Poverty and Place in the Context of the American South

by

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Dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of
the requirements for the degree of Doctor
of Philosophy in the Department of
Sociology in the Graduate School
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ABSTRACT

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Abstract

In the United States, poverty has been historically higher and disproportionately concentrated in the American South. Despite this fact, much of the conventional poverty literature in the United States has focused on urban poverty in cities, particularly in the Northeast and Midwest. Relatively less American poverty research has focused on the enduring economic distress in the South, which Wimberley (2008:899) calls "a neglected regional crisis of historic and contemporary urgency." Accordingly, this dissertation contributes to the inequality literature by focusing much needed attention on poverty in the South.

Each empirical chapter focuses on a different aspect of poverty in the South. Chapter 2 examines why poverty is higher in the South relative to the Non-South. Chapter 3 focuses on poverty predictors within the South and whether there are differences in the sub-regions of the Deep South and Peripheral South. These two chapters compare the roles of family demography, economic structure, racial/ethnic composition and heterogeneity, and power resources in shaping poverty. Chapter 4 examines whether poverty in the South has been shaped by historical racial regimes.

The Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) United States datasets (2000, 2004, 2007, 2010, and 2013) (derived from the U.S. Census Current Population Survey (CPS) Annual Social and Economic Supplement) provide all the individual-level data for this study. The LIS sample of 745,135 individuals is nested in rich economic, political, and racial

state-level data compiled from multiple sources (e.g. U.S. Census Bureau, U.S. Department of Agriculture, University of Kentucky Center for Poverty Research, etc.). Analyses involve a combination of techniques including linear probability regression models to predict poverty and binary decomposition of poverty differences.

Chapter 2 results suggest that power resources, followed by economic structure, are most important in explaining the higher poverty in the South. This underscores the salience of political and economic contexts in shaping poverty across place. Chapter 3 results indicate that individual-level economic factors are the largest predictors of poverty within the South, and even more so in the Deep South. Moreover, divergent results between the South, Deep South, and Peripheral South illustrate how the impact of poverty predictors can vary in different contexts. Chapter 4 results show significant bivariate associations between historical race regimes and poverty among Southern states, although regression models fail to yield significant effects. Conversely, historical race regimes do have a small, but significant effect in explaining the Black-White poverty gap. Results also suggest that employment and education are key to understanding poverty among Blacks and the Black-White poverty gap. Collectively, these chapters underscore why place is so important for understanding poverty and inequality. They also illustrate the salience of micro and macro characteristics of place for helping create, maintain, and reproduce systems of inequality across place.

Dedication

To my late grandparents, Albert Lee and Rose B. Smalls. I know you are smiling down proudly from above.

And to my grandmother, Bertha R. Smith, whose passion for learning, teaching, and life has greatly inspired me.

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The road to getting my Ph.D. has been a long, unpredictable one, with some bumps, twists, and detours along the way. I deeply appreciate everyone, near and far, who helped me along this journey. From family and friends to faculty and staff, I give you a huge, heartfelt thank you for helping to make this one memorable ride.

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Lastly, I had the opportunity to present parts of this dissertation to various audiences whom provided valuable feedback and suggestions. These include the annual meetings of Southern Sociological Society (2013) and the American Sociological

Association (2014), the Economic Sociology workshop at Duke University, the WZB Social Science Center-Berlin, Dartmouth College, Boston University, the University of Pennsylvania, Virginia Commonwealth, the University of Michigan, and the University of Texas. Thank you all.

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1. Introduction

> Call it impoverishment, historic disparity, poor social wellbeing, poor quality of life, social problems or whatever, it is an enduring social challenge for the region. It is an unrecognized if not mostly neglected regional crisis of historic and contemporary urgency. – Wimberley (2008)

The American South has the distinction of having been more intensely analyzed and interpreted than any other region in the U.S., across disciplines, particularly in history and literature (Griffin 1995). Despite this distinction, there remains a need for more mainstream sociological inquiry of the South. In his 2008 presidential address at for the Southern Sociological Society, the late Ronald Wimberley focuses much needed attention on the ongoing socio-economic problems in the South. Wimberley (2008) justifiably argues that the South warrants greater sociological examination to better understand its disproportionate share of the nation's socio-economic problems.

Indeed, the socio-economic problems of the South are enduring and noteworthy. Of the four major U.S. regions as defined by the U.S. Census (i.e. Northeast, Midwest, South, and West), the South has the lowest median household income at $48,128 (vs. the highest median income of $53,142 in the West) (DeNavas-Walt and Proctor 2014). Recent data from 2006-2010 reveals the South also has the largest share of counties with high income inequality (Bee 2012). Of the South's 1,423 counties, 32% have Gini indexes ranking among the top fifth of all 3,143 counties in the U.S. (Bee 2012). The South also ranks the worst in poverty (DeNavas-Walk and Proctor 2014). Official poverty trends



Figure 1: Official Poverty Rate by U.S. Region, 1971 to 2013



Figure 2: Official Poverty Distribution by U.S. Region, 1971 to 2013

from the U.S. Census Bureau (2014) by region from 1971-2013 shows not only has the South maintained the highest rates of poverty over the past 40 years (Figure 1), it has maintained the largest share of Americans living in poverty of all regions (Figure 2).[1]

In addition to having the highest rates of poverty, The South also has a high concentration of individuals living in high poverty areas (Bishaw 2011) and mostly all Southern states have a group of contiguous counties with relatively high poverty rates and low socio-economic well-being indicators (Allen-Smith et al. 2000). Glasmeier's (2002) analyses of economic health by U.S. counties from 1960-1997 further illustrates these regional economic disparities. She finds 40% of chronic, economically depressed counties have been concentrated in the Mississippi Delta and Appalachia, both which are located in the South, yet, the remaining depressed counties are spread out across the U.S. These depressed counties are characterized as having high dependency, high unemployment, low-market participation rates, and a high dependency on government transfer payments (Glasmeier 2002). Several other scholars also find poverty to be concentrated and persistent in the Mississippi Delta, Appalachia, Black Belt, the Rio Grande Valley (Curtis, Voss and Long 2012; Lichter, Parisi and Taquino 2011; Weber et al. 2005; Wimberley 2010), all part of the South as well.

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[1] Because the U.S. official poverty measure underestimates poverty (Brady 2009), the Southern poverty problem is likely to be worse. More comprehensive measures of poverty include taxes and transfers, which tend to be less pro-poor in the South (Newman and O'Brien 2010. Thus, poverty rates are likely to be higher.

Related to poverty, the South also ranks worst in upward mobility. Figure 3, shows absolute upward mobility measured as the expected economic outcomes of children born to a family earning an income of approximately $30,000 (i.e. in the 25th percentile of the income distribution). This is the income range targeted by tax expenditures such as the Earned Income Tax Credit and Child Tax Credit (Chetty et al. 2013). The counties characterized by lower mobility on average are concentrated heavily in Southern states, a strikingly different finding than the Non-South.

Similarly, Flippen (2014) examines county rankings of where Americans are better and worse off based on a composite measure that takes into account household several dimensions. These include income, the unemployment rate, education, disability, obesity, and overall life expectancy. The South has a greater proportion of counties that fare worse along these dimensions than counties that fare better. Moreover, of all the U.S. regions, the South fares the worst overall (see Figure 4).

These observed regional socio-economic disparities reflect an issue that sociologists identified almost 80 years ago. In the 1930s, the dire economic state of the South prompted the U.S. National Emergency Council (1938) to prepare the "Report on the Economic Conditions of the South." Based on sociological findings, this report led President Roosevelt to conclude the South was "the Nation's number one economic problem" (O'Connell 2000:67). Decades later, this still arguably describes the South, as the region continues to lag behind the rest of the U.S.



(Source: Chetty et al., 2013. The Inequality of Opportunity Project)

Figure 3: Absolute Upward Mobility



(Source: Flippen, 2014. *The New York Times*)

Figure 4: Where Americans Are Better and Worse Off

Despite the South's persistent, worse economic conditions, American poverty research has focused more attention on urban poverty, especially inner cities in the Northeast and Midwest, such as Chicago, Detroit, and Philadelphia. Poverty in the South, and especially the rural South, are relatively understudied. Consequently, Wimberley (2008) calls for more research on the South, which he argues deserves more attention given its greater share of the nation's socio-economic related problems, making it a *national* issue as well. Moreover, Lloyd (2012) reviews urbanization in the South, highlighting the region's contemporary trend of persistent poverty and stagnant wages in light of its economic expansion, and argues that major theoretical and empirical contributions would result from greater sociological examination of the South and its cities.

Clearly, sociologists can make significant contributions regarding sociology in the South, and more specifically, the region's ongoing socio-economic issues. Therefore, this dissertation contributes to sociological literature on poverty, inequality, and place by examining poverty in the American South. Each of the empirical chapters in this dissertation examine a different dimension of poverty in the South. The research questions guiding the three empirical chapters of this dissertation are as follows:

1. Why is poverty higher in the South than the non-South? To what extent do family demographics, economic structure, racial composition and heterogeneity, and power resources contribute to the higher poverty in the South?

2. What predicts poverty within the South? How do predictors of poverty differ between the sub-regions of the Deep South and Peripheral South?
3. What is the relationship between historical racial regimes and contemporary poverty in the South? What explains the large poverty gap between Blacks and Whites in the South, and does historical racial regimes play a role?

This dissertation examines these research questions using primarily micro-data from the 2000, 2004, 2006, 2010, and 2013 U.S. waves of the Luxemburg Income Study (LIS), which are derived from the Current Population Survey (CPS) Economic supplement. These data include relevant demographic and socioeconomic information for individuals and households. State-level data come from various sources and allow for estimation of different economic, racial, and political contextual factors.

In the remainder of this introductory chapter, I begin with the significance of the sociological study of place and spatial inequality, and their implications for the South. Then, I discuss regional sociology and the South, including extant research that examines socio-economic inequality in the context of the South. Next, I describe additional characteristics of the South (i.e. other social trends and general population dynamics) that make it important for sociological study. I also discuss different definitions of the South and how I define the South for this study. Lastly, I provide a brief overview of the empirical chapters and their findings.

1.1 Place and Spatial Inequality in Sociology

Recent sociological focus on the importance of place and space for inequality (Gieryn 2000; Lobao, Hook, and Tickamyer 2007; Lobao and Sanez 2002; Tickamyer 2000) illustrate why regional inequality research is valuable. As Gieryn (2000:482) notes, "Is there anything sociological not touched by place? Probably not." Oppositional concepts central to sociological inquiry (e.g. modern/pre-and post-modern, global/local, gesellschaft/gemeinschaft, developed/developing, urban/rural, core/periphery) reflect interest in spatial variation and the meaning of place (Tickamyer 2000).

Gieryn (2000:476) focuses on the meaning of place for inequality research, arguing that places essentially maintain difference and hierarchy, as they "enable power to travel and to extend its reach over people and territory." The difference and hierarchy inherent across place, then, provide a basis for spatial inequality. Broadly defined, spatial inequality is the examination of how and why markers of stratification, (e.g. economic well-being, access to resources, and other related inequalities such as race/ethnicity, class, gender, and age) vary and intersect across territories (Lobao, Hooks, and Tickamyer 2007). By focusing on place, we essentially highlight "both the importance of where actors are located in geographic space and how geographic entities themselves are molded by and mold stratification" (Lobao et al. 2007:3).

While sociologists have long studied stratification and space, it has tended to be along two territorial extremes—urban inner cities and neighborhoods (e.g. Wilson 1987,

Massey and Denton 1993) and the global system of nation states (e.g. Wallenstein 1974, Firebaugh 1999) (Lobao and Hooks 2007). These well-established research traditions of urban sociology and cross national, development sociology, have made significant contributions to the discipline. However, as Lobao and Hooks (2007:30-31) note, the sub-national scale, which essentially occupies the "gray areas of regional territory between the nation and city," (e.g. states, regions of the nation as a whole) has been relatively understudied in sociology compared to the extensive attention given to cross-national and urban scales. This is what Lobao and Hooks (2007) refer to as the issue of the "missing middle."

There has been a growing body of sociological research at the sub-national scale focusing on poverty and inequality at both the county-level (e.g. McLaughlin 2002; Moller, Alderson, and Nielsen 2009) as well as the state-level (e.g. Brady, Baker, and Finnigan 2013; Jenkins, Leicht, and Wendt 2006). Some of the topics of sub-national scale inequality literature include poverty in specific regions/sub-regions like Appalachia, the Mississippi Delta, and the Texas Borderlands (Poston et al. 2010; Slack et al. 2009), poverty and the rural-urban dichotomy (Brown and Lichter 2004; Snyder and McLaughlin 2004), the impact of economic restructuring on poverty in rural counties (Cotter 2002; Tickamyer and Duncan 1990), political institutions and economic development in U.S. states (Jenkins et al. 2006), and state-level labor market institutions (e.g. unionization) and working poverty (Brady et al. 2013). Yet, although the extant

literature at the sub-national scale does illustrate progress in spatial inequality research, the lack of research in this area relative to urban cities and the nation state, remains an important issue to address for several reasons. For example the sub-national scale is where some of the worst inequalities are manifest and it is strongly linked to public policy and poverty, and thus political responses to inequality (Lobao et al. 2008). Furthermore, research on regions, states, counties, etc. is necessary, as it can reveal differences that may challenge, reject, or revise existing generalizations regarding inequality that are nationally framed and do not take into account place (Lobao and Sanez 2002).

The sociological study of spatial inequality is especially important for understanding regional disparities, such as the greater poverty in the South. As Glasmeier (2006:xvii) indicates, "People exist in places, and poverty is a condition experienced in those locations." Moreover, in the U.S., place poverty is persistent over time, and has even increased in severity over the past few decades, particularly in the South (Glasmeier 2006; Wimberley 2008). While there has been growing research examining the spatial context of poverty and inequality, there are few attempts to theorizing the causal determinants of these spatial and temporal patterns across the U.S. (Lobao et al. 2008:97). Thus, the questions of why the geography of poverty in the U.S. has remained relatively unchanged over time and space, and why poverty has been so persistent in the South provide fertile ground for research. Additionally, although

regional poverty gaps narrowed in the expansionary 1990s, the unstable economy in recent years and rises in poverty might exacerbate historical patterns of Southern disadvantage (Ziliak 2003). Thus, more sociological focus on the South is pertinent.

1.2. Regional Sociology and the South

To be sure, an emphasis on regions, namely the South, was long ago an important focus in the discipline of sociology. This led to the sub-field of regional sociology (i.e. "study of a particular type of group, namely a locality group identified as a region" (Bertrand:133). In the 1930s, regional sociology, which focused particularly on the South, was a well-established body of work led by Henry Odum and his student Rupert Vance. Reed (1993b:8) argues that "Odum's excessive, exhaustive fact-gathering in *Southern Regions* and elsewhere, supplemented by the similar work of his students, helped to make the South of the 1930s probably the most thoroughly documented society that has ever existed." Odum brought attention to the South and its numerous social problems at the time. Yet, despite the acceptance and praise for Odum and his student's work on the South, regional sociology (and along with it, general concern with the South) eventually waned. Reed (1980:41) argues this was in part because at that time, "regional sociology was not very good *sociology."* It lacked the use of sociological criteria in problem-finding, was not sufficiently anchored in modern sociological theory, and was adversely influenced by the political context in which Odum and his students worked (Reed 1980). Additionally, "the South's economic and social problems, a central

concern of many regional sociologists, appeared on the way to be solved" (Reed 1980:41). Conversely, as history and the current socio-economic state of the South (as outlined in the beginning of this chapter) illustrate, social problems in the South remain an issue to be solved. Accordingly, there has been a growing body of empirical sociological literature that examines poverty and other aspects of socio-economic well-being in the South.

Several studies have focused on particular sub-regions of the South, such as the Mississippi Delta, Appalachia, the Texas borderlands, and the Black Belt because of their high concentrations of poverty (Duncan 2000; Hattery and Smith 2007; Poston et al. 2010; Slack et al. 2009; Wimberley 2010). Some studies focus on the South overall, focusing on "racial legacy," such as the relationship between slavery and Black poverty (O'Connell 2012) and how slavery emancipation impacted Black entrepreneurship during Reconstruction (Ruef 2014). Other studies address disparities between/among regions, examining topics such as local area racial/ethnic and economic contexts contributing to different child poverty generating processes in the South and Non-South (Curtis, Voss, and Long 2012), higher local and state tax burdens in the South that further disadvantaging the Southern poor (Newman and O'Brien 2010), and regional differences in food stamp participation (Slack and Myers 2012). Recent qualitative studies also draw attention to socio-economic issues in the South focusing on specific cities. These include an examination of food ways of African-Americans from different social classes in

Jackson, Mississippi (Ewoodzie 2014), social class and sources of social capital among African American migrants to Charlotte, North Carolina (Pendergrass 2013), and the intersection of place, race, gender, and class in regards to Black identity in Memphis, Tennessee (Robinson 2014).

Overall, these regional, South-focused studies help demonstrate the spatial nature of inequality, and how factors linked to poverty and inequality are unevenly distributed across place. Although these studies are a step in the right direction, and help draw much needed attention to the socio-economic issues in the South, there persistence suggests there is more to be learned and studied.

1.3 Other Characteristics of the South for Sociology Inquiry

1.3.1 Other Social Trends

In addition to economic inequality, there are regional disparities for a range of other measures that make the sociological study of the South, and especially poverty in the South, valuable as well. The South has historically ranked lowest in education attainment of residents among all regions. Not only does the South fall behind in the education of children (Annie E. Casey Foundation, 2014), it is the region with the highest proportion of residents without at least a high school diploma or GED and the lowest proportion of residents with a bachelor's degree level or higher (Ryan and Siebens 2012). Public school funding per pupil is also lowest in the South, and this is after adjusting for regional variation and population density (Baker, Sciarra, and Farrie 2010). These

disconcerting education trends are noteworthy, especially considering the importance of education in combating poverty.

The South also is worst off on a number of health dimensions. The region has the highest rates of mortality for both adults (Cossman et al. 2007) and infants (Hirai et al. 2014). It also has the greatest prevalence of diseases including cardiovascular disease (United Health Foundation [UHF] 2014) obesity (Center for Disease Prevention and Control 2013) and HIV/AIDS (Reid et al. 2014). Compared to individuals in other regions, Southerners have worse mental health, lower levels of physical activity, more occupational fatalities, and poorer self-reported health status (UHF 2014). Food insecurity among households is highest in the region as well (U.S. Department of Agriculture 2012), and food desserts are prevalent, particularly in the rural South (Blanchard and Lyson 2006). In addition, most Southern states have not expanded Medicaid, which would help increase the affordability, accessibility and quality of health care for many Americans (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services 2014), especially Southerners who are more likely to be uninsured (Shartzer et al. 2014). Given the South has the largest share of rural residents, the rural health disadvantage has implications for regional health disparities and the rural poor in the South as well (Burton et al. 2013).

Crime and incarceration are also high in the South. The region has historically had the highest rates of crime (McCall, Land, and Parker 2010; McCall, Land, and Cohen

1992). With five of its states having the highest adult incarceration rates in all of the U.S., the South has the greatest proportion of residents in prisons or jails of all regions (Evan 2009). It also has had the largest prison growth over the past few decades, accounting for over 50% of all new prisons, particularly in rural areas (Eason 2010). Much of this growth can be attributed to "get-tough" criminal justice policies that have led to mass incarceration. Alexander (2010) argues such laws disproportionately affect poor African-Americans, helping to maintain a social order that further disadvantages already marginalized groups.

1.3.2 Population Dynamics

The South's unique population dynamics also provide reason for more sociological study of the South in general. According to recent U.S. Census Bureau (2015) data, not only is the South the most populous region (accounting for over 37% of the entire U.S. population), it has also experienced the most and fastest population `percentage of Blacks (Allen-Smith et al. 2000). It also has experienced the highest rates of Black migration of all regions in recent years (Hunt, Hunt, and Falk 2013), including reverse migration of Blacks back to the South (Pendergrass 2013; Hunt et al. 2008). Additionally, the South has had the most rapid population growth among Hispanic/Latinos (Ennis, Ríos-Vargas, and Albert 2011) and immigrants, particularly in rural areas (Donato et al. 2007, Marrow 2013).

These changing demographics alone justify the South deserving more sociological attention. Moreover, these changes are consequential for understanding inequality across place. For example, the increased migration of Blacks to the South could "lead to a reconstitution of racial and spatial segregation patterns more reminiscent of an older South, today's North, or a New South with novel forms of race relations and residential patterns" (Hunt et al. 2008:111). This could result in higher poverty and wider poverty racial disparities within the South. As for Hispanic growth, limited opportunities of Mexican immigrants have coincided with increased pockets of poverty throughout regions of the U.S. (Crowley et al. 2006; Lobao, Hooks and Tickamyer 2008). Thus, this could adversely affect already depressed areas in the South.

In addition to population changes, the South has experienced expansive urban growth in the past decade relative to other regions (Lloyd 2012). This also has implications for the study of poverty. For example, Atlanta, one of the South's booming urban centers, has stark divergences in poverty and privilege among Blacks (Lloyd 2012). Yet, as Lloyd (2012) indicates, manufacturing and organized labor, which have been key to Black prosperity (e.g. in Detroit), are/have been virtually non-existent in Atlanta. Thus, major approaches to African-American poverty that emphasize deindustrialization (e.g. Wilson 1987) are inadequate for understanding the strong racialized poverty that exists there (Lloyd 2012). This is only one example of how studying inequality in the South can challenge existing theoretical frameworks.

The South also has ample rural areas, and accounts for over half of all rural residences in the U.S. (Wimberley 2008). In general, rural areas have experienced dramatic and rapid transformations in recent years (e.g. economic restructuring, population changes, migration patterns), which also have implications for the South, such as health disparities that adversely affect the rural poor (Burton et al. 2013).

In sum, the South's persistent poverty combined with its other socio-economic problems, current population dynamics, and unique history make it a fruitful area for study. As Burton et al. (2013), note, such characteristics make the South "a litmus test of regional inequality." Furthermore, studying the South can help illuminate more general questions of sociological inquiry.

1.4 Defining "The South"

Given the importance of place and space for inequality and the need for more regional specific research, how to define "the South" has implications for this study. According to the U.S. Census Bureau definitions for geographical regions, the South consists of 17 states: Alabama, Arkansas, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, North Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, West Virginia, and Washington D.C. Some scholars use this Census-South definition of the South (Firebaugh and Davis 1988; Hubert and Bankston 1998; Quillian 1996). While some scholars justify the Census definition yields more conservative regional estimates (e.g. Hubert and Bankston 1998), Cotter, Shaffer, and

Breaux (2006) notes the use of the Census South definition in scholarship is in part because the Census divisions are the most detailed geographic measure in some commonly used public datasets, such as the General Social Survey.

However, one definition of the South that is prevalent in scholarship consists of the former states of the Confederacy or "Old South." These include all states in the Census defined South *except* for Delaware, Kentucky, Oklahoma, Maryland, West Virginia, and Washington D.C. This "Old South" definition is popular among historians (e.g. Hackney 1969; Keith 2002) and political scientists (e.g. Key 1949; Black and Black 1987; Glaser 1994; Valentino and Sears 2005). Some sociologists use this definition as well (Fullerton and Dixon 2009). Some scholars' define the South as the former Confederate states plus the border states of Kentucky and Oklahoma (e.g. Cobb 2005; Reed 1999). Reed (1999) argues that the South is where people consider: 1) themselves to reside in the South and 2) themselves to be Southern. Reed's (1999) analysis of opinion polls lead him to conclude that the former Confederate states, plus Kentucky and Oklahoma constitute "the South." Others define the South as all the Census South states excluding Delaware, Maryland, and Washington D.C. (e.g. Pendergrass 2013).

Some definitions of the South include more nuanced cultural aspect dimensions. For example, Reed (1976) examines the frequency of the terms "Dixie" and "Southern" in a select sample of southern cities to decide what areas are most Southern. He finds some areas are more "Southern" than others. Expanding on Reed's study, Cooper and

Knotts (2010) examine the use of "Dixie" and "Southern" in Southern states as a whole, and places the South into three categories: "southern to the core," "pretty darn southern," and "sorta southern." They conclude Texas, Maryland, Delaware, and Washington D.C. are not Southern enough to make any of these categories.

In this study, however, I employ the definition of the South defined as the former Confederate states. Although I also consider the U.S. Census definition of the South in supplementary analyses for comparison, my primary measure of the South is that of the former Confederate South. Southern identity and distinctiveness is intrinsically tied to the unique history experienced by Southern states (Cobb 2005; Griffin 2001; Key 1949). Although states included in the Census South that were not part of the Confederacy South share some historical experiences with former Confederate states, such as slavery, there are several other experiences "often cited in explaining southern distinctiveness that they do not have in common" (Cotter et al. 2006:213). For instance, the 11 Confederate states were slave states that seceded from the Union, were defeated in the Civil War and underwent Reconstruction, and resisted the dismantling of the Jim Crow system. Thus, these states have a shared history of being part of the racially oppressive "Old South" that is salient for studying inequality across place.

Using data I compiled from various sources, I created an index of historic items that reflect systems of racial oppression (or racial regimes) in the South. These include slavery, sharecropping, and Jim Crow (via opposition to integration and equal rights). (I

describe these measures in greater detail in Chapter 4, which examines the relationship between historical racial legacy and contemporary poverty). Figure 5 displays the historical racial regime score for all 17 states in the Census-defined South.



