

Rebel Interdependence: Essays on Ethnic Mobilization, Competition, and Inclusion

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Dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy in the Department of Political Science
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ABSTRACT

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Abstract

Ethnic groups within and beyond national borders are interdependent. They are connected via kindred, shared experiences, shared geographic spaces, and so on. How do these interdependencies among ethnic groups affect their mobilizations against their governments, their competition toward one another, and their pursuit of power-sharing and political inclusion? This dissertation views ethnic groups as interdependent actors. It specifically investigates how ethnic interdependence affects subsequent mobilization, competition, and inclusion. It contains three distinct but related essays. The first essay examines the impact of interstate hostility on the risk of ethnic civil wars through the lens of trans-border ethnic kin (TEK) groups. It finds that militarized dispute between a *state-at-risk* and an *external state* increases the likelihood of ethnic wars in the state-at-risk. Moreover, this effect is not conditional on its TEK group's access to power in the external state. The second essay considers how ethnic competition at a subnational level related to the surrounding area of an ethnic group affects the risk of ethnic conflict. It argues that local competition provides opportunities for strategic exploitation by governments, thereby undermining the collective capabilities of potential rebellions and creating co-opted groups with governments. The analysis shows that ethnic groups in areas where local ethnic competition is high are less likely to fight with governments, especially for territorial conflicts. The final essay of this dissertation examines how interdependencies via similar experiences and shared spaces affect an ethnic group's political inclusion in

the center. It argues that similarities in experience help governments learn and assess the consequences of granting concessions to other aggrieved groups, thereby producing an intrastate diffusion of political inclusion. In brief, this dissertation contributes to our understanding of the consequences of interdependence among ethnic groups in ethnic politics in the contemporary world.

To my parents.

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List of Abbreviations

Abbreviations

TEK	Transnational ethnic kin, also known as trans-border ethnic kin.
EPR	Ethnic Power Relation
MAR	Minority At Risk
IR	International relations
MID	Militarized interstate dispute
COW	Correlates of War
GROW ^{up}	Geographical Research On War, Unified Platform
TSSC	Time-Series Cross-Sectional
CIs	Confidence intervals
CINC	Composite Index of National Capability

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Introduction

This dissertation project centers on how interdependencies of ethnic groups both within and beyond national borders influence their mobilization, competition, and political inclusion. Interdependence is a ubiquitous phenomenon in ethnic conflict and ethnic politics. Groups are connected through kindred ties, shared languages, religions, similar experiences—both positive and negative—and shared geographic spaces. These interdependencies have profound implications for the behaviors of relevant actors in ethnic politics as well as for the scientific study of ethnic conflict. However, existing research has devoted insufficient attention to questions on how interdependencies shape and are shaped by interactions among groups either theoretically or empirically. Relying upon group-level data on the interdependencies among ethnic groups, this dissertation thus aims to contribute to our understanding of the consequences of interdependent ethnic groups on conflict mobilization and their subsequent political inclusion.


1.1 Motivations

As depicted in Figure 1.1, ethnic groups are connected within countries as well as beyond national borders. At the international level, the most prominent type of interdependencies among ethnic groups is trans-border ethnic kin (TEK) groups (Chen, Beardsley and Weidmann, 2019). Consider, for example, the Russians in Ukraine and the Russians in the Russian Federation, or the Malay Muslims in Southern Thailand and their kin in Malaysia. The presence of TEK groups in those countries provides pathways through which kin groups, as well as their respective host countries, affect political bargaining among each other (Chen, Beardsley and Weidmann, 2019, Han, O’Mahoney and Paik, 2014). TEK groups are especially concerning when the interstate relations between host countries become hostile, and when, as a consequence, ethnic civil wars often become “international politics by other means” (Carment and James, 1997, Fearon and Laitin, 2008, Toukan, 2019).

However, with only a few exceptions (see, Cederman et al., 2013, Cunningham, 2016, Thyne, 2006, Toukan, 2017), most existing studies focus on the decision calculus of external states and through what means they choose to intervene in civil wars (Huang, 2016, 91). As a result, there has been little adequate treatment of international politics in aggregate models in the study of sub-national conflicts (Kalyvas and Kenny, 2009). Questions such as how interstate hostility between two host states shapes the risk of ethnic rebellion in both countries remain unresolved in large-N statistical studies.

At the domestic level, interdependencies among ethnic groups are even more ubiquitous and have profound implications. Within multiethnic countries, closer geographic distances among groups lead to more interdependencies, thereby yielding both potentially conflictual and cooperative interactions among ethnic groups. In multiethnic societies, both governments and minority groups can be strategic actors

FIGURE 1.1: The geographic distribution of ethnic groups and their trans-border kindred ties



Note: Figure 1.1 displays the geographic distribution of ethnic groups as well as the kindred ties among ethnic groups, with red areas denoting group settlement areas and blue colors denoting group settlement borders. The centroid locations of the ethnic groups are marked with black points, while distances between kindred groups are connected with steel-blue colored lines. I only plot regional based groups. Data on locations of ethnic groups are from Vogt et al. (2015).

and take into consideration interdependencies in the processes of political mobilization and political inclusion. On the one hand, interdependencies among ethnic groups may create competition among them in a locality. This competition is especially concerning in some multiethnic societies where ethnically diverse groups reside in the same regions and compete for scarce resources. The leading theories of ethnic rebellion often stress “distributional conflict between the national capital and the geographic periphery” (Lacina, 2015, 692). Nevertheless, in the case where groups compete with each other, the conventional assumption of the center versus periphery may no longer explain the variations in government responses. It might be possible that ethnic competition can provide strategic opportunities for governments to exploit local ethnic competition, which, in turn, may profoundly influence the way in which governments respond to some group demands, be it with concessions or with

violence.

On the other hand, domestic interdependencies among ethnic groups can provide vital information on the behaviors of other similar groups. Domestic groups share some similarities in their geographic spaces, languages, religions, and experiences. These similarities contain information that may be used by governments to determine and assess the consequences of granting political concessions to different excluded groups. Similar to the diffusion of policy innovation, governments can learn the potential risks of granting political inclusion. This learning process also has profound implications for the study of ethnic inclusion. Since almost all the recent studies on ethnic conflict have found that political exclusion leads to higher conflict risk while political power-sharing can reduce the risk of conflict (e.g., Bormann et al., 2019, Wucherpfennig, Hunziker and Cederman, 2016), understanding how political inclusion within countries is affected by the interdependencies among similar ethnic groups will help explain the causes and assess the consequences of ethnic inclusion/exclusion in the contemporary world.

1.2 Research Questions

This dissertation aims to address these questions. It consists of three stand-alone essays that examine ethnic mobilizations as a result of transnational ethnic ties, ethnic conflict due to local competition, and intrastate diffusion of ethnic inclusion. Specifically, this dissertation asks three research questions:

First, why do some ethnic groups with TEK groups engage in civil conflicts with their governments while others that also share transnational ethnic ties remain peaceful? Specifically, under what conditions can interstate hostility between two states that share ethnic ties affect the risk of ethnic rebellion in one country? This question will be examined in the first essay (Chapter 2), “Interstate Hostility, Trans-border Ethnic Kin, and the Onset of Civil War.”

Second, how does national-level ethnic diversity affect local ethnic competition, and how do governments of multiethnic societies strategically exploit local competition to deter ethnic rebellion? The second essay (Chapter 3), “Ethnic Diversity, Local Competition, and Separatist Conflict,” will mainly investigate this question.

Third, do ethnic rebellions lead to the inclusion of groups beyond those who rebelled? How does ethnic inclusion diffuse within states? These will be the central questions in the third essay (Chapter 4), “In the Shadow of Rebellion: The Intrastate Diffusion of Ethnic Inclusion.”

While all three essays use group-level data and concentrate on the group–government interactions, the first essay mainly investigates interactions across national borders through a transnational lens. In this sense, Chapter 2 aims to bridge international conflict with domestic conflict. In contrast, Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 mainly focus on the domestic politics of ethnic conflict, while factoring out the international influence in ethnic politics. Nevertheless, this does not mean that international influence cannot factor in economic competition and economic inclusion. In fact, there are also increasing scholarship interest in how international politics factor into domestic inter-group comparisons (Chen, Beardsley and Weidmann, 2019) and political power-sharing (Cederman, Gleditsch and Wucherpfennig, 2018). In other words, Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 supplement the existing literature on these issues but provide very different perspectives.

In the following Chapters 2-4, I will present more details on how I answer these questions in turn, and on why they are important for us to understand ethnic rebellion through the lens of rebel interdependencies. I will conclude in Chapter 5 with a summary of my findings in each essay as well as with a brief discussion on the implications for future study.

Interstate Hostility, Trans-border Ethnic Kin, and the Onset of Civil War

2.1 Introduction

Many countries have ethnic kin residing across their borders (Siroky and Hale, 2017, 117). More than 60% of the 853 ethnic groups within the ethnic power relations (EPR) dataset (Vogt et al., 2015), had at least one politically relevant ethnic group in another state(s) during the 1946-2013 period, as illustrated in Figure 2.1. Recent studies on ethnonationalist civil wars have thus increasingly emphasized the effect of external support from TEK groups on the dynamics of civil wars (e.g., Cederman, Gleditsch and Buhaug, 2013, Cederman et al., 2013, Cederman, Girardin and Gleditsch, 2009, Forsberg, 2014*b*, Gartzke and Gleditsch, 2006, Gleditsch, Salehyan and Schultz, 2008, Konaev and Brathwaite, 2019, Saideman and Ayres, 2012).¹ However, it remains puzzling why some ethnic groups with transnational ethnic linkages become engaged in civil conflicts with their governments while others that also share transnational ethnic ties remain peaceful, provided that all ethnic groups, at least in theory, could count on support from their TEK groups (Cederman, Gleditsch and


¹ In this chapter, I use the terms “ethnonationalist civil war” and “civil war” interchangeably.

Buhaug, 2013, 119). For example, the Kurds in Turkey and Iraq have cooperated in violent separatist activities against the governments in their respective countries, whereas the ethnic Han Chinese in Southeast Asian countries, where they were relatively wealthier (Cederman, Weidmann and Gleditsch, 2011) than their ethnic kin in China were surprisingly peaceful (Cederman, Gleditsch and Buhaug, 2013), even in the face of discrimination policies against Han Chinese.² Even groups with the same transnational ethnic kin display contrasting patterns in terms of conflict propensities. For instance, despite shared kin ethnicity with transborder ethnic Russians in Russia, ethnic Russians in Ukraine and Georgia are increasingly engaged in secessionism, while ethnic Russians in Kazakhstan, China, and Uzbekistan are not. What explains the variation in conflict propensities among these groups with transnational ethnic linkages, and under what conditions are groups with transnational ethnic kin more likely to experience civil wars?

Most existing work on transnational ethnic kin and civil wars focuses on whether ethnic groups in civil wars are likely to receive intervention or support from their transnational ethnic kin or how these actions may shape conflict outcomes (Davis and Moore, 1997, Forsberg, 2014*b*, Haynes, 2015, Petersen, 2004, Yazici, 2018). These studies have provided vital insights on the role of TEK groups in civil wars but have largely overlooked these TEK groups' potential effect on the outbreak of civil wars in the first place (Cederman, Gleditsch and Buhaug, 2013, 121). Although existing quantitative research remains limited, some evidence suggests that under certain circumstance, TEK groups can increase the probabilities of civil conflicts, depending on the relative size and access to power of the TEK groups (Cederman et al., 2013, Cederman, Girardin and Gleditsch, 2009). For example, Cederman et al. (2013) find that ethnic groups with too-small or too-large TEK groups are associated

² Cederman, Weidmann and Gleditsch (2011) predict ethnic groups relatively wealthier than other groups or suffered from discrimination are more likely to rebel.

FIGURE 2.1: Ethnic groups with transnational ethnic kin, 1946-2013



Note: Figure 2.1 shows the distributions of TEK count that a group has at the group level. Around 60% of the 853 EPR groups has at least one politically relevant TEK group in other state(s) during the period from 1946-2013. Because the unit of analysis in EPR is group-year, this distribution is aggregated at the group level. The data are from Vogt et al. (2015).

with decreasing probabilities of civil wars, while the presence of intermediate-sized TEK groups can increase the risk of civil wars between the ethnic groups and the incumbent governments. While it is useful to focus on a TEK group’s demographic features when explaining the outbreak of civil war, Cederman et al. (2013) ignore the impact of interstate relations between the two states that share ethnic ties on the onset of an ethnonationalist civil war; thus, it is difficult to fully explain the variation in conflict propensities among ethnic groups.

In this paper, I intend to re-introduce international politics to the study of TEK and civil war onset. Specifically, I investigate how international hostility between two states that share transnational ethnic ties affects the risk of ethnonationalist civil war in one of the two states. For convenience purposes, I use “external state” to refer the state where the TEK group lives and “state-at-risk” to refer to the state that is at risk

of civil war with an internal marginalized ethnic group.³ The marginalized *ethnic group* in the *state-at-risk* shares kindred ties with the TEK group in the *external state*. In other words, this paper examines how interstate hostility between a state-at-risk and an external state affects the risk of civil war between the marginalized ethnic group and the government of the state-at-risk. Here, we can use Ukraine and Russia as examples of the state-at-risk and the external state, respectively. Within Ukraine (i.e., the state-at-risk), the ethnic challenger group is the Russian minority. In theory, this group can expect support from its TEK group in Russia (i.e., the external state), where Russians control the external state. Because groups cannot fight with themselves, I exclude the ethnic group–state-at-risk dyads when the ethnic groups are in power. Therefore, ethnic groups such as Russians in Russia will not be in the sample, but Russians in Ukraine will.

In contrast to Cederman et al. (2013), I argue that conflictual interstate relations can increase the risk of civil war in the state-at-risk, regardless of whether the TEK group controls the external state. Previous work almost exclusively assumes that external support comes only from the TEK group. Therefore, the risk of civil war will increase if the TEK group is willing and able to support the ethnic group; otherwise, the risk of civil war will decrease. In particular, previous work finds a conflict-dampening effect when the TEK group controls the external state, as the incumbent TEK group will restrain itself from interfering in the state-at-risk’s internal affairs (Cederman et al., 2013). In the presence of interstate hostility, however, the ethnic challenger group in the state-at-risk can expect external assistance both from its TEK group and from the external state. On one hand, if the TEK group is not the only dominant group or part of the government coalition in the external state (Cederman, Girardin and Gleditsch, 2009, 413), hostile interstate relations can provide it with a

³ Throughout the paper, I use the terms, *ethnic group* and *challenger group*, interchangeably. By definition, the *ethnic group* is not in dominant status in the state-at-risk as it cannot fight with itself.

source of outside support other than the TEK group itself by motivating the external state to support it. It is in the external state's interest to support the ethnic group in order to undermine the state-at-risk and substitute direct hostilities with action through the ethnic challenger group (Salehyan, Gleditsch and Cunningham, 2011). On the other hand, even if the TEK group controls the external state, its prior concerns regarding international norms of territory integrity or the fear of losing too much territory (Cederman et al., 2013) will be less likely to play a role when its relationship with the state-at-risk becomes hostile. Thus, the conflict-dampening effect may no longer exist in the presence of international hostility. For the ethnic group, an increase in the expectation of external support resulting from interstate hostility can increase its likelihood of making extreme demands of the state-at-risk's incumbent government. As such, the ethnic group in the state-at-risk can still expect external support regardless of whether the TEK group controls the external state.

Using the EPR data from the 1946–2013 period, I find supportive evidence for these arguments. Militarized disputes between the external state and the state-at-risk increase the risk of civil war between the challenger group and the state-at-risk, and this effect is independent of the TEK group's access to power in the external state. In doing so, this paper makes an important contribution to the literature on TEK and civil war onset. Specifically, it provides both theoretical and empirical linkages between international politics and civil war in the framework of transnational ethnic ties. International conflict and civil war are often studied separately (Cunningham and Lemke, 2013) even though scholars have long intuitively suspected that there is a connection between them and indicated that progress can be made on the study of civil wars by “thinking about civil wars as *international politics by other means*” (Fearon and Laitin, 2008, 20).⁴ Indeed, as Wolff (2003) argued, in the presence of a TEK group, the interstate relationship shapes, and is,

⁴ Emphasis in original.

in turn, shaped by the relationship each of the two states has with the co-ethnic group. Therefore, transnational ethnic ties involving an external state and a state-at-risk provide a natural entry point to examine how interstate relations affect the risk of internal conflict in one state or the other. Existing work on TEK group and interstate relations focuses mainly on how such transnational ethnic ties influence the (mostly conflictual) relations between states or how states intervene in ethnic civil wars on behalf of either an ethnic group or the government (see Cetinyan, 2002, Cunningham, 2016, Grigoryan, 2010, 2015, Thyne, 2009). By focusing on the interstate relations rather than the demographic features of TEK groups, this paper adds further constraints to the condition in which large state-controlling TEK groups can generate the conflict-dampening effect in Cederman et al. (2013). When interstate relations become hostile, such a deterrent effect of TEK ties may no longer exist, and instead, ethnonationalist civil wars will be more likely to break out in the state-at-risk. This paper therefore contributes to the literature on the impact of international politics on initial ethnonationalist civil war onset in the context of transnational ethnic ties.

2.2 Literature Review

Existing studies on TEK and civil wars have focused exclusively on how the existence of TEK affects the processes and outcomes of civil wars, especially on how outside states with shared ethnic ties intervene in ongoing civil wars (e.g., Davis and Moore, 1997, Haynes, 2015, Lum et al., 2013, Saideman, 2002). In terms of the linkage between TEK and interstate relations, most existing work focuses on the impact of TEK on interstate relations, such as how the existence of TEK increases the risk of interstate conflict between an external state and a state-at-risk, emphasizing the irredentist aspect of the TEK group (e.g., Ambrosio, 2001, Goemans and Schultz, 2017, Saideman, 1998, Saideman and Ayres, 2000, 2012, Siroky and Hale, 2017).

However, these studies focus mainly on the impact of TEK on the dynamics of civil wars, rarely investigating how interstate relations affect the outbreak of civil war in the state-at-risk in the first place (Cederman, Gleditsch and Buhaug, 2013, 212).

Why do TEK sometimes offer support in civil wars? Existing literature has identified two logics: the first emphasizes ethnic solidarity, while the second concentrates on the power politics of ethnicity (Cederman, Gleditsch and Buhaug, 2013, Lacina, 2015, 125). The first logic values the importance of ethnic affinities in driving the TEK-controlling state's foreign policy behaviors. These studies assume that members of an ethnic group are concerned with the welfare and conditions of other members of their kin group. Thus, if one group is treated differently in the state-at-risk, the co-ethnic group in the nearby state will pressure its government to intervene in the state-at-risk's ethnic policy (Davis and Moore, 1997, 173). In this sense, ethnic affinities serve as motivations for foreign policy actions, as states need to respond to domestic pressure from groups incorporated into the polity in order to maintain their office. In light of this logic, when its kin group is mistreated and excluded in the state-at-risk, a TEK group's presence should increase the risk of civil war. There is some evidence to support this logic. For example, Davis and Moore (1997) and Petersen (2004) find that co-ethnics' differential status can lead to a more conflictual relationship between two states. Saideman (2002) finds that groups with ethnic ties to actors in positions of power in neighboring states are more likely to receive external assistance. Similarly, Nome (2013) finds that marginal-to-marginal group ties and marginal-to-dominant group ties increase the likelihood of military intervention in civil wars.

The second logic, however, tends to downplay the role of ethnic solidarity in driving outside intervention, instead emphasizing that "ethnic politics is as much about power and politics" (Cederman, Gleditsch and Buhaug, 2013, 125). These studies focus almost exclusively on the motivations of third parties with transna-

tional ethnic ties to intervene in ongoing civil wars (see Grigoryan, 2010, Konaev and Brathwaite, 2019, Nome, 2013) or on how TEK-controlling states initiate irredentist conflicts against neighboring states (see Gartzke and Gleditsch, 2006, Siroky and Hale, 2017). In line with this logic, these studies focus more on the strategic interaction between the (state-controlling) TEK group and the state-at-risk. For example, Cetinyan (2002) argues that a third party's willingness to support an ethnic group will not increase the likelihood of ethnic rebellion because both actors are strategic and bargaining breakdown results mainly from information and commitment problems rather than power imbalance in the shadow of third-party intervention. Thus, in the context of TEK intervention with complete information, both the incumbent government and the ethnic group will adjust their respective demands in the bargaining process, and having powerful brethren abroad makes the ethnic group less likely to suffer discrimination by its host state but does not make it more likely to mobilize violently against the host state. Likewise, Thyne (2009) finds that when both the government and the ethnic group are certain about the willingness for third-party intervention, civil wars are less likely to break out because they interpret the information about the likelihood of third-party intervention in the same way and adjust their bargaining positions accordingly. However, if the external state sends cheap signals that increase the uncertainty of its willingness to intervene, civil wars will be more likely to occur because the state-at-risk the dissidents may interpret the likelihood of intervention differently, leading to different expectations about the probability of victory. In other words, these studies emphasize that the uncertainty about the prospects of outside intervention makes civil wars more likely.

However, these arguments are built on the assumption of complete information and ignore the uncertainty about the state-at-risk and the third party's preferences (Grigoryan, 2010). In the incomplete information situation, the third party's resolve and motivation become private information. Moreover, as Cunningham (2016) notes,

even in the complete information situation, bargaining between the government and the challenger group may never occur if the government anticipates overwhelming intervention on its side, which makes the probability of victory for the challenger group almost zero and will make any fighting have a negative expected utility. As such, powerful third parties aligned with the government can deter ethnic rebellion. Cunningham (2016) has three limitations in regard to TEK groups. First, the assumption of overwhelming intervention on the government's behalf is problematic if the TEK group controls the government of the external state. A state-controlling TEK group is unlikely to intervene on the government's side to repress its co-ethnic minority. Second, the study implicitly assumes that the ethnic group's costs of fighting are even higher than those of being eliminated. When a government has overwhelming external support, it is more likely to adopt elimination or ethnic cleaning (Grigoryan, 2010) than to implement repression policies against the ethnic minority. In this case, ethnic groups' other resistance options will disappear, and fighting will be the only option. Third, as Grigoryan (2010, 1149) argues, "third parties often support minorities not because, or not only because, the latter are being subjected to violence, but because the third party has other conflicts with the target-state". As a result, we know little about how the relations between the external state and the state-at-risk affect the risk of civil war between the incumbent government of the state-at-risk and the ethnic challenger group.

Another major stream of work on TEK and civil wars focuses on the diffusion of civil wars, illuminating an alternative way by which transborder ethnic ties help spread civil wars from one country to another. Lake and Rothchild (1998, 25-29) propose four ways in which ethnic conflict in one country can diffuse to another country, and these channels will be more likely to spread civil wars across borders in the presence of TEK groups.⁵ For example, Forsberg (2014*b*) argues that when an

⁵ They include: 1) events abroad may change directly the ethnic balance of power at home,

ethnic group engages in violent conflict in one state, its ethnic kin in a nearby state may be inspired to rebel because the outbreak of conflict renders ethnic bonds and similar conditions salient. These bonds and similarities become even more salient when the kin group has the opportunity and willingness to mobilize for rebellion.

In addition to the demonstration effect discussed above, other scholars have examined preemptive repression as a means to resist negative externalities of ongoing civil wars in neighboring states (see Besley and Persson, 2009, Danneman and Ritter, 2014, Ritter and Conrad, 2016, Young, 2013). For instance, Konaev and Brathwaite (2019) find that the international spread of ethnic conflict is a result of preemptive repression combined with the political opportunity that appears when a neighboring state fights a kin ethnic group. Additionally, Danneman and Ritter (2014) find that states become more repressive when civil wars become prevalent in neighboring states. The diffusion argument, however, assumes that there is already an ongoing civil war that can generate incentive-altering effects for groups in the nearby state (Danneman and Ritter, 2014, 255). As a result, it cannot explain the outbreak of civil war in the state-at-risk when the TEK group in the external state does not rebel.

While much existing research suggests that TEK groups have conflict-inducing effects, recent studies increasingly challenge this notion that transnational ethnic linkages are primarily detrimental, and instead, they find that TEK groups with the greatest capacity to mobilize resources are more likely to promote stability. For example, Lum et al. (2013) find that diasporas—a particular type of TEK—can sometimes promote stability in the state-at-risk. In a direct study of TEK and civil war

disrupting the existing ethnic contract and precipitating violence(refugee); (2)ethnic conflict in one country may prompt groups in another to make more extreme demands (demonstration effect); (3) ethnic conflict abroad may lead groups to update their beliefs about the efficacy of the political safeguards contained in their existing ethnic contrasts; (4) ethnic conflict abroad may lead groups to update their beliefs about the costs of protest or ultimately violence and their probability of success (Lake and Rothchild, 1998, 25-29).

onset, Cederman et al. (2013) find that large TEK groups that control the state have a conflict-dampening effect. In particular, such state-controlling TEK group can generate a deterrent effect on the state-at-risk to constrain its mistreatment on the ethnic group partly because the state-at-risk fears potential intervention or irredentism from the state-controlling TEK group. This accommodation of mistreatment may therefore dilute group grievances and thereby reduce the likelihood of civil conflict. However, their argument on the deterrent effect does not take the state-at-risk's relationship with the external state into consideration; thus, it ignores the possibility that conflicts between the two states can influence the state-at-risk's and the ethnic group's expectations of external support, as well as their beliefs about the likely outcome of civil war (Toukan, 2017), which are directly related to the decision to fight in the first place.


In summary, although existing literature has focused on how civil wars lead to international conflicts (e.g., Gleditsch, Salehyan and Schultz, 2008, Salehyan, 2007), few studies examine how conflictual interstate relations between an external state and a state-at-risk affect the onset of civil war in the state-at-risk. In fact, a conflictual relationship can lead the TEK-controlling state to be more willing to support rebels in the state-at-risk, thus increasing the likelihood of civil war. This is especially the case when the two states are rivals. As Salehyan (2008) argued, rival states will be more likely to support transnational rebels in order to undermine their opponents and substitute direct hostilities with action through proxies (see also Salehyan, Gleditsch and Cunningham, 2011). Moreover, the prospects for international conflict between the external state and the state-at-risk can affect the challenger group's willingness and opportunity to rebel against the government (Thyne, 2009). Regarding willingness, the challenger group can support its TEK in the nearby state to fight with its own government because of ethnic bonds and similarities. Regarding opportunity, if the incumbent government were to engage in an international conflict, the challenger

group may perceive a greater opportunity to achieve its goals because the resources that the state-at-risk can mobilize to repress them will be limited and constrained due to the international conflict with the external state. As a result, if the external state has a conflictual relationship with the state-at-risk, we should expect a greater risk of civil war in the state-at-risk. In the next section, I explain how interstate relations between the external state and the state-at-risk can affect the risk of civil war in the state-at-risk.

