. Truman and Acheson held similar views and over time Truman's support of Acheson became critical as the Secretary of State came under attack from Senator McCarthy and the China lobby. Thus, from when he took office in 1945 until the beginning of the Korean War in

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[73] Cecil Crabb Jr. and Kevin Mulcahy, *Presidents and Foreign Policy Making: From FDR to Reagan* (Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University Press, 1986).

[74] Truman later said of Brynes, "the Secretary of State should never at any time come to think that he is the man in the White House, and the President should not try to be the Secretary of State." Quoted in Paige, 1968, 25.

1950, Truman had four different Secretaries of State with significantly varied views on the proper conduct of international relations.[75]

Not only was there a high turnover in the State Department leading up to the Korean war, but this turnover occurred while serious turf battles were taking place between the well-established State Department and the newly formed Department of Defense. Under the best conditions the creation of this new bureaucracy with foreign policy implications would have led to conflicts with the existing bureaucracy. However, these turf battles were exacerbated by the men at the heads of the respective departments, Acheson at State and Louis Johnson at Defense. Acheson had taken his post with hopes of restoring the State Department to its status as *primus inter pares* in the executive bureaucracy.[76] He believed that the status of the department declined during the Roosevelt era and was concerned that new bureaucracies like the Department of Defense, Central Intelligence Agency, and National Security Agency would encroach on the State Department's traditional purview.[77]

On the other side of this power struggle was Louis Johnson, Truman's second secretary of defense. Johnson was widely seen as an ambitious political operator who made little secret of his desire to parley his service as defense secretary into the position of the Democratic presidential nominee in 1952. On direct orders from Truman, Johnson was instructed to increase the profile of the Department of Defense within the foreign policy bureaucracy, an instruction that would inevitably lead to a clash with Acheson. Some administration observers believe that Truman intentionally pitted his Secretaries of Defense and State against each other in order to help him see issues from different points of view.[78]

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[75] Crabb Jr. and Mulcahy, 1986, Chapter 4.
[76] Glenn Paige, *The Korean Decision* (New York: The Free Press, 1968), Chapter 2.
[77] Crabb Jr. and Mulcahy, *Presidents and Foreign Policy Making*, 140.

While creating such rivalries may benefit policy debates, the differences between Johnson and Acheson rapidly spun out of control. While neither man was in office for very long by the time the Korean crisis erupted (Acheson 18 months and Johnson 16) animosity had quickly developed between them. By early 1950 it was well known that the two men were on poor terms with one another and Johnson had taken to publicly criticizing Acheson over the State Department's lack of a clear policy towards China. Officials in the State Department began to believe that Johnson was responsible for providing anti-Acheson material to hostile Republican Senators.[79]

The differences between Acheson and Johnson extended beyond personal animosity to broad differences on how to handle Korea. Acheson, and by extension many analysts in the State Department, saw U.S. commitment to South Korea as vital to U.S. interests in East Asia and consequently pressed for U.S. support for the weak state. In June 1949 Acheson sought $150 million for Korea but the measure was narrowly defeated in the House, which questioned the country's strategic value.[80] The State Department launched a serious public relations offensive for the aid in which South Korea was portrayed as the last chance for the U.S. to take a stand in

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[78] Paige, *The Korean Decision,* Chapter 2.
[79] Ibid.
[80] Jongsuk Chay, *Unequal Partners in Peace and War: The Republic of Korea and War* (Westport, CT: Preager, 2002), 142.

East Asia, essentially replacing China with Korea. The aid was eventually restored in February 1950, by extending the deadline for the expenditure of funds for Nationalist China, but Acheson believed the initial defeat was significant. He would later attribute the failure of the aid bill as a significant factor in encouraging the attack on South Korea.[81]

While Acheson supported maintaining the U.S. commitment to South Korea, this stance was significantly undercut by his heralded foreign policy address at the National Press Club on January 12, 1950. In the speech Acheson outlined the United States' defense perimeter in Asia, including the Philippines, the Ryukyus, and Japan. As far as other U.S. commitments in the region, Acheson notably excluded South Korea and argued, "[to] guarantee these areas against military attack...is hardly sensible or necessary."[82] Further, the speech was in line with NSC 48, which sought to distinguish U.S. commitments in Asia based upon those states the U.S. would defend, such as Japan, and those where the U.S. had questions about the costs and strategic importance.[83] Further, as Gaddis Smith notes, this defense perimeter had already been enunciated by MacArthur, and "Acheson was stating the obvious fact and was repeating what General MacArthur had publicly said."[84]

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[81] Paige, *The Korean Decision*, 35.

[82] Quoted in Gregory D. Hess and Athanasios Orphanides, "War and Democracy," *Journal of Political Economy* 109, no. 4 (2001), 12. A debate exists about the significance of Acheson's speech in opening the door for the North Korean invasion. Immediately after the invasion the Press Club speech as portrayed as giving the green light to North Korea. While taking a more nuanced view, George and Smoke in their seminal study of deterrence failure, argue that Acheson's speech significantly undercut U.S. deterrence attempts in South Korea. Historian Bruce Cummings assails this view, positing that Acheson was playing a complex game that included the restraint of Rhee and that many in North Korea and the Soviet Union (and the United States) believed that Acheson had included South Korea in the defense perimeter. The current study places Acheson's comments in the larger context of administration policy towards South Korea, and to this extent, the particular interpretation is not critically important. However, the opening of Soviet archives has provided new information (see below) that supports the theory that Acheson's speech served to embolden those backing of Kim's invasion plan.

[83] Charles M. Dobbs, "Limiting Room to Maneuver: The Korea Assistance Act of 1949 " *Historian* 48, no. 4 (1986).

In early May, the chair of the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Tom Connally, stated that it was likely that South Korea would be overrun by the communist North whether the U.S. wanted it or not. Following this rather surprising admission, Acheson refused to commit the United States to the defense of the South in the event of such an attack.[85] Thus, even State Department, which was the strongest defender of the Korean cause within the Truman administration, was not entirely convinced of its value to the United States.

The Department of Defense had its own contradictory approach to Korea. While the State Department pushed for a stronger U.S. commitment to Korea, the reaction of the military and Secretary of Defense Johnson was geared toward reducing the American presence. In 1947, Eisenhower argued that the U.S. should make a serious military commitment to Korea, but later that year he signed off on a Joint Chiefs of Staff memorandum that stated that Korea was of "little strategic interest" and that U.S. troops should be withdrawn.[86] The same year, Secretary of War Robert Patterson said he saw little U.S. interest in Korea and worked to transfer responsibility for the mission to the State Department so troops could be drawn down.

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[84] Gaddis Smith, *Dean Acheson* (New York: Cooper Square Publishers, 1972), 176. According to Smith following the uproar that he was responsible for "greenlighting" the invasion Acheson took to carrying the MacArthur quote around with him to furnish for critics.
[85] Stueck, *The Korean War*, 36-37.
[86] William Stueck, *Rethinking the Korean War: A New Diplomatic and Strategic History* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002), 53.

The view that U.S. troops should be removed from Korea as quickly as possible remained the position of the military until the outbreak of hostilities.[87]

The desire to bring U.S. troops home from Korea was partially due to the view in the Pentagon that Korea was not of strategic value to the United States, but also due to the significant budgetary constraints Truman placed on the military. In addition to raising the profile of the Department of Defense, the other significant task Truman gave Johnson was to reduce the military's budget. Johnson was such a budget hawk that he was accused by Congress of asking Truman for far less money for the military than Truman was in fact willing to offer. These budget reductions made it increasingly difficult for the United States to keep soldiers in Korea. As tensions increased both between North and South and between the government and communists in the South, the US military also worried that the limited number of U.S. military personnel were put at an unnecessary risk by remaining in Korea.[88] Stein argues that this fits a pattern of the United States undertaking global commitments, such as Korea following World War II, but not being willing to fund them.[89]

While the removal of the last Soviet troops from the peninsula at the end of 1948 put pressure on the U.S. to follow suit, the decision to withdraw the troops was controversial. Thus, it was not until six months later in June 1949 that the United

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[87] Ibid.

[88] Ibid.

[89] Arthur A. Stein, "Domestic Constraints, Extended Deterrence, and the Incoherence of Grand Strategy: The United States, 1938-1950," in *The Domestic Bases of Grand Strategy* ed. Richard N. Rosecrance and Arthur A. Stein, *Cornell Studies in Security Affairs* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993), 113.

States had removed all its troops and only a small number of military advisors remained in South Korea. The decision was opposed by the State Department and, not surprisingly, South Korean leader Syngman Rhee.[90] Thus, the administration was deeply divided on a key policy decision that would greatly influence the calculations of the Soviets and North Koreans.

In addition to divisions over the strategic significance of Korea, the importance of keeping U.S. troops there, and the willingness of the United States to come to the defense of the Rhee regime, there were also great debates within the administration over the nature of Soviet and communist threats. While Truman and hawks in the Department of Defense increasingly viewed the Soviets as risk acceptant, and thus a greater threat, Sovietologist George Kennan and Acheson viewed much of what passed for communism in nationalist terms. With respect to Korea, this led to significantly different perceptions of the threat posed by the North and the implications of a potential attack by the North on the South.[91]

Finally, while the administration was bedeviled by its internal divisions, the opposition Republicans and public opinion were putting increasing pressure on the administration. While many of these attacks were successfully deflected, most notably the calls for Acheson's removal, these outside attacks did cause Truman to look for ways to increase bipartisanship in foreign policy, which led to the appointment of John Foster Dulles as a consultant to the State Department in April, 1950. Both Truman and Acheson disliked Dulles, but more importantly, Dulles' hard-line approach to communism, and problems in East Asia in particular, increased the rift within the State Department over the correct approach to Korea.[92]

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[90] Stueck, *Rethinking the Korean War*.
[91] Hastings, *The Korean War*.

### *Dovish Government*

The legacy of Harry Truman is hardly that of a dove. His decision to use the atomic bomb against Japan and to send U.S. troops to defend South Korea lead current accounts of his administration to emphasize his cold warrior mentality. However, as we have already noted, there were significant divisions within the Truman administration over how to best approach the situation in Korea. Certainly there were a broad range of opinions expressed by members of the administration, ranging from hawks like Johnson and Dulles to doves like Acheson. What is critical for the purposes of this study is the Truman administration's rhetoric and actions with regards to Korea.

Perhaps most notable with respect to Truman's hawkishness is the fact that on many of the important decisions related to Korea he sided with his Secretary of State, who was one of the most dovish members of the administration. Thus, while Truman enjoyed pitting Acheson against hawks like Johnson, his warm personal relationship with Acheson led him to favor the State Department's point of view. Moreover, Truman's strong working relationship with Acheson meant that he trusted the Secretary of State to express the administration's views on foreign policy. This meant that Truman either supported or did not contradict Acheson's National Press

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[92] Rosemary Foot, *The Wrong War: American Policy and the Dimensions of the Korean Conflict, 1950-1953* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1985).

Club speech excluding Korea from the U.S. defense perimeter and the controversial NSC 48.

While Truman and Acheson broadly agreed in their outlook on foreign policy, their views on Korea diverged not because of differences in ideology, but rather in fiscal matters. Truman wanted to sustain Rhee's friendly government in Seoul, but this desire was eclipsed by his interest in holding the line on the U.S. defense budget. In general terms, Truman was not yet able to reconcile the Truman Doctrine's admonition that "free peoples of the world look to us for support in maintaining their freedoms," with the costs that such support would entail.[93] Thus his pragmatic approach to foreign policy turned dovish when it came to implementation.

Equally significant was the fact that Truman's opponents worked hard to emphasize the dovishness of the President and his Secretary of State. Particularly galling for some Republicans was Acheson's reluctance to increase U.S. commitment to China, which led to the charge that the Truman administration "lost China". This charge was combined with McCarthy's Red Scare aimed at what he believed were communist sympathizers, particularly in the State Department. The result was that Truman, Acheson, and Johnson found themselves constantly on the defensive in the year-and-a-half leading up to the Korean conflict.

Acheson was portrayed as an appeaser who was soft on communism. He was tainted in the eyes of conservative Republicans by his failure to renounce his friendship with communist Alger Hiss. McCarthy and his supporters called for

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[93] Stein, "Domestic Constraints, Extended Deterrence, and the Incoherence of Grand Strategy," 121.

Acheson's resignation, which Truman refused.[94] On the other hand, Truman and Johnson's desire to reign in defense spending raised the ire of Republicans who believed that this left the U.S. vulnerable to the communists.[95]

In general Republican foreign policy leaders like Dulles expressed a much greater desire to roll back communism and contrasted their approach with the Democrat's acceptance of communism, as expressed by the containment doctrine. This assertiveness in Republican foreign policy was first on display in the Chinese civil war, in which the China Lobby, unofficially led by California Senator William Knowland, refused to accept the defeat of Chaing's forces and believed that U.S. support would allow them to retake portions of the mainland.[96] Republican leaders like Ohio Senator Taft made it known that the 1950 congressional elections and the 1952 presidential election (where Taft hoped to lead the Republican ticket) would be referendums on Truman's foreign policy.[97]

### *The Impact of Disunity on the United States' Ability to Signal*

How did the Truman administration's inner turmoil impact the outbreak of the Korean War? The theory proposed here argues that government unity, or lack thereof, influences four types of signaling mechanisms available to states in a territorial conflict. What that in mind, each result of government disunity will be examined in detail for the Korean War.

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[94] Crabb Jr. and Mulcahy, *Presidents and Foreign Policy Making*, Chapter 4.
[95] Hastings, *The Korean War*, Chapter 1.
[96] Knowland's unwavering support of the Nationalist cause led him to be dubbed the "Senator from Formosa."
[97] Caridi, *The Korean War and American Politics*, Chapter 1.

## INTENTIONS

From the end of the Second World War until the outbreak of the Korean War, the Truman administration was divided on how to proceed in East Asia generally and Korea in particular. These divisions, combined with the administration's dovishness, meant that it could not effectively signal its intentions in Korea to either the North Koreans or the Soviets. As early as 1947, the *New York Times* editorialized that the U.S. had exacerbated the problems in Korea through "confusion, delay, and neglect," and that South Korea represented "democracies' forgotten front."[98] Secretary of State Acheson and the State Department bureaucracy argued that Korea was vital to American interests and worth significant expenditures by the U.S. government. On the other side, the U.S. military was keen to reduce its commitment to South Korea so that it could focus its limited resources elsewhere. While Acheson stressed U.S. commitment, the U.S. Congress blocked aid for South Korea and the military removed the last U.S. troops. However, even Acheson failed to be consistent in his views on Korea, declining the opportunity to express U.S. support for the South when confronted with the hypothetical case of a North Korean attack.

Under such conditions it was not just the Soviets and Chinese who were confused – even US ally Britain had difficulty discerning U.S. intentions. A British War office assessment of the situation in Korea in December 1949 stated, "Regarding

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[98] *New York Times*, March 12, 1947.

American policy, if in fact one exists, towards South Korea, I can only say we know little, and of their future intentions even less..."[99] This constituted damning criticism indeed from an ally but not the core problem faced by the United States.

U.S. intentions in Korea were hamstrung by the disputes over the country's strategic value. Was South Korea a last bastion of capitalism and democracy in continental Asia or an insignificant distraction from U.S. interests elsewhere in East Asia? Once again, the Department of Defense pushed for withdrawal from Korea and considered the stakes relatively small. This image was so ingrained in the United States military that two days after the initial North Korean attack, General MacArthur told the press that anyone who advocated for the U.S. to challenge a Communist power on the Asian continent "ought to have his head examined."[100] The British War Office noted the Americans' confusion:

> Whilst being in no doubt about future North Korean (or Soviet) plans regarding South Korea, we think an invasion is unlikely in the immediate view; however if it did take place, I think it improbable that the Americans would become involved. The possession of South Korea is not essential for Allied strategic plans, and though it would obviously be desirable to deny it to the enemy, it would not be of sufficient importance to make it the cause of World War III.[101]

Of course, the State Department made the South Koreans' case in Washington, although as noted above there was significant confusion. Acheson's advocacy for South Korea was muted by the fact that his primary area of interest was

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[99] Quoted in Hastings, *The Korean War*, 39.

[100] Quoted in Stueck, *The Korean War*, 44. Ironically, MacArthur had made a speech similar to Acheson's Press Club address where he said the United States' defense perimeter in Asia excluded Korea (Catchpole, *The Korean War, 1950-53*, 11). Of course, MacArthur was quick to change his tune as subsequent events would show.

[101] Quoted in Hastings, *The Korean War*, 39.

Europe, not Asia.[102] While he fought for funding for Rhee's government and opposed removing American troops, he believed that the most important battles of the Cold War would play out in Europe, particularly as the internal situations in Greece and Turkey deteriorated.[103] The question loomed in the State Department, was Korea as important to the United States as Greece or Turkey? In making his case for economic aid to Korea, Acheson painted a gloomy picture of what might occur if the U.S. chose to withhold funding; however he was still unable to sway Congressional opinion, while the administration was readily able to secure funding for Greece and Turkey.[104]

The paradoxes of hawks and doves in the Korean conflict were on full display in the discussion of the stakes involved. Hawks were in favor of rolling back communism in general, and in China specifically, but did not see Korea as a focal point in that mission. On the other side, doves believed that communism could be contained, that China was lost, but that the U.S. should support Korea as a fledgling democracy. These internal contradictions in both camps only served to muddy an already complex picture of American stakes in Korea.

## WEAKNESS

While dovish leaders presiding over divided governments are more likely to be labeled as weak, of the three results of disunity in the Korean case, there is the least amount of evidence for weakness. While Republican critics of the administration argued that Truman and Acheson were weak and appeased the communists, this was largely a domestic issue. Domestically, the “loss” of China fed into a Republican narrative that the Democrats were not doing enough to stop the spread of international communism. In 1950, an election year, these attacks became particularly shrill as Republicans were preparing to make this a central election issue.

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[102] Crabb Jr. and Mulcahy, *Presidents and Foreign Policy Making*, 144
[103] Stueck, *Rethinking the Korean War,* 59.
[104] Ibid, 78.

There is evidence that the speed and decisiveness of Truman’s decision to involve the United States in the Korean War was driven by domestic factors. Historian Gary Donaldson argues that "Truman's decision to intervene was made quickly - some have said possibly too quickly. However, faced with a foreign policy stance and a domestic political climate that left him little room for contemplation or reflection, it should be no surprise that his decision to intervene was a quick one."[105] Truman’s hasty action on Korea would do little to silence his Republican critics, and criticism of Acheson and the State Department was widespread. Thus, while weakness was not an important factor externally, it was critical to the perceptions of the Truman administration in its domestic political battle with the opposition.

## DECISIVE ACTION

Divided governments are expected to take contradictory actions and fail to act decisively in crises. The Truman administration was aware of the significant problems facing the Rhee government both internally and externally. Acheson was particularly troubled by Rhee’s increasing authoritarian tendencies and, in April 1950, threatened to withhold aid if elections were not held.[106] In addition to the numerous border clashes, the United States received intelligence that the North was planning an attack. One historian notes that despite all of this:

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[105] Gary Donaldson, *America at War since 1945: Politics and Diplomacy in Korea, Vietnam, and the Gulf War* (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1996), 15.

> U.S. signals on Korea had been ambiguous. During 1949 the United States withdrew its last occupation troops from the peninsula, and it responded coolly to overtures by the Philippines, Nationalist China, and South Korea regarding a 'Pacific Pact' along the lines of NATO.[107]

Indeed, as previously noted, the removal of American troops over the objections of the State Department and Rhee sent a powerful signal. Similarly, although the aid was eventually approved, the initial refusal of funds for South Korea was damning.

Part of the vexing problem that the U.S. faced in South Korea was due to the fact that Rhee presented them with a moral hazard problem. In order to obtain maximum support from the United States, Rhee had incentives to paint the direst picture possible and emphasize the threats facing his regime. Should this prove insufficient, Rhee was not above engaging in skirmishes with North Korean forces to dramatize his plight.[108] This point is also emphasized by Cummings when he argues that Acheson intentionally excluded South Korea from the United States defense perimeter in order to restrain Rhee from attacking North Korea and expecting U.S. assistance.[109] The upshot was that the U.S. could not necessarily trust warnings and intelligence from the South Korean government, a fact that made decisive action more difficult even without a deeply divided government.

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[106] Stueck, *The Korean War,* 36.
[107] Ibid, 35.
[108] Ibid, 30.
[109] Bruce Cummings, *The Origins of the Korean War*, vol. II (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990).

However, comments by a number of top officials in the United States made it clear that they considered Rhee's situation in South Korea to be perilous. The United States was well aware that North Korea was receiving tanks, artillery, and planes from the Soviet Union. In addition, the end of the Chinese civil war meant that the North Korean army would benefit from an additional 60,000 troops filling its ranks.[110] Despite this significant shift in the military balance, the United States undertook no significant action to signal their military commitment to South Korea. George and Smoke's analysis of the causes of the Korean War places particular emphasis on the failure of the United States to respond to the North Korean arms build-up. According to the authors, the lack of American response is particularly troubling given that both Truman and Acheson acknowledged that they were aware the North would eventually attack the South.[111]

### *The View from North Korean and the Soviet Union*

There is significant evidence that the United States was sending mixed signals about its policy on South Korea, but how were these interpreted by North Korea and its Soviet supporters? The signals of the United States do not appear to have had a strong impact on the views of North Korea leader Kim Il-sung. As Cummings notes, North Korea's state-run newspaper misinterpreted Acheson's Press Club speech, writing that “Those countries inside what he called a defense line, meaning those subjugated countries, Japan, the Philippines, and South Korea, such countries would be America's 'direct responsibilities' [for defense]."[112] However, Kim’s supporters in Moscow were much more cautious about a war on the Korean peninsula.

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[110] Ibid, 30.
[111] Alexander L. George and Richard Smoke, *Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974), 163-165.

A debate exists between historians about the role of the Soviet Union in the Korean War. Scholars writing during and directly after the war tended to view North Korea as little more than a Soviet pawn. Revisionist historians, like Cummings, downplay the role of the Soviets while emphasizing the autonomy of the North Koreans in deciding to go to war. The opening of the Soviet archives has led to the view that while Kim initiated the plan to go to war, he needed Soviet support to carry out his scheme. Since this viewpoint provides both a middle ground between the Soviet-controlled and North Korean-controlled camps and is based on the latest archival data, it will serve as the basis for this analysis.

Kim first approach Stalin with his plans in March 1949 and Stalin quickly rejected them, noting that the continued presence of American soldiers in the country made U.S. intervention likely. In September of the same year, Kim asked Stalin again but was rebuffed for fear that the West might intervene.[113] The Soviet Politburo’s response claimed that a North Korean attack would “give the Americans a pretext for all kinds of interference into Korean affairs.”[114] However, by early 1950

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[112] *Worker's News*, January 25, 1950. Cummings also notes that the New York Times also got it wrong, writing, "Second, there is the area of direct American responsibility - the 'defense perimeter' running through occupied Japan, Korea, Okinawa and the friendly Philippines.” (*New York Times*, January 13, 1950).
[113] Alan Levine, *Stalin's Last War: Korea and the Approach to World War Iii* (Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Company, Inc., 2005), 38.
[114] Quoted in *The Cold War International History Bulletin* 6/7, 87.

Stalin had changed his tune. On January 28, 1950 Stalin received intelligence that the U.S. would not intervene in the case of an attack on the South.[115] Two days later, Stalin informed his ambassador in Pyongyang:

> I understand the unhappiness of comrade Kim Il Sung, but he must understand that such a large matter regarding South Korea . . . requires thorough preparation. It has to be organized in such a way that there will not be a large risk. If he wants to talk to me on this issue, then I'll always be ready to receive him and talk to him. . . . I am prepared to help him in this matter.[116]

This was followed by Kim's third visit asking permission to attack the South in April 1950. Unfortunately, the notes on these meetings have not been found in the Soviet archives, however through interviews with those familiar with the negotiations and other reports, scholars concluded that one of the key reasons Stalin chose to support the attack was "a perceived weakening of Washington's positions and of its will to get involved militarily in Asia."[117]

Historian William Stueck offers two reasons why Stalin now viewed conditions as ripe for an attack. First, the end of the Chinese civil war would allow China to contribute troops if necessary.[118] Second, Stalin noted that, "According to information coming out of the United States the prevailing mood is not to interfere."[119] Stalin was referencing both Acheson's speech to the National Press Club which conspicuously omitted South Korea and NSC 48 which seemed to question Korea's strategic importance.[120] For those who downplay the significance of Acheson's speech, Alan Levine notes that "Acheson's remarks were merely the latest and most authoritative expression of a policy based on holding an offshore island perimeter and a refusal to guarantee the defense of South Korea."[121] Although Stalin told Kim to also check with the Chinese before he took action, the key authorization had already been given.

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[115] Steven Hugh Lee, *The Korean War* (New York: Longman, 2001), 43.
[116] Quoted in *The Cold War International History Bulletin* 6/7, 87.
[117] Ibid.
[118] Steuck, *Rethinking the Korean War,* Chapter 3.
[119] Quoted in Stueck, *Rethinking the Korean War,* 73.

North Korea could not contemplate attacking the South without Soviet backing – Stalin's support was vital to Kim. Although there were a number of hawkish pronouncements emanating from the United States in 1950, particularly from Congressional Republicans, Stalin was interested in the intentions of the State Department. The Defense Department had repeatedly made its intentions known and the removal of U.S. troops provided a key indicator that Johnson wished to minimize the American commitment to South Korea. The divisions within the administration allowed Stalin to ignore the substantial evidence that the Democrats in the government could not tolerate another "loss" in the Cold War.

Just as U.S. indecision allowed Stalin to grant Kim permission for an attack, the U.S. might have avoided a confrontation by striking a deal with the Soviets to reign in North Korea just after the war began. Acheson was working on such a deal, but leaked his letter to Moscow to the press before Stalin could respond, torpedoing any deal because the Soviets would face public humiliation. In a more unified dovish administration, Acheson might have been able to make a deal with the Soviets, but the hawks in the administration and fears of Republican reaction killed the talks.[122]

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[120] The exclusion of South Korea from NSC 48 (dated December 30, 1949, shortly before Acheson's speech) further shows that the omission of South Korea was not a mistake. NSC 48 notes,

> The United States should act to develop and strengthen the security of the area from Communist external aggression or internal subversion. These steps should take into account any benefits to the security of Asia which may flow from the development of one or more regional groupings. The United States on its own initiative should now:
> (1) Improve the United States position with respect to Japan, the Ryukyus and the Philippines." (*Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1216)

[121] Levine, *Stalin's Last War*, 38.

While U.S. intentions were confused from the perspective of the Soviets, the inability to take decisive action further emboldened those pushing for an attack. Just as Stalin came to believe that the United States would not become involved in the conflict, he also saw no movement from the United States to counter the military build-up in the North. Thus, the Kremlin's rebuff of Kim in September 1950 was based both on the probability of U.S. intervention and insufficient North Korean strength. After Moscow began assisting Pyongyang with military aid in February 1950, no comparable support was offered by the Americans.

Though there is little evidence that Mao, Stalin, or Kim viewed Truman as weak and thus easy to bully, they did perceive the United States as unwilling to fight. On Dec. 16, 1949, Stalin told Mao, "The Americans are afraid of war. The Americans ask other countries to fight the war, but other countries are also afraid to fight a war."[123] This shows the extent to which divisions within the U.S. government and its general dovishness fed into Soviet perceptions. Views of the U.S. as gun-shy combined with signals that the U.S. would not intervene in a possible conflict to provide a rationale for Soviet support of North Korean adventurism.

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[122] Burton Kaufman, *The Korean War: Challenges in Crisis, Credibility, and Command* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1986), 38.
[123] Lee, *The Korean War,* 41.

### *Alternative Explanations*

Although a number of alternative explanations exist for the outbreak of the Korean War, all of them have significant limitations in their explanatory power.

### THE OPPOSITION

Although the Republicans played an important role in the Korean War, it was hardly in the manner that Schultz anticipated.[124] Schultz's model posits that when the government and opposition both offer support for a particular claim, this sends a significantly stronger signal than in the case when only the government makes such a claim. In the case of Korea, U.S. support for South Korea would have been more credible had both the government and opposition clearly backed such a policy. In fact, the Korean case shows that the judgment of the U.S. position was based much more on the government than on the views of the opposition.

When Stalin gave Kim the go-ahead for the invasion of South Korea, his decision was based not on the statements of Republican congressional leaders, but on those of the Secretary of State and National Security Administration. In fact, examining Republican statements on Korea would have only been marginally useful, since the party was not united in their views on defending the South. In general terms though, the Republicans were the more hawkish party, but the Korean case also shows why foreign leaders might be inclined to discount statements made by the opposition. By 1950, Republican (and Democratic) rhetoric on foreign policy reflected the necessities of the midterm elections, and thus bluster was to be expected.[125] Foreign leaders like Mao, Stalin, and Kim could be forgiven if they weren't sure whether or not the statements being made by the opposition reflected their true interests or simply the necessities of drawing distinctions for the campaign.

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[124] Schultz does not include Korea in his cases of extended deterrence, but does include US defensive actions in Taiwan during the crisis.

Ironically, though, the opposition in this case was more hawkish that the government, so it should have sent a strong message about the willingness of the United States to combat communist advances. On the other hand, as this example makes clear, the opposition is particularly marginalized when the government is as internally divided as the United States was in this case. Just within the State Department there were conflicting messages being sent about the value of Korea. Moreover, the public battles between the Secretaries of Defense and State only added to the confusion of those seeking to predict the American response to an invasion.

## LEADERSHIP TENURE

Grieco and Gelpi's theory posits that democracies are more likely to be the targets of international aggression due to the relative inexperience of their leaders. Since the public is more likely to remember losses suffered than gains, democratic leaders will be more likely to make concessions early in their terms when elections are in the distant future. Over time, democratic leaders are more likely to offer stiff resistance to challenges, making them less likely to be successful.

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[125] Republican Senator William Knowland, called the election, "A solemn referendum by the American people on our far-eastern policy - past, present, and future." Quoted in Caridi, *The Korean War and American Politics*, 77.

In the Korean context it seems unlikely that Truman's tenure was a significant factor in Soviet and North Korean calculations. For starters, by 1950 Truman was a known commodity who had been in office for five years and personally dealt with Stalin. According to the logic of the theory, it would have made much more sense to challenge Truman in 1948 following his narrow win over Dewey than in 1950. Furthermore, 1950 was an election year, meaning that Truman perceived his room to negotiate as significantly restricted, particularly due to Republican attacks on his foreign policy as "appeasement".[126]

The implications of divided government show that the ability of governments to deal or stand firm is contingent upon their ability to rally around one of these options. Many aspects of the U.S. policy towards Korea in the late 1940s indicate that the U.S. would have liked to strike a deal with the Soviets over the division of the peninsula rather than employ force. However, forging a consensus in the administration in support of this viewpoint was impossible. On the other hand, the notion of standing firm was undercut by the previously noted irony that the hawks in this situation sought to cut U.S. responsibilities to South Korea while doves hoped for further support. In the end, the ability of the government to take a decisive path to prevent conflict was undercut by internal divisions.

## PUBLIC OPINION

In *Democracies at War,* Reiter and Stam argue that in democracies leaders follow public opinion in their decision making – challenging other states when public opinion is hawkish and seeking negotiations when the public is dovish. In the Korean context we would expect that public opinion would have to appear permissive in order for Stalin and Kim to believe that the U.S. would not respond to an attack on the South. In fact, the Korean War demonstrates one of the shortcomings of a theory of international relations based on public opinion. In order to gain theoretical traction with Reiter and Stam's theory, it is necessary for the public to have a strong opinion on the issue at hand. In the case of Korea, as Acheson was constantly reminded, the battle was not just to obtain funding for Rhee's government, but also to raise public awareness of the problems facing the new state. With the Berlin Blockade and communist victory in China in 1949, as well as the ongoing worries about the communist threat to Greece and Turkey, the American public saw its attention divided among multiple fronts.

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[126] Caridi, *The Korean War and American Politics*.

In general terms, the American public was strongly anti-communist and favored efforts to prevent future communist advances around the world. Republican politicians hoped to effectively parlay these fears into electoral gains in the elections of 1950. However, while Republican hawkishness might have given them an electoral edge, neither party had a clear platform for dealing with Korea. Thus, it is not surprising that with substantial divisions within and between the two parties the American public did not have strong views on the unfolding crisis in Korea.[127]

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[127] Such unsettled public opinion in response to unclear elite signaling is in line with scholarship by Zaller (*The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion*).

However, once Truman declared that the United States would work with the United Nations to defend South Korea, public opinion rallied.[128] In his seminal study on U.S. public opinion and war, Mueller argues, "To deal with this uncertainty and indecision, many in the population grope for cues on which to base their opinion. The perceived issue position of various opinion leaders is very often taken as an important guide…the most important by far is the president."[129] Mueller goes on to criticize at length the idea that public opinion might constrain a leader's decision to go to war, saying:

> The principle motivating element in the public response to the Korean decision was similar to that in Vietnam – desire to support the country's leadership in time of trouble, the rally-round-the-flag phenomenon. . . . It also suggests that as long as the president has the power to commit troops, proposals that suggest wars would be avoided if the public (or Congress) were required to vote on their desirability are naïve. After the commitment, there is a strong tendency to support the leadership. Even votes taken before the commitment is made are likely to be heavily influenced by the position of the leadership.[130]

Based on Mueller's research it seems much more likely that public opinion was following elite opinion rather than driving it. Eric Larson's research confirms this point as he shows that the initial bipartisan support for the war faded after Chinese entry into the war, and the increasing elite partisan divide was reflected in public opinion.[131] In the end, while the American public may have been generally hard-line and unwilling to prevent further communist advances, this potential signal was obscured to foreign observers by the incoherent policies of the Truman administration.

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[128] Gary Donaldson, America at War since 1945: Politics and Diplomacy in Korea, Vietnam, and the Gulf War (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1996), 26.
[129] John Mueller, *War, Presidents and Public Opinion* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1973), 69.
[130] Ibid, 58.
[131] Eric Larson, *Casualties and Consensus: The Historical Role of Casualties in Domestic Support for U.S. Military Operations* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1996), 80.

## BALANCE OF FORCES

The most applicable Realist argument involves that increasing likelihood of conflict based on a shifting balance of power in the dyad.  In the case of the Korean War, two significant changes occurred to alter the balance of power in the lead-up to the war.  First, North Korea, thanks to arms shipments from the Soviet Union, was gaining an edge over South Korea in armaments.  Second, the end of the Chinese civil war brought home some 60,000 North Korean troops to further strengthen their significant army.

The shifting military balance certainly boosted Kim Il-sung's perception that his military could win a war with South Korea. However, Kim was not dealing with South Korea alone, but rather with the additional threat of American intervention, and thus any shift in balance of forces needed to be weighed against the potential for American intervention.  This problem was particularly acute for Kim since war was inconceivable without Soviet support and Stalin rebuffed Kim in their first two meetings.  The second meeting is particularly instructive for the balance of forces argument compared to American signaling.  The meeting occurred in September 1949 after the withdrawal of the last American troops from South Korea, and Kim's proposal led to an extensive study by the Soviets.  After careful consideration, Stalin rejected the invasion plans for three reasons: he did not believe that the North's forces were superior, the political climate in the South was not ready for reunification, and he worried that such an attack would give the United States reason to reintroduce troops.[132]

What changed between September 1949 and April 1950 when Kim finally received Stalin's support for an invasion? The direct military balance between the two future adversaries changed little over this period. At the same time, Stalin acknowledged that the end of the Chinese civil war factored into his thinking not because of its impact on North Korean forces, but rather because it would allow Chinese support if necessary. However, the more significant change in Stalin's thinking, as discussed earlier, was his changing perception of the likelihood of American intervention, which he viewed as increasingly unlikely.

The shifting balance of forces on the Korean peninsula does not appear to have played a critical role in the outbreak of hostilities. Stalin's assessment of the North Korean forces did not change appreciably between September and April. This observation is supported by the fact that the possibility of Chinese reinforcement meant that North Korea was given some room for error. Certainly adding the Chinese to the equation further tilted the military balance in North Korea's favor, but since the Soviet Union was already supporting North Korea, this shift hardly seems decisive.[133] Instead, it appears that Stalin's thinking was based largely on his views of the potential American response to an invasion. By spring 1950 he had become convinced that the U.S. would stay out of the conflict, and this allowed him to give Kim his blessing.

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[132] Stueck, *Rethinking the Korean War*, 72.

[133] In fact, the Soviets provided aerial support for the North Koreans during the war, ordered to wear North Korean uniforms and not speak Russian (Lowe, *The Korean War*).

# Chapter 5

# Divided Hawks: Israel and the October War of 1973 and India's Kargil War

## *Divided Hawks in Theory*

The previous chapter examined the numerous problems facing divided dovish governments. This chapter will explore the problems facing similarly divided but hawkish governments in international disputes. The one advantage that divided hawks have over divided doves is that their hawkishness makes them appear less weak to potential challengers than dovish governments. However, as with divided doves, the divisions in these hawkish governments creates the dual compounding problems that they cannot signal effectively and those signals they do send tend to be contradictory or confused. These factors mean that such governments are likely to be targeted in international conflict although somewhat less likely than divided doves.

Two factors make divided hawks susceptible to attack. The first is the fact that their internal divisions make it difficult for divided governments to signal their intentions. Internal bickering means that challenger states contemplating an attack cannot predict the target state's response. Will an attack bring the target back to the bargaining table, lead to a limited response, or cause the target to escalate? In addition, these divided states do not have a clear sense of their own goals in negotiations, meaning that challenger states are likely to feel that they are being strung along. The perception that negotiations with such a government are fruitless is likely to cause the challenger to believe that the status quo can only be altered through military action.

The second factor that harms divided hawkish governments is their tendency towards inaction or contradictory actions. Factions within the government with contradictory views on the correct way to proceed with the dispute make deadlock a common outcome. Inaction may be the least costly course for the government that may fear the electoral implications of an intra-party fight. This is not to be confused with taking a hard line or refusing to negotiate. These divided governments are likely to take contradictory actions with one side pursuing negotiations and another taking provocative military action. The weak leadership that characterizes such governments means that government actions will reflect attempts to satisfy the competing factions.

The points above lead to clear predictions about state behavior, signaling, and conflict. In order to make the case for the validity of my theory the following chapter will present the same causal chain discussed in the previous chapter. The first step will show that these governments are, in fact, correctly categorized as divided and hawkish. The second step examines the direct impact that these factors had on the ability of the government to signal its intentions and take decisive action. The next step will change the perspective of the analysis and look at how the challenging states views the target state. Finally, the role that these perceptions ultimately played in the decision to attack will be examined.

In addition to my theory on government unity and hawkishness, alternative explanations for the outcomes discussed in this chapter will also be examined. In particular, four competing theories discussed at length in the theory chapter will be compared to my theory. When opposition parties support the government's policy, theory suggests, challenges should be less likely. Theories of government tenure suggest that the longer a leader is in office, the less likely it will be that her country will be attacked. The likelihood of attack is also thought to be low when public opinion is hawkish on the issue in question. Finally, moving from domestic level explanations, shifts in the military balance of power are thought to make conflict more likely.

This chapter will proceed as follows. Both the Israeli and Indian cases will begin with a brief history of the dispute and an examination of the particular conflict. The next sections will focus on connecting the dots in the causal chain of each conflict. This will begin by examining the justification for the coding of each of the cases. The next section will discuss the relationship between the nature of the governments and the ability of the government to signal its intentions. The final link in the causal chain will connect the signals sent by the government and how the challenging state interpreted and acted upon these signals. The final portion of each case study will examine the applicability of these competing theories to the cases.

## The October War

### *Background of the conflict*

Between 1948 and 1973 the Arabs and Israelis fought four wars with one another. Of these four, the two directly preceding the October War, the 1967 Six Day War and the 1969-1970 War of Attrition, had a significant influence on the events leading up to the October War. In the 1967 war the Israelis were able to strike preemptively against Arab air forces, inflicting heavy losses in Jordan, Egypt, Syria, and Iraq. This action was followed by a ground war in which the Israelis routed the Arab armies, who in the process lost large pieces of territory to the Israelis. As a result of the 1967 conflict, Egypt lost the Gaza Strip and Sinai Peninsula, Jordan the West Bank, and Syria the Golan Heights. In a matter of days the borders and balance of power in the Middle East shifted dramatically in Israel's favor.

Not surprisingly, this dramatic reversal sent shockwaves through the Arab states and particularly Gamal Abdel Nasser's Egypt. Soon after fighting had stopped, Nasser regrouped Egyptian forces and began to bombard Israeli forces on the other side of the Suez Canal. Skirmishes between the two sides continued for months as occasional heavy artillery and mortar barrages by Egypt would be countered with Israeli raids across the Canal. For 1967 and 1968 most of these attacks were more harassment than war, but in early 1969 a number of reports published in Egypt noted that Egyptian leaders realized they could not win a rapid conventional war with Israel and instead would need to plan for an extended conflict that favored their large population and depth of defense.[1]

The War of Attrition became deadlier in 1969. The Israeli Defense Force (IDF) increased its presence on the Sinai and built permanent structures, while tit-for-tat attacks became more common. As the conflict grew more intense, both the UN and US sought to negotiate a settlement, something both sides rejected initially. In January 1970, Israel escalated the war by attacking targets deep in Egypt. As the Israelis stepped up their bombing, the Egyptians sought Soviet aid to limit Israel's dominant position in the air. The introduction of surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) by the Egyptians limited Israel's ability to use its superior airpower in the conflict. Further, heavy Soviet involvement on the Egyptian side meant that the Israelis began to occasionally encounter Soviet piloted MIGs near the Canal.

As summer 1970 approached, the situation along the Canal grew tenser. Casualties were mounting on both sides, with the Israelis suffering more fatalities than during the Six Day War and the Egyptians losing one-third of their combat aircraft and being forced to evacuate half a million civilians from the Canal Zone.[2] The rising cost of the war made both sides more amenable to negotiations, and on August 7, 1970 the parties agreed to a cease-fire plan drawn up by U.S. Secretary of State William Rogers.

Although the cease-fire brought the fighting to an end, the region remained unsettled. Israel was unsure how it should deal with its newly acquired territories, while Egypt remained committed to recovering the Sinai. Shortly after the war ended Egyptian President Nasser died and was replaced by Anwar Sadat. As negotiations over the Sinai continued, Israel would struggle to come to terms with its new territories and Sadat would seek to define his own approach to the conflict. Most importantly, Sadat struggled to make sense of the mixed and contradictory signals from the Israeli government regarding the Sinai.

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[1] Chaim Herzog, *The War of Atonement, October, 1973* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1975), 15.
[2] Ibid.

In the on-and-off negotiations over the Sinai since the Six Day War, the Egyptians became convinced that only the United States could effectively pressure the Israelis to accept an agreement. In March 1973, Egyptian Foreign Minister Hafez Ismail visited Washington to ask the Americans to put pressure on the Israelis. President Nixon told Ismail that such efforts were only possible if Egypt was willing to make concessions beyond what the Rogers Plan called for. Sadat viewed this as the end of negotiations and turned his sights to a military breakthrough. Shortly after the meetings in Washington, Sadat announced before the Egyptian parliament that he was taking over the premiership in order to prepare Egypt for a confrontation with Israel.[3]

Although Sadat had ordered nearly all Soviet advisors out of the country in June 1972, Egypt still benefited from past Soviet involvement. The influx of Soviet arms, particularly in 1970 and 1971, made Egyptian forces stronger than they were prior to the 1967 war. Further, Soviet training made the Egyptian military more professional, if still less well prepared than the Israelis. Finally, the Egyptians absorbed many lessons from the 1967 defeat and carefully studied Israeli maneuvers and response plans.[4]

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[3] Ibid, 27.

On October 6 at two in the afternoon, as many Israelis were enjoying their Yom Kippur holiday, 240 Egyptian aircraft bombed Israeli installations on the Sinai. Five minutes later 2,000 Egyptian weapons opened fire, most focused on the Bar-Lev Line, Israel's forward defense along the Canal. Along the Canal, special tank hunting teams crossed, followed by 8,000 foot soldiers in rubber boats. The Egyptians soon began employing special pressure pumps to blast gaps in the Israeli defenses to allow bridges to span the Canal and the passage of vehicles to the Israeli side.[5]

Egypt successfully concealed its plans from the Israelis and achieved a surprise attack that initially put the Israelis on their heels. Having regrouped, the Israelis were quickly able to push back the Syrian forces and advanced close to the Syrian capital. On the Sinai, while the Egyptians crossed to the East Bank of the Canal, the Israelis were able to counter with a major operation on the West Bank. The Soviets, particularly worried about Israeli advances on Damascus, worked with the U.S. on a Security Council resolution calling for a cease-fire. The cease-fire was accepted by the Egyptians and Israelis on October 22, although fighting continued along the Suez as the two sides jockeyed for position.[6]

The results of the war allowed both sides to claim victory while pointing to the other's defeat. Although the Egyptian army made significant gains in the early fighting, these had been nearly completely reversed by the end of the war. On the

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[4] Edgar O'Ballance, *No Victor, No Vanquished* (San Rafael, CA: Presidio Press, 1978).
[5] O'Ballance, *No Victor, No Vanquished*, Chapter 5.
[6] Ibid.

Israeli side, despite successfully repelling the Egyptian and Syrian forces, Golda Meir wrote, "The war was a near disaster, a nightmare that I myself experienced and which will always be with me."[7] While on the ground the situation after the war was nearly identical to the situation before the war, the Israelis viewed themselves as more vulnerable and the Egyptians gained confidence even in their defeat.

### *Divided government and mixed signals*

The battle lines in the Israeli cabinet that would influence Egyptian thinking on the 1973 war came to the surface even before the 1967 Six Day War was over. Without consulting the cabinet, hawkish Defense Minister Moshe Dayan, who had only joined the cabinet three days prior to the outbreak of hostilities in 1967, escalated the conflict from a limited war to a total war. This change meant that Israel was no longer fighting its neighbors close to its borders, but rather pushing into enemy territory, and in the south and east taking substantial portions of land. Even while fighting was still occurring, there were intense debates within the cabinet over Israel's aims in the war and what to do with captured territory. Israeli Prime Minister Levi Eshkol, who already bowed to pressure from the right to expand his cabinet before the war, once again succumbed to pressure from the right to capture territory.[8]

Despite these significant differences during the war, immediately following the 1967 conflict, there was broad consensus in the cabinet that Israel should exchange the newly acquired territory for political concession from Syria and Egypt.

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[7] Quoted in O'Ballance, *No Victor, No Vanquished*, 330.

[8] Avi Shlaim, *The Iron Wall: Israel and the Arab World* (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 2000), 243.

When both states rejected Israel's demands, this fragile consensus shattered and cabinet members across the political spectrum staked out their respective positions. These new territories offered both opportunities and limitations for Israel both in terms of its domestic politics and foreign policy.  For hawks in the government the addition of the new territories provided Israel with the opportunity to add some strategic depth to its defenses and insulate itself again a future Arab attack.  The Greater Israel movement, born out of the 1967 war, believed that Israel should rightfully claim the territory based on a religious understanding of the state of Israel, called *Eretz Yisrael*. Most importantly though, they believed that the territory now belonged to Israel and should not be traded for agreements with neighboring states.[9]

On the other side of the debate were doves in the peace movement who saw Israel's newly conquered territories as a potential burden on the state.  They worried about the demographic disaster of incorporating all the Arabs in these territories into the state of Israel and how this would impact Israeli democracy.  Moreover, they saw the territories as expensive to control and would cause Israel to become dependent on an Arab workforce.  Instead of holding onto the territories as hawks wished, doves saw the territories as potential bargaining chips to be used in securing future peace deals with neighboring states.  They also worried that long term occupation of the territories would serve as grounds for future conflicts.[10]

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[9] See Schlaim, *The Iron Wall*, Chapter 7; Gershon Kieval, *Party Politics in Israel and the Occupied Territories* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1983), 52-53.
[10] Schlaim, *The Iron Wall*, Chapter 7; Kieval, *Party Politics in Israel and the Occupied Territories*, 52-53.

Immediately after the 1967 War the Israeli cabinet included all the major parties, including the right-wing Gahal Party. Numerous conflicts divided the cabinet composed of Labor (which was itself an amalgamation of three smaller parties), the Mapam Party, the National Religious Party, and Gahal. These parties and cabinet ministers within these parties all took different positions on what Israel should do with respect to the territories. The left-wing Mapam Party saw settlements in the occupied territories as a roadblock to peace and believed that only military installations should be supported. One party under Labor's umbrella platform, Ahdut Ha'avodah, strongly favored new settlements, and ministers Yigal Allon and Israel Galili both spoke out in favor of expanding the Israeli presence.

Another party under Labor's umbrella, Rafi, led by Moshe Dayan, called for strategic settlements throughout the new territories, but argued that the building should be gradual. Finally, the Land of Israel movement, the National Religious Party, Gahal, and some members of Labor argued that all of the new territories should be open to Israeli settlers.[11] In 1970 Prime Minister Meir went so far as to note that, "even political campaigns are easier to weather with more settlements on the map."[12]

For the three years following the 1967 war, there were numerous instances when Gahal threatened to leave to government when it perceived an action or statement as being too dovish. This unwieldy coalition remained in power until

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[11] Kieval, *Party Politics in Israel and the Occupied Territories*, 52-53.

[12] Ibid, 53.

August 1970 when Gahal left the government in a controversy over the Israeli decision to sign a cease-fire with Egypt.[13]

The departure of the right-wing Gahal party from the cabinet should have led to a more unified government, but this wasn’t the case. One reason for the continued divisions within the government was the presence of the National Religious Party (NRP) which continued to take Gahal’s position with respect to the territories. Meir’s government now had a smaller margin in the Knesset, and the desire to keep the NRP in the fold meant that they bore disproportionate influence. Moreover, while Gahal was no longer in the government, their continuous attacks on the coalition influenced government policy. As one observer remarked, "The return of Begin and Gahal to the opposition was a major deterrent to greater flexibility by the Labor-led government between the 1970 cease-fire and the 1973 war with Egypt and Syria."[14]

While differences between parties in the cabinet is a fact of life in coalition governments, the most serious divisions over the status of the territories occurred within the Labor party itself. For six months, from November 1971 through March 1972, Labor members conducted what became known as “the great debate” over how the party should approach the territories. On the one side, Defense Minister Dayan called for increased and expanded settlement activity, while opponents such as Pinhas

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[13] Kieval, *Party Politics in Israel and the Occupied Territories*, 58. Prime Minister Meir had initially rejected the plan, but was forced to reconsider once it was accepted by Egyptian President Sadat. All members of the cabinet except Gahal supported the plan.

[14] Don Peretz, "Israeli Policies toward the Arab States and the Palestinians since 1967," in *The Arab-Israeli Conflict: Two Decades of Change*, ed. Yehuda Lukacs and Adballa Battah (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1988), 30.

Sapir and Deputy Prime Minister Yigal Allon called for their return.[15] Although the debate was to be a private, within-party affair, the differences made their way into the press. The debate, meant to air differences and lead to consensus, had the unintended consequence of hardening positions and exacerbating divisions. Thus, as historian Gershon Kieval notes, "the Israeli government was not any better able to make such decisions [regarding the territories] after the cease-fire than it was prior to it."[16]

What was the position of Prime Minister Golda Meir during these significant debates within the government and her own party? While Meir did not rule the cabinet as firmly as the first Israeli Prime Minister Ben-Gurion had done, she was also not as weak as her predecessor Levi Eshkol. Meir was elevated to the Prime Ministership following the death of Eshkol as a compromise candidate designed to avoid an internal battle between Dayan and Allon. While Meir's appointment prevented these rivals from taking the reigns of power, it did little to unify the substantial divisions within the Labor party.

