

The Demand for Businessperson Politicians: How Do Businesspeople
Win Electoral Nominations and Votes?

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Dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of
the requirements for the degree of Doctor
of Philosophy in the Department of
Political Science in the Graduate School
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ABSTRACT

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Abstract

Businesspeople are a highly represented occupational group in the governments of many countries. What electoral strategies do these businessperson politicians employ that afford them high electoral success? In a context where non-programmatic electoral strategies are common and when faced with strong constraints on the utilization of personal, party, and public resources for distributive purposes, I argue that businessperson candidates' access to private sector resources provides them with an alternative set of distributive resources that can be used to pursue political support, thereby granting businessperson candidates with an electoral advantage over other occupational groups.

Businessperson candidates are able to distribute private sector jobs to build an army of political workers who can provide political services. To test my arguments, I conducted list experiments with 986 employees in firms of businessperson candidates in Thailand. I find that employees in firms of businessperson candidates provide political services such as voting for the businessperson candidate, attending rallies, persuading acquaintances to support the businessperson candidate, and distributing goods and services produced by the firm to voters. Businessperson candidates, however, face a risk of shirking by patronage employees once hired. To overcome the commitment problem, I find that businessperson candidates rely on monitoring and negative inducements, in the form of employment termination threats, to mobilize these patronage employees to provide political services.

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Chapter 1

Introduction

In Thailand's 2019 general election, the newly founded Palang Pracharath party was established with the primary goal of extending the tenure of Prayuth, the leader of the military junta that had overthrown an elected government in 2014. As a nascent party, its primary strategy involved recruiting and "pulling" businesspeople from other parties to strengthen its financial resources for the election (*Wikhro: "phak phalang si khieo"*, 2018). Numerous reports in the months preceding the election highlighted the influx of businesspeople into the party (*Palang Pracharath khukkhak*, 2018; *Suwit nam naktharakit*, 2018). Among the 470 MP candidates representing the party, 252 candidates, or 54% of the candidates are businesspeople who either own businesses or serve in management positions in private businesses prior to their participation in politics (Elect.in.th, 2019). Palang Pracharath, therefore, appeared to have a strong inclination towards recruiting businesspeople to join the party. Fast forward to 2023, Prayuth had left Palang Pracharath to establish the United Thai Nation Party. Party secretary Ekkanat Prompan anticipated that many politicians and businesspeople would join the new party (*"Ekkanat" tang pao*, 2022), indicating that businesspeople continued to be a valuable recruitment target for political parties.

To get a glimpse of what businessperson candidates can contribute to political parties, it can be useful to look at a few businessperson candidates nominated by Palang Pracharath in the 2019 election. In Chonburi, a province in the eastern part of the country, Palang Pracharath nominated two businessperson candidates to run. Suchart Chomklin, a Palang Pracharath candidate in District 1, was the managing director of Arinsiri Land prior to running for the MP

office. Arinsiri Land is a private company that deals with real estate sales in several provinces in the eastern region of Thailand, with over 480 million Thai baht (\$14 million) in registered capital. In District 8 of Chonburi, Palang Pracharath nominated Satira Puakprapan, a businessperson who owns a gold trading business in Chonburi. Campaign spending data from the Electoral Commission of Thailand (ECT) reveals that Palang Pracharath allocated a nearly uniform amount of funds for all of their eight of their candidates running in Chonburi, ranging from 799,900 to 809,180 Thai baht. Looking at personal spending by candidates, however, there was a divergence in how much each candidate spent. Suchart and Satira happened to be the top two spenders from Palang Pracharath in Chonburi. Suchart spent 550,980 Thai baht, and Satira spent 581,000 Thai baht in personal spending, as reported by the ECT. In comparison, five other non-businessperson candidates from Palang Pracharath spent between 150,000 and 300,000 Thai baht, while one other non-businessperson candidate spent 400,301 Thai baht. The two businessperson candidates spent approximately double or close to double the amount of most other non-businessperson members of their party in formal personal spending.

On the party list side, Palang Pracharath nominated several businesspeople to various positions on the closed party list. One of the businesspeople is Santi Prompat, whom the media called the "capitalist" who funds the party (ThaiPost, 2020; *Phuea Thai luad lai mai yood*, 2018). Santi is a businessperson who owns a conglomerate called Nawapatthani, which includes more than 25 businesses within the company network. The conglomerate operates in various sectors ranging from real estate development to machinery and car parts manufacturing (*Profile 'Santi Prompat'*, 2020). The conglomerate has a net asset of around 5.6 billion Thai baht, or around \$160 million (*Pha khum thurakit*, 2013). As the primary funder of the party, Santi was nominated to position number 7 on Palang Pracharat's party list and eventually won an MP seat from his high

position on the party list. Pongkawin Juangroongruangkit is another businessperson candidate from Palang Pracharath. In 2018, Pongkawin donated 5 million Thai baht to Palang Pracharath (*Perd than thun muen lan*, 2018). As a businessperson, Pongkawin serves on the board of 17 firms (*Perd than thun muen lan*, 2018). These 17 firms include a combined total asset of over 7.8 billion Thai baht (\$228 million). Palang Pracharath nominated Pongkawin to position number 16 on the party list, and he was successfully elected as a party-list MP.

These examples suggest that businessperson candidates serve as a significant source of financial resources for political parties. However, even when parties recruit these businesspeople and nominate them for elections, it is also important to understand how these businesspeople get people to vote for them. Based on past general election results and occupational data from the Electoral Commission of Thailand (ECT), businesspeople have often achieved disproportionate electoral success compared to other occupational groups. In the 2001, 2007, and 2019 general elections, 20%, 27%, and 24% of MP candidates were businesspeople. However, 27%, 35%, and 31% of the successful candidates were businesspeople in 2001, 2007, and 2019, respectively (Electoral Commission of Thailand, 2001, 2007, 2019). The higher proportion of businesspeople elected, compared to the proportion of businesspeople nominated, indicates that businesspeople outperformed and were more likely to win elections than candidates from other occupational groups. How can we explain the electoral success of these businessperson candidates?

In addition to spending large sums of money on their campaigns to gain name recognition and votes, the electoral success of businessperson candidates can potentially be owed to these candidates' access to and their ability to mobilize firm resources to win votes and pursue their goals of gaining access to elected offices. Gomes Teekananont is a well-known businessperson politician in Khonkaen province. Gomes owns a dealership that sells several

brands of cars and agricultural machinery. He also co-owns other businesses such as a restaurant and a hospital in Khonkaen province. Gomes is not only successful in his business undertakings but also in the political arena. To win elections, Gomes has been reported to utilize his automobile dealer business as a means to build a network of political supporters. To garner the political loyalty and support of voters in his constituency, Gomes allows buyers to pay for agricultural machinery in installments with a 0% interest rate and is lenient with late payments (Kankaew, 1997). Gomes also has been known to reward his employees, who often serve as brokers, with zero down payment for any automobile they want to purchase. This example suggests that businessperson candidates are capable of mobilizing resources from their firms to serve electoral purposes by exchanging some form of firm benefits in return for political support.