Figure 5: Historical Racial Regimes for all States in the Census South

The states to the right of the reference line are all former Confederate states, whereas the states to the left of the reference line were not part of the Confederacy, but also included in the Census definition of the South. The latter, fall around -1 and below on the scale. Conversely, the former Confederate states, almost all fall above zero (with the exception of Tennessee and Texas). While there is some variation in historic racial regimes among the Confederate states, there is little among variation among the non-Confederate states. This further justifies why I employ the Confederate South as my

primary definition of the South (versus the Census South). Defining the South in this way is intrinsically historically meaningful.

1.5 Conclusion and Overview of Empirical Chapters

As outlined in this introductory chapter, the socio-economic conditions in the American South have historically been and remain to be an issue in the U.S. Even though the study of the South has historical roots in sociology, contemporary regional inequality (particularly as it pertains to the South) has not been a sustained focused in the mainstream of American poverty research. Socio-economic issues aside, there are many reasons why the South deserves more sociological attention. Yet, coupled with its poverty and inequality, the South provides a fertile ground for empirical research. Accordingly, this dissertation focuses on the issue of poverty in the South, making both theoretical and empirical contributions to the sociological literature on the South, poverty, and inequality more generally.

1.5.1 Chapter 2 Summary

First, this dissertation addresses an enduring question of regional inequality in the U.S., which is why poverty is higher in the South than the non-South. Prior research on the spatial distribution of poverty has agreed upon key social factors that drive poverty differences across place: racial/ethnic concentration and economic structure (Curtis et al. 2013). In addition to these factors and the well-documented role of family demographics, Chapter 2 also incorporates a focus on power resources theory (see Korpi

1985), which recent studies find help explain inequality differences across territories such as rich democracies (Brady 2009; Moller et al 2003) and U.S. states (Brady et al. 2013; Jenkins et al. 2006). Specifically, I examine the relative contributions of four theoretical explanations: 1) family demography, 2) economic structure, 3) race composition, and 4) power resources in contributing to the higher poverty in the South. The five most recent U.S. waves (2000, 2004, 2007, 2010, and 2013) from the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) provide the individual-level data for this study. The LIS sample of 745,135 individuals is nested in rich economic, political, and racial data on U.S. states. Utilizing multiple analytic strategies, including mixed multi-level linear probability models and non-linear variance decomposition techniques (see Fairlie 2005), I analyze comprehensive measures of relative and anchored poverty.

Findings show that the higher poverty in the South is most attributable to power resources and to a lesser extent, economic structure. In the linear probability models, adjusting for power resources yields the initial largest declines in the South coefficient compared to economic structure, racial composition and heterogeneity, and family demographics. Similarly, binary decomposition results indicate that power resources and economic structure explain the largest share of the poverty difference between the South and the Non-South. Racial composition/heterogeneity, and to a lesser extent, family demographics, explain the smaller portion of the poverty difference between the South and the Non-South. These results highlight the meaningful role of political and

economic contexts in furthering our understanding of regional poverty trends and inequality more generally. This study also underscores the importance of place characteristics in influencing individual outcomes and shaping patterns of inequality.

1.5.2 Chapter 3 Summary

While Chapter 2 examines the higher poverty in the South in the context of the entire U.S., there is also variation in poverty within the South itself, and factors that explain the higher poverty in the South may not be the driving factor of poverty *within* the South. Thus, in keeping with a focus on the role of family demographics, economic structure, racial composition and heterogeneity, and power resources, Chapter 3 examines these poverty predictors within the South exclusively. This chapter also takes into account variation within the South by examining whether there are differences in the poverty predictors between the sub-regions of the Deep South and the Peripheral South, each having its own distinct characteristics. Analyses include linear probability models of poverty to examine poverty predictors in the South, Peripheral South, and Deep South.

Linear probability regression model results underscore the importance of individual-level ties to the labor market in predicting poverty in the South. Results also indicate some differences between the Deep South and the Peripheral South. For example, the predictors with the largest effects of poverty overall (i.e. such as multiple earners, single mother head and low education head) are even larger in the Deep South

than in the Peripheral South. There are also some divergence state-level effects. For instance, GDPPC is significantly negatively associated with poverty in the Peripheral South, but positively associated with poverty in the Deep South. Such differences as these illustrate how poverty predictors can have varying effects in different contexts. This is essential for understanding how characteristics of place impact inequality.

1.5.3 Chapter 4 Summary

Chapter 4 brings attention to the issue of race and its significance for poverty in the South. Not only is poverty high in the South, there is a disproportionate share of poor Blacks in the South, and there is a large poverty disparity between Blacks and Whites in the South. This chapter examines these poverty patterns in the South by drawing on the notion of racial regimes (see Bonilla-Silva 2015; Omi and Winant 2014) and race legacy (see Snipp 1996; O'Connell 2013, Ruef 2014). Specifically, this study employs an innovative scale measure of Southern historical race regimes (e.g. slavery, sharecropping, Jim Crow) based on data collected from various sources. Using this scale, I examine the bivariate associations of historical race regimes and contemporary poverty (i.e. total poverty, Black poverty, and the Black-White poverty gap). I also employ linear probability regression models to examine the effect of historical race regimes and other poverty predictors on individual poverty. Lastly, I use binary decomposition (Fairlie 2005) to examine what poverty predictors contribute to the Black-White poverty gap.

Chapter 4 bivariate results indicate there is a significant association between state-level historical racial regimes and contemporary poverty patterns for total poverty, Black poverty, and the Black-White poverty gap. Though regression analyses fail to yield significant effects for historical race regimes on individual poverty in the South, decomposition analyses suggest historical race regimes do contribute to the poverty disparity between Blacks and Whites in the South, although the effect is small. Furthermore, a comparison of poverty predictors between Blacks and Whites in both regression and decomposition analyses suggest that individual ties to the labor market and education are key to understanding Black-White poverty disparities in the South. I also consider the possibility that these factors might meditate the effects of historical race regimes on poverty.

Together, the three empirical chapters of this dissertation contribute to a deeper understanding of enduring Southern poverty, and more general theoretical discussions regarding place, inequality and stratification. Additionally, in examining poverty in the South in varying contexts, this dissertation contributes to the growing literature regarding a key sub-national level (see Lobao and Hooks 2007) of poverty. In doing so, this dissertation also brings attention to both micro and macro characteristics of place that help create, maintain, and reproduce systems of inequality.

2. Why is the American South Poorer?

Though persistent poverty and uneven development exists across the U.S., poverty has historically been disproportionately concentrated in the South. For decades, more poor Americans have resided in the South than any other region, with the South accounting for 42% of all Americans living in poverty in 2013 alone (Census Bureau 2014). Indeed, some of the most chronic, economically depressed areas in the U.S. are concentrated in the South (e.g. such as the Black Belt, the Mississippi Delta, and Appalachia) (Glasmeier 2002; Lichter, Parisi and Taquino 2011; Wimberley 2010). With an official poverty rate of 16.1%, the South has the highest poverty rate of all regions (DeNavas-Walt and Proctor 2014) and is the only region to show statistically significant increases in both the official poverty rate and the number in poverty in recent years (DeNavas-Walt, Proctor, and Smith 2011). Using more justifiable relative measures of poverty, the poverty rate for the South is even *higher* at 20%.[2]

The South has made notable economic progress in recent decades. These include increased economic growth and urban expansion relative to other regions (Lloyd 2012) and per capita income gains that have narrowed regional income disparities in recent years (Miller and Ku 2014). However, the persistently high poverty in the South remains a cause for concern. For instance, from 2000 to 2013, 6 of the 10 highest poverty states in

[2] Based on author's calculations using US data from the Luxembourg Income Study from 2000 to 2013.

the U.S. were Southern states (as defined by being former states of the Confederacy) and 9 of the 10 states are in the South as defined by the U.S. Census (see Table 1). Related to its high relative poverty, the South also has the lowest median income (DeNavas-Walt and Proctor 2014), highest income inequality (Bee 2012), and lowest socio-economic mobility (Chetty et al. 2014) of all regions.

Table 1: The Ten Highest Poverty States in the U.S., 2000-2013

State	% Poverty
1. Mississippi[S]	**26.74**
2. Louisiana[S]	**24.92**
3. Arkansas[S]	**23.33**
4. Kentucky[S]	22.86
5. New Mexico	22.67
6. Alabama[S]	**22.62**
7. Washington D.C[S]	22.41
8. West Virginia[S]	22.35
9. Texas[S]	**22.08**
10. North Carolina[S]	**21.22**

Note: Bolded states are former Confederate States. [S] denotes the state is Southern as defined by the U.S. Census regions. Poverty rates are based on the author's calculations from the Luxembourg Income Study.

Despite the South's disproportionate share of the nation's socio-economic problems, there lacks contemporary sociological research in this area (Wimberley 2008). While several studies focus on chronic, poor sub-regions of the South, such as the Mississippi Delta, Black Belt, Appalachia, and Texas Borderlands (see Duncan 2000; Hattery and Smith 2007; Poston et al. 2010; Slack et al. 2009; Wimberley 2010), or the urban/rural poverty gap (see Brown and Lichter 2004; Cotter 2002; Lichter and

McLaughlin 1995), less research examines the South/Non-South poverty gap. In light of this ongoing regional economic disparity, this chapter contributes to the literature by addressing the enduring question: why is poverty higher in the South than the Non-South?

To answer this question, I formulate and empirically test four alternative theoretical explanations with five waves of individual-level demographic U.S. data from the Luxemburg Income Study (2000, 2004, 2007, 2010, and 2010) and state-level economic, racial and political data from a variety of sources. (See Appendix A for a list of all data sources). Specifically, I employ a triangulation of analytic techniques (i.e. comparison of means, multi-level linear probability models, and binary decomposition) to examine the extent to which family demography, economic structure, race composition and heterogeneity, and power resources explain the higher poverty in the South. While each analytic technique has its strengths and weaknesses, the aim is to collectively provide a rigorous set of analyses to obtain a more comprehensive understanding of why poverty is higher in the South.

2.1 Explanations for Higher Poverty in the South

2.1.1 Family Demographics

American poverty research has placed great emphasis on the relationship between family demographic characteristics (henceforth "family demographics") and poverty. The idea here is that poverty is not randomly distributed across families and

households. As Iceland (2013:6) notes, "Poverty is more pervasive among some demographic sub-groups…regardless of the poverty measured used." These include female-headed households, women, children, and people with less education.[3] These groups are more vulnerable to poverty as they are more likely to live in households with economic fewer resources and weaker ties to the labor market. Accordingly, family demographics is pertinent to understanding the higher poverty in the South.

The most emphasized family demographic in poverty literature is family structure, particularly single mother households and the increased likelihood of poverty and reproduction of poverty in these households (McLanahan 1985; Thomas and Sawhill 2005). Compared to married couple households, single mother households are typically younger, with lower levels of education, employment, income, and wealth (Thomas and Sawhill 2005; Western et al. 2008), which put them in greater risk of poverty. Correspondingly, a rise in single mother families from 1975 to 2005 has coincided with an increase in overall poverty rates and total income inequality (Western et al. 2008).

Education attainment is another important family demographic factor linked to poverty. Becker (1994) theorized how greater human capital (e.g. education attainment) influences economic outcomes in families, and thus inequality, due to income gains and better employment opportunities. Indeed, many studies demonstrate lower education

[3] While family demographics related to employment and race/ethnicity are also associated with poverty, I consider them separately in the discussions of economic and racial explanations of poverty to follow.

levels of the head of household are positively associated with poverty (Chen and Corak 2008; McLanahan 1985; Western et al. 2008).

Because the composition of individuals and families vary across place, family demographics are important to understanding place-based inequalities. Ample research examining the rural/urban poverty gap focuses on how family demographics, such as female-headed/single mother households, contribute to the rural/urban poverty gap (Lichter 2004; Sherman 2009; Snyder and McLaughlin 2004; Snyder et al. 2006; Slack et al. 2009). These studies demonstrate that while single mothers are more likely to live in metro areas than non-metro areas, single mothers in non-metro areas are much more likely to be poor and have low paying jobs. Scholars attribute this metro-non-metro gap to rural women's limited job opportunities, segregated labor market, poor quality of jobs, and lack of social support (Brown and Lichter 2004; Duncan 2000; Snyder and McLaughlin 2004). Further, Brown and Lichter (2004) argue that rural, single mothers tend to be "triple disadvantaged" (i.e. they experience higher poverty rates, higher barriers to welfare receipt, and lower economic returns from livelihood strategies such as full-time employment and cohabitation). This is noteworthy considering the recent changes in family structure in rural areas characterized by an increasing percentage of single mothers (Albrecht et al. 2000; Snyder et al. 2004). Scholars argue that compared to urban women, the costs of family structure changes have been arguably higher for rural women (Snyder et al. 2004).

In addition to the role of female-headed households, rural families also are significantly more likely to have younger heads of households, lower levels of education, and younger age at first child birth (Albrecht and Albrecht 2004; Roscigno and Crowley 2001; Roscigno et al. 2006; Brown and Lichter 2004). All of which are associated with the greater poverty observed in rural areas. It is also important to note that the effects of family demographics can have varying effects on poverty by place. For example, although rural residents have higher marriage rates and are more likely to be married at the time of conception than urban residents (Albrecht and Albrecht 2004), their poverty rates are still well above the national average for married couple families (Slack et al. 2009). This suggests that even the benefits associated with certain family characteristics (e.g. marriage) can vary across place, and thus contribute to inequalities.

The well-documented associations between family demographics and poverty, coupled with the evidence of spatial differences in family demographics contributing to poverty differences across place (e.g. urban/rural), are not inconsequential for this current study. Plausibly, family demographics may also contribute to the difference in poverty between the South and the Non-South. The strong relationship between female-heads/single mothers and poverty is pertinent to the South, where almost a third of all children reside with single mothers (Mattingly 2010), and the rate of female heads exceeds the national average (Lofquist et al. 2010). The South also has historically ranked lowest in education attainment among all regions, falling behind in the education of

children (Annie E. Casey Foundation, 2014) and having the least educated adults (Ryan and Siebens 2012).

Taking these factors into account, a family demographics perspective would suggest that observed regional differences in family demographics such as these (and others) should account for why poverty is higher in the South.

2.1.2 Economic Structure & Performance

While family demographics provide an individual-level explanation for poverty and can account for some differences across place, broader structural factors should also be taken into account. For example, Friedman and Lichter (1998) find county unemployment rate matters more for child poverty than do family characteristics. Indeed, a broad literature examines economic structure and performance, and how large-scale economic conditions and transformations shape economic opportunities, and thus, inequality and poverty (Blank 2005; Freeman 2001). Specifically, economic structure reflects industry type, extent of industrial specialization or agglomeration, employment, job quality and quantity, and unemployment, and as Blank (2005:444) notes, “can affect the overall economic climate and the ways in which the local economy is buffeted by or protected from larger macroeconomic trends.”

Several scholars contend that economic structure and performance is a key determinant in shaping poverty. Blank (2000:6) notes that "a strong macroeconomy matters more than anything else" in fighting poverty. Rainwater and Smeeding

(2004:108) conclude, "It is labor market institutions that have the largest impact on a country's poverty rate." Newman (2006:169) states that high levels of economic growth help prevent poverty "mainly because they provide employees with more work hours, and to some degree, better wages or opportunities for upward mobility." As such, economic structure is another key element that constitutes the basis of spatial inequality (Lobao 1996).

Perhaps this is best illustrated by Wilson (1987), whose research highlights how economic structural transformations resulted in concentrated poverty in the inner-city. Specifically, manufacturing job loss in the wake of the globalized economy, suburban growth, and the rise of low-wage service work, led to increased joblessness and insufficient wages among inner-city Black families. Consequently, Wilson (1987) argues such structural changes in the economy foster high poverty and growing disadvantage. Similarly to Wilson (1987), several studies consider the relationship between economic structural changes and poverty in rural areas (Albrecht and Albrecht 2000; Cotter 2002, Lobao 1996; Tickamyer and Duncan 1990) and sub-regions of the South like Appalachia, the Mississippi Delta, and the Borderlands (Duncan 2000; Poston et al. 2010; Slack et al. 2009). This literature shows how past and present economic development policies and transformations result in economic patterns (e.g. industry shifts, service sector growth, uneven development, underemployment) that contribute to the high concentration, persistence, and severity of poverty in these areas.

Accordingly, economic structure does matter for poverty differences across place as well. In a study of rich countries, Moller and colleagues (2003:44) conclude, "Pre-tax and transfer poverty is mainly a function of industrial employment, unemployment, and wage coordination." They find countries with coordinated market economies, characterized by a large percentage of employed working age adults and low unemployment rate, have low levels of pre-tax and transfer poverty. Similarly, Cotter (2002) shows economic structures are key to understanding the rural/urban poverty gap. When taking into account labor market characteristics (e.g. % in manufacturing, unemployment, etc.), rural households are only 19% more likely to be poor than urban households, as compared to 40% when not taken into account (Cotter 2002). These findings highlight that a large extent of the rural/urban poverty gap "is attributable to the *context* [e.g. macro-level economic factors] of non-metro America rather than to the *composition* [e.g. demographic make-up] of non-metro Americans" (Cotter 2002:549). Considering the economic differences between the South and Non-South, economic structure may similarly explain the South/Non-South poverty gap.

In the South, economic restructuring, namely shifts in industries and subsequent job loss, have led to patterns of inequality and uneven development across the region. The decline of the agricultural industry led to collapse of whole local economies in the South, particularly in rural areas (Albrecht and Albrecht 2000). While growth in manufacturing and extraction helped offset this loss, increased automation and

outsourcing led to more eventual job loss (Blank 2005; Duncan 2000; Luebke 1998; Tickamyer and Duncan 1990). Luebke (1998) shows this same trend reflected across sub-regions of North Carolina, arguing that loss of manufacturing jobs contributed to gaps between high and low income counties, creating dual economies. As follows, the higher poverty in the South tends to be in small and rural areas that rely on low-wage employment. Such restructuring and increased cheap, low-skilled labor leads to fewer and limited job opportunities (Blank 2005; Peters 2009). Further, job growth that has occurred recently in the South and in rural areas has been in the service sector (Albrecht and Albrecht 2000; Branch and Hanley 2011). Many of these jobs are part-time, low-skill, low-wage, and temporary, resulting increased under-employment and unemployment, which in turn, lead to economic disparities (Branch and Hanley 2011; Friedman and Lichter 1998; Slack and Jenson 2002).

In light of the economic transformations that have led to poverty and uneven development in the South, the economic structure approach would suggest that regional variation in economic factors such as unemployment, industries, and economic growth are more meaningful factors in explaining the higher poverty in the South than are family characteristics.

2.1.3 Racial Composition and Heterogeneity

It is well-documented that Blacks are significantly more likely to be poor, earn less, and accumulate less wealth (Oliver and Shapiro 2013). The worse economic well-

being among Blacks, along with the greater likelihood of Blacks to reside in the South (Rastogi et al. 2011), make racial composition and heterogeneity important factors to consider for understanding regional poverty disparities.

Extensive research has long documented the linkage between minority concentration and poverty in inner-city neighborhoods (Jargowsky 1997; Massey and Denton 1993, Wilson 1987). Similarly, studies find that the most impoverished areas in the U.S. (e.g. Mississippi Delta, Rio Grande Valley, America Indian reservations) are those with high minority concentrations (Albrecht, Albrecht, and Murguia 2005; Curtis et al. 2012; Lichter, et al. 2011; Wimberley 2010). One explanation for the high poverty in minority concentrated is the notion that racial disparities are a result of subordination, discrimination, and prejudice that are maintained through systems of inequality (Albrecht et al. 2005; Massey and Denton 1993; Snipp 1996; Tomaskovic-Devey and Roscigno 1996). For example, minorities (namely Blacks and Latinos) experience greater discrimination and subjugation in education, employment, and housing markets (Pager and Shepherd 2008), which may explain the greater poverty in high minority areas.

A second explanation for the link between minority concentration and poverty is group threat theory. This theory posits that the larger proportion of the population belonging to a subordinate group (e.g. blacks), the greater competition among racial groups for economic resources and thus, the greater potential for the dominant group to act collectively against the subordinate group (King and Wheelock 2007; Quillian 1996,

Blalock 1967). In turn, this perceived threat leads to prejudice and inequality that disadvantages the subordinate group (King and Wheelock 2007; Taylor 1998). For example, higher proportions of Blacks in an area is strongly associated with more negative racial views of Blacks among Whites (King and Wheelock 2007; Quillian 1996; Taylor 1998) and less support for welfare spending (Fullerton and Dixon 2009).

While racial composition is the racial make-up of a population, racial/ethnic heterogeneity is the degree to which a population is racially/ethnically diverse, and may also be useful for understanding differences in poverty. The basic premise is that "ethnic diversity may increase polarization [among groups] and thereby impede agreement about the provision of public goods and create positive incentives for growth reducing policies" (Easterly and Levine 1997:1206). Indeed, spending on public goods is inversely related to ethnic fragmentation in U.S. cities and counties, especially where ethnic groups are polarized and politicians have ethnic constituencies (Alesina, Baqir, and Easterly 1999). This disadvantages those with the most to gain from public goods (e.g. low-income and minorities), and thus can contribute to spatial inequalities.

Together, racial composition and heterogeneity are pertinent to the South. Not only does the South have the greatest concentration of Blacks, it has the largest overall minority population, and has experienced the largest minority growth rate (34%) of all regions from 2000 to 2010 (Humes, Jones, and Ramirez 2011). These characteristics are even more meaningful in the South considering the history of racial subjugation and

regimes in the region. Minorities in distressed areas often have the shared experience of living in a place that has a history of oppressive, racialized institutions (e.g. slavery and the plantation system, Jim Crow, post slavery agricultural peonage, and the convict lease system) (Snipp 1996). Such historical discriminatory structures put in place in the South have had a significant impact on racial relations and race inequality.

In sum, a racial composition and heterogeneity perspective would argue that the greater concentration of Blacks and overall diversity in the South likely translate into higher levels of group threat and racial polarization (particularly in light of the South's salient racial history). In turn, this leads to greater poverty in the region.

2.1.4 Power Resources

Research has increasingly recognized the important role of politics and power in shaping regional inequalities (Brady and Sosnaud 2010). Power resources theory offers a unique perspective from which to examine how power and politics contribute to inequality, and specifically, the South/Non-South poverty difference. According to power resources theory, collective actors come together and mobilize less advantaged groups of citizens around shared interests (Korpi 1983; 1985). These groups gain power through forming unions and leftist parties to fight against the unequal distribution of political power inherent in a capitalist democracy, which in turn expand the welfare state, resulting in more equitable outcomes (Korpi 1983; 1985). Korpi (1985:41)

underscores the relationship between power resources and inequality and its usefulness for understanding differences across place:

> The existing inequalities in the distribution of power resources in western democracies are great enough to be of crucial importance for the functioning of these societies. Furthermore, the differences in the degree of inequality in the distribution of power resources between countries and between time periods provide a fruitful base for the understanding of variations among the western democracies.

Recent studies incorporate power resources theory in studies of poverty in rich democracies. Moller and colleagues (2003) examine determinants of relative poverty and poverty reduction, and consider how political factors (i.e. left government and welfare policies) may affect poverty directly. Their findings indicate "that states are more likely to effectively redistribute income to the poor when they have longer periods of left rule and more generous welfare states" (Moller et al. 2003:43). Brady (2009) extends power resources theory to advance understanding of poverty differences across territories. He posits that leftist collective political actors/politics, coalitions for equality, and the social policies they are able to institutionalize, shape poverty in society. Brady (2009) finds this to be the case in rich democracies, where those with historically more generous welfare states have lower levels of poverty. Leftist politics, which include the political actors, organizations, and institutions who strive for a more equitable distribution of a society's resources are a key element to power resources (Brady 2009). They are necessary for a stronger welfare state, which consists of policies and programs that disproportionately

allocate economic resources to vulnerable populations (Brady 2009). Also reflecting leftist collective actors, are unions--wage bargaining institutions that affect inequality by helping generate wage compression and maintain relatively high wages (Wallerstein 1999). Western and Rosenfeld (2011:513) argue unions help "institutionalize norms of equity, reducing the dispersion of nonunion wages in highly unionized regions and industries." As follows, studies find unions have a negative effect on inequality across rich democracies (Brady 2009; Wallerstein 1999) and within the U.S. (Branch and Hanley 2011; Jacobs and Myers 2014; Moller et al. 2009). More specifically, unions increase wage earnings (Branch and Hanley 2011; Jacobs and Myers 2014) and even reduce working poverty (Brady, Baker, and Finnigan 2013).

Given the abovementioned ways power resources influence inequality, power resources theory is a useful approach for understanding the higher poverty in the South. This is especially the case when considering the notion of states as consequential polities where struggles and settlements over distribution occur (see Moller 2008), similar to rich democracies. Though national governments sometimes attempt to dictate regional and local activities, states have independent powers to implement (or not implement) national policies, give national political mandates distinctly local and regional flavors, and formulate their own policies altogether (Leicht and Jenkins 2007). This leads to differences in power resources, distribution, and inevitably, inequalities across territories.