In general, Meir supported the status quo and directed the cabinet by trying to limit the influence of those whose views clashed with her own. Whereas Eshkol had been flexible, Meir was intransigent and focused on maintaining the status quo.[17] To help manage her fractious cabinet, Meir tried to form policy outside the usual channels through her use of the "kitchen cabinet," a group of trusted and generally like-minded fellow cabinet members who met on Saturday nights before the Sunday cabinet meetings.[18] Even when it came to discussions on the possibility of war in the months leading up to the attacks in October, she kept much of the cabinet in the dark.[19]

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[15] Kieval, *Party Politics in Israel and the Occupied Territories*, 70-72. Allon's position regarding the territory changed significantly between 1967 and 1971.

[16] Ibid, 61.

[17] Schlaim, *The Iron Wall*, 285.

One member of the cabinet Meir did not include in her inner circle was the Foreign Minister Abba Eban. As she did not share his dovish views on foreign policy, Meir worked to limit Eban's influence and abort his peacemaking efforts.[20] In one particularly humiliating episode, Eban floated the notion of a new peace initiative in February 1970. Seeing that his proposal did not have enough support to pass the cabinet, Eban sought to withdraw it, but to emphasize the unpopularity of Eban's views, Meir forced a vote on the proposal, which inevitably went down in defeat.[21]

These icy relations between the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister inevitably created problems. In negotiations with both the U.N. and U.S. over peace plans Eban indicated Israel's willingness to make concessions that would be rejected by the cabinet.[22] In addition to the signaling problems created by these tense relations between Meir and Eban, the isolation of the foreign minister also meant that his warnings about Egypt went unheeded by the government confident in its deterrence capabilities.  Further, intelligence gathering by the Foreign Ministry was generally ignored.[23]

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[18] Ibid, 287.

[19] Abraham Rabinovich, *The Yom Kippur War: The Epic Encounter That Transformed the Middle East* (New York: Schocken Books, 2004), 42.

[20] David A. Korn, Stalemate: The War of Attrition and Great Power Diplomacy in the Middle East, 1967-1970 (Boulder: Westview Press, 1992), 142.

[21] Schlaim, *The Iron Wall*, 293.

[22] Shlomo Aronson, *Conflict and Bargaining in the Middle East: An Israeli Perspective* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978), 223.

While Meir and Eban clashed, Meir enjoyed a significantly better relationship with the man who was distrusted by many other in the cabinet: Defense Minister Dayan.  Dayan's hawkish views and his distrust of Israel's Arab neighbors accorded with Meir's own.  Along with Meir's trusted advisor Israel Galili, the three were often able to prevail in foreign policy debates despite the fact their views were out of sync with much of the cabinet.[24]  While the three shared a general preference that Israel should keep the territories and settle them, on the question of the Sinai there were important differences between Meir and Dayan.  Dayan strongly believed that Israel should make some territorial concessions to Egypt and that these concessions might lead to peace.  His optimism and flexibility on this issue were not matched by Meir, who believed Israel should take a firmer line.[25]

In relations with Egypt, the views of the Israeli government were further complicated.  While Israeli public opinion broadly supported keeping most of the territories Israel acquired in the Six Day War, support for keeping the Sinai was much lower.[26]  The Israeli government was similarly divided over the future status of the Sinai.  Throughout 1971 a number of proposals regarding the status of the Sinai were floated in the Israeli cabinet.  Even the hawkish Dayan was less wedded to keeping the Sinai and offered plans for partial Israeli withdrawal to allow Egyptians to reopen the Suez Canal.  However, Dayan's proposal drew fire from others in the cabinet who thought it excessively flexible.  When Israel finally formulated a plan that Meir passed on to U.S. President Nixon in December 1971, Nixon thought the time for such a proposal had passed and did not bother giving it to the Egyptians.[27]

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[23] The Insight Team of the London Sunday Times, *The Yom Kippur War* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday and Company, 1974), 64.

[24] Rael Jean Isaac, *Israel Divided: Ideological Politics in the Jewish State* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976), 123.

[25] Aronson, *Conflict and Bargaining in the Middle East*, 149.

[26] Issac, *Israel Divided*, 133.  One poll from the summer of 1972 showed 92% of Israelis favoring keeping the Golan Heights, while only 36% favored keeping the Sinai.

Throughout this period there were also a number of diplomatic initiatives that failed after being rejected by Egypt, Israel, or both.  One initiative was led by United Nations mediator Gunnar Jarring and the other by United States Secretary of State William Rogers.  Both initiatives sought Israeli territorial concessions in return for peace, with the timing and nature of the peace being the most significant differences.  Scholars and politicians continue to debate which side was responsible for the failure of these initiatives and thus carries the blame for the 1973 war, and it is beyond the scope of this study to make a judgment regarding the "fault" of one state or the other in this matter.  However, the inability of the Israeli government to formulate a unified position on the territories did play a role in the failure of peace negotiations.

A significant problem throughout these negotiations was that the Israeli cabinet could not decide what acceptable final borders for the state would look like.  There was general consensus to keep the Golan Heights, but the status of other territorial gains, including the Sinai, remained disputed.  Following the 1967 war, Eban argued that the gains of the conflict were not stable and would need to be followed by a political solution, but this was an unpopular view.[28] Instead, the cabinet was marked by paralysis and uncertainty regarding its future borders.

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[27] Schlaim, *The Iron Wall*, 303-308.

Meir gave an interview to the *London Times* in March 1971 hinting at what Israel's final border might look like. Her admission that the West Bank might eventually be returned caused outrage from parties on the right, leading to two votes of no confidence in the Knesset and threats from the National Religious Party to leave the cabinet.[29] This heated reaction to this vision of Israel's borders made it much easier politically to ignore such questions. Writing on the difficulties facing the Meir cabinet prior to the 1973 war, Aronson states, "The structure of their regime produced, of course, the very political and diplomatic deadlock that led to the war."[30] This was the essence of the problem that plagued the Meir cabinet: the deep divisions over the correct way forward with its neighbors meant that in the end no course was pursued.

### *Hawkish government*

Historically, Labor was a center-left party that included both hawkish and dovish wings, particularly when it dominated Israeli politics during the 1950s and early 1960s. Traditionally, Labor had been a home to both hawks and doves in Israel, including hawk David Ben-Gurion and dove Moshe Sharett, while excluding only the far right. However, the 1967 Six Day War ushered in a new era for the party, both in terms of its own membership and the strength of the opposition. Internally, the most notable addition was the hawkish Moshe Dayan to the cabinet.[31] Although a number of Labor ministers opposed the Dayan's appointment, his status as a war hero meant he had significant public backing. Dayan's inclusion in the cabinet pushed Labor to become more hawkish.[32]

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[28] Walter Laquer, *Confrontation: The Middle-East War and World Politics* (London: Wildwood House, 1974), 35.
[29] Kieval, *Party Politics in Israel and the Occupied Territories*, 64-65.
[30] Aronson, *Conflict and Bargaining in the Middle East*, 236.

Further, the 1967 war emboldened the hawkish Gahal party led by Menachem Begin, which had definite ideas about the future status of the territories Israel had captured in the war. After Gahal left the government in 1970, the party attacked the coalition government and, in particular, any statements or actions that Gahal perceived as indicating Israel might return territory to its neighbors. This pressure from the right increased the power of hawks within both Labor and their coalition partner, the National Religious Party.[33]

The Labor government under Prime Minister Eshkol had been broad, but Eshkol's own dovish views emboldened the other doves in the cabinet. Just as Eshkol's dovishness held the upper hand in his government, Golda Meir's hawkishness permeated her cabinet. Although she was viewed as a compromise candidate following Eshkol's death, Meir was hardly a moderate in her views on foreign policy, and her views were actually at variance with the views of those who nominated her.[34] According to one scholar, "Meir was a hawk who listened only to other hawks."[35] In relations with Arab states Meir believed that Israel should take a hard line and was skeptical of the legitimacy of Arab claims.[36]

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[31] Samuel Roberts, *Party and Policy in Israel: The Battle between Hawks and Doves* (Boulder, CO: Westview 1990), 107. Prime Minister Eshkol only included Dayan in the cabinet under sustained pressure from Ben-Gurion's Rafi party.
[32] Ibid, 33.
[33] Ibid, 35.
[34] Aronson, *Conflict and Bargaining in the Middle East*, 100.

Meir’s ascent to the Prime Ministership meant that Israel’s views on the future of the new territories hardened considerably. Whereas Eshkol and Eban viewed these territories as bargaining chips to be turned in for future peace agreements, Meir was skeptical about the chances of peace with Arab states.[37] In one famous incident in early 1971, Egyptian President Sadat told Newsweek journalist Arnaud de Borchgrave that he would be willing to recognize Israel and live in peace with it. Following the interview, de Borchgrave flew to Israel to meet with Meir who, when told of Sadat’s statement said, “That will be the day. I don’t believe it will happen.”[38]

While much of the Labor leadership remained moderate or dovish, Meir empowered hawks and diminished the power of doves. Her close relationship with Defense Minister Dayan and her advisor Galili gave them considerable power and influence beyond their numbers.[39] All three wanted alterations in Israel’s pre-war borders and supported some form of settlement in the new territories.[40] This put them on the hawkish side of the extensive debates within the government over the correct approach to the peace and the territories. Moreover, Meir also gave considerable influence to the hawkish views of the Isreali Defense Force (IDF) General Staff. Eban noted that while other Prime Ministers had limited the influence of the IDF,

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[35] Shlaim, *The Iron Wall*, 286.
[36] Ibid, 284.
[37] Zeev Maoz, *Defending the Holy Land* (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2006), 122.
[38] Herzog, *The War of Atonement*, 18.
[39] Shlaim, *The Iron Wall*, 286.
[40] Isaac, *Israel Divided*, 123.

"Mrs. Meir herself had more or less said that on security matters, 'I would do nothing but blindly accept the military view.'"[41]

Within the cabinet, dovish views on foreign policy were well represented by Eban, Sapir, and Allon. Eban, as Foreign Minister, was in the best position to translate his views in to policy, but as noted above, Meir worked to marginalize him and limit his influence. All three men were active participants in Labor's internal debates, but none could steer Israeli foreign policy.

The strengthening of hawks within the government and weakening of doves meant that Meir's government was significantly more hawkish than her predecessor Eshkol. The government was not as hawkish as the opposition Gahal party, which actively encouraged the incorporation of many of the territories into Israel. Still, many of Meir and Dayan's views were in line with those of Gahal.

### *Impact of Disunity on Israel's ability to signal*

#### INTENTIONS

What were Israel's intentions for the territories it captured in the 1967 war? This question was the source of divisions within the Labor party. As noted above, the sides of the conflict could roughly be divided between those who supported keeping the territories and gradually incorporating them into Israel and those who believed that they must be returned to the neighboring Arab states. Between the parties in the coalition government and within these parties there were significant differences regarding the proper approach.

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[41] Quoted in Shlaim, *The Iron Wall*, 288.

The results of Israel's confusion were multiple. First, outside peace initiatives from the United Nations and United States failed to gain much traction with Israel. Although Eban, and even to some extent Dayan, worked to reach an acceptable compromise following the end of the War of Attrition in 1970, there was no progress in negotiations. Those who sought compromise received strong criticism both within and outside the government that their flexibility was putting Israel at risk. The deep divisions within the government and realistic exit option for the National Religious Party meant that those seeking peace had to tread lightly. In the end, these domestic constraints were antithetical to any peace processes requiring compromise from both sides. The message sent by Gahal's defection following the War of Attrition cease-fire was that compromise might tear the government apart. The problems facing the final push for peace in 1971 depict this dynamic:

> "The Israeli position was also boosted by the existence of a real anti-concessions opposition. The GAHAL right-wing party repeatedly attacked the government's negotiation position. When Dayan's remarks to Sisco and Rogers expressing support for a modified version of the Sisco memorandum leaked out to the press, the opposition raised hell with the government, accusing it of appeasement. This also came in handy in dealing with the United States. The "moderate" opposition to the government's position was – of course – in the coalition, so it was unwilling to rock the boat over the agreement."[42]

In addition to inflexibility in dealing with foreign peace initiatives, the Meir government also lacked a clear positive vision for the future status of the territories.

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[42] Maoz, *Defending the Holy Land*, 419.

The general preference of Meir and Dayan to keep much of the new territory still left a number of questions unanswered. Which territories? What settlements should be allowed in the territories? What would be done with local Arab populations? The territory to which the Meir government was least committed, the Sinai, was still the source of considerable controversy.

Throughout 1971 and in line with the efforts of the United States Secretary of State Rogers, Dayan sought to reach an agreement on the Sinai that would allow Egypt to reopen the canal while keeping Israeli troops on the peninsula. Dayan first suggested a limited pullback of Israeli troops in a cabinet meeting on March 22. When this initial effort failed to get Egyptian support, Dayan raised the idea of moving Israeli troops back to the Mitla and Gidi passes, approximately 30 kilometers inland. This was criticized as being too drastic by other cabinet members. By the time Meir presented the compromise withdrawal of ten kilometers to the United States in December 1971, Nixon viewed the offer as too little, too late and did not pass it along.[43]

One may contrast Israel's intentions with those of Egypt. While Egyptian President Sadat also rejected a number of foreign peace proposals, his intentions were very clear: regain the territory Egypt lost in the Six Day War. The only questions within the Egyptian government were the best means by which to accomplish this goal. Sadat initially pursued a diplomatic approach, but following the embarrassment of his announced "year of decision" in 1971, the pressure for results grew. Still, most scholars note that Sadat did not choose war until the spring of 1973.[44]

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[43] Shlaim, *The Iron Wall*, 303-305.

Meir's government had difficulty signaling its intentions because between its warring factions there was no clear plan to deal with the territories. By late 1971, frustrated by what it perceived as lack of movement on the Egyptian side, as well as irresolvable differences among its members, the Israeli government essentially stopped trying to reach a peaceful settlement.[45] Without external, and particularly American pressure, the War of Attrition over, and a settlement that would result in significant domestic political costs, it is little surprise that Meir was happy to simply keep the status quo. Historian Avi Shlaim notes, "In the cabinet Golda Meir threw all her weight behind the policy of preserving the status quo and avoiding political risks."[46]

Some of Israel's indecision regarding its intentions sprang from the fact the government of Golda Meir did not value all its newly acquired territory equally. There was widespread support for keeping the Golan Heights for strategic reasons and Jerusalem on political and religious grounds. However, the status of the West Bank and Sinai were much more controversial in the cabinet.[47] The stakes were higher in the West Bank, which contained the religiously significant areas of Judea and Samaria but also a large Palestinian population. There was also strategic importance in the West Bank, since it diminished Israel’s vulnerability in the narrow, central portion of the country.

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[44] Speaking before students protesting a lack of action during the 'year of decision,' in January 1972, Sadat claimed that the decision to go to war with Israel had already been reached. However, this statement appears to demonstrate pandering rather than resolve on Sadat's part (O'Balance, *No Victor, No Vanquished*, 15). In an interview following the war, Sadat noted that, "the decision for war was made in April 1973" (Insight Team of the London Sunday Times, *The Yom Kippur War*). For more on the timing of war planning see: Shlaim, *The Iron War*; Herzog, *The War of Atonement*; Insight Team of the London Sunday Times, *The Yom Kippur War*.

[45] Kieval, *Party Politics in Israel and the Occupied Territories*, 1983.

[46] Shlaim, *The Iron Wall*, 287.

[47] Kieval, *Party Politics in Israel and the Occupied Territories*, 52-53.

Objectively, the stakes in the Sinai were much different. In the first place, the land was dry, sparsely inhabited, with few prospects for settlement and economic development. Moreover, the territory did not hold the religious significance of the West Bank, although the Land of Israel movement included it in *Eretz Yisrael*. The War of Attrition had also shown Israel both the costliness of holding the territory and the costs that Egypt was willing to bear to wear Israel down. Israel’s approval of the Rogers Plan to end to the War of Attrition demonstrated that negotiations over the territory were possible. Strategically, hawks pointed out that the Sinai offered Israel a buffer with its most powerful neighbor. However, as Kieval points out,

> "Israel's willingness to conclude a partial settlement in Sinai suggested its readiness to make territorial concessions in areas that were not considered essential for its security, whereas on the West Bank, where security considerations were much more critical and where religious-historical issues also came into play, the Alignment [governing coalition] continued to put off any decision on border."[48]

The view that the stakes were lower for Israel in the Sinai was reinforced by the fact that it was the territory in which the Meir government appeared willing to make the most significant concessions. The Egyptian acceptance of the Rogers cease-fire had forced Israel’s hand to seek a negotiated end to the war. Particularly surprising is the fact that Defense Minister Dayan was optimistic about the prospects for an agreement with Egypt until the October War. From 1971 on, the Israeli

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[48] Kieval, *Party Politics in Israel and the Occupied Territories*, 66.

Defense Minister offered a number of proposals for partial Israeli withdrawal from the canal region, involving various distances, and discussions over whether or not Egyptian soldiers would be allowed to cross the canal.[49]

A significant problem for the Meir government was its inability to signal flexibility in its dealings with the Sinai while showing deterrence in other areas. Attempts by the doves in the cabinet and Dayan to reach an agreement with Egypt over an intermediate solution to the Sinai problem were torpedoed by hawks who refused to make concessions. After the war both Eban and Dayan noted that more flexibility on Israel's side before the war would likely have allowed Israel to avoid the conflict.[50] Even the hawkish Israel Galili told Meir that, "There is also a possibility that we can avoid all this mess [the danger of war] if we are prepared to enter into talks on the basis of returning to the previous border."[51] However, the strong hawkish element within the cabinet prevented the government from indicating potential flexibility on the stakes involved.

From a security standpoint, the Israeli government was not unified on exactly what strategic value the Sinai served. Those cabinet ministers in the dove camp believed that the Sinai added little to Israeli security and could be returned in its entirety to Egypt. Those in the middle of the debate saw a buffer zone or trip wire between Israel and Egypt as necessary, allowing some of the peninsula to be returned to Egypt. Thus, Dayan was willing to concede some territory on the Sinai but not all of it. Finally, hawks believed that allowing the Egyptians to move across the canal was inherently dangerous to Israel, an issue that exposed a rift between Meir and Dayan.

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[49] Aronson, *Conflict and Bargaining in the Middle East*, 140-150.
[50] Shlaim, *The Iron Wall*, 305.
[51] Rabinovich, *The Yom Kippur War*, 41-42.

## WEAKNESS

Here is one area in which the hawkish Meir government differed from divided dovish governments. While divided governments, and particularly divided dovish governments, may come across as weak, this was not the case for the Israeli government in the run-up to the October War. The Israelis had just fought a low-intensity war against the Egyptians in 1969 and 1970 where they escalated the conflict and bombed targets deep inside Egypt. Although many commentators have noted that the War of Attrition was the first conflict that Israel did not definitively win, it did not show weakness either. Despite the heavy costs, Egypt was not substantially closer to reclaiming the Sinai than it had been before the war.

The presence of Dayan and Meir in the Israeli cabinet also contributed to the view that the government was not weak. Dayan's reputation as a warrior and a hawk, forged in the 1967 war, was well known. After taking control of the government, Meir quickly became known for her hawkish views and deference to the hawks in her government. The more significant problem for Meir was the lack of a clear vision for the final status of the territories.

If anything, the Meir government suffered not from weakness, but from arrogance with respect to a potential attack by Egypt. Although Israelis witnessed Egyptian preparations in the summer of 1973, they did not believe that Sadat would go over the brink and begin a war, despite the fact that "seldom has a leader of a country bent on war enunciated so clearly his intentions to the world and all parties concerned."[52] A major source of the Israeli overconfidence was Defense Minister Dayan, who told Time Magazine in the summer of 1973 that there would be no war between Israeli and its neighbors for ten years. Dayan shared his confidence with Meir and his General Staff, who he told, "We are on the threshold of the crowning period of the Return of Zion."[53] The investigation of the failures leading up to the war focused on intelligence failures and cleared Meir and Dayan of any wrongdoing.[54] However, as noted above, there is also substantial evidence that Meir's close relationship with Dayan and sidelining of Eban gave her a skewed view of Egyptian intentions.

## DECISIVE ACTION

The deadlock experienced by the Israeli government over the territories made decisive action to resolve the crisis with Egypt impossible. The most damaging problem that the Meir government faced was the inability to take positive actions and show initiative. In 1970 Meir announced that Israel would make concessions that would "surprise the world," but this bold proclamation offered no details.[55] In fact, Israeli diplomacy in the period between the Six Day War and the October war was generally reactive. Most of the proposals were the work of the UN delegation headed by Jarring and the US group led by Rogers. Arguably the greatest breakthrough diplomatically from this period was the acceptance of a cease-fire to end the War of Attrition, an action that Israel only took after Egypt accepted the plan.

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[52] Herzog, *The War of Atonement*, 26.
[53] Rabinovich, *The Yom Kippur War*, 41.
[54] Maoz, *Defending the Holy Land*, 143.
[55] Herzog, *The War of Atonement*, 16.

The decision to partially withdraw Israeli troops on the Sinai was supported by Dayan in a cabinet meeting on March 22, 1971. There was some support for this in the cabinet, however significant differences remained over the nature of the Israeli withdrawal. In April, under pressure from Dayan, Meir began to work with American diplomats on a resolution involving the Sinai. The most significant difference was over the distance of the withdrawal – the more conservative ten kilometers or the 30 kilometers favored by Dayan. Meir and Dayan disagreed over whether Egyptian troops should be allowed to cross the canal, a concession that Dayan supported. Eventually, the compromise Israeli proposal – ten kilometers and no troops – was put to the Americans on December 10th in a meeting between Meir and Nixon. From the initial announcement by Sadat, it took the Israeli cabinet nearly ten months to formulate a response. The glacial pace of decision-making by the Meir government meant that the moment for decision passed and Nixon chose not to even show the offer to the Egyptians.[56]

From this point on the Israelis' negotiating strategy was based on inaction. The domestic benefits of new diplomatic initiatives appeared minimal. Putting forth a positive vision of a settlement with Egypt would have required sacrifices the government was unwilling and likely unable to make. On the other hand, inaction could be used to satisfy both the hawks and doves in the cabinet. Each day Israel continued to hold the territories further solidified them as part of Israel, something supported by expansionist cabinet members. On the other hand, by continuing to make minimal efforts in the peace processes – with the focus on the process – the hopes of doves were kept alive. Perhaps most importantly, only the most dovish politicians, like Foreign Minister Eban, saw the potential dangers of inaction. Most members of the Israeli government, despite the recent war with Egypt and the domestic pressures on Sadat, believed that Israel's military might would deter any possible challenges. Thus, the costs of decisive action appeared high while the benefits of the status quo seemed significant.

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[56] Shlaim, *The Iron War*, 303-308.

### *The View from Egypt*

What role did Israel's signaling of its intentions play in the Egyptian decision to attack? Sadat named the initial attack on Israeli positions on the Sinai Operation Spark. The name came from Sadat's desire to "spark" foreign intervention (Soviet and American) in the peace process to pressure Israel.[57] The war was not seen by Sadat as a means in and of itself, but rather as a bargaining ploy to restart negotiations. He saw indications that Israel was willing to bargain over the Sinai, but was unable to follow through due to its internal divisions.

When asked after the war why he attacked Israel in 1973, Sadat noted that he initially had hopes for peace, "I did have slight hopes of Secretary of State Rogers in 1970 and 1971. And he came shopping here. But all he did was extract more and more concessions from us and not a single one from the Israelis."[58] While there is a self-serving element to Sadat's recollection of the peace process, his views shed light on how Israeli actions influenced his thinking. When the Meir government gave up on the peace process due to its internal visions, it signaled a support for the status quo which Egypt had repeatedly signaled was untenable. Official Israeli policy became "the decision not to decide."[59]

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[57] O'Ballance, *No Victor, No Vanquished*, 15.

Domestic gridlock on the part of the Israelis played a significant role in Sadat's calculus. Addressing Egypt's Armed Forces Supreme Council in October 1972, at the meeting where the decision to go to war with Israel was announced, Sadat noted his frustration:

> I am not prepared to accept defeatist solutions or surrender. I will not sit at a table with Israel while I am in such a humiliating position, because that means surrender. . . . The time for words is over, and we have reached saturation point. We have to manage our affairs with whatever we have at hand; we have to follow this plan to change the situation and set fire to the region. Then words will have real meaning and value.[60]

Mohamed El-Gamasy, a field marshal in the Egyptian military, also saw the need to use military pressure, noting, "1972 dawned upon us. It was now evident that Israel would not budge unless it felt threatened by our armed forces."[61] Historian Joseph Finklestone argues,

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[58] Quoted in Insight Team of the London Sunday Times, *The Yom Kippur War*, 46.

[59] Maoz, *Defending the Holy Land*, 138.

[60] Quoted in Uri Bar-Joseph, *The Watchman Fell Asleep: The Surprise of Yom Kippur and Its Sources* (Albany, NY: State University of New York, 2005), 11.

[61] Mohamed Abdel Ghani El-Gamasy, *The October War*, trans. Gilliam Potter, Nadra Morcos and Rosette Frances (Cairo: American University in Cairo, 1989), 143.

> "Yet Anwar Sadat's words, while undoubtedly stressing his commitment to fighting, also imply that almost until at least the middle of 1972 he was still hoping that he might regain Arab territories without launching a war. . . . Only when he became totally convinced that Egypt would have to fight to regain its honour and to have a chance of negotiating for the return of Arab territories in general and Sinai in particular did he give the order for launching the Yom Kippur War."[62]

Sadat was ever-conscious of the role of the United States in the process. Shortly before the war he sent his National Security Advisor, Hafez Ismail, to meet with Henry Kissinger. Kissinger explained the role that Israeli domestic politics were playing in the negotiations and that no progress would be made on the Israeli side until after the 1973 elections.[63] In fact, Sadat's rationale for war – to force American intervention in the peace process – shows that he believed that Egypt alone was not powerful enough to bring about this change. Sadat failed to understand that the domestic divisions that gave rise to Israeli intransigence were not merely power-politics posturing, but instead represented domestic constraints that the Meir government could not overcome. The confused signals that the Israelis sent regarding the Sinai led Sadat to believe that the hard-line Israelis simply needed to be pressured when, in fact, external pressure could not unify the Israeli government to accept a peace proposal.

From the Egyptian point of view the stakes for Israel were equally unclear. Besides the Bar-Lev line, the military fortifications on the western edge of the peninsula, Israel had shown little interest in developing the Sinai, an idea that tapped into controversies over the status of the territories. It was not until August 1973 that the cabinet, under pressure from Dayan, adopted the so-called Galili Plan. This plan accelerated settlement in the territories and offered tax breaks to encourage investment.[64] Still, the fact remained that although Israel was defending the territory, it did not seem intent on full annexation of the Sinai.

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[62] Joseph Finklestone, *Anwar Sadat: Visionary Who Dared* (Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 1996), 90.
[63] Janice Gross Stein, "The Failures of Deterrence and Intelligence," in *The October War: A Retrospective*, ed. Richard Parker (Gainesville, FL: University Press of Florida, 2001), 80-81.

Sadat's own analysis of relations between Egypt and Israel indicates that he believed that Israel was no longer negotiating in good faith. Initially, Egypt, under Nassar and Sadat, pushed hard for a comprehensive resolution that would return all the territories Israel gained during the 1967 war. However, by 1971 Sadat was focused on returning the Sinai to Egypt. On February 4th, 1971, Sadat surprised Israel by offering a new initiative, whereby Israel would withdraw from the canal region so that Egypt could begin clearing it.[65] However, this initiative failed and as the U.S. and U.N. peace processes also ground to a halt in 1972 Sadat turned to war.

## *Alternative Explanations*

### THE OPPOSITION

It has already been documented that although the Labor party was generally centrist, two of the three foreign policy leaders – Meir and Dayan – were hawks. However, they did not represent the most hawkish elements in Israeli politics, as the Gahal party under the leadership of Menachem Begin was defined by its hawkish views. In fact, for Gahal members Meir was too moderate in her views and in those instances when she charted a more moderate path the opposition attacked her for it. More generally, Gahal members assailed any proposals they viewed as showing moderation or weakness to Israel's Arab neighbors.

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[64] Kieval, *Party Politics in Israel and the Occupied Territories*, 76.
[65] Aronson, *Conflict and Bargaining in the Middle East*, 141.

Once again, this is a case where the opposition does not function as Schultz anticipates. Gahal was closely aligned with the Land for Israel movement, and thus after it left the government, it argued that Israel should hold all the land it captured in the 1967 war.[66] This meant that the party opposed negotiations on the territories and pushed for Israel to open the territories for settlement and investment. Unlike many members of Labor who viewed the territories as temporary acquisitions which Israel could use as bargaining chips, Gahal saw them as permanent additions to the Israeli state.[67]

Sadat launched the October War to pressure Israel to make concessions in the peace processes. For a leader to believe that this was possible, he would have had to heavily discount or ignore the positions that the opposition took on the territories. While the views of the government on the status of the Sinai might have been confused and contradictory, the position of Gahal was clear. As Gahal had pressured the government in the past not to succumb to outside pressure, Sadat could not have expected his efforts to reengage the Americans to be successful.[68]

To the extent that Gahal did influence the situation, the impact was domestic and influenced the distribution of power within the cabinet. While having Gahal in the cabinet until 1970 constricted the government's ability to negotiate, having the party in the opposition did not untie the government's hands. Gahal's attacks on ministers who favored negotiations with Egypt emboldened hawks in the government and pressured Meir to move towards the status quo she accepted after 1971.[69]

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[66] Shlaim, *The Iron War*, 253-54. This was a change from their initial willingness following the 1967 war to negotiate on all territories, except the West Bank.
[67] Kieval, *Party Politics in Israel and the Occupied Territories*.
[68] Ibid, 63.

## LEADERSHIP TENURE

According to Grieco and Gelpi's theory, democratic leaders are more likely to be attacked, and more generally leaders early in their term are more likely to be attacked, due to their willingness to make concessions. As Sadat's primary motive in launching the October War was to bring Israel back to the negotiating table and extract concessions, this case appears to be an excellent test of this argument. Once the details of the case are examined, however, the theory is contradicted in two ways.

First, by the time Sadat launched the war on October 6, 1973, Golda Meir had been in office for over four years. While she had not yet served as long as her predecessors Ben Gurion and Eshkol, she was by 1973 an experienced leader. Moreover, although she had risen to power following the death of Eshkol, she enjoyed her own popular mandate based on the elections of 1969. Moreover, through her engagement in the negotiations over the territories her views were well known.

The substance of her views is the second problem with applying the theory to this case. Meir came into office with her views on the territories clearly formed and took a hard-line in negotiations. Although there is some indication that Meir's views with respect to the territories hardened over time, the real problems were domestic divisions.  Negotiations over the territories exposed significant differences of opinion within the Labor party that were irreconcilable over the near term.  As the depth of this division became clear to the Prime Minister, she chose to support the status quo rather than risk a split within the Labor party.  The mixed signals sent by her divided government obscured the fact that Meir was unlikely to budge from her hard-line position.

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[69] Ibid, 61-62.

If Sadat believed that concessions from Israel would be tied to the election cycle then his timing does not make sense.  Knesset elections had been scheduled for October and had to be postponed to December because of the war.  As expected, responsibility for the war was placed on Labor to the benefit of the hawkish Likud party (which succeeded Gahal).  Such an outcome is hardly a surprise, so the question is why Sadat would choose to strengthen those elements in Israeli society least likely to make concessions.  If Sadat wanted to pressure the Labor government, why didn't he wait until after the elections?  Launching the attack directly before the election also contradicts the logic of the theory as that would be the time when leaders are least likely to make concessions, since voters are likely to remember such concessions when they vote.

## PUBLIC OPINION

Among the territories that Israel captured in the 1967 war, the Israeli public was most willing to part with the Sinai.  While large majorities supported keeping the Golan Heights, Gaza Strip, and West Bank, views on the Sinai were much more mixed. In public opinion polls taken at various points during 1972, less than 40% of the public believed Israel should hold onto the peninsula. What is particularly interesting is that the public appears much more flexible with respect to negotiating over the Sinai than the Meir government.[70]

According to the logic of the Reiter and Stam's argument, the Israeli government should have been much more responsive to negotiations over the Sinai. Given that the government had a mandate from the people to make concessions to Egypt, why did this not occur? Had the doves within the Meir cabinet had more power, it is quite likely that Israel would have taken a more flexible bargaining position. The fact that even the generally hawkish Dayan was willing to make concessions on the Sinai reveals that there was significant support for concessions. However, the general intransigence of the cabinet and the deep, irreconcilable divisions between its members prevented all but the most minor concessions.

From a signaling perspective one could argue, as an extension of Schultz's theory, that the public ambivalence to the Sinai provided an enticement for Sadat to pressure the Israelis. He might have believed that he could exploit the public's flexibility on the Sinai to move the government towards compromise. However, there is no evidence that Sadat had Israeli public opinion in mind when he decided to attack Israel. Incidentally, even within the Israeli cabinet it is difficult to find references to public opinion's impact on foreign policy, even though 1973 was an election year. It is most likely that the public, like Meir, was satisfied with the status quo.

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[70] Isaac, *Israel Divided*, 133.

## BALANCE OF FORCES

Between the end of the Six Day War and the initiation of the October War there were significant fluctuations in the balance of forces in the Middle East. One significant development was the willingness of the Soviet Union to supply both Syria and Egypt with large amounts of military hardware including tanks, guns, armored vehicles, and planes. Particularly for Egypt these replacements were imperative as they lost massive amounts of material in both the Six Day War and the War of Attrition. To even contemplate an attack on Israel, Egypt needed an arsenal on par with what it possessed prior to 1967.

Of the military hardware the Soviet Union gave Egypt, nothing was more significant than the surface-to-air missile (SAM) batteries first employed during the War of Attrition. One of the key reasons for Israel's route of Arab forces in the Six Day War was Israeli air supremacy. In the War of Attrition, SAMs installed along the Suez Canal were pivotal in limiting Israeli deep penetration bombing. In future contests the SAM batteries meant that Egyptian airspace would be safe from Israeli bombers and fighters. These two developments – the general rebuilding of the Egyptian military and the introduction of SAMs – did alter the balance of power between Israel and Egypt, but the SAMs strengthened the status quo rather than providing Egypt with new offensive capability. On the other hand, the Soviet-supplied military buildup was certainly a necessary condition for the October War. Following the devastation of the War of Attrition, Egypt was simply not in a position to challenge Israel.

However, while Egypt's increasingly favorable balance may have been a necessary cause for the conflict, it was hardly sufficient. Once again the timing was critical. If the changing balance of forces drove Egypt to attack, why not wait until the balance was even more favorable? Although Sadat had ordered most Soviet advisors out of the country in June 1972, he continued to seek and receive Soviet aid. There is no indication that the Soviets were preparing to turn off the aid faucet for Egypt.

One reason that Sadat did not need to wait for a more advantageous military balance is that he did not plan to try to occupy Israel. Rather, his goals were limited, and he viewed military pressure as a means to bring about a settlement for the Sinai. Considering Sadat's objectives, the military balance was hardly the determinant factor in the conflict. Sadat simply needed a military strong enough to briefly alter the status quo and thereby bring the Israelis back to the negotiating table.

At the time of the October War, the military balance favored the Egyptians and Syrians. The Egyptian military boasted 318,000 men with over half a million in reserve. Following further Soviet support after the War of Attrition, the Egyptians had 1,700 tanks, 1,200 armored vehicles, 150 self-propelled guns, 4,500 guns of various types, and over 120 SAM batteries.[71] Meanwhile, the Syrian army had about 110,000 men under arms at any given time, due to conscription, who could be supplemented by about 200,000 reservists. Also benefiting from Soviet support, Syria possessed 1,100 tanks, 1,000 armored vehicles, 2,000 guns, and over 50 SAM batteries.  In 1973 the Syrians had received $185 million in armaments from the Soviet Union.[72]

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[71] O'Ballance, *No Victor, No Vanquished*, 15-16.

The Israeli Defense Forces regular units included 25,000 soldiers, which could swell to 310,000 with full mobilization within 72 hours.  The IDF possessed a mishmash of weapons reflecting their wide array of suppliers and some Soviet models captures in the 1967 War and the War of Attrition.  The weapons available to Israel included 1,750 tanks, 1,000 armored vehicles, and an array of guns.

## The Kargil War

### *Background to the Conflict*

Chapter 3 provides a general background on the Indo-Pakistani conflict over the state of Jammu and Kashmir.  The conflict dates from Indian independences and the controversial decision of the Kashmiri Maharaja to accede to India in order to gain Indian military assistance against tribal raiders that threatened his rule during the period following Indian independence.  Since 1947, Indian and Pakistan have fought four wars over the territory and experienced numerous skirmishes and crises.

Prior to the Kargil War, the last war between the two sides occurred during the breakup of Pakistan when Bangladesh seceded and gained independence.  This war was followed by the Simla Agreement of 1972, between Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi and Pakistani President Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, creating a Line of Control

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[72] Ibid, 35-36.  This influx allowed the Syrians to add approximately 300 tanks, 500 armored vehicles, 1,200 guns, and over 40 SAMs to their arsenal.

(LOC) separating the Pakistani and Indian controlled territories in Kashmir and delineating something approaching an international boundary within the disputed territory.  The LOC generally runs east-west across the territory until reaching the contested Siachen Glacier.  The mountainous nature of the region means that much of the Line runs through high treacherous mountain peaks that make standard border controls impossible.[73]

In the mid-1980s the Siachen Glacier, extending 75 kilometers and covering nearly 10,000 square kilometers in the northeast corner of Kashmir, became a flashpoint between the two states. The remote location of the glacier and its harsh environment led to only a vague reference to it in the Karachi Agreement of 1949 setting out the ceasefire line between the two sides and no reference at all in the Simla agreement.  In 1984 India deployed troops to the glacier leading to skirmishes with Pakistani troops who were unable to dislodge them.  The dispute over Siachen has led to occasional pitched artillery battles between the two sides.[74]

A second significant development in the region was the outbreak of an indigenous insurgency in Kashmir beginning in 1989.  Although the origins of the rebellion were local, Pakistan soon involved itself, supporting the insurgents and providing direction.  This deadly conflict, which continued throughout the 1990s and is estimated to have cost more than 40,000 lives, meant that the Indian Army had to dedicate significant resources to counter-insurgency operations in Kashmir.[75]

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[73] J. N. Dixit, *India and Pakistan in War and Peace* (New York: Routledge, 2002).
[74] Sumit Ganguly and Devin T. Hagerty, *Fearful Symmetry: India-Pakistan Crises in the Shadow of Nuclear Weapons* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2005), Chapter 7.
[75] Ibid, Chapter 7.

Despite these significant problems, talks between the two sides established confidence building measures in 1990 and 1993 that included provisions on direct phone hotlines between the two states' leaders, avoiding military exercises close to the disputed territory, and the treatment of diplomats. These talks were followed by further negotiations between Prime Ministers Nawaz Sharif of Pakistan and Inder Kumar Gujral of India in 1997. Despite these modest successes, Pakistan remained dissatisfied with the status quo in Kashmir and continued to press for international intervention on the issue to pressure India to allow the Kashmiris to determine their own fate.[76]

The Kargil War followed closely on the heels of the nuclear tests by both states in the spring and summer of 1998. This added a significant new dimension to the Kashmir conflict as the threat of nuclear weapons loomed in the background. The Kargil War also marked only the second time in history that two nuclear-armed states went to war with one another (the Sino-Soviet border war along the Ussuri River in 1969 marking the first).[77]

The overall picture of Kashmir in the late 1990s for Pakistan was not encouraging. Through a mix of coercion and co-option India succeed in largely bringing the insurgency under control, including two sets of elections in 1996. India seemed to control the disputed Siachen Glacier and the nuclear tests reinforced the status quo between the two states.

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[76] Dixit, *India and Pakistan in War and Peace*.

[77] Ganguly and Hagerty, *Fearful Symmetry*, Chapter 7.

Pakistan’s decision to initiate a conflict in the difficult mountainous terrain of Kashmir initially appears puzzling. The rocky mountainous terrain makes transportation and movement difficult and the climate is uninviting, with temperatures plunging to 60 degrees below Celsius. However, the region had significant strategic value. The Kargil front overlooks the Srinagar-Leh National Highway that connects the Valley of Ladakh and Siachen Glacier with the Kashmir Valley, all in the Indian-controlled portion of Kashmir and Jammu. Had the Pakistanis succeeded in closing this road to India, the way would have been opened for them to annex a substantial portion of Indian-controlled Kashmir and finally take control of the Siachen Glacier, as India would have difficulty resupplying its troops there.

The build-up to the conflict was slow and occurred over nearly half a year. From December 1998 through March 1999 Pakistani fighters began to filter across the Line of Control in the Kargil region of Kashmir. Due to the harsh conditions near the LOC in the mountainous region, Indian forces withdrew annually to lower elevations during the winter months as they had done since 1977. Taking advantage of this fact, Pakistani troops moved into these positions which offered them a clear tactical advantage overlooking Indian forces below. Between March and May of 1999, regular Pakistani forces crossed the LOC setting up outposts ten to twelve kilometers inside Indian territory. The first signs of the Pakistani incursion were on May 2 when local herders discovered the troops and reported their presence to the Indian military. Still, it was only after several sightings of Pakistani soldiers by Indian patrols over a number of weeks that the Indian Cabinet Committee on Security decided to take action against the intruders.

Fighting commenced in late May along a 200 kilometer front in inhospitable conditions ranging from 10,000 to 18,000 feet in elevation, earning the Kargil conflict the distinction of being history's highest war. The conflict between two recently announced nuclear states raised international concerns that the limited war in Kargil might evolve into a broader, deadlier conflict. Both the United States and China, from whom Pakistan hoped for diplomatic support, instead admonished Sharif to end the conflict. On July 4, a meeting took place between U.S. President Clinton and Prime Minister Sharif in Washington in which both sides agreed on the need for peace in Kashmir and the restoration of the LOC.

The meeting in Washington was the beginning of the end for Pakistan, which had hoped the war might lead to foreign intervention in its favor. Thus the United States' refusal to intervene for the Pakistanis caused Sharif to rethink the value of the operation, and on July 12 in a nationally televised address he called for the withdrawal of mujahideen forces from the mountains.[78] By July 14 the first fighters began to withdraw and the conflict was over by the middle of the month.[79]

Due to the high altitudes involved and advantageous position for the Pakistanis, India suffered the loss of 524 soldiers and 1,363 wounded. However, the toll was even greater for the Pakistanis, who lost 745 soldiers with 2,500 wounded, according to estimates by the Indian government.[80] The war gained international attention due to the presence of nuclear weapons and the fact that two democracies were fighting one another.[81] The war chilled attempts to peacefully resolve the issue and was soon followed by Pervez Musharraf's October 12 coup that returned Pakistan to military rule.

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[78] The reference to fighters rather than the Pakistani military was in keeping with the Pakistani argument that the conflict represented an indigenous uprising and not a military action.

[79] Ganguly and Hagerty, *Fearful Symmetry*, Chapter 7.

### *Divided Government and Mixed Signals*

Following elections in 1998, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) under the leadership of Atal Vajpayee formed its second government.[82] While the BJP had done well in the 1998 elections, it still needed substantial outside support in order to form a coalition government controlling a majority of the seats in the Lok Sabha. This led to the formation of the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) government with eighteen parties including ten represented in the cabinet. This "inchoate alliance of diverse parties" forming the NDA contained both regional and national parties from across the political spectrum.[83]

The BJP ran on a Hindu nationalist platform that included references to Kashmir as well as the status of Muslims in India. However, in order to cobble together a coalition, the BJP were forced to make concessions to their governing partners, perhaps most significantly renouncing their desire to repeal Article 370 of the Constitution that granted Jammu and Kashmir special status. Repealing this article, which would allow non-Kashmiris to purchase land in Kashmir, would likely lead to a flood of Hindu immigrants into the valley. This compromise was particularly notable for the BJP as its roots dated back to resentment over partition.[84]

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[80] Dixit, *India and Pakistan in War and Peace,* 44.

[81] Polity IV codes Pakistan as 7 prior to Musharraf's coup in October, 1999, a score which would make the country a full democracy, although civil military relations were strained, and Sharif's power over the military was believed to be seriously circumscribed.

[82] The first BJP government was formed in 1996, but lasted a mere two weeks.

[83] Robert Hardgrave Jr., "Hindu Nationalism and the BJP: Transforming Religion and Politics in India," in *Prospects for Peace in South Asia*, ed. Rafiq Dossani and Henry Rowen (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2005), 185.

The need to ignore significant parts of its election platform was emblematic of the lack of unity within the BJP. Although the party was united behind its nationalist agenda, 'debates raged' within the party over the content of that agenda.[85] Within the BJP significant differences had long existed between Vajpayee and the party head (and later Home Minister) L. K. Advani. Since the formation of the BJP in 1980, Vajpayee had worked to make the party a mainstream alternative to Congress. This meant highlighting his personal popularity and downplaying the more extreme elements of the party's platform. In his study of the BJP, Kumar writes, "Under the moderate leadership of Vajpayee BJP had plunged itself into a deep ideological crisis. He was criticized for diluting the pro-Hindu image of the party. . . . In fact, Vajpayee attempts to make the party more and more centrist by diluting the core Hindutva issues."[86]

While Vajpayee enjoyed broader popular support, Advani was seen as the torch bearer for Hindu-nationalist politics within the party. Where Vajpayee worked to make the BJP acceptable to a broader portion of the Indian electorate, Advani sought to maintain its ideological foundation and maintain its ties with the extremist

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[84] Ibid, 190-204.

[85] David Stuligross, "India's Vision--and the BJP's," *Current History* 98 (1999), 425.

[86] Sunil Kumar, *Communalism and Secularism in Indian Politics: Study of the BJP* (New Delhi: Rawat Publications, 2001), 147-148.

RSS organization. Advani was well known as a hard-liner, and when he appointed Home Secretary in 1998 he continued to push the complete integration of Jammu and Kashmir, even as Vajpayee sought to improve India's relations with Pakistan.[87] Further, Advani was greatly disliked in Pakistan, where he was viewed as the most hawkish member of the government.[88]

Vajpayee found himself caught between the hard-line demands of the RSS and more militant members of his own party, the need to maintain the coalition, and his desire to portray the party as moderate.[89] To appease hard-liners he conducted India's first nuclear test on May 11, 1998, which led to both a Pakistani test seventeen days later and worldwide condemnation. At the same time, he kept Article 370 off the table and attempted to restart negotiations with Pakistan over Kashmir. On the sidelines of the U.N. in September 1998, Vajpayee and his Pakistani counterpart Nawaz Sharif decided to reopen the negotiations that started in 1997 under the previous Indian government. This series of talks led to Vajpayees' breakthrough bus trip across the border in February, 1999. On February 21, Vajpayee and Sharif signed the Lahore declaration, which called for resolution on the Kashmir dispute and initiated a further round of negotiations.[90] To the dismay of many member of the

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[87] Ibid, 149.

[88] Kuldip Nayar, *Wall at Wagah: India-Pakistan Relations* (New Delhi: Gyan Publishing, 2003), 206.

[89] Kumar, *Communalism and Secularism in Indian Politics*, 261.

[90] Robert Wirsing, *Kashmir in the Shadow of War: Regional Rivalries in a Nuclear Age* (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 2003), 24.

BJP, Vajpayee made a speech at Minar-e-Pakistan that affirmed the BJP's acceptance of Pakistan's existence.[91]

When the coalition government was initially formed, Vajpayee, in the tradition of Nehru, kept the Foreign Ministry portfolio for himself. He made Advani Home Secretary and George Fernandes of the Samata Party his Defense Minister. Fernandes's decision to join the coalition government was somewhat surprising given his previous criticism of the BJP platform, calling it "fascist" and claiming he would never join a BJP-led government.[92] In December 1998, in what many viewed as a move towards moderation, Vajpayee appointed Jaswant Singh as Foreign Minister, furthering what McMillan called the "constant tension" between Vajpayee and the moderates and Advani and the RSS wing of the party.[93] In the end, as Kumar notes, "It seemed the Prime Minister wielded little authority in the cabinet and in his own party."[94]

In addition to the divisions within the largest party in the government, the coalition was fraught with disagreements among its members from the day it took office. As Kumar writes, "Coalition partners behaved less like members of a cabinet than as sovereign entities who had come together under a treaty alliance.”[95] The coalition was a heterogeneous mix ideologically and included both national parties with broad goals as well as a large number of regional parties with specific mandates. This meant that a number of parties threatened to leave the government, a significant problem for the BJP due to the fragile nature of the coalition. The government’s thin margin of control in the Lok Sabha made such threats credible, and Vajpayee spent an inordinate amount of time dealing with simply keeping the coalition together. As Jaffrelot notes, "The Vajpayee government was also weakened by constant tensions within the coalition."[96]

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[91] M.L. Sondhi and Prakash Nanda, *Vajpayee's Foreign Policy: Daring the Irreversible* (New Delhi: Har-Anand, 1999), 119. The location is significant as it was in Minar-e-Pakistan that the All Muslim League passed a resolution creating Pakistan in 1940.

[92] Christophe Jaffrelot, "The BJP at the Centre: A Central and Centrist Party," in *The BJP and the Compulsions of Politics in India*, ed. Thomas Blom Hansen and Christophe Jaffrelot (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2001), 347. Ironically, once a member of the government, Fernandes became one of Vajpayee's principle troubleshooters, both for possible public relations problems and to keep the coalition intact.

[93] Alistair McMillan, "The BJP Coalition," in *Coalition Politics and Hindu Nationalism,* ed. Katharine Adeney and Lawrence Saez (New York: Routledge, 2005), 29.

[94] Kumar, *Communalism and Secularism in Indian Politics*, 245.

Divisions between coalition members created serious problems for Vajpayee. During the 1998 election campaign, the BJP had run under the banner of “A stable government with an able Prime Minister.” However, the different perspectives of the coalition members challenged both the stability of the government and the abilities of Vajpayee. Particularly troubling were the inflammatory statements by coalition members on foreign policy issues. In addition to the heated rhetoric of Advani, the Union Parliamentary Affairs Minister was quoted as saying, “Pakistan must tell us the place and date for war," while addressing army personnel in Jammu.[97] Thus, hawks in the government continued to rail against Pakistan while moderates like Vajpayee and Singh worked to improve relations with their western neighbor.

These internal tensions eventually led to the government’s collapse in April, 1999. J. Jayalalitha's AIADMK Party withdrew its support from the government, allegedly over the firing of the Naval Chief of Staff, Admiral Vishnu Bhagwat. Bhagwat became a *cause celebrité* for the opposition and some coalition members who argued that his dismissal reflected the Hindu nationalist politics of the BJP. Before leaving the government, Jayalalitha called on Defense Minister Fernandes to step down over the incident and argued that the government showed itself to be on the wrong side of the war against extremism.[98]

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[95] Ibid, 245.
[96] Jaffrelot, “The BJP at the Centre,” 316.
[97] Quoted in Kumar, *Communalism and Secularism in Indian Politics*, 245.