The primary focus of this dissertation is to elaborate on this example and offer a systematic understanding of the demand for businessperson candidates. While there are two primary components of the demand for businessperson candidates, the demand from political parties and from voters, this dissertation will focus on the latter. In other words, it will address how businessperson candidates persuade voters to support them.

1.1 Why study businessperson politicians?

Businessperson candidacy is not uncommon and is prevalent in many countries besides Thailand, the country of focus in this dissertation. As Szakonyi (2020) has compiled the proportion of businessperson candidates running and businessperson politicians serving in legislative bodies in a handful of countries, businesspeople's participation in politics occurs in all parts of the world and both in developed and developing nations. For instance, Carnes (2012) finds that approximately 20% of the members of the U.S. House of Representatives were

businesspeople in the past century. The U.K. sees averages of between 25%-30% of their MPs in the House of Commons with concurrent private-sector employment while working as MP each year (Weschle, 2021). Ukraine saw 30% of its legislators with past experiences in the private sector (Semenova, 2012). While in Russia, Szakonyi (2020) finds that 21% of the candidates for regional legislatures between 2004 and 2011 were businesspeople. Carnes and Lupu (2015) show the class distributions of legislators in Latin American countries. Overall, 20% of legislators in Latin America countries were businesspeople at the time of the survey on average. Looking individually by country, more than 30% of the legislators in countries like Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Honduras, and Paraguay are businesspeople. Turning to Asia, Indonesia also sees a rise in businesspeople's participation in local governments (Aspinall, 2013). The prevalence of participation by businesspeople in politics raises the question of the consequences of participation by this occupational group.

The political participation of businessperson politicians can significantly impact the public policies that are implemented given that the descriptive representation of those who control policy levers can directly influence the policies that are implemented (Besley and Case, 2003; Chattopadhyay and Duflo, 2004; Pande, 2003). Profit-oriented professions such as businesspeople tend to have more conservative economic policy preferences compared to working-class occupations. Therefore, they support a smaller role for the government in regulating healthcare, welfare policies, and other areas (Carnes, 2012, 2018). In addition, businesspeople also tend to have a more pro-business voting record (Witko and Friedman, 2008). As such, it is not surprising that several studies have shown that businessperson politicians tend to shift the allocation of public spending towards infrastructure investments, directly benefit

businesses, while cutting back on redistributive spending and investments in social capital (Szakonyi, 2020; Kirkland, 2021).

Because there are policy and distributional consequences to the participation of businesspeople in politics, a comprehensive understanding of this phenomenon is needed in order to craft appropriate policy responses that can mitigate any adverse effects arising from the overrepresentation of businesspeople in politics. While access to elected office offers firms and businesspeople many benefits, running for and holding political offices are costly endeavors for firms. Firms and businesspeople will have to weigh the costs and benefits of this type of direct electoral participation for their companies and decide whether to have one of their own run for elected office. The study of businessperson politicians, however, cannot end with just an understanding of why businesspeople run for political offices. Once firms and businesspeople decide to run for office, they often need to get nominated by a political party and subsequently win votes from voters. Therefore, it is also important to examine the demand side to fully comprehend the phenomenon of businessperson politicians. While the supply side considers the incentives that drive businesspeople to become electoral candidates, the demand side examines the factors that motivate parties to nominate and voters to vote for businesspeople. This dissertation aims to investigate the latter by providing a systematic explanation of how businesspeople rely on resources from their firms to mobilize political support and win votes, as well as the strategic considerations undertaken by political parties when recruiting and nominating businessperson politicians.

1.2 Defining Businessperson Candidates

As businessperson politicians are the central actors in this dissertation, it is vital to provide a definition for businessperson candidates. In this dissertation, a businessperson candidate is defined as an electoral candidate who works as a businessperson before their electoral candidacy. An electoral candidate will be considered a businessperson candidate if the individual serves in a management role (such as managing director or deputy director) or holds a position within a firm's board of directors before running in an election.

Board members are typically in charge of setting the vision and goals of a firm, but do not usually play a direct role in the implementation of their recommendations or participate in the day-to-day operations of the firm (Hiller and Beaudesne, 2014). Individuals who serve in management roles are usually closely involved with a firm's daily operations and thus have the authority to make day-to-day decisions regarding the allocation of firm resources in order to pursue the board's vision (Hiller and Beaudesne, 2014). Formally, there is a separation of roles between the board and management, where board members do not regularly intervene in the daily operations of firms. In reality, however, many firms around the globe do not witness a complete separation between these two entities, as the CEO often serves as the chairperson of the board, and thus the boards are not completely divorced from daily operations (Josephs, 2019). However, there has been a recent trend among developed economies to separate the roles of the CEO and the board chair due to concerns over potential conflicts of interest (Pick et al., 2011). For example, only 30% of S&P 500 firms separated the roles of CEO and chairperson in 2005, but the percentage of firms with a separation in roles increased to 53% by 2019 (Josephs, 2019).

This trend, however, has not caught on in developing economies, including Thailand. Among 223 Thai firms surveyed in 2000, 157 firms, or 71.04% of the sample, had a managing

director who also served on the board, and the corporate environment has not changed much since then (Wiwattanakantang, 2000; Settsatien, 2020). Not only do we observe more managing directors serving on the boards of their firms in developing economies, but another contrast in the corporate activities of board members between developed and developing economies is that non-managing director board members play a more substantive role in day-to-day operations in developing economies. For example, non-managing director board members in Thai firms regularly advise managing directors on day-to-day management decisions, represent their firms in the media, and make hiring decisions for non-managerial positions (Wiwattanakantang, 2000).

The presence of managing directors on the boards of firms and the active roles of non-managing director board members in daily corporate activities indicate that daily operations are still within the purview of the boards in these developing economies, and board members are expected to play more active roles in a firm's day-to-day operations than their counterparts in developed economies. As a result, businessperson candidates who serve in management roles or as board members have the ability to influence decisions on the allocation of firm resources and can mobilize these resources for electoral purposes.¹ Consequently, the ability to control the allocation and distribution of firm resources for electoral purposes makes businessperson candidates attractive to political parties, particularly those that are resource-deprived. Since my argument is expected to apply to both businesspeople who serve in management roles and those who serve as board members, I categorize both types of businesspeople as businessperson candidates.

¹ No regulation forbids a Thai MP, who is not the Prime Minister or a cabinet member, from continuing to serve as a managing director or as a board member of a private firm. Usually, MPs would step down as the managing director, but continue to serve on the board of their firms. Therefore, incumbent MPs are still capable of using firm resources for electoral purposes.