2.3 A Theoretical Framework for Interstate Hostility and Ethnic Conflict

Previous work has shown how the potential for transnational support for the government or the opposition group can affect these groups' beliefs about the availability and likelihood of outside intervention (see Cetinyan, 2002, Cunningham, 2016, Grigoryan, 2010, 2015, Thyne, 2009). When transnational support overwhelmingly favors the government, the challenger group will be less likely to fight in a civil war because its probability of victory will decrease and the costs of fighting will increase. When the challenger group receives external support, however, its expectations on the probability of victory and the costs of fighting will change accordingly, which may increase the risk of civil war. However, the complexity of interstate relations can increase the likelihood that both the government and the opposition group miscalculate the odds of external intervention (Toukan, 2017, 13). Built on existing work on the triadic research design that involves two states (i.e., an external state and a state-at-risk) and the two co-ethnic groups within them (a TEK group and a marginalized challenger group)(e.g., see Cederman et al., 2013, Cederman, Girardin and Gleditsch, 2009, Siroky and Hale, 2017), this paper emphasizes the role of interstate hostility between two states in shaping conflict risk between an ethnic challenger group and the state-at-risk. When an interstate relationship becomes conflictual, the external

FIGURE 2.2: The ethnonationalist triad configuration with interstate dyad



Note: Figure 2.2 shows the ethnonationalist triad configuration with interstate dyad. The figure is modified from Cederman, Gleditsch and Buhaug (2013, 124).

state and state-at-risk will be less likely to communicate their intentions well. As a result, the state-at-risk may become increasingly less certain about whether the external state will intervene in its civil war. In other words, hostile relations between two states are more likely than cooperative relations to increase the likelihood of civil war in the state-at-risk because hostile relations may increase the level of uncertainty about the prospects of external intervention, whether from the TEK group or from the government of the external state.

Suppose that the external state and the state-at-risk make up a generic dyad. Suppose also that the challenger group in the state-at-risk has a TEK group in the external state, where the TEK group can be either marginalized (denoted in Panel a of Figure 2.2) or in power (denoted in Panel b of Figure 2.2). As such, when the TEK group controls the external state, the interstate dyad becomes the same as the secondary dyad in Panel b of Figure 2.2.

I first consider the interstate dyad in the left panel (i.e., the TEK group is not in power). If the TEK group is excluded in the external state, the two co-ethnic groups

are both marginalized. Cederman, Gleditsch and Buhaug (2013) argue that we can expect a tension between the TEK group and the external state and between the two governments in the left panel of Figure 2.2. When the TEK group is excluded in the external state, it can still inflict costs on the government of the state-at-risk by directly joining the cross-border fighting between its kin and the government of the state-at-risk (such as the Kurds in Iran and Syria) or by helping to set up rebel sanctuaries (Cederman et al., 2013, 394). Empirical evidence has suggested that as the relative size of the TEK group in the external state increases, the likelihood of civil war in the primary dyad also increases because the challenger group will be encouraged to radicalize and articulate larger demands due to increased expectations of greater external support from the TEK group. Additionally because the TEK group is excluded, it will be less bounded by international norms of territorial integrity. In this situation, Cederman, Gleditsch and Buhaug (2013) argue that the excluded TEK group in the external state should have a positive monotonic (non-curvilinear) impact on the conflict propensity within the primary dyad between the state-at-risk and the challenger group because the TEK group can provide more resources to the challenger group as its relative size increases. However, the nature of the relationship in the interstate dyad may affect this kind of support from the excluded TEK group.

First, interstate hostility may decrease the likelihood of state repression on the excluded TEK group in the external state, which may, in turn, leave more room for the excluded TEK group to support the ethnic group. Similar to the prediction of civil conflict in the primary dyad, the likelihood of civil war between the TEK group and the external state may actually increase, as existing work has found that excluded ethnic groups have a higher likelihood of experiencing civil war or repression than included groups (Bak, Chávez and Rider, 2019, Cederman et al., 2013, Cederman, Weidmann and Gleditsch, 2011, Wucherpfennig, Hunziker and Cederman, 2016). In this case, the support from TEK would definitely be limited if the group

were politically excluded and marginalized. Knowing that it may have limited external support from its TEK group may decrease the ethnic group's propensity for mobilization and lead it to make less radicalized demands in bargaining, which can reduce the likelihood of civil war within the primary dyad. However, when the relationship between the two states is hostile, it is often in the external state's interest to support marginalized minorities in the state-at-risk (Grigoryan, 2010) so that the state-at-risk's capacity will be drained by fighting civil wars (Bormann and Hammond, 2016), which will open the door for the external state to gain an advantage in its competition with the state-at-risk (Toukan, 2017). The external state could encourage the excluded TEK group to support the challenger group in the state-at-risk if the two states are both rivalries. Although this encouragement may be less likely because the TEK is excluded, it is possible if the incumbent government of the external state promises to grant autonomy or other concessions to the TEK group. Under such circumstances, the TEK group can provide more external support even if its relative size is small and it is excluded from political power. Moreover, in the presence of interstate hostility, the ethnic challenger group in the state-at-risk can expect external assistance not only from its TEK group but also from the external state (Cederman, Girardin and Gleditsch, 2009, 413), which may significantly affect the risk of civil war.

Second, interstate hostility between the external state and the state-at-risk can discourage the two states' opportunity and willingness to jointly repress the TEK and ethnic groups in their own states. As such, the ethnic group in the state-at-risk can still anticipate support from the TEK group to some extent, even if the TEK group is excluded and has limited resources. When the interstate relations are not hostile, the amount of support from the TEK group may be even more limited, as the two states may coordinate their efforts to repress co-ethnics in their own states. For example, Nome (2013) argues that there exists the possibility of government cooperation to

repress similar ethnic minorities from seeking independence. As Chazan (1991, 19) argues, “if a transborder group attempts secession, the states hosting its population may combine to suppress the movement”. After assessing civil war risk in the primary dyad, the external state might fear that the TEK group will emulate its co-ethnics to seek secession. As such, the external state may seek to cooperate with the government of the state-at-risk to eliminate these possible threats by repressing the two co-ethnic groups in their respective states (Besley and Persson, 2009, Danneman and Ritter, 2014, Ritter and Conrad, 2016, Young, 2013). Therefore, when the relationship between the external state and the state-at-risk is cooperative, the risk of civil war decreases. By contrast, when interstate relations become hostile, the two states will be unlikely to cooperate to repress the marginalized groups in their respective countries, which suggests that the risk of civil war in the state-at-risk may increase under international hostility when the TEK group is excluded from power. As such, we will expect an increase in the risk of civil war in the state-at-risk.

Now, I consider the second scenario in which the TEK group controls the government of the external state, as illustrated in the right panel of Figure 2.2. Cederman et al. (2013) indicate that large TEK groups that control the state have a conflict-dampening effect because the state-at-risk fears triggering irredentism from the external state as a result of the state-at-risk’s mistreatment on the co-ethnic group. Moreover, the TEK group’s willingness to intervene will decrease, partly because it now has much more to lose than stateless groups, especially when the external state is ethnically heterogeneous, and partly because international norms of territorial integrity now restrain the incumbent TEK group from interfering in the state-at-risk’s internal affairs. However, this reluctance to intervene by the incumbent TEK group may disappear when interstate relations become hostile. In other words, the two concerns for the incumbent TEK group in Cederman et al. (2013) usually exist when the interstate relations are not conflictual. When the two states are engaged in con-

frontation, the TEK-controlling external state has already lost too much, and the international norms no longer constrain their hostile behaviors toward each other. As a result, the incumbent TEK group will remain willing to support the ethnic group, and the risk of civil war will not decrease. Given the first scenario in which the TEK group does not control the external state, we can expect that regardless of the TEK group's access to power in the external state, interstate hostility between the external state and the state-at-risk has an overwhelming impact on the risk of civil war in the state-at-risk. I thus propose the following hypotheses:

Hypothesis 1: The probability of civil war between the ethnic challenger group and the state-at-risk increases when the interstate relations between the external state and the state-at-risk are hostile.

Hypothesis 2: The impact of interstate hostility on the probability of civil war in the state-at-risk does not depend on the TEK group's access to power in the external state.

In summary, this paper argues that interstate hostility between the external state and the state-at-risk can affect the outbreak of civil war in the state-at-risk. Moreover, the impact of interstate hostility should not depend on the TEK group's access to power in the external state: interstate hostility between the external state and the state-at-risk should increase the likelihood of civil war, regardless of whether the TEK group controls the external state. In the next section, I introduce the research design I used to test these arguments.

2.4 Research Design

2.4.1 Data and Dependent Variable

To test my theoretical arguments, I use the EPR dataset (EPR-ETH), which includes all politically relevant ethnic groups from 1946 to 2013 (Vogt et al., 2015, Wucherpfennig et al., 2011). EPR-ETH considers an ethnic group to be politically relevant if “either at least one significant political actor claims to represent the interests of that group in the national political arena or if group members are systematically and intentionally discriminated in the domain of public politics”.⁶ Specifically, I use the EPR family dataset (Vogt et al., 2015),⁷ which provides information on ethnic groups’ access to state power, settlement patterns, links to rebel organizations, and TEK relations. Recent work on ethnic civil wars has increasingly shifted the unit of analysis from the country (-year) level to the group (-year) level (Cederman, Gleditsch and Buhaug, 2013, 27-28). However, in regard to TEK groups, neither country-level nor group-level analysis can fully capture the effect of TEK groups on civil war onset (Cederman, Girardin and Gleditsch, 2009, 410). The challenger group–state-at-risk dyadic design makes it difficult to incorporate other information on the TEK groups and the external state into the dyadic conflict studies. I thus use a triadic design (Cederman et al., 2013, Cederman, Girardin and Gleditsch, 2009, Siroky and Hale, 2017) that includes two states (i.e., an external state and a state-at-risk) and two co-ethnic groups within them (i.e., a TEK group and a marginalized challenger group). This design enables me to simultaneously compare relationships between the challenger group–state-at-risk, external state–state-at-risk, TEK group–state-at-risk, TEK group–external state and challenger group–external state dyads

⁶ See EPR-ETH codebook, available at https://icr.ethz.ch/data/epr/core/EPR-2014_Codebook.pdf.

⁷ All the EPR data are downloaded from the *GROW^{up}* (Geographical Research On War, Unified Platform) platform, available at <https://growup.ethz.ch>.

Table 2.1: Comparing relationships at the disaggregated dyads

No.	Dyads	Variables
1.	challenger group–state-at-risk dyad	DV: civil war or not
2.	external state–state-at-risk dyad	IV: interstate hostility or not
3.	TEK group–state-at-risk dyad	IV: relative size of TEK & potential support
4.	TEK group–external state dyad	IV: TEK dominant status or not
5.	challenger group–external state dyad	IV: potential support (unobserved here)

(when the TEK group is not in power in the external state).⁸ Table 2.1 summarizes these disaggregated dyads.

Because this paper examines how interstate hostility between the external state and the state-at-risk affects the risk of civil war between a marginalized ethnic group and the government of the state-at-risk, the dependent variable is civil war onset, measured at the challenger group–state-at-risk dyad (i.e., the primary dyad in Figure 2.2). Specifically, the dependent variable is based on the group-level coding of the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict dataset (Gleditsch et al., 2002). To ensure that each conflict onset is mapped to the corresponding EPR group, Vogt et al. (2015) measure whether a rebel group that is actively fighting in an armed conflict has links to a rebel organization that was actively involved in a conflict in a given year. Thus, civil war onset is coded as “1” if “a rebel organization expresses its political aims (at least partly) in the name of the group and a significant number of members of the group participated in the conflict”; and “0” otherwise (also see Cederman, Gleditsch and Buhaug, 2013, Cederman, Weidmann and Gleditsch, 2011, Cederman, Weidmann and Bormann, 2015). Figure A.1 in the appendix plots all countries in the sample data.

⁸ In theory, there are six different dyads among these four actors, provided that the TEK group does not control the external state. The last dyad is *TEK group–challenger group*. In almost all research, the *TEK group–challenger group* dyad is still assumed to be a “black box” that the relationship between the co-ethnic groups is firm, even though there are cases that co-ethnic groups are competing and even hostile toward one another (for instance, the Koreans in the North Korean and South Koreans). However, I do not challenge this assumption in this paper.

2.4.2 Independent Variables

My independent variables are measured at different dyadic levels, as shown in Table 2.1. As a first cut, I follow Cederman, Gleditsch and Buhaug (2013) in creating a dummy variable of whether the ethnic challenger group has at least one TEK group in power (i.e., TEK group(s) ≥ 1 in power). This variable is coded “1” if the ethnic group has at least one TEK group in power in other state(s), and “0” otherwise.⁹ Meanwhile, I create a similar dummy variable of whether the ethnic group has at least one TEK group that is not in power (i.e., TEK group(s) ≥ 1 not in power). These two variables are measured at the group-year level, which enables me to compare whether the presence of TEK group(s) makes certain groups more likely to fight with the incumbent government of the state-at-risk. At the triadic level of analysis, I use the *TEK dominant status* variable to measure whether the TEK group has a dominant status in the external state by combining the dominant status and monopoly status in the EPR data (i.e., at the TEK group–external state dyad). Thus, TEK dominant status takes a value of “1” if the TEK group has either a dominant status or a monopoly status, and “0” otherwise.

As I have argued, the quantitative literature on TEK and civil war onset has largely overlooked interstate relations when evaluating predictors related to TEK groups, such as their relative size or political status in the external state. Interstate relations, especially hostile relations between the external state and the state-at-risk, can largely shape the marginalized ethnic group’s and the state-at-risk’s expectations on the external state’s intervention during a civil war. Therefore, my primary independent variable of interest is the presence of hostile relations between the external state and the state-at-risk. While there are debates on which is the best way to conceptualize and measure “hostile” relations between states, the general approach

⁹ This information is from the *TEK count* variable in the *GROW^{up}* project.

in the international conflict literature is to examine whether two states were engaged in rival competition (Diehl and Goertz, 2001, Klein, Goertz and Diehl, 2006, Thompson, 2001), experienced a militarized interstate dispute (MID) (Braithwaite, 2010, Jones, Bremer and Singer, 1996, Palmer et al., 2015), or even fought an interstate war (Kocs, 1995, Sarkees and Wayman, 2010). Using the country information associated with the challenger group–TEK dyad, I paired the external state–state-at-risk dyad to characterize whether the two states display hostility toward one another.

First, I create a binary variable of whether the two states experienced at least one MID in a given year using the Correlates of War (COW) Project’s MID dataset (v4.1) (Palmer et al., 2015). MID is defined as a member state’s threat, display or use of military force, short of war, that is explicitly directed towards the government, official representatives, official forces, property, or territory of another state (Jones, Bremer and Singer, 1996, 163).¹⁰ Second, I consider whether the two states are international rivals (Diehl and Goertz, 2001, Klein, Goertz and Diehl, 2006, Thompson, 2001). The presence of interstate hostility in general and international rivalry in particular increases not only the level of domestic polarization in the state-at-risk but also the likelihood that actors in civil wars form different beliefs about the likely outcome of a civil war (see Toukan, 2017). To measure rival relations, I collapse the *peace scale* in Goertz, Diehl and Balas (2016) to create a binary variable on international rivalry, which is coded as “1” if the two states are either severe rivals or less severe rivals on the peace scale, and “0” otherwise.¹¹ Third, I create a dummy variable for whether the two states experienced interstate war, as defined in the COW’s interstate war List. Because the COW’s war list data reach only to the year 2007, I use the

¹⁰ The intensity of MIDs varies from threats to use force to actual combat short of war, though I do not distinguish them when counting the number of MIDs between two states in a given year.

¹¹ The peace scale consists of five discrete levels, with “0” indicating severe rivalries, “0.25” as less severe rivalries, “0.5” as negative peace, “0.75” as warm peace, and “1” indicating security community. The transitional period is coded as “10”.

UCDP/PRIO armed conflict dataset (Gleditsch et al., 2002) to cover the period after 2007. To make the two datasets compatible, I use 1000 battle-related deaths as the threshold for interstate war in the UCDP/PRIO armed conflict dataset. Since these three variables all measure the degree of international hostility and MID has more temporal coverage, I present mainly the results from MID while using the other two variables as a robustness check.¹²

Although my theoretical arguments predict that interstate hostility can increase the risk of civil war in the state-at-risk, there might be an endogenous relationship between my dependent variable and my independent variable in the presence of TEK, that is, ethnonationalist civil war can lead to interstate hostility between the state-at-risk and the external state that hosts the TEK group, as previous studies have found (Gleditsch, Salehyan and Schultz, 2008, Goemans and Schultz, 2017, Siroky and Hale, 2017, Woodwell, 2004). Empirically, the common solution to this issue is to lag the explanatory variable to avoid simultaneity bias (i.e., contemporary correlation) or to use an instrumental variable estimation (Reed, 2015). However, recent work has suggested that lag identification cannot surmount endogeneity concerns and may lead to incorrect inferences in the context of dynamics in the unobserved confounding or reverse causality (Bellemare, Masaki and Pepinsky, 2017, Esarey and Menger, 2019). As such, making a trade-off between ignoring endogeneity threats and employing lagged explanatory variables in the observational data is inevitable. In this paper, I choose to ignore the endogeneity threat rather than employing the lag identification, partly because the relative size of the endogeneity threat might be lower than the causal effect of international hostility and partly because there likely exist dynamics in the unobserved confounding.¹³

¹² The results are in the Appendix, see Figure A.2.

¹³ Moreover, data from the *GROW^{up}* platform do not contain the dates of civil war onset, which makes it harder to identify the contemporary correlation. I leave this problem for future work.

2.4.3 Control Variables

I control for a set of covariates found to be associated with the onset of civil wars across the group level, state level and interstate level. First, at the group level, I control for the relative size of the ethnic group to the incumbent group in the state-at-risk. Group size matters in ethnic politics, as relatively larger groups can serve as a viable base for political coalition-building (Posner, 2004*b*), can affect the bargaining position and are easy to mobilize (Cederman, Gleditsch and Buhaug, 2013). In addition to the relative size of the ethnic group, I control for the relative size of the TEK group in the external state to the incumbent government of the state-at-risk (i.e., at the TEK group–state-at-risk dyad). To account for the curvilinear effect of TEK size (Cederman, Gleditsch and Buhaug, 2013, Cederman et al., 2013), I include both its first-power and second-power terms in the model. Moreover, I control for the ethnic group’s history of conflict with the government (Cederman, Hug and Wucherpfennig, 2015) by counting the number of previous conflicts since 1945. Furthermore, I include excluded status as a dummy variable for whether the ethnic group is excluded politically, coded “1” if so and “0” otherwise (Metternich, Minhas and Ward, 2017). By contrast, status upgrade is a binary variable for whether the status of an ethnic group has been upgraded in the past two years. All the group-level variables are from the EPR family dataset (Vogt et al., 2015).

At the country level, I control for the state-at-risk’s level of economic development and population size. Specially, I use data from the Penn World Tables (v9.1)¹⁴ to create data on GDP per capita and population for the state-at-risk. Both variables are log-transformed to account for the skewed distribution and are lagged one year.

In addition measuring hostile relations between two states, I consider whether there might be “heterogeneous treatment effects” (Grimmer, Messing and Westwood,

¹⁴ see <https://fred.stlouisfed.org/categories/33402/downloaddata>.

2017) regarding the impact of interstate hostility conditions on the external state's domestic politics. Just as the ethnic group resides in and interacts with the state-at-risk, the TEK group also lives in the external state, which should, in turn, affect the TEK group's behavior and its support for co-ethnics. In particular, drawing from the literature on the domestic politics of foreign policy, I examine whether the external state's domestic political conditions can affect its interaction with the state-at-risk, which, in turn, shapes the ethnic group's propensity for conflict in the state-at-risk. Specifically, I consider whether the external state's nationalistic ideology conditions the impact of interstate hostility on the likelihood of civil war in the state-at-risk. Recently, Konaev and Brathwaite (2019) argued that the fear resulting from a civil war involving the kin group will be magnified when the external state is led by a nationalist government, which may in turn increase the external state's incentive to intervene, even at the expense of other groups. I follow Konaev and Brathwaite (2019) in creating a binary variable for whether the external state is led by a nationalist state. The variable takes a value of "1" if the executive party's platform advocates for the defense of a national or ethnic identity, particularly at the expense of other politically relevant groups, or if the ruling party has fought for independence, either militarily or politically, from a colonial power; it takes a value of "0" otherwise (Beck et al., 2001, Cruz, Keefer and Scartascini, 2016, Konaev and Brathwaite, 2019). The data on nationalist governments come from Cruz, Keefer and Scartascini (2016).¹⁵ I interact nationalistic ideology with my measure of hostile interstate relations.

Additionally, I control for the domestic unrest in both the external state and the state-at-risk. Domestic instability may further weaken the incumbent government's abilities to support outside actors or effectively repress inside challengers, which may increase the level of uncertainty regarding the potential external intervention or the

¹⁵ Available at <https://publications.iadb.org/handle/11319/7408>.

state-at-risk’s bargaining power over the ethnic group. I follow Haynes and Konaev and Brathwaite’s work on domestic unrest (Haynes, 2015, Konaev and Brathwaite, 2019) and use the total number of anti-government demonstrations to measure this variable.¹⁶ At the interstate level, in addition to the main explanatory variables, I control for the minimum distance between the external state and the state-at-risk.¹⁷ The minimum distance is computed using *Cshapes* data from Weidmann, Kuse and Gleditsch (2010). The minimum distance is then log transformed.

Given the binary nature of my dependent variable, I use a logistic regression model to estimate the impact of interstate relations on the likelihood of civil war in the state-at-risk. To control for temporal dependence in the data, I follow Carter and Signorino’s recommendation to include years of peace and its polynomial terms (Carter and Signorino, 2010). The standard errors are clustered according to the state-at-risk for all models.¹⁸ Table A.1 presents a descriptive summary of the paper’s variables.

2.5 Results and Discussions

2.5.1 *Main Results*

As a first step, I estimate a simple logit model with standard errors clustered by the state-at-risk for the entire 1946-2013 period using the group-year as the unit of analysis. Model 1 in Table A.2 examines whether the essentialist logic, which argues that all TEK groups should be motivated to intervene due to their ethnic affinity and sentiment, is valid in explaining the outbreak of ethnic civil war. I include two dummy variables for whether the group has at least one TEK that is not in power

¹⁶ This corresponds to the index, *Domestic8*, in Banks and Wilson (2014).

¹⁷ Schutte (2017) examines how distance can condition the information problem in civil war.


¹⁸ As a robustness check, I also use the Bayesian Logistic model (Gelman et al., 2008) to deal with the potential separation issues (Gelman et al., 2008, Rainey, 2016*b*). The results (not reported here) are very similar to the classic logit model.

and whether it has at least one in power in the external state. Panel A of Figure 2.3 illustrates the results. Consistent with previous work (see Cederman, Gleditsch and Buhaug, 2013, Chapter 4), simply having ethnic kin in other state(s) does not make the ethnic group more or less likely to fight the government of the state-at-risk. The coefficients of TEK groups (≥ 1) not in power and TEK groups (≥ 1) in power are both statistically insignificant. Panel A of Figure 2.3 also shows that groups that are of a relatively larger size, with a history of conflict, or excluded from power are positively associated with civil conflict. At the country level, consistent with previous work (e.g., Fearon and Laitin, 2003), the coefficient of GDP per capita is negative and statistically significant, suggesting that relatively wealthier countries are less likely to experience civil conflict. However, I do not find that groups with upgraded status or countries with a larger population size are more or less likely to experience civil conflict.

Model 2 of Table A.2 uses the same specification in Cederman et al. (2013) but at the triad level, which constrains the sample to only ethnic groups that have TEK group(s) in another state(s). In other words, the subsequent analyses examine how interstate hostility between two states that share ethnic ties affects the outbreak of civil war between a marginalized ethnic group and its incumbent government in the state-at-risk. The key difference between these two studies is that Cederman et al. (2013) code the TEK size variable as zero when the group does not have a TEK group, which is plausible when “zero” does not have “true” meaning other than the “absence” of the treatment.¹⁹ Also consistent with Cederman et al. (2013), Panel B of Figure 2.3 presents evidence of an inverted-U-shaped curvilinear relationship

¹⁹ For example, coding the TEK size as “0” can simply mean there is no TEK whereas coding missing values of “log minimum distance” as zero is problematic as the “true zero” would suggest the two states are immediate neighbors. This is the reason why I use the triadic design to examine the TEK-related variable. However, the downside is that the sample becomes groups that have TEK groups. That being said, I also use the approach in Cederman et al. (2013) by coding the TEK size as zero, and the substantive effects of the TEK size are similar.

FIGURE 2.3: The coefficient plot of ethnic civil war onset without interstate-level predictors




Note: Figure 2.3 plots the coefficient estimates with 95% confidence intervals for Models 1-2 in Table A.2. The coefficients for the *peace years* and its polynomial terms are not included in the figure.

between TEK size and civil conflict, as both the linear and squared terms of relative TEK size are statistically significant, with the former being positive and the latter being negative.

While the first two models largely confirm what Cederman et al. (2013) find, as I argued earlier, simply modeling the relative size of TEK does not fully capture how transnational ethnic ties affect the outbreak of civil war in the state-at-risk. Simply because the TEK size is relatively large does not necessarily mean that the TEK group controls the external state such that it can generate a deterrent effect.

FIGURE 2.4: The coefficient plot of ethnic civil war onset with interstate-level predictors



Note: Figure 2.4 plots the coefficient estimates with 95% confidence intervals for Models 3 in Table A.2. The coefficients for other control variables are not included in the figure.

There are many countries in which ethnic minorities are ruling groups, whereas ethnic majorities are excluded from power. More importantly, interstate relations are not included in the model. In the subsequent models, I introduce the characteristics of the external state and its relationship with the state-at-risk to the analysis.

Figure 2.4 shows the coefficient estimates when adding interstate-level predictors. Once we control for interstate hostility, as the coefficient plot suggests, the curvilinear relationship between TEK size and civil conflict disappears as the coefficient of the quadratic term of relative TEK size is no longer statistically significant at the 95% confidence level. In contrast, the coefficient of the militarized interstate dispute is positive and statistically significant at the 95% confidence level, suggesting a positive association between MID and civil war outbreak in the state-at-risk. Therefore, this finding provides evidence to support Hypothesis 1 that international hostility between the external state and the state-at-risk increases the likelihood of civil war



in the state-at-risk. For the control variables, anti-government demonstration in the state-at-risk is positively associated with civil war, which is not surprising, as an ethnic group may be more likely to mobilize during a period of government crisis.²⁰ However, I do not find strong effects of domestic unrest in the external state, as the coefficient of anti-government demonstration in the external state is not statistically significant in Model 3 of Table A.2. I also find that when the external state's government is controlled by a nationalist party, the civil war in the state-at-risk is more likely to occur, as the external state's nationalistic regime is statistically significant at the 90% confidence level.

Figure 2.5 plots the density estimates of the predicted probabilities of MID and the external state's nationalistic ideology using a simulation-based approach. The left panel of Figure 2.5 suggests that the presence of MID between the external state and the state-at-risk has a much higher predicted probability of civil war in the state-at-risk compared to the absence of MID between the two states. While the two density plots in the right panel of Figure 2.5 overlap to some extent, the predicted probability is greater when the external state is led by a nationalist party. Together, these results provide strong support for Hypothesis 1. Given the significant effects of interstate hostility, I further examine whether there are heterogeneous effects of interstate hostility across external states' characteristics, as well as TEK groups' power status.

As stated in the Hypothesis 2, international hostility between the external state and the state-at-risk should increase the risk of civil war in the state-at-risk and should not depend on whether the TEK group controls the external state, which suggests that an interaction between MID and TEK dominant status should yield a null effect. Although there remains an ongoing debate about whether a product

²⁰ It is possible that the anti-government demonstration is endogenous to civil war. However, Arthur Banks' Cross-National Time-Series data do not have the participant information of these demonstration, making the identification difficult. I leave this for future test.