The fall of the BJP-led government created a crisis in leadership for the country. Although opponents of the government, particularly Congress, saw the fall of the government as a significant victory, the opposition proved incapable of capitalizing on the situation and forming their own government. In this divisive atmosphere the Indian President asked Vajpayee if the BJP would continue to lead a caretaker government until elections occurred in the fall. Vajpayee accepted this task, and with the Lok Sabha dissolved until the elections, the BJP ran the government without a mandate through the Kargil War.

This analysis of the BJP-led coalition reveals division throughout the government. Factions developed within the BJP over the extent to which the party should be driven by principle or electoral viability. Disagreements existed between the two most powerful members of the BJP – Vajpayee and Advani – over the appropriate course to pursue with Pakistan and negotiations over Kashmir. Further, differences between coalition members were regularly exposed, and Vajpayee's inability to control cabinet members meant that statements were made with respect to Pakistan that were at variance with the policy he was trying to pursue.

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[98] Yogesh Atal, *Mandate for Political Transition: Reemergence of Vajpayee* (New Delhi: Rawat Publications, 2000) 28-29. The actual grounds for Jayalalitha's dispute with the BJP are likely less principled than pragmatic. Jayalalitha wanted the central government to dismiss the state government in Tamil Nadu, a move that would have favored AIADMK.

Even a casual observer of Indian politics during 1998 and 1999 would have found it difficult to understand the government's course of action with Pakistan. There were elements within the government that favored full incorporation of Jammu and Kashmir into India and no negotiations with Pakistan. Others argued that India could negotiate with Pakistan, but only to further codify what had already been agreed to in the 1972 Simla Agreement. Both these groups believed that India's acquisition of nuclear weapons meant that Pakistan could no longer hope to achieve its goals in Kashmir through force. Finally, still others sought open negotiations with Pakistan where India might make some concessions in exchange for a lasting settlement.

### *Hawkish Government*

Since its creation in 1980, the BJP had developed a niche in the Indian electorate as a Hindu-nationalist party with hawkish views on foreign policy. Although Prime Minister Atal Vajpayee was more moderate than many BJP members, his forty years working for right-wing parties gave him a reputation as a hard-liner. While Hindu nationalism had initially been confined to the edges of Indian society, concessions by the central government to minority groups in the 1980s and 1990s had fueled a backlash in public opinion which rightist parties like the BJP were able to exploit.[99] In addition to employing rhetoric against Muslims in India, the BJP was known as anti-Pakistani as well.[100]

The BJP is only the latest in a line of Hindu nationalist parties that have generally occupied the fringes of Indian politics since independence. The Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), or National Association of Volunteers, was a paramilitary force that pushed Hindu nationalism. It was founded in 1925 and came to prominence as a critic of Congress following independence. 1951 marked the formation of Jan Sangh, a political party that effectively became an arm of the RSS. Jan Sangh led the first non-Congress government in Indian history from 1977 through 1979, which collapsed due to internal divisions and paved the way for the creation of the BJP in 1980. Although the BJP was more independent of the RSS than Jan Sangh, the group still wields considerable influence within the party.[101]

This meant that the BJP was associated with hard-line politics with Pakistan. Campaigning for the 1992 elections, the BJP, led by L. K. Advani, caravanned through Kashmir to raise its profile and increase the salience of India’s Hindu-Muslim divide.[102] Right-wings parties, like BJP predecessor Jan Sangh, heavily criticized negotiations and agreements with Pakistan and had long sought nuclear weapons.[103] Moreover, as already noted, one of the party’s central planks involved altering Article 370 of the Constitution, which would allow greater Hindu settlement in Kashmir. Finally, once in office, the BJP announced a policy of “hot pursuit” of terrorists into Pakistan-controlled Kashmir, something that had been avoided by prior governments out of fear that it might lead to war.[104]

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[99] Stephen Saideman, "At the Heart of the Conflict: Irredentism and Kashmir," in *The India-Pakistan Conflict: An Enduring Rivalry*, ed. T. V. Paul (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 216.
[100] Nayar, *Wall at Wagah*, 357.
[101] Hardgrave, “Hindu Nationalism and the BJP.”
[102] Saideman, "At the Heart of the Conflict: Irredentism and Kashmir," 216.
[103] James Chiriyahkandath and Andrew Wyatt, "The NDA and Indian Foreign Policy," in *Coalition Politics and Hindu Nationalism*, ed. Katharine Adeney and Lawrence Saez (New York: Routledge, 2005), 201.

Previously, Vajpayee led a government that lasted only two weeks in 1996 but was notable for the fact that Vajpayee called for nuclear tests to be carried out, although his short stay in office precluded this.[105] Not surprisingly, once in office for a longer duration, Vajpayee oversaw the nuclear tests within eight weeks of taking office in 1998 that led to a chill in India’s relations with Pakistan (which subsequently tested a bomb of its own). Moreover, Vajpayee’s hawkish views on foreign policy were well known, and he did not appear as constrained in his dealings with Pakistan as his predecessors.[106]

There were also plenty of hawks in the divided government besides the more moderate Prime Minister. One of the most hawkish ministers was Home Secretary L. K. Advani, who viewed the election of the BJP as a revival of Indian strength in its relations with neighbors. Shortly after the government took power, Advani said, "We will not be described as a 'soft state' by our enemies."[107] In addition, he made a number of provocative statements about Pakistan following the Indian nuclear test. Incautiously, he said that India’s possession of nuclear weapons would bring Pakistan to its knees.[108] Further, Defense Secretary George Fernandes, although not a BJP member, was also known for his hawkish views.[109] Although the government also had a number of moderates, including Foreign Minister Singh and non-BJP ministers, the government was certainly more hawkish than a Congress-led government would have been.

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[104] Sreeram Chailia, "BJP, India's Foreign Policy and The ‘Realist Alternative’ To the Nehruvian Tradition," *International Politics* 39 (2002), 224.

[105] Kundu, “The NDA and National Security,” 215.

[106] Chiriyahkandath and Wyatt, “The NDA and Indian Foreign Policy,” 202.

[107] Quoted in C.P. Bhambri, *BJP-Led Government and Elections 1999* (New Delhi: Shipra Publications, 2000), 86.

[108] Nayar, *Wall at Wagah*, 206.

### *Impact of Disunity on India's ability to signal*

#### INTENTIONS

The Vajpayee government faced a number of problems in clearly signaling its intentions for Kargil to the Pakistanis. Perhaps the most significant problem was the difference between the BJP's hawkish reputation and Vajpayee's personal attempt to create a final settlement on the issue. Talks between the two sides launched in 1997 were aborted following the nuclear tests in 1998. The first meeting between Vajpayee and Sharif occurred on the sidelines of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) summit at Colombo in July 1998, but no progress was achieved. A meeting two months later at the United Nations proved more fruitful and launched talks that would eventually lead to the Lahore Declaration on February 21, 1999.[110]

There is evidence that Vajpayee believed that he could make a breakthrough with Pakistan before the end of 1999, and the Lahore Declaration initiated intensive back-channel negotiations on the issue. Between March 3 and May 17, 1999, seven rounds of talks were held between two negotiators personally chosen by Sharif and Vajpayee. Records from the Pakistani side of the negotiations indicate both the potential for breakthrough on Kashmir and deep involvement by Vajpayee. However, the Kargil conflict ended hopes for a settlement before the new millennium.[111]

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[109] Ramesh Thakur, *The Politics and Economics of India's Foreign Policy* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994), 134.

[110] M.L. Sondhi and Prakash Nanda, *Vajpayee's Foreign Policy: Daring the Irreversible* (New Delhi: Har-Anand, 1999), 117-119.

On the one hand, Vajpayee saw a historic opportunity to end the key disputes that had plagued relations between the two states for decades. However, on the other hand, divisions in his government undercut his message of reconciliation. Perhaps no one on the Indian side dampened the prospects for peace more than Home Minister Advani. As noted above, Advani was viewed as a hard-liner by the Pakistanis, and his pronouncements following India’s nuclear test were particularly hawkish. Five days after the test, Advani warned Pakistan “to roll back its anti-India policy, especially with regards to Kashmir” and announced a new approach to “deal firmly and strongly with Pakistan’s hostile designs and activities in Kashmir.”[112]

In particular, with relation to Kashmir, Advani stated that “India’s decisive step to become a nuclear weapon state has brought about a qualitatively new stage in Indo-Pak relations, particularly in finding a lasting solution to the Kashmir problem. . . . Islamabad should realize the change in the geo-strategic situation.”[113] However, Advani was not the only top Indian official rattling his saber following the tests. BJP president Thakre noted that all India wanted from the tests was “to have its territories vacated."[114] Further, BJP spokesman K. L. Sharma argued that the government should take a tough stand against Pakistan and that "Pakistan should be prepared for India's wrath" if it does not comply.[115]

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[111] Wirsing, *Kashmir in the Shadow of War*, 26-30.
[112] Federation of American Scientists, "17 Days in May: Chronology of Indian Nuclear Weapons Tests," http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/india/nuke/chron.htm.
[113] Ibid.

In the background was the acknowledged desire of the BJP to revoke Article 370 of the Constitution ending special land-ownership laws for Kashmir. Although the BJP had renounced this part of its platform to form the coalition government, with Advani as the Home Minister, Pakistan could expect other moves to further the incorporation of the state into India.

Divisions within the BJP and Vajpayee's inability to control the different messages emanating from his government sent Pakistan conflicting signals on India's intentions regarding Kashmir. By tying the nuclear tests to Kashmir, a number of BJP officials essentially argued that Pakistan now had to respect the status quo. Advani's statements indicate a clear belief that nuclear weapons stabilized the status quo. In addition, many of these statements were provocative and implied future military action from India on the issue of Kashmir. By tying the nuclear tests and Kashmir, hard-liners in the government were essentially declaring the issue dead. Of course, this was in direct contradiction to the policy that Vajpayee wanted to pursue.

Unlike the case of Israel and the Sinai Peninsula in 1973, the stakes in Jumma and Kashmir at the time of the Kashmir war in 1999 were clear. The BJP had built a reputation for defending India's rights in Kashmir, and if anything its views were more extreme than those held by members of the Congress-led opposition. While many in Congress accepted the LOC as the de facto border in Kashmir, most BJP members viewed all of Kashmir as Indian with a portion of the territory illegally occupied by Pakistan.

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[114] Ibid.
[115] Ibid.

The BJP had maximalist views on the territory that were only slightly muddied by Vajpayee’s willingness to negotiate. Under different conditions, having a hard-line party like the BJP in power and willing to negotiate over Kashmir with Pakistan might lend credibility to any settlement. Unfortunately, this “only Nixon could go to China” view presupposes that the hard-line party has enough domestic strength and internal unity to pull off such difficult negotiations. As I will argue below, the fact that the disclosure of back-channel negotiations ended the processes shows that Vajpayee was no Nixon.

Of the Indian domestic factors that contributed to Pakistan’s attack, there is little evidence that low-stakes on the part of India played a significant role. The Pakistani leadership knew that India would attempt to defend the territory and placed high value on it. From the Pakistani perspective the question was how the divisions within the governing coalition might impede India from successfully mounting a defense.

## WEAKNESS

In its rhetoric and early actions, the BJP worked hard to portray itself as a tough, firm party that would protect Indian national interests. Its background as a nationalist party and tough rhetoric on Kashmir following the nuclear tests would seem to imply a strong party with a muscular foreign policy. The statements by BJP and government officials following the nuclear test also implied that they believed India was now negotiating over Kashmir from a position of strength. Moreover, following the Lahore meetings, many Indian officials didn't believe that Pakistan would launch an attack.[116]

The inability of Vajpayee to reign in heated rhetoric form some ministers on Kashmir did not just send mixed signals, it also undercut the Prime Minister. The chaotic nature of the coalition and the constant threats of defection made Vajpayee appear weak. Thus, Pakistani leaders were less interested in the hawkish history of the BJP and Vajpayee than in his ability to actually follow through on potential commitments which appeared limited at best.

Finally, the Subrahmanyam Report (named for the Chairman of the Kargil Review Committee) conducted by the Indian government following the Kargil War specifically cited government weakness as one of the six causes of the war. This factor, combined with the lack of Indian troops in the area caused Pakistan to assume that it could successfully carry out a limited land grab without significant consequences.[117] As events on the ground would show, while Pakistan was correct about Indian troop deployments, they seriously misjudged the Indian government. The reason for this mistake is clear from this section: the divided nature of the BJP-led government caused Pakistan to view it as weak.

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[116] Ganguly and Hagerty, *Fearful Symmetry*, 152.

[117] Kargil Review Committee, *From Surprise to Reckoning* (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2000), 90.

## DECISIVE ACTION

The ability of the BJP-led government to act decisively was undermined more by the perception it created than by actual deadlock in the government. In fact, India had been slow to react to Pakistani infiltrations across the line of control in Kargil. The fact that the Pakistanis had been moving across the border was known to India for some time before the war broke out, but Vajpayee hoped to settle the issue in his negotiations with Sharif. In fact, the early success of these back-channel negotiations caused Vajpayee to believe that war could be averted if Sharif could reign in the military.[118]

The desire to avoid outright conflict led to an extraordinary episode between the leaders of the two countries. As Wirsing recounts, Vajpayee hoped to meet with Sharif to discuss the infiltration of militants across the border and believed that Sharif's planned visit to China might allow him to make a brief visit to New Delhi for a meeting. While this was being negotiated, the existence of the back-channel meetings between the two countries came to light in India and Vajpayee took a hard-line.[119] The possibly of avoiding war was prevented due to the divisions in the government that both made back-channel negotiations necessary and harmed Vajpayee's leadership once they came to light.

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[118] Wirsing, *Kashmir in the Shadow of War*, 28.
[119] Ibid, 26-30.

### *The View from Pakistan*

The first problem that emerged between the new Vajpayee government and Pakistan was nuclear testing, and particularly the manner in which the hawkish government chose to frame the tests as support for the status quo. Pakistani Finance Minister Aziz Sartaj later claimed, "Had not Advani made provocative statements we would not have probably gone for tests. He threw down the gauntlet, we had no choice except to pick it up."[120] Further, Pakistani President Sharif noted that the Indian government seemed to view the tests as the end of dialogue between the two sides over Kashmir.[121]

In fact, Vajpayee contacted Sharif immediately after the tests to note that India was still committed to peace and a friendly relationship with Pakistan.[122] Even as the negotiations intensified during the winter and spring of 1999, Pakistan couldn't help but question whether or not the Vajpayee government would actually be able to follow through on its promises, given the divided nature of the government. According to Nayar, who talked with a number of Pakistani officials, there was significant concern that the days of the coalition government were numbered.[123] Thus, the divisions within the government undercut the credibility of the government's intentions and produced a mixed message of hard- and soft-line tactics. Additionally, the Vajpayee government seemed to argue that the nuclear tests both changed everything and nothing while supporting the status quo and opening the way for negotiations.  The Pakistanis simultaneously felt pressure to prevent the nuclear issue from solidifying Indian control over Kashmir and were led to believe that agreement was still possible.

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[120] Nayar, *Wall at Wagah,* 206.
[121] Ibid, 206.
[122] C. P. Thakur and Devendra P. Sharma, *India under Atal Behari Vajpayee: The BJP Era* (New Delhi: UBS Publishers' Distributors, 1999), 134.
[123] Nayar, *Wall at Wagah,* 205.

More importantly, while the Indian government and the BJP in particular, worked hard to send a signal of toughness, this was not the message received by the Pakistanis.  Pakistani Prime Minister Sharif thought that the BJP tested the bomb not to change the strategic balance with Pakistan but instead to "cover up its weakness through the bomb."[124]  In addition, J.N. Dixit argues that Pakistani Army head Pervez Musharraf viewed the BJP as 'paper tigers' known more for their tough talk than action.  Musharraf also believed that Vajpayee was a weak leader.[125]  Much of the Pakistani analysis stems from BJP's weakness in managing its governing coalition. Thus, Sharif believed that the BJP-led coalition was in constant danger of falling, and the nuclear tests were performed to shore up support for the ailing coalition.[126]  This is an astute analysis of the situation and is empirically borne out by the broad support the test received in Indian public opinion.

Musharraf's belief that the BJP was a party of 'paper tigers' may stem from the heated rhetoric following the nuclear tests.  While a number of ministers and BJP party members made aggressive comments about the new balance of power, as was discussed above, Vajpayee continued to hold out hope for a negotiated solution to the Kashmir issue.  Thus, while many hard-liners spoke of a fundamentally changed situation on the sub-continent, there was no actual change in India's strategy.

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[124] Ibid.
[125] Dixit, *India and Pakistan in War and Peace*, 40.
[126] Nayar, *Wall at Wagah*.

Pakistan viewed the divided government as unlikely to meet a significant military challenge. According to the Subrahmanyam Report, "A weak and unstable government in India would be incapable of a firm response and would not expand the conflict into Pakistan across the international frontier."[127] Thus the perceptions of the Pakistanis regarding the impact of divisions in the Indian government were more significant than the government's actual track record. Of course, Pakistan would be proven wrong, but the appearance of the Indian government certainly reinforced this view.

Similar to the Subrahmanyam Report, Singh argues that, "Pakistani estimates were that a government constantly preoccupied with its political survival and domestic politics would either over-react or under-react to Pakistani military aggression."[128] From the Pakistani point of view, the precarious state of the Indian government would favor them no matter which response the incursion generated. If the Indians under-reacted, Pakistan would be able to grab the territory at a low cost with little fear of extensive retaliation. On the other hand, the BJP might overreact in the desire to complete the conflict before the elections scheduled for September. Musharraf and other Pakistani analysts believed that such an overreaction was likely to lead to international intervention because of the nuclear weapons involved.[129]

The view on the part of Pakistanis that India's government could not muster decisive action in the face of an incursion was a key contributor to Pakistan's calculus regarding the likelihood of success in the conflict. The infighting in the governing coalition that Pakistan had witnessed on a host of issues was expected to be transferred to India’s ability to resist an attack. Pakistan misread Vajpayee’s government both due to the mixed messages it was sending regarding Kashmir and its inability to act in a credible manner.

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[127] Kargil Review Committee, *From Surprise to Reckoning*, 90.

[128] Jasjit Singh, "The Fourth War," in *Kargil 1999: Pakistan's Fourth War for Kashmir*, ed. Jasjit Singh (New Delhi: Knowledge World, 1999), 130.

[129] Ibid.

### *Alternative Explanations*

#### THE OPPOSITION

The opposition did play a role in the Kashmir conflict, but not for the reasons that might be expected. The defection of J. Jayalalitha's AIADMK Party from the governing coalition, allowing for a successful vote of no confidence, further exposed the weakness of the government. The divisions within the government up to this point were well known and clear to observers, but the dissolution of the Lok Sabha and creation of a caretaker government contributed to the view that Vajpayee was the weak leader of a divided coalition.

Further, one could argue that the relative dovishness of the opposition harmed the desire of the government to signal a firm line with Pakistan. However, this line of reasoning is problematic on two grounds. First, while the opposition certainly did believe that the government and the BJP in particular were too hawkish, these same divisions existed within the ruling coalition. Hence government ministers could make aggressive statements regarding Kashmir while Vajpayee angled for a permanent settlement through back-channel negotiations.  Further, the most significant foreign policy decision of the Vajpayee government before Kargil was the nuclear tests which were supported after the fact by the opposition.[130]

The second drawback for this argument is the fact that there is no evidence that the Pakistanis considered the opposition in their decision to launch an attack. While there is good evidence that the Pakistani leadership considered a number of factors involving the BJP-led government including the weakness of Vajpayee, its indecisiveness due to internal divisions, its instability, and its inability to support its aggressive rhetoric, there is no reference to what the Pakistanis thought of the main opposition parties: Congress and United Front.[131]  Not that these parties were sending particularly clear signal themselves – Congress in particular also suffered from significant internal divisions.  The divisions within the opposition were also exposed when they brought down Vajpayee's coalition but were unable to create an alternative of their own.[132]

## LEADERSHIP TENURE

What impact did the government's relatively short tenure play in the Pakistani decision to attack India at Kargil?  The BJP-led government had been in power just over a year when Pakistan launched its attack.  This might seem to confirm the Gelpi and Grieco thesis that younger governments are more likely to be challenged, but once again the causal mechanism fails.[133] According to Gelpi and Grieco, the reason that younger government are more vulnerable to attack is that such leaders are likely to cut deals early in their terms before they are held accountable by the electorate.

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[130] Kundu, "The NDA and National Security," 217.
[131] Dixit, *India and Pakistan in War and Peace*.
[132] Hardgrave, "Hindu Nationalism and the BJP."

The problem for the theory in the case of the Kargil War is that while the coalition government had not been in office long, elections were on the horizon. The Pakistanis knew that Vajpayee’s coalition was divided and that a single defection would bring down the government, which was part of the reason they viewed the government as weak.[134] Further, when the AIADMK withdrew from the coalition and the government collapsed, elections were scheduled for September. Thus, Pakistani leaders knew that if they stuck to their timeline they would be attacking before the elections.

Pakistan’s decision to provoke the BJP just months before a general election show the extent to which Pakistan was misled by the government’s mixed signals. Just as the BJP used the nuclear tests to rally public opinion in their favor, the BJP could use a conflict in Kargil to rally support directly before the new elections.[135] If Pakistan was banking on the notion that the relatively new government was going to make major concessions just before an election, it seriously misjudged the situation.

## PUBLIC OPINION

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[133] Christopher Gelpi and Joseph Grieco, "Attracting Trouble: Democracy, Leadership Tenure, and the Targeting of Militarized Challenges, 1918-1992," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 45, no. 6 (2001).

[134] Nayar, *Wall at Wagah*.

[135] Kundu, “The NDA and National Security,” 219. Of course, this is exactly what happened as the BJP was returned to power as part of a more stable coalition and Congress suffered its worst defeat ever at the polls.

Public opinion on the Kashmir issue is difficult to gauge. While there is generalized support for a negotiated settlement, crises tend to harden public perceptions. Perhaps most significantly, Kashmir is simply not an important daily issue for most Indians whose lives are more directly impacted by government decisions on the economy, education, health care, and religion.

However, if anything, before the Kargil War the India public appeared more hawkish than usual as the result of the nuclear tests conducted the previous spring. The nuclear tests caused widespread public celebrations and drew overwhelming support from across the political spectrum. A survey of elites following the tests showed that only 8% opposed India's possession of nuclear weapons. Although 44% of all those surveyed believed that India should never use nuclear weapons, one-third believed that India would be justified in using them if Pakistan sought to take over Kashmir.[136] Soon after the invaders were discovered, Indian public opinion rallied behind the government. Indian Foreign Minister Jaswant Singh argued that Kargil marked India's first war of the media age, and that Indian media outlets played crucial role in mobilizing public opinion.[137]

Thus, Pakistani officials were facing a situation in which the Indian public was both relatively aware of the Kashmir dispute and the capabilities on both sides. However, the apparent hawkishness of Indian public opinion does not appear to have registered with Pakistani officials. The fact that the Indian public would defend Kashmir and did not rule out the use of nuclear weapons to do so is not mentioned by any of the Pakistani elites. Once again the relatively clear signals of the public were obscured by the mixed signals coming from the government.

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[136] Samina Ahmed, David Cortright, and Amitabh Mattoo, "Public Opinion and Nuclear Options for South Asia," *Asian Survey* 38, no. 8 (1998).
[137] Singh, "The Forth War."

## BALANCE OF FORCES

The critical change in the balance of forces between the two sides was the introduction of nuclear weapons to the dispute over Kashmir. The tests of 1998 raised the stakes of future conflicts in the region and should have functioned as the ultimate deterrence. Nuclear optimists would suggest that the introduction of nuclear weapons to the relationship would both stabilize the dispute and prevent future conflicts from breaking out.[138]

In fact, it does appear that Pakistani leaders were concerned that the presence of nuclear weapons on both sides reinforced the status quo in Kashmir. However, there is also evidence to show that the Pakistani elites believed that they would benefit from the "stability/instability paradox" of nuclear weapons.[139] That is, the nuclear balance between India and Pakistan allowed for limited conventional war where the use of nuclear weapons would be unimaginable. It was this view that led a Pakistani military official to say, "There is almost a red alert situation . . . [but] there is no chance of the Kargil conflict leading to a full-fledged war between the two sides."[140]

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[138] Scott Douglas Sagan and Kenneth Neal Waltz, *The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate Renewed; with New Sections on India and Pakistan, Terrorism, and Missile Defense*, 2nd. ed. (New York: Norton, 2003), Chapter 1.

[139] B. H. Liddle Hart, *Deterrent of Defense* (London: Stevens and Sons, 1960).

[140] Quoted in Scott Sagan, "The Perils of Proliferation in South Asia," *Asian Survey* 41, no. 6 (2001), 1072.

The debate over the role of nuclear weapons in conflict demonstrates that the presence of nuclear weapons do not have a clear predicted impact on the likelihood of war. While nuclear optimists emphasize the deterrent value of nuclear weapons, nuclear pessimists point out that these weapons may be permissive to conflict under some conditions. The indeterminacy of these theories appears to be reflected in the thinking of both sides in the conflict. India seemed to view the presence of nuclear weapons as a stabilizing instrument that would enforce the status quo, while Pakistan saw their value in limiting the scope of the conflict once war broke out.

There is evidence that the Pakistanis believed that Indian forces in Kashmir were insufficient to prevent a serious attack. However, India's deployment in Kashmir had not changed significantly since it began increasing the number of troops there to deal with the insurgency in the early 1990s. Thus, while Pakistan might have viewed the military balance as favorable in 1999, these conditions had not changed dramatically in the period directly preceding the conflict.

In fact, of the six factors which the Subrahmanyam Report argues led Pakistan to war in 1999, four did not change prior to the conflict: India's military posture, India's commitment to fight militants in Kashmir, the belief that China would support an incursion, and the view that the international community would intervene. The two that did change were the presence of nuclear weapons, which Pakistan believed would prevent India from crossing its borders, and the perceived weakness and instability of the Indian government.[141] Thus, while the local military balance was not significant in the conflict, nuclear weapons do appear to have played a role in Pakistan's decision making.

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[141] Kargil Review Committee, *From Surprise to Reckoning,* 90.

Overall, the military balance between the two states favored India. With an army of nearly one million, India had nearly 40% more troops under arms than Pakistan. In addition to soldiers, India had 3,414 tanks, 1,517 armored vehicles, over 6,600 artillery pieces, and 774 combat aircraft. Against this, Pakistan had 2,320 tanks, 850 armored vehicles, over 3,600 artillery pieces, and nearly 400 combat aircraft.[142]

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[142] Amarinder Singh, *A Ridge Too Far: War in the Kargil Heights 1999* (Patiala: Motibagh Palace, 2001).

# Chapter 6

## Unified Doves: Israel under the second Rabin government and India under Nehru

*Unified Doves in Theory*

The previous chapters have emphasized the problems that face divided governments regardless of whether or not they are hawkish or dovish. Studying unified dovish governments exposes the important differences that exist between divided and unified governments. Unlike divided governments, unified governments are able to signal credibly and clearly communicate their intentions. While their dovishness may make them slightly more likely to be targeted than united hawkish governments, the significant difference between dovish and hawkish governments is the manner in which they avoid conflict.

The unity of dovish governments is the key that allows them to avoid conflict. While divided dovish governments suffer from having both hawkish and dovish wings that prevent them from signaling their intentions clearly, unable to bargain effectively or credibly, unified dovish governments avoid this problem. Instead, unified doves are able to pursue a credible and clear negotiating line. Through negotiations such states are able to avoid settling their disputes through warfare.

Perhaps most important for unitary dovish governments is their ability to take decisive actions. Divided governments are hindered both by their inability to act and the frequency with which they take contradictory actions. Unified dovish states can pursue a peaceful resolution to a dispute because they can follow through on the commitments that they have made and avoid harmful contradictory actions that might undercut the negotiation process.  Often the strong leader guiding such unified governments has a specific view of how he wants to change the relationship between the two countries and this vision is pursued by the entire government.  Potential challengers view the government as a credible negotiating partner that can deliver on its promises.

Since unified dovish governments are averse to resorting to force to settle their disputes through force, one might expect that such governments might be more susceptible to bullying by challengers who seek to exploit their dovish nature.[1] However there are important factors that mitigate against such behavior.  First, while such governments are dovish, they are not weak.  They can clearly enunciate what they are willing to offer for peace as well as what they expect in return.  Second, while such governments are dovish, they are not pacifists.  Their ability to act decisively means that in addition to making concessions for peace, they can also act defensively against perceived threats.  Finally, as the "only Nixon could go to China" thesis shows, dovish governments will be concerned that the public not view them as negotiating from a position of weakness, and will be sensitive to such bullying efforts.

As in the previous two chapters, this chapter will investigate the three factors listed above and the role they play in preventing a potential challenger from attacking the state in question.  By examining the Israeli and Indian cases this chapter will show not only that unified dovish governments can avoid targeting through negotiations, but that significant strides towards peace can be made under such governments.  If my theory is correct, the fact that these governments are unified and dovish will influence the ability of the government to signal its intentions, take decisive action, and demonstrate strength.  As in previous chapter, the perspective will then shift to examine how potential challengers view the government.  Finally, the chapter will study the role that these perceptions play in the decision of the challenging state to forgo military action.

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[1] This concern is raised in Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and David Lalman, *War and Reason: Domestic and International Imperatives* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992).

A number of competing theories exist that also seek to explain when states are likely to be challenged.  Kenneth Schultz's theory focuses on the role of opposition parties in signaling the intentions of the government to potential challengers. According to this theory, challenges should be less likely when the opposition supports the government's policies.  Chris Gelpi and Joseph Grieco's theory on leadership tenure posits that democratic governments are particularly susceptible to challenge early in their term.  Extending Reiter and Stam's research on public opinion and conflict, challenges seem least likely when the public is hawkish.  Lastly, theories on the balance of forces suggest that shifts in the balance of power will make conflict more likely.

The chapter is organized along the lines of the previous case studies.  For each case a brief history of the dispute will be analyzed.  The next section will examine the unity and dovishness of the government and examine the accuracy of these codings.

In the same vein, the following portion will connect the nature of the government to its ability to signal its intentions, take decisive action, and demonstrate its strength. The focus will then shift from the potential target state to examine how the potential challenger viewed the government and the degree to which this influenced their actions. Each case study will conclude with a discussion of how the alternative theories' predictions compare with the outcome in each case.

## Israel's Peace Process under Rabin

### *Background of the conflict*

The previous chapter chronicled the last war between the Arab states and Israelis, the October War of 1973. Some significant changes occurred between 1973 and 1992, when Yitzhak Rabin took power. The greatest shift occurred in 1978 when Egyptian President Anwar Sadat, the same man who led Egypt to war against Israel just five years earlier, and Israeli Prime Minister Menachim Begin, who led the right-wing Likud Party, signed the Camp David Accords and made peace. The peace deal with Egypt, gained at the cost of returning the Sinai, meant that Israel enjoyed greater security on one of its borders and with its most significant challenger.

While the peace with Egypt marked a significant change for Israeli foreign relations, many other issues present in the October War of 1973 persisted in 1992. The most entrenched problem remained how to proceed with the territories occupied during the Six Day War. With the Sinai returned to Egypt, Israel still controlled the

Golan Heights, West Bank, and Gaza Strip, all territories it was less willing to part with than the Sinai. In addition, the 1982 Lebanon War meant that Israel also controlled an area in southern Lebanon.

The questions that loomed for Israeli leaders in the early 1970s remained twenty years later. To what extent should Israel seek to formally annex these areas? What rights should be afforded Palestinians living in these territories? What arrangement could be made offering Israel both peace and security with its neighbors? Answers to these political questions differed across the political spectrum.

A key development for Israel in the years leading up to Rabin's election was the first Palestinian intifada. The rebellion, which started in December 1987, grew out of Palestinians' frustration with their ambiguous political situation, lack of progress by the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) in pressuring Israel, and generally poor living conditions. The first intifada was marked by Palestinian worker strikes, civil disobedience, boycotts of Israeli goods, and skirmishes between Palestinians and the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF). The intifada also led to an increase in violence against Israelis as militant Palestinian organizations like Hamas and Islamic Jihad targeted not only Israeli settlers, but also civilians within Israeli borders.

Israel's foreign relations were also tense. Despite the peace treaty with Egypt, Israel was still not recognized by Lebanon, Syria, or Jordan. Moreover, the intifada drew the attention of Arab leaders to the plight of the Palestinians and gave their publics a rallying point against Israel. Israel's relations with Lebanon, where it recently fought a war, and Syria, which now had a large hand in Lebanese internal politics, were particularly strained.

### *Unified government and clear signals*

The Israeli elections of 1992 pitted the incumbent, hawkish Yitzhak Shamir, leader of the right-wing Likud party against Yitzhak Rabin, the former Prime Minister and leader of the left-wing Labor party. The election was notable for the critical role that Rabin's personal appeal played in the success of the Labor party. While direct election of the Prime Minister was not introduced until the 1996 Israeli elections, Rabin was such a force in 1992 that the name of the ticket was not the standard "Labor" but instead "the Labor Party headed by Rabin."[2] Rabin's personal appeal had already been tested in his selection to lead the Labor Party. After the Shamir government fell, the Central Committee of the Labor Party voted 582-504 to endorse Shimon Peres as the party's leader. While Peres was popular with party insiders, Rabin felt he could win the nomination among the party's rank and file. Thus, for the first time in Labor Party history there was a national primary process in which Rabin prevailed over Peres, 41% to 35%.[3]

The way in which Rabin came into office gave him a personal mandate that had not been seen before in Israeli politics. Following the "most leader-oriented" campaign in Israeli history,[4] "Rabin enjoyed a position of towering dominance in the making of the government's foreign and defense policy."[5] The personal nature of the election and Labor's success in retaking the government bolstered Rabin's mandate for change and gave him powers closer to those of a president than a prime minister.[6] One of Rabin's first steps in government was to further concentrate his power and he instructed his director general to mold government policies to match the priorities of the Prime Minister. This power grab eventually led to some push-back from cabinet ministers who felt that their power had been usurped.[7] This power would have two important consequences for his government

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[2] Asher Arian, Amikam Nachmani, and Ruth Amir, *Executive Governance in Israel* (New York: Palgrave, 2002), 57.

[3] David Horovitz, ed., *Yitzhak Rabin: Soldier of Peace* (London: Peter Halban, 1996), 106.

[4] Ibid, 109.

The first chance that Rabin had to exert his newly won power as prime minister was in choosing his cabinet. Labor won 44 seats in the Knesset elections, far outdistancing Likud's 32, but also short of the 61 required to achieve a Knesset majority. Rabin called on the dovish Meretz, with its 12 seats to and the Orthodox Shas party with its six seats to join the government. In addition, the government was supported by Arab parties who Rabin did not want in the government so that any peace deals were the result of a "Jewish government". While Rabin initially rejected this outside support, it became critical when the Shas Party left the government in 1993. Finally, Rabin sought a broader coalition than that which he ended up with, and tried to include the hawkish, right-wing Tsomet led by Rafiel Eitan. This failed when Rabin was unable to offer Eitan any of the cabinet posts he desired, so the cabinet was much more homogeneous than Rabin would have liked.[8]

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[5] Avi Shlaim, *The Iron Wall: Israel and the Arab World* (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 2000), 505.
[6] Ibid, Chapter 13.
[7] Arian, Nachmani, and Amir, *Executive Governance in Israel*, 57.

The cabinet that Rabin selected was unified on foreign policy issues and nearly uniformly dovish. Horovitz notes that Rabin "packed the cabinet with his supporters."[9] Even Aronoff, who highlights some of the differences in the Rabin government, notes, "Rabin, who had his way with the allocation of portfolios in his cabinet, ended up with a narrow, dovish, and feuding cabinet."[10] The feuding that Aronoff mentions was limited to two ministers and dealt with domestic political issues, not foreign relations. Interior Minister Aryeh Deri of the Shas Party disagreed with the appointment of left-leaning Meretz member Shulamit Aloni to Ministry of Education and Culture due to that position's role in the religious affairs of the country. While Aronoff spends substantial time dissecting this conflict, it is not mentioned by any other foreign policy analysts and does not appear to have impacted Israel's peace negotiations.

One reason that the Shas-Meretz feud does not receive more attention is that Shas left the government in September 1993, after just over a year in the coalition. A number of Shas' ministers faced corruption charges stemming from their participation in the Shamir coalition. The resignation came six hours after the Israeli High Court of Justice ruled that Rabin should sack two Shas ministers based on the corruption allegations.[11] While Shas' departure narrowed Rabin's margin for error, the two party coalition supported by outside Arab parties was the narrowest (in terms of the number of parties in the government) in Israel's history and took an already homogenous cabinet and further unified it.[12]

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[8] Dan Kurzman, *Soldier of Peace: The Life of Yitzhak Rabin* (New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 1998), 436-440. Aronoff ("Labor in the Second Rabin Era") claims that had Tsomet joined the government, an agreement with the Palestinians would have been impossible.

[9] Horovitz, *Yitzhak Rabin*, 112.

[10] Myron Aronoff, "Labor in the Second Rabin Era: The First Year of Leadership," in *Israel under Rabin*, ed. Robert Freedman (Boulder, CO: Westview Pres, 1995), 130.

More significant than the relations between the parties within the cabinet were the views of the principle foreign policy leaders in the government. An additional benefit of Rabin's post-election power was that it allowed him to assume both the prime minister post and the defense minister portfolio. Rabin's military background made taking the defense position critical to him – a position he enjoyed as a member of the national unity governments of the 1980s but that had been denied him during his first tenure as Prime Minister from 1974-1977. Further, according to David Makovsky, "Because he also holds the defense portfolio, Rabin wields more authority than any prime minister in recent Israeli history."[13]

Rabin also played on his personal popularity and his role in the Labor victory to gain an advantage over his longtime rival for Labor Party leadership, Shimon Peres. Not only did Rabin become the first Israeli Prime Minister since Ben Gurion to take both the Prime Minister and Defense Minister spots, but he also explicitly curtailed the power of Peres's Foreign Minister position. The Prime Minister would conduct all bilateral peace negotiations while the Foreign Ministry would deal with less glamorous multilateral issues.[14] Peres and Rabin had a long history of battling one another within Labor; tensions undermined the first Rabin government, in which Rabin worried that Peres sought to undercut him. The rivalry diminished somewhat during the 1980s as both served in the national unity governments. Relations soured again in 1990 when Peres led a revolt in the national unity government and succeed in bringing the government down. However, Peres miscalculated the support of the Shas Party, which helped bring the government down but refused to support a Peres government. Rabin was angered that Peres' politicking had cost him his position as Defense Minister. Then old wounds were opened anew during their contentious battle for the Labor Party nomination.[15]

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[11] Ibid, 131.

[12] Israel Government, "Knessett History," http://www.knesset.gov.il/history/eng/eng_hist_all.htm.

[13] David Makovsky, *Making Peace with the PLO* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1996), 104.

[14] Ibid, 23-24.

There are elements of the Rabin-Peres relationship that fascinated the Israeli press and some scholars due to the pettiness and soap opera elements. Many scholars note the history of affronts between the two men, both small and large.[16] As noted above, Rabin and Peres had certainly had acrimonious relations in the past. They even had a "fixer," Giora Eini, who was tasked with smoothing over rough patches in their relationship.[17] Once again, Aronoff gives the most attention to the rivalry and argues that it undercut Israel's ability to signal to during the peace process. Further, Aronoff claims that Peres and his supporters sought to undercut Rabin, and this led to a situations that was "less than ideal" during peace negotiations.[18]

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[15] Horovitz, *Yitzhak Rabin*, Chapter 8.

[16] One example of such a slight, reported by Kurzman (*Soldier of Peace*, 473), was an attempt by Rabin to exclude Peres from the peace treaty signing ceremony with Jordan in order to ensure that Rabin received all the credit.

[17] Kurzman, *Soldier of Peace*, 460-461.

[18] Aronoff, "Labor in the Second Rabin Era," 132-137.

However, Aronoff's account differs from those of other commentators who highlight the cooperative relationship the two men built to work for peace. Aronoff himself admits:

> Fortunately for both the Labor party and the nation, the rivalry between Rabin and Peres did not affect the functioning of the government as adversely as it had during Rabin's previous tenure as prime minister (1974-1977). The change in the relations between Rabin and Peres came at a crucial stage in the peace talks and made possible the historic preliminary agreement and mutual recognition between Israel and the PLO. Without their cooperation this monumental breakthrough could never have taken place.[19]

Most scholars echo Makovsky's analysis: "One of the most remarkable aspects of the Oslo breakthrough was the degree of symbiotic cooperation between legendary rivals Rabin and Peres."[20] In fact, the unity between the two men seemed to revolve around their single-minded pursuit of peace. In his analysis of the Rabin-Peres relationship, David Horovitz claims that "Peres insisted that future relations with Rabin would be judged by one yardstick - the peace process. As long as Rabin gave it his best shot, Peres would show unswerving loyalty. But if there were foot-dragging, 'I will not hesitate to raise the banner of rebellion.'"[21] That rebellion never came.

While the former rivals differed on tactical issues, they were united in their pursuit of peace with Israel's neighbors and the Palestinians. The foundation for this working relationship was laid during the national unity government, when both worked together on the "Shamir Plan" that provided a framework for Palestinian elections and eventual self-rule.[22] As they worked together, they realized both how important they were for each other's goals. According to Dan Kurzman, "Rabin had begun to believe that Peres's interests now lay simply in peace, not power."[23] Peres had long been viewed as a dove who sought peace while now Rabin dedicated himself fully to pursing this goal.[24] By all accounts, the two former rivals grew closer the more they worked together.

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[19] Ibid, 132.
[20] Makovsky, *Making Peace with the PLO*, 92.
[21] Horovitz, *Yitzhak Rabin*, 113.

In the end, whether or not Rabin and Peres were friends may be an important question for Israel's tabloids, but not for the Israel's ability to signal its intentions in the peace talks. Rabin and Peres were both ambitious rivals within a single party, but all the evidence suggests that they put their rivalry aside in the interest of peace. Where the two men continued to differ was regarding how best to pursue peace, not whether or not to pursue peace. Instead, both seemed to appreciate the unique opportunity they had to change Israel's relations and did not want to allow their personal rivalry to sabotage this chance. In his study of the Middle East peace process, Dennis Ross notes that Peres realized this and told Rabin that it would probably be the final opportunity for the two men to make peace and they should work together to make the most of it.[25]

While the government was generally unified on peace with the Palestinians and Jordan, the "hardest nut to crack" according to Rabin was Syria. Not surprisingly, this also meant that this would be the peace processes that most tested the unity of the government. In his analysis of Labor's inter-party politics and the peace process, Rueven Hazan argues that internal divisions over peace with Syria made it impossible to strike a deal.[26] There is some truth to this assertion, however it appears that even Rabin, who Hazan identifies as more hard-line with respect to Syria, was willing to make significant concessions for peace.[27]

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[22] Makovsky, *Making Peace with the PLO*, 95.
[23] Kurzman, *Soldier of Peace*, 473.
[24] Ibid, 440.
[25] Dennis Ross, *The Missing Peace: The inside Story of the Fight for Middle East Peace* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2004), 235.

There are several pieces of evidence that point towards Rabin's willingness give up the Golan Heights for peace with Syria. First, Rabin told U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher that Israel would be willing to withdraw to the 1967 borders and give up the Heights. Further, a 1994 *New York Times* story reported that the Rabin government was willing to withdraw from the Heights over a five to eight year period in return for normalized relations with Syria.[28] Finally, since Rabin was personally conducting the negotiations with Syria, Peres was not aware of how far the negotiations had progressed. Following Rabin's assassination, Peres was surprised to learn that Rabin had been willing to pull back to the 1967 border.[29] Thus it appears that in the Syrian case the divisions within the government have been overplayed.

### *Dovish government*

Rabin's electoral victory not only gave him significant power but also allowed him to create a cabinet focused on achieving peace. Before the election, Rabin told

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[26] Reuven Hazan, "Intraparty Politics and Peacemaking in Democratic Societies: Israel's Labor Party and the Middle East Peace Process, 1992-96," *Journal of Peace Research* 37, no. 3 (2000), 370.

[27] Rabin's ambiguous and oft-quoted concession that Israel would be willing to "withdraw *on* the Golan Heights" (emphasis added) but not *from* them captures the difficulty of the issue. Most Israelis and Rabin himself were loath to cede the critically important land to the Syrians.

[28] *New York Times*, May 18, 1994.

[29] Itamar Rabinovich, *The Brink of Peace: The Israeli-Syrian Negotiations* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998), 6.

Chaim Asa, his campaign strategist, "I want a peace bloc. This is my only criterion for winning an election. If there is none, I'm going home. I want sixty-one peace mandates [a Knesset majority]."[30] Thus, the very creation of the government was done with Rabin's singular foreign policy goal of achieving peace in mind. The characterizations of Rabin's cabinet focus on its dovish nature. Dan Kurzman calls the cabinet "a flock of doves,"[31] while Horovitz argues that it was "most peace-oriented government in Israeli's history,"[32] a sentiment echoed by Avi Shlaim.

The government was also a break from the policies of the previous Likud-led coalition under Yitzhak Shamir. Shlaim goes so far as to say that Shamir's government formed in 1990 was "the most right-wing government in Israel's history and certainly the most hard-line when it came to relations with the Arabs."[33] While the Shamir government did take part in the 1991 Madrid Conference on Middle East peace, Shamir later noted that he had little interest in peace negotiations and would have strung the Arabs along for at least ten years.[34] As Lesch notes, this meant that the transition in government from the most hawkish to the most dovish meant a dramatic change in the tenor of negotiations (in this case with Syria):

> The official Israeli position shifted with the change of government in July 1992 from the Likud party, led by Yitzhak Shamir, to the Labor party, under the leadership of Yitzhak Rabin. Shamir's government had maintained the principle of "peace for peace" – Israel and Syria should sign a peace treaty encompassing full diplomatic, economic,

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[30] Quoted in Kurzman, *Soldier of Peace*, 431.
[31] Ibid, 439.
[32] Horovitz, *Yitzhak Rabin*, 112.
[33] Avi Shlaim, *Iron Wall*, 471.
[34] Horovitz, *Yitzhak Rabin*, 103.

> and cultural relations without any Israeli withdrawal from the Golan Heights. In contrast, Rabin argued that peace required compromise on both sides – an enduring political accord with Syria required Israel making territorial concessions."[35]

While the cabinet's general position was dovish, placing Yitzhak Rabin on the hawk-dove continuum is less straightforward. Rabin rose to national prominence as a war hero during the Six Day War and at times during the national unity governments of the 1980s was viewed as taking a hard line in dealing with Palestinians. Part of Rabin's success in the 1992 election was that people believed that he was the only leader who could credibly negotiate peace treaties with the Arabs based on his military background.[36]

Most scholars argue that Rabin was a pragmatic leader who saw peace as in the best interest of Israel. In the 1992 election and upon taking office, Rabin repeatedly spoke out regarding his desire to work for peace. In 1991 Rabin told Dan Kurzman, "Israel should try again to make peace first with the Palestinians. The Gulf War has brought down their expectations, and I'm sure an agreement could be reached with them. Then Jordan should be next, and finally Syria, the hardest nut to crack. . . . If I become prime minster again, we will have peace in the region after nine months."[37] On the campaign trail Rabin repeated the claim that he could bring peace within nine months of coming into office.

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[35] Ann Mosley Lesch, "Israeli Negotiations with Syria, Lebanon, and Jordan: The Security Dimension," in *Israel under Rabin*, ed. Robert Freedman (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1995), 116.
[36] Makovsky, *Making Peace with the PLO*, 86.
[37] Quoted in Kurzman, *Soldier of Peace*, 426-27.

Having won the election, Rabin continued to emphasize his desire for peace. In presenting his new government on July 3, 1992, Rabin told the Israeli public, “No longer are we necessarily ‘a people that dwells alone’ and no longer is it true that ‘the whole world is against us.’ We must overcome the sense of isolation that had held us in its thrall for almost half a century.”[38] In addition to challenging Israeli’s views of themselves, Rabin also laid out his government’s central mission:

> The new government has accordingly made it a central goal to promote the making of peace and take vigorous steps that will lead to the end of the Arab-Israeli conflict. . . . We believe wholeheartedly that peace is possible, that it is imperative, and that it will ensue. . . . I invite the King of Jordan and the Presidents of Syria and Lebanon to this rostum in Israel’s Knesset, here in Jerusalem, for the purpose of talking peace. In the service of peace, I am prepared to travel to Amman, Damascus and Beirut today or tomorrow, for there is no greater victory than the victory of peace. Wars have their victors and their vanquished, but everyone is a victor in peace.[39]

A number of scholars also argue that Rabin’s views on a peaceful settlement had evolved since his first government. Rabin told U.S. President Clinton in 1993, “I have been a warrior, a general for too long. I have seen too much bloodshed. It is time now to make peace.”[40] Yoram Peri argues that Rabin’s transformation from a hawk to a dove began following the Six Day War.[41]

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[38] Quoted in Linda Benedikt, *Yitzhak Rabin: The Battle for Peace* (London: Haus Books, 2005), 133.

[39] Quoted in Martin Gilbert, *Israel: A History* (New York: William Morrow and Company, 1998), 552-554.

[40] Quoted in Kurzman, *Soldier of Peace*, 449.

[41] Yoram Peri, *Generals in the Cabinet Room: How the Military Shapes Israeli Policy* (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2006), Chapter 2.

The first steps that Rabin took once in office were conciliatory. In a move that was condemned by many on the right, within a week of taking office Rabin fulfilled his campaign promise of halting settlement activity in the territories. In addition, Rabin freed a number of Palestinian prisoners but most importantly repealed a law that prevented Israeli officials from contact with the PLO, a move that would prove crucial to the peace process.[42]

Rabin was not ideologically wedded to a dovish stance, but rather made peace gestures for practical reasons. One of Rabin's oft-quoted remarks is that his government "will fight terror as if there are no peace talks and we will conduct peace talks as if there is no terror."[43] This meant that Rabin could toe a hard-line at times, such as when he sought to deport 415 Islamic militants to southern Lebanon in December 1992, a move that drew international condemnation. Further, in the initial stages Rabin was skeptical of the Oslo process but still allowed it to continue, partially because he believed that Peres would receive the blame if it failed.[44]

While Rabin was a pragmatic dove, Shimon Peres was more ideological in his commitment to peace. Peres, like Rabin, was not ideological about Israel's occupation of the West Bank and had worked with Rabin during the national unity government on negotiations with the Palestinians.[45] In his analysis of cabinet politics and the peace process of the 1990s, Reuven Hazan argues that Peres spearheaded the peace camp within Labor which was larger than Rabin's more pragmatic group.[46] Further, it was Peres who pushed for the Oslo channel of negotiations even when Rabin was skeptical.

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[42] Benedikt, *Yitzhak Rabin*, 134.
[43] Quoted in Benedikt, *Yitzhak Rabin*, 135.
[44] Horovitz, *Yitzhak Rabin*, 116-17.
[45] Makovsky, *Making Peace with the PLO*, 93.

The overall portrait of the Israeli government under Rabin is a dovish cabinet led by a pragmatic leader who was willing to pursue peace in the interest of greater security. The most significant differences that emerged were not over whether or not to pursue peace with Israel's neighbors (debates that occurred within the Shamir and national unity governments) but how to best approach the problem, which path to prioritize, and other tactical issues. Even on the highly divisive issue of exchanging land for peace Rabin appears nearly as dovish as Peres or other Labor Party members.