In regards to power resources, Southerners, have historically conservative political ideologies and values (Black and Black 2002; DiMaggio, Evans, and Bryson 1996; Weakliem and Biggert 1999), being less likely to support social welfare programs (Johnson 2003; Luebke 1998; and Weakliem and Biggert 1999). These characteristics are not particularly conducive to strong leftist politics. Further, in the South, conservativism is not limited to a single political party. Luebke (1998) notes that in contrast to past policies in non-Southern industrial states, fundamental to the politics in North Carolina (and likely other Southern states) is a bipartisan rejection of redistributive politics that involve state tax and spending on the less affluent-majority as well as an acceptance of trickle-down economics. Consequently, such conservative ideologies in the South also contribute to the region's weaker welfare state. Johnson (2003) finds states whose residents have more left leaning political ideology tend to have higher welfare benefit levels. Thus, as countries with more generous welfare states have less poverty (Brady 2009), the South's historically weaker welfare state (Quadango 1996, Kail and Duncan 2011) could be associated with its higher poverty as well. The South, also has historically had a strikingly low percentage of the workforce in unions (Roscigno and Kimble 1995). Scholars have identified several barriers to unionization in the South: the passage of the anti-union Taft-Hartly Act of 1947 and subsequent right-to work laws in most Southern states (Dixon 2010; Griffin and Hargis 2012), anti-communism, rigid employer resistance, and racial divisions among manual workers, (Griffin and Hargis 2012),

economic underdevelopment, massive blue-collar job loss due to increased automation and foreign competition (Herod 2012; Roscigno and Kimble 1995), job growth in traditionally hard to unionize sectors (Griffin and Hargis 2012), and vast, hard-to-cover rural areas (Roscigno and Kimble 1995:272). In the absence of unions and their labor agreements, "the government's hands are untied and there is institutional freedom for policy to reflect the incumbent's preferences" such as regressive taxes (Beramendi and Rueda 2007:627). Newman and O'Brien (2011) find the regressive taxation in the South intended to replace missing revenues disproportionately burdens the poor, exacerbates the conditions leading to poverty, and thus contribute to regional poverty disparities.

In sum, less unionization, weaker leftist politics, and less generous welfare states reflect weaker power resources. Thus, if power resources shape inequality, than the South's weaker power resources should explain its higher poverty than the non-South.

2.2 Methods

2.2.1 Data

The Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) provides all the individual-level data for this study. The LIS consists of harmonized and standardized micro-data from national household surveys from various points in time. The U.S. data in the LIS is derived from the Census Bureau's March Current Population Survey (CPS) Annual Social and Economic Supplement. The advantage of the LIS over the original CPS is its comprehensive income measures that incorporate taxes and transfers. I pool the five

most recent of the LIS U.S. datasets: 2000, 2004, 2007, 2010, and 2013. Pooling the data provides more reliable and robust estimates. Further, by including multiple waves of data, I can ensure that one particular year is not responsible for any observed differences. The unit of analysis is all individuals in households. The total pooled sample is 973,459 individuals across the 50 U.S. states and the District of Columbia, which I treat as a 51st state. State-level data come from multiple sources. (See Appendix A for all data sources.)

2.2.2 Dependent Variables

The dependent variable is *poverty.* Following recent studies using LIS data (Brady et al. 2013; Chen & Corak 2008; Gornick & Jäntti 2012; Rainwater & Smeeding 2004), I employ a standard relative measure of poverty in which the threshold is 50 percent of median equivalized, post-tax and post-transfer household income. All individuals in households below this threshold are poor. I calculate household income using the standardized LIS variable disposable household income (DHI). DHI includes cash and noncash income after taxes and transfers (including food stamps, housing allowances, tax credits like the Earned Income Tax Credit [EITC], and near cash benefits). DHI is adjusted for household size by dividing by the square root of the number of household members. This represents the mid-point between the two extreme assumptions of no economies of scale and perfect economies of scale (Gornick and Jäntti 2010). I also include an alternative poverty measure that is a time "anchored" threshold grounded in

2010 and adjusted backwards for inflation so that the measures are fixed (Chen & Corak 2008). While the standard relative measure of poverty may be less sensitive to the business cycle and improvements in standards of living and economic development, the anchored measure is more responsive.

These relative poverty measures are a defensible alternative to the official U.S. measure for multiple reasons. While the U.S. poverty measure is based on gross pre-tax income that excludes in-kind benefits, my poverty measures are based on a more comprehensive income measure, which provide a more reliable and valid poverty estimate (Brady 2009; Rainwater and Smeeding 2004). Further, since taxes and transfers tend to be less pro-poor in the South (Newman & O'Brien 2012), a better measure may yield even higher Southern poverty than the official rates. Moreover, the threshold for the official U.S. measure is commonly understood to be too low, which underestimates poverty (Brady 2003). Finally, these poverty measures (and the income definition underlying them) are more consistent with leading conceptualizations of poverty like social exclusion and capability deprivation (Chen & Corak 2008; Deaton, 2006), and exhibit greater reliability.

2.2.3 Key Independent Variables

The key independent variable is a binary measure indicating whether the individual resides in the U.S. South. In this study, I define *South* as those states that were formally part of the Confederacy. These include Alabama, Arkansas, Georgia, Florida,

Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia. This is the measure of the South commonly used by historians and political scientists (e.g. Black and Black 1987; Keith 2002). These states' shared history (e.g. being former slave states that seceded from the Union, were defeated in the Civil War, and endured some of the worst of Jim Crow) distinguishes them from other states the Census classifies as in the South (i.e. WV, MD, DE, DC, KY, and OK.). While the results in this chapter focus on the analyses using this definition of South, I do complete all analyses using the Census definition for the South. These results are in Appendix B.

2.2.4 Family Demographic Variables

Based on the extant literature, I incorporate several family demographic variables measures at the individual household-level. Four binary variables indicate whether the head of household is a *single mother*, *single father*, *female with no children,* or *male with no children* (reference = married).[4] I also include the *number of children* and binary indicators for the presence of *young children* under age 5 and *older adults* over age 65 in the household. For several variables, I include the characteristics of the lead earner in the household (i.e. that is the individual with the highest earnings, with ties settled by age) in lieu of "head of household." To control for curvilinearity between the lead's age and poverty, I include the following age categories: *under age 25, age 25-34 age 35-44, and*

[4] Cohabiters are not included in the married category.

age 55 and over (reference = age 44 to 54). I measure education of the lead with binary variables, *less than high school,* and *college degree or more* (reference group = high school and some college). Additionally, because poverty is higher among immigrants (Iceland 2013) and rural residents (Cotter 2002), I include binary indicators of the lead's *immigrant* status and the household's *rural* residence (i.e. resides in an area with a population <100,000).

2.2.5 Economic Structure Variables

To assess labor market standing of the household, I include binary measures of whether the individual resides in a household that is *unemployed* (i.e. no paid earners) and has *multiple earners* (i.e. two or more earners). Following recent U.S. poverty studies (Brady et al. 2013; Newman & O'Brien 2012), I also include variables to assess state-level economic performance. I measure g*ross domestic product per capita (GDP PC),* and e*conomic growth,* the annual rate of change in a state's real gross domestic product (GDP). GDP, the total value of goods and services produced in an economy, is "the most comprehensive measure of economic activity" (Mishel et al. 2012:323). I also measure u*nemployment rate*, the share of the state's civilian labor force that is unemployed. While GDP PC tracks long-term economic development, unemployment assesses the shorter-term business cycle. Lastly, I measure the share of all workers in *manufacturing* and in the *public sector* to examine industry effects.

2.2.6 Racial Composition and Heterogeneity Variables

To measure race composition effects, I include individual-level binary indicators of whether the household head (i.e. "lead") is *Black*, *Hispanic,* or *Other Race* (reference = Non-Hispanic White). To capture racial heterogeneity, I employ Alesina and colleagues' (1999) measurement of *racial/ethnic fractionalization*, which reflects how racially/ethnically diverse a state is by computing the likelihood two randomly drawn persons from the same state are of the same race/ethnicity. The values varies from 0 to 1 and is calculated by taking one minus the squared proportions of the population in each racial and ethnic group[5]. The formula is as follows:

$$\text{RACE/ETHNIC FRAC.} = 1 - \sum_i (\text{Race}_i)^2,$$

where Race_i denotes the share of population self-identified as of race *i* and

i – {Non-Hispanic White, Non-Hispanic Black, Non-Hispanic Asian/Pacific Islander, Non-Hispanic American Indian, Non-Hispanic Two or More Race, Hispanic}.

2.2.7 Power Resources Variables

I include several state-level political variables to measure the effects of power resources (see Brady 2009; Moller et al. 2013). Because the modern U.S. Democratic Party is associated with more liberal, leftist views, I measure *Democratic Control*, the

[5] I use the Census racial classification, and group Hispanics of all races in one mutually exclusive category.

lagged five year average of the governor being a Democrat and the proportion of the two houses of the legislature that was Democratic.[6] *Unionization* is the percent of civilian wage and salary employees aged 16 and over that are members of labor unions, measured in the same year. Whereas democratic average can experience radical shifts in a short period of time, unionization rates remain relatively stable, and thus, these two variables essentially capture both short- and long-term effects. Because welfare generosity is another key component in understanding how power resources influences poverty, I also include the combined monthly, maximum potential *Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) and Supplemental Nutrition Assistant Program* (i.e. Food Stamps) benefit for a 3-person family and the maximum weekly *unemployment insurance* benefit per worker. Descriptive statistics for and sources for all variables are in Appendix A.

2.2.8 Analytic Strategy

I employ a triangulation of methods including: 1) a comparison of variable means, 2) multi-level linear probability models, and 3) binary non-variance decomposition technique. Each method has its strengths and limitations, but together, they aim is to provide a set of analyses that help yield a more comprehensive understanding of the higher poverty in the South.

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[6] For Nebraska, I use the Democratic proportion of congressional representatives as a proxy for the non-partisan state legislatures. For D.C., I impute Democratic control of the governor and state legislature.

The first analyses compares variable means for the South and Non-South, This includes t-tests (for continuous variables) and pr-tests (for dichotomous variables) of whether the differences are statistically significant. While descriptive statistics such as means cannot explain why poverty is higher in the South, they highlight factors that may prove substantively important in the multi-variate analyses. To better interpret the substantive differences in the means for the South and the Non-South, I calculate and graph their ratios.

Second, I employ multi-level regression models, which allow for testing of the effects of Southern residence on poverty net of individual/household and state-level characteristics. In this analysis, I examine how adjusting for different groups of independent variables (i.e. family demographics, economic structure, race composition, and power resources) affect the South coefficient. I begin with the unadjusted model that only includes Southern residence and controls for year. I then add one group of independent variables to the model, in turn (e.g. South + family demographics). Lastly, I explore combinations of the models with two, three, and all independent variable groups. I also robust cluster the errors by state.

Multi-level analyses with binary dependent variables typically employ multi-level logit models. However, there has been a growing concern that comparison of coefficients across logit models or groups is inherently problematic due to the varying degree of unobserved heterogeneity across groups (Allison 1999; Karlson, Holm, and

Breen 2012; Mood 2010). Because logit coefficients depend both on the sizes of effects and the magnitude of unobserved heterogeneity, logit models do not allow for straightforward interpretation and comparison of coefficients as do linear regression models (Mood 2010). Thus, I employ mixed linear-probability models (LPMs) for my multi-level analyses.[7] LPMs can effectively address the issues of comparing logit coefficients, however, differences in error distributions across LPMs can lead to mistaken inferences about cofounding, which can bias results (Karlson et al. 2012).

The third set of analyses employs non-linear Fairlie decomposition (see Legewie and DiPrete 2014; Fairlie 2005) to examine the extent to which each of the groups of independent variables contribute to the South/Non-South poverty gap. Because poverty is a binary variable, the non-linear Fairlie decomposition technique is more appropriate than the alternative Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition method, which is based on linear assumptions (Fairlie 2005). Following Legewie and DiPrete, (2014), I use a counterfactual decomposition analyses to determine the relative contribution of the groups of independent variables to the South/Non-South poverty gap. The steps of the decomposition are as follows. First, it estimates a logit model that predicts poverty within the South, adjusting for all variables. Second, it substitutes the values of the independent variables from the Non-South and applies them to the South. Third, it

[7] Specifically, I estimate linear probability models using xtmixed in Stata.

simulates what would happen to poverty with these alternative independent variable values of the Non-South and the original coefficients of the South. Lastly, it attributes the percent of variance explained to each set of variables. While this decomposition technique does not account for the multi-level structure of the data, controls for year correct the non-independence of observations within years. Further, because results are sensitive to the ordering of the variable groups, I randomize the ordering of the variable groups in each replication of the decomposition to approximate the average results over all possible variable group orderings.

2.3. Results

2.3.1. Poverty Rates

Figure 6 displays the mean poverty rates for the South and Non-South for all years. As expected, the South has higher poverty, with relative and anchored poverty rates of 20.5% and 19.7%, compared to 15.4% and 14.8% for the Non-South, respectively.



Figure 6: Poverty Rates in the South and Non-South, 2000-2013

2.3.2 Variable Means and Difference Tests

Table 2 displays the means and difference statistics for all variables for the South and non-South. All mean differences (except children under five and immigrant lead) are statistically significant. For substantive interpretation of the differences, Figure 7 illustrates the South/Non-South ratio of the means. A ratio of one (marked by the horizontal black bar), indicates no difference.

Among the family demographic variables, the largest difference is for low education. In the South, household heads are 35% more likely to have less than a high school degree than the Non-South. Conversely, they are 13% less likely to have a college degree. The South is also more likely to heads of households that are single mother or female (with no children), under age 25, and over age 54. These trends are generally associated with higher poverty. However, households in the South are less likely to have an immigrant head or be in a rural residence.

In regards to economic structure variables, the largest substantive ratio is for no earners households, as individual households are about 18% more likely to have no earners than the Non-South. Relatedly, the South is almost 10% less likely to have households with multiple earners. This suggests weaker ties to the labor market in the South than the Non-South. The ratio for GD PPC also illustrates a sizable difference, as it is 16% lower in the South than the Non-South. Economic growth is also less. The

unemployment rate and the percent of employment in manufacturing and the public sector, however, are only marginally higher in the South than the Non-South.

For race composition and heterogeneity, the South has over two times as many households with Black heads as does the Non-South, while Hispanic heads are almost a third more likely. Conversely, Other Race heads are half less likely in the South than the Non-South. The South is also more diverse than the Non-South as indicated by its level of racial fractionalization, which is almost a third higher.

Among the power resources variables, the most striking difference is in unionization, which is almost 60% lower in the South than the Non-South. Democratic control is 15% lower in the South. Government assistance is also lower in the South, with the TANF/SNAP combined maximum benefit for a family of three being almost a quarter lower, and the maximum unemployment insurance maximum benefit being 20% lower. These power resources are associated with lower poverty. Thus, these large differences may be indicative the importance of power resources in explaining the South/Non-South poverty gap as compared to the other variable groups.

Table 2: Means and Difference Statistics for South and Non-South, 2000-2013

Variables	South	Non-South	Z-score	T-score
Family Demographics				
Single Mother	11.95	10.41	-20.44	----
Single Father	3.66	4.23	11.83	----
Female, No Children	9.67	9.11	-8.01	----
Male, No Children	7.03	7.30	4.35	----
Number of Children	1.30	1.36	----	18.24
Children < Age 5	24.77	25.09	3.09[NS]	----
Adults over Age65	16.42	15.42	-11.38	----
Less than High School	16.55	12.27	-52.02	----
College Degree	27.27	31.29	36.74	----
Age < 25	5.40	5.00	-7.51	----
Age 25-34	19.24	18.55	-7.32	----
Age 35-44	28.98	29.70	6.46	----
Age 45-54	22.18	24.14	18.92	----
Age >54	22.65	21.25	-13.99	----
Foreign Born	5.72	5.58	-2.46[NS]	----
Rural Residence	23.31	27.53	39.32	----
Economic Structure				----
No Earners	12.48	10.58	-23.62	----
Multi-Earners	53.92	59.81	49.27	----
GDPPC	42998.64	50267.49		-203.53
Economic Growth	2.50	2.76	----	48.46
Manufacturing	8.15	8.10	----	-6.46
Public Sector	14.59	14.26		-43.02
Unemployment Rate	5.96	5.87	----	-16.78
Racial Composition & Heterogeneity				
Black	20.92	8.95	-1.5e+2	----
Hispanic	20.48	15.32	-57.10	----
Other Race	4.80	9.72	72.03	----
Racial Fractionalization	56.67	41.43	----	3.2.6e+02
Power Resources			----	
Democratic Average	44.23	50.94	----	150.20
Unionization	5.36	14.20	----	789.83
TANF/SNAP	682.40	919.48	----	605.15
Unemployment Insurance	319.24	395.81	----	338.77
N	217,520	755,939	----	----

Note: Ho: Non-South - South = 0. Z-scores test binary variables; t-scores test continuous variables. All differences are significant at the p <.001 level unless noted [NS] non-significant.



Figure 7: South/Non-South Means Ratios

Note: White filled bars indicate not significantly different.

2.3.3 Multi-level Linear Probability Models (LPMs)

Table 3 displays the South coefficients from the LPMs for both relative and anchored poverty. Among the one group models, living in the South increases an individual's probability of relative and anchored poverty by 5.9% and 5.7%, respectively. This is consistent with the higher poverty rates observed in Figure 1. After adjusting for family demographics (FD), South residence increases the probability of poverty by only 4.1% (relative) and 4.0% (anchored), respectively. In the economic structure model, living in the increases the probability of relative and anchored poverty by only 3%. The race composition and heterogeneity model has a similar effect on the South coefficient (3.1% for relative and 3% for anchored). After adjusting for power resources, living in the South increases the probability of relative and anchored poverty by only 2.9% and 2.5%, respectively. Thus, the power resources model decreases the effect of South by more than half of what it is with no covariates. Further, while the effect of South is significant in all one variable group models, it is only weakly significant ($p<.05$) in the power resources and the race composition and heterogeneity models. (See Appendix A Table A2 for full results for all one variable group models).

Adjusting for two variable groups further reduce the effect of South on poverty. The combination of power resources and racial composition and heterogeneity variables yield the largest decline in the effect of South. In this model, the South coefficient (.001 for relative poverty and -.002 for anchored) is essentially zero and not significant. The

Table 3: South Coefficients (Z-Scores), Multi-Level Linear Probability Models
***N*=745,135**

Models	Relative Poverty		Anchored Poverty	
	South Coeff.	South Z-Score	South Coeff.	South Z-Score
South Only (No Covariates)	.059***	(4.78)	.057***	(4.78)
One Variable Groups				
+ Family Demographics (FD)	.041***	(5.35)	.040***	(4.91)
+ Economic Structure (ES)	.030**	(3.42)	.030***	(3.90)
+ Race Composition/Heterogeneity (RCH)	.031*	(2.37)	.030*	(2.38)
+ Power Resources (PR)	.029*	(2.16)	.025**	(2.13)
Two Group Models				
+ FD + ES	.022***	(3.80)	.022***	(3.92)
+ FD + RCH	.029**	(3.34)	.028**	(3.33)
+ FD + PR	.015	(1.60)	.011	(1.22)
+ ES + RCH	.018*	(2.18)	.018*	(2.22)
+ ES + PR	.018*	(2.20)	.014	(1.96)
+ PR + RCH	.001	(0.12)	-.002	(-0.21)
Three Group Models				
+ FD + ES + RCH	.015*	(2.47)	.015*	(2.59)
+ FD + ES + PR	.013*	(2.01)	.010	(1.73)
+ FD + PR + RCH	-.00005	(-0.01)	-.004	(-0.41)
+ ES + PR + RCH	.003	(0.39)	.0009	(0.11)
Full Model	.002	(0.34)	.0003	(0.06)

Note: All models include year controls. Key: FD: Family Demographics, ES: Economic Structure, RCH: Race Composition and Heterogeneity, PR: Power Resources.
****p* < .001, ** *p* < .01, **p* < .05*

two group model that yields the second smallest decline in the effect of South on poverty is the combination of family demographics and power resources. This effect is also not significant. In fact, *all* the two group models that adjust for power resources

yield weakly significant or not significant South effects. South is also weakly significant in the economic structure and racial composition and heterogeneity model

Among the three group models, the combination of family demographics, power resources, and racial composition and heterogeneity have the largest effect on Southern residence of the South, yielding a probability of poverty that is essentially 0 and not significant. The combination of economic structure, power resources, and racial composition and heterogeneity also yield small South coefficients.

Figure 8 graphically displays the South coefficients from the models in Table 3. The South coefficients tend to be even smaller for anchored poverty. All the models where the South coefficient is not-significant adjust for power resources. Further, the graph illustrates that the two-group combination of power resources and racial heterogeneity yields a much smaller South effect than most of the models that include three variable groups. (See Appendix Table A3 for all coefficients in the full model).



Figure 8: South Coefficients from Multi-Level Linear Probability Models

Note: The white filled bars indicate South coefficient is not significant. All models include year controls.
Key: FD: Family Demographics, ES: Economic Structure, RCH: Race Composition and Heterogeneity, PR: Power Resources

2.3.4 Binary Decompositions

While the multi-level linear probability models give insight into how different groups of independent variables can modify the effect of Southern residence, the binary decomposition analyses show the relative importance of each variable groups in

explaining the actual poverty difference between the South and Non-South. All variables are included in the decomposition. Table 4 reports the estimates from the decomposition of the poverty difference between the South and Non-South.

Table 4: Decomposition of South/Non-South Poverty Difference

	Relative Poverty		**Anchored Poverty**	
Non-South	.1541		.1479	
South	.2046		.1972	
Difference	-.0504		-.0493	
Relative Contribution to Difference	***Coef***	***%***	***Coef***	***%***
Family Demographics	-.0066***	13.10	-.0039***	7.91
	(-15.79)		(-9.74)	
Economic Structure	-.0204***	40.48	-.0204***	41.38
	(-13.19)		(-12.56)	
Racial Composition/Heterogeneity	-.0075***	14.88	-.0074***	15.01
	(-4.04)		(-4.09)	
Power Resources	-.0211**	41.87	-.0219***	44.42
	(-2.96)		(-3.14)	
Year 2004	-.00003	0.06	-.00002	0.04
	(-0.88)		(-0.53)	
Year 2007	-.00002	0.04	6.73e-08	-0.0001
	(-0.70)		(0.00)	
Year 2010	.0002	-0.40	.0001	-0.20
	(0.90)		(0.39)	
Year 2013	.0002	-0.40	.0001	-0.20
	(1.68)		(1.30)	
All Variables Included (Total Explained)	-.0553	109.62	-.0534	108.32

****p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05*

The difference in relative and anchored poverty rates for South and Non-South is .0504 and .0493. Power resources significantly explain the largest portion of the difference in both relative (41.87%) and anchored (44.42%) poverty. Economic structure makes the second largest contribution to the difference at 40.48% (relative) and 41.38% (anchored). Race composition and heterogeneity explain a much smaller percent of the difference for relative (14.88%) and anchored (15.01%) poverty, while family demographics explain the smallest portion of the difference for both relative (13.10%) and anchored (7.91%) poverty.

Together, all the included variables explain 110.56% of the gap for relative poverty and 107.84% for anchored poverty. The total explained over 100% indicates that if variable means for the South were the same as the Non-South, poverty actually be lower in the South. Moreover, in comparing the decompositions by poverty measure, we see that power resources explains even more of the poverty gap with the anchored poverty measure (44.42%) than the relative poverty (41.87%), and is stronger in significance ($p<.001$) for anchored poverty. Concurrently, the contributions of economic structure and race composition and heterogeneity also slightly larger in explaining the anchored poverty gap vs. the relative poverty gap between the South and the Non-South. The contribution of family demographics, however, is lower when using the anchored poverty measure vs. the standard relative poverty measure.

2.4 Discussion

The American South has historically had the highest rates of poverty compared to all other U.S. regions. Motivated by this regional disparity and the lack of contemporary sociological research on this topic, this chapter seeks a deeper understanding of why poverty is higher in the South relative to the Non-South. Using multiple analytic techniques, I examine the role of family demographics, economic structure, racial composition and heterogeneity, and power resources in explaining the higher poverty in the South than the Non-South from 2000 to 2013. Variable means and ratios illustrate some large differences present across all independent variable groups. However, results from the multi-level linear probability models (LPMs) and binary decomposition analyses indicate the higher poverty in the South is largely attributable to power resources and economic structure. That these different analyses, each with their own strengths and limitations, yield similar conclusions, suggests that political and economic contexts are indeed meaningful factors contributing to ongoing regional disparities in the U.S.

While both power resources and economic structure largely contribute to the higher poverty (both relative and anchored) in the South, the power resources variables appear to matter slightly more given they yield such small, and weak or not significant effects of Southern residence in the LPMs and make a greater relative contribution to the poverty difference in the decompositions. However, in examining how broader

contextual factors shape poverty, American poverty literature has tended to focus on the role of joblessness and economic performance (Brady et al. 2013). As Freeman (2003:370) acknowledges, "a strong macro-economic environment appears to be only a necessary condition for reducing poverty; further progress may require measures beyond the scope of macro-economic policy." While economic structure clearly matters in this study, power resources matter even more. These results also suggest a greater research focus on power resources and political contexts in general is a valuable undertaking for better understanding poverty and poverty trends, particularly across U.S. territories. Furthermore, Jacobs and Meyers' (2013:770) conclusion of their study on union strength and inequality is applicable to this study as well: "These findings also underscore the conceptual utility of hypotheses based on a contingent version of the power resource perspective and the explanatory power of analyses grounded in political economy."

Although power resources and economic structure appear to drive the regional difference, the role of racial composition and heterogeneity is more complex. There are some large regional differences in some of the race variables (e.g. Black head of households and racial fractionalization), which would seem consequential given the well-documented link between minority concentration and poverty (Albrecht et al. 2005; Lichter et al. 2011; Massey and Denton 1993) as well as the salient racial history in the South. Indeed, in the LPMs, adjusting for only race composition and heterogeneity yields similar effects of Southern residence on poverty as power resources and economic

structure, but not the smallest effects. However, the combination of both power resources *and* race composition and heterogeneity, yield largest declines in the effect of residence in South on poverty. Moreover, in the decomposition of the South/Non-South poverty gap, racial composition and heterogeneity explain more of the gap than family demographics, and is strongly significant. Additional research is necessary for a deeper examination of race and regional disparities. More nuanced measures may prove race to be of more relevance than observed in the current study. Additionally, scholars can expand on the notion of race legacy (see O'Connell 2013; Ruef 2014) and interrogate the role of historical racial regimes in understanding poverty in the South and other regional disparities. Further, given the complexities of racial and political contexts, future research may expand on the approaches here by focusing on the interactions between race and politics and how this influences inequality.