FIGURE 2.5: The distribution of predicted probabilities of MID and nationalism ideology of the external state




Note: Figure 2.5 plots the distribution of predicted probabilities of MID and nationalism ideology of the external state over 1000 draws from the posterior distribution of parameters in Model 3 of Table A.2. All other variables are taking their observed values in each draw.

term is sufficient to conclude an interaction effect in logit models (see Berry, DeMeritt and Esarey, 2010, Rainey, 2016*a*), for the current analysis, the unconditional effect of MID is better examined through the coefficient of the product term. Moreover, as Rainey (2014, 1085) argues, political scientists often “interpret a lack of statistical significance as evidence for a negligible effect”, which is problematic because this lack is neither necessary nor sufficient evidence to claim a negligible effect. Rainey (2014, 1085) suggests using the 90% confidence intervals to argue against meaningful effects implementing substantively meaningful quantities, such as the change in predicted probabilities (i.e., first difference), preferably using a simulation-based approach from the posterior distribution of model parameters. As such, I use a simulation-based approach to examine whether the 90% confidence intervals of the first difference with regard to the interaction term contain no meaningful effects.

Because of the presence of an interaction term, we should no longer interpret the constitutive terms as if they were unconditional effects if the interaction effect is significant (Brambor, Clark and Golder, 2005). As a matter of fact, interpreting the interaction term directly in binary dependent variable models is often difficult and can easily be misleading (Berry, DeMeritt and Esarey, 2010, Hanmer and Ozan Kalkan, 2013, Rainey, 2016*a*). Consequently, instead of relying on what Hanmer and Ozan Kalkan call an “average case” approach, that is, to “create an example case by selecting a set of specific values for the other variables and calculating the relevant predicted probabilities or marginal effect for that case” (Hanmer and Ozan Kalkan, 2013, 264), I use a novel simulation-based “observed value” approach to compute the conditional effects (Gelman and Hill, 2007, Hanmer and Ozan Kalkan, 2013). For each of k (usually $k = 1000$) simulations, I hold each of the “other independent variables at the observed values for each case in the sample, calculating the relevant predicted probabilities or marginal effect for each case, and then averaging over all of the cases” (Hanmer and Ozan Kalkan, 2013, 264). For the interaction

FIGURE 2.6: The coefficient plot for the effect of MID on ethnic civil war onset



Note: Figure 2.6 plots the coefficient estimates with 95% confidence intervals for Models 4-5 in Table A.3. The coefficients for group-level control variables, the *peace years* and its polynomial terms are not included in the figure.


between two binary variables, the two predictors will yield four different values from the linear combination, which will result in a total of $4 \times k$ draws from the posterior distribution of parameter coefficients in the model. The predicted probability is then calculated for each of n cases. Averaging the predicted probabilities of n cases produces the average treatment effect of the predictor in each simulation. The goal of the “observed value” approach is therefore to obtain an estimate of the av-

erage effect in the population. In addition, this approach is more robust to model misspecification (Hanmer and Ozan Kalkan, 2013, 265).


Table A.3 and Figure 2.6 summarize the coefficient estimates. The coefficient of the interaction term between MID and TEK dominant status is not statistically significant, and only the main variable, MID, displays a strong positive association with civil war outbreak. These findings provide strong support for Hypothesis 2. When the relationship between the external state and the state-at-risk becomes hostile, the risk of civil war in the state-at-risk increases regardless of the TEK group’s access to power in the external state. Thus, interstate relations between the two states play a major role in affecting the expectation of external support from the TEK group or the TEK-controlling state. Panel B of Figure 2.6 further examines whether the effect of MID is conditional on the external state’s nationalistic ideology. While the coefficients of both variables are statistically significant, the interaction term is, again, not statistically significant, suggesting an unconditional effect of MID.

Using the simulation-based “observed value” approach, Figure 2.7 plots the density distribution of the first difference in the predicted probabilities of the interactions over 1000 draws from the posterior distribution of the parameters in Models 4-5 of Table A.3. Because the constitutive terms of the product are both binary, I use the gold-colored density to represent the change in predicted probabilities of MID, which vary from “0” (no MID) to “1” (MID), given that the TEK group does not have a dominant status, that is, $\Pr(\text{civil war} = 1 \mid \text{MID} = 1, \text{TEK status} = 0) - \Pr(\text{civil war} = 1 \mid \text{MID} = 0, \text{TEK status} = 0)$; by contrast, I use the blue-colored density to represent the change in the predicted probabilities of MID varying from “0” (no MID) to “1” (MID), given that the TEK group has a dominant status, that is, $\Pr(\text{civil war} = 1 \mid \text{MID} = 1, \text{TEK status} = 1) - \Pr(\text{civil war} = 1 \mid \text{MID} = 0, \text{TEK status} = 1)$. In other words, the gold-colored density essentially displays the first difference in the predicted probabilities of MID, given that the variable, TEK dominant status, is not

FIGURE 2.7: The first difference in predicted probabilities of the interactions between MID and TEK dominant status



(a) MID \times TEK dominant status



(b) MID \times Nationalist external state


Note: Figure 2.7 plots density distribution of the first difference in the predicted probabilities over 1000 draws from the posterior distribution of the parameters in Models 4-5 of Table A.3, respectively. All other variables are taking their observed values in each draw.

included in the model. Therefore, the 90% confidence intervals in the gold-colored density should not include the vertical line ($x=0$), as the effect of MID should be statistically significant. In contrast, the 90% confidence intervals in the blue-colored density should include the vertical line ($x=0$) because there should be no significant interaction effect.

In panel a, I plot the distribution of the first difference in predicted probabilities of MID, given the TEK dominant status taking a value of “0” (gold color) and “1” (blue color), respectively. Consistent with Rainey’s suggestion, the 90% confidence intervals contain a vertical line ($x=0$), suggesting that there is no conditional effect of MID on TEK dominant status (Rainey, 2014, 1085). Similarly, in panel b, I plot the distribution of the first difference in predicted probabilities of the MID varying from “0” to “1,” given the external state’s nationalistic ideology taking a value of “0” (gold color) or “1” (blue color), respectively. Again, the vertical line ($x=0$) is included in the 90% confidence intervals, suggesting insufficient evidence for a conditional effect of MID by the external state’s nationalistic ideology on the probability of ethnic civil war. As a consequence, these simulation-based predictions further provide evidence of the null effect (i.e., a lack of conditional effect of MID by the TEK’s access to power).

In Figure 2.8, I plot the receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curves (Greenhill, Ward and Sacks, 2011, Hanley and McNeil, 1982) for a model with control variables only and for Model 3. The ROC curve is useful to visually present the predictive power of a model over all possible thresholds. Specifically, “models with high levels of predictive power will tend to have true positive rates that are consistently higher than the corresponding false positive rates” (Greenhill, Ward and Sacks, 2011, 992). Moreover, the area under the ROC curve (that is, the AUC score in Figure 2.8) summarizes the overall predictive power of the model (across all possible thresholds). We observe that including the main independent variable in Model 3 improves our

FIGURE 2.8: The receiver operating characteristic plot




Note: Figure 2.8 compares the Receiver operating characteristic (ROC) plots for predictive success. ROC curve is used to nonparametrically assess the performance of competing methods for classifying binary outcomes. ROC curves demonstrate the in-sample predictive performance of the models. The greater the area under the ROC curve, the better the predictive value of a model.

model's predictive power.


2.5.2 Robustness Checks

As a robustness check, I use rivalry and interstate war as alternative measures of international hostility between two states. Figure 2.9 and Figure A.2 in the appendix illustrate the results. Specifically, I find that both rivalry and interstate war are positively associated with an increased likelihood of civil war in the state-at-risk, as shown in Figure 9. Panel B of Figure A.2 further shows that the effect of rivalry is not conditional on the TEK's dominant status because the interaction term is

FIGURE 2.9: The predicted probabilities of civil war onset for rivalry and interstate war



(a) Rivalry



(b) Interstate war

Note: Figure 2.9 plots the density of the predicted probabilities of ethnic conflict onset using *rivalry* and *interstate war* as alternative measures of interstate hostility. The density plots are based on 1000 draws from posterior distribution of parameters in models from panels a and d of Figure A.2.

not statistically significant.²¹ However, in Panel C of Figure A.2, the interaction between rivalry and a nationalist external state is statistically significant and the coefficient is negative, suggesting a heterogeneous effect of rivalry.²² In addition, I use only contiguous external state–state-at-risk dyads, and the results are similar to the above models in the paper.²³

In summary, these results have shown that interstate relations between the external state and the state-at-risk can largely affect the way in which ethnic groups interact with their incumbent governments in terms of whether they are more or less likely to take concessions from bargaining with the government. The models thus build a connection between ethnic civil wars and interstate politics. In the next section, I conclude with brief summary of the empirical findings, as well as the implications for future work.

2.6 Conclusion

Scholars have intuitively speculated a connection between civil wars and international politics, attempting to examine civil wars from the lens of international politics by other means (Fearon and Laitin, 2008). However, as Kalyvas and Kenny (2009) argue, there has been no adequate treatment of international politics in aggregate models of civil wars. The presence of TEK provides a natural bridge to link civil wars to international politics, but much of the existing work focuses on how civil wars were externalized to international conflicts or how international interventions affect the processes and outcomes of civil wars. I have argued in this paper that the way in which TEK groups affect the risk of civil war in the state-at-risk depends not only

²¹ Because of the perfect prediction of failure using the interaction between *interstate war* and *TEK dominant status*, I do not include the interaction term in the model.

²² However, the substantive effect in terms of first difference in predicted probability is not significant when using simulation over the observed value approach. I leave this for future test.

²³ Contiguity is defined using 50km, 200km, and 400km of minimum distance between the external state and the state-at-risk. Due to space limit, the results are not reported here.

on their relative strength, as previous work has shown (see Cederman et al., 2013), but also, more importantly, on the interstate relations between the external state and the state-at-risk. This paper takes a first step in examining how the left side of the “conflict–cooperation continuum” of interstate relations (Goertz, Diehl and Balas, 2016, Goldstein, 1992) affects the outbreak of civil war within the framework of TEK.

The findings in this paper highlight how hostile relations between the external state and the state-at-risk can increase the risk of civil war in the state-at-risk. Disputes between states have long been a major focus in the international conflict literature and can result in varying consequences within states, especially regarding the processes and outcomes of internal conflicts. However, when examining the effects of TEK on civil wars (Cederman et al., 2013), existing studies often overlook the role of interstate relations in shaping conflict actors’ preferences and expectations regarding whether they should fight in the first place. As a result, this paper’s findings contribute to the literature on the linkage between international politics and civil wars.

The paper also sheds light on future work related to the impact of interstate relations on civil wars. This paper is an initial attempt to theorize how hostile interstate relations shape the outbreak of ethnic civil wars. More work must be done on how cooperative relations between the external state and the state-at-risk can influence the risk of civil war. For example, Cunningham (2016) examines how potential outside intervention on behalf of the government can deter civil war, providing an entry point to examine the conflict-dampening effects of cooperative interstate relations. However, Cunningham does not specifically analyze whether the presence of TEK groups in the external state will affect the external state’s willingness to support the government, which is an interesting area for future work. Moreover, this paper’s findings also suggest that future work may need to take the external state’s

domestic politics into consideration. I find some evidence that the ideology of the external state may lead to some “heterogeneous treatment effects” on international hostility. It is worth looking at whether and how domestic political conditions may constrain the state-controlling TEK group’s willingness and capability to intervene in a civil war. Future work will benefit from the integration of interstate hostility and domestic politics in the study of civil war onset.

Ethnic Diversity, Local Competition, and Separatist Conflict

3.1 Introduction

How does ethnic diversity affect violent conflict in multiethnic countries? What are the consequences of competition among ethnic groups on government strategies to respond to group demands? Many existing studies have found that ethnic diversity is positively associated with ethnic conflict (Bleaney and Dimico, 2017, Horowitz, 1985, Montalvo and Reynal-Querol, 2005). A country with a large number of ethnic groups tends to experience more violent ethnic conflicts. One prominent explanation by Barbara Walter (Walter, 2006*a*, 2009*b*) is that governments in multiethnic societies are reluctant to accommodate group demands because governments fear that doing so will encourage other ethnic groups to seek similar concessions. Thus, bargaining between governments and aggrieved ethnic groups in those countries is less likely to take place or is more likely to break down. As such, governments often respond to these demands with violence to deter future challengers. Another strand of explanation points to the difficulty of cooperation among ethnic groups in multi-

ethnic societies, as ethnic diversity increases cleavages and mistrust among groups, thereby undermining the foundation of effective mobilization against governments (Novta, 2016, Reynal-Querol and Montalvo, 2005). However, these studies largely focus on ethnic heterogeneity at the national level. It remains unclear as to whether and how ethnic diversity shapes ethnic competition at a more local level related to a group's surrounding areas, which in turn may affect the occurrence of violent conflict.

In this chapter, I investigate how ethnic diversity and competition shape the risk of violent conflict in multiethnic countries. Building upon existing work on the role of ethnic diversity in shaping government willingness to make concessions to minority groups as well as the role of ethnic competition in shaping group behaviors (Bates, 1974, Bleaney and Dimico, 2017, Cunningham and Weidmann, 2010, Dion, 1997, Lee, 2018*a*, Olzak, 1992, Schaub, 2017*a*, Wilkes and Okamoto, 2002, Wood and Kathman, 2015), I propose that local ethnic competition can moderate the effects of national ethnic diversity on ethnic conflict. Indeed, in multiethnic societies, both resources and political power are scarce in proportion to the demands for them, so competition over status and resources are inevitable (Bates, 1974, Olzak, 1992). Local ethnic competition leaves these competing groups vulnerable to government exploitation. Specifically, as the level of ethnic competition among groups increases at a locality, the government is less likely to resort to fighting because local competition weakens the separatist movement collectively, thereby leaving the entire insurgency vulnerable to the government's "divide and concede" tactics (Best and Bapat, 2018, Cunningham, 2011, 2013).

Furthermore, local ethnic competition can encourage polarization among groups in peripheral areas, which creates opportunities for the government's strategic exploitation by maintaining the balance of power among rival groups through co-optation and deterrence tactics. When the level of competition between two largest local groups increases, other relatively smaller groups in the same region have to

take sides between the two, leading to a more polarized local balance of power (i.e., bipolarity) in the peripheral areas. As a result, in areas where there is a higher level of inter-ethnic group competition, the government can easily exploit the competition and strategically make concessions to one major group over another major rival, producing a strong co-optation of the chosen group to deter further resistance. As such, ethnic conflict targeting the government will be less likely to occur. Using group-level data from 1946 to 2017, my empirical analysis suggests that while at the national level ethnic diversity does increase the risk of conflict in multiethnic countries, local ethnic competition can instead mitigate such risk. In particular, when a group is surrounded by a large number of competitor groups, it is less likely to take up arms against the government.

This chapter thus joins recent efforts to disentangle the effects of local ethnic diversity and local power configuration on violence (Cunningham and Weidmann, 2010, Lacina, 2015, Schaub, 2017*a*, Weidmann, 2011). Although national ethnic diversity is associated with the costs of conflict for governments, local ethnic competition can mitigate the costs for governments. By focusing on local ethnic competition, this chapter makes two contributions to the existing literature.

First, it examines the interplay between ethnic diversity at the national level and ethnic competition at the local level, thereby providing a framework to unify two strands of research. It refines the “no concessions” argument in ethnically diverse countries (Best and Bapat, 2018, Walter, 2006*a*) by exploring how the presence of local ethnic competition shapes opportunities for governments to strategically exploit the vulnerabilities of rebellion movements resulting from the local competition among rival groups. The civil war literature suggests that internal divisions among rebel actors are more likely to lead to bargaining failure as they exacerbate the information and commitment problems (Cunningham, 2013). This chapter shows that ethnic competitors can also produce conflict-dampening effects when governments

strategically exploit their competition.

Second, and empirically, I construct a new measure of ethnic competition at the local level using the concept of “structural equivalence” from social network analysis. I conceptualize the demand for political inclusion as a scarce resource, which creates competition among excluded groups that are structurally equivalent within the same country. The existence of competition among those groups thus provides the states with an opportunity for strategic exploitation. Using the Ethnic Power Relations (EPR) 2018 data set (Vogt et al., 2015) and its compatible geo-referenced data set, GeoEPR, I develop an index for each group’s potential rivalries in its surrounding areas over time. This approach can be easily generalized to other dimensions of competition both at the group and individual levels, thus providing future avenues to explore the micro-foundations of ethnic competition and its subsequent implications.

The rest of this chapter proceeds as follows. The next section will lay out my theoretical framework, which integrates ethnic diversity at the national level and ethnic competition at the local level; I will also develop an argument for why local ethnic competition can mitigate conflict risk. I will then introduce my research design, including data and the new measure of ethnic competition. Finally, I will discuss the statistical results and conclude with a discussion of the implications for future study.

3.2 A Theoretical Framework for Ethnic Diversity and Ethnic Competition

How do national ethnic diversity and local ethnic competition affect the risk of ethnic conflict? In this section, I present a theory of how ethnic diversity at the national level induces ethnic competition at the local level, which in turn affects the risk of conflict between an ethnic group and the government.

3.2.1 National Ethnic Diversity and Conflict

Most existing research finds that governments of multiethnic countries are generally unwilling to offer accommodations to minority groups and that ethnic diversity is positively associated with the risk of conflict (Bleaney and Dimico, 2017, Fearon, 2003, Walter, 2006*a*). There are four main explanations of why ethnic diversity increases the risk of conflict.

First, ethnic diversity increases government difficulties in building a reputation to deter future challengers. The reputation-building literature on separatist conflicts suggests that governments in multiethnic countries often respond to territorial disputes with violence rather than concessions (Bormann and Savun, 2018, Walter, 2006*a,b*, 2009*a*) because governments fear that granting concessions to one group will encourage other ethnic groups to seek similar concessions in the future. Therefore, to deter future challengers, governments are significantly more likely to fight rather than to concede when the number of ethnic groups in a country increases. In light of this logic, countries with multiple ethnic groups often experience higher rates of ethnic conflict due to strong incentives governments have for reputation-building.

Second, ethnic diversity undermines the provision of public goods to non-coethnics, thereby exacerbating those minority groups' existing grievances, which in turn increases their likelihood of rebellion (Ejdemyr, Kramon and Robinson, 2018, Lee, 2018*a*, Singh and vom Hau, 2016, Wimmer, 2016). Public goods provisions, such as education, health care, transportation infrastructure, electricity, and water, are fundamental to local economic development and growth in less developed areas. Since uneven development and economic inequality among ethnic groups are important drivers of ethnic conflict (Cederman, Weidmann and Gleditsch, 2011), the provision of public goods is said to be an effective tool to reduce the risk of ethnic conflict. Because the provision of public goods requires cooperation between a large number

of individuals within a locality (Lee, 2018a), and cooperation is more likely to occur when individuals involved are from the same ethnic group due to shared languages and social networks as well as the enforcement–sanction mechanism, ethnic diversity will be likely to undermine such cooperation and produce under-provision of public goods for non-coethnics. As such, ethnic diversity can increase the risk of conflict through the under-provision of public goods.

Third, ethnic diversity lowers the costs of fighting for rebellion groups, thereby increasing incentives for potential rebellion groups to pursue their goals with violence. Recent studies of the intrastate diffusion of ethnic conflict (Bormann and Hammond, 2016, Lane, 2016) suggest that, in ethnically diverse countries, potential ethnic rebel groups are likely to strategically take advantage of an ongoing conflict between one group and the government. Governments involved in ongoing civil wars are constrained to utilize additional resources to fight subsequent or simultaneous conflicts with other groups within their countries. Therefore, ethnic bargaining with the government of a multiethnic state is less likely to occur from the group perspective, while direct fighting is more likely to be perceived as a viable option for the rebel group. In this sense, ethnic conflicts are more likely to occur in ethnically diverse countries.

Finally, ethnically diverse countries are more likely to experience external intervention due to the presence of transnational ethnic kin groups (Gleditsch, 2007, Gurses, 2015, Konaev and Brathwaite, 2019, Nome, 2013). Transnational ethnic ties increase risks of foreign interventions and can complicate domestic bargaining, which can increase the risk of ethnic conflict (Cetinyan, 2002, Davis and Moore, 1997). For multiethnic states, irredentist and separatist movements can both turn to violent conflicts (Ambrosio, 2001, Saideman, 1998, Saideman and Ayres, 2000, Siroky and Hale, 2017), especially if a group’s trans-border kin enjoy “greener grass” with regards to economic development (Chen, Beardsley and Weidmann, 2019).

To summarize, most existing research finds a positive relationship between ethnic diversity and ethnic conflict. However, most of these studies focus on the negative consequences of ethnic diversity at the aggregate country level, often with cross-national data. Recent studies on ethnic segregation and polarization at the local level (Ejdemyr, Kramon and Robinson, 2018, Klašnja and Novta, 2016) indicate that diversity may shape the local ethnic power configuration and interactions among groups at the local level. One implication is that ethnic diversity can induce ethnic competition and create ethnic rivalries in local regions. How, then, does local competition affect the risk of ethnic conflict?

3.2.2 Local Ethnic Competition and Conflict

Existing research has pointed out that ethnic diversity at the national level is associated with a regional concentration of minority groups (Bleaney and Dimico, 2017), which can then result in a very different local ethnic composition from the national average. As Cunningham and Weidmann (2010) note, local ethnic heterogeneity is likely to induce competition among local groups because such ethnic configurations may lead local politics to become a “zero-sum” game wherein one group’s gains will be considered as another group’s loss. As a consequence, governments may find it harder to accommodate one group’s demand because making concessions to one group will meet opposition from other minorities in the same region (Cunningham and Weidmann, 2010, Lacina, 2018). In other words, local ethnic heterogeneity can impede government attempts to mitigate group grievances even if governments do not have the incentive to invest in reputation-building (Walter, 2006*a*). The result is that the regional concentration of minority groups can prevent a peaceful resolution of a dispute between an ethnic group and the government, thereby increasing the risk of ethnic conflict (Cunningham and Weidmann, 2010).

However, I argue that such a local ethnic competition can also create an oppor-

tunity for the states to exploit the zero-sum game strategically. Unlike the existing work (Cunningham and Weidmann, 2010, Lacina, 2018) that focuses primarily on the incentive of local opposing groups, I instead look at the incentive of the government in exploiting inter-group competition. Drawing insights from the study of self-determinant movements and rebel actor fragmentation, I argue that the presence of diverse ethnic groups—especially separatist groups—within a country also creates opportunities for rational governments to use “divided and concede” (Cunningham, 2011) and co-optation strategies (Lacina, 2015, Liu, 2018). In particular, as the level of competition among local ethnic groups increases, the chance of using strategic exploitation also increases, which in turn can provide flexible strategies for the government to respond to minority group demands. Through the “divide and concede” strategy, governments can transform those groups that are co-opted into strong deterrence forces in local regions, thereby reducing the risk of conflict for some groups via direct co-optation as well as deterring other groups via local co-opted groups. The observed implication is that the risk of ethnic conflict between the government and an ethnic group with local competitors will be more likely to decrease. Two specific mechanisms can produce the conflict-dampening effect for local ethnic competition.

The first mechanism by which local competition reduces the risk of ethnic conflict is by undermining ethnic mobilization collectively, which then leaves the entire insurgency vulnerable to governments’ strategic exploitation and “divided and conquer” strategies. As infighting between rebels groups can destroy collective resources and turns the factions’ focus from fighting the government to fighting each other (Best and Bapat, 2018, 25), inter-group competition among minority groups can also weaken their capability and drain resources that would otherwise be used to resist government repressions and targeting. Furthermore, local competition limits the costs these minorities can collectively impose on the governments as well as the chances of forming united, cohesive opposition forces against the governments.

During ethnic competition, inter-group mistrust among local groups will be likely to increase (Robinson, 2017, Schaub, 2017*a*). Successful bargaining often requires the potential groups to demonstrate their capabilities of imposing costs on the government. However, competition with other local groups constrains their abilities to impose such collective costs on the government. Moreover, inter-group competition can produce substantial political costs among the public. The diversion from fighting against the government to struggles over resources, labors, and even local support undermines the legitimate image of the separatist movement and hence may reduce mobilization capability. Because all these consequences are *ex ante* and known to groups, it will become increasingly less likely for those competitive groups to take up arms against the government. Therefore, the risk of ethnic conflict will decrease as the level of local inter-group competition increases.

The second mechanism by which local competition reduces the risk of ethnic conflict is by encouraging polarization among local ethnic groups—which is analogical to the bipolarity in IR. When local competition in the periphery becomes intense, group bandwagons are more likely to emerge, which can in turn drive the local power distributing among two largest rival groups. This “bipolarity”/polarization can in turn increase co-optation between the government and some group(s) in the region. The co-opted group, as a result, also has a lower probability of conflict with the government since it now has a political advantage in the capital relative to its competitors (Lacina, 2015, 693). For example, Liu (2018) shows that, through a “cross-ethnic patronage” strategy—patronage (e.g., government personnel allocations and related fiscal spending on government employments) allocated by the ethnic group in power to reward minority out-group elites—the government can successfully manage the risk of ethnic conflict in China’s Xinjiang region because such a co-optation approach creates a sharing of government spoils at stakes that reduce the incentive of minority elites to initiate anti-regime mobilization. Moreover, the co-opted group can become

a deterrent force in the local area and help prevent rebellions by other rival groups within the same region. Lacina (2015) finds that the center's ties to a competing group in the periphery can generate a deterrence effect where a group is less likely to rebel if that group borders with a strong politically included regional group. In this sense, the co-opted group will likely deter would-be rebellion groups in the region, in particular when the government's political commitment to the potential rebellion group's opponents in the periphery is strong (Lacina, 2015, 696).

Another implication of the increased polarization is that it reinforces ethnic identities among in-group members and increases ethnic discrimination toward out-group members (Brancati, 2006). The government can also strategically create a strong rival group bordering other potential groups so that those groups will be focused on the local rivalry and lack the resources and capability to challenge the government. When the local ethnic configuration becomes polarized, one group/side might become more likely to seek outside intervention in local politics, and the governments will become more likely to get involved due to increasing interests in the balance of power within that region. While increased polarization in local politics can lead to more communal violence as competitive groups blame each other for the abuse of scarce resources or their grievances, polarization can also divert the blame away from the government and thus reduce the risk of civil war between the government and the rebellion group (Hillesund, 2019).

For example, Okumu et al. (2017) find that in northwestern Kenya, livestock raids and pastoralist competition over water and pastures among Samburu, Turkana, Pokot, Borana, Gabra, and Rendille communities were manifestations of the local ethnic politics and political contests between those ethnic kingpins, where ethnic politicians and shrewd businessmen exploited these ethnic rivalries to mobilize raids. Similar narratives also exist in the Niger Delta (Folami, 2017) and in India (Lacina, 2014). In the shadow of local ethnic competition, granting accommodation to the

co-opted group is not seen as an outcome but as a strategic act by the government to deter other challenging groups (Cunningham, 2011). As a consequence, the government may become zealous in defense of the status quo by maintaining the polarization structure at the local level and by making firm commitments to the co-opted group. Another prominent example is the Inner Mongolia in China. As the first autonomous region, Inner Mongolia was co-opted in 1947 by the Chinese Communist Party. Since then, the Inner Mongolian have not demonstrated significant political mobilization for greater autonomy (Han, 2011). Instead, the Inner Mongols even participated actively in the state building and helped defeat the Dalai Lama's uprising in Tibet in 1959.

The above discussions lead to the following hypothesis about the effect of local ethnic competition on ethnic conflict:

Hypothesis: Ethnic conflict is less likely to occur between a government and an ethnic group if the ethnic group faces higher levels of competition from its local peers.