### *Impact of unity of Israel's ability to signal*

#### INTENTIONS

The Rabin government was clearly able to exhibit its intentions to the states with which it hoped to make peace. As already noted, Rabin himself went out of his way in both the election campaign and upon taking office to portray himself as the 'peace candidate' who could bring Israel security by making peace agreements with its former enemies. Not only did the Rabin government clearly signal that it wanted to make progress in negotiations, but it also appears that these signals were received by the target audience.

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[46] Reuven Hazan, "Intraparty Politics and Peacemaking in Democratic Societies: Israel's Labor Party and the Middle East Peace Process, 1992-96," *Journal of Peace Research* 37, no. 3 (2000), 374.

During the 1992 campaign, Rabin was able to draw a stark distinction between his foreign policy and that of Shamir. In the only debate of the campaign, Rabin said he would return the Gaza Strip to the Gazans, while Shamir argued that Gaza constituted part of *Eretz Yisrael* and could not be bargained away.[47] During the campaign, Rabin also made it clear that peace would come at a price, telling the *Jerusalem Post*, "We seek a territorial compromise which will bring peace and security. A lot of security."[48] In addition to the highlighting his differences with Shamir, Rabin also repeatedly made the ambitious promise that he would achieve peace with Israel's neighbors within nine months of taking office.

In addition to his statements and actions, Rabin's government pursued peace in manner that made their intentions clear. In all three sets of negotiations Rabin favored lower-profile or backchannel negotiations. In the case of negotiations with the PLO he supported this track after the fact, but over time he worked to increase the power and credibility of the secret Oslo process. With both Jordan and Syria, Rabin was more hands-on in his approach, in the case of Jordan working directly with King Hussein to settle border disputes between the two states. Rabin's high level of involvement increased the clarity of the signal Israel sent, since as Prime Minister and head of the Defense Ministry he spoke credibly for the state of Israel. Rabin's personal interest in the peace process meant that even if other government ministers had given conflicting signals, it was clear which signals foreign leaders should follow: those of Rabin.[49]

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[47] Makovsky, *Making Peace with the PLO*, 86.
[48] Quoted in Kurzman, *Soldier of Peace*, 432.

A key factor that made Israel intentions clear was Rabin's vision of how the peace agreements he sought fit into Israel's general security. In the case of the Palestinians, he viewed Israeli control of Gaza and the West Bank as costly and counter-productive. By increasing Palestinian self-rule and administration he could limit Israel's involvement in the areas and, by reducing Israel's presence, remove Israel as a target for Palestinian anger and attacks. With Syria and Jordan the Labor government believed that a long-term peace was worth concessions on territorial issues. In many respects the debates that raged in the Labor Party following the Six Day War over the appropriate approach to the territories Israel captured had been resolved in favor or trading territory for peace.

In fact, the Rabin government's willingness to make significant concessions set it apart from previous Israeli governments. In the case of the Palestinians this meant halting the settlements and allowing Palestinian self-rule first in Gaza and select West Bank cities and then more broadly. With Jordan he was willing to expand Jordan's water rights and allow Jordan to control the Muslim holy sites in Jerusalem. Finally, as noted above, in the case of Syria, Rabin showed that an Israeli withdrawal from the Golan Heights was possible. These steps, combined with the aforementioned acts of goodwill when he took office, offered ample evidence that Rabin was serious about making peace and that to achieve peace he was willing to make important compromises.

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[49] Efraim Inbar, *Rabin and Israel's National Security* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999), 143-158.

The progress made on the three different fronts Rabin's government pursued – the Palestinian territories, Jordan, and Syria – also reflected the different stakes involved in each dispute. As noted above, Rabin believed that Israel should pursue peace first with the Palestinians, then Jordan, and then the toughest case – Syria. The approach of the Rabin government to the Palestinian territories reflected the non-ideological view of most Labor ministers that Gaza and the West Bank did not belong to *Eretz Yisrael* and would not eventually be incorporated into the Israeli state. With this ideological component absent from government policy, it became more difficult to see the value to Israel in holding the territories. While these views antagonized the Israeli settler population and the opposition, it reflected the prominent dovish view of the territories that had not had a unified government voice since the 1967 war.

## WEAKNESS

One potential problem for dovish governments is that they will be viewed by challengers as weak. As noted above, this was a factor that hurt Peres' bid to lead the Labor Party, as many worried that he might be too accommodating in negotiations with Israel's neighbors. However, despite the fact that Rabin's government was dovish, it also occasionally took hard-line measures to show that it was not weak.

The first steps of the peace process led to an increase in violence initiated by Hamas, which sought to challenge the legitimacy of the PLO, also corresponding to the fifth anniversary of the intifada in December 1992. In an effort to stem the violence, Rabin had 415 Hamas and Islamic Jihad members from the occupied territories deported to southern Lebanon. The Lebanese refused the men entry, and a bizarre international incident ensued when the deportees built an encampment at the site where they were refused entry as the international media came to document the scene. Criticism from human rights groups and Western and Arab governments rained down on Rabin and the peace process stalled temporarily, but Rabin also showed that he was willing to fight back.[50]

Throughout the election campaign and during his time in office, Rabin also emphasized that working for peace would be in some ways tied to and in other ways separate from security issues. One of Rabin's mantras was, "We will fight terror as if there are no peace talks and we will conduct peace talks as if there is no terror."[51] In saying this, Rabin de-linked the Likud idea that there had to be peace in order to discuss peace. Rabin believed that Israel should pursue peace but deal with attacks and other incidents separate from the negotiating process. At the same time, Rabin's candidacy for Prime Minster was based upon the vision that Israel would make certain concessions in return for a long peace with its neighbors. The emphasis of the government was that the peace process was, in fact, a security plan for Israel.

In his study of the efficacy of suicide terrorism, Pape uses a couple of examples from the Rabin era to demonstrate that suicide terror effectively coerced the Israelis to meet certain Palestinian demands. First, he argues that Israeli withdrawal from Gaza was partially motivated by a Hamas and Islamic Jihad suicide bombing campaign in April 1994. This campaign included two attacks and resulted in fifteen deaths according to Pape. Pape notes that these attacks were not launched to move the peace process along, but instead in retaliation for the Hebron massacre, in which an Israeli settler killed 29 Palestinians. Pape considers this a partially successful case of coercion because three more planned attacks were not launched once Israel agreed to withdraw more promptly than expected.[52]

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[50] Martin Gilbert, *Israel: A History* (New York: William Morrow and Company, 1998), 558.
[51] Quoted in Benedikt, *Yitzhak Rabin*, 135.

While Pape also notes that such suicide bombing campaigns are likely to have only a moderate impact on democracies' policies, it is important to put these events in context. As previously noted, Rabin came into office determined to reach peace agreements that would offer Israel security. His government came to power after over four years of intifada violence. While Pape is correct that suicide terror has elements that make it particularly frightening for civilians, non-suicide attacks on Israelis before these Hamas campaigns also increased public ire.[53] In a general sense, such attacks spurred the Rabin government's peace initiatives, but from the standpoint that it would increase Israeli security over the long run. Pape rejects the notion that Hamas opposed the peace processes because they also sought more control over Gaza and the West Bank, however, there is ample evidence that Hamas sought to play a spoiler role earlier in the processes to limit the power of the PLO.

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[52] Robert Pape, "The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism," *American Political Science Review* 97, no. 3 (2003), 353.

[53] Atran, ("The Moral Logic and Growth of Suicide Terrorism," 2006), also takes issue with Pape's distinction between the efficacy of suicide versus conventional attacks.

To support his argument, Pape includes an extensive quote from Rabin's April 18, 1994 speech before the Knesset.  In the speech Rabin notes, "For two or three years we have been facing the phenomenon of extremist Islamic terrorism, which recalls Hezbollah. . . Since there is no separation between the two populations, the current situation creates endless possibilities for Hamas and other organizations."[54] This speech demonstrates two elements of the Rabin government clearly.  First, the time horizon on which it was drawing was longer than that proposed by Pape, who argues that specific campaigns lead to concrete actions.  And second, it shows that Rabin sought to use the issue of extremist terror to build public support for a withdrawal from the territories which he sought.

Pape's argument implies that democratic governments, and specifically the Rabin government, are more easily coerced through the use of suicide terror.  His argument fails for the Rabin government for a number of reasons.  First, Pape fails to put the events of 1994 into the larger context of the peace process.  At the point at which Pape takes up the story, the Rabin government had already taken its most important steps – halting settlements, acknowledging the legitimacy of the PLO and opening talks with the them, and agreeing to an Israeli pullout of Gaza – that were not the result of terror campaigns.  In addition, since Pape's focus is on coercion, we have to believe that Hamas's attacks changed Israeli policy, when it appears instead that they offered Rabin a chance to rationalize his approach.  Rabin believed that Israeli involvement in the territories was costly and put the state unnecessarily at risk, meaning that decreased involvement would increase Israeli security – this makes the coercion argument difficult to sell. Finally, Rabin's earlier actions in response to increased violence (the deportation of Hamas and Islamic Jihad members) would not have signaled to Hamas that a series of retaliatory attacks would cause a change in government policy.

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[54] As quoted in Pape, "Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism," 353.

Rabin's unified dovish government made concessions not out of fear or coercion, but as part of a larger plan to bring Israel peace and security. Rabin's distinct approach to the issue meant that while Israel's long-term security was tied to the peace process, over the short-term steps could be taken to demonstrate Israel's toughness. Finally, while many Arab leaders saw the potential for peace in the Rabin government, there is no evidence that they viewed it as weak.

## DECISIVE ACTION

The manner in which the Rabin government handled the peace process allowed it to take decisive action in order to keep the process moving. Two key elements contributed to the government's ability to act decisively: Rabin's centralization of power in the cabinet and the nature of how negotiations were handled. In particular, Rabin and other key ministers, most notably Peres, took steps to limit the number of people involved in key decisions and thus limit the constraints on policymakers. Meanwhile although the public had knowledge that peace negotiations were occurring, the key details were ironed out in secret.

As noted above, Rabin came to power with a significant electoral mandate that allowed him to dominate the set the agenda for peace negotiations. Further, due to his interest in achieving peace, Rabin was able to focus primarily on this goal that would define his time in office. Rabin's previous foreign policy experience, his decision to also take the Defense portfolio, and limitations he placed on Foreign Minister Peres meant that he dealt with most of the negotiations directly, particularly in the case of Syria and Jordan. In the Jordan's case, he spent a good part of the night going over the Jordanian-Israeli border with King Hussein before allowing subordinates to write up the particulars of the peace deal.[55] Even regarding those issues over which Rabin did not exert total control, such as initial negotiations with the Palestinians, Peres served as the other center of power. Generally, as David Makovsky notes, the cabinet was kept in the dark on peace negotiations until the last minute.[56]

The other key factor that favored decisive action was the nature of the negotiations. The fact that Rabin conducted the Jordanian and Syrian negotiations in a personal manner meant that he did not have to reveal key details until he sought cabinet approval. This seems particularly critical in the Syrian case, in which even Peres was surprised to discover the extent to which Rabin was willing to bargain for peace with the Syrians. Initial negotiations with the Palestinians, on the other hand, were so secret that Rabin did not become aware of their existence until they had been continuing for months. Even then, while Rabin offered his support to the back channel, the official negotiations were allowed to continue despite their increasing irrelevance. Out of the glare of the international media and vested interests on both sides, the Rabin government was able to take decisive actions like the hand-over of Gaza and the phased withdrawal from the Golan Heights that might have proven too controversial to even offer had there been public scrutiny.

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[55] Gilbert, "Israel: A History."
[56] Makovsky, *Making Peace with the PLO*, 105.

### *The Views from Jordan, Syria, and the PLO*

The predominant view among Arab leaders in the Middle East was that the Rabin government was one with which they could work towards peace. Particularly after Likud had been in power (or sharing power) for fifteen years, the change in the approach to the peace process on the Israeli side was dramatic. Following the hard-line Shamir government that refused to recognize Palestinian negotiators and was dragged into the peace process under pressure from the American administration, the Rabin government represented a clear break with the past.

The Shamir government's reluctance to enter into peace negotiations was not lost on those on the other side of the negotiating table. The general stance of the Shamir government was that Israel had already withdrawn from the majority of the territories captured in the 1967 war (the Sinai) and thus had fulfilled its obligations under U.N. resolution 242. According to this view, disputed by Arab states, it was now up to Israel's neighbors to make peace. Along these lines, negotiations with Syria went nowhere, with Israel demanding peace but unwilling to give up and inch of the Golan Heights, while Syria demanded the return of the Heights as a starting point for peace. As Rabinovich notes, "the two positions were, needless to say, irreconcilable."[57] The same problems existed with the Palestinians, with many in the Likud government rejecting the very premise of the negotiations. Scholars note that various issues prevented negotiations between the Shamir government and the Palestinians from moving forward:

> It was Shamir who had denied any role for the PLO, disbarred Palestinian residents of Jerusalem from the Palestinian delegations to the peace process, and resisted any linkage between interim and permanent status negotiations. The consistent abortion of Palestinian attempts to steer the negotiations toward a meaningful resolution frustrated the Palestinian delegation beyond perseverance.[58]

As Majali, et al., note in summary, "The main stumbling block to the smooth sailing of the peace process as a whole was the doctrinaire, uncompromising attitude of the Likud government."[59]

The Israeli elections of 1992 proved to be nothing less than a watershed for the peace process. This was true for all the entities with which Israel wanted peace. "These negotiations [the Madrid Conference] were fraught with difficulties and obstacles, and no real progress was made for a long time. It was . . . the establishment of a Labor government under Yitzhak Rabin that brought about the shift in orientation."[60]

On the Syrian front, Israeli negotiator Itamar Rabinovich notes that "The Shamir government's reluctance combined with his own reservations to produce a meaningless negotiation requiring no painful choices. It was the arrival of Rabin's government that forced Assad to grapple fully with the most fundamental issues that the prospect of a genuine settlement with Israel raised for him and for Syria."[61] While at the time much of Syria's public rhetoric claimed that there was no difference between Rabin's and Shamir's governments, later Syrian Ambassador Walid al-Moualem, who participated directly in the negotiations, noted a significant difference between Rabin's government and his predecessor:

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[57] Rabinovich, *Brink of Peace*, 41.
[58] Abdul Salam Majali, Jawad Anani, and Munther Haddadin, *Peacemaking: The Inside Story of the 1994 Jordanian-Israeli Treaty* (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 2006), 161.
[59] Ibid, 124.
[60] Eyal Zisser, *Asad's Legacy: Syria in Transition* (New York: New York University Press, 2001), 105.

> Israel's commitment to full withdrawal came only after enormous effort. From Madrid onward, the only issue we would even consent to discuss was full withdrawal. Under the Likud, of course, it was a dialogue of the deaf - I think Ben Aharon, the head of the Israeli delegation, was following to the letter [former Prime Minister Yitzhak] Shamir's instructions to continue talking for ten years without result. After Rabin became prime minister in June 1992, we still insisted on discussing withdrawal only. When Rabin finally realized that the Syrians would not move ahead in discussing any of the other elements of a peace settlement before being convinced of Israel's intention of full withdrawal, he made the opening.[62]

The Syrians were not the only group to view the ascendancy of Labor as a positive development for the peace process. In the case of Jordan, Majali et al., note that "The Israeli election outcome was crucial to the continuity and success of the peace process. While opinions among Arab political analysts varied widely over Labor's zeal for peace, there was unanimity in the belief that re-electing Likud would mean the death of negotiations. Jordanians, in particular, viewed a Labor victory as a catalyst of peacemaking."[63]

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[61] Rabinovich, *Brink of Peace*, 53.

[62] Walid al-Moualem, "Fresh Light on the Syrian-Israeli Peace Negotiations. An Interview with Ambassador Walid Al-Moualem," *Journal of Palestine Studies* 26, no. 2 (1997), 5.

The intentions of the Rabin government were also clear to leaders in the region. After visiting Egypt to mend fences shortly after taking office, Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak acknowledged, "I know that [Mr. Rabin] generally supports peace."[64] Even Yasser Arafat, while unwilling to offer Rabin too much praise, at least saw the change in Israeli leadership as positive, saying, "Israelis have voted against the terrorism exercised by Yitzhak Shamir against the women and children of the Palestinian people."[65] Once Labor came to power, Lesch argues, negotiating a settlement became "relatively easy."[66]

Finally, the ability of the Rabin government to deal with the various parties in a unified manner was also critical to the process. Jordan provides the best example of this dynamic. During Rabin's first term as prime minister from 1974-1977, he sought a peace agreement with Jordan. Meetings occurred between the two sides in 1974, but nothing came of them. Rabin's rivalry with his foreign minister, Peres, and his shaky heterogeneous coalition meant that "he was terrified of going forward with Hussein because ay territorial concessions entailed either the departure of the NRP [National Religious Party] or new elections."[67] Nearly twenty years later, the same two leaders returned to the negotiating table, but with Rabin in a much stronger position in his government.  When King Hussein expressed his displeasure at Peres' discussions with the press, Rabin sidelined his Foreign Minister and asserted direct control over the negotiations.

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[63] Majali, Anani, and Haddadin, *Peacemaking*, 143.
[64] Quoted in Kurzman, *Soldier of Peace*, 443.
[65] Quoted in Kurzman, *Soldier of Peace*, 439.
[66] Lesch, "Israeli Negotiations with Syria, Lebanon, and Jordan," 122.
[67] Avi Shlaim, *Lion of Jordan: The Life of King Hussein in War and Peace* (New York: Allen Lane, 2007), 382.

### *Alternative Explanations*

#### THE OPPOSITION

What role did the Likud-led opposition play in Rabin's gambit for peace with Israel's neighbors?  If discord between the government and opposition increases the likelihood of conflict, as Schultz's theory predicts, does amity make targeting less likely?  Likud MKs were generally opposed to the peace processes, but particularly disparaged negotiations with the PLO and Syria that entailed Israel handing over key pieces of territory to potentially hostile groups.  For both ideological and pragmatic reasons they believed such moves were disastrous for Israel.

For ideological reasons many on the right were opposed to giving up portions of Gaza and the West Bank that they considered parts of *Eretz Yisrael*.  Rabin's decision to halt settlements in the territories also inflamed many on the right.  Consequently, as the peace process proceeded, the rhetoric from the right became increasingly harsh. Following the passage of the first Oslo process by the Knesset, Rabin was denounced as a traitor and opposition referred to it as "act of national treachery."[68]  However, Bickerton and Klausner point out that, "There is no doubt that Rabin's election breathed new life into the peace process."[69]

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[68] Quoted in Robert Rabil, *Embattled Neighbors: Syria, Israel, and Lebanon* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2003), 158.

The leader of the opposition, Benjamin Netanyahu, despaired, "It is not just autonomy and it is not just a Palestinian State in the territories but the start of the destruction of Israel in line with the PLO plan."[70] Rabin's predecessor, Yitzhak Shamir, noted the betrayal felt by many on the right: "The Old Testament prophets said it then: 'Neither Babylon nor Persia present the danger, but you, the sons of Israel.' I'm beginning to understand the prophets better."[71] Protesters took up permanent residence outside of Rabin's home, and demonstrations against the government occasionally turned violent.

The opposition's stance concerning the peace process did influence the negotiations primarily in two ways. The hard-line that Likud pursued strengthened the Rabin government's hand to the extent that the government could credibly argue they provided a better option than the alternative. Labor's victory in 1992 on a platform of negotiations with its neighbors offered a dramatic juxtaposition to the intransigence of the previous Shamir-led government. The opposition's continued resistance to the peace process reminded all involved that the window of opportunity was unlikely to stay open very long and Labor was likely a better negotiating partner than Likud.

The second way the opposition influenced the peace process was by limiting the Rabin government's bargaining space, particularly as the process progressed.

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[69] Ian Bickerton and Carla Klausner, *A Concise History of the Arab-Israeli Conflict*, 3 ed. (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1998), 259.
[70] Quoted in Bickerton and Klausner, *History of the Arab-Israeli Conflict*, 268.
[71] Ibid.

While Rabin took office with a significant electoral mandate, the further he pushed the peace process with the PLO and Syria, the more opposition he encountered. In addition, when violence flared, particularly attacks by Hamas, Likud and others on the right pointed out the distance between the security Rabin promised and reality. Fear of defections from the government (as with the Shas Party mentioned above) also constrained Rabin since his government enjoyed such a narrow margin in the Knesset.

Israel's negotiating partners saw a real difference between Rabin's government and the opposition. The hard-line taken by the Shamir government and its ideological stance on the territories made Likud a difficult negotiating partner. This difference also benefited Rabin because it allowed him to point out the advantages of working with his government and the need to make rapid changes. In this case it appears that the lack of unity between the government and opposition made cooperation with potential challengers more likely. Finally, the hard-line taken by Likud reinforced Rabin's view that Israel was not negotiating out of weakness.

## LEADERSHIP TENURE

The notion that newly elected leaders are more likely to make concessions is at the heart of Gelpi and Grieco's theory on why democracies are more vulnerable to attack than autocracies. The implications of this theory for Rabin's government are particularly interesting since the Israelis were willing to make significant concessions in order to gain peace. However, the causal story that Gelpi and Grieco tell does not hold for this case, but does shed light on why unified dovish governments are able to avoid conflict.

According to Gelpi and Grieco's theory, Rabin would likely have been challenged early in his tenure in order to extract concessions that he would have been more willing to make since these costs are more likely to have been forgotten by the next election. In fact, Rabin came to power committed to making concessions. Statements Rabin made during the election campaign showed his willingness to trade territory for peace: "We seek a territorial compromise which will bring peace and security. A lot of security."[72] Thus, concessions were a calculated preference for Rabin and not the result of coercion.

In this same vein, this is where Pape's analysis of the 1994 Hamas suicide bombing campaign fails to take the nuances of Israeli domestic politics into account. On the surface and based on Pape's codings, these might seem to fall in line with the Gelpi and Grieco's theory that this is a democratic government being tested by a challenger to extort concessions. However, as noted above, this analysis fails to deal with the fact that the Rabin government wanted a peace settlement and had already made numerous concessions without being coerced.

While violence did occur during the peace process, particularly from Hamas in the early stages, it does not conform to the logic of the democratic tenure theory. The spate of Hamas attacks against Israeli citizens that occurred in late 1992 demonstrated Hamas's role as a spoiler in the peace process. It was not seeking concessions from Israel because it did not view Israel as a legitimate political entity.

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[72] Quoted in Kurzman, *Soldier of Peace*, 432.

The attacks were a way for Hamas to build support among Palestinians disenchanted with PLO leadership. Further, Rabin's reaction to the attacks, the deportation of 415 militants to Lebanon, showed both that Rabin was willing to take a hard line with certain Palestinian elements and that he viewed the peace process and fighting terror as two separate tracks over the short term.

## PUBLIC OPINION

There are similarities between the role of public opinion and the opposition during the Rabin government's push for peace. Not surprisingly, both constrained to some degree the maneuvering room available to the government. However, just as important, the government ultimately followed its own preferences despite domestic opposition.

The most important elements of public opinion were expressed in the 1992 election, which allowed Rabin to cobble together his "peace bloc". In the fragmented Israeli political system, Rabin initially enjoyed support from 60% of the population. This endorsement of Rabin's proposals allowed him a freer hand in negotiations with Israel's neighbors. Not surprisingly, public opinion vacillated over time, particularly with respect to the Palestinian issue. At the time the Declaration of Principles was announced, only 45% of the Israeli public supported the peace process with the Palestinians. However, this number rose to 65% by the time of the Washington signing ceremony, only to fall to 39% support two month later.[73]

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[73] Theodore Friedgut, "Israel's Turn toward Peace," in *Israel under Rabin*, ed. Robert Freedman (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1995), 85.

The movement in public support of the peace process appears to reflect two facts about public opinion. First, the twenty point surge in public opinion in support of the peace process meant that the Rabin government could reasonably believe that they could lead the public to some degree. This shows that while the government was partially constrained by public opinion, it was certainly not beholden to it, and it could gamble that over the medium term public support could be generated with positive results on the ground. Second, public support seemed driven by events and government rhetoric more than developing from a clear set of priorities.

## BALANCE OF FORCES

No substantial change occurred in the balance of forces between the two sides during the period in question. The armaments of Israel, Jordan, Syria, and the PLO did not change substantially from Shamir's government to Rabin's government. In particular, Israel did not become so much stronger, or its neighbors weaker, that Israel could suddenly negotiate from a position of strength.

However, the collapse of the Soviet Union reverberated strongly in the region. The loss of Soviet support influenced the future power calculations undertaken by the PLO and Syria. Lacking a reliable external support, both entities were forced to reevaluate their ability to challenge Israel. However, the Soviet Union's collapse was not wholly a benefit for Israel either. Many in Israel feared that in the eyes of the U.S. Israel would lose some of its strategic value.[74]

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[74] Ibid, 74.

The primary result of the end of the Cold War was that the Middle East was no longer a point of superpower rivalry. This reduced the complexities of searching for peace as the additional layer of U.S. and Soviet concerns was removed. While the end of the superpower rivalry may have been important, there are two reasons to believe that its influence was limited. First, the era of détente in the late 1960s and 1970s significantly reduced the external rivalry between the U.S. and U.S.S.R, yet Soviet-American agreement on the Middle East resulted in the October War of 1973, not the outbreak of peace.[75] Second, as previously noted, it seems very unlikely that the Shamir government would have taken advantage of the changing geopolitical climate to move the peace process along. The tepid reaction of the Shamir government to the Madrid conference and Shamir's subsequent comments on the subject indicate an entrenched hard-line view on the peace process.

## Sino-Indian Relations under Nehru

### *Background of the conflict*

While the 1954 *Panchsheel* agreement and its popularization of the phrase "Hindi-Chini bhai-bhai" (Indians and Chinese are brothers) marked the highpoint in Sino-Indian relations, there were already storm clouds gathering on the horizon. As early as 1951, Chou En-lai indicated that the demarcation of the Tibetan frontier should occur through consultation with India and Nepal. At the 1954 trade talks, discussion of the border was conspicuously avoided, and repeated Chinese requests for discussions on the borders were rejected by India. From 1956 on, incursions and shootouts became increasingly common along the border as both sides attempted to establish their claims.

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[75] See previous chapter on Divided Hawks for more information on this conflict. There is some indication that Sadat felt less constrained under these circumstances which contributed to the surprise attack.

On the one hand, Nehru's dovish, unitary government prevented war from breaking out prior to 1962. This meant that during two particularly hostile periods, war was avoided. The first event was the Chinese take over of Tibet in 1950, which removed a key buffer area between the two giants. Prior to the attack, the Chinese accused Nehru of collaborating with Western powers to annex Tibet. On the Indian side there was heated rhetoric from the opposition and even some in Congress. There were outcries and demands that India support the Tibetans in their struggle against the Chinese. Nehru chose to downplay the incident. Nehru's rival Sardar Patel wanted to take a firmer line with China, claiming the action brought "the expansion of China to our gates."[76] However, Nehru said he did not consider the Chinese action aggressive and continued to emphasize positive relations between India and China.[77]

The second notable instance of increased tension was the skirmishes of 1959 that could have led to further escalation into all-out conflict between the two states. However, Nehru's steady hand and calm rhetoric marginalized those who sought a tougher response from India. Once again the opposition called for tough action and

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[76] Quoted in Bhim Sandhu, *Unresolved Conflict: China and India* (New Delhi: Radiant 1988), 89.
[77] Ibid.

Nehru did release the diplomatic exchanges between China and India covering the border dispute, but the crisis did not escalate.

### *Unified government and clear signals*

The story of government unity in India in the 1950s and early 1960s is a story of the power of Jawaharlal Nehru. Between his election in 1952 and the Chinese attack in 1962, Nehru dominated Indian politics in a manner seldom possible for democratically elected politicians. His dominance was due to a number of factors, not the least being his prominence in the independence movement and his close connections with Mahatma Gandhi. Within the Congress Party, Nehru had been a significant figure for over twenty years before he became the first Prime Minister of independent India. As a "founding father," Nehru was more than simply a politician, but also embodied the hopes and ideals of the independence struggle and the pride of the new state. Further, there were conspicuously few politicians who rivaled Nehru in their status. This was due in part to the fact that members of the Congress party were unwilling to challenge Nehru, as the party's success rested upon his relationship to it.[78] After Nehru's chief rival, Sardar Patel, with whom he shared governing powers, died in 1951, "Nehru had no peers in India, and for the rest of the decade he bestrode the political scene."[79]

Nehru's power flowed through the entire Indian political system. The Congress Party's control over the upper house of parliament, the Lok Sabha, meant that Nehru's dominance within the party led to de facto control of the legislature as well.[80] Yaacov Vertzberger notes that "the impotence of Parliament was especially noticeable in the area of foreign policy, which had always been a marginal issue in Indian politics and in which Nehru's single-mindedness had been most evident since the death of Sardar Patel in 1951."[81] While Congress was a massive, fractious party with the attendant feuds and factions, Nehru kept such differences tamped down until the Chinese attacked.

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[78] Judith Brown, *Nehru* (New York: Longman, 1999), 100.
[79] Neville Maxwell, *India's China War* (London: Jonathan Cape, 1970), 90.

Civil-military relations also fell under Nehru's purview to much the same effect as was seen elsewhere: Nehru went unchallenged. Vertzberger argues that, unlike most British colonies, the military bureaucracy had been handled entirely by the British, leaving the Indians ill-equipped to develop a competent, politically independent body. Relations between the government and the military were also harmed by the fact that "the intellectual, liberal part of Nehru abhorred the military."[82] Moreover, Nehru's dominance of foreign policy was such that dissent from both civilian and military leaders was muted. Further, although Nehru did not hold the defense portfolio after 1957, he entrusted it to his close friend Krishna Menon. As will be discussed below, Menon was much more interested pushing Nehru's line than listening to critical feedback from below.

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[80] Brown, *Nehru*, 99-101.

[81] Yaacov Y.I. Vertzberger, *Misperception in Foreign Policymaking: The Sino-Indian Conflict, 1959-1962* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1984), 138.

[82] Ibid, 270.

In the Ministry of External Affairs, which Nehru headed, the "general atmosphere was one of constant competition for Nehru's favor."[83] This competition meant that opinions and ideas that ran counter to Nehru's were out of favor, and "there was a willing suspension of critical analysis on major issues of policies."[84] This path went both ways, meaning that information which contradicted the Prime Minister was downplayed in favor of that which reinforced existing policy.

The cabinet was no more able to challenge Nehru than any other political institutions in India. As Neville Maxwell puts it:

> The Cabinet system has never worked in India except in name, and in the 1950s Nehru rarely bothered even to pretend that the Cabinet was the centre of the system. Once in a long while there were complaints about the Prime Minister's 'cavalier and unconstitutional' methods, as a Finance Minister who resigned over them put it in 1956.[85]

This view is echoed by a number of other scholars who argue that the Cabinet became a place where Nehru went to have his policies supported, not debated. As Vertzberger notes, "The Cabinet, although formally a body that could question Nehru's policies and evaluations, was not really able to do so, because of both its lack of power and its method of functioning."[86] Even if there had been significant dissent over Nehru's policies in the cabinet, it is not clear whether that would have had a serious impact on policy, since Nehru regularly took decisions, particularly on foreign policy issues, without consulting his cabinet colleagues.

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[83] Ibid, 275.

[84] Jagat Singh Mehta, "Nehru's Failure with China: Intellectual Naïveté or the Wages of a Prophetic Vision?" in *Nehru and the Twentieth Century,* ed. Milton Israel, *South Asian Studies Papers, No 4.* (Toronto: University of Toronto, 1991), 206-207.

[85] Maxwell, *India's China War*, 91.

[86] Vertzberger, *Misperception in Foreign Policymaking*, 277.

This is not to say that there was not opposition to Nehru within the Cabinet. Particularly with regards to China, Home Minister G.B. Pant, Finance Minister Morarji Desai, and Minister of Food and Agriculture S.K. Patil all opposed Nehru's approach and believed that India should take a tougher line. However, while they were willing to voice their concerns to Nehru in private, none was willing to challenge him in front of their colleagues or, more importantly, go to the press with their complaints.[87]

While Nehru served as his own foreign secretary throughout his term in office, in 1957 he gave the defense minister portfolio to Krishna Menon, a close friend. Menon would later be held responsible for the crushing defeat in the Border War and lose his post, but during his time as defense minister he sought to make himself an extension of Nehru. While serving as one of Nehru's principle foreign policy advisors, Menon proved himself loyal, particularly during his famous eight hour speech before the United Nations defending India's position on Kashmir.[88] But perhaps Menon's greatest quality was that he had "the capacity to echo his leader's foreign policies, the ability to grasp Nehru's thoughts and objectives and to convey them accurately, always pungently, to the outside world."[89]

It is not surprising then, that while Nehru was a formidable figure in domestic politics, he was hegemonic on foreign policy issues. Michael Brecher argues that Nehru's foreign policy position was unique:

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[87] Ibid, 143.
[88] Stanley Wolpert, *Nehru: A Tryst with Destiny* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 1996.
[89] Michael Brecher, *Nehru: A Political Biography* (London: Oxford University Press, 1959), 573.

> In no other state does one man dominate foreign policy as does Nehru in India. Indeed, so overwhelming is his influence that India's policy has come to mean in the minds of people everywhere the personal policy of Pandit Nehru.[90]

Brecher also argues that under Nehru the constraints of a democratic state had little impact on Indian foreign policy. Since Nehru had been active in foreign affairs for decades, few of his colleagues had the knowledge, let alone the stature, to challenge his views.[91]

Nehru's position in Indian politics prior to the Chinese attack was unique. Very few leaders have enjoyed Nehru's combination of power and legitimacy, and the fact he led a democratic state makes it even more unique. Unlike the Israeli cabinet, the unity was not based upon a common purpose among key members, but instead the over-arching power of a single man who was viewed as the sole representative of his country.

### *Dovish government*

Nehru's dominance of Indian foreign policy meant that his views set the course for Indian interaction with other states. In general, Nehru championed the non-aligned movement of which he was the unofficial head. In pursuing this path he hoped to remove India from the military tensions of the Cold War and allow it to focus on its economic development. In relations with China, Nehru held to the

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[90] Ibid, 564.
[91] Brown, *Nehru*, 127.

Gandhian ideals of non-violence and cooperation.  Even as relations between the two countries appeared to deteriorate from 1959, Nehru never believed that war with China was possible.

The Cold War was the dominant foreign policy paradigm for Nehru, and he defined India's foreign policy by his desire to stand aloof from the superpower conflict.  Instead, he focused on the fate of the many newly independent states, like India, emerging in Africa and Asia.  Since Nehru viewed non-aligned states as having shared the same struggle of removing the shackles of colonialism, he tended to downplay the possibility for conflict between such states.  As Judith Brown notes in her biography of Nehru, "In his idealistic hopes for a new and non-aligned world of cooperation to be built by countries newly freed from the burdens of imperial rule Nehru was dangerously blind to other possible sources of violence and coercion."[92]

Nehru's personal struggle for independence through non-violent means shaped his views on international relations.  Throughout the Cold War Nehru was given to criticizing both sides in the conflict and reprimanding them for their inability to solve problems without resorting to force.  Nehru sought to mediate the Korean War and was critical of both the Soviet invasion of Hungary and the Anglo-French-Israeli attack on Egypt in 1956.   Nehru's strong belief in peaceful cooperation also created a certain naiveté. "I do not conceive of any kind of invasion or attack on India - not because of other countries' love of India, but because it will bring them no profit. India does not come into the picture. Any country attacking India merely adds to its troubles."[93]

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[92] Ibid, 130.

When it came to China, Nehru tended to focus on similarities and overlook important sources of friction. Nehru often spoke of the long peaceful shared history between the two nations and focused on the desire of both peoples for economic development. As Brown notes, Nehru viewed China as "a brotherly Asian neighbor with similar priorities and aspirations to India's own."[94] Similarly, Neville Maxwell writes, "Nehru's personal approach towards China was at the beginning positive and warm, even fraternal, springing from a long-held belief that the future of Asia, even of the world, would be marked by the friendship of what he conceived to be two kindred and equal giants."[95] In 1954, Nehru signed a trade pact with Chinese Premier Chou En-lai that included five principles of peaceful co-existence – *Panchsheel* - that were to steer Indian foreign policy until 1962. Despite the different ideologies guiding the two states, Nehru wrote that, "We entirely agree that we should respect each other's viewpoints and without interference co-operate in dealing with our problems. More especially we should co-operate in the maintenance of peace in Asia and the world at large."[96]

Despite mounting tensions in the late 1950s, Nehru remained strongly committed to peaceful relations with China. Nehru kept the dispute between the two countries and the resulting military clashes secret from the Lok Sabha until media reports of clashes in 1959 and the resulting political pressure forced him to open the books. Addressing the Lok Sabha in May 1962, months before the Chinese attack, Nehru made a stunning speech for a leader involved in a territorial dispute:

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[93] Quoted in Brecher, *Nehru*, 566.
[94] Brown, *Nehru*, 162.
[95] Maxwell, *India's China War*, 91.
[96] Quoted in Brown, *Nehru*, 131-32.

> If you start thinking as the Chinese do . . . on the assumption that the territory in Ladakh, especially in the Aksai Chin area, is theirs and has been theirs, well, everything we do is an offence to them. But if we start on the basis of thinking that the territory is ours, as it is, then everything the Chinese do is an offense. It depends on with what assumption you have started.[97]

Similarly, when discussing the Western sector before the Lok Sabha, Nehru highlighted the vagueness of the territorial claims:

> This place, Aksai Chin area, is [Indian] in our maps undoubtedly, but I distinguish it completely from other areas. It is a matter for argument as to what part of it belongs to us and what part of it belongs to somebody else. It is not at all a dead clear matter. I have to be frank with the House. It is not clear. . . . The point is, there has never been any delimitation there in that area and it had been a challenged area.[98]

After serious clashes occurred at the Kongka Pass in 1959 in which a number of Indian soldiers were killed, Nehru called for calm.[99] Finally, Nehru tended to ignore negative information regarding the Chinese threat and branded those who gave him such information “warmongers”.[100] Nehru’s general distrust of the military and the desire of those close to him to tell him what he wanted to hear further reinforced his worldview.  Finally, Nehru's views on China may best be summed up by Michael Brecher in his biography of Nehru, written in 1959: "Nehru is strengthened in this course of action by the conviction that Peking does not represent a threat to Indian interests in the foreseeable future, certainly not for a generation."[101]

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[97] Quotes in Benjamin Zachariah, *Nehru* (New York: Routledge, 2004), 246.
[98] Quoted in Maxwell, *India’s China War*, 119.
[99] Maxwell, *India’s China War*, 131.
[100] Vertzberger, *Misperception in Foreign Policymaking*, 196.

Was the entire government as dovish towards China as Nehru?  No, but because of Nehru's dominance of the government it hardly mattered.  A number of prominent cabinet members including Pant, Desai, and Patil opposed Nehru's approach to China, as did rightist groups in Congress and many in the military.[102] However, these views were seldom, if ever, expressed in public, and Nehru's views represented those of the government.

One can contrast Nehru's positions with those of his critics and the opposition to reinforce the fact he was dovish.  A number of the opposition parties, including Jan Sangh and Swatantra, sought a far harder line with China than Nehru.  Even before the first national elections in independent India, Deputy Prime Minister Sardar Patel argued that India should take a firmer line with China.  Many critics also faulted Nehru for India's restrained response to the Chinese takeover in Tibet in 1950.  As Maxwell notes, "From 1950 onwards Nehru's domestic critics attacked his China policy as one of appeasement and argued that India should never have acquiesced in what they saw as China's invasion of Tibet."[103]  Following the 1959 crisis in Tibet, all the opposition parties except the communists criticized China's actions and called for reexamination of government policy towards China.[104] Nehru's response to the outrage of the opposition was that "we must not, as often happens in such cases, become alarmist or panicky."[105]

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[101] Brecher, *Nehru*, 591.
[102] Verzberger, *Misperception in Foreign Policymaking*, Chapter 11.
[103] Maxwell, *India's China War*, 92.

### *Impact of unity of India's ability to signal*

The Chinese attack on October 20, 1962 came as a shock to Nehru, but more importantly represents a significant puzzle for the study of international relations. How did states that enjoyed such good relations until 1959 so quickly descend into war? Why did Nehru not strike a deal with the Chinese to avoid conflict? What led to more aggressive behavior on both sides after 1959?

### INTENTIONS

Unified states have the advantage that they can make their intentions clearly known to their potential adversary because the message they send is clear and supported by the entire government. The ability to clearly signal greatly decreases the probability that the unified government, even a dovish one, will be attacked. However, one factor that measuring government unity does not take into account is the consistency with which that government acts. There are elements of continuity and inconsistency in the behavior of the Indian government towards China between 1952 and 1962. After 1959 the behavior of Nehru's government became increasingly erratic. Particularly salient on the Indian side was the desire to maintain good relations with China despite the border dispute. Even after relations worsened following the Tibetan uprising and the Dali Lama's flight to India in 1959, Nehru continued to maintain that China and India would not go to war. According to Maxwell, Nehru believed that China and India were "two kindred and equal giants,"[106] meaning that major conflict between the two states was simply inconceivable.

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[104] Nancy Jetly, *India-China Relations, 1947-1977* (New Delhi: Radiant Publishers, 1979), 64-70.
[105] Quoted in Wolpert, *Nehru*, 473.

Another area of consistency in Indian policy was with respect to the McMahon Line as the boundary in the north-eastern section of the border. Throughout the 1950s and early 1960s, Nehru reiterated India's claim that the line was the official demarcation of the border and that because of its existence there could not be a border dispute between India and China. On this issue there was not significant disagreement from China, at least early in the process. Chou En-lai told Nehru in 1956 that the Chinese were also willing to accept the McMahon Line as the official border demarcation, but that the actual border *alignment* would require further negotiations.[107]

Consistency and unity on the border issue were also preserved from 1952 through 1959 by Nehru's decision to keep the Indian public and the Lok Sabha in the dark on all issues regarding relations with China. Until 1959 no one outside of top government circles was even aware that India and China had a territorial dispute. Further, occasional clashes between the two sides were downplayed. Those critical of the government's policies towards China could point to Chinese actions in Tibet, but little else.

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[106] Maxwell, *India's China War*, 91.
[107] Ibid, 94.

Despite these elements of stability in Indian policy, there was also an area in which the Indian government was inconsistent that exacerbated relations with the Chinese. This was the border issue in the northwestern Aksai Chin area. In the northwest there was no McMahon Line to use as a reference point, so where India chose to draw its border was open to greater interpretation. The Indian claim to Aksai Chin can be traced to a 1927 British map that included the region as part of Indian territory, although other British maps did not.[108] The Chinese can be forgiven for not being aware of India's claim to the territory which was only made formally in 1958 following India's discovery of the Chinese road cutting through the region to supply western Tibet.

The problem in Aksai Chin created one of the key sticking points between the two governments. In 1959 Nehru told Peking that he was willing to submit some areas of the border dispute to an international tribunal if China agreed to both the McMahon Line and the inclusion of Aksai Chin in India. The problem developed that both sides claimed they sought borders that conformed to the status quo. For China this meant allowing India to maintain the McMahon Line in the east while claiming Aksai Chin in the west. Nehru also wanted the status quo, but really sought the status quo ante, before China built the road through Aksai Chin, essentially claiming all the disputed territory for India. As noted above, in a speech before the

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[108] Maxwell, *India's China War*, 85. The decision to include Aksai Chin as part of India in 1927 was likely as a further buffer zone against the Soviets.

Lok Sabha, Nehru stated that Aksai Chin's status as part of India was not a clear matter, although he showed no such ambiguity in his discussions with the Chinese.[109]

Still, even though the decision on Aksai Chin was taken relatively late, India's position on the border was clear. In the east they supported the McMahon Line and in the west they believed Aksai Chin to be part of India. The Indian position on the McMahon Line was well known to the Chinese since the early 1950s. As will be discussed in more detail below, India's intentions only became unclear with the implementation of the Forward Policy in 1962.

## WEAKNESS

While the Nehru government was dovish, it hardly presented itself as weak. At times Nehru's domestic rhetoric on the border issue indicated more flexibility on the issue than he showed with the Chinese. Still, even when he said he could understand the Chinese position on Aksai Chin, he was quick to point out that it was Indian territory. Further, his position on the McMahon Line remained unchanged throughout the entire period leading up to the war.

If anything, Indian actions shortly before the war were much closer to hawkishness than dovishness. The Forward Policy Nehru instituted in late 1961 once again moved Indian patrols into the border region and in one case north of the McMahon Line. It would be difficult to view this policy as one of weakness, particularly when Nehru stated that India would throw the Chinese out of the border area on October 12, 1962, after the Chinese moved troops into the disputed area near Thag La.[110]

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[109] Ibid.

## DECISIVE ACTION

While in general Nehru's unified government was able to take decisive action on most issues, with respect to China it encountered two significant problems. The first limitation it faced was the mismatch between its rhetoric and its actions. Thus the issue was not whether or not India could rapidly respond to changing conditions, but rather the widening chasm between the government's rhetoric and its policies. The most notable policy in this regard is the Forward Policy Nehru instituted in the border regions in December 1961. Following the tense stand-offs in 1959, both sides had withdrawn from the immediate border region, which allowed for an uneasy peace to return. With the Forward Policy, Indian troops along the McMahon Line were ordered as close to the border as possible and 24 new posts were erected.

This action might not have been viewed as provocative by the Chinese had not the Indians also set up a post at Dhola just south of the Thag La ridge but north of the McMahon Line. The location of the post was justified by the Indians by the fact that it reflected the line of the prominent geography in the area, although in reality it meant annexing about 25 square miles unilaterally and altering the sacred McMahon Line.[111] Although Indian army commanders in the area protested the decision and questioned its legality, the orders stood. The Chinese also protested this action and in

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[110] Xuecheng Liu, *The Sino-Indian Border Dispute and Sino-Indian Relations* (New York: University Press of America, 1994), 35.
[111] Maxwell, *India's China War*, 290-295.

September 1962 moved troops into the area but did not seek to evict the Indians by force. The day following the entry of Chinese troops to the area, September 9, the Indian government decided to evict the Chinese. On the same day Defense Minister Menon was informed that the Dhola post might be on the Chinese side of the McMahon Line. Further, General Umrao Singh of the XXXIII Corps, having received orders to force the Chinese out, instead reported back that the Dhola post should be removed. When the first confrontation between the two sides occurred on September 15, a civilian Chinese official with the group asked for a meeting to allow the border to be demarcated and avoid bloodshed. This request made it all the way to Nehru, who rejected it.[112]

The divergence between Nehru's pacific rhetoric and the provocative nature of the Forward Policy was significant. While still clinging to the hopes of Sino-Indian friendship and *Panchsheel*, he unilaterally altered the border in India's favor, refused to acknowledge any Chinese claims, and then proceeded to send the military into the region, creating outposts within Chinese territory. However, as with a unified government, the Indians were able to take decisive action as seen in the Forward Policy. On the other hand, as will be discussed below, the inability of the Indian government to process information prevented them from understanding the implications of the Forward Policy.

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[112] Ibid, Part IV.

### *The view from China*

China's initial views of India, and Nehru in particular, were not positive. The new communist government in Peking believed the Indian government to be under the sway of Western capitalist forces. Specifically, the Chinese were skeptical of New Delhi's views on Tibet; as the *People's Daily* expressed in September 1949, "Nehru and company are openly engineering a cleavage between the different peoples in China . . . undermining their unity and interfering in China's internal affairs by declaring in the name of a foreign country that Tibet has never recognized Chinese suzerainty."[113] However, these negative views soon began to change based on two actions of Nehru's government. The first action that caught China's attention was Nehru's early recognition of the communist regime over the objections of the British and the Americans. More important was Nehru's response to China's actions in Tibet in 1950. As already noted, the military action led many Indian politicians to call for India to support the Tibetan rebels, while Nehru demurred. Nehru's muted reaction to the incursion greatly improved his standing among the Chinese leadership.[114]

While relations were positive throughout the 1950s, the underlying territorial dispute eventually boiled over in 1959, due in part to India's unilateral modification of the McMahon Line. The tension this created between the two states could have led to war, but both sides were able to step back from the precipice. Despite the cries of the opposition, it is noteworthy that the Chinese saw a clear difference between Nehru and those who used more bellicose language. In 1959 the *Peking Review* noted,

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[113] *People's Daily*, September 1949.
[114] Maxwell, *India's China War*, 260.

"Prime Minister Nehru is different from many persons who obviously bear ill-will towards China. He disagrees somewhat with us on the Tibet question. But in general he advocates Sino-Indian friendship"[115] Further, even after a number of tense border incidents, Nehru was still praised as having, "done things beneficial to Sino-Indian friendship and the spirit of the five principles of peaceful coexistence."[116]

Thus, throughout the 1950s the Chinese government's views of Nehru's government reflect the two principle arguments of this chapter: that Nehru was a dominant figure in Indian politics and that he held dovish views towards China. Not only did the Chinese have a particular view of the Indian government, but this also guided their interactions with Nehru's government. Even though Nehru had not been particularly accommodating with negotiations, his goodwill towards China seemed to insure a peaceful solution would be found. Although the Chinese disagreed with his understanding of the border, particularly in the Aksai Chin region, Nehru also did not seem willing to force the issue. A diplomatic communiqué from Peking to New Delhi at the end of 1959 summed up the Chinese feelings, stating, "It is impossible to entertain the absurd idea that our two great friendly neighbors with a combined population of more than one thousand million might start a war over such temporary and local disputes."[117]

Chinese attitudes were destined to change again, provoked by the failure of the New Delhi summit in 1960 and the Forward Policy in 1962. The events of 1959 showed the border situation was deteriorating and could lead to broader conflict. Both sides convened in Delhi in April 1960 to work on a resolution. The basic premise of both sides remained problematic: the Chinese favored drawing the border to match the status quo (thus giving them Aksai Chin) while the Indians also claimed to support the status quo, although they actually meant the status quo ante, as they did not control Aksai Chin.

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[115] *Peking Review*, May 12, 1959, 15

[116] *People's Daily,* September 22, 1959.

[117] White Paper, "Notes, Memoranda and Letters Exchanged and Agreements Signed Between the Governments of India and China," Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, New Delhi, 1959-63, 80.

Still, the Chinese did not begin openly attacking Nehru until late in 1962 after the advent of the Forward Policy. While the Forward Policy in itself was provocative, the most unsettling element for the Chinese was the unilateral revision of the McMahon Line and stationing of troops in the annexed area. The combination of India's intransigence in negotiations over the border and the aggressive Forward Policy led to the hostilities of 1962. Ironically, the Chinese view of Nehru returned to what it had been in 1949: in late 1962 the *Peking Review* accused him of "practically throw[ing] away the banner of opposition to imperialism and colonialism...[and] suit[ing] himself to the needs of U.S. imperialism…[That] is the root cause and background of the Sino-Indian boundary dispute."[118]

### *The Price of Extreme Unity*

The theory presented here would predict that under such circumstances a united dovish government would work towards accommodation, but this was not the path Nehru pursued. Instead, Nehru went on the offensive and launched the Forward Policy to remove the Chinese from border areas claimed by the Chinese. As noted previously, the initial flashpoint in the confrontation occurred in an area India unilaterally annexed in 1959. During the confrontations in the spring of 1962, the *Peking Review* called for Nehru to “rein in on the brink of the precipice.”[119] Instead, Nehru walked India to the precipice and stepped off. Why? Was Nehru actually a hawk in dove’s clothing who was looking for war with China? The pursuit of the aggressive Forward Policy over the protests of the Chinese and many commanders in the field would tend to suggest this to be true. However, unshakable belief that war would not occur between China and India cuts against such an explanation. Further, despite all the evidence to the contrary, Nehru believed that the actions of the Forward Policy were within Indian territory and thus would not be viewed as aggressive by China.