1.3 Supply of Businessperson Politicians: Why do businesspeople compete for elected offices?

The regulatory power and economic policies implemented by a government can have a substantial influence on firms and their operations, both positively and negatively. Many firms often engage in various nonmarket strategies, which are a set of objectives and courses of action taken in the nonmarket environment to improve a firm's overall performance (Baron, 2012).² One area of the nonmarket environment in which firms can take action is the political arena, where firms and businesspeople aim to influence the decision-making process of government actors in order to obtain policies and regulations that are favorable to their firms. Firms can either try to expand their interests through favorable policies or limit the negative impact that policies and regulations may have on them (Baron, 2012; Walker and Rea, 2014).

Within the political arena, firms can influence policies legislated and implemented by government actors in their favor through several strategies. First, firms can influence policies through indirect strategies such as making campaign donations to politicians or lobbying. Firms and their representatives can provide financial resources through donations or political support and information through lobbying in order to influence politicians' decisions in a way that would be beneficial to firms (Hertel-Fernandez, 2016; Weymouth 2012; Boas et al. 2014). Politicians act as intermediaries on firms' behalf by taking actions within the political arena that would be favorable to the firms with which the politicians interact with.

The downside of these indirect strategies is that politicians may renege, and there is no guarantee that politicians will act on behalf of the firms once they receive financial resources or

² The nonmarket environment involves “the social, political, and legal arrangements that structure interactions outside of, but in conjunction with, markets and contracts” (Baron, 2012).

information. A policy exchange between firms and politicians suffers a principal-agent problem, which may be further exacerbated by the fact that crafting a formal contract between firms and politicians to specify the terms of exchange is difficult due to uncertainties in the policymaking process or is outright illegal in many countries (Lowery and Marchetti, 2012; Harstad and Svensson, 2011). Even when such a contract is possible, politicians often face various demands from different interest groups. These demands may not be compatible with each other, and politicians may not necessarily support a demand that is favorable to businesses. Although larger contributions increase the probability that a politician will act in a way that a firm wants, it is not always the case that a politician will take action in favor of the special interest group that paid them the most (Grossman and Helpman, 1994). Faced with these uncertainties when relying on an intermediary, firms and businesspeople are incentivized to seek alternative corporate political strategies that would result in the implementation of their preferred policies.

Alternatively, firms can rely on a direct corporate political strategy, where a businessperson from the firm runs for elected office. By having one of their own hold elected office, firms can reduce the uncertainty that arises when relying on an intermediary to represent the firm's interests in the political arena. Once in elected political positions, businessperson politicians are able to provide input and draft new laws and regulations that are favorable to and benefit their firms. For example, businessperson politicians in Thailand draft, promote, and vote on regulations and laws that reduce tax and license fees, increase the number of state contracts, and create new market entry barriers (Bunkanwanicha and Wiwattanakantang, 2009). Direct participation in politics also provides firms with information that allows them to manage and adapt to new laws and regulations ahead of time, enabling them to maximize benefits and minimize costs from regulatory changes.

Although directly running for office may sound attractive, firms may incur high costs from this strategy. Firms and businessperson candidates incur opportunity costs when they choose to run for office. The time that businessperson candidates could spend managing the firm is instead used to run political campaigns, learn a new skill set to navigate the political world, and govern. Furthermore, campaign expenditures have been on the rise, both in developing and developed countries, which means that firms and businesspeople will have to invest substantial financial resources into the campaign (Waitookiat and Chambers, 2015; Albert, 2017; Virananda et al., 2021). The sums invested in electoral campaigns do not guarantee that the businessperson will win the election. Firms and businesspeople will thus have to risk paying the cost for campaigns, but may gain minimal returns from the spending. Both the opportunity and financial costs internalized by firms and businesspeople mean that firms do not automatically select businessperson candidacy as their preferred corporate political strategy.

Given the several options that firms have to influence laws and regulations, along with the varied associated costs and benefits of each option, an important question is when firms and businesspeople would select the direct strategy of businessperson candidacy over indirect strategies such as donations and lobbying. The first set of explanation focuses on the personal characteristics of the businessperson, which may not be directly related to a firm's financial calculus. For example, personal upbringing, such as through politicized educational experiences and parental support, can increase the chance that an individual will run for office, while membership in an underrepresented group may decrease the likelihood that an individual will seek candidacy (Fox and Lawless, 2005, 2014). Additionally, individuals may be drawn to run for elected office due to the potential for personal financial gains from holding elected positions

(Eggers and Hainmueller, 2009). The personal financial gains derived from political offices are expected to enhance the payoff for a businessperson, thus motivating them to run for office.

Another set of explanations examines the institutional arrangements that drive firms to engage in businessperson candidacy. First, strong and robust democratic institutions can prevent businessperson politicians from passing policies that are detrimental to their constituents and thus limit the potential gains from running for office (Gehlbach, Sonin, and Zhuravskaya, 2010). Strong democratic institutions promote the voters' ability to hold politicians accountable and prevent them from implementing policies that are favorable to their firms but at the expense of the public. If candidates choose to implement policies that deviate from the preferences of the median voter, they will face electoral punishment. As such, the spoils of office are limited if businessperson politicians are unable to pursue their preferred policies, making the cost of businessperson candidacy higher than the benefits. In a polity with weak democratic institutions, businessperson politicians will be able to deviate from their campaign promises and implement policies that may not be in the public interest with less fear of electoral punishment from voters. Weak democratic constraints increase the potential benefits that firms gain from holding elected office. As such, these gains from holding an elected office may outweigh the cost of running and can increase the payoff from businessperson candidacy, making it more attractive than indirect corporate political strategies.

In developing democracies where vote-buying is a primary strategy for winning nominations, electoral institutions such as candidate selection rules can also impact the ease of electoral entry experienced by businessperson politicians and thus their willingness to run. Expanding the selectorate of electoral candidates increases the cost of buying off the selectorate, thus making vote-buying a less feasible strategy to secure a nomination. Wealthy aspiring

candidates, such as businessperson candidates, who lack appeal among the selectorate are less likely to run when the selectorate is large because they see a lower expected probability of winning a nomination given that vote-buying is no longer a viable strategy to win a nomination (Ichino and Nathan, 2022). As such, the supply of businessperson politicians is expected to be larger in a context where the size of the selectorate for nomination is small because these businesspeople will have an easier time "buying" a nomination.

In addition to political institutions, the direct participation of businesspeople in politics is also argued to be associated with economic institutions. Li et al. (2006) argue that businessperson candidacy is a result of the underdevelopment of markets and market-supporting institutions. Businesspeople are more likely to participate in politics in a context with a weak rule of law and insecure property rights. When market-supporting institutions are weak, firms face uncertainties that can increase operational costs and thus reduce the firms' profit margins. By participating in politics, businesspeople receive protection from these uncertainties or can lower the cost of settlement when disputes occur as participation in politics provides businesspeople with connections to government officials who may assist them in making and enforcing contracts.