Finally, synthesizing the discussion on national ethnic diversity and local ethnic competition, I summarize their interactive roles in a 2×2 typology in Table 3.1. At the national level, governments tend to fight rather than concede when the level of ethnic diversity increases (and vice versa); at the local level, however, governments are more likely to exploit ethnic competition strategically and selectively use a “divide and concede” strategy to undermine the collective opposition movement. Therefore, concession is not an outcome but a strategic tool of ethnic conflict.

To summarize, ethnic diversity at the national level shapes the overall possibility of bargaining (or failure of bargaining). Ethnically diverse countries have higher rates of ethnic conflict. However, ethnic diversity can also induce competition among minority groups at the local level, which counterintuitively reduces the likelihood of

Table 3.1: A typology of ethnic diversity and local ethnic competition

		Local Competition	
		High	Low
Ethnic Diversity	High	Moderate Risk (Fighting, No fighting)	High Risk (Fighting, Fighting)
	Low	Low Risk (No fighting, No fighting)	Moderate Risk (No fighting, Fighting)

Note: Table 3.1 present a 2×2 typology of ethnic diversity and local ethnic competition as well as their associated governments' preferred strategies. For example, the upper-left cell denotes the situation where high ethnic diversity is associated with *fighting* strategy, whereas high local competition reduces the incentive to fight, which jointly presents a moderate risk of conflict.

ethnic rebellion. Local competition creates vulnerability to government strategic exploitation by weakening group capabilities, draining resources collectively, and encouraging polarization at the local level. As a consequence, governments can strategically exploit local ethnic competition to maintain the status quo or manage risks of conflict.

3.3 Research Design

3.3.1 Data and Dependent Variable

The data are mainly taken from the 2018 version of the EPR data set (Vogt et al., 2015), which includes all politically relevant ethnic groups from 1946 to 2017. Because my interest is to examine how local competition among ethnic groups affects the risk of conflict between an ethnic group and the government, I only consider countries that contain at least three active politically relevant groups: One comprises the government, with at least two further groups in potential competition

with each other.¹ Following standard practice (Cederman, Gleditsch and Buhaug, 2013, Cederman, Weidmann and Gleditsch, 2011), I also exclude groups that are in dominant or monopoly status as those groups by definition cannot fight with themselves in the statistical analysis. The unit of analysis is *group-year*. In the main analysis, I focus only on groups that were excluded in the previous year.

My main dependent variable, ETHNIC CONFLICT, is coded 1 if an ethnic group has a link to a rebel organization that was actively involved in a conflict in a given year and 0 otherwise (Cederman, Weidmann and Gleditsch, 2011, 484).² Note that this definition does not distinguish the types of conflict incompatibility. As Buhaug, Cederman and Gleditsch (2014) note, groups with different types of grievances may end up taking distinct forms of rebellion. As such, I follow Buhaug, Cederman and Gleditsch (2014) and differentiate between TERRITORIAL CONFLICT and GOVERNMENTAL CONFLICT by creating two additional dependent variables.

3.3.2 Measuring Local Ethnic Competition

The key independent variable is LOCAL ETHNIC COMPETITION. Existing research on ethnic competition mainly focuses on ethnic individuals (Bates, 1974, Olzak, 1992, Schaub, 2017a), and there is no systemic measure at the group level. While some anecdotal accounts of ethnic rivalries and competition in some countries are helpful to identify the causal mechanisms (Lacina, 2018, Okumu et al., 2017, Posner, 2004a, Wilkes and Okamoto, 2002), a replicable and complete measure of ethnic competition is necessary for a global test.

Building upon the IR literature on economic competition (Cao, 2010, Cao and Prakash, 2010, Maoz et al., 2006, Piezunka et al., 2018), I use a social network

¹ For other research using a minimum of three groups, see Bormann and Hammond (2016).

² More precisely, EPR-ETH records a group as being in conflict if “a rebel organization expresses its political aims (at least partly) in the name of the group and a significant number of members of the group were participating in the conflict.” (Cederman, Weidmann and Gleditsch, 2011, Cederman, Weidmann and Bormann, 2015).

approach to create a new measure of ethnic competition. Specifically, I use the social network term *structural equivalence* to understand the relative position of each ethnic group within the domestic network power structure. Groups that are connected in the same way to the rest of the network are considered to be equivalent and to occupy the same position (Borgatti and Everett, 1992, 2–3). Similar positions in the network can induce competition between them because, from the government’s perspective, they are substitutable. For example, when the government considers granting power-sharing only to one ethnic group between A and B, the two are likely to compete for the inclusion if A and B are structurally equivalent. This also means that, for the government side, it does not make a difference whether they choose A or B because A and B are substitutable due to their structural equivalence.

Following Piezunka et al. (2018, E3362–3) and Cao (2010), my measurement of structural equivalence relies on ethnic groups’ past rankings within countries across years. Given the nested nature of the data structure—ethnic groups nested within a country and the total number of groups within a country changed over time—I create the structural equivalence scores for each group of a country for each year. I assume that access to political power is a scarce resource for all excluded groups. Therefore, there exist competitive relationships among those ethnic groups, in particular among excluded groups seeking power-sharing, which is also the reason why the main analysis focuses on groups that were excluded in the previous year.

I use the Euclidean distance between groups i ’s and j ’s status rankings relative to other groups across all years. I calculate these distances from temporally updated matrices of status comparison outcomes $\mathbf{M}_t = [\mathbf{m}_{ij,t}]$ in which $m_{ii,t} = 0$ and $m_{ij,t} = m_{ji,t}$. Therefore, each entry $m_{ij,t}$ is the absolute distance between i ’ and j ’s ranking. If i and $j = 0$, this means that both groups are in the same position in the ethnic hierarchy of power. Those similar ranking groups are more likely to form a competitive relationship because both are closer to and have the same chance

for power-sharing. In other words, I assume that \mathbf{M}_t is a competitive network of power status. I then use the method developed by Lorrain and White (1971) and Batagelj, Ferligoj and Doreian (1992) to compute a structural equivalence score between i and j in $m_{ij,t}$ in a given year. Because structural equivalence scores are calculated as Pearson correlations between two groups' ranking distance in the same country, they are bounded between -1 and +1. The result is a score that captures the situation where two ethnic groups share the exact same positions (i.e., +1) or the most dissimilar positions (i.e., -1) in the ethnic power hierarchy.

Although \mathbf{M}_t gives us structural equivalence scores between two groups over time, it is essential to identify a set of competitor groups for group i . Given that \mathbf{M}_t is symmetric, I follow Cao (2010) and use the i th row of the matrix to define this set of group competitors. To define a set of competitor groups for ethnic group i , I choose $k = 0.5$ as the threshold value for the structural equivalence scores. Following Cao (2010, 839), I only use structural equivalence scores that are higher or equal to 0.5 and transform them to a binary value of 1, while group structural equivalence that is lower than this 0.5 threshold value is treated as zero. In the subsequent analyses, I also use $k = 0.1, 0.2, \dots, 0.9$ as alternative values. I then sum the i th row to obtain the number of group competitors for group i . Thus, LOCAL ETHNIC COMPETITION essentially counts the number of ethnic competitors that group i has in a given year.

3.3.3 Control Variables

I include several control variables that account for alternative explanations in the existing literature. At the country level, I first control for GDP PER CAPITA, which is the lagged log of the GDP per capita at the country-year level. Data on GDP and population are from the Penn World Table 9.1 (Feenstra, Inklaar and Timmer, 2015) and are supplemented by World Development Indicators and the COW's National Material Capability Project. Likewise, I control for COUNTRY POPULATION using

the lagged log of the total population at the country–year level. Second, I include the NUMBER OF ETHNIC GROUPS as a measure of a country’s ethnic diversity at the national level.³

At the group level, I control for GROUP SIZE as a measure of a group’s proportion of the state’s total population. Posner (2004*b*) finds that the size of a group determines whether a group is useful for coalition building. In addition, I follow Roessler and Ohls (2018) and control for THREAT CAPABILITY, which is the centroid distance in kilometers between the capital city and the centroid of the ethnic group’s homeland. I use this variable to proxy the mobilizational potential to threaten the central government (Roessler and Ohls, 2018, 435–36). I use the inverse distance so that closer groups have higher values. Finally, to account for the temporal dependencies in TSSC data with binary dependent variables (Carter and Signorino, 2010), I include PEACE YEARS—the number of peaceful years at the group–year level—and its polynomial terms, PEACE YEARS², and PEACE YEARS³.

3.4 Results and Discussions

3.4.1 Main Results

Following the standard practice in using EPR data (Cederman, Gleditsch and Buhaug, 2013, Cederman, Weidmann and Gleditsch, 2011, Cederman, Weidmann and Borrmann, 2015), I first estimate a set of logistic regression models where the dependent variable is ETHNIC CONFLICT ONSET and my main independent variable is LOCAL COMPETITION. All standard errors are clustered to the country level in order to account for additional sources of within-country autocorrelation. I expect local competition to induce a *conflict-dampening effect* that decreases the risk of ethnic conflict

³ I also use the most common indicator of ethnic diversity—the degree of ethnic fractionalization (Fearon, 2003, Fearon and Laitin, 2003, Robinson, 2017)—measured by $EF = \sum_{i=1}^N \pi_i^2$ where π is the proportion of the population represented by ethnic group $i = (1, \dots, N)$ (Haynes, 2015, 263). It estimates the probability that two randomly selected individuals in a given state will belong to different ethnic groups.


for groups surrounded by a greater number of competitive groups.

Figure 3.1 displays the effect of local competition on ethnic conflict when the threshold value is $k = 0.5$. The coefficient for LOCAL COMPETITION in panel a of Figure 3.1 is negative and statistically significant, suggesting that a group is less likely to fight against the government if the group is surrounded by an increasing number of competitor ethnic groups. This finding supports my hypothesis that ethnic competition at the local level can decrease the risk of ethnic conflict.


Panel b of Figure 3.1 displays the predicted probability of ethnic conflict for LOCAL COMPETITION via a simulation-based approach. Specifically, I use an observed-value approach (Hanmer and Ozan Kalkan, 2013) where, in each simulation, all variables except for the variable of interest (i.e., local competition) are taking their true values in the sample data. I use 1,000 simulations and plot the 95% confidence intervals from the distributions of these simulations. Panel b of Figure 3.1 strongly indicates that, as the level of local competition increases, ethnic groups are very reluctant to take up arms against the government. As argued above, on the one hand, since local ethnic competition increases opportunities for the government to strategically exploit rival ethnic groups, the government can use a “divide and concede” strategy, which can prevent an excluded ethnic group within a locality from rebelling and can instead even induce a co-opted relationship with the government. On the other hand, local ethnic competition and rivalry not only weaken the separatist movement collectively but also drain group resources that would otherwise be used to fight against the government. As a consequence, competition among these groups undermines their effective resistance capabilities, which further reduces the risk of conflict between that group and the government.

While Figure 3.1 provides strong empirical evidence for my hypothesis on the relationship between local competition and ethnic conflict, it is possible that this statistical and substantive finding is a result of the arbitrary choice of threshold

FIGURE 3.1: The effects of local competition on ethnic conflict




(a) Coefficients



(b) Predicted probability

Note: Panel a of Figure 3.1 displays the coefficients (rescaled) for all variables based on Model 5 of Table B.1. PEACE YEARS and its polynomial terms are excluded. Whiskers denote 90% and 95% CIs. The threshold is set to $k = 0.5$ for the structural equivalence scores. Panel b of Figure 3.1 shows the predicted probabilities of ethnic conflict as the level of local competition increases. Gray areas denote 95% CIs from 1,000 simulations.

FIGURE 3.2: The estimated effects for local competition with varying threshold




Note: Figure 3.2 compares the estimated effects of local competition on ethnic conflict with different threshold for structural equivalence scores based on models in Table B.1. Whiskers denote 90% and 95% CIs, with coefficients rescaled.


value $k = 0.5$. To rule out this possibility, I use a set of different values for k , and the full results are presented in Table B.1. Figure 3.2 compares the estimated effects for the different threshold to define competitor groups in terms of the structural equivalence scores. The coefficients for LOCAL COMPETITION across these models are all negative and statistically significant, which again lends robust support to my original finding.

If local ethnic competition can shape the risk of ethnic conflict, does it matter for different types of ethnic conflict? Existing research has shown that ethnic territorial conflicts and ethnic governmental conflicts tend to follow distinct logics due to their different perceived grievances and goals. This difference might be particularly true for the government’s “divide and concede” strategy (Cunningham, 2011). In separatist conflicts (a.k.a. territorial conflicts), local competition may result in

FIGURE 3.3: The estimated effects for local competition with varying threshold by conflict type



(a) Territorial ethnic conflict



(b) Governmental ethnic conflict


Note: Panel a of Figure 3.3 compares the estimated effects of local competition on territorial ethnic conflict with varying threshold for structural equivalence scores. Whiskers denote 90% and 95% CIs. Panel b of Figure 3.3 shows the estimated effects of local competition on governmental ethnic conflict with varying threshold for structural equivalence scores.

greater vulnerability. Thus, I compare the effects of local competition for these two types of ethnic conflict. Figure 3.3 summarizes the outcome of the comparisons. Panel a largely confirms the findings in Figure 3.2, while panel b shows no effects on governmental conflicts. In other words, local ethnic competition mainly affects the risk of ethnic territorial conflict but not ethnic governmental conflict. In this sense, local ethnic competition mainly affects government strategies when dealing with separatist movements, which is consistent with the findings in the study of self-determinant movements.


So far, I have shown that ethnic competition at the local level can produce a conflict-dampening effect. However, ethnic diversity at the country level can increase the risk of ethnic conflict, as many existing studies have suggested (Bleaney and Dimico, 2017, Haynes, 2015, Novta, 2016). To confirm the paradox, I examine how ethnic diversity at the national level affects ethnic conflict. I aggregate group-level conflict to the national level and count the number of conflict onsets within each country in each year. Thus, I estimate four negative binomial models; and the findings are summarized in Figure 3.4. I use THE NUMBER OF ACTIVE GROUPS, THE NUMBER OF EXCLUDED GROUPS, THE NUMBER OF INCLUDED GROUPS, and THE NUMBER OF POLITICALLY RELEVANT GROUPS in each model while also controlling for GDP PER CAPITA and POPULATION.

Not surprisingly, ethnic diversity measured by the number of ethnic groups within a country does increase the likelihood of ethnic conflict within a country. The coefficients for THE NUMBER OF EXCLUDED GROUPS along with the overall number of ethnic groups are positively and statistically significant. These findings are still at the country level, which to some extent are consistent with the existing studies on ethnic diversity as well as the studies on reputation-building (Walter, 2006*a*). However, as my previous findings have revealed, ethnic diversity at the national level can induce ethnic competition at the local level, which in turn creates exploitation

FIGURE 3.4: The effects of the number of groups on ethnic conflict at the national level



(a) Coefficients



(b) Predicted count

Note: Panel a of Figure 3.4 displays the coefficients (rescaled) for all variables of interest (all other variables are excluded). Whiskers denote 90% and 95% CIs. Panel b of Figure 3.4 shows the predicted count of ethnic conflicts. Gray areas denote 95% CIs.

opportunities for governments and undermine the rebellion capabilities of local ethnic groups to challenge governments. Taken together, at the national level, we find that ethnically diverse countries tend to experience higher rates of ethnic rebellion; however, at the local level, such diversity-induced competition can mitigate the risk of conflict. These findings are important for us to understand the dynamic role of ethnic diversity at different levels.

Finally, my control variables across different models are highly consistent with existing research. `GROUP SIZE` is positively associated with ethnic rebellion as larger sized groups have higher mobilization potentials. Likewise, `STATUS DOWNGRADED IN THE PAST TWO YEARS` as well as `PAST CONFLICT HISTORY` also increase the risk that a group will fight against government. For the country-level control variables, `GDP PER CAPITA` is negatively associated with ethnic conflict while `COUNTRY POPULATION` is positively and statistically significantly associated with ethnic rebellion, indicating evidence consistent with existing studies.

3.4.2 Robustness checks

I conduct a set of robustness checks to ensure that the previous findings are consistent.

First, I consider alternative modeling strategies and use a set of multilevel logistic models. Since the unit-of-analysis is *group-year*, we essentially have a dataset with a nested structure—ethnic groups nested within each country. The multilevel logistic regression is particularly suitable for handling this type of data structure (Gelman and Hill, 2007). Table B.2 summarizes the results from multilevel logistic models, which are still highly consistent with the ones in Table B.1.

Second, I use alternative measures for competition. Instead of the count of competitors, I use the weighted number of competitors by the distance among ethnic groups. The results are also consistent. I also weight the number of competitors

by group threat capability, which is the centroid distance in kilometers between the capital city and the centroid of the ethnic group's homeland. I find similar effects for local ethnic competition. Moreover, it is possible that the effects of competitors are driven by the overall number of excluded groups in the country, as the higher the number of groups in a country is, the more possible similar groups exist. I thus control for the number of excluded groups, and the coefficient of local competition is still statistically significant and consistent.

Third, I consider the possible influence of the new entry of an ethnic group on the risk of conflict. Some research on non-state actors such as terrorist groups finds that competition among them will increase when a new group enters the game. Following Wood and Kathman (2015), I use the CHANGES IN THE NUMBER OF REBEL GROUPS to capture ethnic competition because a new entry of a politically relevant group can be perceived as a threat to the existing ethnic power structure as well as to scarce resources within that region. However, I do not find evidence for the effect of new entry of ethnic groups. One possible reason is that the new entry of one group does not induce strong competition among local ethnic groups.

Fourth, I look at whether the rates of conflict are higher during election times (Butcher and Goldsmith, 2017). Politically competitive and rival groups tend to show intense competition during elections. I use country-level election data from Hyde and Marinov (2012) and interact with the local competition. I do not find any statistically significant effects for the interaction term.

Fifth, I consider the potential for reverse causality, that is, the level of local competition could be a function of civilian displacement resulting from violent conflict with government. As recent research suggests, civil wars often create tremendous displacement in areas where governments fought with rebel groups (Balcells, 2018, Rügger and Bohnet, 2018). Therefore, it is possible that the lack of competition is a result of civilian displacement caused by violent conflict with government. However,

this is unlikely to be the case with respect to the EPR data due to the way in which the EPR project coded and defined ethnic group's settlement areas. In general, the settlement areas of ethnic groups are not sensitive to immediate changes from displacement (Cederman, Wimmer and Min, 2010, Vogt et al., 2015).

Finally, instead of focusing on previously excluded groups only, I include all groups in countries that have at least three ethnic groups. The results are still consistent, though much weaker in the multilevel logistic models.

3.5 Conclusion

In this chapter, I examine the role of ethnic diversity at the national level and its induced ethnic competition at the local level in shaping the risk of ethnic conflict in multiethnic countries. Unlike most previous studies that examine how country-level ethnic diversity affects the risk of ethnic conflict, I focus on how local competition induced by national ethnic diversity shapes the likelihood of ethnic conflict. I argue that local competition among excluded groups not only weakens the insurgent movement collectively but also provides an opportunity for the government to strategically exploit. Government strategic exploitation can take on a variety of forms, which can significantly reduce the risk of ethnic conflict in multiethnic states. These findings thus can help us understand why ethnic conflict is more likely to concentrate in some parts of a multiethnic states (e.g., China, Russia, or India) while other parts of the multiethnic states are able to remain relatively peaceful.

For example, although there are over 50 ethnic minority groups in China, only a few groups such as the Tibetans and the Uighurs used to engage in mobilization against the central government. By creating, identifying, and migrating a number of other ethnic groups to the surrounding areas or within lower-level administration regions, the Chinese government is able to build a number of pro-government and co-opted ethnic minorities that serve as deterrence forces in its peripheral areas

such as Yunnan or Inner Mongolia (Han, 2011). Those multiethnic provinces rarely experience ethnic violence since then and have become the major bases to help deter ethnic rebellion in their nearby regions such as Tibet and Xinjiang.

Empirically, I leverage a social network approach to construct a new measure of ethnic local competition in term of groups' relative position in a competitive network: that is, ethnic power ranking. My new measure provides a spatial account of local ethnic competition and demonstrates consistent effects across different modeling strategies. This social network approach can also be easily applied to other types of ethnic network, allowing us to examine more complex interactive effects of ethnic politics.

Future studies may build on this chapter and explore the causal mechanism with field experiments. As Larson and Lewis (2017) show, the study of ethnic networks is still an understudied area and can benefit from a network approach. That being said, more local knowledge and local fieldwork are needed to explore the micro-foundations of how ethnic competition leads to a reduced risk of conflict. Recent work at the individual levels in ethnically diverse villages shows the potential to further uncover the causal mechanisms underlying this competition–conflict nexus (Schaub, 2017*a*).

In the Shadow of Rebellion: The Intrastate Diffusion of Ethnic Inclusion

4.1 Introduction

Recent scholarship on ethnic conflict has generally found that politically excluded ethnic groups are associated with higher rates of violent rebellions (e.g., see Borrmann et al., 2019, Cederman, Gleditsch and Buhaug, 2013) and that granting political power-sharing to these excluded groups can help reduce risks of ethnic conflicts (Cederman et al., 2015).¹ These studies have thus implicitly viewed violent ethnic rebellion as a strategy or an instrument to improve a group's political status within a state (Koos, 2016, 3). One implication for this instrumental function of ethnic rebellion is that, if a group's exclusion from political power in the center is a driver of its rebellion, then an (or anticipated) ethnic conflict would lead to a transition of that group from exclusion to inclusion.² However, with only a few exceptions (Koos, 2016, Webster et al., 2019), existing research has fallen short of a consensus on the

¹ Throughout this chapter, I use political inclusion and political power-sharing interchangeably.

² For example, if the government anticipates a rebellion to come shortly, it may grant political inclusion in order to prevent such a rebellion.

efficacy of ethnic rebellion—at least there is inconclusive evidence at the individual group level. Just as conflict can be both a hindrance to and a catalyst for gender hierarchies (Webster, Chen and Beardsley, 2019), ethnic rebellions might also reinforce or undermine ethnic exclusion. However, we still know very little about *whether* and *how* excluded ethnic groups gain political inclusion in the shadow of rebellion.

Rebel groups within the same country are dependent upon one another (Akcinaroglu, 2012, Schricker, 2017). Ethnic conflict between one group and the government can increase the risk of conflict between another group and the same government (Bormann and Hammond, 2016, Lane, 2016). This interdependence among rebel groups is also well documented in the reputation-building literature in civil war studies wherein governments often take other potential rebellion groups within the same countries into consideration when gauging the trade-off between fighting and negotiation with a challenger group (Walter, 2009*b*). According to Walter (2009*b*), governments of multiethnic societies are reluctant to grant accommodations to one ethnic group because they fear doing so will encourage other ethnic groups to seek similar concessions. As a result, governments are often willing to pay the costs of fighting early challengers to deter other groups from making similar demands in the future (Bormann and Savun, 2018, Walter, 2003, 2009*b*). In light of the logic of reputation-building, ethnic groups in multiethnic societies should find it increasingly difficult to gain political rights if governments strongly believe in and thus invest in reputation-building. However, the reputation-building theory is premised upon a slippery slope that concessions to one group will necessitate concessions to others, which has yet to be examined empirically. In fact, the worldwide inclusion of ethnic groups in multiethnic societies has posed empirical challenge to the reputation-building logics, and governments do grant concessions to a set of minority groups in the same country (Cederman, Gleditsch and Wucherpfennig, 2018, Cunningham and Sawyer, 2017). If the slippery slope logic holds, then does it imply that, once

political inclusion is granted to one group, it will diffuse to other groups? The existing literature is still unclear about whether or not ethnic conflict can lead to the inclusion of groups beyond those who merely rebelled.

This chapter aims to answer this question by examining whether ethnic inclusion follows a diffusion pattern in which the inclusion of one group leads to the inclusion of other *similar* groups in the same country. Building upon the study of conflict diffusion, I theorize ethnic inclusion within a country as an outcome of a diffusion process. While not discounting the efficacy of violent rebellion as a catalyst for a social group's political empowerment (Koos, 2016, Webster, Chen and Beardsley, 2019), I argue that violent rebellion can produce broader effects across multiethnic societies such that ethnic groups connected—either politically, socially, or physically—to the warring group can enjoy the dividends of its ethnic rebellion. Consequently, those connected groups do not necessarily need to foment violent rebellion to gain political rights; instead, they can also gain political rights as a result of government response to another connected group's demand within the same country. In other words, ethnic inclusion follows an intrastate diffusion pattern: If one excluded group is granted access to political power, another similar group is also likely to be politically included subsequently.

What are the channels through which the intrastate diffusion of ethnic inclusion takes place? Unlike most existing research focusing on a simple geographic notion of “connectivity,” this chapter considers how the prevalence of *experientially similar* groups within a country shapes the government's decision to grant previously excluded groups access to political power. I argue that similarities in experiences can serve as a viable precedent for both relevant actors—excluded groups and the government—to, respectively, strategically demand and to supply political rights. For the demand-side (i.e., excluded groups), similarities with a successfully included group make an ethnic group's learning and emulation easier and faster. The success

of a similar group can inspire other groups to demand similar political rights and to adopt similar strategies that have been proven effective by the successful group.

From the supply-side (i.e., the government) perspective, however, granting subsequent concessions is more complicated. The logic of reputation-building implies that a government will prefer fighting over concessions when facing multiple potential challengers because granting power-sharing to one group can trigger a domino effect among other groups (Walter, 2009*b*). Thus, as Cederman, Gleditsch and Wucherpfennig (2018, 1287) assert, entirely voluntary mechanisms may not be enough to affect changes from the supply-side in the first place. Once the government has made the first concession, the question is whether the government will do so again for another group(s) so that the intrastate diffusion of political inclusion can take place. There are two possibilities that subsequent concessions are more likely in multiethnic societies with experientially similar groups.

First, governments that have made the first concession to one group are a result of a self-screening process wherein they are not resolved enough to hold such strong lines, so they are willing to make subsequent concessions. This type of government may have realized that granting political power-sharing to the excluded group(s) is less costly than fighting with them (Koos, 2016), so they are willing to make concessions to the early group as well as to later groups.

Second, governments that have made the first concession to one group are generally no longer willing to make concessions and instead may hold stronger lines. However, the prevalence of multiple experientially similar groups can increase the costs for the government to such a degree that granting political power-sharing is less costly than fighting with multiple groups. Furthermore, the prevalence of similar groups can provide critical information for the government to mitigate the commitment problem as to whether granting concessions will lead to higher demands from the groups. Because of the precedent set by an early group, this information might

be more complete and comparable to such a point that the government’s fear of triggering a commitment problem as well as the costs of designing and implementing inclusive policies will be reduced and mitigated from the supply-side perspective. As a consequence, this initial willingness to grant concessions signals a different type of government that is also likely to offer additional concessions to respond to future demands for power-sharing.

Moreover, the prevalence of experientially similar groups can increase the perception of the internal unity that social movements for inclusive policies have demonstrated (Vogt, 2016), thereby increasing the social pressure they exert on government elites, which in turn leads to broader inclusion of groups beyond those who have rebelled. Indeed, recent empirical work has shown that the logic of reputation-building only may apply to a few cases (Bormann and Savun, 2018, Forsberg, 2013, Sambanis, Germann and Schädel, 2018). Governments may have incentives to invest in reputation, but they are also likely to be constrained by their own resources as well as by the strength of these similar groups. In this sense, similarities can serve as channels for the domestic diffusion of political inclusion.