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[118] *Peking Review*, November 2, 1962.

This brings us back to the question of why the conflict occurred if Nehru’s government was unified and dovish. Divided governments fuel conflicts based on misperception, but this was not the case between China and India. While China did not agree with Nehru’s position, it clearly knew where he stood. Further, there is no evidence from the Chinese side that the government viewed India as a particularly attractive target from which to claim territory. Instead, the Chinese began to see the Indians as intransigent in their claims and, with the advent of the Forward Policy, aggressive. Yet, as Maxwell notes in his study of the conflict, “There is no reason to believe that if at any time before mid-October 1962 India had changed her policy towards China, either by agreeing to negotiate a general boundary agreement or even by simply suspending the forward policy, China would not have responded and encouraged Sino-Indian relations to simmer down."[120]

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[119] *Peking Review*, March 22, 1962.

If the Indian government was unified and dovish, why did it pursue the aggressive Forward Policy, refuse to negotiate, and eventually suffer a devastating route at the hands of the Chinese? The answer seems to lie in the Nehru's dominance over the Indian government. Even dominant democratic leaders need impartial sources of information that will allow them to assess a situation and develop a rational response. In the Indian case, as has already been documented, Nehru's control over all facets of the foreign policy bureaucracy prevented him from receiving accurate information on a host of issues. Nehru's dominant position in the government and a fledgling foreign policy bureaucracy combined to create a dangerous echo chamber.

In particular, Nehru's close relationship with Menon, the Defense Minister, and the purging of independent-minded senior staff officers led to a number of misperceptions on Nehru's part. In his analysis of the Border War, Vertzberger attributes most of the blame to misperception within the Indian government due to Nehru's status and the resulting group-think that it caused. There is a great deal of support for this viewpoint. First, increasingly hostile Chinese signals relating to the border were not passed along to Nehru. The director of the Intelligence Bureau was a close friend and was selective about what information was passed along, in addition to adopting Nehru's views of the Chinese. Thus, although there was substantial evidence that India had a hand in provoking unrest in Tibet, Nehru knew nothing of it, which made his denials ring false to the Chinese.[121] Nehru's style of micro-management on foreign policy issues meant that he had to review massive amounts of information on a daily basis. This process inevitably hampered the ability of the government to analyze incoming information, and even Nehru realized its limitations: "In Delhi our days are spend in rushing from one [person] to another or from one activity to another, and we do not have the advantage of leisurely thinking."[122]

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[120] Maxwell, *India's China War*, 275.

In addition, a gap developed in the military between the senior staff officers who were loyal to Nehru and senior field officers who were much more pessimistic about India's prospects along the border.[123] While this created a number of significant problems, none was more important than the view, supported by senior Indian officials, that India held the military advantage along the northeaster border. Although those in the field were well familiar with the difficulties facing the Indians, including long supply lines and acclimating to high altitudes, up until the beginning of the war Nehru maintained that India had a military advantage.[124] Furthermore, Nehru seemed oblivious to the repercussions of ordering India troops to remove the Chinese troops from the Thag La area. He reportedly told field commanders that despite such provocative action, "the Chinese would not take any strong action against [India]."[125] That the Chinese would interpret such an action as aggressive was correctly predicted by many Indians outside Nehru's close circle. Speaking to Major General Niranjan Prasad, President Radhakrishnan said:

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[121] Vertzberger, *Misperception in Foreign Policymaking*, 194-195. In addition, much of the intelligence information was never passed on the Defense Ministry.
[122] Nehru, May 28, 1959.
[123] Vertzberger, *Misperception in Foreign Policymaking*, 268.
[124] Maxwell, *India's China War*, 302.
[125] Quoted in Liu, *Sino-Indian Border Dispute*, 35.

> We had no business to have sent the army on this mission. We seemed to have gone mad about Thag la. At best Thag la is disputed territory. What does Nehru mean by saying "I have ordered the army to throw the Chinese out?" Is this the language to be used in international affairs? Is this the manner in which grave national issues are handled?[126]

In the end, Nehru's dominance of the foreign policy bureaucracy, a group of intelligence, military, and foreign policy advisors more interested in telling Nehru what he wanted to hear rather than informing him, and complete misreading of the situation along the border led to the 1962 war. Even the most unified democracies still need to have access to impartial analysis and opposing point of view. At the height of his power, Nehru's government no longer possessed the key checks and constraints necessary for democratic decision making.

### *Alternative Explanations*

The preceding section shows the extent to which the qualities of India's unified dovish government managed a peaceful relationship with China from 1952 until 1961. The Border War with China in 1962 is the result of insufficient feedback within the Indian government that led to disastrous miscalculation and failure to anticipate the results of the Forward Policy. Do any of the alternative explanations offer a better explanation for why the two states went to war in 1962? The following section will investigate their predictions and how they correspond to the historical record.

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[126] Quoted in Liu, *Sino-Indian Border Dispute*, 35.

## THE OPPOSITION

According to Schultz's theory, when the opposition fails to back the government, it signals a lack of commitment on the part of the government, and thus the challenger can view this discord as a signal the government is bluffing. As is the case with most dovish governments, the opposition was more hawkish with regards to China than Congress and Nehru in particular. Particularly after the clashes of 1959 the Jan Sangh, Swatantra, and Praja Socialist Parties all condemned the government for its soft-line with China.[127] These attacks continued with increasing ferocity until the war in 1962. Thus, there was divergence between the government and the opposition, but the opposition signaled a tougher line than the government.

Did the divisions between the government and the opposition with regards to China signal an opening for the Chinese? It does appear that the Chinese were concerned about the opposition, but not for the reasons outlined in Schultz's theory. Instead, Vertzberger argues that the modest gains made by the opposition in the 1962 elections and their anti-Chinese rhetoric concerned the Chinese.[128] Still, the Chinese were well aware of the modest power of the opposition and were much more focused on the government and Nehru in particular. Opposition rhetoric regarding China had been heated since 1950 and particularly 1959, but it was only when the Chinese changed their view of Nehru in 1962 that war occurred.

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[127] Naheed Murtaza, *Parliament and Foreign Policy: Reflections on India-China Relations*, 1st ed. (New Delhi: CADPLAN Publisher & Distributor, 1998), Chapter 5.
[128] Vertzberger, *Misperception in Foreign Policymaking*, 147.

The opposition had another role in the conflict, but one also not predicted by Schultz's theory. Vertzberger in particular argues that once Nehru felt compelled to release all the government discussions with China in 1959, he became increasingly constrained in his dealings with China. While the opposition did become increasingly vocal on the government's China policy and attacked Defense Minister Menon, the missing link is a change in Nehru's negotiating style. As has been argued above, Nehru consistently argued that India would not alter its view of the borders. Thus no change in policy can be attributed to the opposition.

What role did the opposition attacks play in Nehru's decision to pursue the Forward Policy? This is difficult to assess, but even if Nehru felt pressure to take a tough line with the Chinese, the dominant issue was the problems within the government rather than pressure outside it. Throughout his term as Prime Minister, Nehru repeatedly defended his soft-line towards China before the opposition, and at the height of his power in 1962 it is unclear why he would suddenly be bullied into taking an action he didn't want. Rather, as discussed above, the groupthink that existed in the foreign policy bureaucracy was a far more significant issue.

## LEADERSHIP TENURE

The 1962 Border War makes a particularly unlikely case for Gelpi and Grieco's theory of leadership tenure. According to their theory, newly elected leaders are more likely to make concessions because the public then has a few years to forget about the concessions before they head to the ballot box again.  In the Indian case, Nehru was hardly inexperienced in 1962 after fifteen years in office.  Not only that, but Nehru also had been firm in his views on the border and the significance of the McMahon Line ever since China raised the border issue.

Further, Gelpi and Grieco’s theory implies a weakness in leaders that encourages challenges.  This certainly may be true in some cases, but in 1962 Nehru was at the height of his power in India and weakness does not appear to have played a role in the Chinese calculations.  As noted above, the Chinese did not attack India because they believed that Nehru was vulnerable and might succumb to pressure, but rather under duress from what they viewed as aggressive tactics on the part of the Indians.

According to Gelpi and Grieco’s theory, 1950 should have been the year when war broke out between India and China.  The Chinese were annexing Tibet, and tensions with India were high.  Further, Nehru was a relative newcomer to the office of Prime Minister, having achieved the office with Indian independence.  However, as noted previously, Nehru’s restraint regarding the Chinese annexation and general dovishness prompted a positive view of Nehru in China that prevented the conflict from further escalating.

## PUBLIC OPINION

According to Reiter and Stam's theory of public opinion, politicians should follow the will of the public and, as an extension of Schultz's argument, public opinion may serve to support or contradict the government's policy. Thus, we would expect that when public opinion is inflamed the government will be pressed to take action, while a restrained public reaction will constrain state leaders. In the case of Sino-Indian relations, India public opinion was inflamed on three occasions: 1950, 1959, and 1962. Much like the opposition, it is notable that the first two cases did not lead to action by the government or broader conflict in general.

The Chinese were certainly aware that there were anti-Chinese pockets in Indian public opinion, but their significance was marginal. The Chinese did not view India as anti-Chinese until their perceptions of Nehru changed in late 1962. By the same token, in both 1950 and 1959 Nehru was vocal in calling for restrained reaction to Chinese actions. Nehru's calm reaction, coupled with China's focus on Nehru as the sole spokesman for Indian foreign policy, prevented these incidents from escalating.

The events of 1962 provide an interesting test for both Schultz's and Reiter and Stam's theories. The fact that public opinion in India was consistently more hawkish vis-à-vis China than Nehru's government should have signaled to the Chinese that an attack would provoke a significant Indian response. Once Nehru began to take what the Chinese viewed as provocative action, it was Nehru's aggressiveness and not Indian public opinion that drove the Chinese. Additionally, Maxwell points out that the fateful decision by the Indian government to remove the

Chinese from the border area was taken on September 9, the day after the Chinese took up positions in the Thag La area, and before stories of the Chinese action were published.[129] Moreover, Nehru was out of the country at a meeting of Commonwealth ministers when the decision was taken.

## BALANCE OF FORCES

The Indians faced significant disadvantages across the border region. In the Northeastern Frontier Area (NEFA), conditions for the undermanned Indian forces were particularly dire. The geography of the area offered the Chinese important advantages. As winter conditions developed in the higher altitudes, the well-equipped Chinese soldiers in their winter uniforms saw the incoming Indian forces shiver in their thin cotton summer uniforms. The Chinese had been training in the high altitudes of the Tibetan plateau and acclimatized to thin air, while the new Indian forces, fresh from the plains, were undergoing major altitude adjustments over short periods of time. Pulmonary edema, a condition brought on by the lack of oxygen at higher altitudes, was a serious problem for the Indian forces. Even those Indian soldiers not facing life threatening conditions were exhausted from the stains of climbing.[130]

The difficult terrain facing the Indians created other problems as well. While the Chinese had advantages throughout the border region, Thag La was a particularly disadvantageous point for the Indians to pick a fight. A road led to a point from which Chinese soldiers only had a three hour march to the ridge, while the Indians faced a six day hike from the closest road. This meant that throughout the border region the Chinese had significantly shorter supply lines for their troops. While it is not clear to what degree the Chinese outnumbered Indian forces, in one of the initial Chinese probes on October 10, the Indians were outnumbered twenty to one.[131]

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[129] Maxwell, *India's China War*, 302.
[130] Ibid, Part IV.

The overall picture for the Indians in the border area was not favorable. As already noted above, Nehru continually claimed the Indians had the advantage in the border area. The Chinese, with more soldiers, better equipment, and shorter supply lines should clearly have deterred the Indians. Those Indian commanders in the area were well aware of the disparities facing their forces, but these were ignored by the leaders in New Delhi. Given the long odds facing the Indian along the border, the provocative actions approved by Nehru appear all the more anomalous. In the end, balance of forces theories cannot explain why the Indians chose to fight in an area where they were so clearly overmatched.

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[131] Ibid, 338

# Chapter 7

# United Hawks: Israel under Ben Gurion and the United States under Nixon

### *Unified Hawks in Theory*

Like unified doves, unified hawks can successfully avoid the targeting that plagues divided governments.  In addition, unified hawks and doves can clearly and credibly signal their intentions to possible challengers.  The advantage that unified hawks have over unified doves is that they are less likely to be considered weak, making them the least likely to be targeted in international conflict.

Unified hawkish governments receive high scores in all three areas influenced by government unity: intentions, decisive action, and strength. It is the unity of these governments, as was the case of the dovish governments in the previous chapter, that is the key to avoiding conflict.  The intentions of these governments are clear to potential challengers, although in ways that are different from united doves. Divided hawkish governments, while they are less likely to be viewed as weak, cannot clearly signal their intentions and bargain credibly or effectively.  Meanwhile, unified hawkish governments seek to prevent challenges through displays of force and threats.  Thus, like unified dovish governments they can avoid conflict, but instead of focusing on negotiations, unified hawkish governments rely on tough posturing and credible threats to signal their intentions.

Another shared characteristic between unified hawks and doves is their ability to take decisive action.  Divided governments are prevented from making resolute policies through their internal contradictions, while simultaneously creating gridlock in the decision making process and leading to contradictory actions.  The strong leaders characteristic of unified governments and their like-minded cabinets give these governments a clearer sense of purpose.  Unified hawkish governments can successfully show their commitment to territory through military posturing and, when necessary, retaliatory measures.  Potential challengers are dissuaded from attack through the credible threats presented by unified government.  While the challenger may desire a revision of the status quo, the unified hawkish government can credibly signal the costs that such a revision would entail.

Finally, unified hawkish governments are likely to be viewed as strong and unlikely to make good targets.  Whereas the internal divisions in divided governments may make them appear unable to successfully meet serious challenge, the same is not true for united hawks.  Through both rhetoric and action, unified hawks can explicitly show how they will respond to a challenge.

This chapter presents two case studies of “dogs that didn’t bark,” which creates some unique problems in discussing them.  Since the focus of this research is on when democracies will be challenged, these “silent dog” cases often contain significantly less information than other cases.  In order to overcome this potential limitation, the chapter will focus more on temporal comparison and changes in the two independent variables than the previous chapters.

In addition to the proposition that unified hawks are significantly less likely to be attacked, this chapter will also explore whether such governments are particularly likely to instigate international conflict. With respect to the case of Israel under Ben Gurion, this chapter will argue that launching the preventive war against Egypt in 1956 would not have been possible were it not for shifts in the cabinet composition, unifying the government under the leadership of hawks. This case study highlights the importance of cabinet unity to take decisive action necessary to launch a war. Thus, while unified hawks may be the least likely to be challenged, this case will show that they are particularly prone to launch conflicts.

As in the previous case studies, this chapter will first make the case that these governments are unified and hawkish. It will then investigate how these two variables influence the three factors listed above: intentions, decisive action, and strength. Both the Israeli and the United States cases investigated demonstrate that these governments were able to clearly signal their intentions, take decisive action, and appear strong to potential challengers. The case studies will then shift their focus to examine how potential challengers viewed these governments. The final link in the causal chain will be established when I show how these perceptions influenced the challenging state to abstain from military action.

A number of competing theories exist that also seek to explain when states are likely to be challenged. Kenneth Schultz's theory focused on the role of opposition parties in signaling the intentions of the government to potential challengers. According to this theory, challenges should be less likely when the opposition supports the government's policies. Chris Gelpi and Joseph Grieco's theory on leadership tenure posits that democratic governments are particularly susceptible to challenge early in their term.  Extending Reiter and Stam's research on public opinion and conflict, challenges seem least likely when the public is hawkish.  Lastly, theories on the balance of forces suggest that shifts in the balance of power will make conflict more likely.

The chapter is organized along the lines of the previous case studies.  For each case a brief history of the dispute will be analyzed.  The next section will examine the unity and hawkishness of the government and the accuracy of these codings.  In the same vein, the following portion will connect the nature of the government to its ability to signal its intentions, take decisive action, and demonstrate its strength.  The focus will then shift from the potential target state to examining how the potential challenger viewed the government and the degree to which this influenced their actions.  Each case study will conclude with a discussion of how the alternative theories' predictions compare with the outcome in each case.

## Arab-Israeli Relations under Ben Gurion

### *Background of the conflic*t

The unsettled nature of territorial issues following the founding of Israel led to repeated cross-border raids shortly after the founding of the state.  Between 1948 and 1953, most of these raids were carried out by local peasants to tend to crops, livestock or to steal.  However, there were also violent incidents, and Israelis living in border regions demanded that the government take action to halt the raids. Initially, the government avoided retaliation because it could not be sure who was responsible for the raids. Soon, these fears were eclipsed by concerns that the raids were causing vigilantism along the border, and the situation might escalate. To satisfy the public, the IDF engaged in retaliatory raids, often using disproportionate force in the border areas.[1]

The number of raids steadily increased during 1953 and 1954, but the nature of the conflict took a significant turn following an Israeli retaliatory raid in February 1955 in Gaza. This raid was a departure from previous Israeli practice in that it was not in clear response to a previous infiltration and was directed against the Egyptian military. In addition to killing a number of Gazans, 39 Egyptian soldiers were killed, which "heralded a new era in Israeli-Egyptian relations."[2] While the raid produced an initial downturn in cross-border violence in the area, it led to rioting in Gaza, which caused Egypt to intervene and President Nasser to make his first trip to Gaza since coming to power. Nasser later said that the raid "drastically altered" his views on coexistence with Israel, and Egypt began to take an active hand in organizing the *fedayeen* attacks, which became more frequent and more deadly.[3] The persistent, low-level violence led Ben Gurion to call the conflict a "small war".[4]

The other threat facing the region was the unsettled status of relations between Israel and its neighbors following the 1948 War. No peace agreements were signed among the warring factions, only cease-fires. In Israel, this created a concern among many politicians, and particularly the hawks, that a "second round" of fighting was inevitable and the question was not if, but when. Both Syrian and Egyptian leaders regularly made bellicose statements threatening Israel's existence. The 1955 Czech arms deal, which substantially increased the quantity of Egyptian arms while simultaneously upping the quality as well, further inflamed the situation. Israeli hawks were concerned that if Israel waited for an (inevitable in their view) Egyptian attack, it would occur under circumstances unfavorable to Israel.[5]

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[1] Benny Morris, *Israel's Border War 1949-1956* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 176-79.

[2] Jonathan Shimshoni, *Israel and Conventional Deterrence* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1988), 79.

[3] Morris, *Israel's Border War 1949-1956*, 328.

[4] Quoted in Shimshoni, *Israel and Conventional Deterrence*, 37.

These concerns and the problems created for Israeli shipping by the blockade imposed by Egypt on the Straits of Tiran eventually led to the Suez War of October 1956. Based on a secret agreement Israel reached with England and France, following an initial Israeli attack, the two powers intervened to stop the fighting, while in the process taking control of the Suez Canal from the Egyptians. Israel was able to rapidly conquer the Sinai Peninsula, and Britain and France were making headway in the Canal area when pressure from the Eisenhower administration brought the conflict to a rapid conclusion. Under U.S. pressure, Israel withdrew from the Sinai. Perhaps most importantly for the Israelis, the Suez campaign allowed them to destroy the *fedayeen* groups operating in Gaza and the Sinai. Israel estimated that prior to the war there were as many as 500 *fedayeen* fighters in these areas, many of whom were killed or fled during the fighting. Further, some 1,200 Palestinian

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[5] Jack S. Levy and Joseph R. Gochal, "Democracy and Preventive War: Israel and the 1956 Sinai Campaign," *Security Studies* 11, no. 2 (2001/2002).

Brigade troops crossed Israel to the West Bank during the conflict and were disarmed by Jordanian authorities.[6]

Although France and England failed to achieve their main objectives in the war, namely removing Nasser and retaking the Canal, Israel was better served by the conflict. Although Israel was not able to maintain control of the Sinai, the war effectively ended the cross-border raids and pushed the Egyptian military back across the Canal. Further, Moaz points out the positive developments for Israel following the conflict,

> The subsequent ten years after the Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai were the most peaceful years Israel had experienced since its inception. The Israeli-Egyptian border was notoriously quiet, and the conflict between the two states was converted from a shooting and bleeding confrontation to a contest of words and propaganda, but without military clashes. The Egyptian army established tight control over the Palestinian population of the Gaza Strip, preventing any attempt to infiltrate Israel. Terrorism emanating from the Gaza Strip was renewed only after the Israeli occupation of the area in 1967.[7]

This chapter explores how Israel moved from a state of persistent low-level conflict to a period of durable peace over a short time. Specifically, the following sections examine the role that Israel's domestic politics played in altering the dynamics with its neighbors.

### *Unified government and clear signals*

Two views existed in the Israeli government regarding the most effective manner of dealing with the increasingly deadly and destructive cross-border raids.

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[6] Morris, *Israel's Border War 1949-1956*, 407.

[7] Zeev Maoz, *Defending the Holy Land* (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2006), 77.

One faction, represented by Prime Minister and Minister of Defense Ben Gurion, argued that Israel's Arab neighbors only understood the language of violence. In practice, this meant that Israel's retaliatory raids were designed to inflict significant casualties on the offending state to emphasize Israel's deterrent power. The dovish faction was represented by Foreign Minister (and later Prime Minister) Moshe Sharett. This group did not eschew violence completely, but rather emphasized the point that retaliatory raids harmed Israel's international standing and that all peaceful avenues should be exhausted before force was used.[8]

Thus, the period preceding the 1956 Suez War was marked by significant turmoil within the Mapai-led government. Although Ben Gurion was generally regarded as an autocratic leader and many of the disagreements were not made public, undercurrents of dissent existed. These disputes came into focus when Ben Gurion took a temporary leave from his posts in the government and handed the reins to Sharett. On December 7, 1953, Ben Gurion retired to kibbutz Sede-Boker, but before leaving, he installed three politicians who shared his foreign policy views: Pinhas Lavon as Defense Minister, Shimon Peres as Director General of the Ministry of Defense and Moshe Dayan as the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) Chief of Staff.[9]

Sharett's more open style of government, significant factions loyal to Ben Gurion, and increasingly independent actions by the defense establishment brought the simmering foreign policy disagreements to a boil. Historian Avi Shlaim notes that during this period, “Israel’s leaders were deeply divided among themselves on the nature of the threat facing them and on the best way of safeguarding the country’s security.”[10] Sharett’s tenure was marked by a struggle between him and Ben Gurion’s supporters, Lavon and Dayan. At the core of the struggle was the best approach for Israel to take regarding the raids. Lavon repeatedly ignored Sharett’s authority and kept information from him. Following a raid against the Jordanian town of Nahhalin, British Ambassador Evans said the violent retaliation was “a measure of the Prime Minister’s internal weakness.”[11] Of the same raid Yosef Ariel, an Israeli diplomat in Brussels, noted, “I am obliged to tell you that we [i.e. Israel’s diplomats in Belgium] were all of the opinion that this matter was a great mistake... There is no logic in pursuing two contradictory paths [simultaneously] - to seek justice in the Security Council [over a prior raid against Israel] and to take the law into our own hands [in Nahhalin].”[12]

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[8] See Morris, *Israel's Border War 1949-1956*, 227; Avraham Avi-hai, *Ben Gurion, State-Builder* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1974), 189.

[9] Avi Shlaim, *The Iron Wall: Israel and the Arab World* (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 2000), 94.

Following the exposure of what came to be known as the “Lavon Affair,” where a ring of Israeli spies were captured in Egypt, Lavon was ousted as Defense Minister, and Ben Gurion returned to the government in 1955. Back in government, Ben Gurion immediately pressed for a more aggressive foreign policy, particularly in Israel’s response to Arab raids. Two of Ben Gurion’s more auspicious plans – capturing the Straights of Tiran and building settlements in the al-’Awja Demilitarized Zone area – were rejected by the cabinet. In both cases, Sharett was able to rally the moderates in the cabinet to resist such plans. However, Israeli public opinion was not with Sharett, and when Mapai lost five seats in the July 1955 election, it was portrayed as a repudiation of Sharett's moderate line. Thus, Sharett believed that the tougher line that Ben Gurion sought also contained a degree of electoral calculus, "I knew well what they [Ben Gurion and Dayan] were all thinking - though no one put it into words - that to do nothing at this time would be a mortal blow for us in the elections and would send thousands of voters to [Herut] and [Ahdut Ha'Avoda, the Activist socialist party]."[13] Further controversy broke out in August 1955, when Sharett called back a planned raid, and Dayan threatened to resign. In protest, Ben Gurion and his followers stayed home the following day. Sharett was forced to back down, and the raid went forward, while Ben Gurion called on the government to follow a single line, either his or Sharett's.[14]

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[10] Ibid, 95.
[11] Morris, *Israel’s Border War 1949-1956*, 302.
[12] Quoted in Morris, *Israel’s Border War 1949-1956*, 304.

In November 1955, Ben Gurion formed his new government and the open controversies so visible under Sharett's leadership immediately declined.[15] While Ben Gurion was a committed democrat, he also felt that Israel's political system with a broad array of political parties and coalition governments did not serve the interests of the state and longed for a two party system with a strong executive along the lines of the United States or Great Britain. Thus, Ben Gurion believed that strong leadership was necessary to overcome the divisions within the political establishment.[16] Ben Gurion was further frustrated by Sharett's ability to rally the Cabinet against some of his more audacious plans, including capturing Gaza.[17] As Shlaim argues, "Ben Gurion was moving toward the conclusion that war with Egypt was inevitable, and he knew that Sharett would oppose launching a preemptive strike. He also knew that Sharett would be capable of mobilizing a majority in the cabinet to veto a proposal to go to war."[18]

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[13] From Sharett's diary, as quoted in Morris, *Israel's Border War 1949-1956*, 180.

[14] Avi Shlaim, "Conflicting Approaches to Israel's Relations with the Arabs: Ben Gurion and Sharett, 1953-1956," *Middle East Journal* 37, no. 2 (1983), 1983, 192.

[15] In one instance, Ben Gurion ordered a raid against Syria in December 1955 that killed 37 Syrian soldiers and twelve civilians, causing international condemnation. The raid effectively undercut Sharett's mission to secure arms from the U.S. and led the Ha'aretz newspaper to editorialize, "Ben Gurion, who serves as prime minister and defense minister, did not ask the opinions of the cabinet members regarding the Kinneret [Lake Tiberias] operation." Quoted in Moshe Ma'oz, *Syria and Israel: From War to Peacemaking* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), 49.

Over time, Ben Gurion sought to decrease Sharett's power by eroding his base[19], and Zeev Maoz notes the success of this project:

> By 1955, however, the militant coalition was able to tilt the balance of political power in its favor, with the return of Ben-Gurion to the Defense Ministry and - later that year - to the prime minister's office. By mid-1956, the moderate elements were purged from the government and the activist coalition could operate without any effective oversight by more moderate and level-headed politicians.[20]

The final and most significant element of the purge occurred on June 6, 1956, when two Mapai officials arrived at Sharett's door and delivered an ultimatum: either he resigned that day or Ben Gurion would return to Sde Boker. Sharett reportedly told the officials, "I know why you have come. To slaughter me! I agree!"[21] Several scholars argue that the resignation of Sharett removed the final moderate element in

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[16] Giora Goldberg, *Ben-Gurion against the Knesset* (Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 2003), 108.

[17] Dan Kurzman, *Ben-Gurion: Prophet of Fire* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983), 384. The Arab world was aware of these internal discussions as witnessed by Arab diplomat's questioning U.S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles how the US would react to such an action (Morris, *Israel's Border War 1949-1956*, 333).

[18] Avi Shlaim, *Iron Wall*, 161-62.

[19] Shlomo Aronson, *Conflict and Bargaining in the Middle East: An Israeli Perspective* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978), 13.

[20] Zeev Maoz, *Defending the Holy Land* (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2006), 75-76.

[21] Kurzman, *Ben-Gurion*, 385.

Ben Gurion's government and eliminated the last roadblock on the path to the Suez War.[22]

Ben Gurion, serving as both Prime Minister and Defense Minister, already had strong supporters in the Ministry of Defense (Peres) and the IDF (Dayan) and now just needed a foreign minister to replace Sharett. He chose Golda Meir, who had already established herself as a hawk by supporting Ben Gurion's proposed Gaza takeover and generally favoring a hard-line with the Arabs.[23] According to Shlaim, in Meir Ben Gurion,

> found a Foreign Minister after his own heart, for she accepted unquestioningly the supreme authority of the Prime Minister and his conception of the role of the Foreign Minister as essentially a spokesman for the defense establishment. Her ignorance of international affairs was one of her main qualifications for the post, as Ben Gurion was later to reveal, for it enabled his go-ahead lieutenants to bypass the Foreign Ministry and resort to unorthodox methods and unconventional channels in their quest for French arms.[24]

With Sharett and his followers out of the way, Ben Gurion could finally conduct Israel's foreign relations as he wished. The reconstruction of the Cabinet turned a divided government into a unified one in less than one year's time. The characteristics of a unified government were all present: a strong leader, similarly hawkish views among the key foreign policymakers, and little overt disagreement.[25]

Following the Suez War and until Ben Gurion's retirement in 1963, the unity of the government continued.[26] Gone were the disagreements over the correct policy to pursue with the Arab countries. The 1956 war enhanced Ben-Gurion's prestige and political power, leading Avi Shlaim to argue, "In the period 1957-1963 Ben-Gurion thus enjoyed a near-monopoly in the making of foreign and defense policy."[27] Already viewed as autocratic, Ben Gurion increased his control over the levers of power in the Israeli government.

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[22] See Maoz, *Defending the Holy Land*, 66; Roberts, *Party and Politics in Israel*, 19; Maxime Rodinson, *Israel and the Arabs*, trans. Michael Perl (New York: Pantheon Books, 1968), 74.
[23] Morris, *Israel's Border War 1949-1956*, 333.
[24] Shlaim, "Conflicting Approaches to Israel's Relations with the Arabs," 199.
[25] This is not to say there was no disagreement. In particular, Meir and Ben Gurion parted ways when Ben Gurion sought to buy and sell weapons with West Germany. However, their views regarding the Arab world were similar.

Ben Gurion's method for dealing with dissent was previewed in the preparations for the Suez War. Preliminary discussions and preparations remained within a small, ideologically homogeneous group centering on Ben Gurion, Dayan, and Peres. The secret negations with Britain and France at Sévres were conducted by Ben Gurion and Dayan. Returning to Israel following the negotiations, Ben Gurion informed the more hawkish parties in the government – Mapai, Ahdut Ha'avodah, National Religious Party, and the Progressive Party – while waiting to inform the more dovish Mapam members until the last moment.[28] Later decisions followed this pattern, where Ben Gurion would discuss policymaking with like-minded ministers while keeping possible opponents in the dark.

Between 1949 and the end of Ben Gurion's term in office, only the extremes of the political spectrum were kept out of the government: Herut on the far right and Maki on the far left. The period was also marked by significant stability on the Left

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[26] Motti Golani, *Israel in Search of a War, the Sinai Campaign, 1955-1956* (Brighton, England: Sussex Academic Press, 1998), 195. Golani argues that the War restored Ben Gurion's public image: "In 1955, his [sic] seemed to be near the end of his tether, but his party's impressive victory in the 1959 general elections, which kept him in power until 1963, was to a certain extent due to the impact of the Sinai War."

[27] Shlaim, *Iron Wall*, 188.

[28] The two votes against the decision to go to war came from Mapam ministers (Shlaim, *Iron Wall*, 178).

(excepting the communists), which won between 68 and 71 seats in the four elections between 1951 and 1961. Throughout the entire period, Mapai was the largest party in the government and represented a broad range of views on foreign policy. The National Religious Party was more conservative but basically followed Mapai's line on foreign policy issues in exchange for support on religious policies. The leftist Ahdut ha'Avodah party supported a hawkish foreign policy, while only Mapam was a truly dovish leftist party.[29] Significantly, no Mapam members held key foreign policy posts during Ben Gurion's tenure.

### *Hawkish government*

The unity in Ben Gurion's government sprang from generally similar views on foreign policy among top policymakers. As noted above, the Sharett government exhibited a clash between doves and hawks, principally over how to respond to Arab raids. The hawks in the government, who became increasingly strong following Ben Gurion's return as Defense Minister,[30] viewed a "second round" with Israel's Arab neighbors as inevitable.[31] These leaders also came to view Nasser's rise to power in Egypt as signaling a shift towards radicalism that could not go unchecked.[32] While the doves in the government believed that the answer to the Czech arms deal was great power support and increased Israeli defenses, the hawks began to see relations with Egypt as characterized by a closing window of opportunity for preventive war.

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[29] Abraham Diskin, *The Last Days in Israel*, (Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 2003), Chapter 3.

[30] Historian Morris notes, "Ben-Gurion's return to the Cabinet immediately tilted the balance in favour of the Activists" (Morris, *Israel's Border War 1949-1956*, 325).

[31] Maoz, *Defending the Holy Land*, 60.

[32] Ibid, 50.

Historians differ in the extent to which they believe that Ben Gurion and the hawks were spoiling for war in the mid-50s. The more traditional view is that the hawks were generally defensive in their outlook but were forced to consider preventive war due to the deteriorating situations at the borders, the blockades, and the Czech arms deal. In their study of the 1956 war, Jack Levy and Joseph Gochal argue that the Czech arms deal was the decisive factor that drove Israel to war. Upon learning of the deal, Ben Gurion said, “If they [Egpyt] really receive the MiGs, then we should bomb them!”[33] The announcement of the deal also led Ben Gurion to begin developing war plans in the fall of 1955.

Among the revisionist scholars, Motti Golani makes a forceful case that through provocation and intransigence the hawks sought to create a rationale for war with Israel’s neighbors. Thus, the harsh reprisal policy favored by Ben Gurion, Peres, and Dayan was not designed to act as a deterrent but rather provoke an attack, particularly from Egypt. In 1954, when Lavon and Dayan presented a plan to use force to break the Straits of Tiran and Suez Canal blockades, Sharett asked Dayan, “Do you realize this means war with Egypt?” Dayan replied, “Of course I do.”[34] While the debate over Israel’s true intentions is important, for the purposes of this study the key point is that Ben Gurion and his allies in the government had clearly defined and established hawkish views.

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[33] Quoted in Kurzman, *Ben-Gurion*, 382.

[34] Quoted in Maoz, *Defending the Holy Land*, 57.

During his tenure in office, Sharett worked (at times unsuccessfully) to limit the number and scope of reprisal raids while keeping diplomatic channels open. He was particularly worried that the Israeli reprisals might lead to war and that these actions damaged Israel's standing in the international community. Where the hawks saw the Czech arms deal as a *causus belli*, Sharett believed that Israel should pursue arms deals with the Western powers. Not only was Sharett more cautious with respect to the reprisal raids, he also opened preliminary negotiations with Nasser. Secret talks and an exchange of letters between the two leaders began in 1954. As violence along the border escalated, partially due to Lavon's "energetic… pursuit of his own goal of escalating the conflict,"[35] the negotiations ended in the spring of 1955 following a deadly raid in Gaza. As noted earlier, attempts by Sharett to garner U.S. weapons were undercut by raids carried out without his approval.

During the Cabinet purges of spring and summer 1956, Sharett's dovish camp was largely removed from the government. The government already became more hawkish when Ben Gurion returned from Sde Boker, which led to more frequent and more damaging raids. Of course, the resignation of Sharett paved the way for Israel's preventive war against Egypt. If anything, the 1956 war, although not a complete success, reinforced the hawkishness of the government. Following the 1956 war, both Yigal Allon, the Minister of Labor, and Shimon Peres, Deputy Defense Minister, stated that if Egypt concentrated troops in the Sinai it would constitute a *causus belli*. Further, peace negotiations become dormant as Ben Gurion's government pursued a policy of peace through strength.

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[35] Shlaim, "Conflicting Approaches to Israel's Relations with the Arabs," 187.

While certainly hawkish, Ben Gurion's government was not extremely hawkish. Many scholars consider Dayan the most hawkish member of the government, and view Ben Gurion as more moderate than Dayan.[36] Further, the opposition Herut Party led by hawkish Menachem Begin, positioned itself as the hard-line alternative to Mapai. Finally, Mapai was a centrist party that represented a broad cross-section of the Israeli electorate. However, the departure of Sharett and his supporters meant that the dovish wing was no longer represented and the government could be accurately characterized as hawkish.

### *Impact of unity of Israel's ability to signal*

#### INTENTIONS

The hawks in the Israeli government argued that only through harsh reprisal attacks could Israel hope to end the border incursions from Egypt, Syria, and Jordan. Ben Gurion and his supporters clearly staked out this position and were only prevented from seeing it through by Sharett and his supporters. However, when Ben Gurion rejoined the Cabinet as Defense Minister in February 1955, he immediately ordered a powerful raid into Gaza that changed the dynamics of the conflict. From this point until the Suez War the Israeli raids were more frequent and more deadly.

The impact of these raids was significant. Initially, the raids escalated the violence along the border, as Egypt began controlling the *fedayeen*. However, over time the harsh Israeli response to the *fedayeen* attacks caused trouble for Egypt. A significant raid on Khad Yunis on August 31, 1955 killed 72 Egyptians and Palestinians. According to Benny Morris:

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[36] Aronson, *Conflict and Bargaining in the Middle East,* 15-18

> Khan Yunis was enough. The Egyptians stopped the raids.... On 4 September both countries accepted the UN-sponsored cease-fire…. The heavy Egyptian casualties coupled with Western pressure, stemming from a fear of escalation, combined to pressure Nasser to call it quits. The Egyptian government knew their army was still no match for the IDF; further raiding would needlessly endanger Egyptian control of the Strip and, perhaps, the Egyptian army itself.[37]

Thus, while the Suez War was necessary to completely eradicate the *fedayeen* threat, there are signs that Nasser was beginning to scale back the attacks prior to the conflict. Israel's intentions in its retaliatory raids were clear, as enunciated by Dayan,

> But it is in our power to set a high price on our blood, a price too high for the Arab community, the Arab army, or the Arab government to think it worth paying. We can see to it that the Arab villages oppose the raiding bands that pass through them, rather than give them assistance. It is in our power to see that Arab military commanders prefer a strict performance of their obligation to police the frontiers rather than suffer defeat in clashes with our units.[38]

While the raids were not the sole causes of the Suez War, ending the border violence was a significant goal for Israeli policymakers.[39] As many of these raids were directly orchestrated by Egypt, the Israeli government wanted to be sure that when it withdrew from the Sinai the raids would not resume.[40] Thus, following the

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[37] Morris, *Israel's Border War 1949-1956*, 352.
[38] Quoted in Shimshoni, *Israel and Conventional Deterrence*, 40.
[39] Levy and Gochal, "Democracy and Preventive War," 44.
[40] Michael Bar-Zohar, *The Armed Prophet: A Biography of Ben Gurion*, trans. Len Ortzen (London: Arthur Barker Limited, 1966), 253.

War and before its withdrawal, Israel was able to negotiate U.N. troops in Gaza instead of Egyptian, a demilitarized Sinai, and American navigation guarantees for the Straits of Tiran. The conditions in the Sinai and Straits of Tiran served as new red lines for Israel, which would result in serious consequences if crossed.

The priorities of Ben Gurion's government following the Suez War were abundantly clear. The peace attempts of the early and mid-1950s orchestrated by Sharett were disregarded. Maoz notes that between the end of the war and Ben Gurion's resignation, there were no significant peace attempts. Further, Israel's defense expenditures from 1957 to 1962 rose at an average rate of 15% annually. This was very much in line with Ben Gurion and his followers' view that Arab leaders would only respond to force and that peace could only be attained through Israel's military might.[41]

## WEAKNESS

The hawks in the government believed that Israel's policy of reprisal raids was a means to establishing a reputation of toughness. While Sharett and his followers were still in control of the government, the reprisal policy was controversial and incoherent. Sharett's belief that the reprisals were counter-productive and harmed Israel's image in the international community limited them in scope and number. However, once Ben Gurion returned to the government, the balance shifted in the cabinet, and the reprisal policy became tougher.

Further, many historians, particularly revisionist historians, view Israeli actions in the 1950s as more provocative than defensive. Moshe Ma'oz argues that the scale of Israeli raids contributed to the escalation of the conflict. He quotes General Harkabi, Chief of Military Intelligence in the mid-1950s, as saying, "As far as retaliatory action has been directly related to the previous event, there certainly had been a disproportion between the [Arab] inducement and the [Israeli] reaction to it. It had stemmed from Israel's feelings of weakness, of isolation, of fear regarding the future."[42] Further, Ma'oz cites General Makleff, the Israeli Chief of Staff in the mid-1950s, who argues that Israeli actions along the border with Syria, such as establishing Israeli settlements and burning Syrian farmer's fields, were provocative.[43]

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[41] Maoz, *Defending the Holy Land*, 79.

Perhaps the most significant signal of Israel's strength came from the Suez War. As Shimshoni argues, by launching a preventive strike against Egypt, Israel was able to establish a reputation for deterrence. Israel's neighbors could no longer continue the draining raids without fear of escalation. The danger that Egypt and the other states now confronted was that a series of small-scale raids might lead to the massive retaliation evinced in the Suez War.

## DECISIVE ACTION

Once again, contrast can be drawn between the Sharett era and Ben Gurion's government. While Sharett tried to curtail retaliatory raids, under Ben Gurion they were more frequent and forceful.[44] Once Sharett resigned, the conflicting "one foot on the brake and the other on the gas" approach to the raids ended. As Avi-hai observes, "Ben Gurion remained unswervingly committed to the idea of the status quo and the need to defend it whenever it was threatened."[45]

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[42] Ma'oz, *Syria and Israel*, 47.
[43] Ma'oz, *Syria and Israel*, 50.

The decision to launch the preventive Suez War was the most decisive action of Ben Gurion's tenure. There are significant hurdles for democratic states to launch preventive wars, and in many ways, the 1956 conflict remains an anomaly for those who study the democratic peace. Levy and Gochal argue that the two necessary elements for the war were the Czech arms deal and the cooperation with Britain and France. While these factors undoubtedly played critical roles in the decision to go to war, Levy and Cochal minimize the impact of domestic politics on the decision. In Avi Shlaim's article on the conflicting visions of Sharett and Ben Gurion, he convincingly argues that each man had a coherent vision for securing peace for Israel. History tells us that Ben Gurion won the battle, but this was not a foregone conclusion. Had Sharett been able to dominate the cabinet as Ben Gurion did, perhaps his efforts at peace negotiations and weapons procurement would not have been undercut, and the 1956 war would have been avoided.

It is significant that while Sharett was Prime Minister, he sought to rein in Ben Gurion's more aggressive tendencies. Ben Gurion's plans to seize Gaza as a bargaining chip, capture the Straits of Tiran, and build settlements in the DMZ were all rejected by Sharett and his followers. Ben Gurion knew that he could never launch a preventive war against Egypt with Sharett in the cabinet, thus he pressured him to resign to clear the path for war. Removing the final hurdle to direct confrontation, Ben Gurion was able to concoct a complex surprise attack with the help of Britain and France. Both the ability to launch the attack and the element of coordination required could not have been achieved without a highly unified approach by Ben Gurion and his top foreign policy officials. Thus, the unity of the foreign policymaking members of the cabinet was a necessary condition for war.

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[44] Avi-hai, *Ben Gurion*, 189.
[45] Avi-hai, *Ben Gurion*, 195.

While the Suez War nearly eliminated border problems until 1967, it did not end them completely. The most significant border clash of Ben Gurion's tenure after the Suez War occurred in 1960 when the IDF routed a group of Syrian troops, who, dressed as peasants, attempted to take control of the demilitarized zone. This caused tensions to mount along the Syrian border, and in support, Egypt began to move troops into the Sinai. To defuse the situation, Ben Gurion took the opportunity to travel to the United States to receive an honorary degree. The implication of outside support caused the tensions to dissipate. Two years later, the Syrians provoked again, and a harsh retaliatory raid followed.[46]

### *The view from Israel's neighbors*

From the Israeli perspective, the most critical and potentially threatening state was Egypt. In July 1952, King Farouk was overthrown by the Free Officers, and General Mohammed Neguib was thrust into power. By March 1954, Gamal Abd al-Nasser had overthrown Neguib and taken control of the Revolutionary Command

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[46] Avi-hai, *Ben Gurion*, 195.

Council.  As Shimshoni notes, "by 1955, Egypt had become Israel's primary and immediate enemy."[47]

Even before the Suez War, Nasser was worried about the possibility that the *fedayeen* raids would lead to escalation between Israel and Egypt.  While the border conflict increased after 1954, the year Egypt began to organize the *fedayeen*, attacks from Egypt declined toward the end of 1956.  Cross-border raids fell significantly from 76 in the spring of 1956 to seventeen in the summer and sixteen in the fall.[48] This drop in cross-border raids corresponds to a decision by Nasser to pull his troops back from the border with Israel and eastern portions of the Sinai to assure the Israelis he had no intention of attacking and reduce the danger of miscalculation.[49]  While Nasser did not want a war with Israel, he did want *fedayeen* harassment to continue, meaning that infiltration from Jordan, which had been at low levels since 1954, spiked to 52 in the fall of 1956.  This approach complicated matters for Israel since the attacks were Egyptian orchestrated but originated from Jordan, leading to the question of where the reprisals should occur.

Nasser was hoping to have his cake and eat it too with the raids.  He sought to continue harassing Israel without Israel holding him responsible for the attacks.  By halting the attacks from Egypt and pulling back from the Sinai, Nasser was clearly signaling that he did not want the low-level conflict to escalate.  Further, Israel's harsh reprisals following Ben Gurion's return to the government demonstrated the weakness and limitations of Nasser's forces.

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[47] Shimshoni, *Israel and Conventional Deterrence*, 70.
[48] Ibid, 43.
[49] Levy and Gochal, "Democracy and Preventive War," 42.

While Israel's threats and actions had a significant impact on Nasser's thinking, the Suez War signaled to Egpyt that low-level conflict could escalate. Yair Evron's study of the demilitarization of the Sinai from 1957-67 argues that Egypt believed that a military build-up in the Sinai would provoke a strong response from Israel. While the Sinai was not completely demilitarized during this period, only limited numbers of Egyptian troops were deployed. Evron posits that statements by Allon and Peres (see above) regarding an Israeli response to a potential Egyptian troop concentration on the Peninsula served to deter Nasser.[50]

In his analysis of Israeli deterrence, Jonathan Shimshoni argues that the Israeli government used the Suez War to establish a reputation for deterrence. Shimshoni writes that following the Suez War, "Nasser changed his Israel policy dramatically, in ways that reflected Israeli deterrence success. The overall Egyptian force was basically demilitarized. The *fedayeen* units - destroyed in the campaign - were not reconstituted, and harassment across the border and through Jordan virtually ceased. The blockade of the straits was lifted."[51] The 1956 War took Israel out of the cycle of tit-for-tat retaliation raids and demonstrated to Nasser that a small conflict could escalate in a manner that was not advantageous to Egypt. This point was made by Nasser himself when he spoke before the legislative council of Gaza in 1962, which sought a more activist policy from Egypt, "How can I be sure that Ben-Gurion will not perform sharper [larger?] operations against us, and not necessarily quasi-military operations."[52]

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[50] Yair Evron, *The Demilitarization of the Sinai*, Jerusalem Papers on Peace Problems (Jerusalem: The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 1975), 6-10. Evron also cites Nasser's desire to consolidate his power domestically and (following Suez) concerns about foreign intervention as primary reasons for Egypt keeping the Sinai demilitarized.
[51] Shimshoni, *Israel and Conventional Deterrence*, 120.

The impact of unified Israeli threats can be seen on other neighboring states besides Egypt. Despite bellicose rhetoric regarding Israel, Syria stood pat during the Suez War. When Palestinian troops crossed into Jordanian territory during the Suez War, they were promptly disarmed by Jordanian authorities. Moreover, for both countries, as with Egypt, the Suez War appeared to have served to enhance Israel reputation for deterrence. No significant hostile activity originated from Jordan for the decade following the War. There were two incidents involving Syria, but this was also in a region where Israel was taking controversial actions relating to the development of Israeli settlements in the Huleh Valley.[53]

What was the relationship between the change in Israel's government and the decade of peace that followed the Suez War? Three significant changes occurred with respect to Egypt's approach to Israel. The first was Nasser's decision to back the *fedayeen* raids once he came to believe that Israel was no longer truly seeking peace. Sharett's government was unable to firmly commit to negotiating a settlement and credibly prevent the attacks. The second change in Nasser's thinking began after Ben Gurion returned to power, and Israel's reprisal raids became more frequent and deadly. Egypt already significantly changed its posture vis-à-vis Israel before the Sinai war was launched. The final change occurred when the Sinai War showed Nasser that the limited conflict might escalate in ways that he could not control.

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[52] Ibid, 120-21.

[53] Robert Rabil, *Embattled Neighbors: Syria, Israel, and Lebanon* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2003), 16.

Thus, continued targeting of the unified hawkish Ben Gurion government became unattractive for the Egyptian leader.

### *Alternative Explanations*

#### THE OPPOSITION

The theory on the role of the opposition in signaling potential challengers posits that it is government-opposition unity that dissuades attacks. When there are differences between the government and opposition, the challenging state may question the credibility of the government's signals on the issue at hand. In the Israeli case, the opposition did have an important role but not in signaling the intentions of the state. In addition, the role played by the opposition does not conform to Schultz's theory.

While there was little concern in the government with how it was viewed by the communist Maki Party, there was significant concern regarding the threat from the far right presented by Menachem Begin's Herut Party. As in other cases, the opposition, rather than acting to retard the actions of an activist government instead served as an accelerant. Herut was highly critical of the restrained government approach towards infiltrations that existed during Sharett's tenure.[54] In justifying a raid on Beit Liqya to the American change d'affaires in Tel Aviv, Sharett argued the IDF attacked, "to forestall [an] increase of pro-Herut sentiment."[55]

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[54] Maoz, *Defending the Holy Land*, 67.

[55] Quoted in Morris, *Israel's Border War 1949-1956*, 180.

While the divisions in Sharett's government made it particularly susceptible to such influence, he was not alone. As a broad, center-left party, Mapai leaders worried about ceding electoral ground to the right (a fear that later events would show to be well founded). In his study of the cross-border raids of the 1950s, Historian Benny Morris notes that,

> Internal political calculation also played its part [in Israel's response to the raids]. The ruling Mapai Party leadership understood that failure to retaliate might carry a high political price. Israelis, especially the new immigrants from Arab lands who lived in border communities and development towns, might turn to Menachem Begin's Herut Party, which consistently urged a more militant policy against the Arabs.[56]

However, the real difference, as noted above, was not between Mapai and Herut but rather between Sharett and Ben Gurion's factions within Mapai. Once Ben Gurion returned as Prime Minister, and particularly after the departure of Sharett, the distance between Mapai and Herut's favored policies narrowed significantly. As in previous chapters though, the role of a hawkish opposition is not fully accounted for by Schultz. The message sent by the differences between Sharett's Mapai and Herut was not that the government's threats were not credible but rather that the government was choosing not to make them.

## LEADERSHIP TENURE

The differences between the Sharett and Ben Gurion governments could be attributed to the differences in their time in office. According to Gelpi and Grieco, newer leaders are more likely to be challenged because they are more likely to make concessions than leaders facing election in the near future. At first glance, there appears to be support for this line of reasoning in this case. Ben Gurion had been a leader in the Zionist movement for decades and at the helm of the Israeli state since 1948. On the other hand, Sharett came to power not through an election, but rather the departure of Ben Gurion. The escalation of the border raids coincided with his short time in office.