Another explanation for why businesspeople decide to run for political office shifts the focus away from institutional factors and instead considers the economic market structure that firms face. While Szakonyi (2020) argues that the main driving force behind a businessperson's decision to run for office is the potential defection by politicians, Szakonyi contends that the threat of politicians' defection is especially pronounced in sectors with intense competition between firms, leading to an expectation that more businesspeople will run for office in such highly competitive sectors. In these competitive sectors, each firm anticipates that its competitors will engage in lobbying and campaign donations to politicians to win favors and gain an

advantage over other firms in the sector. With this expectation, each firm becomes concerned that it may not receive favorable policies if too many firms are competing for politicians' attention through donations and lobbying as politicians will have more opportunities to defect and help other firms instead. To mitigate the risk of politicians' defection when using indirect strategies such as donations and lobbying, firms and businesspeople may decide to run for political office. If all firms in a sector share this belief, a large number of businesspeople from that sector are likely to run for office. In summary, firms are more likely to encourage their businesspeople to run for political office in highly competitive sectors when the risk of defection from politicians is elevated.

1.4 Demand for Businessperson Politicians

This brief review above suggests that scholars have a fairly robust understanding of when and why businesspeople are expected to run for political offices. However, the literature has not provided the same level of analysis concerning the demand for businessperson candidates. Once firms and businesspeople decide to run for elected positions, the quest for public office does not end there. Businessperson politicians must overcome several more hurdles before they can hold an elected office. This dissertation aims to contribute further knowledge to the businessperson politician phenomenon by focusing on the demand side of businessperson politicians. In particular, this dissertation examines how businessperson candidates garner the necessary electoral support to win elections.

1.4.1 Winning Political Support and Votes

To win an elected office, businessperson candidates must garner political support and secure votes. Consequently, a question arises regarding the electoral strategies used by businessperson politicians to attract voter support. In the context of many developing countries, several studies have identified clientelism as an electoral strategy employed by politicians to win political offices (Stokes, 2007; Kitschelt, 2000; Nichter, 2008). Politicians distribute material benefits, access to public services, or public sector jobs to obtain the political support of the recipients. Specifically, politicians utilize distributive strategies to influence the turnout and vote choices of the electorate, and ultimately, the electoral results.

While the electoral success of businessperson politicians may be attributed to their ability to engage in benefit distribution more intensely due to their vast financial resources, I argue that this is not the sole explanation for their electoral success. Businessperson politicians' electoral success can also be explained by their access to private sector resources. In a context where non-programmatic distributive electoral strategies are common and when faced with strong constraints on the utilization of personal, party, and public resources for distributive purposes, I argue that businessperson candidates' access to private sector resources provides them with an alternative set of resources that can be distributed to garner political support and win votes, thereby granting these businesspeople with an electoral advantage over other occupational groups.

Businessperson politicians can distribute patronage jobs within the private sector to build an army of political workers who provide political services that increase the likelihood of the businessperson politicians winning the election. In return for the job, these employees are

expected to turn out and vote for businessperson politicians, attend their employer's rallies, and persuade acquaintances within their social networks to support businessperson politicians.

In addition to job distribution, businessperson politicians also distribute benefits from their firms to voters. For instance, the firms of businessperson politicians may distribute goods and services they produce for free or at a discount. Distribution of these goods and services to voters can be contingent on the political support of voters, but not always necessary. Patronage employees play a role in distributing these firm benefits to voters by gathering information on potential recipients and occasionally making decisions on who will receive the benefits. Benefits distributed from firms can be a one-time occurrence before the election or a long-term arrangement where the distribution of benefits can take place between elections as well.

To identify the political services provided by these patronage employees, I conducted list experiments with 986 employees in firms of businessperson politicians across 72 firms in Thailand. Given the sensitive nature of some of these activities and to avoid social desirability bias, list experiments allowed me to elicit truthful answers from respondents, as were not required to directly respond whether they engaged in the sensitive activities or not. Using list experiments, I find that a non-negligible proportion of employees in firms of businessperson politicians engaged in all of the activities identified above, though the prevalence varies between activities.

The relationship between businessperson politicians and patronage employees, however, is plagued by the commitment problem. The non-simultaneous exchange of a job in return for political services creates an opportunity for one side to renege. Businessperson politicians may deny an individual a job if political services are provided before a job offer has been made, and an individual can choose not to provide political services if a job is given to them before political

services are provided. While some employees may provide political services without being monitored, I find that monitoring and negative inducements can further mobilize more patronage employees to provide political services. Businessperson candidates can make credible threats to terminate patronage employees' employment if they fail to provide the required political services. The fear of losing the job and the steady stream of income that comes with it help mobilize these employees to provide political services. Among non-patronage employees who may react more adversely to negative inducements, I find that businessperson candidates tend to rely on monitoring and positive inducements to boost the provision of political services. Figure 1.1 displays a chart that illustrates and summarizes the flow of my argument.




Figure 1.1. Flowchart of the Argument on Businessperson Candidate's Distribution of Private Sector Resources

1.5 Contributions to the Literature

The primary contribution of this dissertation is to fill the gaps in our comprehension of businessperson candidacy. By examining the incentives of political parties in nominating businessperson politicians and the electoral strategies of businessperson candidates, this dissertation provides a more comprehensive understanding of when we will see businesspeople in elected offices.

By exploring the demand for businessperson politicians, this dissertation also makes contributions to several areas of political science. First, this dissertation contributes to the literature on non-programmatic distributive politics. Existing studies have identified personal wealth, political parties, and the public sector as the sources of materials used for distribution (Mares et al., 2018; Mares and Young, 2016). Candidates can use their personal wealth to fund their vote-buying efforts. Wealthy candidates in Thailand have been known to fund and distribute cash and food to voters before the election (Callahan and McCargo, 1996). Distributed benefits can also come from political parties. Studies have shown that parties in Argentina fund the distribution of minor gifts such as food, clothing, and cash to voters (Brusco et al., 2004; Stokes et al., 2013). Jobs from the public sector can also be distributed to supporters, and these patronage employees are expected to provide political services to the politicians who hired them. Political parties in Argentina have been known to distribute jobs in the public sector to supporters in order to extract political services from them in return (Calvo and Murillo, 2004; Oliveros, 2021). In addition to jobs, another type of public sector resource that can be used for clientelistic exchanges is social and welfare benefits. Politicians can provide voters with preferential access to social and welfare programs and public services (Diaz-Cayeros et al., 2016; Stokes et al., 2013; Herrera, 2017).