The large role of power resources and economic structure in explaining the higher poverty in the South is noteworthy considering American poverty literature places great emphasis on the role of family characteristics (especially family structure). While I find family demographics do influence the likelihood of individual poverty, they are not the driving factors in explaining the regional differences in poverty. In the LPMs, family demographics yield the smallest decline in the effect of Southern residence on poverty. Additionally, in the binary decompositions, have the smallest contribution in explaining the South/Non-South poverty gap. These findings illustrate how broader

structural and institutional contexts, beyond individual family demographics, also matter for poverty and inequality, particularly across place. They also underscore the importance of including both micro- and macro-level factors in studies of inequality. Macro-level factors such as labor market and political institutions also matter, and as this chapter shows, can even modify the effects of micro-(individual) level factors (e.g. Southern residence). This is important for creating alternatives to anti-poverty policy solutions that focus solely on marriage and family. For example, the importance of power resources suggests the need for a greater policy emphasis on topics such as better and stronger workers' rights and greater income supports (e.g. increased TANF/SNAP benefits) in the South. Whereas the importance of economic structure underscores the need for more policies designed to stimulate the Southern economy, create better work opportunities, and increase work supports for individuals and families who need them the most.

3. Poverty within the South, Deep South, and Peripheral South: An Analyses of Sub-Regional Variation

Poverty exists across all U.S. regions. However, it is in the South where poverty has remained the highest and most persistent for decades (Reed 1982; Wimberley 2010). The previous chapter investigates this issue, specifically focusing on the role of family demographic, economic, racial, and political factors in explaining the higher poverty in the South relative to the Non-South. However, the factors that are most meaningful in explaining why the South has higher poverty than the non-South may differ from those factors that actually drive poverty within the South. As Betrand (1959:133) notes, "Social problems are, to a large extent, regional in nature." Accordingly, a regional analyses of solely the South is necessary for better understanding the South's poverty problem.

As outlined in the introductory chapter, there are several practical and justifiable reasons why an analyses of poverty in the South is worthy of sociological inquiry. These include (but are not limited to) the following: 1) Not only does the South have the highest poverty rate, it also has the most chronically poor areas among all regions in the U.S. (Glasmeier 2002); 2) Despite being the most populated region having experienced the most total population growth of all U.S. regions in the past decade (U.S. Census Bureau 2014) and experiencing substantial urban growth (Lloyd 2012), poverty remains high and a persistent problem in the South. 3) the socio-economic problems of the South coupled with its unique characteristics (make the region a viable testing ground for

different theories and hypotheses that may help us better understand poverty and other social phenomena elsewhere; 4) studying poverty in the South contributes to necessary inequality research on sub-national scale territory (see Lobao and Sanez 2002) that illustrates why nationally framed generalizations regarding inequality is not always applicable, which has important policy implications. 5) Given the negative outcomes associated with living in poverty and the subsequent costs for the U.S., poverty in the South can be considered not only a Southern problem, but a *national* problem that is worthy of attention (Wimberley 2008).

In addition to the abovementioned reasons, it is also essential to examine poverty within the South in light of within region variation. Although it is known that the South is poorer than other regions, it is not a monolithic, geographic entity. Salient differences in poverty within the South are meaningful as well. For example, the rural/urban dichotomy is especially pertinent to poverty in South. Despite a long research tradition of urban poverty studies in America, rural areas experience higher poverty than urban areas across the U.S. (Allen-Smith et al. 2000; Cotter 2002; Moller, Alderson and Nielsen 2009). Yet, it is in the South where rural poverty has historically been the most severe and most heavily concentrated (Tickamyer and Duncan 1990) such as in the Black Belt, Mississippi Delta, Appalachia, and the Rio Grande (Albrecht et al. 2005; Duncan 2000; Slack et al. 2009; Wimberley 2000). The emergence of rural ghettos is also consequential for poverty in the South as well (Burton, Garrett-Peters, and Eason 2012)

There is also variation in poverty among states within the South. Mississippi, the state with the highest poverty rate in the U.S., is located in the South. Yet, Virginia, which has one of the lowest poverty rates among all states, is located in the South as well. Moreover, Mississippi is part of the "Deep South," and Virginia is part of the "Peripheral South," and there are salient differences between these two sub-regions that may be consequential for poverty in the South. All of these reasons justify why the study of poverty within the South is a worthy pursuit.

As follows, this chapter examines poverty within the South and addresses the following research questions: 1) What predicts poverty within the South? Specifically, to what extent is individual poverty in the South attributable to family demographics, economic structure, racial composition and heterogeneity, and power resources? 2) How do these predictors of poverty differ between sub-regions of the South, namely the Deep South and Peripheral South?

The outline of this chapter is as follows. I begin with a brief discussion of the Deep South and the Peripheral South. I then provide a brief theoretical overview of how family demographics, economic structure, race composition and heterogeneity, and power resources help shape poverty in the South and sub-regions of the Peripheral South and the Deep South. I empirically test these alternative explanations using individual-level data from the Luxemburg Income Study (i.e. waves 2000, 2004, 2007, 2010, and 2010) and state-level data from a variety of sources. (See Appendix A for a list

of all sources). Lastly, I complete a series of multi-level linear probability models to examine what are the largest/most salient poverty predictors within the South, and whether and how these vary between the Peripheral South and the Deep South.

3.1 Distinguishing the Deep South and Peripheral South

While understanding what factors drive poverty within the South is an important issue to address, it is also necessary to consider sub-regional differences. A common distinction is between two sub-regions of the South—the inner or "Deep South" and the outer or "Peripheral South" (Black & Black 1989, Glasser 1994). The states composing these sub-regions all share the history of being former Confederate states. However, there are some noteworthy differences.

The Deep South, from west to east, consists of Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, Georgia, and South Carolina, and "is often used to distinguish the part of the South 'most southern' in its demography, its economy, its politics, and its character" (Glasser 1994:28). These states are the first slave states to secede from the Union prior to the U.S. Civil War and are what geographers argue form "the core" of the South due to their past plantation system and staple-crop economy (Reed 1994). Relatedly, the Deep South states have historically had the highest proportion of Blacks (Black and Black 1987) and has a high concentration of Blacks in poor areas (Hattery and Smith 2007; Wimberley 2008). Further, the Deep South states essentially have shaped Southern culture, politics, and images of what the South was and is about (Reed 1994).

Conversely, the states of the Peripheral South, (i.e. Texas, Arkansas, Tennessee, North Carolina, and Virginia), though still "southern in character and geography," are not as "southern" as their Deep South counterparts (Glasser 1994:28). This is in part because of the sub-region's sizable northern immigrant population, greater proportion of metropolitan areas, and smaller Black populations (Black and Black 1989; Glasser 1994). Residents of the Peripheral South have also been better off economically and more educated (Black and Black 1989) and are also less politically conservative (McKee 2009). Given these distinctions and the historical contexts in the Deep and Peripheral South, the factors that drive poverty in one sub-region may differ from those in the other.

3.2 Explaining Poverty within the South

Chapter 2 outlined four explanatory factors of poverty and how they might explain the higher poverty in the South: family demographics, economic structure, racial composition and heterogeneity, and power resources. In keeping with this theme, this chapter also examines these factors, specifically, how much they contribute to poverty within the South, and whether there are differences between the Deep South and the Peripheral South. Because the previous chapter details how these factors contribute to poverty, the section to follow provides a brief discussion of each, addressing how they may contribute to poverty in the South and how their effects may differ by sub-region.

3.2.1 Family Demographics

American poverty and inequality scholars have given great attention to the role of family demographics. This is because belonging to certain sub-groups, such as single mothers, females, the young, and immigrants, increase the likelihood of poverty (Iceland 2013). Although I find family demographics explain the least of the South/non-South difference in poverty (Chapter 2), these factors may be rather important in explaining poverty within the South. The South has a higher percentage of female/single mother households (Lofquist et al. 2010; Mattingly 2010) and lower education attainment (Ryan and Siebens 2012), for example. These characteristics are positively associated with individual poverty, and thus are likely to be strong predictors of poverty in the South.

Moreover, in the Deep South, which has even higher rates of poverty, some family demographics that are positively associated with poverty (e.g. less education single motherhood, and rural residence) are even more exacerbated (Hattery and Smith 2007; Wimberley 2007). These factors likely have greater explanatory power in the Deep South than the Peripheral South. On the other hand, factors such as immigrant status, also associated with poverty (Iceland 2013), may be more meaningful for poverty in the Peripheral South, where more immigrants reside.

3.2.2 Economic Structure and Performance

Several poverty scholars note the importance of economic structure and performance in shaping poverty and inequality (see Blank 2005; Newman 2006;

Rainwater and Smeeding 2004). Economic structure and performance can influence the economy and the availability of jobs and employment opportunities (Wilson 1987). In the previous chapter, I find economic factors are largely important in explaining the higher poverty in the South. While individual ties to the labor market (i.e. living in an unemployed household or multi-earner household) were the stronger economic factors, state-level factors such as GDP PC, economic growth, and unemployment rate, also matter. It is likely that these economic factors are significant predictors of poverty among Southerners as well.

The economic contexts of the Deep South and Peripheral South provide reason why their effects may differ. The Deep South is poorer and significantly more rural. Rural areas are associated with fewer economic opportunities, less diversified industries, lower quality jobs, and underemployment and unemployment (Albrecht and Albrecht 2000; McLaughlin and Coleman-Jensen 2008; Tickamyer and Duncan 1990). Thus, economic differences between the Deep South and Peripheral South could be indicative of stronger explanatory economic factors of poverty observed in one sub-region, versus the other (e.g. unemployment having plausibly stronger effects in the Deep South).

3.2.3 Racial Composition and Heterogeneity

The enduring relationship between race and inequality in the U.S. is important for understanding why race may be an important poverty predictors in the South The well-documented link between minority concentration and poverty (Lichter, Parisi and

Taquino 2011; Massey and Denton 1993; Wimberley 2000) is especially pertinent to the South where the most Blacks reside (Rastogi et al 2010), and even more so for the Deep South, where Blacks are heavily concentrated (Hattery and Smith 2007). In a study of states in the Deep South, Hattery and Smith (2007) find the higher percentage of Blacks in a county is associated with poorer residents, less access to education, and less wealth accumulation.

The South's racial past makes the strong association between minority concentration and poverty even more salient for understanding poverty in the South. Entrenched systems of racial subjugation are characteristic of the South in general, yet, these ties are most firmly rooted in the Deep South. The Deep South had high rates of slavery and endured the worst of Jim Crow (e.g. it was the last to racially integrate schools (Keith 2002) and had the greatest concentration of lynching (Reed 1994)). Furthermore, related the South's racial history, there are stark differences in racial attitudes between the Deep South and the Peripheral South. Valentino and Sherman (2005) find Whites' negative racial attitudes towards Blacks along dimensions such as Jim Crow racism and racial stereotypes, are significantly stronger in the Deep South than the "Outer South" (i.e. Peripheral South). Therefore, given the nuanced historical contexts and differences in contemporary racial attitudes between the Deep South and the Peripheral South, as well as related theories of group threat (Blalock 1967; King and Wheelock 2007) and racial fractionalization (Alesina et al. 1999; Easterly and Levine

1997), race is likely to be an important explanatory factor for poverty in the South, and have even stronger effects in the Deep South than the Peripheral South.

3.2.4 Power Resources

As Korpi (1985) and others have argued, power resources ultimately help shape inequality. Power resources play a large role in the South/Non-South poverty difference (see Chapter 2), but given power resources are overall lower in the South, they may not be strong predictors of poverty within the South. Despite Southern workers' more positive inclination toward unions than workers in other regions (Herod 2012), the South has historically low levels of unionization organization and formation (Roscigno and Kimble 1995) and still remains the least unionized (Brady et al. 2013). Further, differences in economy, politics, and population demographics have influenced the geography of unions in the South (Herod 2012). Despite low unionization overall, levels of poverty within the South have ranged from 4% to 42% in 1939, to 3% to 13% in 2010 (Griffin and Hargis 2012).

The history of partisan control is also essential to understanding how power resources may influence poverty within the South. In the old South, one-party politics were dominated by Southern Democrats, who fought to uphold white supremacy and institutionalize racial injustice through Jim Crow, especially in the Deep South (Key 1949). They also opposed organized labor and taxation (Black and Black 2002). As the national Democratic party became more "liberal" (e.g. supported the New Deal, civil

rights movement, and labor union movement) the Southern Democratic "solid South" dissipated, and White southerners, especially those in the growing middle to upper class electorate, realigned with the "new" more conservative, national Republican party (Black and Black 2002). A strong two-party system has since emerged in the South, which has increasingly become more Republican. As a result of strong recruitment efforts and redistricting, Republicans have seized vital Southern electorates for winning political offices, and in recent years (e.g. 2006 and 2008) comprised more than 61% and 55% of the House of Representatives delegation in the Deep and Peripheral South, respectively (McKee 2009).

Regardless, of the changing partisan dynamics in the South, as Black and Black (1987:213) summarize, "conservatism occupies an exalted ideological position in the South." However, the Deep South is more politically conservative than the Peripheral South, which scholars argue help shape political action (Valentino and Sears 2005, White 2013). In the 2004 and 2008 presidential elections, for example, Whites in the Deep South were over twice as likely as Whites in the Peripheral South to vote for the Republican candidate (McKee 2009). Such conservatism is associated with less support for redistributive policies and welfare programs (Johnson 2003, Luebke 1998, Weakliem and Biggert 1999). Thus, the observed differences in power resources between the Deep South and Peripheral South likely yield different effects on poverty.

3.3 Data and Methods

3.3.1 Data

Individual-level data comes from the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) U.S. datasets: 2000, 2004, 2007, 2010, and 2013. (Please refer to Chapter 2 for details on the LIS). However, because this chapter focuses exclusively on poverty within the South, I exclude all non-Southerners (i.e. individuals who do not reside in the South as defined as the former Confederate states) from the larger pooled LIS sample. This yields a total sample size of 217,520. I also have sub-samples of individuals residing in the Deep South (i.e. Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, and South Carolina) (N=61,962) and the Peripheral South (i.e. Arkansas, Florida, North Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia) (N=155,558). State-level variables come from various sources. (See Appendix A).

3.3.2 Variables

As with the previous chapter, the dependent variable in this study is poverty, which includes both a relative and an anchored measure. This chapter also employs all the same independent variables as Chapter 2, with the exception of Southern residence. Because this chapter examines poverty predictors within the South, I exclude the binary indicator of Southern residence from my analyses.

3.3.3 Analytic Strategy

Analyses begin with linear probability regression to determine the strongest predictors of poverty within the South. Then, a second set of analyses include sub-

samples of the Deep South and the Peripheral South to examine whether there are differences in poverty predictors between these two sub-groups. All analyses cluster the errors by state. In addition, unlike Chapter 2, these analyses do not employ multi-level models because there is not a sufficient number of level 2 units (i.e. only 11, 5, and 6 level 2 units as compared to 51 level 2 units in Chapter 2).

3.4 Results

3.4.1 Descriptive Statistics

Table 5 displays the descriptive statistics for all variables in the pooled sample.

Table 5: Descriptive Statistics for Pooled Sample, N=217,520

	Mean	S.D.	Min.	Max.
Relative Poverty	20.46	4.39	0	1
Anchored Poverty	19.72	3.40	0	1
Family Demographics				
Single Mother	11.95	32.43	0	1
Single Father	3.65	18.76	0	1
Female, No Children	9.67	32.43	0	1
Male, No Children	7.02	25.56	0	9
Number of Children	1.30	1.33	0	1
Children < Age 5	24.77	43.67	0	1
Adults > Age 65	16.42	37.06	0	1
Less than High School	16.55	37.17	0	1
College Degree	27.27	44.52	0	1
Age < 25	5.40	22.60	0	1
Age 25-34	19.24	39.32	0	1
Age 35-44	28.98	45.37	0	1
Age 55-64	11.94	32.42	0	1
Age 65-74	6.08	23.91	0	1
Age > 74	4.63	21.00	0	1
Foreign Born	5.72	23.22	0	1
Rural Residence	23.31	44.53	0	1

Economic Structure				
No Earners	12.48	33.05	0	1
Multiple Earners	53.90	49.84	0	1
GD PPC	43998.64	5572.03	29337	52465
Economic Growth	2.49	1.83	-3.5	5.6
Manufacturing	8.15	2.11	3.39	16.20
Public Sector	14.59	2.23	11.01	19.13
Unemployment	5.96	2.25	23	11.3
Race Composition & Heterogeneity				
Black	20.82	40.60	0	1
Hispanic	20.82	40.35	0	1
Other Race	4.80	2.14	0	1
Racial Fractionalization	53.67	7.64	34.36	64.30
Power Resources				
Democratic Control	44.24	17.77	22.63	79.93
Unionization	5.36	1.55	2.7	10.8
TANF/SNAP	682.40	99.01	499	846
Unemployment Insurance	319.24	73.94	190	535

3.4.2 Linear Probability Models of Poverty in the South

Table 6 displays the LPMs regression analyses for relative poverty in the South. Most of the family demographic variables are signficant. Among these, the largest positive effects are for less than high school, under age 25, and over age 74. Living in a household whose head has low education increases the probability of poverty by 16.8%. Having a young head of household (under age 25) increases the probability of poverty by 15.6%, and head of households age 75 and older households increase the probability of poverty by 15.4%. The largest negative effects among family demographics are for over 74 head and college educated head, as these decrase the probability of poverty by

15.4% and 8.1%, respectively. Although other non-married household structures, the presence of young children and older adults, rural residence, and immigrant status are also positively associated with poverty in the South, these effects are not as large.

Table 6: Linear Probability Model of Relative Poverty in the South, N=217,520

	Coefficient	*T-Score*
Marital Status (Ref: Married)		
Single Mother	.133***	(10.94)
Single Father	.033**	(4.50)
Female No Children	.092***	(12.31)
Male, No Children	.032***	(6.12)
Number of Children in HH	.038***	(23.39)
Children < 5 in HH (Ref: No)	.019***	(4.52)
Adults >65 in HH (Ref: No)	-.036***	(-8.42)
Age (Ref: 45-54)		
Age < 25	.156***	(25.72)
Age 25-34	.008*	(2.24)
Age 35-44	-.020***	(-6.11)
Age 45-64	-.002	(-0.59)
Age 65-74	-.099***	(-15.96)
Age Over 74	-.154***	(-28.08)
Education (Ref: HS Grad/Some College)		
Less than High School	.168***	(23.04)
College or More	-.081***	(-18.94)
Rural Residence (Ref: No)	.040***	(6.36)
Foreign-Born (Ref: No)	.048***	(7.47)
Unemployed HH (Ref: No)	.367***	(41.13)
Multi-Earner HH (Ref: No)	-.179***	(-15.70)
GDPPC	-1.86e-07	(0.25)
Economic Growth	.001	(0.80)
Manufacturing	.001	(0.68)
Public Sector	-.0002	(-0.12)
Unemployment	.008*	(2.69)
Race (Ref: Non-Hispanic White)		
Black	.076***	(12.04)
Other Race	.025**	(4.94)

Hispanic	.072***	(10.92)
Racial Fractionalization	-.306	(-0.59)
Democratic Average	.0002	(1.03)
Unionization	-.0008	(-0.41)
TANF/SNAP	-.00009	(-1.14)
Unemployment Insurance	-.00004	(-0.92)

Note: All models include year controls and cluster errors by state.
****p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05*

Among the economic variables, what matters most is whether the household is unemployed (i.e. with no earners). Living in an unemployed household increases the probability of poverty by 36.7%. Conversely, having multiple earners in the household decreases the probability of poverty by 17.9%. State-level economic variables do not yield strong or large effects on poverty. Only the unemployment rate significantly predicts poverty in the South. A unit increase in unemployment increases the probability of poverty by 0.8%. While GD PPC and public sector employment have negative coefficients and economic growth and manufacturing have positive coefficients, they are statistically insignificant.

For the race variables, compared to Non-Hispanic White household heads, having a head that is Black, Other race, or Hispanic head, increases the probability of poverty by 7.6%, 2.5%, and 7.2%, respectively. These are strongly significant. Racial fractionalization, though it decreases the probability of poverty, is non-significant.

All power resources variables, except for Democratic Control, fall in the expected negative direction. However, none of the power resources have either large or significant effects.

The results for anchored poverty are quite similar to that of relative poverty, however the effects tend to be slightly smaller. (See Appendix Table C1).

3.4.3 Linear Probability Models: Deep South and Peripheral South

Table 7 displays the results for the LPMs of poverty in the Deep South (Model 1) and Peripheral South (Model 2). As with the entire South sample, among the demographic variables, having a head with less than a high school education has the largest positive effects on individual poverty in both the Deep South and Peripheral South. For example, having a head with low education increases the probability of poverty by about 19% in the Deep South compared to 16% in the Peripheral South. In both models, elderly heads, young head, and single mother heads also have sizeable effects on poverty, yet these effects are larger for the Deep South.

Table 7: Linear Probability Models of Poverty in the Deep South & Peripheral South

	M1: Deep South		**M2: Peripheral South**	
	Coeff.	***T-score***	***Coeff.***	***T-score***
Marital Status (Ref: Married)				
Single Mother	.159**	(7.90)	.121***	(11.35)
Single Father	.038*	(3.43)	.031*	(3.48)
Female No Children	.110***	(9.28)	.083***	(11.48)
Male, No Children	.048*	(4.21)	.025*	(6.86)
# Children in in HH	.041***	(16.17)	.037***	(22.04)

Children < 5 in HH (Ref: No)	.016*	(2.73)	.020*	(3.76)
Adults >65 in HH (Ref: No)	-.024	(-2.10)	-.039***	(-9.61)
Age (Ref: 45-54)				
Age < 25	.156***	(15.21)	.152***	(19.43)
Age 25-34	-.006	(-0.70)	.011*	(3.25)
Age 35-44	-.027***	(-4.65)	-.018**	(-4.19)
Age 55-65	-.003	(-0.38)	-.002	(-0.35)
Age 66-74	-.119***	(-8.63)	-.093***	(-16.25)
Age >74	-.166***	(-16.38)	-.146***	(-19.19)
Education (Ref: HS Grad/Some College)				
Less than High School	.190***	(38.35)	.160***	(23.35)
College or More	-.088***	(-27.91)	-.079***	(-14.56)
Rural Residence (Ref: No)	.030**	(7.11)	.045**	(4.45)
Foreign-Born (Ref: No)	.048*	(3.56)	.049**	(6.74)
Unemployed HH (Ref: No)	.382***	(47.66)	.358***	(28.80)
Multi-Earner HH (Ref: No)	-.163***	(-19.52)	-.185***	(-13.00)
GDPPC	4.40e-06	(1.57)	-2.02e-06**	(-7.03)
Economic Growth	.002	(1.45)	.0007	(0.47)
Manufacturing	.001	(0.25)	.005†	(2.17)
Public Sector	.002	(0.08)	.002	(.99)
Unemployment	.017	(1.92)	.006	(2.39)
Race (Ref: Non-Hispanic White)				
Black	.076***	(8.13)	.074***	(8.88)
Other Race	.030***	(2.81)	.023***	(4.06)
Hispanic	.071***	(4.92)	.073***	(9.52)
Racial Fractionalization	-.006	(-0.09)	.131	(1.71)
Democratic Control	.0001	(0.43)	.0003	(1.12)
Unionization	.001	(0.87)	.001	(0.29)
TANF/SNAP	-.0004†	(-2.41)	.0002	(0.35)
Unemployment Insurance	-.0002	(-1.17)	-.00008	(-1.01)
N	61,962		155,558	

Note: All models include year controls and cluster errors by state.
****p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05, † p < .1*

The effects of other family demographic variables positively associated with poverty (i.e. other family structures and number of children) are also larger in the Deep South, except rural residence and foreign born heads, which have larger effects in the

Peripheral South. Similarly, mostly all demographic variables that are negatively associated with poverty have larger effects in the Deep South. For example, having a head over age 74 decreases the probability of poverty by 16.6% in the Deep South, but only 14.6% in the Periphery South. A college educated head decreases the probability of poverty by 8.8% and 7.9% in the Deep South and Peripheral South, respectively.

Economic variables are also important explanatory factors for poverty in both the Deep and Peripheral South. Living in an unemployed household has the largest significant, positive effect on poverty in both models, and these effects are also the largest of all variables. Living in an unemployed household increases the probability of individual poverty in the Deep and Peripheral South by 38.2% and 35.8%, respectively. The effect of multiple earners on poverty is also one of the larger effects overall in both models, but is larger in the Peripheral South (18.5%) than the Deep South (16.3%). These individual level economic variables have much stronger and more significant effects than state-level economic variables.

While unemployment rate has the largest effect among the state-level variables in the Deep South, it is not significant. The remaining state-level economic structure variables are positively signed, but do not have significant effects in the Deep South either. However, in the Peripheral South, GD PPC, has a significant, negative effect and manufacturing employment has a near significant

All the individual level race variables have a positive association with poverty in both models, but the effects are slightly larger in the Deep South. In the Deep South, living with a Black, Other Race, or Hispanic head increases an individual's probability of poverty by 7.6%, 3.0%, and 7.1%, respectively, compared to 7.4%, 2.3%, and 7.3% in the Peripheral South. While the degree of diversity in a state, as measured by racial fractionalization, has a negative signed in regards to poverty in the Deep South, it is positively signed with poverty in the Peripheral South. Though the effect is larger in the Peripheral South, is not a significant predictor of poverty in either model.