To empirically test this argument, I use spatially weighted regression models along with the EPR data set (Vogt et al., 2015) from 1946 to 2017. I find strong evidence that ethnic inclusions are more likely to diffuse among similar ethnic groups that share geographic space, conflictual experiences, and ethnic kin ties. In doing so, this chapter makes three contributions. First, it unpacks the intrastate diffusion of inclusion within states, which has largely been ignored in the existing literature. While there is increasingly research on the “open-polity” model of ethnic power-sharing (Cederman, Gleditsch and Wucherpfennig, 2018), which seeks explanations outside of the state, this chapter shows that such a diffusion model exists not only between but also within countries. Second, I demonstrate that intrastate diffusion not only exists in a geographic sense—which has been the focus of most existing

work—but also exists in non-geographic space. Scholars have long argued for non-geographic notions of “proximity” in political science (Beck, Gleditsch and Beardsley, 2006), yet there is still a lack of sufficient studies on non-geographic notions of space. This chapter joins these attempts to fill that gap.

Finally, I add to a broader literature on the nexus between conflict and social hierarchies by explicitly focusing on ethnic power hierarchies within states. Social hierarchies, particularly ethnic hierarchies, may persist for decades or even centuries, and even in the aftermath of major societal catastrophes, such as intrastate and interstate wars (Webster, Chen and Beardsley, 2019, Webster et al., 2019). I show the conditions under which these ethnic groups are more likely to secure their dividends of rebellion in the shadow of ethnic conflict.

The rest of the chapter proceeds as follows. In the next section, I review the relevant literature on ethnic inclusion and power-sharing, with a particular emphasis on the broader effects of conflict and war. I then integrate these studies and develop a theoretical framework of intrastate diffusion of ethnic inclusion. I then introduce my research design, including data sources, variable measurement, and statistical modeling in the fourth section, and present my analysis in the subsequent section. I conclude by discussing the implications for the spread of ethnic inclusion and for future research.

4.2 Literature Review

A large body of literature focuses on how the political status of an ethnic group can become a source of grievances that mobilize its rebellion. Scholars have demonstrated that excluded ethnic groups are more likely to take up arms against governments (e.g., Gates et al., 2016, Strøm et al., 2017, Wucherpfennig, Hunziker and Cederman, 2016). However, with only a few exceptions, little attention has been paid to whether and how, if any, ethnic rebellion can be paid back with an improvement of the group’s

political status. As Cederman, Gleditsch and Wucherpfennig (2018) note, we still know little about what causes transitions to the political inclusion of ethnic groups. Ignoring this opposite causal direction, however, may lead to invalid inference for the effects of political power-sharing on ethnic conflict. This is particularly true in the empirical models where selection bias could arise due to a disregard of whether and how ethnic conflict could shape ethnic exclusion (Bormann et al., 2019, Wucherpfennig, Hunziker and Cederman, 2016). It is not until recently that scholarship has started to address this potential opposite causal direction (Wucherpfennig, Hunziker and Cederman, 2016) by exploring factors that affect the political inclusion of ethnic groups (Cederman, Gleditsch and Wucherpfennig, 2018, Cunningham and Sawyer, 2017, Koos, 2016, Webster et al., 2019).

Scholars have focused on the general phenomenon of transition to political inclusion at the country level. For example, Cederman, Gleditsch and Wucherpfennig (2018) examine a set of factors that could lead to the political inclusion of an excluded ethnic group in multiethnic states. Rather than focusing on domestic explanations of political inclusion, such as the level of ethnic diversity, democracy, and political (in)stability, they find that political inclusion tends to cluster in spaces. They thus offer an “open-polity” model that attempts to explain the inclusion of ethnic groups beyond the national border (Cederman, Gleditsch and Wucherpfennig, 2018, 1281). They find that political inclusion is more likely to diffuse at the regional level rather than at the global level or between territorial neighbors. This clustering is due to regional organizations’ pressure, persuasion, and socialization as well as learning effects produced by early pioneering states within that region. While Cederman, Gleditsch and Wucherpfennig (2018) include both domestic and trans-border factors in explaining the transition from political exclusion to inclusion, their theoretical story is mostly pertinent to country-level inclusion rather than ethnic group-level inclusion. Therefore, we still lack an account of how individual groups obtain political

power-sharing.

Another strand of research examines the impact of armed conflict on the empowerment of social groups in general and excluded ethnic groups in particular, seeking more micro-level factors to explain the transition from exclusion to inclusion. For example, Koos (2016) focuses on whether violent rebellion becomes a viable strategy for deprived groups to move from exclusion to inclusion at the group level. He finds that groups that experienced ethnic rebellion managed to improve their status following their rebellion because violent rebellion can increase the costs for the government to a point where granting political inclusion to politically deprived groups becomes more preferable to war. Moreover, violent rebellion may lead to more inclusive reforms in domestic institutions. Although these findings also comport well with recent studies on the effects of war on social groups' political inequalities (Webster, Chen and Beardsley, 2019, Webster et al., 2019), Koos's exclusive focus on politically deprived groups—a subset of a larger number of ethnic groups—also raises some methodological concerns. First, those politically deprived groups might be significantly different from other marginalized groups as to whether they are highly motivated to overhaul the governments. If so, those politically deprived groups will certainly impose higher costs on the government, thereby increasing the likelihood of obtaining political rights. As a consequence, there might be a selection effect in Koos's findings. Moreover, Koos (2016) cannot explain the political inclusion in societies where no rebellion takes place. In other words, if ethnic rebellion is not the only pathway to inclusion, what are the different channels through which excluded groups can move up in the ethnic hierarchies? Third, since Koos (2016) looks at only those aggrieved groups and neglects other non-excluded groups at the same time, we still do not know for sure if an ethnic group's inclusion is at the expense of other groups' status with regard to whether ethnic rebellion can lead to more repression or more inclusion. This potentially neglected effect in Koos (2016) leaves an incomplete

picture of the broader impact of violent rebellion on power-sharing in multiethnic countries.

Though not necessarily related to the transition from ethnic exclusion to inclusion, existing studies also point to other factors that could lead to changes in power-sharing in central governments in multiethnic states. The literature on civil war resistance indicates another pathway by which excluded groups can gain political rights without resorting to violent rebellion (Stephan and Chenoweth, 2008). For instance, Vogt (2016) finds that indigenous movements in Latin America—defined as the number of organizations that represent group claims—can produce social pressure on the government and leading political parties, which in turn can promote political inclusion for historically marginalized groups. However, Vogt (2016) also reveals that this inclusion-inducing effect of indigenous movements only works in democratic countries.

Briefly stated, existing work has exclusively focused on the effects of political exclusion on the occurrence of ethnic conflict while largely ignoring the opposite causal direction. Moreover, among those few exceptions that do look at what causes political inclusion, little attention has been paid to group inclusion through means other than violent rebellion. In summary, the literature indicates the following pathways that groups can pursue to gain political rights. That is, political inclusion can be (1) a result of a group's own fighting and negotiation (Cederman et al., 2015); (2) a product of modernization and normative changes at the global or regional levels (Cederman, Gleditsch and Wucherpfennig, 2018); (3) a compromise due to third-party imposed pressure on the government (Bush, 2011, Cederman, Gleditsch and Wucherpfennig, 2018, Vogt, 2016); and (4) an unintended consequence of efforts by other groups to seek political rights.

This chapter contributes to the existing literature on the political inclusion of ethnic groups, both theoretically and empirically. Drawing from studies on con-

flict diffusion (Black, 2013, Bormann and Savun, 2018, Bormann and Hammond, 2016, Buhaug and Gleditsch, 2008, Cederman, Gleditsch and Wucherpfennig, 2018, Cederman et al., 2015, Forsberg, 2014*a*, Lane, 2016, Linebarger, 2016, Olar, 2019, Walter, 2006*a*, Wucherpfennig, Hunziker and Cederman, 2016), I propose a theory of intrastate diffusion of ethnic inclusion, which accounts explicitly for the interdependencies between ethnic groups and their broader strategic environment within states. Empirically, this chapter adopts a novel spatial regression approach that takes the nested nature of group-level data into consideration through the creation of spatial adjacency for each country in each year, thereby contributing to the existing spatial approach to conflict studies, which often uses static panels over time.

4.3 A Theoretical Framework for Intrastate Diffusion of Ethnic Inclusion

In this section, I present a theory of how political inclusion diffuses among ethnic groups within the same states, with an emphasis on similarities in group experiences.

4.3.1 Geographic Proximity as Channels of Diffusion

Existing scholarship in conflict studies has well documented the importance of interdependences among rebel groups both empirically and theoretically. One group's behavior affects and is affected by the behavior of other groups (Akcinaroglu, 2012), especially those that are physically and socially connected.

Not surprisingly, most studies on conflict diffusion emphasize the role of geographic proximity in spreading conflict (Buhaug and Gleditsch, 2008). In ethnic politics, the local geographic configuration of ethnic groups can shape the motivations as well as the opportunities for rebellion (Weidmann, 2009), leading to domestic diffusion of ethnic conflict (Bormann and Hammond, 2016, Lane, 2016). Indeed, geographic proximity provides an important pathway by which diffusion via cognitive

heuristics, emulating, and learning can take place (Böhme, 2016, 381). In light of this potential effect of geography, on the one hand, concessions that governments grant to one group are more likely to be learned by that group's neighbors, which can, in turn, accelerate group comparisons among these groups, thereby inducing or reducing grievances of the nearby groups, depending on the outcome of social comparison (Chen, Beardsley and Weidmann, 2019).

On the other hand, information about the incentives and motivations of one group's neighbors will be critical for the government when granting political power-sharing to that group and other proximate groups. In addition to weighing the costs between fighting and concession when facing a violent rebellion, governments calculate the strategic environment surrounding that group to make sure granting one group concessions will not invite future violent challenges. As the reputation-building literature suggests (Bormann and Savun, 2018, Walter, 2009*b*), governments of multiethnic countries are generally reluctant to grant concessions to one group lest doing so could encourage other ethnic groups to seek similar concessions. In other words, if a government decided to grant power-sharing to one group—whether or not that group rebelled—that government can be perceived as a result of a “screening” from governments that are willing to offer concessions. In other words, a government willing to offer a concession to an excluded group in the first place might already give up the strategy of investing in reputation. As a consequence, such a type of government is also likely to accommodate future demands if asked.

This self-screening logic indicates that, once governments decide to grant concessions, they will examine all excluded groups and select the least conflict-prone groups to grant the concessions to. This screening will take place so that making concessions will not signal weakness to other potential challengers and will not attract similar attempts at seeking concessions. If the government finds that the neighborhood of the ethnic group has a lower propensity for rebellion, it is more likely to grant conces-

sions to the group and its neighbors. As such, the government will be more likely to become less resistant to grant inclusion if it observes that the consequences of shifting away from the exclusion for one group has been proven less feared (Cederman, Gleditsch and Wucherpfennig, 2018, 1284). As such, political inclusion tends to cluster within geographically proximate areas. When the overall degree of ethnic inclusion in an excluded group's neighborhood increases, governments coming out from a self-screening might feel increasingly pressured to open the doors to additional excluded ethnic groups, thereby leading to a broader inclusion within the state.

The above discussion leads to the following hypothesis regarding geographic proximity:

Hypothesis 1: The higher the level of political inclusion in the neighborhood of an ethnic group, the more likely the group will be included.

4.3.2 The Importance of Social Similarities

As discussed above, geographic proximity can provide both governments and ethnic groups with information on nearby groups to assess the consequences of granting and demanding power-sharing, thereby facilitating learning and emulation through which an intrastate diffusion of ethnic inclusion takes place. However, interdependencies among ethnic groups should not be limited to geographic proximity. The spaces in which learning and emulation occur can go beyond geography (Beck, Gleditsch and Beardsley, 2006). Recent work in conflict studies has suggested that social proximities can also be channels through which learning and emulation lead to diffusion (Böhmelt, 2016, Böhmelt and Bove, 2019, Weyland, 2005). For example, Böhmelt and Bove (2019) find that migrants' cultural proximity to the host society mitigates the diffusion of terrorism via population movements because cultural proximity can shape people's societal norms, customs, and beliefs, making it "more difficult for ter-

rorist organizations to exploit transnational population movements for radicalization and as a recruitment pool.”

Building upon these studies of social proximity and conflict diffusion, I argue that similar experiences among ethnic groups can be potential channels for the diffusion of ethnic inclusion within the same state. While living in the same neighborhood is *one special type* of similar experience—which is rooted in physical space and has been well-studied—shared ethnic history, either positive or negative, is another type of similar experience—which is rooted in social space and has been neglected to a large extent. Why do similarities in experiences matter for the diffusion of ethnic inclusion?

First, social space is broader than physical space as the former entails social settings—visible or invisible—where ethnic groups could be connected. At one extreme, groups are connected to one another even without any physical contact, such as TEK groups living on two different continents (Cederman et al., 2013, Vogt et al., 2015). At another extreme, geographically proximate groups can also share similar experiences. For example, Lane (2016) finds that excluded groups are also geographically clustered, suggesting that common exclusion experiences exist among these groups. In this sense, a similar experience is more general and broader than geographic proximity.

Second and related, information learned from similar groups might be more complete and comparable for both the demand side and supply side of inclusion. The decision to grant inclusion to an excluded group could spur high costs as well as uncertainties for the government in the shadow of potential domino effects (Bormann and Savun, 2018, Forsberg, 2013). For governments, the motivations and incentives of potential rebel groups are usually underlying latent features, which may not be easy and obvious to infer solely based on geography. Under such incomplete information, similar experiences with a well-known group might be useful for the government

to gauge the potential consequences of granting political inclusion. For example, Olar (2019) finds that information on the consequences of repression gained from other similar autocracies helps the leaders in autocratic regimes augment their decisions regarding optimal levels of repression for political survival. Likewise, Böhmelt (2016) finds that information on the level of violence from similar international crises helps relevant actors reach consensus on international mediation in other similar crises.

Third, the diffusion literature in public policy (Dobbin, Simmons and Garrett, 2007, Gilardi, 2010, Graham, Shipan and Volden, 2013) has found that learning, emulation, and competition as primary drivers of policy diffusion are all more likely to take place among *similar* units—though not necessarily within geographic neighbors (Linebarger, 2016). During periods of ethnic rebellion, dominant ethnic elites are often pressured to grant previously excluded ethnic groups power-sharing in the hope of ending the conflict or preventing future rebellion (Cederman et al., 2015). When the dominant ethnic elites look for comparable information, similar experiences other than geographic proximity might be more relevant in part because the fear of opposition to the promised concession from competitive groups in the same areas is diminishing (Cunningham and Weidmann, 2010). Furthermore, the government may no longer need to worry about the potential collective rebellion in the future if the relevant comparison was based on similar social groups. As indicated by Böhmelt and Bove (2019), these similar experiences can shape and reinforce group beliefs, norms, and behaviors to a point where governments can hold similar expectations for these groups for their future propensities for rebellion—just as what governments did when granting their initial concessions during previous periods. As such, dominant ethnic elites can still maintain certain levels of exclusive practices within the country while also avoiding challenges from these groups in the same areas.

The foregoing suggests my second hypothesis:

Hypothesis 2: The higher the level of political inclusion among similar groups of an ethnic group, the more likely the group will be included.

Although the above discussions lead to the expectation that intrastate diffusion of political inclusion should be more likely among ethnic groups with *similar* experiences, the occurrence of ethnic conflict between one group and the government may mitigate the impact of *similar* experiences on the diffusion of ethnic inclusion. Given that ethnic conflict can be an effective strategy for excluded groups to gain political rights (Koos, 2016) or can open up spaces for their future empowerment (Webster et al., 2019), those groups that are fighting against the government might have higher rates and chances than those that are not engaging in ethnic conflict to improve their status. For example, the government may feel it more urgent to grant power-sharing to a rebellion group if the overall degree of inclusion among its similar groups is increasing. As a consequence, participating in violent rebellion can speed up its gaining of political rights. Conversely, the government may become more resistant to granting political power-sharing to a rebellion group if the previously dominant ethnic elites have much to fear from sharing power with those vengeful and assertive counter-elites (Cederman, Gleditsch and Wucherpfennig, 2018, Roessler, 2011), even when the overall degree of inclusion among its similar groups is increasing. In other words, similarity can also lead to countervailing effects if the government believes that granting political power to a set of similar groups can increase the risk of greater demands from them or higher risk of rebellion. Therefore, I propose the following conditional effect regarding the impact of social similarity, although I do not expect a specific direction of the interactive effect:

Hypothesis 3: The impact of social similarity on the diffusion of political inclusion among similar groups is conditional on the incidence of conflict among these groups.

4.4 Research Design

4.4.1 Data and Dependent Variable

To test my argument about the impact of social similarity on the diffusion of political inclusion, I rely on the 2018 version of the EPR data set (Vogt et al., 2015), which includes all politically relevant ethnic groups from 1946 to 2017. Following Bormann and Hammond (2016), I include only those states that contain at least three politically relevant groups—one group–government dyad and one observer group—such that the dominant group grants political power to an excluded group, which then diffuses to another excluded group (Bormann and Hammond, 2016, 591). The unit of analysis is *group–year*. The main analysis in the subsequent section focuses on groups that were excluded in the previous year.³


My dependent variable is the *changes* in the group’s status ranking within a given state in a given year. I rely on a roughly ordinal scale of 1–7 from the 2018 version of the EPR Core dataset. The scale measures group access to national power on a scale of “1” (discriminated), “2” (powerless), “3” (self-exclusion), “4” (junior partner), “5” (senior partner), “6” (dominant), and “7” (monopoly).⁴ To construct my dependent variable (i.e., “ Δ STATUS RANKING”), I take the yearly difference between the value for the current year and the value for previous years. That is the difference between year t and year $t - 1$. Therefore, a positive value of “ Δ STATUS RANKING” indicates improvement of status ranking while a negative value suggests downgrade of status ranking. Figure 4.1 displays the distributions of my dependent variables with one-year, two-year, three-year, four-year, five-year, and ten-year increments.⁵ As shown in Figure 4.1, the spikes across panels suggest that

³ In the robustness check section, I also use all groups from for the same period.

⁴ See variable `Status_Pwrrank`. When the value takes between “1” and “3”, groups are regarded as “excluded,” while a value equal to or greater than “4” means ethnic groups are included.

⁵ If a group’s ranking is not changed between t and $t - 1$, then the value is zero, suggesting no change.

FIGURE 4.1: The distribution of the dependent variables



Note: Figure 4.1 plots the distribution of the changes in group’s status ranking.

a group’s current status ranking may persist for decades, while intermediate change may not usually be possible. To shake the ethnic power hierarchy, as revealed in Webster, Chen and Beardsley (2019), opportunities created by massive upheavals such as conflict and war are required. Using this scale rather than a binary fashion (e.g., Koos, 2016), my dependent variable can capture the extent to which a group’s status changes as a result of a “similar” group’s impact.

4.4.2 Measuring Intrastate Diffusion of Inclusion

To test the impact of intrastate diffusion of inclusion among ethnic groups within the states, I build a set of spatial lags for each ethnic group within a country for each year. Following Lane (2016, 402), the spatial lag is a spatial weighting matrix, \mathbf{W}_{ji} , which specifies the prevalence and similarity of these covariates. The spatial weighting matrix is first generated as an $n \times n$ connectivity matrix (n denotes the

number of groups within a country in a given year), which pairs each ethnic group i with all other ethnic groups j in the same state. For example, China had 25 ethnic groups in 1946 and 26 groups in 1950 in the EPR, respectively, so the connectivity matrix for China in 1946 is 25×25 , and is 26×26 in 1950. Following convention, a group cannot connect to itself, so the diagonal of the matrix is set to zero.

To fill each element, w_{ij} , I measure whether group i and group j share a “connection” in a given year. To define “connection,” I move beyond the geographic notion of space (Beck, Gleditsch and Beardsley, 2006) by considering not only physical geographic distances between groups but also ethnic cleavages (e.g., religion, race, and language), experiential similarity (e.g., conflict experience), and status similarity (e.g., exclusion, powerless, self-exclusion, and discrimination) as well as ethnic linkage (e.g., coethnic group). After filling the cell of the matrix, I row-standardize the matrix so that each row sums to 1.⁶ As such, if the element is measured on a continuous scale (e.g., geographic distance), then row-standardizing weighs remote groups much more heavily than nearby groups; if, however, the element is measured in a binary fashion, then row-standardizing assigns equal weight to any “similar” groups. Finally, to get the spatial lag for each group in a country in a given year, I multiply the spatial weighting matrix ($n \times n$) by the temporally lagged dependent variable (y_{t-1}) for the ethnic group ($n \times 1$). This procedure is repeated for each country by each year, so $Wy_{i,t-1}$ represents group i ’s row-standardized weighted average degree of “status change” in other proximate groups j in a state for a given year.

My spatial lags include the following dimensions:

$Wy_{i,t-1}^{contiguity}$. I first consider the physical geographic distance between ethnic groups within the state. Recent studies have shown a domestic diffusion process of ethnic conflict (see Bormann and Hammond, 2016, Lane, 2016) where more geo-

⁶ See Buhaug and Gleditsch (2008), Franzese and Hays (2007), Franzese, Hays and Cook (2016), Hays, Kachi and Franzese Jr (2010), Plümper and Neumayer (2010), Plümper, Troeger and Manow (2005), Ward and Gleditsch (2018).

graphically proximate groups are more likely to affect one another. In light of these findings, I utilize the GeoEPR data set (Wucherpfennig et al., 2011) and use the centroid points to calculate the distance between groups. Following Toukan (2019), I use the inverse distance between groups, so closer units have larger weights.

$Wy_{i,t-1}^{religion}$, $Wy_{i,t-1}^{language}$, and $Wy_{i,t-1}^{race}$. I then consider the ethnic cleavages between ethnic groups. Specifically, I use shared religion, common language, and common race to define whether two groups within a country are similar. Data on religion, language, and race are from the Ethnic Power Relations–Ethnic Dimensions (EPR–ED) dataset (Bormann, Cederman and Vogt, 2017), which recodes the linguistic and religious similarities. I code two groups sharing religion, language, and race if the two share at least one of the three largest components in the EPR–ED dataset.

$Wy_{i,t-1}^{conflict}$, $Wy_{i,t-1}^{territorial\ conflict}$, and $Wy_{i,t-1}^{governmental\ conflict}$. Ethnic groups fighting together against governments may be more likely to be included politically after the conflict. These shared fighting experiences can be perceived as a form of alignment or even alliance by the government, thereby making it easy to obtain political rights at the same time. I use the ACD2EPR dataset (Vogt et al., 2015) to create a connectivity matrix on whether ethnic groups within a state experience conflict in the same year. I further disaggregate the types of conflict into territorial and governmental conflicts, as recent research finds that only governmental conflict can lead to changes in group status (Webster et al., 2019).

$Wy_{i,t-1}^{exclusion}$, $Wy_{i,t-1}^{self\ exclusion}$, $Wy_{i,t-1}^{powerless}$, and $Wy_{it}^{discrimination}$. The reputation-building theory suggests that governments fear incurring similar demands from other groups if they make concessions to one group. Thus, it is reasonable that groups of a similar status may be more likely to make such demands. I thus measure whether groups are at the same levels of status ranking and create the spatial lags based on the 2018 version of the EPR Core dataset (Vogt et al., 2015).

$Wy_{it}^{TEK\ exclusion}$, $Wy_{it}^{TEK\ inclusion}$. Finally, I consider the impact of transnational

comparison between coethnic groups by linking status changes with groups' TEK. Recent studies find that transnational influence exists during the diffusion process for political inclusion (Cederman, Gleditsch and Wucherpfennig, 2018) and state repression (Olar, 2019), though these studies still focus on country-level diffusion. At the individual group level, I use TEK groups to account for possible transnational influences. As shown in Cederman et al. (2013), external states that host the TEK groups can deter the maltreatment of coethnic groups in other states. Therefore, having TEK groups that are in power can improve status ranking—at least deterring maltreatment—or can worsen the status ranking if the TEK groups are also excluded. The data on TEK are taken from the 2018 version of the EPR–Trans-border Ethnic Kin (EPR-TEK) dataset (Vogt et al., 2015). I build a connectivity matrix indicating whether groups are TEK groups in a given year and then multiply changes in status ranking of the group after row-standardizing the connectivity matrix.

4.4.3 Control Variables

I control for both group-specific and country-specific covariates. To measure the impact of conflict on the changes in group status, I use a dummy variable of whether an ethnic group is involved in conflict directly against the government in a given year. Thus, ETHNIC CONFLICT (i.e., `incidence_flag`) is coded 1 if the group in a given year is experiencing conflict and 0 otherwise. Again, I include GOVERNMENTAL CONFLICT and TERRITORIAL CONFLICT as dummy variables. Data on group-level conflict are taken from the ACD2EPR dataset (Vogt et al., 2015).

I also control for the SIZE of ethnic groups, as larger groups can produce a greater potential for mobilization and threats, thus making their demands for political rights more likely to be granted (Roessler and Ohls, 2018). Data on GROUP SIZE are taken from the EPR Core project. To account for the effect of regime type on the diffusion of inclusion—where democratic countries are more inclusive, thereby

indicating greater mobility of status upgrades—I control for the regime type using the Polity IV data (Marshall and Jaggers, 2002). I use the `POLITY2 SCORE`, which ranges from -10 (most autocratic) to +10 (most democratic). Likewise, I control for `GDP PER CAPITA` as the level of economic development is likely to affect the political powering-sharing, which is also used as a proxy for state capacity. Roessler and Ohls (2018) show that power-sharing is more likely in societies where governments possess strong capacity. Data on `GDP PER CAPITA` are taken from Penn World Table 9.1 (Feenstra, Inklaar and Timmer, 2015), supplemented by the COW Project’s National Material Capability (Singer, Bremer and Stuckey, 1972). Meanwhile, I control for `POPULATION` of the country using Penn World Table, Composite Index of National Capability (CINC), and World Development Indicator (World Bank Group, 2014).⁷ Finally, I control for the linear trend of group status improvement by including `CALENDAR YEAR`. Table C.1 presents a descriptive summary of my variables.⁸

4.5 Results and Discussions

To account for the hierarchical nature of the data—where the group–year observations are nested in groups, which are then nested in states—I use a multilevel modeling approach with the intercepts varying as a function of group and country-level variables. Essentially, this multilevel model is a three-level mixed-effects linear model (Bates et al., 2015, Gelman and Hill, 2007), which places a random effect on the ethnic group as well as a random effect on the country.⁹ However, this modeling approach may also have its weakness for the current data format. First, the

⁷ For country-level covariates, I use Bayesian semiparametric copula methods to impute missing values (Hoff et al. 2007). See Hollenbach et al. 2018 for an excellent review of this multiple imputation method.

⁸ Table C.7 presents the descriptive summary of my variables using all groups from 1946–2017.

⁹ Although largely consistent with previous practice (Buhaug and Gleditsch, 2008, Lane, 2016, Olar, 2019), this multilevel mixed-effects model with a spatial lag of Δ status ranking may also lead to inefficient estimates.

dependent variables are *changes* in group status ranking on a scale of 1–7 and are thus bounded within a specific range. This may create upper or lower cases where there is no possibility to increase or decrease any further. As Figure 4.1 shows (upper left), however, there is no massive number of upper cases, which, to some extent, obviates the first concern. Second, since the original scale of status ranking is more ordinal than interval, the multilevel model might not be able to separate and capture the unobserved transitions from one category to another. In this sense, a Markov switching regression model or an ordered logistic model might be useful to overcome this weakness due to the measurement.¹⁰

4.5.1 *Main Results*


Recall that the spatial lags adopt row-standardizing connectivity matrices, measuring the average level of changes in status ranking among the defined “neighborhood” of an ethnic group, and that my dependent variable is the *change* in the status ranking of the group during the *current year*. Therefore, the spatial lags can be interpreted directly due to row standardization.¹¹ A positive coefficient for the spatial lag would indicate that as a group’s neighborhood moves toward higher average levels of ethnic inclusion, that group is also more likely to shift from a lower ranking to a higher ranking in the ethnic power hierarchy within a state, suggesting a positive diffusion process. In contrast, a negative coefficient of the spatial lag would indicate that a higher average level of changes in status ranking in the neighborhood hinders the improvement of political inclusion for the ethnic group.