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[56] Morris, *Israel's Border War 1949-1956*, 180.

However, there are also significant problems for this argument, particularly relating to Sharett's tenure in office. Although Sharett only came to power in late 1953, elections were scheduled for a year-and-a-half later. Thus, had Sharett believed that negotiating with the Egyptians would cost him his position, he should have taken a harder line to stay in power. There is some evidence, largely based on the five seats Mapai lost in the 1955 election, that Sharett's moderate policies harmed him politically, as the theory would predict. However, the question is why he pursued these policies in the first place if they were bound to harm him at the ballot box. The answer lies in the fact they he was never able to actually pursue the foreign policy that he wanted, as Shlaim's article on the subject makes clear.[57] Instead, the divided message sent by his government emboldened the Egyptians more than his short tenure in office.

Finally, Egyptian actions appear to follow the dynamics of Israeli retaliation far more than the particular leader's term in office. As Shimshoni's study indicates, disproportionate acts of retaliation by the Israelis tended to lead to periods of calm.[58]

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[57] Shlaim, "Conflicting Approaches to Israel's Relations with the Arabs."

[58] Shimshoni, *Israel and Conventional Deterrence*.

At the same time, there is also strong evidence that Israeli reprisals fueled Egyptian escalation. The return of Ben Gurion also brought a coherence to the Israeli reprisal policy which led Egypt to begin ratcheting down the violence before the Suez War. Both the rise and decline in cross-border raids does tend to correlate with who was in power in Israel. However, the underlying logic of the increases and decreases in raids matches the coherence of Israeli policies towards the raids themselves.

## PUBLIC OPINION

The increasing number of raids in 1954 and 1955 drew public outrage, first from Israelis living in the border regions and then from the public more generally. Between 1948 and 1953, the occasional reprisal raids by the IDF generally served to mollify the Israeli public.[59] Sharett's government came under increasing public pressure to use more force to respond to the raids, something which Sharett was reluctant to do. As the July 1955 election approached, the opposition, in particular Herut, drew a sharp distinction between their hard-line approach to border violence and the mixed response of the Sharett government.

Although Mapai only lost five seats in the 1955 election, the losses were viewed (particularly by Ben Gurion and his followers) as a condemnation of Sharett's soft-line policies.[60] The elections saw Herut nearly double its seats in the Knesset from eight to fifteen, while the activist Ahdut ha'Avodah also increased its share.

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[59] Morris, *Israel's Border War 1949-1956*, 179.

[60] Morris, *Israel's Border War 1949-1956*, 180.

These results paved the way for Ben Gurion to form his own government in November 1955.

If the Egyptians had been truly sensitive to Israeli public opinion, the election of 1955 should have been a watershed for Egyptian-Israeli relations. However, serious border incidents continued for nearly another year along the Egyptian border. The election allowed the Israeli public to register its displeasure with Sharett's more moderate policies (or more likely, the ineffectual, conflictual nature of his government), yet the Egyptians showed little interest in the outcome.

One probable reason for this is that Sharett remained an important figure in the government and served as a brake on the more militant policies proposed by Ben Gurion and his supporters. Thus, while the Israeli public may have become significantly more militant as a result of the raids, this hawkishness was of little consequence to the Egyptians until changes in the government signaled a shift in policy.

Public opinion did play a role in Israeli politics but in a relatively conventional manner. Hawkish politicians in Mapai could use public opinion as a justification for pushing a more hawkish line. The election of 1955 emboldened the hawks in the government, but as previously noted, this was not enough for a complete policy change. In the end, it was domestic policy dynamics that led to changing perceptions of Israel and paved the way for the Suez War.

## BALANCE OF FORCES

The famous Czech arms deal is seen as a catalyst for the Suez War and key to Israel's desire to prevent the balance of forces to shift too dramatically against them. However, the critical question is why Egypt first began a policy of border harassment only to more or less stop two years later. The border harassment began in a situation where the two sides were relatively evenly balanced. In 1955, Egypt had 170-200 tanks and 80 aircraft, while Israel had 180 tanks and 50 aircraft. At this point, Israel's arms were considered of higher quality than Egypt's.[61]

A year later, following the Czech arms deal, Egypt had over 510 tanks and 250 jets, while Israel had only 345 tanks and 114 jets. Even more important, according to Levy and Gochal, is the fact that Egypt simultaneously increased both the quantity and quality of its arms. This was especially true in the case of fighter aircraft, where the new MiGs the Egyptians received as part of the deal were thought to be superior to the French Mystere fighters purchased by the Israelis.[62] The shift in the balance of forces threatened the Israelis and Ben Gurion, in particular. It helps explain the Israeli decision to launch a preemptive war against the Egyptians, but it cannot explain the Egyptian behavior along the border. The attacks began with the two countries relatively equal in strength and ended after Egypt became significantly more powerful. This change in attitude, as noted earlier, appears to have come from Nasser's fear that Egypt might inadvertently be drawn into a war it did not want.

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[61] Levy and Gochal, "Democracy and Preventive War," 29.
[62] Ibid.

There are those who speculate that Egypt was preparing for a "second round" with Israel and was simply waiting until it had received all its new weapons and trained its solders to use them. In fact, this logic drives the closing window of opportunity arguments that caused Israel to go to war in 1956. However, such an attack was not inevitable. Egypt might have rightly worried that French and British dissatisfaction with Nasser's government might have caused them to intervene in the case he attacked Israel. Further, Israeli restraint on the border and fewer Egyptian raids might have allowed Israel to attain more arms, particularly from the United States.

## United States-North Korean Relations under Nixon

### *Background of the conflic*t

Ever since the Korean War ended in a cease-fire rather than a peace treaty, relations between North Korea and the United States remained tense. Seeking to avoid the missteps of the Truman administration, subsequent presidents made the U.S. commitment to defend South Korea explicit. This meant that despite harsh rhetoric from North Korean leader Kim Il-sung, the border between the two adversaries remained quiet between the end of the war and 1967.

Between 1967 and 1969, North Korea dramatically increased the number of provocations along the demilitarized zone. These events, combined with two larger attacks on the United States forces in the area, have been labeled the "Second Korean

War."[63] In 1967, there were 462 incidents along the DMZ, followed by 542 the following year. These incidents resulted in the deaths of 75 South Korean and sixteen American in 1967 and 81 South Korean and fourteen American deaths in 1968.[64]

This campaign included two attacks on the United States military. The first was the capture of the U.S. Navy intelligence vessel, the USS *Pueblo*, on January 23, 1968 by the North Korean navy. Very quickly, the Johnson administration decided to not employ force against the North Koreans and instead pursue diplomatic channels to ensure the return of the 82 crew members held by the North Koreans. Eventually, after long negotiations between the two sides, the U.S. decided to publicly admit guilt for the capture in a written statement, while orally repudiating it after the signing. On Christmas Day, 1968, the crew of the *Pueblo* returned to San Diego, while the ship itself remained in North Korea.

Just as the Johnson Administration ended its term with a crisis involving North Korea, the first foreign policy crisis for the Nixon Administration also involved Kim Il-sung's regime. On April 15, 1969, an American EC-121 surveillance aircraft was shot down by the North Korean Air Force over the Sea of Japan. All 31 people on board died. While many in the Nixon administration pushed for immediate retaliation, there was also significant resistance to this from the Secretaries of State and Defense. In addition, due to the strains of the Vietnam War and other logistical issues, a forceful response would have been difficult. While it appeared that Kim might be once again ratcheting up the level of violence in the region, the downing of the EC-121 marked the beginning of a decline in violence. 1969 saw an 80% decrease in the number of incidents along the DMZ and a total of only ten soldiers killed. After 1969, there were no major incidents along the border during the Nixon Administration and the number of incidents remained at low levels. The threat decreased sufficiently enough that, “even under the hawkish Nixon administration, the North’s threat seemed to drop sufficiently to warrant withdrawal of one of the two U.S. infantry divisions stationed in the ROK in 1971.”[65]

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[63] Richard A. Mobley, *Flash Point North Korea: The Pueblo and EC-121 Crises* (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2003), 8.
[64] Ibid, 149.

While I do not have access to North Korean archives and cannot definitively state the grounds for North Korean escalation, it does appear to have been part of a campaign to alter the status quo with the South Koreans and Americans. Richard Mobley’s study of the *USS Pueblo* and EC-121 incidents argues that they are part of a conscious campaign by the North Korean government to advance its cause in South Korea. In particular, the North hoped that it could provoke South Korean peasants to turn on their government, create instability, test American commitment, and generally make conditions suitable for a North Korean military advance.[66]

### *Unified government and clear signals*

Richard Nixon came to power wishing to fundamentally alter the foreign policy making structure of the United States. The most significant departure Nixon made was diminishing the power of both the Departments of State and Defense, while elevating the position of national security advisor, famously held by Henry Kissinger.

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[65] Ibid, 142.

[66] Ibid, 151.

This shift in power was orchestrated both through institutional changes and through Nixon's personal handling of the individuals involved. One of Nixon's first actions, taken over the objection of the Secretaries of State and Defense, was to shift control of policymaking from the committees they oversaw to the new Review Group at the National Security Council, where Kissinger was in power.[67] Further, Kissinger assisted in shifting the center of power to the White House by setting up a direct line to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, undercutting the Pentagon in the process.[68] This meant a seismic shift, as "the National Security Council staff, under the direction of Henry Kissinger, emerged as not simply a claimant for presidential attention in foreign policy making but as the principal vehicle for the articulation and implementation of the administration's objectives."[69] At the personal level, Nixon marginalized the Secretaries of State and Defense while seeking council from Kissinger on foreign policy issues.

The unquestioned center of foreign policy decision making was Nixon himself. From the beginning of his presidency, Nixon worked to concentrate foreign policymaking power in the White House. This was in line with Nixon's belief in a strong executive branch and a hierarchical foreign policy system.[70] Despite Kissinger's power and influence, foreign policy decisions were ultimately Nixon's. While offering Kissinger the position as national security advisor, Nixon also, "wanted Kissinger to understand that he [Nixon] was as thoughtful about foreign affairs as Kissinger was and had no intention of ceding control of policy making to a subordinate, however considerable his talents as an academic."[71]

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[67] Robert Dalleck, *Nixon and Kissinger* (New York: Harper Collins, 2007), 85. The manner in which this bureaucratic change occurred foreshadowed future actions by the administration. Kissinger writes, "The President-elect assembled his senior appointees - William Rogers, Melvin Laird, and myself - at Key Biscayne, Florida, on December 28, 1968, to discuss my organizational proposals. Characteristically, Nixon had approved my memorandum the day *before* - depriving the meeting of its subject, though the other participants did not know this. Like so many meetings in the Nixon administration the Key Biscayne session had its script determined in advance" (*White House Years*, 44, italics original).

[68] Elizabeth Drew, *Richard M. Nixon* (New York: Times Books, 2007), 63.

[69] Cecil Crabb Jr. and Kevin Mulcahy, *Presidents and Foreign Policy Making: From FDR to Reagan* (Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University Press, 1986), 261.

The reason behind this shift in the foreign policy machinery was Nixon's distrust of government bureaucrats. Ultimately, Nixon had little use for the permanent foreign policy apparatus (which he did not believe he could trust) or Congress.[72] Kissinger supported Nixon's views by telling him that history showed that statesmen needed to be free of cautious bureaucrats.[73] Corresponding to this view, the administration repeatedly focused on back channel discussions with other governments conducted by Kissinger rather than the State Department.[74] By shifting power and reshaping the foreign policy decision making process, "Nixon and Kissinger's new arrangements would of course make it more difficult for dissenting views to get through to the White House."[75]

Besides the President, the most pivotal foreign policy figure in the Nixon administration was Henry Kissinger. Kissinger became one of the most influential

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[70] See Crabb Jr. and Mulcahy, *Presidents and Foreign Policy Making*, 251-53; Garrison, 1999, 6.
[71] Dallek, *Nixon and Kissinger*, 82.
[72] Robert Schulzinger, "Richard Nixon, Congress, and the War in Vietnam, 1969-1974," in *Vietnam and the American Political Tradition: The Politics of Dissent*, ed. Randall Woods (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 284.
[73] Dalleck, *Nixon and Kissinger*, 84.
[74] Jean Garrison, *Games Advisors Play: Foreign Policy in the Nixon and Carter Administrations* (College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 1999), 35.
[75] Drew, *Richard M. Nixon*, 64.

Presidential assistants in the history of the U.S. presidency.[76] Although Nixon was impressed with Kissinger's command of foreign policy, "It cannot be emphasized too strongly that Kissinger's influence was so great because his views were in alignment with Nixon's."[77] Although the two were not close before Nixon was elected (in fact, Kissinger served as an advisor to Nelson Rockefeller, Nixon's rival for the nomination), but, "Kissinger enjoyed the status he did largely because he served Nixon's interests and ambitions.... Nixon and Kissinger complemented each other intellectually, politically, and psychologically."[78] Moreover, Nixon believed that Kissinger would be loyal because Kissinger had no independent power base and because Kissinger's power was ultimately dependent upon keeping Nixon's favor.[79] Historian Robert Dallek, in his study of the two men, calls Kissinger "blindly loyal" to Nixon.[80]

Nixon's background in international relations, his reliance on Kissinger, and his distrust in the role the State Department played in previous administrations led him to minimize the role of the Secretaries of State and Defense.[81] Significant potential for disunity existed in the administration, as both Secretaries were more dovish than Nixon and Kissinger. From his experience in the Eisenhower administration, Nixon wanted to avoid a strong-headed Secretary of State like John

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[76] Crabb Jr. and Mulcahy, *Presidents and Foreign Policy Making*, 256.
[77] Ibid, 258.
[78] Ibid, 257.
[79] See Garrison, *Games Advisors Play*, 9; Crabb Jr. and Mulcahy, *Presidents and Foreign Policy Making*.
[80] Dallek, *Nixon and Kissinger*, 622.
[81] Nixon once referred to Washington's diplomatic core as "striped-pants faggots in Foggy Bottom." (Drew, *Richard M. Nixon*, 63).

Foster Dulles.[82] In selecting William Rogers to fill this post, he chose a man with no foreign policy experience but who was very loyal to Nixon.

As Dallek notes, “Nothing demonstrated Nixon’s preoccupation with controlling foreign policy more than his appointment of a secretary of state.”[83] This would prove critical as Rogers often opposed administration policy but generally kept his views private.[84] Bureaucratic struggles between Kissinger and Rogers consistently ended with Kissinger coming out on top. Historians Crabb Jr. and Mulcahy argue that Rogers’s subservience was critical to the unity of the administration:

> His [Nixon’s] administration also came close to avoiding the intra-executive branch conflict that has plagued postwar foreign policy making, though this was accomplished by effectively displacing the secretary of state from any meaningful role and substituting the national security adviser in his place.[85]

Nixon admitted as much to Kissinger when he said he “considers Rogers’s unfamiliarity with the subject an asset because it guaranteed that policy direction would remain in the White House.”[86]

In choosing a Secretary of Defense, Nixon wanted to avoid the legacies of the Kennedy and Johnson administrations where the post was both visible and influential.[87] To fill the role Nixon chose Melvin Laird, a Congressman from

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[82] Tad Szulc, *Illusion of Peace: Foreign Policy in the Nixon Years* (New York: Viking Press, 1978), 16.
[83] Dallek, *Nixon and Kissinger*, 83.
[84] William Bundy, *A Tangled Web: The Making of Foreign Policy in the Nixon Presidency* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1998); Garrison, *Games Advisors Play*, 10.
[85] Crabb Jr. and Mulcahy, *Presidents and Foreign Policy Making*, 237.
[86] Quoted in Dallek, *Nixon and Kissinger*, 83.
[87] Ibid, 83-84.

Wisconsin. Both Nixon and Kissinger believed that Laird had it in for them, which led a Nixon official say that, "Nixon [was] treating his Secretary of Defense as a sort of foreign government out to get him."[88] Laird, like Rogers, disagreed with the administration on several occasions but was more skillful at manipulating the bureaucracy to his advantage than Rogers.[89] However, just as he sidelined the State Department, Nixon minimized the role of the Department of Defense as well.[90]

The release of archival material and particularly Nixon's tapes, paint the portrait of an administration riven with internal conflicts, rivalries, colliding egos, and paranoia. A particularly sharp rivalry existed between Kissinger and Rogers over who was the appropriate spokesman for the government on foreign policy issues. Why should the Nixon administration be considered unified when the historical record shows that it was anything but?

It is important to acknowledge that differences between Kissinger and Rogers did have a significant impact on the ability of the United States to mediate between Israel and Egypt during the War of Attrition. While Rogers pushed his peace plan, both warring factions discovered over time that it was not backed by Kissinger or Nixon. Further, there were instances when the press uncovered the rift between the two, such as a lengthy article published in the *Christian Science Monitor* in mid-December 1970 discussing the rivalry between the two men.

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[88] Szulc, *Illusion of Peace*, 180.
[89] Bundy, *A Tangled Web*, 53.
[90] See Crabb Jr. and Mulcahy, *Presidents and Foreign Policy Making*, 263; Drew, *Richard M. Nixon*, 63.

However, it is important to put the rivalry between Kissinger and Rogers in context. First, there were relatively few press stories about their differences. While providing extensive coverage of their private spats, Dallek notes that, "Although newspaper articles appeared about the Rogers-Kissinger battles, most of their struggles were a well-kept secret."[91] Further, the area of greatest dispute was the Middle East and to a lesser extent, China. Since the focus of this case study is U.S.-North Korean relations, the rivalry has significantly less relevance. Further, to foreign leaders it was clear which of the two men had the ear of the President. In a heated exchange with Kissinger following a meeting with Yitzhak Rabin, Rogers acknowledged that Kissinger was the preferred channel to the President.[92] It should also be noted that Kissinger played a significant role in managing Rogers: drafting instructions, secretly approving his appointments, and when necessary, keeping him in the dark.[93]

In addition, the administration gained renown for its obsession with secrecy.[94] Both Nixon and Kissinger worked hard to combat leaks and began using the FBI to conduct wiretaps on reporters who used leaked material. One step the administration took to limit diverse views from appearing in the press was to have officials clear any comments through Kissinger first before speaking with the press.[95] Further, both

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[91] Dallek, *Nixon and Kissinger*, 252.
[92] Ibid, 222.
[93] Melvin Small, *The Presidency of Richard Nixon* (Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 1999), 54.
[94] Bundy, *A Tangled Web*, 55.
[95] Garrison, *Games Advisors Play*, 45.

Nixon and Kissinger tried to keep Rogers and Laird in the dark about their foreign policy maneuvers.

In their review of post-war foreign policy making in the United States, Crabb and Mulcahy conclude their discussion of the Nixon-Kissinger era by noting that it "will have continuing import for the changes that were introduced in the foreign policy making process. For the first time in American history, the secretary of state was effectively excluded from diplomatic decision making, with the national security advisor serving as de facto secretary."[96]

### *Hawkish government*

Richard Nixon made a name for himself as a staunch anti-Communist who rose to prominence during the "red scare" of the late 1940s. He advocated a policy of confrontation with regards to the Soviet Union and thought the United States should do more to "roll back" Soviet influence around the globe. By the time he became president, Nixon's views on foreign policy, while still hawkish, had moderated somewhat. Still, during the Pueblo crisis when North Korea seized an American submarine and held its crew captive, Nixon chastised the Johnson Administration for what he saw as a weak response. Nixon viewed the *Pueblo* seizure as part of a larger narrative where, "respect for the United States has fallen so low, that a fourth-rate military power like North Korea will hijack a United States naval vessel on the high seas."[97]

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[96] Crabb Jr. and Mulcahy, *Presidents and Foreign Policy Making*, 271.
[97] Quoted in Marvin L. Kalb and Bernard Kalb, *Kissinger*, 1st ed. (Boston: Little, 1974), 94.

However, Nixon's foreign policy legacy is more moderate than his background would suggest. His breakthrough visit to China and his work towards détente with the Soviet Union both appeared at odds with his prior rhetoric and drew harsh appraisals from hawkish critics in the Republican Party. However, a number of scholars have argued that it was precisely Nixon's reputation for hawkishness that allowed him to make these moves once in office.[98] Cukierman and Tommasi argue that such moves are particularly credible because the public does not view them as being simply ideologically driven.[99] Similarly, Kenneth Schultz posits that hawkish leaders who cooperate are viewed as moderates, while doves who do so are viewed as extremists.[100]

Henry Kissinger, while lacking Nixon's reputation as an anti-communist, was known for his views on power politics. In order to maintain international stability, which was placed at the pinnacle of Kissinger's foreign policy goals, the United States had to develop a reputation for toughness that prevents challenges to the status quo. Kissinger's views of communist countries were moderated by his belief that these were no longer revolutionary regimes but rather status quo powers that should be dealt with as such.[101]

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[98] See Alex Cukierman and Mariano Tommasi, "When Does It Take a Nixon to Go to China?," *The American Economic Review* 88, no. 1 (1998); Tyler Cowen and Daniel Sutter, "Why Only Nixon Could Go to China," *Public Choice* 97, no. 4 (1998); Kenneth Schultz, "The Politics of Risking Peace: Do Hawks or Doves Deliver the Olive Branch?," *International Organization* 59 (2005).

[99] Cukierman and Tommasi, "When Does It Take a Nixon to Go to China?" 181.

[100] Schultz, "The Politics of Risking Peace," 5.

[101] Crabb Jr. and Mulcahy, *Presidents and Foreign Policy Making*, 253-54.

Nixon and Kissinger's foreign policy views were quite similar, which explains some of Kissinger's power within the administration.[102] Both men were strongly influenced by the pragmatism of Realism, with an emphasis on international stability and balance of power.[103] However, the moderating impact of Realism was undercut by the ongoing struggle in Vietnam. Nixon and Kissinger worried that the problems the U.S. faced in Vietnam might harm American commitments elsewhere, thus making it necessary to take a tough line in other disputes.

In dealing with adversaries, Nixon also saw the benefits of using his history as a hard-liner to his advantage. During talks with communist regimes, Nixon believed that his reputation for anti-communism led other leaders to fear him more than other American politicians.[104] Further, Nixon famously discussed his "madman theory" with Bob Halderman during a walk on the beach in 1968:

> I want the North Vietnamese to believe that I've reached the point where I might do anything to stop the war. We'll just slip to them the word that, For God's sake, you know Nixon is obsessed about communism. We can't restrain him and he's angry - and he has his hand on the nuclear button - and Ho Chi Mihn himself will be in Paris in two days begging for peace.[105]

While the "madman theory" was not successful with Ho Chi Mihn, Nixon and Kissinger both tended to favor tougher action in Vietnam, while Rogers and Laird counseled restraint. Moreover, Nixon understood that his reputation meant that no one could question his credentials and his threats to foreign leaders were more credible.[106] Not surprisingly, based on the power dynamics within the administration, the Nixon and Kissinger line generally carried the day.[107]

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[102] Garrison, *Games Advisors Play*, 8.

[103] Dallek, *Nixon and Kissinger*, 249; Drew, *Richard M. Nixon*, 60.

[104] Drew, *Richard M. Nixon*, 67.

[105] Quoted in Drew, *Richard M. Nixon*, 67. Nixon claims to not remember this conversation ever taking place.

### *Impact of unity on the United States' ability to signal*

#### INTENTIONS

Both Nixon and Kissinger believed that in order to maintain U.S. credibility, particularly with the problems in Vietnam, it was necessary to send a strong signal to the North Koreans. When the United States did not strike back militarily following the downing of the EC-121 aircraft, due to strong resistance from Rogers and Laird, Nixon was furious.[108] He fumed, "They got away with it this time, but they'll never get away with it again."[109]

While the United States did not take military action against North Korea in response to the EC-121 incident, there were strong indications that a future incident might be met with force. On May 4th, the *New York Times* published a story about a possible military response if the North Koreans shot down another aircraft. This story was followed two days later by a second story in the *Times* that stated Nixon would order retaliation for any future attacks against American aircraft.[110]

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[106] Small, *Presidency of Richard Nixon*, 61.
[107] Jeffrey Kimball, *The Vietnam War Files: Uncovering the Secret History of Nixon-Era Strategy* (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2004), 12.
[108] Both Nixon and Kissinger were angered by the lack of action in response to the EC-121 downing and were determined to not let the State Department and Pentagon impede them again.
[109] Quoted in Mobley, *Flash Point North Korea*, 139.
[110] "Hints of reprisal shield U.S. planes," *New York Times*, May 4, 1969; "Aides say Nixon weighed swift reprisal," *New York Times*, May 6, 1969. Nixon was not happy that these sentiments made it into

The EC-121 incident led Nixon to believe that the North Koreans were preparing to take advantage of the U.S. being tied down in Vietnam to attack South Korea. Nixon's concerns led him to meet with South Korean President Park in San Francisco in August 1969. In a joint statement released as part of the summit, both countries, "reaffirmed the determination of their Governments to meet armed attack against the Republic of Korea in accordance with the Mutual Defense Treaty."[111]

Throughout the entire period of North Korean escalation from 1967-1969, all signs pointed to a continued U.S. commitment to its ally. During this period, the United States reaffirmed its commitment to the South while seeking to improve the capabilities the South Korean forces through increased military aid. The United States might have been tied down in Vietnam, but it never wavered on its commitment to South Korea, eventually showing one of the premises of the North Korean attacks to be false.

## WEAKNESS

The hawkishness of the administration and its unity in foreign policy made it appear anything but weak. As noted above, Nixon was happy to use his reputation as a hard-liner to his advantage, even if he sought more moderate goals. It was a reputation that Nixon had built first during the McCarthy era as a Congressman, then during the 1950s as Vice President, and in the 1960s as a critic of the Johnson administration.

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the public record, and the two articles led the administration to begin tapping the phone of William Beecher, the *Times* reporter for both stories.

[111] Quoted in Szulc, *Illusion of Peace*, 145.

In addition, Nixon was well aware that he could use his reputation for hawkishness to his advantage against potential enemies. The “madman” discussion with Halderman displays Nixon’s keen awareness of his ability to play on his anti-Communist background. Further, as Melvin Small notes, because of his history, no one would ever question Nixon’s credentials on national security.[112] Robert Dalleck also notes that Nixon viewed himself as a Realist, and that (in his eyes) this meant that tough responses to adversaries were the best way to maintain international stability.[113]

Nixon had been very critical of the Johnson administration’s handling of the *Pueblo* crisis, and argued that the United States should have taken a firmer line. This, combined with news stories indicating that further attacks would lead to retaliation, underlined the tough stance the administration would take with the North. Thus, despite the serious problems the United States faced in Vietnam, Nixon’s government was able to maintain a posture of strength on the Korean peninsula.

## DECISIVE ACTION

The American response to the North Korean provocations, across the Johnson and Nixon administrations was consistent and restrained. Despite key differences between the two incidents, in both cases the use of force to settle the dispute was ruled out at an early stage. Instead, in both cases the United States relied on a show of force and a reiteration of its commitment to defend South Korea. The approach of both administrations is reflected in the comments of Secretary of State Rogers, "The weak can be rash; the powerful must be more restrained."[114]

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[112] Small, *Presidency of Richard Nixon*, 61.
[113] Dalleck, *Nixon and Kissinger*, 249.

In his analysis of the EC-121 incident in White House Years, Kissinger is critical of the Nixon administration's response to its first crisis. Kissinger believed that the United States should have responded to the attack forcefully and saw the attack as a challenge to American credibility in East Asia. Of the handling of the crisis Kissinger wrote, "I judge our conduct in the EC-121 crisis as weak, indecisive, and disorganized... I believed we paid in many intangible ways, in demoralized friends and emboldened enemies."[115] This response may reflect the fact that Kissinger's line of action was not followed, but as Kissinger acknowledges, the new government's actions were hailed as successful by the press. Historian Tad Szulc argues that despite the internal debates, the public viewed the administration as unified in its approach to the crisis.[116]

One reason the U.S. did not strike back was the logistical issues involved in such a response. The Pentagon claimed it would take several days to prepare for such a strike, at which time the desired effect would have been lost.[117] While the U.S. did not strike back, it did make a show of force to the North Koreans. Following the *Pueblo* seizure, the Johnson administration kept the U.S. navy away from the Korean peninsula, but following the downing of the EC-121 Nixon deployed U.S. Task Force

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[114] Quoted in Andrew Nahm, "The United States and North Korea since 1945," in *Korean-American Relations, 1866-1997*, ed. Yur-Bok Lee and Wayne Patterson (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1999), 109.
[115] Henry Kissinger, *White House Years* (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1979), 316, 318, 321.
[116] Szulc, *Illusion of Peace*, 84-5.
[117] Ibid, 82. There is also information that the inability of the U.S. to carry out retaliatory strikes was related less to logistics than to foot dragging on the part of Laird, who opposed such action.

71 to the Sea of Japan: 23 warships including three carriers.[118] Further, just a few days after the attack, Nixon ordered the resumption of surveillance flights, this time with armed escorts in the form of fighter jets. No further incidents occurred involving the flights.

### *The view from North Korea*

Gaining the perspective of the North Korean regime, famous for its reclusive and opaque nature, is difficult. Most of the information cited here relies on the judgment of observers of the conflict and their views on the North's intentions. The "Second Korean War" did not turn out the way that North Korean leaders wanted. Neither of their goals of destabilizing the South Korean regime and testing the U.S. commitment to the South during the Vietnam War was met. In fact, the seizure of the *Pueblo*, the downing of the EC-121 and the escalation of the DMZ conflict all appear to have had the opposite effect that the North intended.

Throughout the negotiations over the *Pueblo*, U.S. analysts received numerous reports that the North was planning an attack. Nearly all of this intelligence turned out to be of dubious origin but also caused alarm in the U.S. because of the potential that the heated rhetoric might lead South Korea to preemptively attack. Nevertheless, the Department of Defense began developing plans for general war on the Korean Peninsula. Further, the threat of war caused the United States to reassess its military capabilities in South Korea and spend considerable sums to improve the infrastructure of its bases. The U.S also increased its military aid to the South, including a number of new fighters. In his study of the *Pueblo* crisis, Mobley notes,

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[118] Nahm, "The United States and North Korea," 109.

> From North Korea's perspective, then, the *Pueblo* crisis had unpleasant and unintended effects. It accelerated the U.S. program to enhance its readiness to conduct both counterinsurgency and general war on the Korean peninsula. More seriously from a prestige perspective, *Pueblo* indirectly provided the South with highly publicized (and prestigious) new equipment for its arms race against the North.[119]

The changing of administrations also appears to have played a role in the *Pueblo* end game. State Department officials let it be known that if the North Koreans chose to reject their final offer (the signed statement of fault and verbal rejection) that the Johnson administration would not make any more offers during its final weeks in office. In a message to U.S. embassies in Seoul and Moscow, the State Department indicated that it was willing to use Nixon's reputation as a hard-liner to pressure the North Koreans to accept the offer, "Our hope is that North Koreans will calculate that they are not likely to get more from President-elect Nixon than President Johnson and will accept one of [the] choices offered."[120]

More than a single event, the significant drop in the number DMZ incidents from 1969 on signaled that the North had given up on failed policy. The hopes of some in the North to create instability in the South had failed miserably, and they would not risk, "starting a war that the North was ill prepared to fight."[121] Moreover, the balance sheet for the North following the "Second Korean War" was negative,

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[119] Mobley, *Flash Point North Korea*, 85.
[120] Quoted in Mobley, *Flash Point North Korea*, 88.
[121] Ibid, 149.

"North's provocations had encouraged the South's populace to rally behind the government, Washington to increase its presence and military spending on the ROK, and Seoul to enhance its counter infiltration capability."[122]

Kim Il-sung's regime hoped to test two loyalties in their campaign: those of the South Korean populace to President Park and those of the Americans to the South Koreans. Both proved more loyal than Kim anticipated. In particular, the Americans, who may have appeared overburdened by the fighting in Vietnam, could have shown a reluctance to take a stand against North Korean aggression. However, both administrations, and the Nixon administration in particular, offered strong displays of force against the North Korean aggression. We do not have the data to make a certain determination on why the North Koreans stopped their campaign, but the firm American response appears to have played an important role in forcing Kim to change tactics.

### *Alternative Explanations*

#### THE OPPOSITION

According to Schultz's argument, dissent from the opposition offers the potential challenger a costly signal about the actual beliefs of the government. Thus, differences between the government and opposition should lead to a higher likelihood of military challenge. Once again, as this study has previously shown, it does not only matter whether or not the government and opposition differ, but *how* they differ. In the case of U.S.-North Korean relations, we see important differences between the two administrations, despite the fact the actions taken were broadly similar. Johnson's restraint during the *Pueblo* seizure drew an outcry from Republicans, and Nixon in particular. There was strong pressure for the U.S. to retaliate in response to the seizing of the boat.

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[122] Ibid, 150.

Once Nixon was in power, the roles were reversed. The opposition Democratic Party was generally disillusioned with the war in Vietnam and wary of Nixon's history as a hard-liner. However, the Nixon administration's moderate response to the EC-121 incident drew widespread approval from Democrats in Congress. In fact, there are indications that potential Congressional opposition played a small role in the administration's response. Kissinger worried that despite the benefits of a reprisal attack, it might cause the administration to "lose the doves" making future foreign policy actions more difficult.[123] However, this is a traditional avenue of domestic politics influencing foreign policy and unrelated to signaling behavior. In addition, history would come to show that the Nixon administration was willing to take a number of actions without gaining Congressional consent, so the role of legislature is marginal at best.

Ironically in this instance, North Koreans were likely to draw the "wrong" lesson from unity between the Democrats and Republicans. The cautious approach favored by Democrats might have emboldened the North Koreans, although in fact it seems to have little impact. Instead, the North Koreans were well aware that future provocations were likely to draw a response, and that the United States would continue to support the South Korean government. For both the Johnson and Nixon administrations, the actions of the government appeared to be the key factor in determining what signals the North Koreans received.

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[123] Quoted in Mobley*, Flash Point North Korea,* 124.

## LEADERSHIP TENURE

The theory proposed by Gelpi and Grieco posits that new leaders are particularly susceptible to pressure from challenging states, as they will want to cut a deal earlier in their term to give the public more time to forget about it. The events in the “second Korean War” do not conform to this logic. The first problem is that North Korea began to escalate the conflict along the DMZ in 1967 after Johnson had been in office over three years. Not only that, but Johnson was soon to be up for reelection and unlikely to succumb to pressure.

Further, the logic of the theory would hold that the incoming Nixon administration would face additional escalation of the conflict. The downing of the EC-121 should have been the first shot across the bow of the Nixon administration and signal worse to come. In fact, it was one of the final acts in the surge of violence along the border that rapidly diminished during Nixon’s first year in office.

Mobley, who offers one of the most detailed accounts of the period, argues that the escalation was a test of American resolve during the Vietnam War. As the U.S. became more and more bogged down in Vietnam, Kim’s regime thought that the time was ripe to see if the U.S. could maintain its commitments to the South

Koreans.[124] Thus, the time line appears to have much more to do with the War in Vietnam than the U.S. election cycle.

## PUBLIC OPINION

It is possible that a belligerent American public might have dissuaded the North Koreans from further escalating the violence along the DMZ. Even if American leaders appeared weak and malleable, the American public's hawkish views might have shown Kim's government that in the event of an attack, Nixon would be pressed to act. Unfortunately, there are a number of problems facing the public opinion argument. First, American public opinion in the late 1960s was fragmented. The Vietnam War divided the country and public opinion on foreign policy in a way the country had not seen before.

Second, the Vietnam War tended to overshadow developments elsewhere in the world, and Korea was no exception. While both the Johnson and Nixon administrations made efforts to show their continuing commitment to Seoul, the American public had little interest in events on the Korean peninsula. Finally, to the extent that the North Koreans might perceive a public mood in the country, it would hardly have been bellicose. The widespread public dissatisfaction with the course of the war in Vietnam and the large public protests against the war would have made the U.S. public appear reluctant to become involved in another conflict. Had Kim been looking to the American public for the best course of action rather than the government, he might well have seen signs that emboldened him to attack.

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[124] Ibid, 149.

## BALANCE OF FORCES

The differences between North and South Korea in 1969 are highlighted by their approach to military affairs. North Korea spent heavily on the military, budgeting $692 million in 1969, a total equaling fully 25% of the state's GDP. In 1969, the Korean People's Army had 350,000 men under arms, 900 Soviet-made tanks, 200 self-propelled guns, and 6,000 other large guns and mortars. The Air Force consisted of 590 combat aircraft, including 430 MiG-15 and MiG-17 fighter-bombers.[125]

In contrast, the South Korean military was larger but less well funded. Despite a population more than twice the size of the North's, only 550,000 men served in the military. In 1969, the South Korean government spent $290 million on the military, only 6% of GDP. The South Korean military had two armored brigades with M-48 Patton tanks and four tank battalions in reserve with M-47 Patton tanks. In addition, there were 80 artillery battalions with large guns, and several with surface-to-air missiles. The Air Force owned 215 combat aircraft, including 45 F-5s, 40 F-86Ds, and 120 F-86F Interceptors.[126]

In discussing the balance of power between the two countries, David Kang argues that, "comparisons between the South and the North that ignore the role of the U.S. are seriously misleading."[127] South Korean forces were supported by 52,000

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[125] Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance, 1969-1970* (London: ISS, 1969), 45.
[126] Ibid, 46.
[127] David Kang, "International Relations Theory and the Second Korean War," *International Studies Quarterly* 47 (2003), 308.

U.S. troops, significant heavy armor, and a portion of the Fifth Air Force with F-4, F-102, F-105, and C-130 aircraft.[128] Approximately 10,000 South Korean soldiers served with U.S. troops in the country. Another 50,000 South Korean troops were deployed alongside U.S. forces in South Vietnam.

The balance of power between the two sides was not significantly influenced by outside arms procurements. Neither the U.S. nor the Soviet Union made a major arms shipment to either state in the few years preceding 1969.[129] However, North Korea did substantially increase its arms spending between 1966 and 1969. As a percentage of GDP, defense expenditures rose from 15.4% in 1966 to 24.9% in 1969.[130] Despite this substantial increase, the North's weapons remained outmoded compared to those in South Korea, meaning that the change in defense spending overstates the shift in the balance of power. Moreover, as Kang notes, scholarship from the 1960s focused on the North Korean-U.S. relationship, correctly viewing South Korea as a minor partner.[131] Based on this, the shift in North Korean capabilities is even less significant.

In light of the fact that the number of North Korean attacks increased significantly around 1967, the relationship between military spending and the "Second Korean War" is difficult to disentangle. Were the North Koreans more likely to attack because their increased spending gave them an advantage over the South, or was the increase simply funding the surge in attacks? Further, unlike South

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[128] Robert Sellers, *Armed Forces of the World*, 3rd ed. (New York: Praeger, 1971), 263.
[129] IISS, *The Military Balance, 1969-1970*, 60-61.
[130] IISS, *The Military Balance, 1970-1971*, 111. Although these numbers should be treated with some caution as the expenditures claimed by the North Korean government are often unreliable.
[131] Kang, "International Relations Theory," 309.

Korea, which could rely on U.S. military aid, the Sino-Soviet split hurt the North Koreans since it cost them a clear benefactor.

If the North Koreans were counting on an improving balance of power to sustain their attacks, then it is unclear why they escalated the conflict in 1967 even though their military spending advantage peaked in 1972. Further, there is little indication from the North Korean side that their actions were the result of an improving military balance. Instead, the North Koreans’ preoccupation appears to have been with two factors: whether they could foment a revolt in the South Korean countryside and testing the U.S. commitment to the South. In the end they were unsuccessful on both accounts and forced to scale back their attacks.

# Chapter 8

# Conclusion

This study was motivated by a series of puzzles stemming from the relationship between domestic politics and international relations. The project of blending second and third image explanations for international outcomes has yielded a number of important findings, however the microfoundations of these correlations remain underspecified. To gain insight into these puzzles, this study moves away from the autocratic-democratic divide to focus on particular attributes of democratic governments which influence interactions between states. The particular issue that unites the puzzles is why democratic states are targeted in international relations. All of the puzzles involve differences between theoretical expectations and empirical realities.

The first puzzle this project examines is the presence of incomplete information, which has been posited as a key contributor to bargaining failure and the eventual outbreak of conflict.[1] Many scholars examining the intersection of domestic politics and international relations posit that democratic institutions decrease incomplete information problems because of their transparency and the credibility checks available to democratic leaders.[2] However, a number of scholars have challenged both the transparency and credibility arguments, citing the confusing plurality of democratic societies and a number of limiting factors that circumscribe credibility.[3] This study examines the domestic factors that systematically influence the extent to which incomplete information is created in a relationship.

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[1] See James Fearon, "Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes," *American Political Science Review* 88, no. 3 (1994); James Fearon, "Signaling Foreign Policy Interests: Tying Hands Versus Sinking Costs," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 41, no. 1 (1997).

[2] See Fearon, "Domestic Political Audiences," Fearon, "Signaling Foreign Policy Interests," Thomas C. Schelling, *The Strategy of Conflict* (Cambridge,: Harvard University Press, 1960); Robert Pahre, "Endogenous Domestic Institutions in Two-Level Games and Parliamentary Oversight of the European Union," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 41, no. 1 (1997); Kenneth Schultz, "Do Democratic Institutions

The benefits that some scholars attribute to democracies in international relations leads to a second puzzle. If democracies have even a modest advantage in signaling and communicating their interests, certain results should follow. Most importantly, these advantages should make democratic states less likely to be attacked in international conflict. Systematic advantages in communication, by making stakes and potential responses clearer, should decrease the ambiguities that lead to war. However, these theoretical expectations are confounded by data showing that democratic states are disproportionately likely to be attacked in international conflict. Rousseau et al., found that democracies were 20% more likely to experience militarized threats or uses of force than authoritarian states, and a number of other scholars have made similar findings.[4]

One specific puzzle related to democratic institutions is the role played by the opposition in signaling to potential challengers. Kenneth Schultz argues that the

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Constrain or Inform? Contrasting Two Institutional Perspectives on Democracy and War," *International Organization* 53, no. 2 (1999); Alastair Smith, "International Crises and Domestic Politics," *American Political Science Review* 92, no. 3 (1998).

[3] See Branislav Slantchev, "Politicians, the Media, and Domestic Audience Costs," *International Studies Quarterly* 50 (2006); Bernard Finel and Kristin Lord, *Power and Conflict in the Age of Transparency* (New York: Palgrave, 2000); Bernard Finel and Kristin Lord, "The Surprising Logic of Transparency," *International Studies Quarterly* 43, no. 2 (1999).

[4] See David Rousseau, Christopher Gelpi, and Paul Huth, "Assessing the Dyadic Nature of the Democratic Peace, 1918-88," *American Political Science Review* 90, no. 3 (1996); Christopher Gelpi and Joseph Grieco, "Attracting Trouble: Democracy, Leadership Tenure, and the Targeting of Militarized Challenges, 1918-1992," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 45, no. 6 (2001); Joseph Grieco, "Repetitive Military Challenges and Recurrent International Conflicts, 1918-1994," *International Studies Quarterly* 45 (2001).

opposition offers a check on statements of the government since it has the opportunity to support or oppose the position taken by the government with respect to an extended deterrence challenge.[5] The puzzle evoked by Schultz's findings comes from his own dataset, which shows that despite the opportunity for opposition dissent, it often goes unrealized, as the government receives support for its position fully 84% of the time. This raises the question of whether the opposition truly offers an independent signal or simply rallies around the flag.

The final puzzle that motivates this study is also related to the likelihood of democracies being attacked, but instead of focusing on institutional factors, looks instead at preferences. The dominant view in international relations is that dovish governments, more averse to the use of force and more likely to compromise than their hawkish counterparts, are disadvantaged in international relations. Many formal models assume that dovish governments will attempt to portray themselves as hawkish in order to gain the advantages enjoyed by hawks. Further, Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman argue that dovish governments are more likely to launch preventive wars to dissuade potential challengers that might be emboldened by their dovishness.[6] Such theories and other assumptions about dovish governments cannot explain why many governments embrace a dovish approach and work for better relations with potential challengers.

Taken together, these puzzles contribute to the core question of the dissertation: why are democratic states targeted in international conflict? There appears to be a significant gap between theoretical expectations and empirical reality. This study offers a domestic politics explanation that focuses primarily on the unity of the democratic government in question while secondarily addressing the role that government preferences play in targeting.

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[5] Kenneth Schultz, *Democracy and Coercive Diplomacy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 2001).

[6] Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and David Lalman, *War and Reason: Domestic and International Imperatives* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992).

## The Theory

The transparency that many international relations scholars hail as beneficial for democratic states is not without its problems. Most notably, the free press, intraparty politics, and differentiation of responsibilities leads to conditions that violate one of the basic tenets of international relations theory: that states are unitary actors on the international stage. This study argues that the degree of unity that states present is variable and that this has important implications for states' abilities to signal.

The core of the theory posits a causal chain premised on the unity of the government in question. Governments' levels of unity and hawkishness influence the signals democratic states send to potential challengers. In particular, government unity influences three facets of ongoing disputes between states. First, unified governments can clearly signal their views on the stakes involved in a dispute while divided governments cannot. The inability to clearly signal the stakes involved creates problems regardless of whether the government seeks to negotiate or simply maintain the status quo. Lack of clarity in the stakes hinders negotiations because it makes it impossible to establish a baseline for bargaining. Even if the state simply wishes to maintain the status quo, lack of agreement on the stakes raises questions over the extent to which the state will go to keep the territory.

Second, divided governments lack the ability to take decisive action in crises. Specifically, divided governments are likely to take confused or contradictory actions. Once again, regardless of the preferred path the state wishes to take, inability to take decisive action increases the likelihood of a military challenge. In negotiations, states that cannot take decisive action are likely to be viewed as incredible partners, causing the potential challenger to become disillusioned about the progress of negotiations and increasingly likely to see military action as a more effective means for achieving their goals. On the other hand, for states that choose to take a hard-line and refuse to negotiate, inability to take decisive action can embolden challenging states. If a challenger launches minor provocations against the target state and there is no clear response, the challenger is likely to believe that the target state will not be able to adequately respond to more serious attacks.

Finally, divided and dovish governments are likely to be perceived as weak by potential challengers. Divisions within the government and contradictory statements on disputed territories lead potential challengers to believe that the target country's leadership is weak and raises questions over how effective the country's response will be to an attack. Similarly, dovish governments are often portrayed as weak, and their desire to negotiate or make concessions may be taken by challengers to signal weakness and vulnerability.  Potential challengers may believe that an attack will lead to more concessions.

These two variables can be combined to generate four government types. Unified hawks will be the least likely to be challenged, as their unity will allow them to signal effectively while their hawkishness will prevent them from being viewed as weak.  Also unlikely to be attacked are unified doves, who similarly can clearly signal their intentions, although they may occasionally be viewed as weak and thus susceptible to attack.  Much more likely to be targeted are divided hawks, who cannot effectively communicate their views.  Finally, the most vulnerable states are divided doves which are doubly impacted by their inability to signal and the perception that they are weak.

This ordering of government types shows two things.  First, both unified hawks and doves find their own ways to avoid conflict.  Unified hawks can do this through clear signaling of strength and power, while unified doves may do this through negotiations.  While their preferences are different, they are similar in their ability to prevent attacks.  The second point is that government unity is a more significant variable than hawkishness.  Thus, unified hawks and doves have much more in common under this theory than divided and unified doves.  The clarity and credibility of the message, as determined by government unity, takes precedence over hawkishness.

The first two steps in the causal chain posited in this theory have focused on the target country and examined the relationship between government unity and hawkishness and the influence these variables have on how the target state is perceived. The third and fourth links in the causal chain shift the focus from the target state to the potential challenger. The question is not only what signals are being sent by the target state but also how those signals are perceived by the potential challenger.

The first issue from the perspective of the potential challenger is how they perceive the target government's statements and actions. To what extent are divisions within the government visible to the challenger? The final critical link in the causal chain is the extent to which the challenger's perceptions of the target government influence its decision making. It is critical to not only show that the target state is sending mixed signals, but that these mixed signals play a significant role in the decision of the challenging state to attack.

The theory of government unity and type was tested alongside several competing theories of military attacks. The first theory is Kenneth Schultz's previously mentioned study of government and opposition unity and division, which posits that extended deterrence is most likely to fail when the opposition fails to back the government.[7] According to Gelpi and Grieco's theory of leadership tenure, longer serving leaders are less likely to be challenged militarily.[8] A third theory extends existing work on public opinion and audience costs. According to this theory, hawkish public opinion regarding a disputed territory is likely to act as a deterrent, while more dovish opinion could raise the likelihood of an attack. The final alternative theory is a balance of capabilities argument that as the balance of power shifts in favor of the potential target state, the likelihood of an attack will rise as the challenger seeks to attack while the democracy is still relatively weak.

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[7] Schultz, *Democracy and Coercive Diplomacy*.
[8] Gelpi and Grieco, *Attracting Trouble.*

## Findings

The dissertation uses both case studies and statistical models to test the validity of the theory. The statistical tests offer the benefits of precision, transparency, and clarity of results, but are limited by their narrowness. On the other hand, the case studies, which were selected to encompass the four different combinations of the two key independent variables, include a much richer picture of the proposed causal pathway. The multiple testing methods used in the dissertation complement each other by providing the large-scale comparative element offered by statistical tests and a detailed examination of the role of the theory in historical cases.

The statistical tests employ a dataset created by the author to test the theory, which includes three novel variables: government unity, hawkishness, and government type. Using a dataset that includes nineteen dyads, spanning the period from 1950 through 2000, the theory was tested on two different dependent variables – war target and militarized conflict target – while controlling for balance of power, government strength in the legislature, government tenure, and peace years. The results of the statistical tests provide strong support for the theory.

Both government unity and government type, run in two separate models, are statistically significant in all the tests run. More importantly, changes in both these variables also have a large substantive impact on the dependent variables. Moving from a moderately divided to a moderately united government reduces the likelihood of conflict 85%, while changing a government from divided and dovish to unified and hawkish leads to a 99% reduction in war targeting. The hawkishness variable is not consistently statistically significant and had a smaller substantive impact.

Of the control variables, only government tenure and alliance portfolio have significant substantive impacts. For government tenure the relationship is in the opposite direction predicted; the longer the tenure of the government, the higher the likelihood of an attack. However, further statistical tests reveal that this relationship is dependent upon government tenure's correlation with government unity. Once an interaction variable was added to the model, government tenure was no longer significant, while longer-serving, unified governments were more likely to be attacked. With the alliance portfolio variable, the causal logic is tenuous: do alliances deter potential challengers or do countries avoid forming alliances with states embroiled in ongoing territorial disputes?

The statistical tests showed the key variables of interest had a far greater substantive impact then any of the other variables. These results held through a number of robustness checks and for both dependent variables. Both models predicted over 90% of the cases correctly when war target was the dependent variable. At the same time, neither model significantly outperformed the other in ROC curve comparisons of predictive power.