Overall, the power resources variables have the smallest effects on individual poverty in both models. Of these, TANF SNAP has a negative, near significant effect on poverty in the Deep South, but not in the Peripheral South. Democratic control and unionization, and unemployment insurance are not significant.

The results using the anchored poverty results are quite similar, however, TANF/SNAP and unemployment rate are more significant for poverty in the Deep South and Peripheral South, respectively. For example, while the effect of TANF/SNAP is significant at $p < 0.1$ for relative poverty, it is significant at $p < .05$ for anchored poverty. (See Appendix Table C2 for anchored poverty results.) Anchored poverty is more responsive to the business cycle and improvements in standard of living. Thus, that TANF/SNAP has a greater effect in the anchored model suggests it matters for reducing poverty in the Deep South, particularly in light of economic trends.

3.5 Discussion

In light of the higher and persistent poverty in the U.S. South, this chapter examines predictors of poverty (i.e. family demographics, economic structure, racial composition and heterogeneity, and power resources) within the South from 2000-2013, and sub-regional differences between the Deep South and the Peripheral South. Overall, in the South, economic and demographic variables have the largest effects on poverty. Many of these effects are larger in the Deep South than the Peripheral South. Furthermore, some variables that are not significant in the overall South become significant in the individual models (e.g. TANF/SNAP in the Deep South and GD PPC in the Peripheral South).

Across all models, the factor with the largest explanatory power is living in a household that is unemployed. The probability of poverty for those living in unemployed households is more than double than other factors that are largely associated with poverty (e.g. family structure and education). These strong effects of individual-level economic variables suggest that having ties to the labor market are essential for avoiding poverty in the South, and even more so in the Deep South than Peripheral South.

Consistent with the extant literature, other variables such as single mother, less than high education, under age 25, and race of head also important predictors of poverty. Moreover, these effects are even stronger for the Deep South. None of these

other significant factors, however, trump the effects of living in an unemployed household (in all models) or multi-earner households (in the South and Peripheral South models). This supports the argument that the labor market and having earners in the household is the most important factor for preventing poverty (Rainwater and Smeeding, 2004).

Beyond individual characteristics unemployment rate is the only state-level variable that is significant for poverty in the overall South. It has a significantly positive effect on poverty, which further highlights the importance of economic structure, especially labor market ties, in influencing poverty across the South.

Among other state-level variables, there are some patterns and sub-regional differences worth noting. To provide possible insights into these, Figure 9 and Figure 10 illustrate the bivariate associations between individual-level poverty and the state-level variables by sub-region. For example, GD PPC has a significant, negative effect on poverty in the Peripheral South. This negative relationship is evident in Figure 9, where Arkansas, which has the highest poverty rate in the Peripheral South, has the lowest GD PPC; whereas Virginia, with the least poverty, has the highest GD PPC. However, in the Deep South, although the highest poverty state (i.e. Mississippi) has the lowest GD PPC, the states with the highest GD PPC, Louisiana and Georgia, have the lowest and second highest poverty rates in the Deep South, respectively. This may contribute to the non-significant effect of GD PPC in the Deep South.



Figure 9: Bivariate Associations between State-Level Economic Structure and Race Variables and

Contrary to the expected direction, economic growth fails to yield a significant negative effect on poverty in the South, across models. In the Deep South, although Mississippi and Louisiana have the highest poverty rates and lowest rate of economic growth, there is not much variation in economic growth among all the Deep South. In the Peripheral South, both the lowest poverty state (i.e. Virginia) and the highest poverty state (i.e. Arkansas) have similar levels of economic growth. Further, scholars have highlighted the paradox of the South (as a whole) having experienced substantial economic growth in recent decades, yet still enduring high rates of poverty (Lloyd 2012; Tomaskovic-Devey and Roscigno 1997). Plausibly, urbanization in southern metropolitan areas (see Lloyd 2012) could be driving the overall economic growth in the South, while rural areas in the region areas that are more economically disadvantaged, have not reaped the wider benefits. Further, recent job growth in the South and rural areas have been in the service sector (Albrecht et al. 2000; Branch and Hanley 2011; McLaughlin and Coleman-Jensen 2002). These jobs tend be part-time, low-skill, low-wage, seasonal and temporary, resulting in lower job quality, underemployment, and limited room for advancement or growth (Kalleberg, Reskin, and Hudson 2000; Slack and Jenson 2002; Tickamyer and Duncan 1990). This could explain the higher economic growth that coincides with higher rates in poverty in some states, such as Arkansas and North Carolina. Furthermore, overall trends in economic expansion could also explain the results for economic growth. In the 2000s, the top shares of the income distribution

experienced rising wealth, while the bottom half experienced stagnation and decline (Blank 2009), and increased productivity and growth did not significantly reduce unemployment (Freeman and Rogers 2005).

Manufacturing also has a positive effect on poverty in all models, and is near significant in the Peripheral South. As Figure 9 illustrates, Arkansas and North Carolina, which have the highest poverty rates, also have the highest manufacturing rates (12.55% and 11.08%). This could be in part because of the low unionization rates in these states. Florida and Virginia, however, which have the lowest poverty rates, have the lowest rates of manufacturing employment (4.06% and 6.07%). Although manufacturing employment is typically associated with less poverty, it is not in the South.

While racial fractionalization is positively associated with poverty in the Peripheral South, it has virtually no effect in on poverty in the Deep South. This could be attributable to the lack of variation in racial fractionalization among the Deep South states as Figure 9 (bottom right) shows.

Among power resources variables, there are no significant effects on poverty in the South or Peripheral South, and only weak effects in the Deep South for TANF/SNAP maximum benefit, which has negative effect on poverty (more so for anchored poverty). Yet, there are plausible reasons for the unexpected direction of effects and lack of significance among some power resources variables. For example, the positive association between Democratic Control and poverty (in all models) is somewhat

counterintuitive given more liberal politics is associated with less poverty (Brady 2009; Moller et al. 2003). However, the Southern states of Arkansas, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, which have had *more* years of higher Democratic control on average than Republican control since 1990 than other Southern states (Elliot and Balz 2013) have the higher rates of poverty (see Figure 10).



Figure 10: Bivariate Relationships between Power Resources Variables and Poverty in the Deep South and Peripheral South, 2000-2013

The history of Southern politics helps illuminate these findings. Democrats in the South are quite conservative in general, but even more so in the South. Appendix

Figures C1 and C2 compares Democratic control and citizen political ideology (see Berry et al. 1998) for the Deep South and Peripheral South from 2000 to 2013. The Deep South had a higher Democratic control average than the Peripheral South from 2000 to 2007. Then, in 2010 and 2013, the Deep South had a lower Democratic control average than the Peripheral South. Conversely, the Deep South has maintained a lower citizen political ideology score than the Peripheral South, indicating that it is overall *more* conservative. Moreover, though some Deep South states have fairly high levels of Democratic control, such states having a greater concentration of Blacks are home to the most conservative Southern White Democrats (Glasser 1994). Thus, Democrats in the South do not necessarily act in ways that our conducive to leftist politics. Indeed, some Southern states have a bipartisan rejection of redistributive politics that involve state tax and spending on the less affluent-majority and an acceptance of trickle-down economics (Luebke 1998). This helps explain the region's weaker welfare state (Johnson 2003; Kail and Dixon 2011; Quadango 1996). However, results show TANF/SNAP maximum benefit does have a significant negative effect on poverty in the Deep South. This makes sense given the Deep South is poorer overall, and home to some of the poorest counties in the U.S. Individuals in the Deep South stand to gain the most from welfare benefits.

The results for unionization also do not fall in the expected direction. Despite the continuing importance of unions in increasing incomes (Jacobs and Myers 2014) and preventing poverty (Brady et al. 2013), the results indicate unionization is not a large or

significant predictor of poverty in the South across models. This is not too surprising given the historically low levels of unionization across the South. With the exception of Alabama (with ~10% unionization), unionization levels in the South range from only 3.1% to 6.4%. As Figure 10 shows, Alabama, which has the highest unionization levels in the South (and Deep South), also has a fairly high relative poverty rate (22.6%). Also, in the Deep South, Mississippi and Louisiana, which have the highest poverty rates, have slightly higher unionization than South Carolina and Georgia, which have the lowest poverty in the Deep South. As Roscigno and Kimble (1995) note, the high rates of unionization in some areas of the South may be the result of national and international capital relocating to areas of the South with the lowest levels of education and the lowest wage markets. Thus, with cheap labor as the motivation for some industries relocating to the South, "higher rates of unionization may not result in higher standards of living and a reduction in poverty" (Roscigno and Kimble 1995:293), which would help explain the lack of a significant negative effect for unionization across all the models.

In sum, this chapter shows the importance of economic factors, specifically individual ties to the labor market, in driving poverty within the South. Family demographics, namely education and family structure, also are strong predictors of poverty. However, this chapter also highlights differences between the Peripheral South and the Deep South, which is helpful for a more nuanced understanding of poverty within the South. That several of the individual-level variables have larger and/or more

significant effects in the Deep South (e.g. unemployed household, less than high school, single mother, TANF/SNAP, etc.), and that some state-level variables yielded unexpected associations (e.g. Democratic control and economic growth on poverty) and non-significant effects underscore how the characteristics of a place matters for inequality, as variables can have different effects in various contexts. This is especially important to take into consideration when addressing the problem of poverty in the South. Further, the quite small and often non-significant state-level effects in general, are not inconsequential, as they offer us further insight into why poverty in the South is high and enduring.

4. Race, Contemporary Patterns of Poverty, and Southern Historical Racial Regimes

Racial disparities in the United Sates have persisted for decades. One of the most enduring disparities is the disproportionate share of poor Blacks. Blacks are almost three times as likely to live in poverty as Non-Hispanic Whites (henceforth "Whites"). Blacks also lag behind Whites along several other poverty-related dimensions. For example, compared to Whites, Blacks have substantially less income and wealth (Oliver and Shapiro 2013), lower education attainment and achievement (Harris 2011), worse health outcomes across the life course (Williams et al. 2010), and higher rates of incarceration (Alexander 2012). The large Black-White disparities in poverty and the above-mentioned poverty-related dimensions reflect the enduring issue of poverty and race in America, one that is especially salient within the historical context of the American South.

Poverty rates in the South have been historically higher than all other regions in the United States. However, as the distribution of all poor Blacks and Whites illustrates, (Figure 11) poor Blacks are more heavily concentrated in the South (43%), whereas poor Whites are more evenly distributed among all regions. There is also a large disparity in poverty rates between Whites and Blacks in the South, as illustrated in Figure 12. From 2000-2013, the mean difference in poverty between Blacks and Whites was almost 20%.



Figure 11: Total Distribution of *all* Poor Whites and Poor Blacks in the U.S. and Where They Reside in 2013

Note: The South is defined as the 11 former states of the Confederacy. When using the Census-defined South, the percentage of poor Blacks and Whites is 57.84 and 33.25%, respectively. Relative poverty rates are calculated using data from the Luxemburg Income Study for the U.S.



Figure 12: Black and Non-Hispanic White Poverty Rates in the South, 2000-2013

Note: See: Black and White poverty rates by state in the South in Appendix C.

The South's enduring overall high rates of poverty, disproportionate share of poor Blacks, and large Black-White poverty gap are especially pertinent to the historical context of the region. Early sociologist Rupert Vance argued that "it was the tragic course of Southern history that condemned the region to its poverty and dependence" (Reed 1982:xvii). Indeed, many scholars contend that high poverty areas are produced and maintained through historical systems of racial subjugation and oppressive institutions (Albrecht, Albrecht, and Murguia 2005; Foulkes and Schafft 2010; Snipp 1996; Tomaskovic-Devey and Roscigno 1996). Considering the deep history of discrimination and disadvantage that characterizes racial regimes in certain parts of America, it follows that they have helped shape who gets what and where. For example, recent studies highlight the link between the institution of slavery in the plantation South and subsequent economic outcomes (e.g. Levernier and White 1998; O'Connell 2012; Ruef 2014).

Given the salience of race in the American South, racial history and its legacy is a meaningful factor to consider when examining poverty, and particularly racialized poverty patterns in the region. Thus, this chapter focuses attention to this issue by addressing the following questions: 1) What is the relationship between a state's historical racial regimes and contemporary individual poverty? 2) Does the strength of a state's historical racial regimes help predict total poverty and Black poverty? 3) How do

poverty predictors, in general, differ for Black and White Southerners? 4) What explains the Black-White poverty gap in the South and do historical racial regimes play a role?

To address these questions I use individual-level demographic data from the 2000-2013 U.S. waves from the Luxemburg Income Study (LIS) and historic state-level data from various sources to construct an index of historical racial regimes. I begin with bivariate analyses to examine the relationship between historical racial regimes and contemporary poverty. I then employ linear probability regression models to examine historical racial regimes and other predictors of poverty among Southerners, Blacks, and Whites, in turn. Lastly, I employ binary decomposition (Fairlie 2005) to examine the extent to which Southern historical racial regimes and other predictors of poverty explain the poverty difference between Whites and Blacks.

4.1 Theoretical Background

In the theoretical discussion section to follow, I begin with a description of regimes, particularly inequality regimes and how they contribute to disparities. I define race regimes and address how the American South exemplifies historic race regimes. I also discuss how historic race regimes shape inequality through their long-term impact. Lastly, I discuss other correlates of poverty.

4.1.1 Inequality and Racial Regimes

Put simply, "a regime can be defined as a complex of rules and norms that create established expectations" (Sainsbury 1999). Particularly pertinent to this study is the

notion of an inequality regime. Acker (2006:443) describes inequality regimes as consisting of "loosely interrelated practices, processes, actions, and meanings that result in and maintain class, gender, and racial inequalities." Inequality regimes vary greatly, tend to be fluid and changing, and are linked to inequality in the surrounding society, its politics, history, and culture (Acker 2006). For example, the construction of welfare state regime typologies, such as that of Esping-Anderson (1999), have been useful for understanding patterns of disadvantage, inequality, and social exclusion in capitalist societies (Butler and Watt 2007). According to Esping-Anderson's (1990), the welfare state is characterized by the balance of state, market, and family, which determines rights to benefits. Because these dimensions vary from society to society, the welfare state essentially functions as a system of stratification, creating patterns of inequality among rich democracies (Esping-Andersen 1990). Moreover, feminist scholars have incorporated gender into the welfare state regime concept, illustrating how the welfare state shapes gender inequality (e.g. Hook 2010, Orloff 1993).

As inequality can result from welfare state regimes, inequality can also result from racial regimes. The racial regime is a specific type of inequality regime that is particularly useful for understanding inequality in the United States, and especially how the South's historical context is relevant to contemporary patterns of poverty in the region. Omi and Winant (2014:137) define the U.S. racial regime as "a system of racial rule [that] has always been in place, operating not merely though macro-level, large-

scale activities but also through micro-level, small-scale practices" that shape racial inequality. According to Bonilla-Silva (2001), one of the central elements that helps maintain the racial order that characterizes racial regimes is racial ideology, for in a racialized system it is impossible for individuals not to be shaped by racial ideology. While individuals have some degree of agency within a racial regime, "the views and behaviors of actors are fundamentally connected to their position in a racial regime" (Bonilla-Silva 2015:78). The racial regime, then, is both enforced and challenged, remaining unstable and contested (Omi and Winant 2014). Yet, as Acker (2005:455) indicates, even when an inequality regime is challenged and contested, "the interest and the power of those in charge (at top of regime) often outweigh the interests of those who suffer from inequality. Further, advantage is hard to give up." Hence, the benefits of White privilege can impact the actions of individuals within the U.S. racial regime, which can help uphold White supremacy and produce and maintain inequalities.

4.1.2 Historic Racial Regimes in the South

Bonilla-Silva (2015:77) suggests the U.S. racial regime has undergone three periods: slavery (conquest and genocide), Jim Crow, and a "new racism" (i.e. "the post-Civil Rights racial regime characterized by subtle, institutionalized and seemingly nonracial practices and mechanisms to produce racial inequality"). Both the periods of slavery and Jim Crow are inherent to the American South, and illustrate how the historic South is a quintessential example of racial regimes at work. According to Lowe and

Shaw (2009:803), "As V.O. Key has suggested, the South is the clearest U.S. example of government sanctioning of, and investment in, forms of racial inequality driven by an aristocratic and/or elite/corporate order" (e.g. slavery and the plantation system, post slavery agricultural peonage, the convict lease system, and emerging agribusiness).

Woodward (2001) notes that each successive racial regime in the South was characterized by its own economic and industrial organization, system of politics, and social arrangements. Slavery, was the first primary racial regime of the South (and the U.S.) (Bonilla-Silva 2015, Omi and Winant 2013, Woodrow 2001). It was a way in which Whites sought to define the status of Blacks and his "place" in society, as well as assure his subordination (Woodward 2001:11). Slavery was the "key social division in both the colonial period and after," as it influenced race relations for years to come (Omi and Winant 2013:79)

After the emancipation of slavery came the ending of Reconstruction, which according to Omi and Winant (2014:25) "signaled a rise of a new southern racial regime," which consisted of coercive debt peonage, denial of political rights, segregation, and negrophobic terrorism." Scholars argue that the coercive debt peonage system of share-cropping that was part of the new post-Reconstruction racial regime, essentially became the "new slavery" for Blacks in the South (Mandle 1978, Quadango 1994, Ruef and Fletcher 2003). Even regional sociologists of the time deemed

sharecropping "was little better than slavery" (O'Connor 2001:69), for as Quadango (1994:21) summarizes, "Debt kept sharecroppers nearly enslaved."

As the plantation system begin to diminish, the supporters of the White supremacist racist order eventually "regained dominance in the modified form of the Jim Crow system of segregation and disfranchisement that largely prevailed until the civil rights era of the 1960s" (King and Smith 2006:77). Woodrow (2001:7) summarizes Jim Crow laws as having "constituted the most elaborate formal expression of sovereign white opinion upon the subject," giving way to a law-enforced "racial ostracism" that extended to virtually all facets of social life. These racial regimes ensured Blacks endured systematic oppression for decades.

4.1.3 Long-Term Effects and Legacy of Racial Regimes

Examining racial regimes in a historic context helps highlight the long-term historic origins of inequality that are important to take into consideration when examining contemporary inequality. In reference to the U.S. racial regime, Omi and Winant (2014:137) state, "We cannot step outside of race and racism, since our society and our identities are constituted by them; we lie in a racial history." Consequently, this deeply rooted racial history of America's racial regime', particularly in the South, has helped shape inequality. For example, scholars find some of the currently most economically deprived places in the United States are those with high minority concentrations (i.e. the South, Black Belt, Mississippi Delta, Rio Grande Valley, Mexican

Colonia, rand Indian reservations) (Albrecht et al. 2005; Lichter, Parisi and Taquino 2011; Snipp 1996; Weber et al. 2005; Wimberley, Libby and Morris 2002). Snipp (1996:127) notes that distressed areas with high minority concentrations, "share the experience of living the historical remnants of institutions explicitly created to conquer, oppress, and maintain their subordinate position in American society." Such institutions include: slavery, sharecropping, plantation agriculture, Jim Crow, labor contractors, and immigration authorities, the Bureau of Indian Affairs, and tribal police (Snipp 1996). These reflect broader racialized systems that contributed to inequalities.

Acker (2006) argues that inequality regimes ultimately relate to economic decision making that lead to dramatically different local and regional configurations of inequality across the United States. Indeed, a growing body of literature suggests the important long-term effects that historic events can have on places, such as economic development. For example, Nunn (2008), finds that the parts of Africa from which the largest number of slaves were taken are today the poorest parts of Africa, arguing that Africa's external trade in slaves had a significant negative impact on the subsequent economic development of the regions within Africa. In an earlier study, examining extraction (via colonialism) and underdevelopment in Africa, Nunn (2002:24) concludes that after its demise, the past effects of extraction are still felt because the society has been permanently moved to a new equilibrium characterized by high levels of

corruption, rent-seeking, and insecure property rights." This is what Nunn (2002:24) describes as "the legacy of colonialism."

Similarly, scholars have focused attention to how the racialized past of America has shaped inequality in the country. The "legacy of slavery" is a prime example. Oliver and Shapiro (2013) argue that slavery was a racialized state policy that severely limited the economic rights of Blacks and prevented them from acquiring wealth. Yet, poor Whites (males) at the time had the ability to buy land, own businesses, and develop wealth assets they could pass down from generation to generation. Nowadays, *poor* Whites have nearly as much mean financial assets as the *highes*t earning Blacks (Oliver and Shapiro 2013). While it is not difficult to understand how a racial regime characterized by slavery would lead to various inequities as ample studies underscore, relatively less literature empirically tests this relationship. This is because "legacy mechanisms" can be difficult to quantify. Some scholars, however, have attempted to address this issue by focusing on the legacy of slavery in contributing to economic outcomes and disparities (Ruef and Fletcher 2003; Levernier and White 1998; O'Connell 2012; Ruef 2014). O'Connell (2012) finds the slave concentration in Southern counties in 1860 is related to poverty disparities among Southern Blacks and Whites today, and this is independent of demographic and economic conditions, racialized wealth disparities and racial threat. Another recent study (Archarya, Blackwell, and Sen 2015) traces contemporary differences in political attitudes of Whites across Southern counties to the

prevalence of slavery over a century and half ago. This recent literature on legacy is strongly suggestive of how macro-level racial systems (i.e. racial regimes) matter when understanding sources of inequality across place.

However, while the legacy of slavery is a salient measure reflecting a past Southern race regime, other mechanisms mentioned above have similarly shaped social and economic opportunities in the South. For example, sharecropping (i.e. "the new slavery") and the debt it brought onto many contributed to increased poverty among Blacks and overall devastation to the region (Mandle 1978; Quadango 1994). The oppressive system of Jim Crow also inhibited opportunities for advancement of Blacks and the effects of this are still felt. King and Smith (2006:83) argue that "because many of the institutionalized inequities in schooling, jobs, education, and political offices created by the Jim Crow order still endure, opposition to measures explicitly aimed at reducing inequalities helps maintain many white statuses and privileges." This further illustrates how today's inequalities can be historic in origin, in this case, historic racial regimes of the South.

These other legacy mechanisms varied in strength across the South, and thus, should also be taken into account in an examination of poverty in the South. For example, more rural states maintained sharecropping longer (Mandle 1978) and the Deep South endured the worst of Jim Crow and strongest White resistance (Bartley 1997; Woodrow 2001). These past differences across the South may help better understand

poverty patterns across the South today. Thus, this study, builds upon the notion of racial legacy by considering different institutions that reflect historical racial regimes of the South. In addition to the institution of slavery, which has been a focus of recent studies examining the historical effects of race in the South (e.g. O'Connell 2013, Ruef 2014, Acharya et al. 2015), I also incorporate Black sharecropping and White resistance to Jim Crow into a scale measure I constructed to reflect these various aspects of Southern historical racial regimes. I then use this measure to examine the relationship between historical racial regimes and contemporary poverty in the South. Based on the literature I expect the following outcomes: 1) Historical racial regimes are positively associated with contemporary poverty patterns in Southern states (i.e. total poverty, Black poverty, and the Black-White poverty gap). 2) Historical racial regimes help predict poverty in the South, and this effect will be larger for Blacks than Whites. 3) Historical racial regimes help explain the higher poverty among Blacks and Whites (i.e. Black-White poverty gap).

4.1.4 Other Correlates of Poverty

While the primary focus of this study is historical racial regimes and their association with contemporary poverty patterns in the U.S. South, I also take into account individual poverty predictors, how they differ for Blacks and Whites in the South, and the extent to which they help explain the poverty difference between Blacks and Whites in the South. Literature on poverty and race has focused much attention to

individual-level characteristics that are associated with poverty. Among those more likely be poor are female heads, children, individuals with lower education attainment, the unemployed, immigrants, and rural residents (Iceland 2013). While racial differences among these characteristics are associated with various racial disparities, the most emphasized in the poverty literature is family structure (i.e. female/single mother-headed households) (McLanahan and Percheski 2008).

In examining other correlates of poverty, it is important to consider the possibility of mediating relationships between historic racial regimes and poverty. For example, Morris and Monroe (2013) note that ample studies detail how slavery and legalized segregation marginalized Blacks in regards to education (e.g. Anderson 1998; Bullock 1967; Butchart 1980; Woodson 1919). They conclude that any effort to understand the social, economic, and educational experiences and outcomes of Black students should take into account the significance of the American South (Morris and Monroe 2010:31). This suggests that the legacy of historical racial regimes may be reflected in poverty predictors, such as education. In a recent study, Reece and O'Connell (2015) find a significant effect of historical slave concentration on school segregation in the South, arguing that the legacy of slavery in the South has shaped local structure in ways that have led to White disinvestment in public education. This in turn, leads to unequal education and thus subsequent racial inequalities (e.g. poverty) that result. Therefore, if historical race regimes do not yield significant effects on poverty in

this study, it could mean that another variable, such as education, mediates the relationship.

4.3 Data and Methods

4.3.1 Data

The individual-level data for this study come from the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) U.S. datasets: 2000, 2004, 2007, 2010, and 2013. (Please refer to Chapter 2 Methods section for details on the LIS). The sample consists of only individuals that reside in the South (i.e. former Confederate states). The total sample size is 208,076, with sub-samples of 114,607 Non-Whites and 42,267 of Blacks. Descriptive statistics for the total sample and sub-samples are displayed in Appendix Table D1. I compiled the state-level data from multiple sources. These include the 1860 U.S. Decennial Census, the U.S. Census of Agriculture Historical Archives, the U.S. Office of the Historian, and Gov.Trac. (See Appendix Table D2).