To better account for the uncertainties around model estimations as well as to better present the substantive quantities of the interests for these spatial lags, I rely on a simulation-based approach to calculate the marginal effects of my core

¹⁰ I leave this concern for future investigation.

¹¹ For similar applications, see Böhmelt (2016), Böhmelt and Bove (2019).

FIGURE 4.2: The marginal effects of spatial lags for previously excluded groups



Note: Panel a of Figure 4.2 displays the marginal effects for future changes in previously excluded groups’ status rankings based on results from Table 4.1. Panel b shows the short-term and long-term impacts of $W_y^{\text{contiguity}}_{t-1}$ based on results in Table 4.2.

independent variables. Inspired by Hanmer and Ozan Kalkan (2013), this simulation approach is based on the observed values of all independent variables where only the value of the variable of interest is varying while allowing all other variables to take their observed values in the sample for each simulation. I repeat this procedure 1,000 times and then take the average of these 1,000 simulations to get the “average marginal effects in the population” (Hanmer and Ozan Kalkan, 2013).

Table 4.1 summarizes the results from spatial regression models and focuses on the changes in status ranking for groups that were excluded in the previous year. Overall, I find some evidence of positive diffusion as most of the coefficients for the spatial lags, W_y_{t-1} , are positive, even though only $W_y^{\text{language}}_{t-1}$ and $W_y^{\text{self-exclusion}}_{t-1}$ are statistically significant at the 5% level. These findings are also mirrored by the distribution of the average marginal effects in Figure 4.2, in which only the values of spatial lags vary from their minimum to their maximum values while all other variables take their true values in the sample for each of the 1,000 simulations. While the strong effects of $W_y^{\text{language}}_{t-1}$ and $W_y^{\text{self-exclusion}}_{t-1}$ suggest that improvements in

Table 4.1: The intrastate diffusion of changes in group status ranking (1946-2017)

	Contiguity	Religion	Language	Race	Conflict	Gov. Conflict	Terr. Conf	Exclusion	Self-exclusion	Powerless	Discrimination	TEK Excl	TEK inclusion
(Intercept)	-1.1458*** (0.2729)	-1.1436*** (0.2729)	-1.1322*** (0.2728)	-1.1443*** (0.2729)	-1.1505*** (0.2731)	-1.1414*** (0.2729)	-1.1505*** (0.2730)	-1.1480*** (0.2734)	-1.1620*** (0.2734)	-1.1445*** (0.2728)	-1.1417*** (0.2730)	-1.1439*** (0.2728)	-1.1446*** (0.2728)
Wy _{t-1}	0.0225 (0.0156)	-0.0133 (0.0164)	0.0784*** (0.0233)	0.0026 (0.0176)	0.0618 (0.0320)	0.1094 (0.0649)	0.0513 (0.0417)	0.0202 (0.0122)	0.1645** (0.0574)	-0.0028 (0.0141)	0.0284 (0.0271)	0.0278 (0.0190)	-0.0013 (0.0170)
Ethnic conflict	0.0034 (0.0086)	0.0032 (0.0086)	0.0036 (0.0086)	0.0032 (0.0086)	0.0041 (0.0086)	0.0030 (0.0086)	0.0039 (0.0086)	0.0035 (0.0086)	0.0028 (0.0086)	0.0032 (0.0086)	0.0033 (0.0086)	0.0031 (0.0086)	0.0032 (0.0086)
Year	0.0007*** (0.0001)	0.0007*** (0.0001)	0.0007*** (0.0001)	0.0007*** (0.0001)	0.0007*** (0.0001)	0.0007*** (0.0001)	0.0007*** (0.0001)	0.0007*** (0.0001)	0.0007*** (0.0001)	0.0007*** (0.0001)	0.0007*** (0.0001)	0.0007*** (0.0001)	0.0007*** (0.0001)
Polity2	0.0047*** (0.0005)	0.0047*** (0.0005)	0.0047*** (0.0005)	0.0047*** (0.0005)	0.0047*** (0.0005)	0.0047*** (0.0005)	0.0047*** (0.0005)	0.0047*** (0.0005)	0.0047*** (0.0005)	0.0047*** (0.0005)	0.0047*** (0.0005)	0.0047*** (0.0005)	0.0047*** (0.0005)
ln(GDP per capita)	-0.0310*** (0.0039)	-0.0312*** (0.0039)	-0.0308*** (0.0039)	-0.0311*** (0.0039)	-0.0312*** (0.0039)	-0.0311*** (0.0039)	-0.0313*** (0.0039)	-0.0312*** (0.0039)	-0.0312*** (0.0039)	-0.0312*** (0.0039)	-0.0312*** (0.0039)	-0.0311*** (0.0039)	-0.0312*** (0.0039)
Group Size	0.1015*** (0.0215)	0.1015*** (0.0215)	0.1017*** (0.0215)	0.1016*** (0.0215)	0.1010*** (0.0215)	0.1013*** (0.0215)	0.1014*** (0.0215)	0.1008*** (0.0216)	0.1012*** (0.0216)	0.1017*** (0.0215)	0.1016*** (0.0215)	0.1014*** (0.0215)	0.1016*** (0.0215)
Ln(Country Population)	-0.0006 (0.0028)	-0.0006 (0.0028)	-0.0006 (0.0028)	-0.0006 (0.0028)	-0.0006 (0.0028)	-0.0006 (0.0028)	-0.0006 (0.0028)	-0.0006 (0.0028)	-0.0007 (0.0028)	-0.0006 (0.0028)	-0.0006 (0.0028)	-0.0006 (0.0028)	-0.0006 (0.0028)
AIC	1049.7369	1051.1542	1040.4477	1051.7909	1048.0918	1048.9696	1050.3010	1049.0620	1043.6291	1051.7748	1050.7201	1049.6599	1051.8080
BIC	1135.0551	1136.4725	1125.7660	1137.1092	1133.4101	1134.2879	1135.6193	1134.3803	1128.9474	1137.0931	1136.0383	1134.9781	1137.1263
Log Likelihood	-513.8684	-514.5771	-509.2239	-514.8955	-513.0459	-513.4848	-514.1505	-513.5310	-510.8146	-514.8874	-514.3600	-513.8299	-514.9040
Num. obs.	17261	17261	17261	17261	17261	17261	17261	17261	17261	17261	17261	17261	17261
Num. groups: gwgroupid:gwid	455	455	455	455	455	455	455	455	455	455	455	455	455
Num. groups: gwid	104	104	104	104	104	104	104	104	104	104	104	104	104
Var: gwgroupid:gwid (Intercept)	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
Var: gwid (Intercept)	0.0036	0.0036	0.0035	0.0035	0.0036	0.0035	0.0036	0.0037	0.0036	0.0035	0.0036	0.0035	0.0035
Var: Residual	0.0614	0.0614	0.0614	0.0614	0.0614	0.0614	0.0614	0.0614	0.0614	0.0614	0.0614	0.0614	0.0614

***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05

ethnic group rankings do diffuse among groups that speak a similar LANGUAGE or groups that share a similar SELF-EXCLUSION status in previous years, Figure 4.2 also reveals a further need for investigation into the channel by which ethnic inclusion diffuses within states.

On the one hand, the statistically insignificant effects of other spatial lags might be because a longer time is required for excluded groups to actually be integrated into the center even if governments have already granted power-sharing to these groups. Since my dependent variable in Table 4.1 measures the *current-year* changes in group status ranking, it is possible that models in Table 4.1 might not capture the changes in group status ranking within just a one-year window. Indeed, inclusive reforms that aim to grant more groups access to in political power may take years to implement and take effect in post-conflict societies (Sisk, 1996). On the other hand, the simulated marginal effects for most spatial lags in Figure 4.2 are heavily skewed on the right side, indicating that the insignificant effects in Table 4.1 could be a result of model estimation uncertainties and the simulations can provide some more reliable evidence of positive diffusion.

To investigate whether the choice of a one-year time window for my dependent variable is responsible for the insignificant effect, I follow Webster, Chen and Beardley (2019) and Webster et al. (2019) in running a set of models that allow me to examine the short-term and long-term effects of the spatial lags. Table 4.2 shows the estimated results of $\mathbf{W}\mathbf{y}_{t-1}^{\text{contiguity}}$ for future changes beyond the current-year in groups' status ranking. The results in Table 4.2 strongly confirm that status ranking changes are more likely to occur in a few years later rather than during the current year. All the coefficients are statistically significant for the *one-year*, *two-year*, and up to *ten-year* changes. The marginal effects of these corresponding spatial lags in panel b of Figure 4.2 are distributed far away from the $x=0$ vertical line, with an average improvement of three and a half units. This finding is a strong confirmation

Table 4.2: The short and long- term diffusion of changes in group status ranking (1946-2017)


	Current	1-year	2-year	3-year	4-year	5-year	10-year
(Intercept)	-1.1458*** (0.2729)	-1.5682*** (0.3573)	-1.8506*** (0.4192)	-2.3461*** (0.4632)	-2.4566*** (0.5022)	-2.5617*** (0.5397)	-3.9895*** (0.7103)
$W_{y_{t-1}}^{\text{Contiguity}}$	0.0225 (0.0156)	0.5453*** (0.0117)	0.5402*** (0.0116)	0.5258*** (0.0117)	0.5219*** (0.0119)	0.5058*** (0.0122)	0.4795*** (0.0132)
Ethnic conflict	0.0034 (0.0086)	0.0041 (0.0116)	0.0130 (0.0135)	0.0196 (0.0148)	0.0518** (0.0160)	0.0714*** (0.0171)	0.1038*** (0.0220)
Year	0.0007*** (0.0001)	0.0010*** (0.0002)	0.0011*** (0.0002)	0.0014*** (0.0003)	0.0015*** (0.0003)	0.0015*** (0.0003)	0.0023*** (0.0004)
Polity2	0.0047*** (0.0005)	0.0066*** (0.0006)	0.0086*** (0.0008)	0.0088*** (0.0008)	0.0094*** (0.0009)	0.0093*** (0.0010)	0.0108*** (0.0012)
ln(GDP per capita)	-0.0310*** (0.0039)	-0.0357*** (0.0054)	-0.0447*** (0.0063)	-0.0521*** (0.0070)	-0.0557*** (0.0076)	-0.0572*** (0.0082)	-0.0840*** (0.0108)
Group size	0.1015*** (0.0215)	0.2498* (0.1038)	0.3990** (0.1249)	0.5682*** (0.1478)	0.6822*** (0.1618)	0.8748*** (0.1786)	1.3217*** (0.2125)
Ln(Country Population)	-0.0006 (0.0028)	0.0055 (0.0047)	0.0115* (0.0056)	0.0143* (0.0062)	0.0144* (0.0068)	0.0150* (0.0074)	0.0281** (0.0099)
AIC	1049.7369	6611.3993	10996.3097	13431.4744	15000.8293	16151.4623	18649.5298
BIC	1135.0551	6696.6562	11081.2341	13516.0921	15085.1112	16235.4050	18731.8164
Log Likelihood	-513.8684	-3294.6996	-5487.1548	-6704.7372	-7489.4146	-8064.7311	-9313.7649
Num. obs.	17261	17165	16654	16196	15709	15232	13103
Num. groups: gwgroupid:gwid	455	455	450	449	447	440	415
Num. groups: gwid	104	103	103	103	103	102	99
Var: gwgroupid:gwid (Intercept)	0.0000	0.0670	0.0950	0.1381	0.1627	0.1998	0.2324
Var: gwid (Intercept)	0.0036	0.0284	0.0484	0.0680	0.0808	0.0835	0.1860
Var: Residual	0.0614	0.0784	0.1029	0.1210	0.1368	0.1515	0.2165

*** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$

of the positive diffusion of ethnic inclusion among nearby groups ($H1$). Moreover, and in contrast to the effects in Table 4.1, the coefficients for ETHNIC CONFLICT in Table 4.2 become increasingly significant as the time window of my dependent variable increases. In this sense, and consistent with Koos (2016), violent rebellion does pay back and can lead to the improvement of ethnic group status, though this will not happen immediately after their rebellions.

Indeed, the choice of a one-year time window not only affects the effect for $W_{y_{t-1}}^{\text{contiguity}}$ but also for the rest of the spatial lags. Figure 4.3 shows very similar effects for the rest of my spatial lags. With the exception of $W_{y_{t-1}}^{\text{language}}$, the simulated marginal effects for all spatial lags after the current-year change are distributed far away from the $x=0$ vertical line, suggesting strong positive intrastate diffusion of ethnic inclusion in the years following neighborhood empowerment. These findings

FIGURE 4.3: The short-term and long-term impacts of spatial lags



Note: Panels a-l of Figure 4.3 displays the marginal effects for future changes in status ranking. The model (not shown here) specifications are similar to the models in Table 4.2.

lead to the following conclusions that link my empirical results to the theoretical framework. First, ethnic inclusion does diffuse from one group to another within the same country. But this is not only done via a geographic channel of nearby groups; it is also done via the channel of similar experiences—both positive and negative. Second, intrastate diffusion of ethnic inclusion may not take place immediately after one group is included; instead, it might take years to arrive for similar groups. One possible reason is that inclusive policies and reforms may need a longer time to implement and take effect. Another reason might be that governments still need to wait and see if including similar groups can result in the spread of similar demands from other groups. Hence, the government might not be willing to grant concessions to all similar groups at the same time. This implies that the progress of political inclusion will probably be slower than expected and may experience extra difficulties.


4.5.2 Extension: Conditioning Effects

Next, I examine whether the effects of spatial lags are conditional upon whether groups are engaging in conflict with the government. Therefore, I interact the spatial lags with ETHNIC CONFLICT. The results are summarized in Table C.3.

In Table C.3, only the interaction between $\mathbf{W}\mathbf{y}_{t-1}^{\text{self-exclusion}}$ and ETHNIC CONFLICT as well as between $\mathbf{W}\mathbf{y}_{t-1}^{\text{exclusion}}$ and ETHNIC CONFLICT are statistically significant, although their effects are contrary to each other. Again, I use the simulation via observed-value approach to plot the interaction effects for both models. In Figure 4.4, the y-axis represents the difference in the estimated changes in spatial lags following a change from its 2.5th percentile to 97.5th percentile conditional on NO ETHNIC CONFLICT to ETHNIC CONFLICT. Panels a–b are based on the respective models in Table C.3, whereas panels d–c use the same model specifications but focus on one-year change rather than current-year change in group status ranking.

Panel a of Figure 4.4 shows that, as the average level of ethnic inclusion among

FIGURE 4.4: The interaction effects between conflict and spatial lags



Note: Panels a–b shows the marginal effects of the interaction terms for $W_{y_{t-1}}^{\text{exclusion}}$ and $W_{y_{t-1}}^{\text{self-exclusion}}$ and ETHNIC CONFLICT based on results in Table C.3. Panels c–d shows the marginal effects on one-year change. The y-axis shows the difference in the estimated changes in group status ranking following a change from NO ETHNIC CONFLICT to ETHNIC CONFLICT as the spatial lags change from -2 to 2. All other variables are taking their observed values in the sample over 10000 simulations.

similar excluded groups increases, groups that are engaging in ethnic conflict against government are more likely to gain political rights than those groups that are not fighting against governments. In a more disaggregated analysis, however, I find that it is not the case for the spatial lags defined by SELF-EXCLUSION, DISCRIMINATION, and TEK EXCLUSION, as the example in panel b of Figure 4.4 shows. Instead, compared to those who are not engaging in conflict, I find that groups that are

fighting against government are less likely to gain power-sharing as the level of ethnic inclusion among similar self-excluded groups increases. There is also evidence that these patterns still exist when we move the time window for comparison to one-year change (panel e–f).

Since the effects of similarities in experiences might be delayed in conflict states, I also run models for the future one-year change rather than focusing on the current-year change. Figure 4.5 displays the marginal effects of the interaction on the future one-year change for the rest of the spatial lags. The effects of these spatial lags can be represented by the two similar patterns in Figure 4.4. Overall, there is some evidence that ongoing ethnic conflict can undermine or reinforce the effects of similar groups, depending on the type of similar experiences.

The political inclusion (e.g., obtaining territorial autonomy) of five major ethnic minority groups in China illustrates this dynamic. As of 2003, China has established 155 ethnic autonomous areas, including five autonomous regions at the provincial level, thirty autonomous prefectures, and one hundred twenty autonomous counties (see Table 4.3). While the Chinese Communist Party created the first autonomous region—Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region (IMAR)—in May 1947, it did not grant the second autonomous region, Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region, until October 1955. The successful experience with IMAR and Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region accelerated the creation of Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region in March 1958 and Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region in October 1958, respectively. However, the 1959 violent rebellion of the Tibetan significantly reduced the incentive of the Chinese Communist Party to grant greater autonomy and political rights to Tibet. The Tibet Autonomous Region was created on September 1, 1965, more than seven years after the 1959 violent rebellion. Table 4.3 also suggests that the timing of granting territorial autonomies to minorities in China as well as the locations of those autonomous areas tend to cluster.


Table 4.3: The creation of ethnic autonomous areas in China

Year	Counties	Prefectures	Regions				
1947	0	0	1				
1950	3	1	0				
1951	3	1	0				
1952	3	2	0				
1953	6	7	0				
1954	16	8	0				
1955	5	0	1	Provinces	Counties	Prefectures	Regions
1956	10	4	0	Chongqing	4	0	0
1957	1	3	0	Gansu	7	2	0
1958	5	2	2	Guangdong	3	0	0
1962	1	0	0	Guangxi	12	0	1
1963	4	0	0	Guizhou	11	3	0
1964	1	0	0	Hainan	6	0	0
1965	2	0	1	Hebei	6	0	0
1966	1	0	0	Heilongjiang	1	0	0
1979	2	0	0	Hubei	2	1	0
1980	2	0	0	Hunan	7	1	0
1981	2	0	0	Inner Mongolia	3	0	1
1982	0	1	0	Jilin	3	1	0
1983	1	1	0	Liaoning	8	0	0
1984	11	0	0	Ningxia	0	0	1
1985	10	0	0	Qinghai	7	6	0
1986	2	0	0	Sichuan	4	3	0
1987	16	0	0	Tibet	0	0	1
1988	1	0	0	Xinjiang	6	5	1
1989	1	0	0	Yunnan	29	8	0
1990	9	0	0	Zhejiang	1	0	0
2002	1	0	0	Total	120	30	5
2003	1	0	0				
Total	120	30	5				

Note: Table 4.3 shows the timing of the establishment of ethnic autonomous areas across three administration levels in China. Data source:

<http://www.china-un.org/eng/gyzg/bp/t418954.htm> (last accessed on October 20, 2019).

FIGURE 4.5: The conditional effects of similar groups and ethnic conflict on change in group status ranking



Note: The y-axis of each panel shows the difference in the estimated changes in group status ranking following a change from NO ETHNIC CONFLICT to ETHNIC CONFLICT over the spatial lags. All other variables are taking their observed values in the sample over 1,000 simulations. The marginal effects figures correspond to models in Table C.3 while focusing on future one-year change.

4.5.3 Robustness Checks


I run a set of robustness checks using different modeling strategies and alternative measures.

First, I consider whether a national election is an intermediate mechanism for political inclusion. It is possible that ethnic inclusion is merely a result of national election (Huber, 2017, Hyde and Marinov, 2012) rather than a result of diffusion. I use the National Elections Across Democracy and Autocracy (NELDA) data (Hyde and Marinov, 2012) and include three dummies on EXECUTIVE ELECTION, LEGISLATIVE ELECTION, and CONSTITUENT ELECTION to measure whether election at the national level takes place in a given year.

Meanwhile, I consider whether REGIME CHANGE is an intermediate mechanism. Irregular leader exit or entry can lead to dramatic political changes, opening up new spaces for excluded groups in the central government. However, it can also lead to greater repression, which creates additional obstacles for developing an inclusive regime. Building on Webster, Chen and Beardsley (2019), I use data from Goemans, Gleditsch and Chiozza (2009) to measure whether there was an irregular leadership exit or entry in a given year. Table C.2 summarizes the results from spatial regression models when controlling for election at different levels and irregular leadership changes. I find that, while election appears to be associated with changes in group status, the findings are largely consistent with the ones in Table 4.1, even when controlling for ELECTIONS.

Second, I consider whether the diffusion pattern discovered previously only exists among previously excluded groups or among all ethnic groups. Table C.4 summarizes the results from spatial regression models for all group status changes in the current year. I find that there tends to be more positive diffusion than just for groups excluded in the previous year. Panel a of Figure 4.6 displays the marginal effects for

FIGURE 4.6: The marginal effects for all groups



Note: Panel a of Figure 4.6 displays the marginal effects for future changes in status ranking for all groups based on results in C.4. Panel b of Figure 4.6 is based on the model in Table C.6.

future changes in status ranking based on results in C.4, which suggests larger diffusion patterns. Moreover, Table C.5 uses the same model specification but controls for REGIME CHANGE and ELECTION. Finally, Table C.6 runs the interactions for all groups. The results are also largely consistent with my previous findings.

4.6 Conclusion

This chapter focuses on the political inclusion of ethnic groups from post-World War II to the present. Just as ethnic conflict can diffuse between and within states, the analysis reveals that ethnic power-sharing can also diffuse within the same country, where granting political rights to one group can make other similar groups more likely to be included in subsequent periods. This finding is robust to a variety of modeling approaches and alternative measures, thereby lending evidence to my theory of intrastate diffusion of political inclusion. Together with the interstate diffusion of inclusion (Cederman, Gleditsch and Wucherpfennig, 2018), we now have a much more complete picture regarding why political inclusion tends to cluster.

The analyses presented in this chapter resonate well with existing literature on the

interdependencies of rebel groups (Akcinaroglu, 2012, Schricker, 2017), albeit from a very different perspective. Moving beyond a simple binary distinction of group interdependence (such as allied or not allied), I show that group interdependence is more than material or geographic. Indeed, social proximity can be an important channel through which ethnic groups affect one another. As the results show, the fact that ethnic groups are dependent on one another can produce strategic incentives for governments to respond to domestic ethnic grievances more strategically.

The analyses, however, also reveal important heterogeneities in the effects of social similarities. One particular inconsistent finding is related to language similarity. Unlike the effects for the rest of the similarities, the positive diffusion of ethnic inclusion via language proximity is only transient, and an excluded group is no more likely to be included in future years, regardless of whether the average degree of ethnic inclusion increases among groups speaking similar languages. One possible explanation is that language can be a more prevalent source of perceived grievance among excluded groups due to its omnipresent pervasiveness in daily life (Bormann, Cederman and Vogt, 2017), which can be viewed by governments as providing a greater mobilization potential for those similar groups. The presence of a unifying language can promote mobilization for violence within the same country, thus reducing the incentive for governments to include more groups with similar languages. Therefore, the governments will be reluctant to grant political rights to those groups, hindering the diffusion of ethnic inclusion.

Although the analyses in this chapter focus on five dimensions of similarities, they are not representative of the full spectrum of social proximity. Future research can further uncover other dimensions of shared experiences and common characteristics. For example, recent work has shown that rebel groups that share constituencies—such as Islamism or Marxism—are more likely to ally with one another (Balcells, Chen and Pischedda, 2019). Co-ideology might be another dimension that has not

been fully explored but that is worthy of further investigation. The presence and ease of reputation-building incentives revealed in the analysis also resonates with broader IR literature on reputation and conflict (Crescenzi, 2007, 2018). The key takeaway is that interdependence among conflict actors can produce broader strategic implications for their learning behaviors, which, in turn, shapes their decisions to upend social power structures.

Conclusion

Interdependence has long been an empirical and theoretical focus in conflict studies. This dissertation project is centered on the role of interdependence among ethnic groups and examines the consequences of interdependence on ethnic mobilization, competition, and political inclusion. Each of the three essays contained in this dissertation addresses one of the dimensions in the study of ethnic conflict. In this chapter, I first briefly summarize the motivation, argument, analysis, and findings for each essay. I then discuss their implications for future research.

5.1 Summary of Findings

In Chapter 2, I begin with the observation that, while many ethnic groups have ethnic kin in other countries, existing research has paid insufficient attention to the role of the interstate relations between countries hosting the same ethnic kin groups in shaping the risk of conflict. Although TEK groups are treated as interdependent in some studies, we know less about how international politics factor into the domestic bargaining between these TEK groups and their governments. In line with recent efforts to understand the dynamic consequences of international politics on

domestic unrest (Bak, Chávez and Rider, 2019, Hong and Kim, 2019, Konaev and Brathwaite, 2019), I revise the conventional assumption that having powerful ethnic kin abroad can prevent and deter maltreatment by domestic governments. I particularly consider the situation where two host countries are engaged in hostile activities and examine how these interstate hostilities affect domestic ethnic mobilization and conflict. I argue that, when the relationship between the two countries becomes hostile, the risk of ethnic conflict in one or the other country will increase, regardless of whether a group's kin is included in power or not. This is because interstate hostility overwhelms the previous caution of governments and creates additional uncertainties regarding the expectation of foreign intervention within the conflict-at-risk country.

Using data on TEK groups as well as interstate hostility from 1946 to 2013, my statistical analyses confirm the conflict-inducing effect of interstate hostility on ethnic conflict onset. I further find that this conflict-inducing effect does not depend on the political status of the TEK group in another country. These findings not only extend previous findings in Cederman et al. (2013) but also demonstrate the need to bring international politics back into the study of the role of TEK groups in domestic ethnic conflict. Taken together, this chapter adds to the growing literature on how international politics affect the domestic risk of conflict (Bak, Chávez and Rider, 2019, Breslawski and Cunningham, 2019, Hong and Kim, 2019, Lee, 2018*b*).

Chapter 3 turns group interdependencies from the transnational dimension to the domestic level by looking at the impact of ethnic competition induced by national-level ethnic diversity on government strategies. Departing from the traditional model of the distributional conflict between the center and the periphery, this chapter begins to take into consideration the periphery versus periphery model (Cunningham and Weidmann, 2010, Lacina, 2015). Specifically, I argue that, in multiethnic societies, ethnic groups are likely to engage in competition for scarce resources, such as seats in the national government or economic resources. The local competition

creates opportunities for governments to strategically exploit and undermine the capabilities of collective movements. The implication of the strategic exploitation is that groups are not more likely to take up arms against government when they are surrounded by a greater number of ethnic competitors who are co-opted by government. Empirically, I create a new measure of ethnic competition based on the idea of structural equivalence in social network analysis. I then use the EPR data set again to test my argument that a group with a large number of ethnic competitors will be less likely to rebel against government. My results show that, while ethnic diversity at the national level does increase the risk of conflict, local ethnic competition can mitigate the risk of conflict between government and a group with higher levels of ethnic competitors.

Finally, Chapter 4 moves beyond how ethnic conflict starts and examines how ethnic groups gain political power in the shadow of conflict. Drawing on insights from the study of conflict diffusion, I build a framework of domestic diffusion of political inclusion, which departs from the previous literature on cross-country diffusion in conflict studies (Cederman, Gleditsch and Wucherpfennig, 2018) or ethnic inclusion as an independent phenomenon within countries (Vogt, 2016). I argue that ethnic inclusion follows a diffusion pattern in which the inclusion of one group leads to the inclusion of other *similar* groups in the same country. In terms of the channels through which the intrastate diffusion of ethnic inclusion takes place, I consider how the prevalence of *experientially similar* groups within a country shapes government decision to grant previously excluded groups access to political power. I argue that similarities in experiences can serve as a viable precedent for both relevant actors—excluded groups and government—to, respectively, strategically demand and supply political rights.