Departing from existing work, I present evidence that businessperson candidates can also distribute resources from the private sector to achieve their electoral goals. While recent studies have started acknowledging private sector resources as an alternative type of resources that politicians can employ for electoral purposes, these studies largely concentrate on how employers rally their employees to vote for the electoral candidates they endorse (Frye et al., 2014, 2019; Mares et al., 2018). However, these studies do not conceptualize these jobs as patronage positions used in clientelistic exchanges, where employers hire employees without expecting them to offer political services or reciprocate politically. Instead, I argue that for businessperson politicians, private sector jobs can be distributed in a clientelistic manner, with positions given in exchange for political favors. The political services anticipated from these patronage employees necessitate more effort than mere voting, as suggested in existing work, with the potential consequence of employment termination if these services are not provided. Moreover, businessperson politicians can distribute goods and services produced by their firms to voters. In summary, this dissertation identifies and measures the extent to which private firm resources are being distributed in a non-programmatic manner by businessperson candidates to achieve their electoral objectives.

Second, this dissertation also speaks to the literature that examines how the structure of firms impacts their ability to engage in corporate political activities. Numerous studies have investigated how firm-level characteristics influence firms' capacities to participate in various types of corporate political activities. Firm size, for example, is a determinant of a firm's decision to engage in such activities. Larger firms are often associated with more political activities; firms with larger assets are more likely to form PACs, contribute to corporate PACs, hire more lobbyists, and donate more to charities (Hansen and Mitchell, 2000; Hart, 2001; Grier et al., 1994).

In addition to external activities, larger firms imply that employers have a larger workforce to mobilize, thus increasing the likelihood of politicians trying to persuade or coerce these firms into mobilizing their employees (Frye et al., 2014). In this dissertation, I further argue that firm size is consequential for the distribution of private sector resources for electoral purposes. Firms with larger assets can divert resources for electoral distribution, achieving the same electoral output as smaller firms, but suffering less productivity loss. Therefore, larger firms are better equipped and more likely to distribute firm resources during election periods.

The existing literature also explores how shareholders affect firms' level of corporate political activities. When shareholders are in agreement and stand on the same side of the political spectrum, they are more likely to approve a firm's decision to engage in corporate political activities, resulting in a higher level of corporate political contributions by firms, as measured by donations to political parties (Hoepner and Lin, 2022). Regardless of the political alignment between management and shareholders, when a firm engages in corporate political activities that shareholders disapprove of, these shareholders are likely to unite in expressing their disapproval and attempt to limit future activities by submitting shareholder proposals to management (Min and You, 2019).

In a similar vein, I argue that the agreement and approval of shareholders are crucial to the ability of businessperson candidates to utilize firm resources to pursue electoral goals. Given that the electoral distribution of firm resources often does not maximize profit, at least in the short term, some shareholders might view the distribution of firm resources as a non-optimal corporate strategy, and thus, may not support the use of firm resources in this way. However, as the number of shareholders in a firm increases, shareholders opposing this distributive strategy will find it more challenging to band together to express their disapproval and counter the

businessperson politicians' decision to use firm resources for electoral purposes. Therefore, the distribution of firm resources for electoral goals should be more common in firms with a large number of shareholders.

1.6 Studying Businessperson Politicians in Thailand

Thailand serves as a perfect setting to study the demand for businessperson candidates given the prevalence of businesspeople in Thai politics. Since the late 1960s and early 1970s, when the schism between military factions opened the political arena up to non-military players, firms and businesspeople have been playing an active role in the Thai political arena either directly through participation in the Parliament and the cabinet or indirectly through lobbying and participating in business-based interest groups (Laothamatas, 1988). Businesspeople who decide to run for elected offices saw the direct control of political offices as a more certain way to improve and expand their business opportunities and pursue their particularistic and group interests (Laothamatas, 1988). Table 1.1 shows the proportion of the parliamentary seats held by businesspeople as well as the ranking of businesspeople in comparison to other occupational groups in each parliament.³ More active participation of businesspeople in politics during this time period can be seen in the expansion and prominence of their representation in Parliament. In the fourteen Parliaments that were formed between 1969 and 2019, businesspeople held at least one-fifth of the parliamentary seats in eight of them.⁴ Businesspeople are always the first or the

³ As pointed out by Maisirikrod and McCargo (1997), beginning in 1995, politicians started to more frequently declare themselves as a “professional politician” rather than a “businessperson” to the authority in charge of the election. This change resulted in a significant decrease in the percentage of self-identified businesspeople in election authority database post-1995.

⁴ The 1988 election and the September 1992 election is excluded from consideration as there is no data available.

second most represented occupational group in all parliaments formed since 1969. Between 1969 and March 1992, in six of the seven Parliaments formed during that period, the percentage of seats held by businesspeople was more than double that of the bureaucrats, who were the second most represented group.

Table 1.1. Proportion of Parliamentary Seats Held by Businesspeople and Ranking of Businesspeople based on Occupational Groups of MPs

Election year	Percentage of businesspeople in the parliament	Businesspeople ranking based on occupational groups of MPs	Electoral System
1969	45.70%	1 st	Block Voting (multi-member districts with entire province as one district)
1975	34.60%	1 st	Block Voting (multi-member districts with more than one electoral district in a province possible)
1976	29.40%	1 st	Block Voting (multi-member districts with more than one electoral district in a province possible)
1979	37.20%	1 st	Block Voting (multi-member districts with more than one electoral district in a province possible)
1983	38.30%	1 st	Block Voting (multi-member districts with more than one electoral district in a province possible)
1986	24.80%	1 st	Block Voting (multi-member districts with more than one electoral district in a province possible)
1988	No information available		Block Voting (multi-member districts with more than one electoral district in a province possible)
March 1992	46.00%	1 st	Block Voting (multi-member districts with more than one electoral district in a province possible)
September 1992	No information available		Block Voting (multi-member districts with more than one electoral district in a province possible)

1995	29.00%	1 st	Block Voting (multi-member districts with more than one electoral district in a province possible)
1996	22.90%	2 nd	Block Voting (multi-member districts with more than one electoral district in a province possible)
2001	27.0% in single member constituency seats/21.0% in party list seats	2 nd in single member constituency seats/2 nd in party list seats	Parallel System (first-past-the-post districts + national party list)
2005	16.8% in single member constituency seats/11.0% in party list seats	2 nd in single member constituency seats/2 nd in party list seats	Parallel System (first-past-the-post districts + national party list)
2007	27.0% in multimember constituency seats/22.5% in party list seats	2 nd in single member constituency seats/2 nd in party list seats	Parallel System (one-, two-, three-members districts + regional party list)
2011	15.7% in single member constituency seats/18.4% in party list seats	2 nd in single member constituency seats/2 nd in party list seats	Parallel System (first-past-the-post districts + national party list)
2019	30.0% in single member constituency seats/24.0% in party list seats	2 nd in single member constituency seats/1 st in party list seats	Mixed-Member Apportionment (first-past the post-districts + national party list)

Businessperson politicians in Thailand can be divided into two main groups: metropolitan businesspeople and provincial businesspeople. These two groups are often in competition with each other over the control of the policy-making process, especially economic

policies. Metropolitan businesspeople are often more influential in the policy-making process under military rule, while provincial businesspeople gain the upper hand during more democratic periods (Phongpaichit and Baker, 1997). Under military rule, the government often placed metropolitan businesspeople in legislative assembly seats and cabinet positions that allowed them to provide input on the direction of economic policies (Kongkirati and Kanchoochat, 2018). They could either directly influence the economic policy-making process if they were placed in the relevant cabinet positions or provide their input through bureaucrats and technocrats in charge of implementing economic policies when placed in consultative positions.