4.3.2 Dependent Variables

As with the previous chapters, ***poverty*** is the dependent variable in this study, and includes both a relative and anchored measure. (Please refer to Chapter 2).

4.3.3 Key Independent Variable

The primary independent variable is a state-level measure that reflects ***historical racial regimes*****.** For this variable, I constructed a standardized scale composed of four

items associated with historical racial regimes in the American South. These items are standardized (mean 0, variance 1) before summed in the scale.

For the first scale item composing ***historical racial regimes***, I follow previous recent studies (e.g. O'Connell 2013, Reece and O'Connell 2015) and measure the total proportion of the population that were slaves in 1860, but at the state-level. The second scale item measures black sharecropping, which scholars contend became the "new slavery" for African-Americans contributing to poverty and devastation in the South (Mandle 1978, Quadango 1994). This measure is the mean total percentage of all sharecroppers in each Southern state from 1930-1940 that were African-American. The third scale item measures the proportion of a state's total U.S. congressional delegates that signed the Southern Manifesto. The Southern Manifesto was a document written in opposition to racial integration in public places and was a response to the *Brown v. Board of Education* Supreme Court ruling deeming public school segregation unconstitutional (Aucoin 1996). The final scale item measures the proportion of a state's congressional delegates that voted against the 1965 Voting Rights Act, which granted Blacks the right to vote. Growing Southern (White) resistance to civil rights, such as massive opposition to the integration of public schools (Bartley 1997) and denial of voting rights (Jeffries 2010), served as additional obstacles to equality. Thus, these last two scale items that measure support of segregation and opposition to equal rights for African-Americans

attempt to capture state-level White resistance during the Jim Crow regime. Table 8 shows values for each scale item by state.

Table 8: Historic Racial Regime Scale Items by State

	Slavery Population 1960 (%)	Black Sharecroppers 1930-1940 (%)	Congressional Support of the Southern Manifesto (%)	Congressional Opposition to the 1965 Voting Rights Act (%)
Alabama	45.12	95	100	100
Arkansas	25.52	64.18	100	100
Florida	43.97	30.88	80	75
Georgia	43.72	48.44	100	90
Louisiana	46.85	67.14	100	85.74
Mississippi	55.18	78.34	100	100
North Carolina	33.35	46.67	71.43	100
South Carolina	57.18	64.91	100	100
Tennessee	24.84	32.54	36.34	27.78
Texas	30.22	35.14	20.83	55.43
Virginia	30.75	36.52	100	95

Note: Data Sources are in Appendix Table D2

Together, these four scale items yield a strong alpha measure of 0.9439, which indicates high reliability of the scale based on the internal consistency of a the average correlation of the scale items tested. The inter-item correlation of these four items is .8081. This high correlation among indicators that span across over 100 years (i.e. 1860-1965) suggests there are indeed highly reliable regimes of historical racism in the American South, which this scale reflects.

4.3.4 Other Independent Variable

The individual-level independent variables, many of which were employed in the prior two empirical chapters, consists of several individual/household-level demographic variables. To measure the effect of individual-level race, I include binary variables for White (reference) Black, Other Race, and Hispanic. To assess family structure and composition, I include measures for marital status, number of children, age structure: whether the head of household is a single mother, single father, female with no children, or male with no children (reference: married), number of children, presence of children under age 5 and elderly adults (over 65) in the household, age of head (under 25, age 25-34, age 35 to 44, age 44 to 54 (reference), age 65 to 74, and age over 74. Three binary variables measure education attainment—whether the head of the household (e.g. lead earner or oldest member), has less than a high school education, a high school diploma/GED or some college (reference) and a college degree or more. I also include binary measures of the head of household's work status indicating whether the head of household is unemployed, employed part-time, or employed full-time (reference). Additional binary measures indicate whether there is at least one retired adult in the household and whether the household has multiple earners. Lastly, at the individual-level, I also control for rural residence and whether the head is foreign born

4.3.5 Analytic Strategy

I begin by examining the bivariate relationships of historical racial regimes and poverty (i.e. relative poverty, Black poverty, and the Black-White poverty difference/gap) from 2000-2013 among states in the South. I then employ linear probability regression models to further examine the relationship of historical racial regimes with poverty. These models cluster the errors by state. I estimate separate models for the total sample, only Blacks, and only Whites. I estimate a separate model for Whites so that I can compare poverty predictors of poverty between Blacks and Whites, such as whether historical racial regimes matter more for poverty among Blacks than Whites and whether the largest predictors of poverty for Blacks in the South differ from that of Whites. I also include a secondary set of analyses to determine whether education mediates the relationship between historical racial regimes and poverty. Lastly, I employ Fairlie decomposition to examine what predictors drive the Black and White gap in poverty in the South and whether historical racial regimes contribute to the gap.

4.4 Results

4.4.1 Bivariate Relationships of Historical Racial Regimes and Poverty

Figures 13 illustrates the bivariate relationship between historical racial regimes and the percent of individuals in poverty 2000-2013 by state. There is a moderate,

positive association between the strength of former Confederate state's historical racial regimes and contemporary rates of individual poverty (*r*=.40). Mississippi has the highest racial regime score and the highest rate of overall poverty. In general, the states that score higher for historical racial regimes also have the higher poverty rates (e.g. Mississippi, Louisiana, Alabama, and Arkansas). In contrast, states with weaker historical racial regimes tend to have lower rates of poverty (e.g. Florida, Virginia, and Tennessee). Somewhat of an outlier, Virginia has the lowest poverty rates, yet it does not have the weakest historical racial regimes.



Figure 13: Bivariate Relationship of Historical Racial Regimes and Poverty (2000-2013) by State (r=.40)

Figure 14 illustrates the bivariate relationship between historical racial regimes and African-American poverty. African-Americans have much higher rates of poverty

than the overall population (Figure 3). There is also a more pronounced, positive linear relationship between African-American poverty and historical racial regimes (*r*=.49) than that of overall total poverty and racial regimes (Figure 3). The four states with the highest rates of African-Americans living in poverty (i.e. Arkansas, Louisiana, Alabama, Mississippi, and Alabama) also have among the strongest historical racial regimes. Arkansas has the highest rate of African-American poverty (43%). Historical racial regimes are also more varied among the states with lower rates of African-American poverty as compared to the states with higher rates.



Figure 14: Bivariate Relationship of African-American Poverty (2000-2013) and Historical Racial Regimes by State (r=.49)

The final scatterplot (Figure 15) displays the bivariate relationship between historical racial regimes and the poverty gap between Black and White individuals from

2000-2013 by state. There is a moderate positive, linear association between the Black and White poverty difference and historical racial regimes as well (*r*=.53). The same states with the highest overall poverty rates also have the greatest poverty disparity between Blacks and Whites (i.e. Louisiana, Arkansas, Mississippi, and Arkansas), and these states have very strong historical racial regimes. Conversely, the states with weaker racial regimes tend to have much smaller Black-White poverty gaps.



Figure 15: Bivariate Relationship of Historical Racial Regimes and the Black-White Poverty Gap (2000-2013) (r=.53)

As shown in Figures 13-15, the strength of racial historical regimes among Southern states has positive linear associations with total poverty, Black poverty, and the Black-White poverty gap. These moderate associations suggest there is an important

link between historical racial regimes and contemporary poverty in the South and that historical racial regimes may further understanding of poverty today.

4.4.2 Linear Probability Models of Poverty among All Southerners

To supplement the significant relationships between historical racial regimes and poverty in the South illustrated in the bivariate associations, linear probability models of poverty test whether historical racial regimes have a significant effect on poverty in multivariate models. Table 9 displays these linear probability models for poverty among all Southerners. Model 1 includes only historical racial regimes and year controls. In this base model, historical racial regimes has virtually no effect on poverty in the South. For a one unit increase in racial regimes, the probability of poverty increases by only .06%.

Model 2 adds the individual-level controls. The effect of historical racial regimes on poverty in the South ears significance after taking into account all other variables. As for the individual-level variables, their effects fall in the expected direction. The largest positive effects on overall poverty in the South are having an unemployed head, less than high school education, and single mother head. The largest negative effects are for multiple earners, and college educated head. In the largest effect overall, having an unemployed head of household increases the probability of poverty by 28%.

Model 3 adds tests the interaction between Black and historical racial regimes. The effect of historical racial regimes attenuates with the addition of the interaction of historical racial regimes and Black. The addition of the interaction also makes the

positive direction of Black on poverty smaller. Yet, although the interaction between racial regimes has a positive sign, it is not significant. The effects of the other independent variables in the model do not change much, if at all, from the previous model without the racial regime and Black interaction.

Table 9: Linear Probability Models of Relative on Poverty in the South, 2000-2013, N=208,076

	Model 1		***Model 2***		***Model 3***	
	Coef.	***t***	***Coef.***	***t***	***Coef.***	***t***
Historical Racial Regimes	.006	0.35	.011†	2.04	.005	1.47
Racial Regimes x Black					.025	1.61
Race (Ref: Non-Hisp. White)						
Black			.082***	11.40	.070***	9.16
Other			.031**	6.11	.030***	5.82
Hispanic			.071***	9.84	.069***	10.39
Marital Status (Ref: Married)						
Single Mother			.128***	10.17	.127***	10.22
Single Father			.029**	3.58	.030**	3.64
Female No Children			.066***	9.99	.066***	9.94
Male, No Children			.010*	2.57	.010*	3.64
Number of Children			.037***	21.16	.037***	21.04
Children < 5			.017**	4.62	.017**	4.59
Adults >65			-.044***	-9.42	-.044***	-9.54
Age (Ref: 45-54)						
Age < 25			.124***	17.22	.124***	17.25
Age 25-34			-.001***	-0.13	-.001	-0.11
Age 35-44			-.026***	-6.20	-.026***	-6.23
Age 55-64			.013*	3.25	.013**	3.28
Age 65-74			.014	2.21	.014	2.21
Age >74			.025**	4.40	.025**	4.40
Rural Residence			.048***	6.64	.047***	6.21
Foreign-Born			.040***	6.50	.041***	6.82
Education (Ref: HS Grad/ Some College)						
Less than High School			.175***	19.51	.174***	19.15
College or More			-.083***	-22.09	-.083***	-22.10
Employment Status						

(Ref: Full-time)				
Part-time	.139***	-16.33	.139***	-16.36
Unemployed	.283***	24.22	.283***	24.13
Retired Adult	-.038***	-5.98	-.038***	-5.99
Multiple Earners	-.210***	-22.10	-.210***	-22.10

Note: All models include year controls and cluster the errors by state.
*** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05, † p < .1*

4.4.3 Linear Probability Models of Poverty among Blacks and Whites

Table 10, Models 1 and 2, display the linear probability results of poverty among Blacks in the South. In Model 1 with only year controls, historic racial regimes has a significant, positive effect on poverty for Blacks. One unit increase in historical racial regimes increases the probability for Blacks by 7.1%. However, in Model 2, which adds all individual-level variables, the effect of historical racial regimes weakens and becomes not significant.

For comparisons of overall poverty predictors between Blacks and Whites, Models 3 and 4 display the linear probability models of poverty for Whites. Unlike in Model 1 for Blacks, historical racial regimes does not have a significant effect among Whites in the South in Model 3. As expected, this effect is also much smaller than it is for Blacks as a unit increase in historical racial regimes increases poverty by only about 2% for Whites as compared to 7% for Blacks). Model 4 adds all individual level variables. This further weakens the effect of racial regimes for poverty among Whites.

Table 10: Linear Probability Models of Poverty among Blacks Only and Whites Only in the South, 2000-2013

	Blacks Only				Whites Only			
	Model 1		*Model 2*		*Model 3*		*Model 4*	
	Coef.	*t*	*Coef.*	*t*	*Coef.*	*t*	*Coef.*	*t*
Historical Race Regimes	.071*	3.14	.016	1.00	.019	1.15	.010	1.52
Marital Status (Ref: Married)								
Single Mother			.124***	7.46			.128***	11.73
Single Father			.008	0.46			.055**	3.58
Female No Children			.090***	8.34			.067***	9.96
Male, No Children			.024*	3.05			.022**	3.99
Number of Children			.057***	17.63			.023***	7.05
Children < 5			.030**	2.50			.012*	2.84
Adults >65			-.063***	-3.29			-.038**	-4.49
Age (Ref: 45-54)								
Age < 25			.111***	7.11			.138***	12.59
Age 25-34			-.038**	-3.98			-.010	1.52
Age 35-44			-.033***	-3.78			-.0261*	-4.24
Age 55-64			.014	1.45			.010	2.06
Age 65-74			.065**	3.34			-.003	-0.35
Age >74			.083**	4.64			.004	0.43
Rural Residence			.061***	5.44			.046***	8.07
Foreign-Born			.023*	2.74			.030*	2.47
Education (Ref: HS Grad/Some College)								
Less than High School			.172***	19.66			.175***	16.95
College or More			-.132***	-16.18			-.070***	-16.32
Employment Status (Ref: Full-time)								
Part-time			.131***	-7.06			.111***	-8.09
Unemployed			.321***	26.67			.251***	15.49
Retired Adults			-.037**	-3.28			-.024***	-2.15
Multiple Earners			-.281***	-17.41			-.135***	-15.55
N			42,267				114,607	

Note: All models include year control and cluster the errors by state.

**** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05, † p < .1*

Beyond racial regimes, there are some notable similarities and differences in poverty predictors among Blacks and Whites. All individual-level variables are significant (with the exception of single father and age 55 to 64 head for Blacks and heads age 25 to 34, 35 to 44, and over 74 for Whites). For both Blacks and Whites, the largest effect is for unemployed head. Living in an unemployed household increases the probability of poverty by 32.1% for Blacks and 25.1% for Whites. Having multiple earners in the households is also important, and even more so for Blacks, as it decreases the probability of poverty by 28.1% for Blacks compared to only 13.5% for Whites. This effect of multiple earners is the second largest effect for Blacks. However, the second largest effect for Whites, is low education. For Whites, living with a head of household who has less than a high school education increases the probability of poverty by 17.5% compared to 17.2% for Blacks. Further, among Blacks, the negative effect of having a college educated head is almost twice as high as that of Whites. Living with a college educated head decreases the probability of poverty for Blacks by 13.2%, compared to only 7% for Whites. This effect of college education for Blacks is even larger than that of living in a single mother or female headed household, but this is not the case for Whites.

The linear probability models of poverty using the alternative anchored poverty measure are not substantively different from the relative poverty model results. These results are presented in Appendix Table D3.

4.4.4 Exploratory Analyses of Education as a Mediating Variable

Given the previous models do not yield significant effects for historical racial regimes, I also consider the possibility that education might mediate the relationship between historical racial regimes and poverty. To explore this possibility, I re-estimate the full models without the education variables. Table 11 displays these results in comparison to the original models that control for education.

Table 11: Historical Racial Regime Coefficients from Linear Probability Models of Relative Poverty With and Without Education

	Total Sample		**Blacks Only**		**Whites Only**	
	Coeff.	*t*	Coeff.	*t*	Coeff.	*t*
PANEL A Historical Racial Regime Coefficients						
Historical Racial Regimes (HRR)	.006	0.35	.071*	3.14	.019	1.15
HRR + Controls	.011†	2.04	.016	1.00	.010	1.52
HRR + Controls *(no education)*	.010	1.31	.021	1.19	.012	1.26
PANEL B Black x Historical Racial Regime Interaction Coefficients						
HRR + Controls + Black x HRR	.005	1.47	--	--	--	--
HRR + Controls + Black x HRR (*no education)*	.002†	1.97	--	--	--	--

****p* < .001, ** *p* < .01, * *p* < .05, † *p* < .1

In the model for the total sample, the positive effect of historical racial regimes is weakly significant in the original model that includes all controls (see Panel A). However, after removing the education variables from the model, the significance between historical racial regimes and poverty attenuates. Though the change is very

small, it is suggestive that education might possibly mediate the relationship between historical racial regimes and poverty. In the separate models for each Blacks and Whites, however, the removing of education does not yield smaller effects for historical racial regimes. Panel B shows the coefficients for the interaction between Black and historical racial regimes. Although the interaction is not significant in the original model that includes education, once education is excluded, the interaction becomes more significant.

In another exploratory analyses, I estimate linear probability models to examine the effects of historical race regimes on education for Blacks and Whites. Table 12 displays the coefficients for low education. For Blacks, historical racial regimes have a significant, positive effect on the probability that the head of household has less than a high school education. For Whites, the effect of historical racial regimes is also positive but not significant. After adding all other controls, the effect of historical racial regimes attenuates for both Whites and Blacks, but remains significant for Blacks. Despite the historical race regimes being a significant predictor of low education among Blacks and not Whites, these results are conflicting with the previous analyses in which education does not appear to mediate the relationship between historical regimes and poverty. Thus, further analyses is warranted.

Table 12: Low Education Coefficients from Linear Probability Models of Low Education for Blacks and Whites

	Blacks Only		Whites Only	
	Coeff.	*t*	*Coeff.*	*T*
Historical Racial Regimes (HER)	.056**	4.62	.048	.093
HRR + All Controls	.026*	2.32	.010	1.52

****p* < .001, ** *p* < .01, * *p* < .05, † *p* < .1

4.4.5 Binary Decomposition of the Black-White Poverty Gap

The final set of analyses employs binary decomposition to identify the relative contributions of all independent variables to the poverty difference between Blacks and Whites in the South. Table 3 displays the results from the binary decomposition.

In the South, the poverty rates for Whites and Blacks in the South is 12.22% and 30.69%, respectively. This yields a total poverty difference of -18.47% between Blacks and Whites. Together, the variables in the model explain approximately 66% of the poverty difference between Blacks and Whites in the South. Thus, approximately 44% of the Black-White poverty gap is unexplained by this model.

Historical race regimes make a 2% contribution to the poverty gap between Blacks and Whites in the South, and this effect is significant. However, this is but a small portion of the total almost 66% of the difference explained by the entire model.

In regards to the other independent variables, living in a household with multiple earners explains the largest portion of the poverty difference between Blacks and Whites in the South. This accounts for 29% of the total difference explained by the

Table 13: Binary Decomposition of the Black-White Poverty Gap

	Relative Poverty	
White Poverty	.1222	
Black Poverty	.3069	
White-Black Difference	-.1847	
Relative Contribution to Difference	*Coef.*	*%*
Historical Racial Regimes	-.003***	2.11
Single Mother	-.019***	15.97
Single Father	8.84E^{06}	-0.01
Female Head, No Children	- .007***	5.40
Male Head, No Children	-.0001***	.61
Number of Children	-.008***	6.56
Children Under Age 5	.0005**	.39
Adults Over Age 65	-.0009**	.75
Under Age 25	-.002***	1.87
Age 25-34	.001***	-1.07
Age 35-44	-.001***	.85
Age 55-64	.0001	.11
Age 65-74	.001****	-.46
Over Age 74	.001***	-.65
Immigrant Head	-.001***	.49
Rural Residence	.0002**	.23
Less than High School	-.014***	11.27
College Degree	-.020***	16.98
Part-time	- .003***	2.23
Unemployed	-.008***	6.68
Retired Adult	.001***	.54
Multiple Earners	-.037***	29.32
Year 2004	.0004***	.31
Year 2007	-5.54E^{-06}	.00
Year 2010	.001***	-.43
Year 2013	.00001	-.07
All Variables (Total Explained)	-.1217	65.87

$^{***}p < .001$, $^{**}p < .01$, $^{*}p < .05$

decomposition model. The next largest individual contributions to the gap are for college educated head (~17%), single mother household (~16%) and less than high school head (11.3%). Further, living with an unemployed head accounts for 9.7% of the Black-White poverty difference explained by the model. With the exception of head age 55 to 64 and the year 2007 and 2013, all individual level variables are significant in the decomposition. (See Appendix Table D4 for the decomposition results using the anchored poverty measure).

4.5 Discussion

Drawing on the concept of inequality regimes, this chapter address poverty and race in the context of the U.S. South. Using a unique index measure of historical racial regimes I constructed using historical data from various sources, I examine the relationships of historical racial regimes with contemporary poverty patterns in the American South. Specifically, I examine whether historical racial regimes predict poverty in the South, how poverty predictors differ between Blacks and Whites in the South, and what explains the Black-White poverty gap. While linear probability models fail to yield significant relationships between historical race regimes and total poverty, Black poverty, and White poverty, binary decomposition results suggest racial regimes do matter in explaining the Black-White poverty gap. Further, exploratory analyses examining whether education could mediate the relationship between historical race regimes and poverty is inconclusive.

In regards to whether there is a significant relationship between historical racial regimes and contemporary poverty patterns in the South, graphical results of associations suggest this is so. There is a moderate, positive relationship between historical racial regimes and 1) overall poverty, 2) Black poverty, and 3) the Black-White poverty gap. Of these, historical racial regimes has the strongest bivariate association with the Black-White poverty gap. These results indicate that Southern states with the strongest historical racial regimes have the highest poverty and largest racial disparities in poverty.

These bivariate relationships also serve as a basis for testing the effect of the legacy of historical racial regimes on poverty in the multi-variate models (i.e. linear probability models). In the South only model, historical racial regimes has a very weakly significant, positive effect on total poverty after controlling for several individual level factors such as race, family structure, family composition, education attainment, and employment status. These results offer weak support to the hypothesis that historical race regimes predict poverty in the South. However, when including the Black x historical racial regimes interaction, the effect of historical racial regimes weakens, but neither this nor the interaction is significant.

In the linear probability model of poverty among only Blacks, racial legacy does have a significant, positive effect. However, after controlling for the individual level variables, this effect is no longer significant. Among Whites, the effect of racial regimes

is smaller than that of Blacks, and is not significant in either model. Even though the effects are not significant in the full models, the larger effects for Blacks suggest that hypothesis that racial regimes do matter more for poverty among Blacks than Whites.

The inability to find a significant effect of historical racial regimes in the full linear probability model does not necessarily mean that historic racial regimes do not matter for contemporary poverty. The bivariate associations (Figures 1-3) of historical racial regimes and poverty in the South do illustrate a relationship between them, as states who had stronger historical racial regimes tend to have higher poverty for to the total population and for Blacks. Thus, the lack of significant effects could suggest that the effects of historical racial regimes are not easily discernable due to other mediating factors. The results of an explanatory analyses of whether education mediates the effect of historical racial regimes on poverty are not conclusive. Results show that education seems to weakly mediate the relationship in the South. However, this is not the case for Blacks and Whites separately, despite the fact that historical racial regimes significantly predicts low education among Blacks, but not Whites. More research is needed to further examine this issue. Further, there remains the possibility that other variables may mediate the effect of historical race regimes on poverty.

For example, work status, namely unemployed head and multiple earners, are the strongest predictors of poverty across all models. Recent literature demonstrates the importance of long-term effects of historical events on economies and economic

development (e.g. Nunn 2008). Inequality regimes influence economic decision making, which help shape inequalities across territories (Acker 2006). Thus, the historical racial regimes in the South, which led to decreased opportunities and economic disparities, could have a significant effect on labor and employment factors, which in turn, may mediate the effect of historical racial regimes on poverty in the South. This could especially be the case for Blacks, due to the history of racial discrimination in the labor market. Studies show that compared to minorities, Whites receive better job leads (McDonald, Lin, and Ao 2009) and have greater access to helpful contacts in the job search and entry process, even in the blue-collar job market (Royster 2003). Compared to Whites, Blacks are also significantly more likely to be discriminated in the job search and application process (Bertrand and Mullainathan 2003) and actual hiring, including being more likely to be channeled downward into less desirable jobs (Pager and Quillian 2005). Thus, future research is necessary to address whether employment and other factors may mediate the effects of historical racial regimes on poverty.

That the historical racial regime measure is a state-level variable is a limitation of this study that may also help explain why the linear probability models did not yield more significant effects. The South is not a uniform region and there can be much variation across states. For example, in the South, poverty is concentrated in sub-regions such as the Mississippi Delta, Rio Grande Valley, Appalachia, and rural areas more generally. These areas have experienced some of the worst oppression. Thus, by

grouping al individuals together at the state-level, some of the nuanced poverty differences within states are lost. A future study that couples county-level historical racial regimes data (i.e. slavery and share cropping) with state level variables such as congressional support of Jim Crow, could very well yield more significant effects.

Although the linear probability models do not fully support the argument that historical racial regimes significantly matter for poverty among the total population, Blacks, or Whites, results do suggest historical race regimes contribute to the Black-White poverty gap in the South. Although historical racial regimes explains only a very small portion of the difference in poverty between Blacks and Whites in the South, this effect is strongly significant.

Beyond historical racial regimes, this study also highlights differences in poverty predictors between Whites and Blacks and their contributions to the White and Black poverty gap, which also illuminates the relationship between race and poverty disparities in the South. Unemployment and multiple-earners have large effects in predicting individual poverty and together. These factors account for over almost half of the total Black-White difference gap explained by the decomposition model. This underscores how important employment and individual ties to the labor market are in reducing poverty (particularly poverty among Blacks) and the White-Black poverty gap. Despite beliefs that family structure and single motherhood are to blame for racial disparities in poverty, the reality is that employment is what really makes a difference in

preventing poverty. This supports the conclusions of recent studies highlighting the importance of work over family structure in regards to poverty (e.g. Baker 2015, Rainwater and Smeeding 2004).

Education is also essential in addressing poverty and the gap between Whites and Blacks in the South. Not only does high education make the second largest individual contribution to the gap, together, both education variables (less than high school and college education) account for 24% of the total contribution to the gap. This makes education of even greater importance than the family structure variables combined (i.e. single mother, single father, female with no children, and male with no children). Further, that education is significant across analyses, and that high education has larger negative effect on poverty for Blacks than Whites suggests the importance of higher education in increasing the life chances of Blacks in the South. This further helps illuminate the relationship between race and poverty disparities in the South.