**Table 8.1: Summary of Testing Results for Hypotheses**

| **Hypothesis** | **Result** |
|---|---|
| $H_1$: *Higher levels of government unity will decrease the likelihood of receiving military challenges.* | Confirmed |
| $H_2$: *Higher levels of hawkishness will decrease the likelihood of receiving military challenges.* | Partially confirmed. Not true for militarized dispute targeting. |
| $H_3$: *Unified hawkish governments will be less likely to receive military challenges.* | Confirmed |
| $H_4$: *Divided dovish governments will be more likely to receive military challenges* | Confirmed |
| $H_5$: *Government unity will have a more significant impact on war targeting than hawkishness.* | Confirmed |
| $H_6$: *The impact of hawkishness on war targeting is contingent on government unity and will have the most significant impact when unity is low.* | Confirmed |
| $H_7$: *Government unity and hawkishness will have a greater substantive impact on targeting than any other variables.* | Partially confirmed. Hawkishness was not consistently significant. |

The case studies tell a similar story while increasing confidence in the causal logic of the theory. For both the Truman and Shastri governments, their divided dovish nature was a significant contributor to the fact they were challenged. Stalin's views of the mixed messages from the Truman administration led him to support Kim Il-sung's attack. Perceptions of the weakness of Prime Minister Shastri's government emboldened hard-liners in Pakistan, particularly Foreign Minister Bhutto, who believed that the time was right for an attack.

For Israel in 1973 and India in 1999, the hawkishness of the main actors did not prevent military challenges which were encouraged by divisions within the government. The Israeli ambivalence about holding the Sinai, combined with its unwillingness to negotiate led Egypt to believe both that it could not achieve its ends through peaceful means and that military pressure would force a compromise. Sadat thought that Israeli's intransigence meant pressure would be successful, failing to realize that Israel's embrace of the status quo was the result of domestic divisions. For the Pakistanis in 1999, Vajpayee's lame-duck government appeared a prime target for attack. From the Pakistani perspective, the severe internal divisions in the Indian government would cause it to either under-react to an attack, which would allow Pakistan to capture the territory, or overreact, which would force foreign intervention in the Kashmir conflict, another goal of Pakistan. Either way, domestic divisions within India played into Pakistan's hands.

Just as the case studies show the inherent problems faced by divided governments, they also show how unified government, whether hawkish or dovish, can avoid conflict in their own ways. For the Israeli government in 1992, the shift from Shamir to Rabin was widely noted in the Arab world. Leaders throughout the region viewed the Rabin government as truly committed to peace. Further, unlike his government in the 1970s, Rabin was more powerful and able to prevent bickering with Shimon Perez which undercut previous negotiations. Throughout the 1950s, Nehru was able to maintain good relations with China due to his dominance of Indian foreign policy and his ideology of solidarity in the developing world. Crises in the

1950s were downplayed by Nehru and drew positive responses from China. Although China was worried about hawkish elements in Indian public opinion, it was confident in the power of Nehru to maintain good relations until the early 1960s.

Finally, significant changes occurred in the relationship between Israel and its neighbors when Ben Gurion strengthened his control over the cabinet and forced his most significant opponent, Moshe Sharett, to resign. Rather than relying on a mix of half-hearted negotiations and inconsistent cross-border raids that characterized the previous government, Ben Gurion's government took a uniformly tough, aggressive line. Scholars argue that Israel's tougher line under Ben Gurion had a significant impact on Nasser's thinking. Similarly, the Nixon administration's firmer line on the Korean conflict led to a dramatic reversal of the "Second Korean War". Instead of weakening Washington's commitment to Seoul, the surge in North Korean attacks during the late 1960s recommitted the United States to protecting its ally. Kim il-Sung was forced to back away from his failed campaign in the face of a united and hawkish Nixon administration.

Together the statistical tests and case studies show a strong relationship between government type and the likelihood of attack. While the statistical models provide evidence that increasing government unity and changing government type have a strong substantive impact on the likelihood of war targeting, the case studies help to fill in the causal mechanisms. Unified governments, whether hawkish or dovish, can clearly communicate their intentions and interests to a potential challenger. Unified dovish governments can credibly negotiate with a challenging state while unified hawkish governments can make convincing threats in response to provocations. Divided governments cannot negotiate credibly, may be viewed as weak, and are unable to take decisive actions. These factors, taken together embolden potential challengers to take action.

## Policy Implications and Future Research

The most significant divide is not between hawks and doves but rather between unified and divided governments. Despite the focus in both international relations scholarship and the popular press on candidates' hawkishness, this is relatively unimportant compared to their ability to successfully manage a government. The differences between a divided and a unified dovish government are much more significant than the differences between unified hawkish and dovish governments. More attention should be paid to the kind of cabinet that the head of state will assemble and the degree to which they will face serious opposition from within the government.

The results for some of the other theories tested also yielded surprising results. The relationship between the government and the legislature indicates that governments that dominate the legislature in terms of the number of seats they control are more likely to be attacked. This problem meshes with the view propounded by democratic peace scholars that domestic constraints are a key factor in why democracies avoid conflict with one another. However, the results also seem to indicate that the efficacy of these constraints is not uniform over time and between states.

However, another role for the legislature, proposed by Kenneth Schultz, posits that the legislative opposition acts as a key signaler in the case of threats from a potential challenger. Schultz argues that the ability of the opposition to support or dissent from the position taken by the government provides a powerful signal of the stakes. While Schultz's work focuses on issues of extended deterrence, one would expect the logic to carry over into the targeting examined in this study.

Still, there is little support for extending Schultz's theory in the case studies. In the cases of divided dovish governments, which were most likely to be attacked, the opposition was often more hawkish than the government, but this did not matter to the challengers. Moreover, when unified hawkish governments were in power and the opposition was generally dovish, these differences should have undercut the government's attempts to signal their strength. However, the statistical tests show that unified hawkish governments were the least likely to be attacked in this study.

The case studies reveal that, in general, potential challengers pay little attention to the opposition and focus much more on the government. Heads of state of potential challengers correctly assess that the rhetoric of the opposition is often driven much more by domestic concerns than international signaling. Depending on the conditions and the issue at hand, the opposition may find it expedient to support or oppose the government. The only time the opposition is noticed by potential challengers is during election periods, particularly when electing the opposition might signal a radical shift in policy regarding the dispute at hand.

A second finding relating to competing theories centers on the government's tenure in office. Chris Gelpi and Joe Grieco's theory of government tenure posits that newer governments will be more likely to receive challenges because they can be pressed to deal when elections are further in the future. Surprisingly, this study found the exact opposite to be true, with the likelihood of challenges increasing as tenure increased. These contradictory results are likely the product of two factors, one benign to Gelpi and Greico's theory and the other more serious. The fact that Gelpi and Grieco's study covers a far broader range of cases, thus including many more dyads and observations, likely explains part of the difference. However, it is problematic that the predictions of the theory are reversed in a subset of cases where conflict is more likely.

However, the case studies in the dissertation indicate deeper problems for the underlying theory. The theory posits that the least advantageous time for a challenger to attack is shortly before an election when the government will want to avoid being viewed as weak by offering concessions. Conversely, the case studies show a number of instances when the challenger attacked with elections in the near future: India in 1999, Israel in 1973 and England in 1982. In two of the three cases, the success of the targeted government in the conflict greatly contributed to victory at the polls. Part of the reason why challengers may attack longer-serving governments is that it takes time for negotiations to break down. New governments may inspire potential challengers to believe that peaceful settlement is possible, and only over time, as the divided governments prove themselves incapable of delivering on their promises, do they conclude that war is the only way to alter the status quo. In fact, there is strong evidence of this type of thinking in each of the three conflicts listed above.

The results of this study could lead some to argue that the dangers of disunity should lead governments to act more secretively and stamp out dissent. This conclusion is incorrect for two reasons. First, governments can experience high levels of internal debate without appearing fractious to outside observers. Such debate is likely useful and fruitful when it comes to helping the head of state choose among foreign policy options. Further, this study focused upon the government's general approach to issues, not specifics. Here again, governments may usefully discuss the particulars of different policies given that they agree on the general approach to the problem.

The second issue is the commonly known problems surrounding groupthink. The dangers of groupthink are not fully investigated in this study, but there is some evidence of it when it comes to the behavior of long-serving unified governments. The case of India under Nehru appears to exemplify this potential problem. While initially Nehru was able to manage relations with the Chinese despite some tense moments, as the relationship between the two states deteriorated from 1959 onwards, Nehru's dominance of Indian foreign policymaking created significant problems. The inability of ministers to challenge Nehru's plans and of subordinates to offer realistic assessments of Sino-Indian relations, led India into a disastrous war with

China.  This case illustrates that the problem with long-serving governments may have less to do with groupthink and hinge more on the fact that such governments become less responsive to democratic controls.

Just as the statistical analysis and case studies illustrate some problems associated with unity, hawkishness can also be problematic.  The data on militarized dispute targeting shows that unified hawkish governments received far more challenges than unified doves.  This seems to result from the higher likelihood that hawkish governments will become embroiled in tit-for-tat disputes.  These attacks indicate that the aggressiveness of hawkish governments may create cycles of violence with potential challengers.

In addition, a number of questionable military campaigns were launched by unified hawkish governments, such as Eden’s decision to collude with the Israelis and French on the 1956 Sinai War, Israel’s 1982 invasion of Lebanon, and Johnson’s decision to escalate in Vietnam.  In each case, a small cadre of top foreign policy officials developed their plans largely out of the public eye.  The problems encountered in each one of these conflicts could also be the result of insufficient outside scrutiny prior to the conflict.  While such decisions do not impact a state’s likelihood of being attacked, the problems of aggressive foreign policies are certainly relevant.

One surprising finding of this study is that coalition governments are not inherently disadvantaged in their ability to signal.  While there certainly are examples of broad, chaotic coalition governments like Vajpayee’s in 1999 that cannot clearly signal their intentions, there are notable counterexamples. Rabin's dovish coalition in 1992 had a number of different parties but was united in its approach to the peace process. Further, there are numerous examples of single-party governments with serious divisions.

The study does point towards periods where democracies may be particularly vulnerable. Leaders that follow long-serving, popular, or dominant heads of state may be viewed as weak relative to their predecessors. This was the fate of Lal Shastri in India who followed the dominant Nehru, and Moshe Sharett in Israel during his brief stint in office while Ben Gurion retired to his kibbutz. Similarly, the ways that leaders come to power, which might limit their influence, including intra-party struggles and succession without election, appear to be associated with government disunity.

Powerful, independent foreign ministers may also lead to divided governments. Such foreign ministers are likely to view themselves as the primary representative of the state's foreign policy interests, which may create conflicts with the head of state. Dean Acheson in the Truman administration and Lord Carrington in Thatcher's government both exemplify this type. In both cases, they created problems by taking positions that were at odds with the head of state.

Finally, the breakdown of negotiations is unlikely to lead to a lasting peace. In a number of the case studies, the challenger's attack was preceded by a serious failure in negotiations and the perception by the challenger that the other side was not negotiating in good faith. With the Falklands in 1982, Egypt in 1973, and China in

1962, it appeared that the side favored by the status quo was unwilling to make serious compromises.  At this point, the challenger is likely to view military force as the only means to overturn the status quo or reopen negotiations.

The findings of the study offer some tips for leaders wishing to prevent attacks.  The first is that divided governments can become unified governments if cabinets are reshuffled and dissenting voices are either removed or placed in roles without foreign policy exposure.  The dismissal of Moshe Sherett as Foreign Minister by Ben Gurion and Eden's decision to move Walter Monkton out of the Defense Ministry both increased the unity of the governments involved.  Of course, having a revolving door in a particular ministry, like Thatcher's treatment of the Foreign Office, may do more to solidify divisions, so some care is required in making such choices.

Extending the argument presented above, dovish governments do not need to pretend to be hawkish.  The likelihood of sending mixed and confusing messages seems likely to increase if governments attempt to "play against their type."  The last years of the Nehru government seem to exemplify this problem, as do the actions of the Eshkol government leading up to the Six-Day War.  In the end, governments are better off taking a consistent approach in their disputes and clearly signaling their intentions.

Lastly, states should choose a clear path regarding negotiations.  If leaders want to negotiate, they should be willing to make the necessary concessions and be sure that they can deliver on their promises.  However, if states do not want to negotiate, they should prepare to maintain the status quo through the use of force, if necessary. This means that limited incursions and threats will be taken seriously and responded to militarily.

What states should avoid at all costs is getting trapped in a situation where they are negotiating half-heartedly while only attempting minimal deterrence. This was the situation Britain found itself in prior to the Falklands War. The removal of the HMS *Endurance* and the lack of response to Argentine incursions might have been appropriate if negotiations were going well but were clearly counterproductive in a situation where negotiations were at a standstill. Likewise, the deadlock in the Meir government over the appropriate action to take regarding the Sinai and the resulting breakdown of negotiations with the Egyptians, should have spurred a much more vigorous deterrence effort.

While this dissertation offers a number of insights on the role that government unity and hawkishness play in the likelihood of conflict, there are several issues that will require more scholarly attention. An important further step would expand this project to look at non-democracies, as much of the logic of the project applies to them as well. The democratic-autocratic divide dominates the domestic politics literature in international relations, but there are other useful ways to categorize states. A number of scholars have already shown systematic differences between autocratic states, but government unity may be a way to categorize states that show similarities between certain autocracies and democracies.[9]

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[9] Mark Peceny, Caroline Beer, and Shannon Sanchez-Terry, "Dictatorial Peace," *American Political Science Review* 96, no. 1 (2002); Barbara Geddes, *Paradigms and Sand Castles: Theory Building and*

By expanding the dataset to include autocracies, one could also make the theory interactive. By including both sides of the dyad, the theory would both increase its predictive power and capture more realism. One might imagine that two divided governments facing each other might be particularly prone to strife, while unified governments, with their clear signaling, would be able to avoid conflict. The state of the Argentinean junta before the Falklands invasion and the Pakistani government before the 1999 Kargil war all show that issues of government unity also appear critical on the side of the challenger.

Finally, while this project focuses on government targeting, it is likely that the two primary variables in this study have an impact on a range of other possible outcomes of interest to international relations scholars. In particular, government unity could be associated with behavior within conflicts, conflict resolution, and negotiations. Further, although briefly explored in the Ben Gurion case study, the role of government unity in choosing to go to war is not fully developed in this project and deserves closer scrutiny.

In conclusion, the project of exploring the relationships between government unity and hawkishness and international targeting has already yielded significant results. Both government unity and government type have significant substantive effects on the likelihood that a state will be attacked. Further, the case studies confirm the role that these factors play in the calculus of potential challengers. However, there is a great deal of work to be done on this topic. Expanding the

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*Research Design in Comparative Politics*, Analytical Perspectives on Politics (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2003).

dataset, including autocracies, and making the dyads interactive would improve the theory and increase our confidence in the results.

# Appendix A: Independent Variable Coding Procedures

## *The Study of Cabinets*

The role of cabinets and foreign policy remains remarkably understudied in international relations. There has been comparatively little theorizing on the role of cabinets and government unity in international policy outcomes, with most scholarship relying on case studies. Cabinets appear to fall into a gap in the literature between scholarship looking at leaders[1] and more general theories on the role of democratic institutions. This is unfortunate for a number of reasons. First, case studies of international crises often point to the significant role played by cabinets as time pressures may preclude broader consultation.[2] Second, cabinets often play a considerable role, along with the state leader, in setting the agenda for a particular crisis, which may appreciably influence later discussions. Finally, there is evidence of considerable variation in the unity of cabinets with respect to international crises.

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[1] Studies has pointed to the importance of individual leaders in international relations, see Andrew Bennett, "The Guns That Didn't Smoke: Ideas and the Soviet Non-Use of Force in 1989," *Journal of Cold War Studies* 7, no. 2 (2005); Daniel L. Byman and Kenneth M. Pollack, "Let Us Now Praise Great Men: Bringing the Statesman Back In," *International Security* 25, no. 4 (2001); Janice Stein, "Political Learning by Doing: Gorbachev as Uncommitted Thinker and Motivated Learner," *International Organization* 48, no. 2 (1994). Further, studies have also examined the duration of leaders in office and how they are sanctioned, see Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, Randolph Siverson, and Gary Woller, "War and the Fate of Regimes," *American Political Science Review* 86, no. 3 (1992); Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and Randolph M. Siverson, "War and the Survival of Political Leaders: A Comparative Study of Regime Types and Political Accountability," *American Political Science Review* 89, no. 4 (1995); H. E. Goemans, *War and Punishment : The Causes of War Termination and the First World War*, Princeton Studies in International History and Politics (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2000).

[2] This point will be discussed in more detail below.

While some cabinets are so strongly unified that their discussion verge on groupthink, other cabinets exhibit significant rifts between key ministers.[3]

Many case studies have examined the role of cabinets in international crises. A number of critical issues repeatedly appear throughout these works. The first issue is whether or not the chief executive dominates cabinet decisions or whether decisions are, in fact, collective. If leaders dominate cabinet decisions, then it would make little sense to study the entire cabinet when the leader would provide a good proxy for cabinet decisions. Luckily, a number of scholars, including Hill and Graff, both find that while there are times when the chief executive may exert more influence, this is hardly uniform.[4] In his study of six decisions made by the British government prior to World War II, Hill argues that although Churchill was viewed as a dominant prime minister, on many issues he could not dominate his cabinet.[5]

A second topic is the extent to which the entire cabinet is consulted. Hill argues that time pressures were not a determinate factor in the number of cabinet members consulted in the British case, although the number of ministers directly involved in discussions of a particular issue varied. Yaniv's masterful study of the Israeli cabinet during the 1982 war in Lebanon details the role of a number of cabinet members in the decision making process, particularly as they began to feel that

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[3] Irving Lester Janis, *Groupthink: Psychological Studies of Policy Decisions and Fiascoes*, 2nd ed. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1982).

[4] See Christopher Hill, *Cabinet Decisions on Foreign Policy: The British Experience, October 1938-June 1941*, LSE Monographs in International Studies (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991); Graff, *Tuesday Cabinet*.

[5] Hill, *Cabinet Decisions on Foreign Policy*.

Defense Minister Sharon was not fully disclosing his plans to them.[6] However, Yaniv also notes that those cabinet ministers without military experience were at a distinct disadvantage to those who could ask more critical questions about the planning and conduct of the war. Graff's study of Johnson's "Tuesday Cabinet" during Vietnam highlights the role that particular cabinet positions, such as Secretaries of Defense and State, play in advising the leader.

A third question centers on the extent to which cabinets are amenable to internal dissention. Nearly all of the case studies describe situations where significant debate occurred before coming to a decision. Hill recounts the visit by rebellious members of Chamberlain's cabinet to 10 Downing Street following Hitler's invasion of Poland to pressure the Prime Minister to remain firm with British demands and offer a short time-line for the Germans to respond to their demands.[7] Although it appears that Chamberlain was more hamstrung by French wavering than any personal qualms, cabinet members were adamant that the Prime Minister take a hard-line with the Germans. The divisions within the French cabinet in the run-up to World War II have been well documented, even if some argue that the cabinet was not as fractious as it is often portrayed.[8] Finally, a number of studies of American cabinet behavior have documented extensive debates about policy decisions.[9]

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[6] Avner Yaniv, Dilemmas of Security: Politics, Strategy, and the Israeli Experience in Lebanon (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987).

[7] Hill, *Cabinet Decisions on Foreign Policy*, 95.

[8] Talbot C. Imlay, *Facing the Second World War: Strategy, Politics, and Economics in Britain and France, 1938-1940* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003); Robert J. Young, *France and the Origins of the Second World War* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996). A dissenting view is offered by Adamthwaite (*France and the Coming of the Second World War*), who acknowledges these divisions while arguing that they are less dire than often portrayed.

[9] Graff, *Tuesday Cabinet*.

A final issue regarding cabinets concerns the efficacy of unitary versus multi-party cabinets. It is generally held that coalition governments are less effective in international relations, while single-party governments are better able to achieve their goals. The basic logic for such arguments hold that more heterogeneous cabinets have difficulty coming to decisions internally which hampers them in international negotiations and makes other states concerned that any agreement reached will not be implemented. Hagen acknowledges that such logic may apply occasionally, but critical anomalies exist. He cites examples of fractious cabinets that are able to act forcefully in international relations or semi-presidential states like Finland or France's Fifth Republic.[10]

Examining different responses of states towards selling off state owned companies, Boix finds an interaction between ideology and cabinet unity.[11] Single party right- or left-wing cabinets were able to effectively meet their partisan goals while divided cabinets were not. Boix argues that multi-party governments are less likely to achieve their goals for two reasons. The first is that such governments are likely to be moderated by including centrist parties. The second reason is that coalition cabinets tend towards 'gridlock' because negotiations between the parties involved can be contentious.

In general, systematic study of the influence of cabinets on foreign policy remains underdeveloped. Case studies of cabinets tend to indicate that cabinets play a significant role in the formation of foreign policy, but these anecdotes have not been investigated in a systematic fashion. In particular, divisions within cabinets seem to offer a particularly fruitful window into state decision-making, but work on this issue has tended to focus on domestic economic policy. Finally, the interaction between cabinet unity and ideological orientation appears to be a particularly interesting avenue of study.

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[10] Joe D. Hagen, *Political Opposition and Foreign Policy in Comparative Perspective* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1993).

[11] Carles Boix, "Privatizing the Public Business Sector in the Eighties: Economic Performance, Partisan Responses and Divided Governments," *British Journal of Political Science* 27 (1997).

### *Unity of Government*

In this study, the assessment of the unity of the government is based on secondary historical sources. Historical accounts of the governments in questions were examined for information on inter-cabinet relations. A particular focus was placed on relations between the head of government, the minister of defense, and the foreign minister. In some cases top officials dealing directly with the territorial dispute in question would also be included, such as ambassadors, diplomats, and special envoys.

The scope of the variable includes cabinet members but not the relationships in the legislature or between the executive and the legislature. Thus it is possible to have a unified government even if the party in control of the legislature is different than the party in control of the government (as the term ‘divided government’ is often used in the American case). Unity is assessed on a five point scale with +2 indicating fully unified governments and -2 designating complete division. The particular type of unity in question is over the general handling of foreign affairs issues and whether or not the government should pursue a hard- or soft-line in their dealing with other states. Thus disagreements in strategy or implementation are not considered divisive, while different views on whether to make a military response are considered a significant sign of disunity.

While coalition governments may, on average, exhibit higher levels of disunity, coalition governments, *per se*, are not taken as a sign of disunity, just as single-party governments are not assumed to be unified. Sometimes coalition governments are fractious as occurred in Turkey in the early 1960s, but they may also be relatively unified as in the case of Israel under Begin. The number of parties in the cabinet does not factor into the coding of unity of government.

The unity of a government is based upon three indices. The first is the power of the head of state. This focuses on the degree to which the head of state can impose his or her views on the rest of the government and perhaps make a more fractious cabinet appear unified. Powerful heads of state can both squelch dissention and be taken as speaking for the government. In signaling terms, this means that potential challenging states can be assured that statements made by the chief executive represent the views of the government as a whole and that actions taken by the government are likely to match these statements.

The second indicator is the level of difference that exists between key ministers. To the degree that differences exist, they may be the result of deep-rooted beliefs, such as the difference between a hawk and dove, or less significant disagreements on how to best achieve an agreed upon policy goal. This may be thought of as the amplitude of disagreement: the leaders may take significantly different positions or only slightly different ones.

The final indicator is the frequency of disagreement between the key ministers. Is there constant disagreement over each action that the government takes, or is there only disagreement over a single policy? Constant bickering between government officials sends a much different signal than occasional differences of opinion that may exist from time to time.

There is an interaction between the amplitude and frequency of difference. States that score high on both indicators are likely to send both incredible and confused signals to potential challengers. In a middle category are states with large but infrequent or small but frequent differences. Of these two, the distance between opinions is thought to have a more significant impact than frequency because they are particularly likely to emerge during times of crisis such as military challenges.

Secondary sources on the countries and territorial disputes in question were consulted to generate the codings in this study. All the sources I consulted were English language which is more a limitation for some states than others. In the case of the United States and Britain the secondary literature on government unity and foreign policy is vast, while for Israel a sizable English language literature exists. The data for Turkey and India does present some problems. In the case of Turkey, the secondary literature in English is less well developed than in any of the other cases. In some cases this meant that there was less corroboration than was possible for other states. For India a very substantial English language literature exists, but more than any of the other cases, much of it is partisan or of lower scholarly quality. To limit the problems this implied, as much corroboration as possible was sought and less partisan sources were given more weight.

In general, there were high levels of agreement among the secondary sources on the unity of the government in question. Generally, the most common point of disagreement are scholars claiming that governments were more (or less) unified than they appeared at they time. Since the focus of this study is how governments were perceived while they were in office, such criticism is not a significant problem. More problematic are those few instances where there was disagreement among historians over the level of unity within the government. When such disagreement occurred, coding was based on the dominant view among sources consulted. If historians appeared divided over the status of the government, an average of their views was taken for the coding. Such entrenched disagreements were very rare.

The values for government unity may change over the course of a given government. Variation in government unity is due to changes in the government's composition. This can happen for several reasons. A minister may be removed due to her differences with other cabinet members and her replacement may have a stronger ideological affinity with the other members of the government. In a parliamentary system of government parties may be added to the government that increases the diversity of views and hence decreases the unity.

Based on these sources and criteria, I created a five-point government unity scale.

A highly unified government (2) exhibits several characteristics. The head of state is a powerful figure and may even dominate the cabinet to such a degree there is little room for dissent. Prime Minister Nehru's cabinets before the 1962 border war with China were an example of this type of government. Such high levels of unity are also seen in the views of President Johnson and his advisors with respect to Vietnam. While dissent towards American policy in Vietnam grew substantially within Johnson's own party, there was notably little disagreement among top foreign policy officials. In addition to a powerful chief executive, the head of state and ministers are highly similar in their views on foreign policy. Finally, there is little public disagreement between key officials and to the extent it occurs it is infrequent and idiosyncratic.

A moderately unified government (1) is unlikely to have a dominant leader, but rather consists of generally like-minded officials who occasionally disagree. While a highly unified cabinet is often notable for its strict conformity, here there may be some instances of disagreement or dissention. In practice, such governments may have one official who disagrees with the head of state, but rarely challenges him or her. Such governments are likely to be very unified on two of the three indicators. One case of such a government is the Israeli cabinet led by Ben Gurion with Moshe Sharett as Foreign Minister. Although Ben Gurion was a dominant figure (and also for a time Minister of Defense as well as Prime Minister) and a hawk, Sharett attempted to take a softer line in foreign relations, but public disagreements were relatively rare.

A moderate government (0) exhibits midrange levels of unity on all three indicators. Such governments have leaders that are able to exert some control but not dominate the cabinet and have occasional disagreements between important cabinet members. The second term of U.S. President Bill Clinton had many characteristics of a moderate government. Clinton was not a dominant President, and in fact encouraged disagreement between his advisors. There were important differences among the top foreign policymakers in the administration, however they were aired only occasionally.

A moderately divided government (-1) exhibits serious disagreements between the head of state and at least one important minister. Such disagreements are chronic and involve important issues in the state's foreign policy. Leaders are not powerful enough to silence their critics or bring them in line, so the divisions are clear to the outside world. Israeli Prime Minister Eshkol's governments in the 1960s (until the formation of the unity government) exhibited there characteristics, as Eshkol was unable to reign in dissenters within the cabinet.

A highly divided government (-2) suffers from high levels of disunity on all three indicators: weak leadership and serious and frequent differences between key ministers. Leaders of such governments are viewed as weak both within and outside the cabinet. Key foreign policy ministers actively oppose the position taken by the head of state and make such disagreements public. Several Turkish governments of the early 1960s exhibited these traits as weak Prime Ministers presided over coalition governments with frequent disagreements. The Israeli governments led by Moshe

Sharett for a short time in 1953 and 1954 were also highly divided as Sharett was continually challenged by more hawkish elements in the government.

To give the reader a better understanding of the coding system, two examples – one from a unified government and the other from a divided – will be examined. Coding each case means employing the three criteria discussed above: the power of the head of state, the distance between key foreign policymakers, and the frequency of disagreement.

Levi Eshkol's government from 1963-68 will be examined as a case of divided government. The first factor to look for is the Eshkol's personal power over the cabinet. A number of scholars unfavorably compare Eshkol's power to that of his predecessor Ben-Gurion.[12] While Ben-Gurion had significant control over Israel's foreign policy, Eshkol was a much less dominant figure, and none of the sources claim Eshkol was a powerful leader. The second point to study is the distance between the views of key foreign policymakers. With the creation of the unity government in 1967, Eshkol brought well-know hawks Dayan and Begin into the moderately dovish cabinet.

The scholarship highlights the difference between dovish Foreign Minister Eban and the hawkish Defense Minister Dayan.[13] In addition, nearly all the scholarship discusses the ideologically divided nature of the government, while there are no scholars claiming that the government was ideologically unified. Finally, the frequency of disagreement in the Eshkol government was also high. Initially the government faced regular attacks from Ben Gurion and his followers and Eshkol had to spend a great deal of time dealing with these problems.[14] Once the unity government was created, Dayan would often make pronouncements at odds with those of Eban and Eshkol.[15] On the other hand, none of the sources claimed that disagreement was infrequent.

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[12] See Zaki Shalom, *Ben-Gurion's Political Struggles, 1963-1967: A Lion in Winter* (New York: Routledge, 2006), 89; Shlomo Aronson, *Conflict and Bargaining in the Middle East: An Israeli Perspective* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978), 49.

[13] See Zeev Maoz, *Defending the Holy Land* (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2006), Chapter 3; Maxime Rodinson, *Israel and the Arabs*, trans. Michael Perl (New York: Pantheon Books, 1968), Chapter 5; Shlaim, *Iron Wall*, Chapter 6.

Looking back over the criteria, each of the three points receives a high score, particularly after the formation of the unity government. The high values for each of the factors means that a rating as a highly divided government (-2) is appropriate. From this example we can also see the impact of creating the unity government both increased the ideological heterogeneity of the government and the level of disagreement, causing the government to go from moderately to highly divided.

At the other end of the spectrum is the United States government from 1953-1960 under President Eisenhower. Once again employing the three factors, Eisenhower was a powerful leader whose personal popularity and military background boosted his status in the government.[16] This strength was particularly evident in defense affairs issues where Eisehower, based on his military service, tended to dominate. Eisenhower created a cabinet that represented moderate

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[14] See Maoz, *Defending the Holy Land*, Chapter 3; Aronson, *Conflict and Bargaining in the Middle East*, 67

[15] Shlaim, *Iron Wall*, Chapter 6.

[16] See Tom Wicker, *Dwight D. Eisenhower* (New York: Times Books, 2002); David Reinhard, *The Republican Right since 1945* (Lexington, KY: University of Kentucky Press, 1983).

Republican views on foreign policy, significantly excluding hard-liners such as Taft.[17]

The views of the three leading foreign policy specialists, Eisenhower, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, and Defense Secretary Charlie Wilson were all similar. Moreover, Eisenhower and Dulles had a very close relationship, and despite the image of the time that Eisenhower essentially abdicated foreign policy to Dulles, Eisenhower was intimately involved in the foreign policy process.[18] The relationship between Eisenhower and Wilson was less close, but Eisenhower's military background and interest in the area limited Wilson's influence.

Here again the criteria for government unity line up nicely. The leader of the government was powerful and used that power both to shape the cabinet and to prevent dissention. Further, while Defense Secretary Wilson did occasionally "pop off", showing some divisions within the government, such incidents were rare and did not reveal deep-seated differences in the government.[19] Combining these factors shows a highly unified government that received a score of 2.

### *Government Views on Force*

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[17] See Ronald J. Caridi, *The Korean War and American Politics: The Republican Party as a Case Study* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1968), Chapter 8; William Stueck, *Rethinking the Korean War: A New Diplomatic and Strategic History* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002), 170; David Anderson, *Trapped by Success: The Eisenhower Administration and Vietnam, 1953-1961* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991), 19.

[18] See Peter Boyle, *Eisenhower* (New York: Pearson Education Limited 2005), 37; Robert Bowie and Richard Immerman, *Waging Peace: How Eisenhower Shaped an Enduring Cold War Strategy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), 55.

[19] Wicker, *Dwight D. Eisenhower*, 18.

Politician's views on international relations are often placed along a hawk-dove continuum based on their position on the use of force. Hawks are more willing to support the use of force to resolve international disputes and less willing to make compromises to reach a settlement. When it comes to territorial disputes, hawks often take a maximalist position that the entire territory belongs to the state in question and that it will be protected through the use of military force, if necessary. For states that may be challenged in a territorial dispute, hawks rely on their deterrent capabilities to prevent attacks. The Israeli government under Menachem Begin after 1982 was particularly hawkish. In addition to Begin, the leading figures in the cabinet – Defense Minister Ariel Sharon, Foreign Minister Yitzhak Shamir, and Lieutenant General Rafael Eitan – were all characterized by hawkish views and belief in the efficacy of force to resolve Israel's foreign policy problems. This mindset led the group to eschew negotiations and instead launch a conflict with Lebanon.

Unlike hawks, doves eschew the use of force to resolve international conflicts and seek solutions through mediation and compromise. In the case of territorial disputes, doves are more willing to negotiate and believe that future peaceful relations depend on a compromised solution rather than an imposed decision. Doves are also more likely to recognize some of the claims of the potential challenger in the dispute as legitimate. The Indian government under Nehru was diplomatic in its relations with China regarding the two nations' border dispute. Throughout the 1950s Nehru negotiated with the Chinese over the disputed area and rejected calls for military actions against the Chinese in 1950 and 1959. Until the early 1960s, Nehru firmly believed that the dispute between the two states could be resolved peacefully and on a number of occasions recognized some legitimacy to China's claims.[20]

It should also be noted that being a hawkish government does not preclude one from taking part in negotiations nor does being a dovish government mean that a state cannot employ force. The hawkish and dovish labels represent central tendencies for the governments in question. Thus, even the most dovish governments do not want to be bullied and thus must occasionally take military action. Similarly, the most hawkish governments may find advantages to negotiating from a position of strength. This is hardly surprising, since few people or governments are so ideologically dogmatic that they are continually consistent. Rather, as with government unity, it is necessary to look at the overall thrust of government rhetoric and policy and decide its position.

As with government unity, hawkishness may change over the course of a given government. The most obvious factor driving such changes is shifting the makeup of the government in a way that empowers the opposite viewpoint. For example, adding a hawk to a divided moderate government might shift the balance of power in favor of more hard-line views. Shifts in a government's hawkishness are rarer than shifts in the government's unity as shifts in the composition of the government are unlikely to radically change the government's general character.

A government's placement on the hawk-dove scale comes from studying second-hand historical analyses of leaders and political parties. The coding of the government is based on the makeup of the cabinet. As with government unity, coding of the views on the use of force comes from key foreign policy decision makers. These coding decisions reflect their views (and, over time, actions) and not the manifestos of their political parties.

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[20] For more on Sino-Indian relations under Nehru see the chapter on unified doves.

Political party manifestos have two significant problems with respect to the coding on government views on force. First, such manifestos often tend to emphasize peaceful efforts to resolve conflict over the use of force, regardless of politicians actual views on dispute resolution. Second, the politicians representing the party in the cabinet may not reflect the views on force expressed in the party manifesto. It is not uncommon, particularly for large centrist parties, such as the Israeli Labor Party or the Indian Congress Party, to have leaders whose views on the use of force are at variance with the party manifesto.

It is also important to note that while governments may generally be viewed as hawkish or dovish, how they are viewed by a particular country may be quite different. Thus, while Margaret Thatcher's government is viewed as hawkish (although much of that reputation came *after* the Falklands War), in its relationship to Argentina it was generally dovish. At the same time, it is also possible for state to behave quite differently towards two simultaneous territorial disputes. Thus, India can take a generally hard-line towards Pakistan over Kashmir in the 1950s while pursuing a much softer line towards its territorial dispute China during the same period.

Once again to clarify the coding process two examples will be presented – one hawkish and one dovish – to clarify how the coding procedures employed. The

Indian government under Prime Minister Vajpayee represents a hawkish government. The leading member of the coalition, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), had long stressed taking a tougher line with both China and India and criticized previous governments as being overly accommodating. In addition the party had a long history of taking a hard line with Pakistan, and Muslims generally.[21]

Prime Minister Vajpayee himself had long been a leader in of the Hindu nationalist movement that partially defined itself in opposition to Pakistan. The cabinet included some other well-known hawks including Home Minister L.K. Advani, who made provocative statements both after the government took power and following the nuclear tests.[22] The hawkishness of the government was further emphasized by its decision to test a nuclear weapon in 1998, a provocative act that led to international criticism and a rival test by Pakistan. Other provocative decisions taken by the government included a "hot pursuit" policy of terrorists into Kashmir that some feared could spark a war.[23]

To code the Vajpayee government as hawkish, a number of factors were taken into account. The first were the leanings of Vajpayee's top ministers, who were generally hawkish. In addition, the leading party in the coalition government had a long history of hawkish positions vis-à-vis both Pakistan and China. Finally, many of the first actions of the government reflected a hawkish stance, most notably on the nuclear weapons testing issue. These factors combined to justify a coding as very hawkish (2).

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[21] See Keshav Mishra, *Rapprochement across the Himalayas: Emerging India-China Relations in the Post Cold War Period (1947-2003)* (New Dehli: Kalpaz Publications, 2004), 181; Victoria Schofield, *Kashmir in Conflict: India, Pakistan and the Unfinished War* (New York: I.B. Tauris, 2000), 205; Apurba Kundu, "The NDA and National Security," in *Coalition Politics and Hindu Nationalism*, ed. Katharine Adeney and Lawrence Saez (New York: Routledge, 2005), 214; C. P. Thakur and Devendra P. Sharma, *India under Atal Behari Vajpayee : The BJP Era* (New Delhi: UBS Publishers' Distributors, 1999), 134.

[22] C.P. Bhambri, *BJP-Led Government and Elections 1999* (New Delhi: Shipra Publications, 2000), 86.

[23] Sreeram Chailia, "BJP, India's Foreign Policy and The 'Realist Alternative' To the Nehruvian Tradition," *International Politics* 39 (2002), 224.

A strong contrast can be drawn between Vajpayee's BJP-led government and Yitzhak Rabin's Labor-led government in Israel between 1992 and 1995. Rabin led a dovish government that actively pursued peace with a number of Israel's former adversaries. The first factor in coding the Israeli government were the stances taken by Rabin and other leading government members during the election campaign of 1992.[24] During this campaign Rabin and others made it clear they would pursue peace with the Palestinians, Jordan, and Syria, once in office.

Further, at least since 1977, Labor established itself as the party that took a softer line on negotiations over Israel's border, unlike rival Likud which took a harder line. In forming his cabinet, Rabin sought to create a "peace bloc" which included the most dovish parties in Israeli politics.[25] Rabin (who acted as his own defense minister) and Foreign Minister Shimon Peres were both committed to a peace process with the Palestinians. Finally, once in office Rabin took a number of conciliatory steps including halting settlements in the occupied territories.[26]

Taking these factors together a picture of a dovish government emerges. First, the top policymakers' views were surveyed and found to be dovish. Further, the Labor party which was the dominant member of the coalition was dovish, as were most of the other parties in the coalition. The initial actions of the government once in power also reflected a dovish outlook. The only factors preventing Rabin's government from being coded as highly dovish are the inclusion of the rightist Shas Party and Rabin's own views on the use of force. While substantial evidence exists that Rabin's views evolved over time, he was still viewed as more pragmatic than dovish in his outlook.[27] Taking all these factors into account, Rabin's government is coded as moderately dovish (-1).

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[24] Dan Kurzman, *Soldier of Peace: The Life of Yitzhak Rabin* (New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 1998), 439; David Horovitz, ed., *Yitzhak Rabin: Soldier of Peace* (London: Peter Halban, 1996), 112.
[25] Kurzman, *Soldier of Peace*, 431.
[26] Linda Benedikt, *Yitzhak Rabin: The Battle for Peace* (London: Haus Books, 2005), 133; Martin Gilbert, *Israel: A History* (New York: William Morrow and Company, 1998), 552-554.

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[27] David Makovsky, *Making Peace with the PLO* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1996), 86.

# Appendix B: List of dyads in the dataset and period covered

| Country A | Country B | Years |
|---|---|---|
| United Kingdom | Argentina | 1950-2000 |
| United Kingdom | Spain | 1950-2000 |
| United Kingdom | Egypt | 1950-1956 |
| West Germany | East Germany | 1955-1972 |
| West Germany | Poland | 1955-1970 |
| West Germany | Czechoslovakia | 1955-1973 |
| West Germany | France | 1955-1957 |
| United States | North Korea | 1950-2000 |
| United States | North Vietnam | 1954-1975 |
| Turkey | Greece | 1950-1974 |
| Japan | Soviet Union/Russia | 1952-2000 |
| Japan | China | 1952-2000 |
| Japan | South Korea | 1952-2000 |
| Israel | Egypt | 1950-2000 |
| Israel | Syria | 1950-2000 |
| Israel | Lebanon | 1950-2000 |
| Israel | Jordan | 1950-2000 |
| India | China | 1950-2000 |
| India | Pakistan | 1950-2000 |

# Appendix C: Coding Sources

## General Sources

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## Germany

**Leader:** Konrad Adenaur
**Party:** Christian Democratic Union
**Years:** 1949 – 1963
**Hawk/Dove:** -1, 1 (East Germany)
**Government Unity:** 2; 0 (1961-1963)
**Evidence:** In the early years of the Federal Republic, Adenauer exercised considerable influence over foreign policy, encountering only two major clashes with colleagues over foreign policy issues. The Chancellor had a strong, dogmatic personality that allowed him to dominate policy decision-making; he frequently made decisions without consulting his cabinet (Kaarbo, 1997, 566). A 1963 *Nation* article described his time in office as “virtually without a government crisis and with an authority envied by the statesmen of the democracies” (Abosch, 1963, 29). However, Adenauer’s control was shaken toward the end of his chancellorship due to the complex partisan makeup of his Cabinet, which forced him to account for the critical views of his coalition partners (Irving, 2002, 199). In the 1961 election the coalition between the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and the Free Democratic Party (FDP) broke, and Adenauer lost the support of key figures in his government including Ludwig Erhard, Eugen Gerstemeier, Gerhard Schroder, Franz-Josef Strauss and Heinrich von Bertano. Adenauer was a strong advocate of reconciliation with France and Western Europe and emphasized a strong defense as an adjunct of foreign policy (Irving, 2002, 89). His primary goal as Chancellor was to rebuild Germany as

a sovereign, free, and democratic state and was willing to give up Germany's Communist territories in order to achieve these objectives as in the case of the Saarland (Irving, 2002, 121). However, although Adenauer desired the reunification of Germany, he was not willing to meet the concessions of Soviet Russia or its satellite states and maintained West Germany's international claim to represent all Germans (Banchoff, 1999, 25).

**Leader:** Ludwig Erhard
**Party:** Christian Democratic Union
**Years:** 1963-1966
**Hawk/Dove:** -1
**Government Unity: -**1
**Evidence:** Erhard lacked the strong, authoritative leadership personified by Adenauer, and he did not have the prestige and skill to control fractional disputes or quell competing policy demands (Edinger, 1986, 156). Debate about whether to support the U.S. or France caused a polarization of political viewpoints and raised debate within and across party lines. Erhard was attacked by the Gaullists within his own party as well as chided by his coalition partners; the CDU/CSU acted as the unofficial opposition on some major foreign policy issues. The opposition on the Right was particularly effective due to its leverage in the cabinet and the CDU/CSU and was successful in obstructing the establishment of diplomatic relations with Rumania and resisted opportunities for exploratory talks with Czechoslovakia. The Gaullists also were successful in modifying the conciliatory language of Erhard's "Peace Note." Erhard suffered from ineffectiveness as chancellor and a loss of prestige to the point that rivals within his own party were making plans to topple him. "Erhard, handicapped by a divided party and coalition as well as by his personal shortcomings, was doubly ill-equipped to deal with the situation (Hanrieder and Auton, 1980, 83-87). Erhard continued a dovish foreign policy, emphasizing conciliation and negotiation. Erhard's 'Peace Note' of 1966 offered bilateral renunciation of force agreements to the states of the Warsaw Pact. However, the agreement excluded the GDR and insisted that Germany's prewar borders constitute the basis for future relations with East Germany (Banchoff, 1999, 59). Thus he was unwilling to make crucial concessions in some border disputes.

**Leader:** Kurt Georg Kiesinger
**Party:** Christian Democratic Union
**Years:** 1967 - 1969
**Hawk/Dove:**-1, 1 (East Germany)
**Government Unity:** 0
**Evidence:** Kiesinger's governing style was "like a board chairman who is at most first among equals" (Edinger, 1986, 158). His weak leadership constrained his use of his formal powers and prevented his autonomy in determining government policy. Under Kiesinger, institutional responsibility for the conduct of foreign affairs was blurred; Brandt, in the foreign office, was clearly the innovator in foreign

policymaking. For the most part, Kiesinger worked in tandem with Brandt and his SPD Deputy Chancellor (Edinger, 1986, 245), and although Brandt disagreed with Kiesinger on many policies, his public statements indicated an amicable relationship between the two (Binder, 1975, 225). However, Brandt occasionally made public statements in contradiction to the policies set out by the Chancellor. For example, his address regarding the Oder-Neisse line went against a declaration by the Chancellor's the previous week stating that Bonn could not recognize the boundary at that time. Futhermore, the Grand Coalition was working at cross-purposes, with the more conservative CDU/CSU elements acting as a constant brake on more innovative SPD elements. In 1969, these divisions lead to considerable stagnation of foreign policy. However, the internal conflict was muted from the public for the sake of electoral politics (Hanrieder and Auton, 1980, 88-89). Kiesinger sought to soften lines between East and West Germany. In an April 12, 1967 speech he declared, "We want to get rid of the cramps, rather than harden up, to overcome the gap rather than deepen it" (Binder, 1975, 226).

**Leader:** Willy Brandt
**Party:** Social Democratic Party of Germany
**Years:** 1970 - 1974
**Hawk/Dove:** -2
**Government Unity:** 1; -2 (1972)
**Evidence:** Under his first cabinet, Brandt was a charismatic leader who "symbolized the union of power and intellect" (Marshall, 1997, 82). Brandt had worldwide prestige as a statesman to play the role of a conciliator in foreign affairs, and during his term the SPD and FDP elites collaborated fairly easily on foreign policy issues (Edinger , 1986, 159-60). However, his easygoing style of leadership allowed intraparty conflicts in the SPD to mount. Brandt's leadership suffered greatly under his second cabinet. Internal bickering among Brandt's advisors left him without a supportive staff. Brandt suffered a severe loss of authority as he was criticized both within the cabinet and publicly by his most important colleagues, Schmidt and Wehner. Brandt's *Ostpolitik* was fundamentally a policy of resignation designed to achieve general rapprochement with the East (Hanrieder, 1980, 28). In his first government declaration in October 1969, Brandt signaled his readiness to engage Soviet leaders in a wide-ranging dialogue based upon an acceptance of the territorial status quo, thus removing the largest obstacle to better relations with the Soviets (Banchoff, 1999, 61). Brandt's opening speech as Chancellor to parliament announced a continuity of a policy of renunciation of the use of force to the GDR.

## India

**Leader:** Jawaharlal Nehru
**Party:** Congress
**Years:** 1950-1963
**Hawk/Dove:** Pakistan: 1; China: -2, -1 (1960, 1961, 1962), 0 (1963)

**Government Unity:** 2, 1 (1963)
**Evidence:** Nehru was a powerful force in Indian politics and very difficult to challenge, and prior to the invasion has still exerted great power (Murtaza, 1998, 116, 196; Sandhu, 1988, 98; Brass, 1994, 36; Thakur, 1994, 63-64). Criticism of Nehru's China policy began to mount after 1961 (Murtaze, 1998, 133). Nehru constantly tried to reach a peaceful settlement with the Chinese (Jain, 1986, 125; Sandhu, 1988, Chapter 4; Jetly, 1979, 164). With Pakistan, Nehru negotiated but took a relatively hard-line (Blinkenberg, 1972, Chapter 5). Nehru acted as his own foreign minister and was very close with his defense minister Menon (Bernard, 2001, 229; Sandhu, 1988, 149).

**Leader:** Lal Shastri
**Party:** Congress
**Years:** 1964-1965
**Hawk/Dove:** China: 0; Pakistan: -1, 0 (1966)
**Government Unity:** -2
**Evidence:** Following the powerful Nehru, Shastri was seen as the weak leader of a caretaker government and internal critics were ready to pounce on his mistakes (Rizvi, 1986, 108; Singh, 1980, 62; Blinkenberg, 1972, 239). Pakistan took India's mild response in the Rann of Kutch dispute as a sign of weakness and indecisive leadership (Ganguly, 1994, 73; Rizvi, 1986, 111). While Shastri was dovish and came into office seeking improved relations with Pakistan, hawks within the government put increasing pressure on him, particularly after the Rann of Kutch incident (Dixit, 2002, 143; Singh, 1980, 75; Bernard, 2001, 253).
**Sources:**

**Leader:** Indira Gandhi
**Party:** Congress
**Years:** 1966-1976, 1980-1984
**Hawk/Dove:** 0
**Government Unity:** -2, 2 (1971-1976, 1980-1984)
**Evidence:** Following her ascension to power and the elections of 1967, there were serious divisions within the Congress party and by 1969 Gandhi worried that elements within Congress wanted to overthrow her (Dixit, 2002, Chapter 5; Bernard, 2001, 290-94). Policies towards Pakistan became more moderate particularly in the early years of her government, and she showed herself to be a realist in international relations (Dixit, 2002, 167; Bernard, 2001, 309). Following elections in 1971 and the split of the Congress party, Gandhi was able to consolidate her power (Brass, 1994, 39). During the state of emergency beginning in 1975, Gandhi arrested opposition members and further asserted her control (Brass, 1994, 41). Returning to power in 1980 Gandhi pursued similar policies to those of her first term. She conducted negotiations with both China and Pakistan over the respective border disputes (Bernard, 2001, 396-97, Chengappa, 2004, Chapter 4).

**Leader:** Morarki Desai
**Party:** Janata
**Years:** 1977-1979
**Hawk/Dove:** 1
**Government Unity:** -2
**Evidence:** For the first time in Indian history, the opposition took over power from Congress. Janata was composed of five groups (Bernard, 2001, 361). Serious struggles broke out between coalition members, each of which drew on different constituencies, eventually leading to the government's downfall (Brass, 1994, 85; Khan, 2000, 156). Desai followed a hard-line policy with respect to the dispute with China and put the onus on China to make concessions (Chengappa, 2004, 174)

**Leader:** Rajiv Gandhi
**Party:** Congress
**Years:** 1985-1989
**Hawk/Dove:** 0; -1 (China)
**Government Unity:** 0
**Evidence:** The government suffered from serious divisions particularly between Gandhi and Nehru, which led to numerous cabinet reshuffles (Bernard, 2001, 421). However, Gandhi also tended to make major decisions on his own and held the defense portfolio for a number of years, and Congress remained highly centralized under his leadership (Bajpai, et al., 1995, 42-43; Brass, 1994, 73). Gandhi's foreign policy was quite similar to his mother's (Bernard, 2001, 428). A dialogue between India and Pakistan and China continued during his time in power, although Gandhi also launched Operation Brasstacks which brought India and Pakistan close to war and the resignation of the foreign minister (Bernard, 2001, Chapter 16; Thakur, 1994, 48; Bajpai, et al., 1995, 33-34). On the China front, however, Gandhi made improving relations a top priority from his first days in office (Chengappa, 2004, 178).