In addition to access to governmental positions, businesspeople in Bangkok took several other actions to ensure that they could voice their opinions and have a strong influence during the policy-making process. First, the Joint Public and Private Sector Consultative Committee (JPPCC), a formal government-business forum, was made up mostly of members of the business community in Bangkok, and thus provided metropolitan businesspeople with direct access to high-level state policymakers (Laothamatas, 1992). At times when the influence of the JPPCC in the economic policymaking process was on the decline, these metropolitan businesspeople alternatively and routinely built and relied on social links with high-level bureaucratic families to influence the policymaking process (Hewison, 1989). Moreover, these Bangkok businesspeople also tried to maintain their political influence by hiring high-level bureaucrats and government officials to come and work at their firms. This direct or indirect access to the economic policy-making process allowed these Bangkok businesspeople to achieve policies that were favorable to them, such as an increase in and expansion of tariffs, large expenditures on metropolitan infrastructure, and the creation of other trade barriers (Phongpaichit and Baker, 1997).

Under military rule, provincial businesspeople, however, had limited reach and influence in the policymaking and implementation processes when the main actors in these processes were cabinet members, legislators, bureaucrats, and civil service officials who represented metropolitan business interests. The centralized nature of the Thai government further complicated the ability of provincial businesspeople to influence the policy process through provincial officials. These officials did not have policy-making power and merely followed guidelines from the central administration (Chotiya, 1997). In addition, these provincial officials often rotated around to different posts, thereby limiting provincial businesspeople's ability to form connections with government officials (Anderson, 1990). They had to live in an environment where national policies impacted the operation of their businesses, but they had very few opportunities to make their voices and interests heard at the national level (Chotiya, 1997). It was only when the electoral arena opened up in the late 1980s that provincial businesspeople began to have a voice in the policymaking process.

During a more democratic period, provincial businesspeople were able to build up their political influence through an electoral system that was favorable to them. As provincial constituencies made up the majority of parliamentary seats and vote-buying was the prevailing electoral strategy in provincial districts, these provincial businesspeople as a group were able to win and control a large number of seats in the parliament (Phongpaichit and Baker, 1997; McVey, 2001; Hicken, 2002). The large bloc of provincial businesspeople in the Parliament gave them the ability to obtain a parliament majority and bargain for cabinet seats and their preferred Prime Minister.

Once they were in power, these provincial businesspeople tried to entrench their power by expanding the power of the legislature at the expense of the bureaucracy (Phongpaichit and

Baker, 1997). Additionally, these provincial businesspeople, while in elected offices, were also able to influence the allocation of the budget for public works projects that benefit their constituencies as well as extract rent and patronage flow from these public works contracts, resulting in the expansion of the electoral war chest for future elections (Phongpaichit and Baker, 1997, 2001; Ockey, 1992). The tension between the metropolitan and the provincial businesspeople drove both business groups to actively participate in politics to preserve their interests and political domain, thus resulting in the high prevalence of businesspeople in Thai politics.

Along with the high level of participation and representation of businesspeople in politics, Thailand provides a good setting to study the demand for businessperson politicians from political parties and voters for other reasons as well. One such reason is Thailand's large and robust private sector. Among those who are employed, only 9.5% work in the public sector, while the other 90.5% work in the private sector (International Labour Organization, n.d.). This significant private sector presence is attributable to its efficiency, as highlighted by Thailand's 21st place ranking out of 190 countries in the World Bank's "Ease of Doing Business" index in 2020 (The World Bank, 2020). Additionally, the country performed well on the index measuring the availability of capital promoting investment, ranking 11th, 29th, 34th, and 14th out of 141 countries in domestic credit available to the private sector, SME financing, venture capital availability, and market capitalization, respectively (World Economic Forum, 2019). Given that Thailand has a relatively vibrant and strong private sector, businessperson politicians have access to substantial private sector resources which gives them the ability to use the distribution of widely available private sector jobs along with goods and services from the private sector as an

electoral strategy to build linkages with voters. As a result, Thailand serves as an excellent context to study the mechanism of this electoral strategy.

Empirically, there are several advantages to studying businessperson politicians in Thailand. Elected officeholders and electoral candidates in Thailand are not prohibited from owning a business, holding shares of a business, or serving on the board of a business, with the exception being that the Prime Minister and cabinet members are not allowed to hold shares over some quantity ceilings, depending on firm types. Overall, Thai businesspeople have substantial flexibility in "moonlighting" as they are allowed to participate in the private sector while they hold public offices. The lack of a legal constraint that forbids businessperson candidates and politicians from holding posts in the public and the private sector at the same time makes it easier to identify and connect businessperson candidates to private firms. It also alleviates the potential concern that businessperson candidates may only have limited ability to influence the allocation of firm resources and thereby their capability to distribute these resources, if they have to quit private-sector jobs while running for and holding public offices.

Elected politicians, however, are not allowed to own, hold shares, or serve on the board of media or telecommunications firms based on the restrictions set forth by the 2017 Constitution (Chaivised, 2019). Based on the business registration data on the Department of Business Development's (DBD) website, 8,390 firms are classified as media or telecommunications firms. Therefore, only 0.01% of the 816,033 active firms in Thailand are classified into this industry (Department of Business Development, 2022). The small fraction of telecommunications firms where concurrent appointments in the public and private sectors are not allowed should minimize the concern that many businessperson politicians do not hold authority over the allocation and distribution of private sector resources. Therefore, the theories proposed in this

dissertation should remain applicable to a substantial proportion of businessperson politicians in Thailand.

The variation in economic development, economic activity, and partisan affiliation at the subnational level in Thailand enables a more robust testing of the theories I propose concerning the demands of businessperson politicians. By leveraging the subnational variation in the country, rigorous tests of the theories proposed can yield evidence that elucidates the contexts where the strategic nomination of businessperson candidates by political parties and the distribution of firm resources by businessperson candidates are more likely to be observed.

Studying the demand for businessperson politicians in Thailand is also made easier by the availability of data on both the business and political sides. All firms in Thailand, regardless of size, are required to register with the Department of Business Development (DBD) within the Ministry of Commerce. Information on all of the firms, including the identity of board members, is available online on the DBD's database. On the electoral side, the Electoral Commission of Thailand (ECT) collects data on electoral candidates along with their demographic data. The availability of these two sets of data allows us to identify businessperson politicians in Thailand and test the arguments on the demands for businessperson politicians by parties and voters.