5. Conclusion

Motivated by the historically high poverty in the South and the relative lack of American poverty research examining this topic, this dissertation focuses attention to the issue of poverty and place in the context of the American South. Specifically, this study examines 1) why poverty is higher in the South, relative to the Non-South, 2) what predicts poverty within the South and the sub regions of the Deep South and Peripheral South, and 3) whether historic racial regimes explain poverty in the South and contribute to the Black-White poverty gap among Southerners. To address these questions, this study employs multiple analytical techniques (e.g. regression and decomposition) to examine demographic micro-data from the 2000-2013 waves of U.S. data from the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) and state-level economic political, and racial data from multiple sources.

5.1. Overview of Findings

Overall, the results of this dissertation demonstrate how both micro- and macro-level contexts shape poverty across place, namely between the South and Non-South and within the South. Results also shows how place characteristics vary across regions and within regions, which can also influence how different variables impact inequality.

Chapter 2 takes into consideration several different theoretical explanations for poverty—family demographics, economic structure and performance, racial composition and heterogeneity, and power resources—to examine why poverty is

higher than the South than the Non-South. An analysis of variable means finds almost all differences between the South and Non-South are statistically significant, with some notable differences among each of the four variable groups. Yet, collectively, power resources variable means have the largest substantive differences between the South and the Non-South. Multi-level linear probability regression models add depth to these observed differences. Specifically, among the one independent variable group models, power resources (followed by economic structure) yield the largest decline in the positive effect of Southern residence on poverty. Among the two group models, the combination of power resources and racial composition and heterogeneity yield the largest decline. Overall, models that include power resources either yield the smallest South coefficients and/or make the effect of South become not significant. Lastly, decomposition results indicate power resources explain the largest portion of the poverty difference between the South and Non-South, closely followed by economic structure. That these three separate analyses all find power resources to be such a large driving factor suggest the importance of power resources in contributing to the regional disparity of higher poverty in the South. These findings also demonstrate the salience of political and labor market institutions in studying poverty and inequality.

That poverty is higher in the South than the Non-South, raises the question of what drives poverty within the South. Chapter 3 addresses this question, as well as whether poverty predictors differ between the sub-regions of the Deep South and the

Peripheral South. The results indicate that economic structure and family demographic variables have the overall largest impact on poverty in the South. However, unemployment is the most important factor, with effects that are twice as large as the other strong predictors (e.g. family structure and education). These effects are even larger in the Deep South. The findings from this chapter illustrate other poverty predictors vary in their effects across territories. For example, although unemployment has a significant, positive effect on poverty in the overall South, it does not in either the Deep South or Peripheral South. Whereas GD PPC has a significant, negative effect on poverty in the Peripheral South, it does not in the Deep South, or overall South. Further, Chapter 3 results also demonstrate the lack of significant state-level effects across the South and its sub-regions. Graphical illustrations of the bivariate associations between state-level variables and individual poverty rates by state offer some insights into these lack of state-level effects (e.g. the lack of a significant unionization effect could be due to overall low unionization rates in the South in general, and some of the highest poverty states concurrently having high levels of unionization).

In light of the South's deep racial history and recent literature that suggests historical events helped shape modern economic development and poverty (Nunn 2008; O'Connor 2013), Chapter 4 examines historical racial regimes and whether they help explain poverty and racial poverty disparities in the South. While historical racial regimes have significant bivariate associations with total poverty, Black poverty, and the

Black-White poverty gap, multi-variate results are not conclusive. Regressions of poverty fail to yield large or significant effects for historical racial regimes, yet, decomposition analyses suggests that historical racial regimes make a significant, albeit small, contribution the Black-White poverty gap. This chapter also examines whether education could mediate the relationship between historical race regimes and poverty, but results do not fully support this argument. Beyond historical race regimes, Chapter 4 results indicate that in the South, employment status and education largely explain Black poverty and the Black-White poverty gap.

5.2 Contributions

This dissertation makes important contributions to the areas of poverty and inequality, place, and the South. First, this dissertation focuses much needed sociological attention on the issue of poverty in the American South. While some recent studies do examine poverty in the South (see Newman and O'Brien 2010; O'Connell 2013), the South remains relatively understudied in the mainstream of sociological literature on poverty compared to other regions such as the Northeast and Midwest. This is despite the South having long-maintained a disproportionate share of the nation's socio-economic problems (Wimberley 2008).

Furthermore, contributes to the growing literature on spatial inequality (Gieryn 2000; Lobao et al. 2007), and highlights sociology's "missing middle" sub-national scale (i.e. the spatial territory between cities and countries that) (Lobao and Hooks 2007;

Lobao et al. 2008) in the context of poverty. Sub-national scale research helps further understanding of inequality because it illustrates how there can be variation within a broader nation and how smaller entities within that nation (e.g. states) can shape inequality across territories. Additionally, as Lobao and Sanez (2000) conclude, sub-national scale inequality research can lead to the challenging, rejection, or revision of existing generalizations regarding inequality that are nationally framed without regard to the significance of place (Lobao and Sanez 2000). This has theoretical implications, as different frameworks are not always applicable across different place settings. This also has policy implications. Scholars have stressed the importance of place-based policy solutions to poverty and inequality, arguing that it is difficult to have progressive and effective policy and public outreach without taking into consideration the differences inherent across place(Lichter et al. 2008; Lobao and Sanez 2002; Wimberley and Morris 2002). Sub-national scale research (e.g. that explains why regional differences even exist as this study demonstrates) helps underscore that a "one size fits all" approach will not be effective in addressing poverty and inequality in America. This provides yet another reason why building upon existing scholarship on the South, regional disparities, and sub-national scale territories in general, is both valuable and necessary.

This study also contributes to the spatial inequality literature by incorporating a multi-level approach. Much spatial research tends to focus on all aggregate-level data or all individual-level data. However, as Cotter, Hermsen, and Vannerman (2007) indicate,

individual factors (e.g. family characteristics) vary across space and time in macro-level patterns affecting outcomes, and thus, multi-level models can illustrate how both micro- and macro variables both help determine outcomes such as poverty rates. Thus, studies (e.g. this dissertation) that consider both micro- and macro-level factors in the context of space, allow for more a comprehensive examination of inequality and the testing of theoretical explanations for regional differences. Accordingly, this study considers how family demographics, economic, racial, and political factors all contribute to poverty. While existing studies examine one or some of these elements, I consider them all, which is another valuable contribution of this dissertation.

Moreover, by focusing on both individual-level and state-level factors that contribute to poverty, this study demonstrates the importance of taking into account how both micro- and macro- characteristics shape inequality, such as poverty across place. In doing so, this study makes important substantive contributions as well. For instance, Chapter 2 highlights how state-level power resources are key in understanding the higher poverty in the South relative to the Non-South. This is noteworthy given the large emphasis on family demographics (especially family structure) in the poverty literature. Of course, family demographics do matter and impact individual poverty. However, this study further illustrates how broader and institutional factors play an important role in contributing to individual-level factors (e.g. individual poverty) and thus, overall poverty patterns (e.g. the higher poverty in the South).

At the same time, while such state-level factors drive regional poverty disparities, this study also demonstrates how *within* the South, individual-, not state-level factors, are the dominating force driving poverty. This is not to say state-level characteristics do not matter for poverty within the South. Instead, as highlighted in Chapter 3, in the South (especially in each the Deep South and Peripheral South), the lack of variation among some state-level variables (e.g. unionization) as well as the unique circumstances illuminating observed patterns among others (e.g. manufacturing employment and Democratic control) are not inconsequential. They actually underscore the importance of state-level factors and how different variables can have varying effects depending on the context. This is also important for understanding inequality across place.

Another contribution of this dissertation is to scholarship on the legacy of historical events and their influence on place (e.g. Nunn 2008; O'Connell 2013; Ruef 2014; Sen et al. 2015). Although Chapter 4 results do not indicate large and significant effects for historical racial regimes, my particular measure of historical racial regimes still offers a novel, reliable measure of a meaningful concept. Previous research has looked at the "legacy" of one specific institutions, such as slavery (O'Connell 2013; Nunn 2008; Reese and O'Connell 2015; Acharya et al. 2015). However, I consider slavery, sharecropping, and Jim Crow (via White resistance) to reflect the concept of "historical racial regimes" over the course of 100 years (i.e. 1860-1965). This measure enables

comparison of the degree of historical racial regimes across all Southern states. This helps highlight variation in the historical contexts of places, which is useful to consider when examining sources of inequality.

Furthermore, this measure of historical racial regimes is at the state-level. Scholars argue states are essentially political entities with the ability to make decisions and influence distribution and this inequality (Leicht and Jenkins 2007; Moller 2008). Fullerton and Dixon (2009) note that the unique historical trajectories of U.S. states influence contemporary outcomes, such as political orientations and prevailing ideologies. Thus, this state-level measure of historical racial regimes provides theoretically meaningful insights into differences among states to better contextualize and understand differences in outcomes across states.

5.3 Limitations and Challenges

Despite the above contributions of this dissertation, there are some challenges and limitations worth noting. One limitation of this study is the cross-sectional nature of the analyses. Cross-sectional data does not permit observation of individual trajectories in outcomes, including changes that may affect those outcomes. Cross-sectional analyses also does not allow the netting out of unobservable differences between places. Furthermore, cross-sectional analyses does not recognize that independent variables could have differing effects on individual poverty over time. For example, during the Great Recession of the late 2000s, unemployment and economic growth may have had a

larger and stronger effect on an individual being poor as compared to other time periods. Moreover, whereas time-series data can help establish causality, cross-sectional data cannot.

The time period consisting of only six waves of data between the years 2000 to 2013 also limits the scope of this study. By not having data for each year during this time period, there is the potential to miss nuances in the data that may otherwise affect the observed results. For example, the Great Recession, which lasted from 2007 to 2009, is only captured in one wave (i.e. 2007) of the data employed in this study. Moreover, the earliest time point in this study is the year 2000. A time frame covering a longer span of time beginning with the 1990s or 1980s, for example, could different yield results. While I find that the higher poverty in the South is highly attributable to power resources during 2000-2013, this may or might not be the case for a different time frame.

While the relative measures of poverty in this study are more defensible than the U.S. official poverty measure, 50% of the *national* median income provides the poverty threshold for the relative measures used. This is a limitation in that the relative measures in this study do not account for variations in the cost of living across regions/states. A regional cost-of-living measure would provide an even more accurate measure of poverty among all states and across regions, and could make a difference in the observed results. This is because it could reveal a somewhat different story in terms of

regional disparities, as specific places may be worse or better off than existing research leads us to believe.

Another limitation of this study is that the smallest geographic unit is the state. There can be much variation in poverty within a single state. There can also be much variation among state-level effects. For example, whereas one area of a state might have high economic growth and low unemployment, another could have the complete opposite. Thus, by having state-level variables, I potentially lose some more nuanced data that I would have had otherwise.

In regards to analyses, one challenge present in this study is that because individuals in the South are nested in only 11 states (based on the Confederate South definition), there are not enough level-2 units to use multi-level regression models in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4. While these two empirical chapters do cluster the error terms by state and control for year, the analyses cannot fully account for the multi-level structure of the data.

In keeping with analytic approaches, another challenge that is important to highlight is the potential issue of mediating variables in Chapter 4. While regression models fail to yield significant effects of historical racial regimes on poverty, the bivariate associations suggest there is a significant relationship between these. Plausibly, there are other variables in which the effect of historical racial regimes operate. In anticipation of this, I examine education as a potentially mediating variable due to the

historical effects of racial relations in the South on the education system and overall outcomes for Blacks (Morris and Monroe 2010; Reece and O'Connell 2015). However, results from a simple exploratory analyses do not fully support this claim. Moreover, given the findings that employment variables (especially unemployment) are strong predictors of poverty among all Southerners and for Blacks, as well as contributes to the poverty gap, the effects of historical racial regimes on poverty could operate though employment, which may serve as a mediating variable. As discussed in Chapter 4, the history of racial discrimination in the South likely impacted the labor market and thus, economic outcomes, such as employment. In fact, the other individual-level variables could also potentially mediate the relationship between historical racial regimes and poverty. This is because by nature of the South's history, historical racial regimes could easily operate through other variables. Consequently, the effects of historical racial regimes on modern poverty is difficult to disentangle within the scope of this study.

5.4 Future Research

Given the contributions and limitations of this study, there are some other areas I identify where future research could explore. Because states are not monolithic entities and have great within variation, even within sub-regions, the use of county level data offers great potential for further study of poverty in the South. Counties are a useful units because they represent recognized local areas and are likely to approximate local economic markets, especially in less populated (e.g. non-metro) areas (Friedman and

Lichter 1998). Moreover, as Moller, Alderson, and Nielsen (2009:1045) explain, "Inequality… is a property of a collectivity, not of individuals." Thus, because county level data allows us to take into account geographical variation in the context of the collectivity, it provides further insight into inequality generating social mechanisms. Specifically, scholars can use county-level data in conjunction with either individual- or state-level data for a multi-level approach similar to this current study. Scholars can also use county-level data to examine specific patterns and trends in the South. For example, what accounts for variation in poverty rates in Southern counties? What factors are associated with significant changes in poverty in Southern counties in recent years, and how did the Great Recession play a role?

A longitudinal research design also provides more opportunities for research on poverty in the South and regional disparities. Most of the studies examining stratification across region use cross-sectional data. Conversely, the use of longitudinal data would allow for more in-depth analyses of temporal and spatial trends with respect to how and why place matters. For example, longitudinal data can enable analyses of how region of residence influences life outcomes, such as poverty, income, education or health. Furthermore, scholars could employ advanced statistical techniques with longitudinal data, such as latent trajectory analysis (see McCall, Land and Parker 2011), to examine outcome patterns, and identify what sub-groups (e.g. intersections of

region/race/gender) are likely to follow similar trajectories. This could help determine whether there is a "Southern penalty" and who is likely to experience it.

The finding of the importance of power resources in explaining the higher poverty in the South also lends itself for future research on the topic. It raises the question of what factors might be driving power resources? Kail and Dixon (2011) examine political institutions and race, and find that race influences the uneven pattern of welfare benefits experienced across states. Thus, it could be that racial history and racial division in the South undermine power resources in the South. Furthermore, given the finding from Chapter 2 that the combination of power resources and race variables have a large impact on the South coefficient (i.e. it makes the effect of South not significant and essentially zero in some cases), race could be endogenous to power resources. Ample research explores the complex, intertwined relationship of race and politics in the South (e.g. Bartley 1999; Black and Black 1987; Jeffries 2010; Valentino and Sears 2005). Hence, examining the link between race and power resources seems a necessary step to further understanding of poverty in the context of the American South.

Further in regards to race, there is also research potential involving my constructed measure of historical racial regimes. Although this dissertation examines the relationship between historical racial regimes and poverty in the South, future studies can employ this historical racial regimes measure to examine other racial disparities in the South such as in education, housing, or crime. Moreover, in this study, the scale

consists of just four items reflecting historical racial regimes (e.g. slavery, sharecropping, Jim Crow (via support of segregation and opposition to equal voting rights for Blacks) that span over 100 years. Future research can expand this scale by considering other measures that reflect racism and racial regimes, such as more contemporary measures (e.g. "segregation academies," hate crimes, housing and banking discrimination, police brutality, etc.) Essentially, the addition of other highly reliable measures that reflect racial regimes over an even longer period of time will help better capture the "race legacy" of the South.

Another area future poverty research on the South should explore concerns the changing race population dynamics. As mentioned in Chapter 1, the population of the South is growing rapidly (U.S. Census Bureau 2015), particularly among Hispanics/Latinos and immigrants (Ennis et al. 2011; Marrow 2011). There has also recently been high levels of Black migration to the South (Hunt et al. 2013). Bonilla-Silva (2004) argues that the rapidly growing minority population has led the U.S. to move from a bi-racial to a tri-racial system of stratification, like that of Latin- and Caribbean America. These changes are even more meaningful in the South where race is already salient and inequalities persist. Some recent studies examine the South as new Hispanic immigrant destinations, focusing on the assimilation of newcomers spatially, economically, socially, and politically (e.g. Flippen and Parrado 2012; Morrow 2011). These studies show how changing population dynamics in the South are meaningful in

regards to race. Thus, scholars can make valuable contributions on poverty in the South and regional disparities by examining how such population changes may shape inequality or changes in inequality.

Lastly, in addition to expanding on the racial aspects of poverty research in the South, intersectionality is yet another area where future research regarding regional inequalities would be fruitful. This has been a growing area of research, as sociologists have focused on how various intersections (e.g. race/ethnicity, gender, sexuality, class, etc.) produce, reproduce, and maintain inequalities (Acker 2006; Browne and Misra 2003; Collins 1998; McCall 2001). However, there is room for exploration of intersectionality as it pertains to spatial inequality because as Tickamyer (2000:809) states, "Poverty is gendered, raced, and spaced." While variables such as race or gender are often part of analyses and can help explain observed outcomes, their interactions and relationship with place have not been thoroughly examined. In the South, the intersection of class, race, and gender are quite historically salient. As historian, Keith (2002:11) notes:

> The traditional power of white men derived from their gender as well as their color. When Southerner's said the South was a white *man's* country, they were not kidding…the history of southern gender roles has meant that struggles for racial justice always had gender implications, while attempts by women of both races to attain equality have been complicated by racial issues.

Moreover, since White men were at the top of the racial hierarchy and Black women at the bottom, it follows that in the South, strong anti-feminist attitudes (Keith 2002) coincide with strong racist attitudes. The intertwined racial and gender history in the

South underscore why an intersectionality approach is useful for understanding poverty and inequality in the South, particularly considering the high poverty among Southern women, especially Black women (Lofquist et al. 2010; Mattingly 2011). Some scholars have at least highlighted the role of intersections in regional inequalities. For example, in his research on the Black Belt, Wimberley (2008:895) states, "The intersection of race, region and rurality in the South forms a strong pattern and works to the disadvantage of all." Indeed, more intersectional research at varying sub-scale units will help to gain a deeper understanding of regional inequalities and address why certain sub-groups are at a greater disadvantage or more vulnerable depending on where they are geographically.

In sum, these potential avenues for future sociological research pertaining to poverty and inequality in the South and across regions will advance our knowledge on place-based inequalities. Income inequality and poverty in the U.S. have been on the rise, particularly in recent years (Bievens et al. 2014; OCED 2008). This has coincided with a significant rise in concentrated poverty in the South and overall increased regional disparities (Bishaw 2014). Therefore, the need for additional research that considers the importance of place at varying sub-scale units (especially in the South and rural areas) has become even more salient for a comprehensive understanding of persistent spatial inequality in America, and adequately addressing the important question of who gets what, where, and *why*.

Appendix A: Chapter 2 Supplementary Material

Table A1: Descriptive Statistics and Data Sources for Pooled Sample, 2000-2013, N=973,459

Variable	Mean	S.D.	Min.	Max.	Sources
Relative Poverty	0.165	0.372	0	1	Luxemburg Income Study (LIS)
Anchored Poverty	0.159	0.365	0	1	LIS
South Residence	0.308	0.462	0	1	LIS
South2 Residence	0.23	0.42	0	1	LIS
Single Mother	0.107	0.310	0	1	LIS
Single Father	0.410	0.198	0	1	LIS
Female, No Children	0.092	0.298	0	1	LIS
Male, No Children	0.072	0.259	0	1	LIS
Number of Children in HH	1.343	1.37	0	13	LIS
Children Under Age 5 in HH	0.250	0.433	0	1	LIS
Adults Over Age 65 in HH	0.156	.363	0	1	LIS
Age < 25	0.51	.220	0	1	LIS
Age 25-34	0.187	0.390	0	1	LIS
Age 35-44	0.295	0.456	0	1	LIS
Age >54	0.216	0.411	0	1	LIS
Less than High School	0.132	.339	0	1	LIS
College Degree	0.305	0.460	0	1	LIS
Rural Residence	0.266	.442	0	1	LIS
Foreign Born	0.056	0.230	0	1	LIS
No Earners in HH	0.111	0.314	0	1	LIS
Multi-Earners in HH	0.585	0.493	0	1	LIS
GD PPC	48643.26	14987.31	29337	174240	Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA)
Economic Growth	2.698	2.20	-3.5	11.6	BEA
Unemployment	5.92	2.44	2.3	13.7	Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS)
Manufacturing Employment	10.22	4.10	0.18	22.88	BLS

Public Sector Employment					BLS
Black	0.11	0.32	0	1	LIS
Hispanic	0.16	0.37	0	1	LIS
Other Race	0.08	0.27	0	1	LIS
Racial Fractionalization	0.45	0.17	0.066	0.701	U.S. Census Bureau
Democratic Control	50.87	20.94	10	100	University of Kentucky Center for Poverty Research (UKCPR)
Unionization Rate	12.38	5.95	2.8	25.7	Hirsch and Macpherson (2014)
TANF/SNAP Maximum Benefit	853.93	176.39	499	1427	UKCPR
Unemployment Insurance Maximum Benefit	408.07	89.27	220.5	786	Department of Labor

Table A2: Multi-level Linear Probability Models of Poverty with One Independent Variable Group, *N*=973,459

	Unadjusted Model		*Family Demographics*		*Economic Structure*		*Race Composition & Heterogeneity*		*Power Resources*	
	Relative Poverty	*Anchored Poverty*	*Relative Poverty*	*Anchored Poverty*	*Relative Poverty*	*Anchored Poverty*	*Relative Poverty*	*Anchored Poverty*	*Relative Poverty*	*Anchored Poverty*
South	.059***	.057***	.041***	.040***	.030***	.030***	.031***	.030**	.029**	.025***
Single Mother	---	---	.230***	.226***	---	---	---	---	---	---
Single Father	---	---	.056***	.054***	---	---	---	---	---	---
Female, No Children	---	---	.170***	.166***	---	---	---	---	---	---
Male, No Children	---	---	.111***	.109***	---	---	---	---	---	---
# Children	---	---	.035***	.034***	---	---	---	---	---	---
Children Age<5	---	---	.029***	.028***	---	---	---	---	---	---
Adults Over 65	---	---	.016***	.013***	---	---	---	---	---	---
Under Age 25	---	---	.142***	.138***	---	---	---	---	---	---
Age 25-34	---	---	.014***	.013***	---	---	---	---	---	---
Age 35-44	---	---	-.021***	-.020***	---	---	---	---	---	---
Over age 54	---	---	.078***	.077***	---	---	---	---	---	---
Less than H.S.	---	---	.224***	.218***	---	---	---	---	---	---
College Degree	---	---	-.088***	-.084***	---	---	---	---	---	---
Immigrant	---	---	.063***	.060***	---	---	---	---	---	---
Non-metro	---	---	.027***	.025***	---	---	---	---	---	---
Unemployed	---	---	---	---	.257***	.255***	---	---	---	---
Multi-Earners	---	---	---	---	-.188***	-.182***	---	---	---	---
GDPPC	---	---	---	---	$-6.35e^{07}$***	$-.5.70^{e07}$***	---	---	---	---
Economic Growth	---	---	---	---	.0008***	.0009***	---	---	---	---
Manufacturing	---	---	---	---	.0005	.0001	---	---	---	---
Public Sector	---	---	---	---	.004***	.003***	---	---	---	---
Unemployment	---	---	---	---	.005***	.005***	---	---	---	---
Black	---	---	---	---	---	---	.176***	.173***	---	---
Hispanic	---	---	---	---	---	---	.173***	.166***	---	---
Other Race	---	---	---	---	---	---	.067***	.064***	---	---
Racial Frac.	---	---	---	---	---	---	.008	.006	---	---
Democratic Control	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	-.00002	-.00002

Unionization	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	-.002***	-.002***
TANF/SNAP	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	-00006***	-.00006***
Unemp. Insurance	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	-.00004*	-.00005*

Note: All models include year controls.