Empirically, I use a geospatial approach to create a set of spatial lags for each ethnic group within a country for each year. I then use a multilevel modeling strategy

to test my hypothesis regarding the impact of similar experiences on the diffusion of ethnic inclusion within countries. My results show that group interdependence is more than material or geographic and that social proximity can be an important channel through which ethnic groups affect one another. These findings have important implications for the study of ethnic inclusion as well as conflict diffusion.

5.2 Avenues for Future Research

Interdependence is a complex phenomenon in the study of ethnic conflict and ethnic politics. The results from each chapter of this dissertation also suggest interesting avenues for future research.

Chapter 2 only touches the surface of how international politics affect domestic unrest broadly, and there is ample space for future work on how international politics factor into each of the relevant actors' decision calculus. In line with Lee (2018*b*), future work can investigate whether the impact of interstate hostility varies from the countries that share TEK groups to countries that have no TEK groups. Moreover, a new measure of interstate hostility could be created by future research. Chapter 3 almost exclusively focuses on military hostility while ignoring other types of hostility. One particular type of future work might be to use large-scale event data to build new measures of non-military hostility, such as verbal conflict or latent relationships between states (Tellez and Roberts, 2019, Weschle, 2018). Furthermore, future research might try to address potential endogeneity issues between conflictual interstate relationships and domestic ethnic bargaining.

Chapter 3 on local ethnic competition suggests several future research avenues. The first is to look at the micro-foundation of ethnic competition and tease out the mechanisms underlying ethnic competition. An early sociology work by Olzak (1992) focuses on ethnic competition among individuals and exemplifies the need to address the micro-foundations of ethnic competition. However, there are challenges

in analyzing the micro-foundations of ethnic competition when the unit-of-analysis is *ethnic groups* rather than *individuals*. Researchers need a better way to aggregate individual preferences to social groups, which is still a challenge in conflict studies. One possible avenue is to use lab-in-the-field approach, so researchers can test their proposed mechanisms in field labs (Schaub, 2017*a,b*). Another future research avenue is to move beyond social competition in terms of seeking political power in the center. Chapter 3 conceptualizes the inclusion of governments as scarce resources due to limited supply and high demand in multiethnic societies. Natural resources, such as oil, diamonds, land, or water, can all be triggers of ethnic competition. Future studies can make use of these scarce natural resources to create new measures of competition based on the social network approach.

Chapter 4 on ethnic inclusion demonstrates the presence of a domestic diffusion process. The results suggest that diffusion may take multiple pathways—in my own case, similar experiences and identities. The heterogeneities in the effects of social similarities suggest additional directions for future research. Indeed, not all similar experiences play the same role or reveal the same information for government learning. Work still needs to be done with respect to the potential heterogeneity associated with each type of social experiences. Furthermore, the analytical approach in Chapter 3 can be applied to other similar settings where intrastate diffusion can affect the dynamic political process.

Finally, the theoretical frameworks and empirical findings in each chapter can also help us better understand some of the most puzzling conflicts of our time, such as conflicts in Syria, Yemen, Myanmar, and Nigeria. For example, once we bring the international politics between the United States and Russia, or the regional countries like Turkey into the civil war in Syria (Toukan, 2019), we can better understand the conflict dynamics and why external kin states' interventions may actually create greater instability rather than promote conflict resolution. On the other hand, the

presence of local competitive rebel groups can even breed infighting among rebel groups, which are the cases in Syria (Gade, Hafez and Gabbay, 2019) and Nigeria (Dorff, Gallop and Minhas, 2019). The closer incorporation of group-level analysis thus supplements our conventional understandings of the dynamics of ethnic conflict and ethnic politics.

Appendix A

Appendix for Chapter 2

Table A.1: Descriptive summary

	N	Mean	Std.	Min	Max
Civil war onset	91170	.0067018	.08159	0	1
TEK groups(≥ 1) not in power	95587	.7381234	.4396581	0	1
TEK groups(≥ 1) in power	95587	.6692542	.4704842	0	1
Rel. group size	95587	.3663977	.3717948	.0001061	1
Excluded status	95587	.5008526	.5000019	0	1
Number of previous conflicts	95587	.1972025	.5685927	0	6
Status upgraded	95587	.0218021	.1460377	0	1
Log of Population, lag	75304	16.52884	1.68438	12.26953	21.02735
Log of GDP per capita, lag	75304	8.587843	1.23845	5.144375	12.08766
Rel. TEK size	62820	.4161766	.3747547	.0001061	1
Rel. TEK size, sq	62820	.3136419	.3922352	1.13e-08	1
Rivalry	36432	.3170839	.4653468	0	1
Nationalist regime, external state	47057	.1831821	.3868199	0	1
Number of demonstrations	90128	.871627	2.958943	0	74
Number of demonstrations, external state	63650	.8571092	3.108206	0	74
TEK dominant status	62820	.2039637	.4029455	0	1
MID	72481	.071398	.2574903	0	1
Interstate war	95587	.2137529	.4099565	0	1
Log of minimum distance	68811	3.560783	3.474324	0	9.743033

Table A.2: Logistic regression on the onset of civil war with no interaction term

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
TEK groups(≥ 1) not in power	0.289 (0.183)		
TEK groups(≥ 1) in power	-0.212 (0.178)		
Rel. group size	0.719** (0.336)	0.374 (0.660)	0.114 (0.416)
Excluded status	1.467*** (0.267)	1.388*** (0.458)	1.290*** (0.358)
Number of previous conflicts	0.712*** (0.101)	0.728*** (0.126)	0.451*** (0.108)
Status upgraded	-0.280 (0.557)	-0.190 (0.647)	-0.167 (0.663)
Log of Population, lag	0.0978 (0.106)	0.0665 (0.0941)	-0.0940 (0.0860)
Log of GDP per capita, lag	-0.383*** (0.0909)	-0.200* (0.122)	-0.353*** (0.124)
Rel. TEK size		1.767*** (0.660)	2.459*** (0.896)
Rel. TEK size, sq		-1.543** (0.624)	-2.121* (1.125)
MID			0.536** (0.222)
Number of demonstrations, external state			-0.0227 (0.0452)
Number of demonstrations			0.133** (0.0616)
Nationalist regime, external state			0.283* (0.148)
TEK dominant status			0.0281 (0.414)
Log of minimum distance			-0.0247 (0.0357)
Peace years	-0.286*** (0.0485)	-0.243*** (0.0514)	-0.281*** (0.0547)
Peace years, sq	0.0107*** (0.00225)	0.00880*** (0.00215)	0.00917*** (0.00285)
Peace years, cube	-0.000115*** (0.0000281)	-0.0000904*** (0.0000307)	-0.0000896** (0.0000418)
Constant	-3.230* (1.828)	-4.340** (2.151)	0.307 (1.845)
Observations	28258	49846	33680
AIC	1928.3	3645.7	2711.6
Log lik.	-952.1	-1810.8	-1337.8
Chi-squared	424.5	209.4	339.6

Robust standard errors are clustered in parentheses.

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table A.3: Logistic regression on the onset of civil war with interaction term

	Model 4	Model 5
MID	0.590*** (0.226)	0.628*** (0.225)
TEK dominant status	0.0811 (0.420)	0.00816 (0.414)
Number of demonstrations, external state	-0.0227 (0.0450)	-0.0244 (0.0449)
Nationalist regime, external state	0.284* (0.148)	0.343** (0.137)
MID × TEK dominant status	-0.456 (0.398)	
MID × Nationalist regime, external state		-0.393 (0.378)
MID × Number of demonstrations, external state		
Number of demonstrations	0.133** (0.0617)	0.134** (0.0607)
Log of minimum distance	-0.0253 (0.0355)	-0.0256 (0.0356)
Rel. TEK size	2.477*** (0.895)	2.455*** (0.893)
Rel. TEK size, sq	-2.139* (1.126)	-2.094* (1.129)
Rel. group size	0.102 (0.414)	0.101 (0.412)
Excluded status	1.286*** (0.360)	1.289*** (0.360)
Number of previous conflicts	0.449*** (0.107)	0.451*** (0.108)
Status upgraded	-0.167 (0.663)	-0.167 (0.662)
Log of Population, lag	-0.0948 (0.0864)	-0.0940 (0.0851)
Log of GDP per capita, lag	-0.355*** (0.123)	-0.350*** (0.124)
Peace years	-0.281*** (0.0546)	-0.281*** (0.0550)
Peace years, sq	0.00917*** (0.00285)	0.00919*** (0.00286)
Peace years, cube	-0.0000895** (0.0000418)	-0.0000898** (0.0000419)
Constant	0.333 (1.843)	0.272 (1.830)
Observations	33680	33680
AIC	2712.9	2712.6
Log lik.	-1337.4	-1337.3
Chi-squared	349.8	340.2

Robust standard errors are clustered in parentheses.

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

FIGURE A.1: The sample countries in the analysis





FIGURE A.2: The coefficient plots using rivalry and interstate war as alternative measures of interstate hostility



Note: Figure A.2 plots the coefficients of four model results using *rivalry* and *interstate war* as alternative measures of interstate hostility. Coefficients of the *intercept*, *peace years* and its polynomial terms are not included.

Appendix B

Appendix for Chapter 3

Table B.1: Logit models of the effect of local competition on ethnic conflict

	Model 1 (k=.1)	Model 2 (k=.2)	Model 3 (k=.3)	Model 4 (k=.4)	Model 5 (k=.5)	Model 6 (k=.6)	Model 7 (k=.7)	Model 8 (k=.8)	Model 9 (k=.9)
Ethnic conflict									
Local competition	-0.0507*** (0.0150)	-0.0506*** (0.0150)	-0.0493*** (0.0154)	-0.0484*** (0.0156)	-0.0502*** (0.0160)	-0.0487*** (0.0158)	-0.0475*** (0.0169)	-0.0480*** (0.0165)	-0.0468*** (0.0168)
Group size	1.592** (0.689)	1.587** (0.688)	1.619** (0.689)	1.621** (0.688)	1.603** (0.692)	1.603** (0.688)	1.642** (0.686)	1.645** (0.687)	1.668** (0.674)
Status downgraded2	0.957** (0.447)	0.966** (0.447)	0.959** (0.450)	0.960** (0.449)	0.960** (0.449)	0.963** (0.448)	0.974** (0.444)	0.974** (0.445)	0.963** (0.447)
Conflict history	0.709*** (0.0855)	0.709*** (0.0842)	0.692*** (0.0895)	0.692*** (0.0904)	0.692*** (0.0899)	0.693*** (0.0907)	0.692*** (0.0970)	0.693*** (0.0969)	0.683*** (0.101)
Ln(GDP per capita)	-0.319*** (0.0997)	-0.313*** (0.0988)	-0.304*** (0.0999)	-0.305*** (0.0998)	-0.306*** (0.0994)	-0.306*** (0.0997)	-0.305*** (0.0996)	-0.306*** (0.0996)	-0.302*** (0.101)
Ln(Population)	0.176* (0.0950)	0.175* (0.0946)	0.177* (0.0987)	0.177* (0.100)	0.183* (0.100)	0.181* (0.101)	0.172 (0.105)	0.174* (0.104)	0.172 (0.107)
Peace years	-0.236*** (0.0557)	-0.236*** (0.0558)	-0.238*** (0.0560)	-0.237*** (0.0560)	-0.237*** (0.0560)	-0.237*** (0.0560)	-0.235*** (0.0556)	-0.235*** (0.0557)	-0.237*** (0.0558)
Peace years ²	0.00870*** (0.00240)	0.00871*** (0.00241)	0.00877*** (0.00242)	0.00876*** (0.00242)	0.00875*** (0.00242)	0.00874*** (0.00241)	0.00870*** (0.00241)	0.00869*** (0.00242)	0.00877*** (0.00242)
Peace years ³	-0.0000924*** (0.0000283)	-0.0000926*** (0.0000284)	-0.0000933*** (0.0000284)	-0.0000931*** (0.0000284)	-0.0000931*** (0.0000284)	-0.0000929*** (0.0000284)	-0.0000926*** (0.0000284)	-0.0000925*** (0.0000284)	-0.0000937*** (0.0000285)
Constant	-2.354** (1.017)	-2.397** (1.020)	-2.497** (1.065)	-2.515** (1.073)	-2.561** (1.069)	-2.556** (1.078)	-2.517** (1.112)	-2.531** (1.103)	-2.547** (1.139)
Observations	16742	16742	16742	16742	16742	16742	16742	16742	16742

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table B.2: Multilevel logit models of the effect of local competition on ethnic conflict

	Model 1 (k=.1)	Model 2 (k=.2)	Model 3 (k=.3)	Model 4 (k=.4)	Model 5 (k=.5)	Model 6 (k=.6)	Model 7 (k=.7)	Model 8 (k=.8)	Model 9 (k=.9)
Ethnic conflict									
Local competition	-0.0457*** (0.0176)	-0.0468*** (0.0175)	-0.0406** (0.0173)	-0.0391** (0.0174)	-0.0425** (0.0172)	-0.0397** (0.0173)	-0.0352** (0.0170)	-0.0355** (0.0171)	-0.0316* (0.0171)
Group size	1.567** (0.718)	1.556** (0.717)	1.577** (0.717)	1.589** (0.717)	1.578** (0.715)	1.580** (0.717)	1.602** (0.717)	1.605** (0.716)	1.619** (0.717)
Status downgraded2	1.165*** (0.443)	1.168*** (0.443)	1.158*** (0.443)	1.161*** (0.443)	1.161*** (0.443)	1.165*** (0.443)	1.173*** (0.443)	1.172*** (0.443)	1.164*** (0.443)
Conflict history	0.526*** (0.0912)	0.525*** (0.0911)	0.523*** (0.0913)	0.524*** (0.0913)	0.524*** (0.0911)	0.526*** (0.0912)	0.527*** (0.0912)	0.527*** (0.0911)	0.524*** (0.0911)
Ln(GDP per capita)	-0.310** (0.125)	-0.306** (0.125)	-0.301** (0.125)	-0.301** (0.125)	-0.303** (0.125)	-0.302** (0.125)	-0.298** (0.126)	-0.300** (0.126)	-0.302** (0.126)
Ln(Population)	0.248** (0.100)	0.250** (0.1000)	0.236** (0.0994)	0.235** (0.0999)	0.243** (0.0995)	0.238** (0.1000)	0.225** (0.0990)	0.225** (0.0989)	0.217** (0.0989)
Peace years	-0.230*** (0.0430)	-0.230*** (0.0431)	-0.231*** (0.0431)	-0.230*** (0.0431)	-0.230*** (0.0431)	-0.230*** (0.0431)	-0.229*** (0.0431)	-0.228*** (0.0431)	-0.229*** (0.0431)
Peace years ²	0.00879*** (0.00185)	0.00878*** (0.00185)	0.00881*** (0.00185)	0.00880*** (0.00185)	0.00879*** (0.00185)	0.00878*** (0.00185)	0.00875*** (0.00185)	0.00874*** (0.00185)	0.00878*** (0.00185)
Peace years ³	-0.0000943*** (0.0000216)	-0.0000942*** (0.0000216)	-0.0000945*** (0.0000216)	-0.0000944*** (0.0000216)	-0.0000944*** (0.0000216)	-0.0000942*** (0.0000216)	-0.0000940*** (0.0000216)	-0.0000938*** (0.0000216)	-0.0000944*** (0.0000216)
Constant	-3.730*** (1.397)	-3.781*** (1.401)	-3.721*** (1.399)	-3.737*** (1.405)	-3.780*** (1.398)	-3.765*** (1.403)	-3.716*** (1.410)	-3.707*** (1.407)	-3.627*** (1.404)
/									
var(_cons[gwid])	0.806** (0.356)	0.809** (0.357)	0.798** (0.354)	0.800** (0.354)	0.781** (0.348)	0.792** (0.352)	0.812** (0.357)	0.811** (0.357)	0.814** (0.359)
Observations	16742	16742	16742	16742	16742	16742	16742	16742	16742

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table B.3: Descriptive summary (all groups)

	N	Mean	S.D.	Min	Max
Ethnic conflict	27800	.0079496	.0888072	0	1
Ethnic territorial conflict	28299	.0052299	.0721297	0	1
Ethnic governmental conflict	28865	.0025983	.0509082	0	1
Local competition (k=.1)	28861	10.18623	13.95392	0	50.21499
Local competition (k=.2)	28861	10.0748	13.99095	0	50.21499
Local competition (k=.3)	28861	9.823572	14.09969	0	50.21499
Local competition (k=.4)	28861	9.637016	14.18643	0	50.21499
Local competition (k=.5)	28861	9.550178	14.22818	0	50.21499
Local competition (k=.6)	28861	9.392211	14.31391	0	50.21499
Local competition (k=.7)	28861	9.206508	14.1433	0	50.21499
Local competition (k=.8)	28861	9.140672	14.16567	0	50.21499
Local competition (k=.9)	28861	8.84768	14.13348	0	50.21499
Group size	29368	.129649	.1984701	.0001	.9808
Status downgraded2	29368	.0193408	.137722	0	1
Conflict history	29368	.2187755	.6336542	0	7
Ln(GDP per capita)	29368	8.382733	1.078326	4.785665	11.62775
Ln(Population)	29368	10.35115	2.117616	4.994276	14.15876
Peace years ²	29368	1237.045	1354.511	0	5041
Peace years ³	29368	61942.54	87025.25	0	357911

Table B.4: Descriptive summary (previously excluded groups)

	N	Mean	S.D.	Min	Max
Ethnic conflict	16999	.0094123	.0965623	0	1
Ethnic territorial conflict	17389	.0067284	.0817527	0	1
Ethnic governmental conflict	17941	.0025082	.0500207	0	1
Local competition (k=.1)	18042	13.62492	16.2235	0	50.21499
Local competition (k=.2)	18042	13.48608	16.28714	0	50.21499
Local competition (k=.3)	18042	13.26131	16.40781	0	50.21499
Local competition (k=.4)	18042	13.05231	16.52917	0	50.21499
Local competition (k=.5)	18042	12.98049	16.57339	0	50.21499
Local competition (k=.6)	18042	12.8373	16.66673	0	50.21499
Local competition (k=.7)	18042	12.58782	16.49985	0	50.21499
Local competition (k=.8)	18042	12.5305	16.52622	0	50.21499
Local competition (k=.9)	18042	12.22328	16.49041	0	50.21499
Group size	18335	.0563881	.1031745	.0001	.83
Status downgraded2	18335	.0156531	.1241328	0	1
Conflict history	18335	.2563403	.7023935	0	7
Ln(GDP per capita)	18335	8.44137	1.066889	5.661548	11.58433
Ln(Population)	18335	10.75276	2.144581	5.020586	14.15876
Peace years ²	18335	1238.189	1372.771	0	5041
Peace years ³	18335	62435.63	88666.44	0	357911

Appendix C

Appendix for Chapter 4

Table C.1: Summary statistics

Statistic	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Pctl(25)	Pctl(75)	Max
Δ status ranking	18,318	0.021	0.248	-2.000	0.000	0.000	4.000
$W_{t-1}^{\text{contiguity}}$	17,277	0.002	0.121	-1.777	0.000	0.000	4.000
$W_{t-1}^{\text{religion}}$	17,277	0.003	0.116	-4.000	0.000	0.000	3.000
$W_{t-1}^{\text{language}}$	17,277	0.001	0.081	-3.000	0.000	0.000	4.000
W_{t-1}^{race}	17,277	0.002	0.108	-2.000	0.000	0.000	3.000
$W_{t-1}^{\text{conflict}}$	17,277	-0.001	0.059	-3.500	0.000	0.000	1.333
$W_{t-1}^{\text{gov.conflict}}$	17,277	0.0003	0.029	-1.000	0.000	0.000	1.333
$W_{t-1}^{\text{terr.conflict}}$	17,277	-0.001	0.046	-3.500	0.000	0.000	0.000
$W_{t-1}^{\text{exclusion}}$	17,277	-0.008	0.157	-4.000	0.000	0.000	1.500
$W_{t-1}^{\text{self-exclusion}}$	17,277	0.0005	0.033	-2.000	0.000	0.000	2.000
$W_{t-1}^{\text{powerless}}$	17,277	-0.004	0.135	-4.000	0.000	0.000	1.000
$W_{t-1}^{\text{discrimination}}$	17,277	-0.003	0.070	-3.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
$W_{t-1}^{\text{tek exclusion}}$	17,277	0.001	0.100	-2.000	0.000	0.000	3.500
$W_{t-1}^{\text{tek inclusion}}$	17,277	-0.001	0.111	-3.500	0.000	0.000	3.000
Ethnic conflict	18,335	0.062	0.242	0	0	0	1
Group Size	18,328	0.063	0.114	0.0001	0.004	0.071	0.912
Year	18,335	1,986.258	19.145	1,947	1,971	2,003	2,017
Polity2	18,335	-0.415	6.424	-10	-7	6	10
ln(GDP per capita)	18,335	8.441	1.067	5.662	7.679	9.211	11.584
Ln(Country Population)	18,335	10.752	2.145	5.021	9.269	12.318	14.159
Executive election	16,782	0.071	0.257	0.000	0.000	0.000	1.000
Constituent election	16,782	0.009	0.092	0.000	0.000	0.000	1.000
Legislative election	16,782	0.175	0.380	0.000	0.000	0.000	1.000
Irregular entry	17,674	0.026	0.160	0.000	0.000	0.000	1.000
Irregular exit	17,674	0.034	0.180	0.000	0.000	0.000	1.000

Table C.2: Robustness check: the intrastate diffusion of changes in group status ranking (1946-2012)

	Contiguity	Religion	Language	Race	Conflict	Gov. Conflict	Terr. Conf	Exclusion	Self-exclusion	Powerless	Discrimination	TEK Exclusion	TEK Inclusion
(Intercept)	-1.4725*** (0.2981)	-1.4680*** (0.2981)	-1.4537*** (0.2980)	-1.4686*** (0.2981)	-1.4786*** (0.2983)	-1.4650*** (0.2981)	-1.4771*** (0.2983)	-1.4760*** (0.2989)	-1.4913*** (0.2986)	-1.4694*** (0.2982)	-1.4659*** (0.2982)	-1.4661*** (0.2980)	-1.4691*** (0.2981)
Wy _{t-1}	0.0300 (0.0162)	-0.0051 (0.0177)	0.0807*** (0.0239)	0.0040 (0.0182)	0.0663* (0.0329)	0.1083 (0.0659)	0.0551 (0.0424)	0.0271* (0.0128)	0.1755** (0.0584)	0.0033 (0.0151)	0.0323 (0.0276)	0.0300 (0.0200)	0.0010 (0.0179)
Ethnic conflict	0.0001 (0.0091)	-0.0002 (0.0091)	0.0003 (0.0091)	-0.0002 (0.0091)	0.0010 (0.0091)	-0.0004 (0.0091)	0.0007 (0.0091)	0.0003 (0.0091)	-0.0007 (0.0091)	-0.0002 (0.0091)	-0.0001 (0.0091)	-0.0002 (0.0091)	-0.0002 (0.0091)
Executive election	0.0070 (0.0085)	0.0068 (0.0085)	0.0072 (0.0085)	0.0068 (0.0085)	0.0067 (0.0085)	0.0069 (0.0085)	0.0067 (0.0085)	0.0069 (0.0085)	0.0066 (0.0085)	0.0068 (0.0085)	0.0069 (0.0085)	0.0071 (0.0085)	0.0068 (0.0085)
Constituent election	0.0826*** (0.0222)	0.0823*** (0.0222)	0.0823*** (0.0222)	0.0823*** (0.0222)	0.0822*** (0.0222)	0.0823*** (0.0222)	0.0822*** (0.0222)	0.0824*** (0.0222)	0.0826*** (0.0222)	0.0823*** (0.0222)	0.0822*** (0.0222)	0.0821*** (0.0222)	0.0823*** (0.0222)
Legislative election	-0.0114* (0.0057)	-0.0114* (0.0057)	-0.0116* (0.0057)	-0.0114* (0.0057)	-0.0113* (0.0057)	-0.0113* (0.0057)	-0.0114* (0.0057)	-0.0115* (0.0057)	-0.0113* (0.0057)	-0.0114* (0.0057)	-0.0114* (0.0057)	-0.0115* (0.0057)	-0.0114* (0.0057)
Irregular leadership entry	0.1091*** (0.0234)	0.1085*** (0.0234)	0.1088*** (0.0234)	0.1087*** (0.0234)	0.1089*** (0.0234)	0.1087*** (0.0234)	0.1088*** (0.0234)	0.1092*** (0.0234)	0.1094*** (0.0234)	0.1087*** (0.0234)	0.1089*** (0.0234)	0.1088*** (0.0234)	0.1087*** (0.0234)
Irregular leadership exit	-0.0180 (0.0205)	-0.0181 (0.0205)	-0.0181 (0.0205)	-0.0181 (0.0205)	-0.0181 (0.0205)	-0.0181 (0.0205)	-0.0181 (0.0205)	-0.0185 (0.0205)	-0.0178 (0.0205)	-0.0181 (0.0205)	-0.0182 (0.0205)	-0.0182 (0.0205)	-0.0181 (0.0205)
Year	0.0009*** (0.0002)	0.0009*** (0.0002)	0.0009*** (0.0002)	0.0009*** (0.0002)	0.0009*** (0.0002)	0.0009*** (0.0002)	0.0009*** (0.0002)	0.0009*** (0.0002)	0.0009*** (0.0002)	0.0009*** (0.0002)	0.0009*** (0.0002)	0.0009*** (0.0002)	0.0009*** (0.0002)
Polity2	0.0046*** (0.0005)	0.0046*** (0.0005)	0.0046*** (0.0005)	0.0046*** (0.0005)	0.0046*** (0.0005)	0.0046*** (0.0005)	0.0046*** (0.0005)	0.0047*** (0.0005)	0.0046*** (0.0005)	0.0046*** (0.0005)	0.0046*** (0.0005)	0.0046*** (0.0005)	0.0046*** (0.0005)
ln(GDP per capita)	-0.0327*** (0.0041)	-0.0328*** (0.0041)	-0.0323*** (0.0041)	-0.0327*** (0.0041)	-0.0329*** (0.0041)	-0.0327*** (0.0041)	-0.0329*** (0.0041)	-0.0330*** (0.0041)	-0.0328*** (0.0041)	-0.0328*** (0.0041)	-0.0328*** (0.0041)	-0.0327*** (0.0041)	-0.0328*** (0.0041)
Group size	0.1032*** (0.0226)	0.1032*** (0.0226)	0.1036*** (0.0226)	0.1034*** (0.0226)	0.1029*** (0.0226)	0.1030*** (0.0226)	0.1031*** (0.0226)	0.1023*** (0.0227)	0.1029*** (0.0226)	0.1032*** (0.0226)	0.1032*** (0.0226)	0.1033*** (0.0226)	0.1033*** (0.0226)
Ln(Country Population)	0.0006 (0.0030)	0.0006 (0.0030)	0.0006 (0.0030)	0.0006 (0.0030)	0.0006 (0.0030)	0.0006 (0.0030)	0.0006 (0.0030)	0.0005 (0.0030)	0.0005 (0.0030)	0.0006 (0.0030)	0.0006 (0.0030)	0.0006 (0.0030)	0.0006 (0.0030)
AIC	1458.4377	1461.7707	1450.4581	1461.8060	1457.7807	1459.1560	1460.1661	1457.4084	1452.8210	1461.8055	1460.4857	1459.6048	1461.8511
BIC	1581.0408	1584.3737	1573.0611	1584.4090	1580.3837	1581.7590	1582.7691	1580.0114	1575.4240	1584.4086	1583.0888	1582.2078	1584.4542
Log Likelihood	-713.2189	-714.8853	-709.2290	-714.9030	-712.8903	-713.5780	-714.0830	-712.7042	-710.4105	-714.9028	-714.2429	-713.8024	-714.9256
Num. obs.	15720	15720	15720	15720	15720	15720	15720	15720	15720	15720	15720	15720	15720
Num. groups: gwgroupid:gwid	438	438	438	438	438	438	438	438	438	438	438	438	438
Num. groups: gwid	101	101	101	101	101	101	101	101	101	101	101	101	101
Var: gwgroupid:gwid (Intercept)	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
Var: gwid (Intercept)	0.0034	0.0033	0.0033	0.0033	0.0034	0.0033	0.0034	0.0035	0.0034	0.0033	0.0034	0.0033	0.0033
Var: Residual	0.0634	0.0634	0.0634	0.0634	0.0634	0.0634	0.0634	0.0634	0.0634	0.0634	0.0634	0.0634	0.0634