1.7 Overview of the Dissertation

This dissertation aims to provide insights into the demand for businessperson politicians. Chapter 2 offers a literature review on distributive politics and political mobilization at the workplace. I discuss how existing works on clientelism focus on the use of party and public sector resources when distributing benefits, as well as point out the potential constraints faced by politicians when relying on these sources of distributive benefits. Given such constraints,

businesspeople with access to private sector resources have an advantage over candidates from other occupational groups when non-programmatic distribution is a crucial component of candidates' electoral strategy. However, the literature has yet to provide detailed insights into how resources from the private sector can be used for distribution. I also discuss the literature on workplace mobilization, which primarily examines how employers mobilize employees to vote for specific political candidates but has yet to explore workplace mobilization when the employer and electoral candidate are one and the same and when employees are asked to provide political services that require more effort than just voting.

Chapter 3 proposes a theory on how businessperson candidates distribute firm resources for electoral purposes. I discuss the two types of benefits distributed by businessperson politicians: jobs and goods or services produced by the firm. Private-sector jobs are given to individuals with the expectation that they will provide political services in return for patronage jobs. Businessperson politicians also distribute goods and services produced by the firm to voters to elicit their political support. Additionally, this chapter argues that businessperson politicians mobilize employees to provide political services through monitoring their behavior. In addition to monitoring, I argue that businessperson candidates deter patronage employees from shirking on political services provision by issuing negative threats, such as termination threats. In contrast, businessperson candidates rely on positive inducements, such as promises of rewards, to mobilize non-patronage employees.

Chapters 4, 5, and 6 present empirical evidence of the distribution of firm resources for electoral purposes by businessperson candidates. Chapter 4 uses data from list experiments that I collected from employees in firms of businessperson politicians to provide quantitative evidence that patronage employees offer various political services to businessperson politicians. Chapter 5

provides quantitative evidence demonstrating how businessperson candidates rely on monitoring and inducements to mobilize firm employees to provide political services. Chapter 6 offers qualitative evidence that elucidates how businessperson candidates mobilize firm resources to pursue their electoral goals. I conducted semi-structured interviews with employees in firms of businessperson candidates to illuminate and explain the quantitative findings from previous chapters.

The concluding chapter discusses the major findings and their implications for understanding the demand for politicians among voters. The final chapter also addresses potential limitations of this dissertation and offers suggestions for future research on the demand for politicians and their implications, both in Thailand and other countries.

Chapter 2

Literature Review: Unpacking Clientelistic Distribution of Public Sector and Party Resources and the Relationship Between the Private Sector and Electoral Politics

2.1 Introduction

Existing literature on clientelism and distributive politics has predominantly emphasized the role of political party and public sector resources as the primary sources of materials that politicians use for clientelistic exchanges. In addition to discussing the existing work on the utilization of party and public sector resources for clientelistic exchanges, this chapter raises an issue with the current focus on these sources of distributive resources. While prior studies have provided ample evidence of the effectiveness of vote buying, turnout buying, and patronage employment using party and public sector resources (e.g., Vicente, 2014; Kramon, 2016; Cantú, 2019; Calvo and Murillo, 2004; Chubb, 1981), it is important to acknowledge that such a strategy is not always feasible for electoral candidates (Allen, 2015; Kitschelt and Yildirim, 2020; Takahashi, 2017). This chapter delves into the several types of constraints that politicians may encounter when mobilizing party and public sector resources, specifically in the context of Thailand, which is the primary focus of this dissertation. By identifying and examining the various constraints that political candidates may face, this chapter highlights the need for further investigation into alternative sources of distributive materials. Given the restrictions associated with using public sector and political party resources, it is crucial to explore and understand how electoral candidates can effectively leverage private sector resources as an alternative means of forming non-programmatic linkages with voters.

In addition, this chapter also delves into existing research on workplace political mobilization. Recent studies have provided valuable insights into the manner and motivations of employers who mobilize their employees in support of particular political candidates. However, these studies have only examined cases where actors in management positions have undertaken such mobilization efforts. No work to date has examined cases where the manager and electoral candidate are one and the same individual. Additionally, current scholarship has primarily focused on the mobilization of employees to simply turn out and vote for a particular candidate. This chapter raises the possibility that employees may be asked to undertake actions that require more substantial effort beyond simply casting a vote.

2.2 Defining Clientelistic Exchanges

Electoral strategies employed by politicians are often varied and diverse, and one such strategy that is commonly utilized in developing democracies is the formation of clientelistic linkages with voters. Prior to delving deeper into the sources of clientelistic resources, it is essential to first provide a definition of the term "clientelistic exchange" as used in this dissertation. Unlike other forms of distributive politics, clientelistic exchange is a targeted, discretionary, and contingent exchange between politicians and voters (Kitschelt and Wilkinson, 2007; Hicken, 2011; Stokes et al., 2013). In contrast to programmatic politics and pork barrel politics, wherein anyone who satisfies certain criteria or resides in a specific area can receive benefits and cannot be excluded, patrons can target specific individuals or groups that will receive the benefits while excluding others in clientelistic exchanges. Patrons have the discretion to determine the specific beneficiaries of the distributed benefits, and there either exist no formal rules for distribution, or existing formal rules are not rigorously enforced (Stokes et al., 2013). In

addition, clientelistic exchanges are inherently quid pro quo, with clients expected to "return the favor with a vote or other forms of political support" to receive benefits from patrons (Stokes et al., 2013).

2.3 Distribution of Personal, Political Party, and Public Sector Resources for Electoral Purposes

Numerous studies have identified a diverse range of distribution types, from the distribution of goods and services to the provision of public sector patronage employment, which are expected to serve various objectives, such as vote-buying and turnout-buying (e.g. Brusco et al., 2004; Nichter, 2008; Weitz-Shapiro, 2012; Wantchekon, 2003; Piattoni, 2001; Robinson and Verdier, 2013; Vicente, 2014). Through the provision of such handouts, politicians extract benefits in the hopes of increasing their chances of electoral victory. For instance, politicians may offer small gifts or access to social programs and public services with the goal of mobilizing supporters will turn out to vote for them or persuading independents to support them (e.g. Nichter, 2008; Callahan and McCargo, 1996; Diaz-Cayeros et al., 2016). Alternatively, they may offer public sector jobs to supporters in exchange for the provision of various political services, ranging from attendance at rallies to targeted public service delivery to voters (e.g. Oliveros, 2021; Toral, 2020). Moreover, the distribution of resources and benefits can be viewed as "credibility buying" as it enables candidates to signal to voters that they are electorally viable by conveying information about their resources and ability to distribute benefits in the future (Muñoz, 2014; Kramon, 2017; Hicken et al., 2022).¹ Finally, distribution also serves the function of "turf protection" where