Table A3: Mixed Multi-Level Linear Probability Full Model for Poverty, N=973,459

	Relative Poverty		Anchored Poverty	
	Coefficient	*Z-score*	*Coefficient*	*Z-score*
South	0.002	0.34	0.0004	0.06
Single Mother	0.129***	115.34	0.127***	114.90
Single Father	0.026***	15.97	0.025***	15.59
Female, No Children	0.073***	59.71	0.071***	58.74
Male, No Children	0.027***	20.28	0.027***	20.66
# Children in in HH	0.031***	100.44	0.030***	98.84
Children < 5 in HH	0.016***	17.8	0.015***	17.64
Adults >65 in HH	-0.094***	-86.20	-0.095***	-88.46
Age < 25	0.160***	100.09	0.155***	98.58
Age 25-34	0.009***	9.14	0.008***	8.35
Age 35-44	-0.023***	-25.76	-0.022***	-25.16
Age >54	-0.024***	-21.83	-0.024***	-22.11
Less than High School	0.164***	158.52	0.160***	156.49
College or More	-0.066***	-88.37	-0.062***	-84.40
Non-Metropolitan	0.030***	34.87	0.028***	33.34
Immigrant	0.030***	20.73	0.029***	20.05
No Earners in HH	0.313***	245.94	0.312***	248.57
Multi-Earners in HH	-0.157***	-210.79	-0.152***	-207.04
GDPPC	0.000***	-4.44	0.000***	-3.69
Economic Growth	0.0008***	3.70	0.0008***	3.71
Unemployment	0.006	12.39	0.006***	12.86
Manufacturing	0.0003	0.58	0.00004	0.08
Public Sector	0.001***	1.83	0.0006	1.07
Black	0.079***	72.61	0.078***	72.84
Latino	0.073***	69.9	0.069***	67.23
Other Race	0.053***	41.26	0.053***	41.17
Racial Fractionalization	-0.012	-0.82	-0.013	-0.93
Democratic Average	-0.00001	-0.25	-0.00002	-0.56
Unionization	-0.001***	-4.24	-0.001***	-4.30
TANF/SNAP	-0.00001	-0.98	-0.00002	-1.54
Unemployment Insurance	-0.00001*	-0.69	-0.00002	-1.89
Year 2004	-0.013***	-7.72	-0.016***	-9.48
Year 2007	0.005*	2.27	-0.001	-0.58
Year 2010	-0.035***	-8.73	-0.031***	-7.94
Year 2013	-0.015***	-3.88	-0.008*	-2.18

****p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05*

Appendix B: Chapter 2 Analyses with Census South

Table B1: Means and Difference Tests Statistics for South and Non-South, 2000-2013

Variables	Census South	Non-South	Z-score	T-score
Family Demographics				
Single Mother	11.87	10.26	23.63	----
Single Father	3.82	4.23	9.63	----
Female, No Children	10.18	8.81	-21.62	----
Male, No Children	7.31	7.21	-1.64[NS]	----
# Children	1.27	1.38	----	34.88
Children < age 5	24.31	25.34	10.77	----
Adults > age 65	16.65	15.19	-18.25	----
Less than High School	15.49	12.22	-43.94	----
College Degree	28.47	31.35	28.60	----
Age < 25	5.34	4.98	-7.60	----
Age 25-34	19.07	18.54	-6.04	----
Age 35-44	28.63	29.94	13.09	----
Age 45-54	22.47	24.25	19.04	----
Age >54	23.00	20.63	-22.96	----
Foreign Born	5.29	5.75	9.11	----
Rural Residence	25.00	27.30	23.72	----
Economic Structure				
No Earners	12.77	10.33	-35.47	----
Multi-Earners	54.09	60.45	58.83	----
GDPPC	48547.22	48686.03	----	-4.22
Economic Growth	2.38	2.84	----	96.57
Manufacturing	7.57	8.35	----	108.00
Public Sector	15.57	13.78		-2.6e+02
Unemployment	5.91	5.88	----	-6.37
Racial Composition & Heterogeneity				
Black	21.27	7.32	-2.0e+02	----
Hispanic	16.57	15.68	-10.98	----
Other Race	4.84	9.30	65.38	----
Racial Fractionalization	50.82	41.21	----	-2.7e+02
Power Resources			----	
Democratic Control	50.32	49.17	----	-1.3e+02
Unionization	6.93	14.58	----	740.08
TANF/SNAP	717.32	932.928	----	611.90
Unemployment Insurance	327.51	404.50	----	366.00
N	299,919	675,540	----	----

Note: Difference tests Ho: Non-South - South = 0. Z-scores for binary variable. T-scores for continuous variables. All differences significant at the p <.001 level unless noted [NS] for non-significant.

Table B2: Census South Coefficients from Multi-Level Linear Probability Models of Poverty, *N*=973,459

Models	Relative Poverty		Anchored Poverty	
	South Coefficient	South Z-Score	South Coefficient	South Z-Score
South-Census (No Covariates)	.056***	(5.52)	.054***	(5.53)
One Variable Groups				
+ FD	.040***	(5.78)	.039***	(5.79)
+ ES	.026***	(3.64)	.026***	(3.76)
+ RCH	.031**	(2.86)	.030**	(2.87)
+ PR	.033**	(3.18)	.029**	(2.89)
Two Variable Groups				
+ FD + ES	.023***	(4.60)	.023***	(4.72)
+ FD + RCH	.029***	(3.95)	.027***	(3.82)
+ FD + PR	.019*	(2.43)	.015*	(2.03)
+ ES + RCH	.017*	(2.47)	.017*	(2.53)
+ ES + PR	.015*	(2.09)	.012*	(1.78)
+ PR + RCH	.008	(0.73)	.004	(0.40)
Three Variable Groups				
+ FD + ES + RCH	.018***	(3.69)	.018**	(3.79)
+ FD + ES + PR	.015**	(2.76)	.013*	(2.41)
+ FD + PR + RCH	.005	(0.61)	.001	(0.19)
+ ES + PR + RCH	.005	(0.77)	.003	(0.43)
Full Model	.009	(1.58)	.006	(1.21)

Note: All models include year controls. Key: FD: Family Demographics, ES: Economic Structure, RCH: Race Composition and Heterogeneity, PR: Power Resources.
****p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05*

Table B3: Multi-level Linear Probability Models of Poverty with One Independent Variable Group (Census South), *N*=973,459

	Unadjusted Model		*Family Demographics*		*Economic Structure*		*Race Composition & Heterogeneity*		*Power Resources*	
	Relative Poverty	*Anchored Poverty*	*Relative Poverty*	*Anchored Poverty*	*Relative Poverty*	*Anchored Poverty*	*Relative Poverty*	*Anchored Poverty*	*Relative Poverty*	*Anchored Poverty*
South (Census)	.056***	.054***	.040***	.039***	.026***	.026***	.031***	.030**	.033***	.029***
Single Mother	---	---	.230***	.226***	---	---	---	---	---	---
Single Father	---	---	.056***	.054***	---	---	---	---	---	---
Female, No Children	---	---	.170***	.166***	---	---	---	---	---	---
Male, No Children	---	---	.111***	.109***	---	---	---	---	---	---
# Children	---	---	.035***	.034***	---	---	---	---	---	---
Children Age<5	---	---	.029***	.028***	---	---	---	---	---	---
Adults over 65	---	---	.016***	.013***	---	---	---	---	---	---
Under age 25	---	---	.142***	.138***	---	---	---	---	---	---
Age 25-34	---	---	.014***	.013***	---	---	---	---	---	---
Age 35-44	---	---	-.021***	-.020***	---	---	---	---	---	---
Over age 54	---	---	.078***	.077***	---	---	---	---	---	---
Less than H.S.	---	---	.224***	.217***	---	---	---	---	---	---
College Degree	---	---	-.088***	-.084***	---	---	---	---	---	---
Immigrant	---	---	.063***	.069***	---	---	---	---	---	---
Rural Residence	---	---	.027***	.025***	---	---	---	---	---	---
Unemployed	---	---	---	---	.256***	.255***	---	---	---	---
Multi-Earners	---	---	---	---	-.188***	-.182***	---	---	---	---
GDPPC	---	---	---	---	-7.08e^{-07}***	-6.43e^{-07}***	---	---	---	---
Economic Growth	---	---	---	---	.0008***	.0009***	---	---	---	---
Manufacturing	---	---	---	---	.0001	-.0003	---	---	---	---
Public Sector	---	---	---	---	.003***	.003***	---	---	---	---
Unemployment	---	---	---	---	.005***	.005***	---	---	---	---
Black	---	---	---	---	---	---	.176***	.176***	---	---
Hispanic	---	---	---	---	---	---	.173***	.173***	---	---
Other Race	---	---	---	---	---	---	.067***	.066***	---	---
Racial Frac.	---	---	---	---	---	---	.003	.003	---	---

Democratic Control	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	-.00002	-.00002
Unionization	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	-.002***	-.002***
TANF/SNAP	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	.00005***	-.00006***
Unemp. Insurance	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	.00002*	-.00004**

*Note: All models include year controls. ***p< .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05*

Table B4: Multi-Level Linear Probability Full Model for Poverty (Census-South),

	Relative Poverty		Anchored Poverty	
	Coefficient	*Z-score*	*Coefficient*	*Z-score*
South (Census)	.010	(1.58)	.006	(1.21)
Single Mother	.129***	(115.34)	.127***	(114.9)
Single Father	.026***	(15.97)	.025***	(15.59)
Female, No Children	.073***	(59.71)	.071***	(58.74)
Male, No Children	.027***	(20.29)	.027***	(20.66)
# Children in in HH	.031***	(100.44)	.030***	(98.85)
Children < 5 in HH	.016***	(17.80)	.015***	(17.64)
Adults >65 in HH	-.094***	(-86.20)	-.095***	(-88.46)
Age < 25	.160***	(100.09)	.155***	(98.58)
Age 25-34	.009***	(9.14)	.008***	(8.35)
Age 35-44	-.023***	(-25.76)	-.022***	(-25.16)
Age >54	-.024***	(-21.82)	-.024***	(-22.11)
Less than High School	.164***	(158.51)	.160***	(156.48)
College Degree	-.066***	(-88.37)	-.062***	(-84.4)
Rural	.030***	(34.87)	.028***	(33.34)
Foreign-Born	.030***	(20.73)	.029***	(20.05)
No Earners in HH	.313***	(245.94)	.312***	(248.57)
Multi-Earners in HH	-.157***	(-210.78)	-.152***	(-207.04)
GDPPC	-4.90e-07***	(-4.63)	3.91e-07***	(-3.82)
Economic Growth	.0008***	(3.84)	.0008***	(3.83)
Unemployment	.006***	(12.49)	.006***	(12.94)
Manufacturing	.0001	(0.43)	.00004	(-0.08)
Public Sector	.0009	(1.49)	.0005	(0.81)
Black	.079***	(72.58)	.078***	(72.81)
Latino	.073***	(69.91)	.070***	(67.25)
Other Race	.053***	(41.27)	.053***	(41.19)
Racial Fractionalization	-.016	(-1.20)	-.017	(-1.32)
Democratic Average	-.00001	(-0.40)	-.00002	(-0.69)
Unionization	-.001***	(-4.05)	-.001***	(-4.11)
TANF/SNAP	-.000006	(-0.60)	-.00001	(-1.17)
Unemployment Insur.	-.000006	(-0.54)	-.00002	(-1.76)
Year 2004	-.014***	(-7.88)	-.016***	(-9.63)
Year 2007	.005*	(2.10)	-.002	(-0.74)
Year 2010	-.036***	(-8.93)	-.032***	(-8.12)
Year 2013	-.016***	(-4.10)	-.009*	(-2.38)

****p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05*

Table B5: Decomposition of South/Non-South Poverty Difference (Census-South)

	Relative Poverty		Anchored Poverty	
Non-South	.1521		.1450	
South (Census)	.1975		.1903	
Difference	-.0463		-.0453	
Relative Contribution to Difference	***Coef***	***%***	***Coef***	***%***
Family Demographics	-.0029***	6.26	-.0014***	3.09
	(-12.27)		(-6.18)	
Economic Structure	-.0226***	48.81	-.0226***	49.89
	(-36.97)		(-37.18)	
Racial Composition/Heterogeneity	.0006	-1.30	.00004	-0.88
	(0.84)		(0.06)	
Power Resources	-.0266***	57.45	-.0249***	54.97
	(-10.44)		(-9.91)	
Year 2004	-.00007	0.15	-.00007*	0.15
	(-1.96)		(-1.81)	
Year 2007	-.00002	0.04	.00002	-0.04
	(-0.98)		(0.69)	
Year 2010	.0002	-0.43	.0003	-0.66
	(1.21)		(1.55)	
Year 2013	.0002**	-0.43	.0002*	-0.44
	(2.99)		(2.40)	
All Variables Included (Total Explained)	-.0510	110.56	-.0465	107.84

****p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05*

Appendix C: Chapter 3 Supplementary Material

Table C1: Linear Probability Model of Anchored Poverty in the South, Pooled Sample, N=217,520

	Coefficient	*T-score*
Marital Status (Ref: Married)		
Single Mother	.131***	(10.86)
Single Father	.033***	(4.37)
Female No Kid	.087***	(11.77)
Male, No Kid	.032***	(6.16)
# Kids in in HH	.036***	(21.04)
Children < 5 in HH (Ref: No)	.019**	(4.46)
Adults >65 in HH (Ref: No)	-.036***	(-7.86)
Age (Ref: 45-54)		
Age < 25	.153***	(30.93)
Age 25-34	.008	(2.35)
Age 35-44	-.017***	(-5.74)
Age 55-64	-.001***	(-0.41)
Age 65-74	-.103***	(-14.93)
Age > 74	-.153**	(-27.77)
Education (Ref: HS Grad/Some College)		
Less than High School	.165***	(24.37)
College or More	-.078***	(-18.03)
Rural Residence (Ref: No)	.037***	(6.40)
Foreign-Born (Ref: No)	.045***	(7.77)
Unemployed HH (Ref: No)	.369***	(39.60)
Multi-Earner HH (Ref: No)	-.175***	(-14.93)
GDPPC	-4.95^{e-07}	(0.72)
Economic Growth	.001	(0.88)
Manufacturing	.001	(0.85)
Public Sector	-.0004	(-0.34)
Unemployment	.009*	(2.94)
Race (Ref: Non-Hispanic White)		
Black	.074***	(11.14)
Other Race	.026***	(5.48)
Hispanic	.067***	(10.15)
Racial Fractionalization	-.026	(-0.56)
Democratic Control	.0002	(1.07)

Unionization	-.0008	(-0.42)
TANF/SNAP	-.00009	(-1.21)
Unemployment Insurance	-.00006	(-1.14)

*Note: All models include year controls. ***p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05*

Table C2: Linear Probability Models of Anchored Poverty in the Deep South and Peripheral South

	Model 1:Deep South		Model 2: Peripheral South	
	Coef.	*T-score*	*Coef.*	*T-score*
Marital Status (Ref: Married)				
Single Mother	.157**	(7.51)	.120***	(11.61)
Single Father	.037*	(4.37)	.031***	(3.28)
Female No Children	.105**	(9.09)	.081***	(10.97)
Male, No Children	.046*	(4.15)	.027***	(6.45)
Number of Children in HH	.041***	(18.47)	.034***	(21.07)
Children < 5 in HH (Ref: No)	.016	(2.65)	.021***	(3.70)
Adults >65 in HH (Ref: No)	-.021	(-1.69)	-.042***	(-9.82)
Age (Ref: 45-54)				
Age < 25	.152***	(16.56)	.152***	(23.58)
Age 25-34	-.006	(-0.93)	.012**	(4.58)
Age 35-44	-.025**	(-4.80)	-.014**	(-4.58)
Age 55-65	-.001	(-0.14)	-.001	(-0.33)
Age 66-74	-.130**	(-7.45)	-.092***	(-21.35)
Age >74	-.173***	(-16.52)	-.145***	(-20.79)
Education (Ref: HS Grad/Some College)				
Less than High School	.185***	(38.29)	.157***	(24.29)
College or More	-.086***	(-24.85)	-.075***	(-14.14)
Rural Residence (Ref: No)	.026***	(11.16)	.042***	(4.43)
Foreign-Born (Ref: No)	.045*	(3.57)	.047**	(7.08)
Unemployed HH (Ref: No)	.387***	(53.56)	.359***	(27.65)
Multi-Earner HH (Ref: No)	-.156***	(-18.24)	-.181***	(-12.70)
GDPPC	$5.50e^{-06}$	(1.79)	$-1.45e^{-06}$*	(-3.84)
Economic Growth	.003	(1.51)	.0006	(0.32)
Manufacturing	.003	(0.60)	.004	(1.77)
Public Sector	-.0009	(-0.19)	.001	(0.53)
Unemployment	.021	(2.11)	.007*	(2.59)
Race (Ref: Non-Hispanic White)				
Black	.074***	(7.14)	.071***	(8.51)
Other Race	.030***	(2.93)	.023***	(4.61)
Hispanic	.065***	(3.96)	.069***	(9.08)
Racial Fractionalization	.049	(0.64)	.084	(1.15)
Democratic Control	.0003	(0.88)	.0001	(0.52)
Unionization	.002	(1.21)	-.0012	(-0.29.)

TANF/SNAP	-.0005*	(-3.58)	-3.60e^{-07}	(-0.01)
Unemployment Insurance	-.0002	(-0.86)	-.00006	(-0.81)
N	155,558		61,962	

*Note: All models include year controls. ***p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05*



Figure C1: Democratic Control by South Sub-Region, 2000-2013



Figure C2: Citizen Political Ideology by South Sub-Region, 2000-2013

Appendix D: Chapter 4 Supplementary Material



Figure D1: Relative Poverty Rates for Whites and Blacks in the South by State, 2000-2013



Figure D2: Anchored Poverty Rates by for Southern Whites and Blacks by State, 2000-2013

Table D1: Descriptive Statistics for Total Sample, Blacks, and Whites, 2000-2013

	Total Sample		Blacks Only		Whites Only	
	Mean	***SD***	**Mean**	***SD***	**Mean**	***SD***
Relative Poverty	.195	.396	.122	.327	.307	.461
Anchored Poverty	.187	.390	.117	.322	.297	.457
Historical Racial regimes	.309	.502	.355	.493	.518	.486
Single Mother	.116	.319	.070	.256	.232	.422
Single Father	.036	.187	.322	.177	.038	.192
Female, No Children	.096	.294	.085	.280	.158	.365
Male, No Children	.069	.254	.064	.245	.085	.278
Number of Children in HH	1.284	1.328	1.183	1.229	1.269	1.406
Children < Age 5 in HH	.246	.430	.219	.413	.230	.421
Adults > Age 65 in HH	.162	.368	.171	.377	.175	.380
Age < 25	.050	.218	.038	.192	.061	.239
Age 25-34	.190	.392	.165	.371	.195	.396
Age 35-44	.293	.455	.294	.256	.262	.440
Age 55-64	11.91	.324	.126	.332	.132	.396
Age 65-74	.060	.237	.069	.254	.062	.241
Age > 74	.047	.212	.057	.232	.047	.213
Less than High School	.162	.369	.091	.287	.179	.383
College Degree	.277	.448	.344	.475	.181	.384
Rural Residence	.232	.422	.262	.440	.264	.441
Foreign-Born	.184	.387	.050	.219	.078	.268
Black	.204	.402	--	--	--	--
Other Race	.048	.214	--	--	--	--
Hispanic	.206	.405	--	--	.021	.144
Part-time HH	.068	.240	12.70	.056	.062	.241
Unemployed HH	.076	.264	.082	.274	.101	.302
Retired Adult in HH	.143	.351	.157	.364	.145	.352
Multiple Earners HH	.555	.496	.583	.545	.452	.498
N	208,076		114,607		42,267	

Table D2: Data Sources for State-Level Historic Racial Regime Measures

Historic Racial Regimes	Source
Slavery Population (1860)	U.S. Census Bureau: https://www.census.gov/prod/www/decennial.html
% Black Sharecroppers (1930, 1935, 1940)	U.S. Department of Agriculture Historical Archive http://agcensus.mannlib.cornell.edu/
Southern Manifesto Supporters	*Congressional Record*. 1956. March 12. 84th Congress Second Session. Vol. 102, part 4. Washington, D.C.: Governmental Printing Office. 4459-4460. Members of 84th Congress: Office of the Historian, http://history.house.gov/Congressional-Overview/Profiles/84th/_1965
1965 Voting Act Opposes	GovTrac: https://www.govtrack.us/congress/votes

Table D3: Linear Probability Models of Anchored Poverty in the South, 2000-2013, *N*=208,076

	Model 1		***Model 2***		***Model 3***	
	Coef.	***SE***	***Coef.***	***SE***	***Coef.***	***SE***
Historical Racial Regimes	.005	.017	.009	.005	.004	.004
Black x Race Regimes					.023	.016
Race						
(Ref: Non-Hispanic White)						
Black			.079***	.007	.068***	.008
Other			.032**	.005	.031***	.005
Hispanic			.066***	.007	.064***	.007
Marital Status						
(Ref: Married)						
Single Mother			.126***	.012	.126***	.012
Single Father			.029**	.009	.029**	.009
Female No Children			.061***	.006	.061***	.006
Male, No Children			.010*	.003	.010*	.004
# Children in in HH			.036***	.002	.036***	.002
Children < 5 in HH			.017**	.004	.017**	.004
Adults >65 in HH			-.043***	.005	-.044***	.005
Age (Ref: 45-54)						
Age < 25			.121***	.006	.121***	.007
Age 25-34			-.002***	.004	-.001	.006
Age 35-44			-.024***	.004	-.026***	.004
Age 55-64			.015*	.006	.013**	.004
Age 65-74			.011	.007	.014	.007
Age >74			.024**	.005	.025**	.005
Rural Residence			.044***	.007	.047***	.007
Foreign-Born			.038***	.006	.038***	.006
Education of HoH						
(Ref: High School Grad						
Some College)						
Less than High School			.171***	.008	.171***	.009
College or More			-.079***	.003	-.079***	.004
Employment Status HoH						
(Ref: Full-time)						
Part-time HoH			.139***	.009	.139***	.009
Unemployed HoH			.282***	.012	.282***	.012
Retired in HH			-.039***	.006	-.039***	.006
Multiple Earner HH			-.206***	.010	-.205***	.010

*Note: All models include year controls. ***p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05*

Table D4: Binary Decomposition of the Black-White (Anchored) Poverty Gap, 2000-2013, *N*=208,076

	Anchored Poverty	
White Poverty	.117	
Black Poverty	.2968	
White-Black Difference	-.1794	
Relative Contribution to Difference	***Coef.***	***%***
Historical Racial Regimes	-.003***	1.77
Single Mother	-.022***	15.78
Single Father	.000***	-0.02
Female Head, No Children	- .007***	5.18
Male Head, No Children	-.0007***	.58
Number of Children	-.0008***	6.75
Children under Age 5	.000**	.44
Adults over Age 65	-.001**	.94
Under Age 25	-.002***	1.93
Age 25-34	.001***	-1.16
Age 35-44	-.001***	.78
Age 55-64	.0001	.15
Age 65-74	.001****	-.52
Over Age 74	.001***	-.77
Immigrant Head	-.001***	.49
Rural Residence	.0003*	.24
Less than High School	-.013***	11.51
College Degree	-.020***	16.71
Part-time	- .003***	2.37
Unemployed	-.012***	6.79
Retired Adult	.001***	.75
Multiple Earners	-.037***	29.43
Year 2004	.000***	.35
Year 2007	.000	.00
Year 2010	.001***	-.40
Year 2013	.000	-.02
All Variables (Total Explained)	-.119	66.14

$^{***}p < .001$, $^{**}p < .01$, $^{*}p < .05$, $^{\dagger}p < .1$

Table D5: Linear Probability Models of Anchored Poverty among Blacks and Whites in the South, 2000-2013

	Blacks Only				Whites Only			
	Model 1		*Model 2*		*Model 3*		*Model 4*	
	Coef.	*SE*	*Coef.*	*SE*	*Coef.*	*SE*	*Coef.*	*SE*
Historical Racial Regimes	.067*	.023	.013	.016	.016	.016	.008	.006
Marital Status (Ref: Married)								
Single Mother			.127***	.018			.126***	.011
Single Father			.012	.016			.056**	.152
Female No Children			.085***	.011			.064***	.007
Male, No Children			.021*	.008			.022**	.006
# Children in HH			.057***	.003			.023***	.003
Children < 5 in HH			.032**	.011			.012*	.004
Adults >65 in HH			-.065***	.018			-.037**	.008
Age (Ref: 45-54)								
Age < 25			.112***	.016			.133***	.011
Age 25-34			-.040**	.010			-.010	.007
Age 35-44			-.030***	.009			-.019	.004
Age 55-64			.018	.009			.011	.005
Age 65-74			.065**	.021			-.006	.009
Age >74			.089**	.016			.002	.011
Rural Residence			.057***	.011			.043***	.005
Foreign-Born			.022*	.008			.029*	.012
Education of HoH (Ref: H.S. Grad./Some College)								
Less than High School			.171***	.008			.170***	.011
College or More			-.125***	.009			-.065***	.004
Employment Status HH (Ref: Full-time)								
Part-time HoH			.134***	.017			.107***	.032
Unemployed HoH			.323***	.011			.229***	.017
Retired in HH			-.043**	.012			-.024***	.010
Multiple Earner HH			-.279***	.015			-.131***	.008
N			42,267				114,607	

*Note: All models include year controls. *** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05, † p <.1*

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Biography

Regina Smalls Baker was born September 12, 1984 in Savannah, Georgia. She received a Bachelor of Arts in Sociology and the Program in Leadership and Community Service from Mercer University in 2007 and a Master of Social Work with a concentration in Community Empowerment and Program Development and a Certificate in Non-Profit Organizations from the University of Georgia in 2009. She pursued further graduate studies at Duke University, where she received a Master of Arts in Sociology in 2012. She will receive her Ph.D. in Sociology from Duke University in September 2015. While at Duke University, Regina authored/co-authored three peer-reviewed journals publications:

- Regina S. Baker. (Forthcoming 2015). "The Changing Association among Marriage, Work, and Child Poverty in the U.S., 1974-2010." Journal of Marriage and Family.
- Brady, David, Regina S. Baker, and Ryan Finnegan. 2013. "When Unionization Disappears: State Level Unionization and Working Poverty in the U.S." American Sociological Review 78(5): 872-896.
- Burton, Linda M., Daniel T. Lichter, Regina S. Baker, and John Eason. 2013. "Inequalities, Family Processes, and Health in a 'New' Rural America." American Behavioral Scientist 57(8): 1127-1150.

Regina also received several fellowships while attending Duke: a Ford Foundation Dissertation Fellowship (2014-15), an American Sociological Association Minority Fellowship (2013-14), a Sulzburger-Levitan Graduate Research Fellowship in Social Policy from Duke University's Center of Family and Child Policy (2012-13), a Graduate Fellowship from the Kenan Institute of Ethics (2012-13), and Summer Graduate Research Fellowships from the Duke University Graduate School (2012, 2013).

She is a member of several professional organizations including the American Sociological Association, Southern Sociological Society, Sociologists for Women in Society, and Sociologists for Women in Society—South.

Regina recently moved to Philadelphia, PA to continue her career as a Tenure-Track Assistant Professor in the Department of Sociology at the University of Pennsylvania beginning July 2016.