**Leader:** V.P. Singh
**Party:** Janata
**Year:** 1990
**Hawk/Dove:** 1
**Government Unity:** -2
**Evidence:** The Janata coalition included the nationalistic BJP among its members and often relied upon tough rhetoric in international relations (Ganguly, 2001, 94; Ganguly and Hagerty 2005, 92). Particularly in relations with Pakistan, the government took a hard-line (Dixit, 2003, 215). This broad coalition included both the far-right and far-left as outside supporters of this minority government and was quite fractious (Brass, 1994, 86; Khan, 2000, 158-59; Dixit, 2003, 210).

**Leader:** Chandra Shekhar
**Party:** Janata

**Year:** 1991
**Hawk/Dove:** 0
**Government Unity:** -2
**Evidence:** Shekhar took over the coalition after the BJP withdrew its support from the coalition government. In fact, Shekhar had exploited divisions within the National Front coalition to make himself Prime Minister (Khan, 2000, 159). Thus, while the government lost the right-wing BJP, it did not become significantly more unified (Khan, 2000, 160). The departure of the BJP decreased the hawkishness of the government, and Shekhar took a softer line with India's neighbors (Dixit, 2003, 216-17).

**Leader:** Narasimha Rao
**Party:** Congress
**Years:** 1991-1995
**Hawk/Dove:** -1
**Government Unity:** 1
**Evidence:** Rao was committed to moving toward solutions in India's disputes with Pakistan and China and held generally dovish views (Deepak, 2004, 338; Bernard, 2001, Chapter 17; Shah, 1992, 153). In both cases Rao focused on improving the channels of communication and increasing the contacts between the countries (Dixit, 2003, 219). The minority government Rao led survived a number of no confidence votes during its tenure. While less charismatic than his immediate predecessors, Rao was adept at managing conflict within the government (Bernard, 2001, 448).

**Leader:** Deve Gowda
**Party:** United Front
**Years:** 1996
**Hawk/Dove:** -1
**Government Unity:** -1
**Evidence:** The United Front formed a minority government with outside Congress support. Although it was made up of 13 parties, the UF was united, although serious divisions did exist between the UF and Congress which eventually led to the fall of the government (Khan, 2000, 162-63). The large number of regional parties in the government also made it difficult to formulate a coherent foreign policy (Dixit, 2003, 232). Gowda and his foreign minister Gujral pursued a soft-line foreign policy to decrease tensions in the region (Dixit, 2003, 222).

**Leader:** IK Gujral
**Party:** United Front
**Years:** 1997
**Hawk/Dove:** -1
**Government Unity:** -1
**Evidence:** Gurjal continued the soft-line policies he initiated under the Gowda government (Schofield, 2000, 195; Dixit, 2003, 222). The coalition government

Gurjal headed experienced many of the same tensions experienced by the previous government and was viewed as somewhat indecisive (Dixit, 2003, 234).

**Leader:** Atal Behari Vajpayee
**Party:** BJP
**Years:** 1998-2000
**Hawk/Dove:** 1
**Government Unity:** -1, -2 (1999)
**Evidence:** The BJP government came to power wishing to emphasize national security and take a firmer hand in its dealing with China and Pakistan (Mishra, 2004, 181; Schofield, 2000, 205; Kundu, 2005, 214; Thakur, 1999, 134). The early decision to test nuclear weapons was seen as hawkish behavior in both China and Pakistan (Dixit, 2003, 446). However, attempts were made to improve relations with China from 1999 on (Kundu, 2005, 230). An already weak coalition government was viewed as even weaker for part of 1999 following a no confidence vote which hamstrung the government until elections later in the year (Wirsing, 2003, 67; Dixit, 2003, 447).

## Israel

Leader: David Ben-Gurion
Party: Mapai (Labor)
Years: 1950-1953
Hawk/Dove: 1
Government Unity: 1, -2 1953
Evidence: Ben-Gurion was a powerful figure in the cabinet, and although Sharett often disagreed with him, resistance was minimal. Further Ben-Gurion took a hard line with regards to territorial issues, particularly with Jordan (Shlaim, 2000, Chapter 2). Further, from the pre-independence era he gained a reputation as a hawk (Aronson, 1978, 8) Ben-Gurion left government in summer 1953 and government became much more divided under Sharett (see below).

**Leader:** Moshe Sharett
**Party:** Mapai (Labor)
**Years:** 1954-1955
**Hawk/Dove:** -1
**Government Unity:** -2, -1 (1955)
**Evidence:** Sharett was well known for his policy of restraint with regard to Arab raids and strongly supported negotiations with the Arabs (Shlaim, 2000, Chapter 3; Rodinson, 1968, Chapter 3). Sharett's views were perceived as dovish, and received intense criticism inside and outside the government. Defense Minister Lavon acted without Sharett's approval on a number of occasions (Moaz, 2006, ; Shlaim, 2000, Chapter 2). In 1954 Sharett created a senior committee to deal with defense issues,

which included Lavon and Dayan, both strong hawks (Shlaim, 2000, Chapter 3). Ben-Gurion rejoined the government with the defense portfolio in 1955, and then replaced Sharett as Prime Minister in mid-summer increasing the government unity (Shlaim, 2000, Chapter 3).

**Leader:** David Ben-Gurion
**Party:** Mapai (Labor)
**Years:** 1956-1962
**Hawk/Dove:** 1
**Government Unity:** 1
**Evidence:** In mid-1956 Sharett resigned from the cabinet and was replaced by the much more hawkish Meir. Ben-Gurion took the Mapai losses in the 1955 elections as a criticism of Sharett's moderate policies (Rodinson, 1968, Chapter 3). Only opposition to war with Egypt in the cabinet came from Mapam ministers (they were also the last informed of the decision by Ben-Gurion) (Shlaim, 2000, Chapter 4). Following the war in 1956, Ben-Gurion's prestige was greatly enhanced and he had a "near-monopoly in the making of foreign and defense policy" (Shlaim, 2000, 188;). Further, Ben-Gurion wanted the Knesset to impede him as little as possible and thought it undermined Israel democracy (Goldberg, 2003, Chapter 3). Ben-Gurion also tried to position himself between the most extreme hawks and the moderates (Aronson, 1978). While less expansionist than Begin, Ben-Gurion was adamant about not giving up territory (Rodinson, 1968, Chapter 5).

**Leader:** Levi Eshkol
**Party:** Mapai (Labor)
**Years:** 1963-1968
**Hawk/Dove:** -1, 0 (1967, 1968)
**Government Unity:** -1, -2 (1967, 1968)
**Evidence:** Eshkol was viewed as much less powerful than Ben-Gurion (Shalom, 2006, 89; Aronson, 1978, 49). Soon after Eshkol took office, Ben-Gurion led a campaign against him, and eventually defected to form his own Rafi party and Eshkol spent much of his time fighting them off (Maoz, 2006, Chapter 3; Aronson, 1978, 67). Eshkol was viewed as easygoing and sought to resolve problems with Egypt through diplomatic means, after the 1964 elections the dovish Eban became foreign minister (Moaz, 2006, Chapter 3; Rodinson, 1968, Chapter 5). Under heavy pressure from the right, particularly Rafi and Gahal, Eshkol created a unity government in 1967. The unity government included hawkish leaders Dayan as defense minister and Begin as minister without portfolio, which further divided the cabinet (Shlaim, 2000, Chapter 6; Segev, 2007, Chapter 22).

**Leader:** Golda Meir
**Party:** Mapai (Labor)
**Years:** 1969-1973
**Hawk/Dove:** 1

**Government Unity:** -1, -2 (1969)
**Evidence:** Although dovish Eban was the foreign minister, Meir stripped him of his power, while empowering hawks Dayan and Galilee (Korn, 1992, 142; Shlaim, 2000, 286; Insight Team, 1974, 64). Meir was generally viewed as hawkish and a strong leader (Roberts, 1990, 36; Maoz, 2006, 122; Shlaim, 2000, 284). In 1970 the unity government crumbled and Gahal left the government. Divisions in the cabinet led to persistent deadlock (Aronson, 1978, 236).

**Leader:** Yitzhak Rabin
**Party:** Labor
**Years:** 1974-1976
**Hawk/Dove:** 0
**Government Unity:** -2
**Evidence:** During his tenure Rabin was constantly challenged by Peres and suffered from extreme infighting (Roberts, 1990, 37; Schlaim, 2000, 326; Peretz, 1988, 32). The 1967 war provoked a ten year crisis in party unity on foreign policy for Labor (Roberts, 1990, 123). Despite pressure from some cabinet ministers, notably Allon, Rabin refused to involve Israel in Lebanon (Peleg, 1987, 147).

**Leader:** Menachem Begin
**Party:** Likud
**Years:** 1977-1983
**Hawk/Dove:** 2
**Government Unity:** 1, -1 (1979, 1980), 2 (1981, 1982, 1983)
**Evidence:** Begin dominated the party and laid the ideological basis for its program (Roberts, 1990, Chapter 7). Once in power there were increasing divisions within Likud, but Begin was generally able to suppress them (Roberts, 1990, Chapter 7). During and following the peace process with Egypt, the greatest opposition to Begin came from within Likud, but most dared not challenge Begin (Rabil, 2003, 153). Significant differences between the first Begin government 1977-1981 and the second 1981-1983, as all the moderating influences had been removed in the second government (Peleg, 1987, 147). Following the 1981 elections Begin forced out moderates Weizman, Yadin, and Dayan, while bringing in hawks Shamir, Arens, and Sharon (Yaniv, 1987, 92). For the first time in Israeli history the people in charge of the key defense and foreign affairs posts were uniformly hawkish in their views (Schiff and Ya'ari, 1984, 39; Shindler, 1995, 114))

**Leader:** Yitzhak Shamir
**Party:** Likud
**Years:** 1984
**Hawk/Dove:** 1
**Government Unity:** -1
**Evidence:** The second grand coalition in Israeli history, and the presence of Labor greatly restrained the actions of Likud (Yaniv, 1987, 278). Little foreign policy

coordination existed as Perez sought peace agreements while Shamir sought to undercut them (Peretz, 1988, 39). Shamir was a less dominant leader than Begin, but still a hawk (Shindler, 1995, 192; Schiff and Ya'ari, 1984, 39).

**Leader:** Shimon Peres
**Party:** Labor
**Years:** 1985-1986
**Hawk/Dove:** 0
**Government Unity:** -2
**Evidence:** Peres assumed power in the grand coalition on a rotating basis. Major disagreements existed about foreign policy (Peretz, 1988, 39). To gain broader acceptance in Labor, Peres moderated his hawkish views and actively worked to negotiate (Roberts, 1990, 39; Shlaim, 2000, Chapter 11). Peres and Shamir were very far apart ideologically, although Rabin (the defense minister) tended to support Peres (Shlaim, 2000, 427).

**Leader:** Yitzhak Shamir
**Party:** Likud
**Years:** 1987-1991
**Hawk/Dove:** 1, 2 (1990, 1991)
**Government Unity:** -2, 1 (1990, 1991)
**Evidence:** Under the rotating Prime Ministership Shamir took power in 1987. The presence of Labor greatly restrained the actions of Likud (Yaniv, 1987, 278). Little foreign policy coordination existed as Perez sought peace agreements while Shamir sought to undercut them (Peretz, 1988, 39; Shlaim, 2000, 426). After 1990 Shamir was at the helm of a very hawkish administration, but with some divisions particularly with the far right (Shindler, 1995, 262; Shlaim, 2000, 471). Still, all those in prominent positions (Foreign Minister Levy and Defense Minister Moshe Arens) were solid hawks (Shlaim, 2000, 471). Shamir was a less dominant leader than Begin, but still a hawk (Shindler, 1995, 192; Schiff and Ya'ari, 1984, 39).

**Leader:** Yitzhak Rabin
**Party:** Labor
**Years:** 1992-1995
**Hawk/Dove:** -1
**Government Unity:** 1
**Evidence:** By holding the defense minister post and constraining the independent action of Foreign Minister Peres, Rabin exerted an unparalled control over Israeli foreign policy (Shlaim, 2000, 505). Although Rabin's coalition included the conservative Shas party, it was generally uniform on its views on the peace process (Rabil, 2003, 157). Rabin benefited from pervious experience as Prime Minister and knew how to use the levers of power to manage the cabinet (Lockery, 1999, 19). Both Rabin and Peres were committed to the peace process and the cabinet was very dovish (Shlaim, 2000, 503).

**Leader:** Simon Peres
**Party:** Labor
**Years:** 1996
**Hawk/Dove:** -1
**Government Unity:** 1
**Evidence:** Peres worked to continue Rabin's peace proposals and legacy of negotiation (Enderlin, 2002, 19). Peres, since his time as Prime Minister in the 1980s had been very committed to the peace process (Shlaim, 2000, 506). As Rabin had before him, Peres occupied both the position of prime minister and defense minister, as Barak took control of the foreign ministry. Carrying Rabin's mantel of peace following the assassination, Peres exerted power through enormous personal popularity (Shlaim, 2000, 552).

**Leader:** Benjamin Netanyahu
**Party:** Likud
**Years:** 1996-1999
**Hawk/Dove:** 2
**Government Unity:** 0
**Evidence:** Netanyahu headed a very broad coalition of the right and center, which included seven parties. Although Netanyahu was the first directly elected prime minister in Israeli history, he was not able to marginalize the cabinet as he wished and, in fact suffered from more internal dissention than Rabin (Lockery, 1999, 14; Shlaim, 2000, 569). Netanyahu himself was very hawkish in his views and sought to undo some elements of the peace process (Shlaim, 2000, 564). The cabinet contained a number of hard-line ministers who Netanyahu sought to appease, particularly with respect to possible land transfers (Lockery, 1999, 15).

**Leader:** Ehud Barak
**Party:** Labor
**Years:** 2000
**Hawk/Dove:** 0
**Government Unity:** 1
**Evidence:** In the second direct election of the prime minister in Israel, Barak was able to score an enormous victory. He used his personal popularity to dominate the cabinet (Enderlin, 2002, 108). Although he had a history of hawkishness, Barak wanted to continue the peace process while providing security (Shlaim, 2000, 608).

## Japan

**Leader:** Yoshida Shigeru
**Party:** Liberal
**Years:** 1952-1954
**Hawk/Dove:** 1

**Government Unity:** -1, 1 (1952)
**Evidence:** During the period of factional dominance, only members of the president's own faction or close associations within the LDP were appointed to the key post of secretary general in order to better control the party (Shinoda, 2000, 10). However, during Yoshida's final two years in office he faced significant turmoil within the LDP (Dower, 1979). At the San Francisco Peace Conference, Yoshida pushed for the recognition of disputed territories as Japanese (Yoshida, 2007).

**Leader:** Hatoyama Ichiro
**Party:** Democratic
**Years:** 1955-1956
**Hawk/Dove:** 1
**Government Unity:** -2
**Evidence:** The merger of the Liberal and Democratic parties brought together two different views of foreign policy, and differing outlooks between the more dovish Hatoyama and his more hawkish Foreign Minister Shigemitsu (Hara, 1998, 80; Hellmann, 1969, 33). No agreement within the ruling coalition over how to approach China or the Soviet Union (Mendl, 1978, 18; Hellmann, 1969, 48; Hellmann, 1972, 52). The government took a hard-line with respect to Korea despite US pressure to reach an accord (Hook, et al., 2001, 204).

**Leader:** Kishi Nobusuke
**Party:** Liberal Democratic
**Years:** 1957-1960
**Hawk/Dove:** 2
**Government Unity:** 1, -1 (1960)
**Evidence:** Serious factional disagreement came out in 1960 over what some perceived as Kishi's hard-line leadership (Richardson, 1997, 76). Kishi took a tough line with China which eventually led to the severing of trade relations between the two sides (Mendl, 1978, 19; Hook, et al., 2001, 191, Hamaguchi-Klenner, 1981, 38; Jain, 1977, 125). This posture also strained relations with South Korea (Hook, et al., 2001, 204).

**Leader:** Ikeda Hayato
**Party:** Liberal Democratic
**Years:** 1961-1964
**Hawk/Dove:** 1
**Government Unity:** 1
**Evidence:** The hard-line attitude of the Kishi government continued under Ikeda, particularly with respect to China and South Korea (Hook, et al., 2001; Hamaguchi-Klenner, 1981, 40). However, as Kishi's government was undone due to a controversy over foreign relations, Ikeda emphasized friendly relations between Japan and nearby states (Lee, 1976, 141; Jain, 1977, 125; Hellmann, 1972, 69). Less serious divisions existed over foreign policy.

**Leader:** Sato Eisaku
**Party:** Liberal Democratic
**Years:** 1965-1972
**Hawk/Dove:** 1
**Government Unity:** 2, -1 (1970-1972)
**Evidence:** Sato was skilled at managing factional alliances and defuse challenges to his power (Curtis, 1988, 99). All Sato's most significant rivals died within three months of him taking office, leading to a very strong position (Hellmann, 1972, 53). Although before taking office Sato talked of conciliatory measures with China, once in office he took a harder line and followed U.S. policy closely (Mendl, 1978, 25; Zhao, 1993, 73; Hook, et al., 2001, 191; Hamaguchi-Klenner, 1981, 46; Jain, 1977, 50). The publication on a 'unified view' on China in 1964, formulated by the hard-line Foreign Ministry, guided Japanese policy for the next seven years (Mendl, 1978, 48). However, divisions over China increased after 1970 as a large faction favored changing the traditional Japanese stance (Hook, et al., 2001, 192)

**Leader:** Tanaka Kakuei
**Party:** Liberal Democratic
**Years:** 1973-1974
**Hawk/Dove:** 0
**Government Unity:** -1
**Evidence:** In his efforts to succeed Sato, Tanaka made it clear his views on China differed from Sato's and that he would seek better relations with China (Zhao, 1993, 75; Hamaguchi-Klenner, 1981, 55). Tanaka's rapprochement with China was opposed by large sections of the party and continued throughout his time in office, leading to speculation the party might split (Richardson, 1997, 77).

**Leader:** Miki Takeo
**Party:** Liberal Democratic
**Years:** 1975-1976
**Hawk/Dove:** -1, 1 (Soviet Union)
**Government Unity:** -2
**Evidence:** Weaker control existed for Prime Ministers during this period and greater factional conflicts occurred. Intra-party fighting drove Miki from office (Shinoda, 2000, 10-11). Serious factional split between the followers of Tanaka and Fukuda led to the Kaku-Fuku war lasting through several governments and limiting Miki's power (Richardson, 1997, 65; Jain, 1977, 116). Miki was viewed as a weak Prime Minister and only controlled a small section of the party (Hamaguchi-Klenner, 1981, 61). He was also viewed as overly soft on communism by rightist members of the party (Richardson, 1997, 77-78). However, the government took a tough line against the Soviet Union (Hara, 1998, 149).

**Leader:** Fukuda Takeo

**Party:** Liberal Democratic
**Years:** 1977-1978
**Hawk/Dove:** 1
**Government Unity:** -1
**Evidence:** Weaker control existed for Prime Ministers during this period and greater factional conflicts occurred. Intra-party fighting drove Fukuda from office (Shinoda, 2000, 10-11). Serious factional split between the followers of Tanaka and Fukuda led to the Kaku-Fuku war lasting through several governments (Richardson, 1997, 65; Hamaguchi-Klenner, 1981, 62). Fukuda's government continued to take a hard line against the Soviet Union (Hara, 1998, 149).

**Leader:** Ohira Masayoshi
**Party:** Liberal Democratic
**Years:** 1979-1980
**Hawk/Dove:** 1, -1 (China)
**Government Unity:** -1
**Evidence:** Weaker control existed for Prime Ministers during this period and greater factional conflicts occurred. (Shinoda, 2000, 10-11). Followed previous governments in taking a hard-line against the Soviets (Hara, 1998, 149; Suganuma, 2000, 138). Relations with South Korea also deteriorated during this period (Hook, et al., 2001, 205). Began taking a more conciliatory line with the Chinese (Hamaguchi-Klenner, 1981, 64).

**Leader:** Suzuki Zenko
**Party:** Liberal Democratic
**Years:** 1981-1982
**Hawk/Dove:** 1
**Government Unity:** -2
**Evidence:** Suzuki distributed cabinet positions among the five feuding LDP factions and factionalism within the party increased during his tenure (EWYB, 2006). The government took a hard line with respect to the Kuriles and relations with South Korea were tense (Hara, 1998, 150; Hook, et al., 2001, 205).

**Leader:** Nakasone Yasuhiro
**Party:** Liberal Democratic
**Years:** 1983-1987
**Hawk/Dove:** 1, -1 (South Korea)
**Government Unity:** 1, 2 (1986-87)
**Evidence:** Nakasone sought to increase ties to the United States, increased military power and higher defense expenditures (EWYB, 2006; Curtis, 1988, 36). Nakasone was viewed as a dominant leader who used his personal popularity to control the party (Curtis, 1988, 105). New elections in 1986 led to a cabinet composed entirely

of LDP members (EWYB, 2006). Factionalism declined during this period and there was less intra-party fighting (Richardson, 1997, 68). While conditions with China were negatively influenced by Nakasone's hard-line attitude, he worked to improve relations with South Korea (Hook, et al., 2001)

**Leader:** Takeshita Noboru
**Party:** Liberal Democratic
**Years:** 1988-1989
**Hawk/Dove:** 1
**Government Unity:** 1
**Evidence:** Takeshita vowed to continue Nakasone's foreign policies (EWYB, 2006). This led to increased defense expenditures and more assertive military stance that drew criticism from China (EWYB, 2006). Factionalism declined during this period and there was less intra-party fighting (Richardson, 1997, 68).

**Leader:** Kaifu Toshiki
**Party:** Liberal Democratic
**Years:** 1990-1991
**Hawk/Dove:** 1
**Government Unity:** -1
**Evidence:** While Kaifu was viewed as popular with the general public, he was not particularly strong within the LDP, in part due to his status as a relative unknown before taking office and the weakness of his own faction (EWYB, 1990; Hara, 1998, 162). Scandals from previous administrations caused serious intra-party competition and infighting (Richardson, 1997, 80). After a series of incidents relating to the Ryukyus, Japan reiterated its hard-line position (Suganuma, 2000, 139).

**Leader:** Miyazawa Kiichi
**Party:** Liberal Democratic
**Years:** 1992-1993
**Hawk/Dove:** 0
**Government Unity:** -2
**Evidence:** From the beginning of his tenure viewed as a very weak leader. Scandals from previous administrations caused serious intra-party competition and infighting (Richardson, 1997, 79-80). Serious division existed within the government regarding China, right-wing sought a hard line (Hagström, 2005, 134).

**Leader:** Hosokawa Morihiro
**Party:** Japan New
**Years:** 1994
**Hawk/Dove:** -1, 1 (Russia)
**Government Unity:** -1

**Evidence:** Hosokawa's government was composed of eight parties. The government continued to take a tough line with Russia on territorial issues (Hara, 1998, 199). On China, Hosokawa signaled a much more conciliatory line than previous prime ministers (Koji, 2006, 39; Hook et al., 2001, 197).

**Leader:** Murayama Tomiichi
**Party:** 1995
**Years:** Socialist
**Hawk/Dove:** -1
**Government Unity:** -1
**Evidence:** Government passed a measure apologizing to those countries whose citizens had suffered at the hands of the Japanese army during World War II (EWYB, 2006). On China, Murayama signaled a more conciliatory line than previous LDP prime ministers (Koji, 2006, 39). Improved relations were also sought with South Korea (Hook et al., 2001). Murayama's more moderate line created controversy in the cabinet where several ministers took a tougher line (Koji, 2006, 39).

**Leader:** Hashimoto Ryutaro
**Party:** Liberal Democratic
**Years:** 1996-1998
**Hawk/Dove:** 1, -1 (Russia, China after 1997)
**Government Unity:** 0
**Evidence:** The government refused to condemn nationalists that sought to claim the uninhabited Senkaku Islands for Japan, and Hashimoto reiterated the government's claim to the islands (EWYB, 2006; Hagström, 2005, 146). However, government took a more pragmatic line with China form 1997 on (Togo, 2007, 86). Hashimoto entered office viewed as a hard-liner (Koji, 2006, 41). Further relations with South Korea were strained due to various fishing and territorial disputes (EWYB, 2006). On the other hand, relations with Russia improved under Hashimoto's government (Hara, 1998, 222; Togo, 2007, 89).

**Leader:** Obuchi Keizo
**Party:** Liberal Democratic
**Years:** 1999
**Hawk/Dove:** -1, 1 (China)
**Government Unity:** -1
**Evidence:** Government took a number of nationalistic measures, including granting legal status to the national flag and anthem (EWYB, 2006). Some militaristic rhetoric, particularly over nuclear weapons and China, also came from the government (EWYB, 2006; Hook et al., 2001, 198). However, Obuchi was not as hard-line as his predecessors with respect to China (Togo, 2007, 92). The three party coalition contained broad range of ideologies, with the Liberal party seeking to increase Japan's military capabilities while Komeito remained pacifist (Koji, 2006,

42). In 1999 disagreements within the coalition increased as the Liberal Party threatened repeatedly to withdraw. Relations with South Korea and Russia improved with increased cooperation (EWYB, 2006; Hook et al., 2001, 209; Togo, 2007, 97).

**Leader:** Mori Yoshiro
**Party:** Liberal Democratic
**Years:** 2000
**Hawk/Dove:** -1, 1 (China)
**Government Unity:** 0
**Evidence:** Made a number of statements expressing imperialist views, which he refused to retract (EWYB, 2006). Took a hard-line with China while relations with South Korea were good (Hook et al., 2001; Togo, 2007, 100). Relations with Russia improved as Mori took a more flexible approach on territorial issues (Togo, 2007, 101). Mori was unpopular (Koji, 2006, 43).

## Turkey

**Leader:** Adnan Menderes
**Party:** Democratic Party
**Years:** 1950-1959 (Non-democratic after 1954)
**Hawk/Dove:** -1
**Government Unity:** 2
**Evidence:** The Menderes government was initially fairly quiet about the action of the EOKA on Cyprus, and relations between Turkey and Greece were peaceful (Bahcheli, 1990, 37; Hale, 2000, 124). Over time Menderes became increasingly intolerant of opposition both within and outside the party, culminating in limiting civil rights, freedom of the press, and the opposition (Sayari, 2002, 71; Aksin, 2007, 262). His populist style and the imagined threat of the opposition allowed Menderes to silence dissent within the party (Sayari, 2002, 75-76; Ahmad, 1977, Chapter 3).

**Leader:** İsmet İnönü
**Party:** Republican People's Party
**Years:** 1962-1965
**Hawk/Dove:** 0, 1 (1963-64)
**Government Unity:** -1, -2 (1963), 0 (1964-65)
**Evidence:** İnönü was wary of foreign adventures and sought to dampen heated rhetoric over Cyprus particularly during the 1964 crisis (Bahcheli, 1990, 63). Although Turkey came very close to using force during the crisis, under US pressure they backed down (Hale, 2000, 149). The unstable nature of the coalition governments made serious negotiations with Greece an impossibility (Ahmad, 1977, 405). The military altered the constitution following its intervention, leading to a great increase in the diversity of parliament. Since neither the Republican People's Party (CHP) nor the Justice Party could win a majority, İnönü led three shaky coalition governments from 1962 until 1965 (Hale, 2000, 147). The first coalition

between the CHP and the JP was relatively unified as İnönü argued that divisions would embolden the military to intervene again, but still fairly fractious as it represented the first coalition government in Turkish history (Hale, 1994, 153; Ahmad, 1977, 214). The second coalition, where the JP was replaced by a number of smaller parties, was very fractious (Ahmad, 1977, 220). The final coalition was a minority government between the CHP and the Independents that was more unified, but still relatively ineffective (Ahmad, 1977, 223; Dodd, 1998, 27).

**Leader:** Süleyman Demirel
**Party:** Justice Party
**Years:** 1966-1970
**Hawk/Dove:** 0
**Government Unity:** 2, 1 (1967, 1968)
**Evidence:** Demirel's Justice Party won a majority in the 1965 election and governed alone until the military intervened in 1971 (Hale, 2000, 147). Although Demirel had criticized İnönü as weak for failing to use force during the 1964 crisis, once in office he was cautious, negotiated directly with Greece over Cyprus, and during a crisis in 1967 he also avoided using force after US mediation (Hale, 2000, 153; Ahmad, 1977, 415). Although the election of 1969 decreased the Justice Party's vote share, it increased Demirel's control over the party (Ahmad, 1977, 244).

**Leader:** Bülent Ecevit
**Party:** Republican People's Party
**Years:** 1974
**Hawk/Dove:** 1
**Government Unity:** -1
**Evidence:** It took a long time for the CHP to find a coalition partner and choosing the National Salvation Party (MSP) meant the partners had very different views (Hale, 1994, 216-17; Ahmad, 1977, 337). Rising tensions over Cyprus led MSP leader Necmettin Erbakan to take a significantly more hard-line than Ecevit (Ahmad, 1977, 343; Dodd, 1998, 30; Dodd, 1994, 219). While Ecevit's history was not militaristic, upon taking office he encouraged Turkish Cypriots to stand up for their rights (Dodd, 1998, 29-30).

## United Kingdom

**Leader:** Clement Attlee
**Party:** Labor
**Years:** 1950-1951
**Hawk/Dove:** 1
**Government Unity:** -1
**Evidence:** Attlee's government was divided on its approach to the colonies, with Attlee seeking withdrawal, while others believed that the colonies were critical to Britain's global standing (Heinlein, 2002, 16). Attlee's relationship with his foreign

minister Morrison was strained and difficult (Barnes, 2001, 98). Labor sought to avoid the charge by Churchill that they were scuttling the empire and thus sought to take a harder line (Darwin, 1988, Chapter 3; Coxall, 1997, 257).

**Leader:** Winston Churchill
**Party:** Conservative
**Years:** 1952-1955
**Hawk/Dove:** 2
**Government Unity:** 1
**Evidence:** Government's slim majority after the election meant that internal dissent would not be tolerated (Onslow, 1997, 107). Generally, Churchill's handling of the cabinet was fairly autocratic (Childs, 2001, 56). Churchill and Eden (Foreign Minister) disagreed over policy towards Egypt, with Churchill advocating a hard-line and backed by the 'Suez Group' (Heinlein, 2002, 93; Kyle, 2003, 42; Barnes, 2001, 98, Louis, 1989, 64; Amery, 1990, 115). Eventually Eden and the military united in pushing Churchill toward a treaty with Egypt (Ovendale, 1988, 150). In foreign policy issues, and particularly the relationship with Egypt, Churchill took a hands-on approach (Ovendale, 1988, 152).

**Leader:** Anthony Eden
**Party:** Conservative
**Years:** 1955-1956
**Hawk/Dove:** 2
**Government Unity:** 1
**Evidence:** Although he had opponents in the cabinet, Eden remained dominant on foreign policy issues (Onslow, 1997, 201; Verbeek, 2003, 117). Despite his earlier dovish views towards Egypt, once taking office Eden adopted Churchill's tough stance (Ovendale, 1988, 153; Kyle, 2003, 96). Foreign Secretary Macmillan sought a softer-line in foreign relations, but he was replaced in 1956 with Lloyd who Eden knew would support him (Kyle, 2003, 86; Gorst, 1997, 43; Barnes, 2001, 98). Minister of Defense Monckton was not necessarily opposed to war, but was skeptical about the actual plans; he was replaced with the more hawkish Head shortly before the Suez war (Kyle, 2003, Chapter 11; Gorst, 1997, 81; Verbeek, 2003, 124).

**Leader:** Harold Macmillan
**Party:** Conservative
**Years:** 1957-1963
**Hawk/Dove:** 1
**Government Unity:** 2
**Evidence:** Macmillan exerted strong control over foreign policy (Hennessy, 2000, 255; Barnes, 2001, 98). The cabinet was fully of allies and relatives, giving Macmillan little opposition (Childs, 2001, 72). In cabinet affairs, Macmillan tended to interfere with cabinet minister's departments (Hennessy, 2000, 255). While still

hawkish, the cabinets views were moderated somewhat (Kyle, 2003, 86). On Gibraltar the government took a hard line and balked at negotiations (Gold, 2005, 16).

**Leader:** Alec Douglas-Home
**Party:** Conservative
**Years:** 1964
**Hawk/Dove:** 0
**Government Unity:** -1
**Evidence:** Douglas-Home took office following a succession fight between Powell and Macleod that left the party divided (Hennessy, 2000, 276). In addition, Douglas-Home was a reluctant prime minister and somewhat weak (Hennessy, 2000, Chapter 11). Home was viewed as more dovish towards the Spanish on Gibraltar, but minimal progress was made (Gold, 2005, 21).

**Leader:** Harold Wilson
**Party:** Labor
**Years:** 1965-1970
**Hawk/Dove:** Argentina: 0; Spain: 1
**Government Unity:** 0, 1 (1969, 1970)
**Evidence:** Wilson placed high value on cabinet unity and established a group of ‘kitchen cabinet’ confidants who held more influence than the actual cabinet (Hennessy, 2000, Chapter 12). However, Wilson worked hard to achieve consensus and would use this to postpone making difficult decisions (Frankel, 1975, 116). In his first administration Wilson included a number of opponents in the cabinet (Childs, 2001, 119). The government sought to distance itself from the hard-line of the previous conservative administrations and focus on peace efforts, however Gibraltar was an exception (Hennessy, 2000, 290; Gold, 2005, 16). Wilson had a difficult relationship with his foreign secretary Brown, which improved when Brown was replaced by Stewart in 1968 (Barnes, 2001, 98).

**Leader:** Edward Heath
**Party:** Conservative
**Years:** 1971-1973
**Hawk/Dove:** 0
**Government Unity:** 1
**Evidence:** The Heath government continued talks over the Falkland Islands that started during the Wilson administration (Stationary Office, 2001, 31). However, while talks continued on Gibraltar, the British continued to take a hard line (Gold, 2005, 21). Heath and his foreign minister Douglas-Home had an amicable working relationship (Barnes, 2001, 98). Entering office, Heath proposed a more realist approach to British foreign policy that focused on interests and not ideology (Frankel, 1975, 168-69) The cabinet was collegial but still dominated by Heath, who could at time be authoritarian (Hennessy, 2000, 344; Childs, 2001, 163).

**Leader:** Harold Wilson
**Party:** Labor
**Years:** 1974-1975
**Hawk/Dove:** Argentina: -1; Spain: 1
**Government Unity:** 1
**Evidence:** The relationship between Wilson and his foreign minister Callaghan was strong and unified (Barnes, 2001, 98; Hennessy, 2000, 365). Like Wilson's previous governments, there was a generally moderate approach to foreign policy with an emphasis on peaceful relations (Hennessy, 2000, 290). On the Falklands issue, the government attempted to move forward with negotiations and offered new proposals while deterring hard-line rhetoric from the Argentines (Stationary Office, 2001, 33-35). With the Spanish, Wilson came into office offering a more conciliatory line, but soon hardened (Gold, 2005, 22).

**Leader:** James Callaghan
**Party:** Labor
**Years:** 1976-1978
**Hawk/Dove:** Argentina: -1; Spain: 1
**Government Unity:** 1
**Evidence:** Following increasing tensions with Argentina, Callaghan's government opened a fresh round of talks in 1976 (Stationary Office, 2001, 42-43). Stalemate continued with the Spanish, despite democratization (Lord, 2005, 23). Callaghan enjoyed good relations with his foreign secretary and their moderate views united them (Barnes, 2001, 98; Carr, 2004, 95). While emphasizing collegiality in the cabinet, Callaghan could also be autocratic at times (Hennessy, 2000, 396).

**Leader:** Margaret Thatcher
**Party:** Conservative
**Years:** 1979-1990
**Hawk/Dove:** Argentina: -1 (1979-1982), 2 (1983-1990); Spain -1 (1979-1983), 1 (1984-1990)
**Government Unity:** -1 (1979-1989), 1 (1990)
**Evidence:** Thatcher began to consolidate the cabinet under her control in the fall of 1981, but full consolidation did not occur until the summer of 1982 (Hennessy, 2000, 411). Thatcher questioned Foreign Secretary Carrington's loyalty, while Carrington was viewed as an appeaser (Hastings, 1983, 76; Bennett, 2004, 133). The approach of the Thatcher government on the Falklands was to continue the negotiations started under Callaghan (Freedman, 1991, 9). Carrington and Thatcher took different approaches to the Falklands, with Carrington pushing for serious negotiations and Thatcher seeking to postpone a decision (Stationary Office, 2001, 57; Bennett, 2004, 123). The approach taken by defense secretary Nott and Carrington was dovish, while Thatcher didn't respond to Argentine bellicosity (Stationary Office, 2001, 60-71). Serious disagreements continued with a succession of Foreign Ministers – Pym and Howe – who strongly disagreed with Thatcher and supported a more diplomatic

line in foreign relations (Stuart, 2004, 145; Barnes, 2001, 98). Thatcher's final Foreign Secretary, Hurd, fostered better relations between the Prime Minister and the Foreign Office. Thatcher became more assertive and dominant of the cabinet over time (Cardock, 1997, 24-25).

**Leader:** John Major
**Party:** Conservative
**Years:** 1991-1996
**Hawk/Dove:** Argentina: 0; Spain: 1
**Government Unity:** 1 (1991-1993); -1 (1994-1996)
**Evidence:** Major had a more collegial approach to the Cabinet than Thatcher and disagreement was more openly expressed (Junor, 1996, 209). While there were serious disagreements within the government, Foreign Minister Hurd supported Major (Evans, 1996, 251-52; Taylor, 2006, 108). On Gibraltar, Major and Howe offered little substantive change from Thatcher's hard line (Lord, 2005, 138). Major also had good relations with his second foreign minister Rifkind (previously Defense Secretary) (Thwaites, 2004, 243; Seldon, 1997, 588). However, relations in the cabinet and later with Defense Minister Portillo soured from 1994 on (Seldon, 1997). Major was generally more moderate than the hard-line Thatcher (Seldon, 1997, 588).

**Leader:** Tony Blair
**Party:** Labor
**Years:** 1997-2000
**Hawk/Dove:** Argentina: 0; Spain: 1
**Government Unity:** 1 (1997), 2 (1998-2000)
**Evidence:** While there were a few clashes between Blair and Foreign Minister Robin Cook during their first year in power, the two generally worked well together (Kampfner, 2003, 16; Vickers, 2004, 264). Blair took firm control of foreign policy and limited discussion during cabinet meetings (Kampfner, 2003, 14). Further, Blair worked hard to maintain party discipline and increase the stature of the Prime Minister relative to his colleagues (Foley, 2000). While there was initial talk of a more "ethical" British foreign policy, Blair showed himself to be more moderate (Kampfner, 2003, 17). Soon after taking office Blair spoke in favor of taking a tough stance on Gibraltar (Gold, 2005, 188).

### United States

**Leader:** Harry Truman
**Party:** Democrat
**Years:** 1950-1952
**Hawk/Dove:** -1
**Government Unity:** -1, 0 (1951, 1952)
**Evidence:** Following the "loss" of China the previous year, Truman worried about being perceived as dovish, particularly domestically (Donaldson, 1996, 17; Kaufman,

1986, 37; Stueck, 1995, 42; Hastings, 1987, 42). Opposition Republicans sought a tougher policy in Asia and targeted Secretary of State Acheson and Truman as being overly dovish (Paige, 1968, Chapter 2; Lowe, 2000, 57). Serious divisions existed within the administration over the policy towards China – one side looking for a harder line and the other seeking to drive a wedge between China and the Soviet Union (Foot, 1985, 53; Chang, 1990, 6-7). Public disagreements between Acheson and Secretary of Defense Johnson existed, while internal disagreements were increased with the addition of the hawkish Dulles to the State Department (Hess, 2001, 17; Crabb Jr. and Mulcahy, 1986, 147; Foot, 1985, 43; Mann, 2001, 43) Acheson stated that Korea was outside of the US security perimeter, and refused to commit US troops if an attack occurred (Stueck, 1995, 30; Hess, 2001, 12). Divisions between the Defense and State Departments narrowed when Johnson was replaced by George Marshall in September 1950 (Paige, 1968, 28).

**Leader:** Dwight Eisenhower
**Party:** Republican
**Years:** 1953-1960
**Hawk/Dove:** 1
**Government Unity:** 2
**Evidence:** Although Republicans were very critical of Truman's policies on Korea, Eisenhower took pains to distance himself from the more extreme foreign policy views of the party (Caridi, 1968, Chapter 8; Steuck, 2002, 170; Anderson, 1991, 19). Despite Secretary of State Dulles's endorsement of 'rollback', Eisenhower came into office seeking to end the Korean War (Foot, 1985, Chapter 6; Divine, 1981, 15). Still, Eisenhower believed that military strength would be critical to win the cold war (Bowie, 1998, 45-49; Boyle, 2005, 44-48). In composing his cabinet, Eisenhower excluded the harder-line Taft wing from foreign affairs, which hid the divisions in the Republican party (Wicker, 2002, 18; Reinhard, 1983, 98). Eisenhower and Dulles had a strong working relationship and similar views on foreign policy (Boyle, 2005, 37; Bowie, 1998, 55). Eisenhower worked hard to achieve consensus in the cabinet and effectively served as his own Secretary of Defense, based on his extensive military service, minimizing the impact of Defense Secretary Charles Wilson (Crabb Jr. and Mulcahy, 1986, 168-170; Wicker, 2002, 18).

**Leader:** John Kennedy
**Party:** Democrat
**Years:** 1961-1963
**Hawk/Dove:** 0
**Government Unity:** -1, 0 (1963)
**Evidence:** Kennedy was less hawkish than his advisors and he was attacked for not being hard-line enough, particularly for his stance on negotiations over intervention in Laos (Logevall, 1999, 23; Porter, 2005, 156; Bassett, 1989, 229). In 1961, Kennedy was looking for ways to reduce the US commitment in Vietnam, however Secretary of State Dean Rusk was unwilling to pursue a diplomatic solution (Logevall, 1999,

Chapter 1). By 1963 none of the top officials in the administration advocated US withdrawal (Logevall, 1999, 51). Kennedy was sensitive to Republican charges that he was 'soft' on communism (Bassett, 1989, 237). Secretary of Defense McNamara was personally loyal to Kennedy and came to share his views, while Secretary of State Rusk was considerably more hawkish than the President (Porter, 2005, 166-168; Freedman, 2000, 333).

**Leader:** Lyndon Johnson
**Party:** Democrat
**Years:** 1964-1968
**Hawk/Dove:** 1
**Government Unity:** 2, -1 (1968)
**Evidence:** Hours before taking office, Johnson pledged that he would not 'lose' Vietnam as Truman lost China (Logevall, 1999, 76). Showing American military strength was critical for Johnson both for international and domestic reasons (DeBenedetti, 1987, 30-31). Johnson was a dominant figure who either intentionally or unintentionally limited dissent within the administration (Hess, 2001, 80-82; Barrett, 1993, 21; Logevall, 1999, 79; DeBenedetti, 1987, 33-35). Within the cabinet Johnson put a high premium on consensus and there was a great deal of uniformity in the views of Johnson and his top advisors on Vietnam, particularly Rusk and McNamara (Graff, 1970, Chapter 1; Logevall, 1999, Chapter 3, Hess, 2001, 82; Kaiser, 2000, 287; Crabb Jr. and Mulcahy, 1986, 213). Dissent within the administration increased when Vietnam critic Clifford became Secretary of Defense in 1968 (Crabb Jr. and Mulcahy, 1986, 219).

**Leader:** Richard Nixon
**Party:** Republican
**Years:** 1969-1974
**Hawk/Dove:** 1
**Government Unity:** 1
**Evidence:** Before taking office Nixon made a name for himself as an anticommunist crusader. Although he was more pragmatic once he took office, he and Kissinger were still more hawkish than his Secretaries of State and Defense (Bundy, 1998, 317; Drew, 2007, 60; Kimball, 2004, 19). One distinguishing characteristic of the Nixon administration was the prominent role played by the National Security Advisor Kissinger, whose status eclipsed that of the Secretary of State Rogers (Garrison, 1999, Chapter 1; Schulzinger, 2003, 284; Drew, 2007, 63; Crabb Jr. and Mulcahy, 1986, 237). Nixon and Kissinger held similar world views and trusted each other (Garrison, 1999, 8; Szulc, 1978, 17; Crabb Jr. and Mulcahy, 1986, 258). Both men also strongly believed strictly controlling information coming out of the administration (Bundy, 1998, 55; Drew, 2007, 64). Strained relations existed between Nixon and Secretary of Defense Laird, and both Laird and Rogers advocated de-escalation in Vietnam, which Nixon and Kissinger opposed; however, for the most

part these controversies remained private (Szulc, 1978, 180; Kimball, 2004, 12; Drew, 2007, 76).

**Leader:** Gerald Ford
**Party:** Republican
**Years:** 1975-1976
**Hawk/Dove:** 1
**Government Unity:** 0, 1 (1976)
**Evidence:** Ford and Secretary of State Kissinger had a good working relationship and Ford's lack of foreign policy experience meant that Kissinger had a great deal of power (Mieczkowski, 2005, 281; Morris, 1977, 292). Ford believed that the United States must show strength following withdrawal from Vietnam (Schapsmeier and Schapsmeier, 1989, 191; Melanson, 2005, 82). Although less so than Nixon, Ford was viewed as a cold war hawk (Brinkley, 2007, 92). Much as he had in the Nixon administration, Kissinger dominated the foreign policy bureaucracy (Hult and Walcott, 2004, 137; Morris, 1977, 292). Kissinger and Ford clashed with Secretary of Defense Schlesinger who was more hawkish, but he was replaced in November 1975 by Rumsfeld, leading to less disagreement (Morris, 1977, 292; Brinkley, 2007, 129).

**Leader:** Jimmy Carter
**Party:** Democrat
**Years:** 1977-1980
**Hawk/Dove:** -1, 1 (1979, 1980)
**Government Unity:** -2, 1 (1980)
**Evidence:** Carter came into office pushing for détente and removing US troops from South Korea, which led to conflicts within the administration and with the military (French, 2005, 190; Oberdorfer, 1997, 84-89). However, by 1979 Carter became more hawkish and moved from supporting Vance to backing Brzezinski (Melanson, 2005, 108-109; Garrison, 1999, 14; Crabb Jr. and Mulcahy, 1986, 274; Skidmore, 1996, 29; Hult and Walcott, 2004, 137). Carter encouraged multiple viewpoints on foreign policy decisions which encouraged multiple viewpoints but also highlighted serious divisions between his National Security Advisor Brzezinski and Secretary of State Vance (Garrison, 1999, 6-7; Crabb Jr. and Mulcahy, 1986, 276-277; Moens, 1996, 36; Maga, 1994, 14; Melanson, 2005, 95; Thornton, 2005, 113). Brzezinski and Secretary of Defense Brown shared hawkish views on foreign policy while Vance was dovish (Garrison, 1999, 17; Skidmore, 1996, 29; Moens, 1990, 50). Divisions declined following Vance's resignation in 1980 (Crabb Jr. and Mulcahy, 1986, 277).

**Leader:** Ronald Reagan
**Party:** Republican
**Years:** 1981-1988
**Hawk/Dove:** 2, 1 (1987, 1988)
**Government Unity:** -1, -2 (1981), 1 (1988)

**Evidence:** Reagan believed strongly in peace through strength and hard-line policies and was critical of détente (Melanson, 2005, 136; Crabb Jr. and Mulcahy, 1986, 280; Bell, 1989, 9; Hyland, 1987, xii; Moore, 1990, 179). The administration moderated in the second term (Hyland, 1987, vii). Generally, Reagan was viewed as allowing significant autonomy among cabinet members which led to some open disagreements (Whickler, 1990, 64; Moore, 1990, 170; Fischer, 1997, 74; Melanson, 2005, 139). Haig, Reagan's first Secretary of State, openly disagreed with the President and other White House officials on a number of occasions (Crabb Jr. and Mulcahy, 1986, 292; Fischer, 1997, 75; Moore, 1990, 179). The level of disagreement decreased substantially under Reagan's second Secretary of State Schultz, although significant differences existed between the more dovish Schultz and the hawkish Secretary of Defense Weinberger (Crabb Jr. and Mulcahy, 1986, 295; Melanson, 2005, 145; Fischer, 1997, 79; Moore, 1990, 181). Last year of the administration had lowest levels of conflict as Weinberger was replaced as Secretary of Defense by Frank Carlucci (Fischer, 1997, 76; Moore, 1990, 195; Melanson, 2005, 145).

**Leader:** George H.W. Bush
**Party:** Republican
**Years:** 1989-1992
**Hawk/Dove:** 1
**Government Unity:** 2
**Evidence:** While hawkish in his views, Bush was more pragmatic than Reagan (Preston, 2001, 199; Barilleaux, 2004, 118; Hurst, 1999, 8). He favored stability and although he though military force had a role, also sought multilateralism (Hurst, 1999, 11; Barilleaux, 2004, 118). Bush's foreign policy inner circle – Secretary of State Baker, Secretary of Defense Cheney, and National Security Advisor Scowcroft – all like minded (Melanson, 2005, 200; Hurst, 1999, 13). Moreover, Bush was friends with or on good terms with most of his inner circle (Barilleaux, 2004, 120-121; Hurst, 1999, 14; Sununu, 1997, 158; Melanson, 2005, 200). Bush sought a consensus among his advisors (Preston, 2001, 194; Sununu, 1997, 160; Porter, 1997, 167).

**Leader:** Bill Clinton
**Party:** Democrat
**Years:** 1993-2000
**Hawk/Dove:** 0
**Government Unity:** -1, -2 (1993), 0 (1995-2000)
**Evidence:** The administration was generally non-ideological with Albright (first as UN Ambassador, then as Secretary of State) as a somewhat hawkish exception (Hyland, 1999, 21). Clinton supported a broader understanding of national interest that included human rights, multilateralism, and engagement (Hyland, 1999, 21; French, 2005, 198). Clinton, early in his tenure primarily concerned with domestic issues, delegated extensively on foreign policy and sought a collegial style with his cabinet (Preston, 2001, 222-225; Berman, 2001, 35; Berman, 2001, 35; Berman and

Goldman, 1996, 290-291). On Korea, the administration was divided on the proper approach, and special envoy Carter contradicted administration positions (French, 2005, 200; Henriksen, 1996, 9; Burns, 1999, 176). Indecision and lack of coherence affected the early years of the administration (Melanson, 2005, 241; Preston, 2001, 224; Halberstam, 2001, 174; Berman and Goldman, 1996, 291). Perry replaced Aspin as Secretary of Defense in early 1994, which led to a decline in divisions within the administration (Berman and Goldman, 1996, 299; Burns, 1999, 196). Cabinet reshuffle for the second term increased unity (Blumenthal, 2003, 635).

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# Biography

Matthew Blake Fehrs was born on February 10, 1976, in Allentown, Pennsylvania, to parents Mary and Delmer Fehrs. He spent his school-age years in Aloha, Oregon before departing for Pitzer College in Claremont, California. In 1998, Matt graduated with honors from Pitzer with a Bachelors degree in Psychology and Political Studies. For the following two years, he lived in Leipzig, Germany, first as a Fulbright Scholar and then as an employee of the Sächsische Entwicklungsgesellschaft. He received a Masters in International Affairs from the Columbia University School of International and Public Affairs in 2002. Concentrating on the fields of international relations and comparative politics, he received a Masters in Political Science from Duke University in 2004. With a dissertation that examines the role of government unity in the targeting of democratic states, Matt received a PhD in Political Science in 2008. Matt has received support from the Fulbright Commission, the Columbia University Center for European Studies, the Duke University Political Science Department, the Graduate School at Duke University, the Bradley Foundation, and the Mershon Center for International Security Studies.