***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05

Table C.3: The intrastate diffusion of changes in group status ranking conditional on ongoing conflict (1946-2017)

	Contiguity	Religion	Language	Race	Conflict	Gov. Conflict	Terr. Conf	Exclusion	Self-exclusion	Powerless	Discrimination	TEK Exclusion	TEK Inclusion
(Intercept)	-1.1487*** (0.2730)	-1.1444*** (0.2729)	-1.1287*** (0.2728)	-1.1469*** (0.2730)	-1.1532*** (0.2731)	-1.1484*** (0.2740)	-1.1573*** (0.2730)	-1.1495*** (0.2734)	-1.1082*** (0.2742)	-1.1478*** (0.2728)	-1.1409*** (0.2730)	-1.1423*** (0.2728)	-1.1445*** (0.2729)
Wy_{t-1}	0.0142 (0.0165)	-0.0182 (0.0172)	0.0679** (0.0246)	-0.0068 (0.0185)	0.0174 (0.0657)	0.1097 (0.0649)	0.0500 (0.0416)	0.0111 (0.0128)	0.2823*** (0.0644)	-0.0052 (0.0144)	0.0344 (0.0293)	0.0363 (0.0204)	-0.0030 (0.0185)
Ethnic conflict	0.0036 (0.0086)	0.0031 (0.0086)	0.0036 (0.0086)	0.0034 (0.0086)	0.0043 (0.0086)	-0.0019 (0.0150)	0.0044 (0.0102)	0.0057 (0.0087)	0.0053 (0.0086)	0.0036 (0.0086)	0.0029 (0.0086)	0.0033 (0.0086)	0.0032 (0.0086)
Wy_{t-1} × Ethnic conflict	0.0848 (0.0526)	0.0498 (0.0548)	0.0978 (0.0750)	0.0960 (0.0590)	0.0582 (0.0752)			0.0971* (0.0412)	-0.5687*** (0.1416)	0.0612 (0.0718)	-0.0409 (0.0756)	-0.0624 (0.0555)	0.0113 (0.0471)
Year	0.0007*** (0.0001)	0.0007*** (0.0001)	0.0007*** (0.0001)	0.0007*** (0.0001)	0.0007*** (0.0001)	0.0007*** (0.0001)	0.0007*** (0.0001)	0.0007*** (0.0001)	0.0007*** (0.0001)	0.0007*** (0.0001)	0.0007*** (0.0001)	0.0007*** (0.0001)	0.0007*** (0.0001)
Polity2	0.0047*** (0.0005)	0.0047*** (0.0005)	0.0047*** (0.0005)	0.0047*** (0.0005)	0.0047*** (0.0005)	0.0047*** (0.0005)	0.0047*** (0.0005)	0.0047*** (0.0005)	0.0047*** (0.0005)	0.0047*** (0.0005)	0.0047*** (0.0005)	0.0047*** (0.0005)	0.0047*** (0.0005)
ln(GDP per capita)	-0.0311*** (0.0039)	-0.0312*** (0.0039)	-0.0308*** (0.0039)	-0.0311*** (0.0039)	-0.0313*** (0.0039)	-0.0311*** (0.0039)	-0.0313*** (0.0039)	-0.0312*** (0.0039)	-0.0307*** (0.0039)	-0.0312*** (0.0039)	-0.0312*** (0.0039)	-0.0311*** (0.0039)	-0.0312*** (0.0039)
Group size	0.1012*** (0.0215)	0.1013*** (0.0215)	0.1016*** (0.0215)	0.1016*** (0.0215)	0.1011*** (0.0215)	0.1019*** (0.0216)	0.1017*** (0.0215)	0.1013*** (0.0216)	0.1012*** (0.0216)	0.1020*** (0.0215)	0.1015*** (0.0215)	0.1012*** (0.0215)	0.1017*** (0.0215)
Ln(Country Population)	-0.0006 (0.0028)	-0.0006 (0.0028)	-0.0006 (0.0028)	-0.0006 (0.0028)	-0.0006 (0.0028)	-0.0006 (0.0028)	-0.0006 (0.0028)	-0.0006 (0.0028)	-0.0008 (0.0029)	-0.0006 (0.0028)	-0.0006 (0.0028)	-0.0006 (0.0028)	-0.0006 (0.0028)
AIC	1049.1364	1052.3285	1040.7478	1051.1448	1049.4916	1049.0779	1050.3220	1045.5075	1029.5201	1053.0481	1052.4271	1050.3966	1053.7501
BIC	1142.2109	1145.4030	1133.8222	1144.2192	1142.5660	1134.3962	1135.6402	1138.5820	1122.5946	1146.1225	1145.5015	1143.4710	1146.8245
Log Likelihood	-512.5682	-514.1643	-508.3739	-513.5724	-512.7458	-513.5390	-514.1610	-510.7538	-502.7601	-514.5240	-514.2135	-513.1983	-514.8750
Num. obs.	17261	17261	17261	17261	17261	17261	17261	17261	17261	17261	17261	17261	17261
Num. groups: gwgroupid:gwid	455	455	455	455	455	455	455	455	455	455	455	455	455
Num. groups: gwid	104	104	104	104	104	104	104	104	104	104	104	104	104
Var: gwgroupid:gwid (Intercept)	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
Var: gwid (Intercept)	0.0036	0.0036	0.0035	0.0036	0.0036	0.0035	0.0036	0.0036	0.0038	0.0035	0.0036	0.0035	0.0035
Var: Residual	0.0614	0.0614	0.0614	0.0614	0.0614	0.0614	0.0614	0.0614	0.0613	0.0614	0.0614	0.0614	0.0614

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$

Table C.4: The intrastate diffusion of changes in group status ranking (all groups, 1946-2017)

	Contiguity	Religion	Language	Race	Conflict	Gov. Conflict	Terr. Conf	Exclusion	Self-exclusion	Powerless	Discrimination	TEK.Excl	TEK.Inclusion
(Intercept)	-0.2755 (0.1732)	-0.2783 (0.1731)	-0.2773 (0.1731)	-0.2782 (0.1732)	-0.2804 (0.1731)	-0.2756 (0.1731)	-0.2808 (0.1731)	-0.2739 (0.1731)	-0.2817 (0.1731)	-0.2720 (0.1731)	-0.2764 (0.1731)	-0.2758 (0.1731)	-0.2768 (0.1731)
W_{yt-1}	0.0036 (0.0102)	-0.0164 (0.0108)	0.0429* (0.0171)	-0.0101 (0.0112)	0.1184*** (0.0306)	0.1358 (0.0694)	0.1366*** (0.0373)	-0.0177 (0.0128)	0.1600** (0.0611)	-0.0379* (0.0150)	-0.0076 (0.0287)	0.0208 (0.0143)	-0.0086 (0.0120)
Ethnic conflict	-0.0162* (0.0077)	-0.0163* (0.0077)	-0.0163* (0.0077)	-0.0162* (0.0077)	-0.0153* (0.0077)	-0.0165* (0.0077)	-0.0151 (0.0077)	-0.0164* (0.0077)	-0.0169* (0.0077)	-0.0163* (0.0077)	-0.0163* (0.0077)	-0.0163* (0.0077)	-0.0162* (0.0077)
Year	0.0002 (0.0001)	0.0002 (0.0001)	0.0002 (0.0001)	0.0002 (0.0001)	0.0002 (0.0001)	0.0002 (0.0001)	0.0002 (0.0001)	0.0002 (0.0001)	0.0002 (0.0001)	0.0002 (0.0001)	0.0002 (0.0001)	0.0002 (0.0001)	0.0002 (0.0001)
Polity2	0.0003 (0.0003)	0.0003 (0.0003)	0.0003 (0.0003)	0.0003 (0.0003)	0.0003 (0.0003)	0.0003 (0.0003)	0.0003 (0.0003)	0.0003 (0.0003)	0.0003 (0.0003)	0.0003 (0.0003)	0.0003 (0.0003)	0.0003 (0.0003)	0.0003 (0.0003)
ln(GDP per capita)	-0.0029 (0.0016)	-0.0030 (0.0016)	-0.0029 (0.0016)	-0.0030 (0.0016)	-0.0029 (0.0016)	-0.0029 (0.0016)	-0.0030 (0.0016)	-0.0029 (0.0016)	-0.0028 (0.0016)	-0.0028 (0.0016)	-0.0029 (0.0016)	-0.0029 (0.0016)	-0.0029 (0.0016)
Group size	-0.0063 (0.0067)	-0.0062 (0.0067)	-0.0063 (0.0067)	-0.0062 (0.0067)	-0.0063 (0.0067)	-0.0063 (0.0067)	-0.0063 (0.0067)	-0.0062 (0.0067)	-0.0062 (0.0067)	-0.0062 (0.0067)	-0.0062 (0.0067)	-0.0063 (0.0067)	-0.0062 (0.0067)
Ln(Country Population)	-0.0001 (0.0008)	-0.0001 (0.0008)	-0.0001 (0.0008)	-0.0001 (0.0008)	-0.0001 (0.0008)	-0.0001 (0.0008)	-0.0001 (0.0008)	-0.0001 (0.0008)	-0.0001 (0.0008)	-0.0000 (0.0008)	-0.0001 (0.0008)	-0.0001 (0.0008)	-0.0001 (0.0008)
AIC	5398.4301	5396.2284	5392.2468	5397.7427	5383.5502	5394.7274	5385.1045	5396.6654	5391.6925	5392.1326	5398.4853	5396.4365	5398.0496
BIC	5489.3970	5487.1954	5483.2138	5488.7097	5474.5172	5485.6944	5476.0715	5487.6324	5482.6595	5483.0995	5489.4523	5487.4035	5489.0166
Log Likelihood	-2688.2150	-2687.1142	-2685.1234	-2687.8713	-2680.7751	-2686.3637	-2681.5523	-2687.3327	-2684.8463	-2685.0663	-2688.2427	-2687.2183	-2688.0248
Num. obs.	28846	28846	28846	28846	28846	28846	28846	28846	28846	28846	28846	28846	28846
Num. groups: gwgroupid:gwid	655	655	655	655	655	655	655	655	655	655	655	655	655
Num. groups: gwid	108	108	108	108	108	108	108	108	108	108	108	108	108
Var: gwgroupid:gwid (Intercept)	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
Var: gwid (Intercept)	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
Var: Residual	0.0705	0.0705	0.0705	0.0705	0.0705	0.0705	0.0705	0.0705	0.0705	0.0705	0.0705	0.0705	0.0705

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$

Table C.5: Robustness check: the intrastate diffusion of changes in group status ranking (all groups, 1946-2012)

	Contiguity	Religion	Language	Race	Any conflict	Gov. Conflict	Terr. Conf	Exclusion	Self-exclusion	Powerless	Discrimination	TEK Exclusion	TEK inclusion
(Intercept)	-0.4599*	-0.4636*	-0.4590*	-0.4644*	-0.4683*	-0.4608*	-0.4680*	-0.4602*	-0.4697*	-0.4592*	-0.4620*	-0.4591*	-0.4628*
	(0.1988)	(0.1988)	(0.1987)	(0.1988)	(0.1987)	(0.1987)	(0.1987)	(0.1988)	(0.1988)	(0.1987)	(0.1988)	(0.1988)	(0.1988)
WY_{t-1}	0.0077	-0.0146	0.0466*	-0.0097	0.1189***	0.1358	0.1354***	-0.0133	0.1663**	-0.0341*	-0.0073	0.0220	-0.0093
	(0.0108)	(0.0115)	(0.0182)	(0.0117)	(0.0312)	(0.0704)	(0.0378)	(0.0135)	(0.0620)	(0.0159)	(0.0292)	(0.0151)	(0.0128)
Ethnic conflict	-0.0212**	-0.0212**	-0.0213**	-0.0212**	-0.0201*	-0.0216**	-0.0200*	-0.0214**	-0.0220**	-0.0212**	-0.0213**	-0.0213**	-0.0212**
	(0.0082)	(0.0082)	(0.0082)	(0.0082)	(0.0082)	(0.0082)	(0.0082)	(0.0082)	(0.0082)	(0.0082)	(0.0082)	(0.0082)	(0.0082)
Executive election	-0.0001	-0.0001	0.0002	-0.0002	-0.0001	-0.0000	-0.0002	-0.0002	-0.0002	-0.0002	-0.0001	0.0000	-0.0001
	(0.0066)	(0.0066)	(0.0066)	(0.0066)	(0.0066)	(0.0066)	(0.0066)	(0.0066)	(0.0066)	(0.0066)	(0.0066)	(0.0066)	(0.0066)
Constituent election	0.0613**	0.0609**	0.0613**	0.0612**	0.0596**	0.0613**	0.0594**	0.0612**	0.0614**	0.0610**	0.0613**	0.0610**	0.0612**
	(0.0204)	(0.0204)	(0.0204)	(0.0204)	(0.0204)	(0.0204)	(0.0204)	(0.0204)	(0.0204)	(0.0204)	(0.0204)	(0.0204)	(0.0204)
Legislative election	-0.0069	-0.0070	-0.0071	-0.0069	-0.0069	-0.0068	-0.0069	-0.0069	-0.0069	-0.0069	-0.0069	-0.0070	-0.0069
	(0.0046)	(0.0046)	(0.0046)	(0.0046)	(0.0046)	(0.0046)	(0.0046)	(0.0046)	(0.0046)	(0.0046)	(0.0046)	(0.0046)	(0.0046)
Irregular leadership entry	0.0269	0.0269	0.0267	0.0269	0.0274	0.0269	0.0274	0.0267	0.0274	0.0267	0.0268	0.0268	0.0269
	(0.0196)	(0.0195)	(0.0195)	(0.0195)	(0.0195)	(0.0195)	(0.0195)	(0.0196)	(0.0195)	(0.0195)	(0.0196)	(0.0195)	(0.0196)
Irregular leadership exit	0.0097	0.0091	0.0095	0.0094	0.0095	0.0096	0.0095	0.0096	0.0097	0.0096	0.0095	0.0095	0.0095
	(0.0172)	(0.0172)	(0.0172)	(0.0172)	(0.0172)	(0.0172)	(0.0172)	(0.0172)	(0.0172)	(0.0172)	(0.0172)	(0.0172)	(0.0172)
Year	0.0002*	0.0002*	0.0002*	0.0002*	0.0002*	0.0002*	0.0002*	0.0002*	0.0002*	0.0002*	0.0002*	0.0002*	0.0002*
	(0.0001)	(0.0001)	(0.0001)	(0.0001)	(0.0001)	(0.0001)	(0.0001)	(0.0001)	(0.0001)	(0.0001)	(0.0001)	(0.0001)	(0.0001)
Polity2	0.0004	0.0004	0.0004	0.0004	0.0004	0.0004	0.0004	0.0004	0.0004	0.0004	0.0004	0.0004	0.0004
	(0.0003)	(0.0003)	(0.0003)	(0.0003)	(0.0003)	(0.0003)	(0.0003)	(0.0003)	(0.0003)	(0.0003)	(0.0003)	(0.0003)	(0.0003)
ln(GDP per capita)	-0.0024	-0.0025	-0.0024	-0.0025	-0.0025	-0.0024	-0.0025	-0.0024	-0.0024	-0.0024	-0.0024	-0.0024	-0.0025
	(0.0017)	(0.0017)	(0.0017)	(0.0017)	(0.0017)	(0.0017)	(0.0017)	(0.0017)	(0.0017)	(0.0017)	(0.0017)	(0.0017)	(0.0017)
Group size	-0.0056	-0.0055	-0.0056	-0.0055	-0.0056	-0.0055	-0.0056	-0.0055	-0.0055	-0.0055	-0.0055	-0.0055	-0.0055
	(0.0072)	(0.0072)	(0.0072)	(0.0072)	(0.0072)	(0.0072)	(0.0072)	(0.0072)	(0.0072)	(0.0072)	(0.0072)	(0.0072)	(0.0072)
Ln(Country Population)	0.0004	0.0004	0.0004	0.0004	0.0004	0.0004	0.0004	0.0004	0.0004	0.0004	0.0004	0.0004	0.0004
	(0.0008)	(0.0008)	(0.0008)	(0.0008)	(0.0008)	(0.0008)	(0.0008)	(0.0008)	(0.0008)	(0.0008)	(0.0008)	(0.0008)	(0.0008)
AIC	5631.1670	5630.0713	5625.0939	5630.9760	5617.1767	5627.9473	5618.8460	5630.6929	5624.4706	5627.0791	5631.6055	5629.5592	5631.1395
BIC	5761.8311	5760.7354	5755.7580	5761.6401	5747.8408	5758.6114	5749.5101	5761.3570	5755.1347	5757.7432	5762.2696	5760.2233	5761.8036
Log Likelihood	-2799.5835	-2799.0357	-2796.5470	-2799.4880	-2792.5884	-2797.9737	-2793.4230	-2799.3465	-2796.2353	-2797.5396	-2799.8027	-2798.7796	-2799.5697
Num. obs.	26017	26017	26017	26017	26017	26017	26017	26017	26017	26017	26017	26017	26017
Num. groups: gwgroupid:gwid	639	639	639	639	639	639	639	639	639	639	639	639	639
Num. groups: gwid	106	106	106	106	106	106	106	106	106	106	106	106	106
Var: gwgroupid:gwid (Intercept)	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
Var: gwid (Intercept)	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
Var: Residual	0.0726	0.0726	0.0726	0.0726	0.0726	0.0726	0.0726	0.0726	0.0726	0.0726	0.0726	0.0726	0.0726

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$

Table C.6: The intrastate diffusion of changes group status ranking conditional on ongoing conflict (all groups, 1946-2017)

	Contiguity	Religion	Language	Race	Conflict	Gov. Conflict	Terr. Conf	Exclusion	Self-exclusion	Powerless	Discrimination	TEK.Excl	TEK.Inpower
(Intercept)	-0.2766 (0.1732)	-0.2804 (0.1731)	-0.2765 (0.1731)	-0.2791 (0.1731)	-0.2819 (0.1731)	-0.3147 (0.1734)	-0.2634 (0.1729)	-0.2754 (0.1731)	-0.2686 (0.1732)	-0.2728 (0.1731)	-0.2757 (0.1731)	-0.2756 (0.1731)	-0.2770 (0.1731)
Wy_{t-1}	-0.0002 (0.0105)	-0.0217 (0.0112)	0.0391* (0.0182)	-0.0166 (0.0116)	-0.0008 (0.0678)	0.1321 (0.0694)	0.1395*** (0.0372)	-0.0252 (0.0135)	0.2635*** (0.0685)	-0.0393** (0.0153)	0.0027 (0.0312)	0.0224 (0.0149)	-0.0154 (0.0127)
Ethnic conflict	-0.0166* (0.0077)	-0.0166* (0.0077)	-0.0164* (0.0077)	-0.0169* (0.0077)	-0.0151 (0.0077)	-0.0594*** (0.0132)	0.0058 (0.0093)	-0.0151 (0.0078)	-0.0151 (0.0078)	-0.0161* (0.0077)	-0.0167* (0.0077)	-0.0162* (0.0077)	-0.0164* (0.0077)
Wy_{t-1} × Ethnic conflict	0.0594 (0.0417)	0.0732 (0.0419)	0.0321 (0.0528)	0.0883* (0.0424)	0.1497* (0.0759)			0.0797 (0.0438)	-0.5030*** (0.1510)	0.0355 (0.0767)	-0.0689 (0.0803)	-0.0205 (0.0525)	0.0654 (0.0393)
Year	0.0002 (0.0001)	0.0002 (0.0001)	0.0002 (0.0001)	0.0002 (0.0001)	0.0002 (0.0001)	0.0002* (0.0001)	0.0001 (0.0001)	0.0002 (0.0001)	0.0002 (0.0001)	0.0002 (0.0001)	0.0002 (0.0001)	0.0002 (0.0001)	0.0002 (0.0001)
Polity2	0.0003 (0.0003)	0.0003 (0.0003)	0.0003 (0.0003)	0.0003 (0.0003)	0.0003 (0.0003)	0.0002 (0.0003)	0.0003 (0.0003)	0.0003 (0.0003)	0.0003 (0.0003)	0.0003 (0.0003)	0.0003 (0.0003)	0.0003 (0.0003)	0.0003 (0.0003)
ln(GDP per capita)	-0.0029 (0.0016)	-0.0030 (0.0016)	-0.0029 (0.0016)	-0.0030 (0.0016)	-0.0030 (0.0016)	-0.0029 (0.0016)	-0.0026 (0.0016)	-0.0029 (0.0016)	-0.0028 (0.0016)	-0.0028 (0.0016)	-0.0029 (0.0016)	-0.0029 (0.0016)	-0.0030 (0.0016)
Group size	-0.0064 (0.0067)	-0.0063 (0.0067)	-0.0063 (0.0067)	-0.0063 (0.0067)	-0.0064 (0.0067)	-0.0057 (0.0067)	-0.0055 (0.0067)	-0.0061 (0.0067)	-0.0063 (0.0067)	-0.0062 (0.0067)	-0.0063 (0.0067)	-0.0063 (0.0067)	-0.0062 (0.0067)
Ln(Country Population)	-0.0001 (0.0008)	-0.0001 (0.0008)	-0.0001 (0.0008)	-0.0001 (0.0008)	-0.0001 (0.0008)	-0.0002 (0.0008)	-0.0001 (0.0008)	-0.0001 (0.0008)	-0.0001 (0.0008)	-0.0000 (0.0008)	-0.0001 (0.0008)	-0.0001 (0.0008)	-0.0001 (0.0008)
AIC	5398.3973	5395.1842	5393.8786	5395.4163	5381.6631	5379.1157	5388.5214	5395.3578	5382.5995	5393.9179	5399.7495	5398.2839	5397.2864
BIC	5497.6341	5494.4210	5493.1153	5494.6530	5480.8999	5470.0827	5479.4884	5494.5946	5481.8363	5493.1546	5498.9862	5497.5206	5496.5231
Log Likelihood	-2687.1987	-2685.5921	-2684.9393	-2685.7081	-2678.8316	-2678.5579	-2683.2607	-2685.6789	-2679.2998	-2684.9590	-2687.8747	-2687.1419	-2686.6432
Num. obs.	28846	28846	28846	28846	28846	28846	28846	28846	28846	28846	28846	28846	28846
Num. groups: gwgroupid:gwid	655	655	655	655	655	655	655	655	655	655	655	655	655
Num. groups: gwid	108	108	108	108	108	108	108	108	108	108	108	108	108
Var: gwgroupid:gwid (Intercept)	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
Var: gwid (Intercept)	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
Var: Residual	0.0705	0.0705	0.0705	0.0705	0.0705	0.0705	0.0705	0.0705	0.0705	0.0705	0.0705	0.0705	0.0705

***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05

Table C.7: Summary statistics for all groups

Statistic	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Pctl(25)	Pctl(75)	Max
Δ status ranking	30,450	0.003	0.262	-5.000	0.000	0.000	4.000
W_{t-1} contiguity	28,872	0.005	0.153	-2.693	0.000	0.000	4.000
W_{t-1} religion	28,872	0.003	0.145	-4.000	0.000	0.000	3.000
W_{t-1} language	28,872	0.001	0.092	-3.000	0.000	0.000	4.000
W_{t-1} race	28,872	0.004	0.140	-2.500	0.000	0.000	3.000
W_{t-1} conflict	28,872	-0.0004	0.051	-3.500	0.000	0.000	2.500
W_{t-1} gov.conflict	28,872	0.0002	0.023	-1.000	0.000	0.000	1.333
W_{t-1} terr.conflict	28,872	-0.001	0.042	-3.500	0.000	0.000	2.500
W_{t-1} exclusion	28,872	-0.005	0.122	-4.000	0.000	0.000	1.500
W_{t-1} self-exclusion	28,872	0.0003	0.026	-2.000	0.000	0.000	2.000
W_{t-1} powerless	28,872	-0.003	0.105	-4.000	0.000	0.000	1.000
W_{t-1} discrimination	28,872	-0.002	0.054	-3.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
W_{t-1} tek exclusion	28,872	0.001	0.109	-2.667	0.000	0.000	3.500
W_{t-1} tek inclusion	28,872	0.001	0.130	-3.500	0.000	0.000	4.000
Ethnic conflict	31,482	0.043	0.202	0	0	0	1
Group Size	31,399	0.171	0.243	0.0001	0.011	0.230	0.988
Year	31,482	1,987.078	19.276	1,946	1,972	2,004	2,017
Polity2	31,482	0.183	6.578	-10	-7	6	10
ln(GDP per capita)	31,482	8.382	1.077	4.786	7.622	9.165	11.628
Ln(Country Population)	31,482	10.320	2.088	4.994	8.858	11.871	14.159
Executive election	28,621	0.080	0.272	0.000	0.000	0.000	1.000
Constituent election	28,621	0.007	0.082	0.000	0.000	0.000	1.000
Legislative election	28,621	0.183	0.387	0.000	0.000	0.000	1.000
Irregular entry	30,280	0.028	0.164	0.000	0.000	0.000	1.000
Irregular exit	30,280	0.034	0.182	0.000	0.000	0.000	1.000

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Biography

Chong Chen graduated from Nankai University in Tianjin, China, with a B.A. in International Politics in 2010, and an M.A. in International Relations in 2012, respectively. At Nankai University, he received the National Scholarship twice from the Chinese Ministry of Education in 2008 and 2009. Prior to coming to the United States for his graduate studies, he participated in the Spring 2012 voyage of the Semester at Sea. From 2013 to 2015, he received a full scholarship from the Department of Political Science at Utah State University, where he also completed an M.S. in Political Science in 2015.

He started his Ph.D. studies in the Department of Political Science at Duke University in August 2015. At Duke University, most of his work focuses on the intersection between international relations and comparative politics, with a specialization in armed conflict and political violence both within and beyond national borders. His work has been published in peer-reviewed journals, including *International Organization* and *The Chinese Journal of International Politics*. His dissertation received support from the Duke Graduate School, the Bradley Foundation, and the Jerry B. and Callie Stone Scholarships. He also spent two summers as a visiting scholar at University of Konstanz in Germany in 2017 and Tsinghua University in 2018, both with fellowships from the Duke Political Science Department.

Starting from January 2020, he will be an assistant professor in the Department of International Relations at Tsinghua University in Beijing, China.