¹ It should be noted that the act of "credibility buying" does not necessarily fall under the category of clientelistic exchanges, as previously defined. This is due to the fact that the distribution can occasionally be untargeted, and thus voters are not expected to provide political support in return.

resources are distributed to retain support from core supporters and to prevent these core supporters from defecting to opposing candidates (Hicken et al., 2022).²

The extant literature on clientelism and distributive politics has identified three primary sources of distributed benefits. The first source comprises of the personal wealth of electoral candidates, which they can use to secure electoral support. Examples of such positive inducements include private gifts such as food, daily necessities, and cash, as demonstrated in prior studies (Callahan and McCargo, 1996; Schaffer, 2007; Aspinall and Mas'udi, 2017; Berenschot, 2018). The second source of benefits originates from political parties where candidates hand out gifts or cash funded by political parties (Stokes et al., 2013). Finally, the third source involves the utilization of public resources by electoral candidates to mobilize voters. Candidates may rely on partisan public officials to provide preferential administrative favors to clients, such as expedited permits and preferential access to social programs or public services (Gryzmala-Busse, 2007; Diaz-Cayeros et al., 2016; Stokes et al., 2013; Herrera, 2017). The distribution of civil service or public sector jobs to political supporters is yet another method of utilizing public resources for electoral gains, as documented in studies (Chandra, 2004; Oliveros, 2021; Toral, 2020).

2.3.1 Constraints to the Use of Personal, Party, and Public Sector Resources for Distribution

While significant strides have been made in recent decades towards developing a better understanding of the mechanisms behind the distribution of personal, party, and public resources, comparatively little attention has been devoted to the constraints faced by politicians

² Similar to "credibility buying", "turf protection" does not necessarily fit with the definition of clientelistic exchanges defined in this chapter as politicians may not expect returned support from voters.

in utilizing these resources (Allen, 2015; Kitschelt and Yildirim, 2020; Takahashi, 2017). In this section, I will explore these constraints in greater detail, and examine how they apply to Thailand, the country of focus for this dissertation.

Although existing scholarship has not explicitly outlined the limitations imposed upon politicians when utilizing personal wealth, it stands to reason that only highly affluent candidates possess the capability to distribute personal resources. Furthermore, the wealth held by these candidates must be in the form of liquid capital that can be swiftly used to purchase gifts or distribute as cash. However, not all electoral candidates possess access to substantial amounts of readily available liquid capital during election season, and are therefore limited in their ability to utilize personal wealth for electoral gains.

In Thailand, a significant number of elected officials have a relatively low net worth, with 364 of the 500 MPs elected (73%) in 2019 reporting a total net worth of 100 million Thai baht (~\$3 million) or less (*Song tualek khwam mang khang*, 2019). This is particularly significant given the high costs associated with buying votes and ensuring high voter turnout, which can range from 10-20 million baht per constituency race.³ As a result, many candidates would need to spend a significant portion of their personal wealth to fund the distribution of resources.⁴ However, even if candidates are willing to expend a large portion of their personal wealth, they may not have sufficient liquid capital to engage in a sizeable resource distribution necessary for electoral success. Thus, personal wealth may not be a viable source of distributive materials for the majority of Thai electoral candidates.

³ A leaked text message during the 2019 election reveals a candidate intending to pay 500 baht per person to 35,000 voters which amount to 17,500,000 baht (~\$500,000) (*Por chor por ngat lakthan chae*, 2019).

⁴ An assumption made here is that the pattern of net worth among all candidates is similar to those of the elected candidates.

With party resources, political parties must possess the necessary distributive resources, either bankrolled by wealthy individuals, donations, or state subsidies. Without control over substantial resources, parties are unable to reach, form ties with, and mobilize enough voters to give the parties and their candidates the electoral victory. To complicate matters further, the use of party resources for electoral distribution can be hindered by formal campaign regulations that limit spending and require transparency. These regulations curtail parties' ability to freely distribute resources or make the contribution contingent on political support, provided regulations are properly enforced (Bruhn, 2019; Hummel et al., 2019). In addition, a strong party with high organizational capacity is also crucial if efficiency in mobilizing votes is desired. High organizational capacity allows parties to effectively target and monitor clients, thereby enforcing the exchanges and ensuring that clients provide the expected political support (Stokes, 2005; Stokes et al. 2013, Brusco et al., 2004).

In Thailand, political parties struggle financially due to limited funds, and donations are scarce. Move Forward was the only party to receive a substantial amount of donations, with 13 million baht in 2020 and 27.5 million baht in 2021. In contrast, other parties received less than 3 million baht in donations annually. These donations are unlikely to cover the expense of distribution during an electoral season, at least not at a level that will allow all candidates in a party to be successful electorally. While the Electoral Commission's Party Development Fund offers subsidies to political parties, they are typically inadequate for effective vote-buying or turnout-buying. The Democrat party was the only party to receive a significant subsidy of around 13 million baht in 2022, while others received less than 1 million baht. Consequently, political candidates in Thailand cannot rely on party resources or state subsidies to fund the distributive resources, unless the parties are bankrolled by wealthy individuals.

When it comes to utilizing public sector resources, politicians face a range of political, institutional, and economic constraints that may restrict or prohibit them from engaging in clientelistic distribution. These constraints can be broadly classified into three types: incumbency, regulatory, and budgetary. As is the case in other regions of the world, these restrictions serve as a limiting factor on the ability of Thai politicians to distribute public resources to serve electoral purposes. According to two waves of survey conducted by the Democratic and Accountability Linkages (DALP) Project, country experts reported in 2008 that the seven largest political parties in Thailand exerted minimal effort in providing preferential access to social policy programs and negligible effort in providing preferential access to public employment to citizens. The second wave of survey, conducted in 2021, revealed a similar trend, with the five largest political parties in Thailand averaging only moderate levels of effort in providing preferential access to social policy programs and minor levels of effort in providing preferential access to public employment to the electorate. These findings suggest that Thai politicians have only made limited use of public sector resources for distributive purposes.

a.) Incumbency Constraints

Public sector resources are typically only available to incumbent politicians. Access to public sector resources is usually tied to political offices and only those who hold public offices have control over or can heavily influence how such resources are distributed (Arriola, 2012). Many existing studies on patronage and public-resource-based clientelism often have a built-in assumption that the actors under investigation are incumbent politicians (e.g. Calvo and Murillo, 2004; Oliveros, 2021; Kuo, 2018; Diaz-Cayeros et al., 2016). This assumption is entirely reasonable, as non-incumbents typically lack any jurisdiction over public employment and public resource

distribution, at least not de jure, and therefore seldom have public resources distribution as an option in their menu of available electoral strategies.

While a non-incumbent may rely on allied incumbents who occupy different public offices to distribute public sector resources on their behalf, such an arrangement is fraught with issues. First, these allied incumbents may demand reciprocation, such as financial benefits such as cash or future political favors such as help in future campaigns or assistance in passing future legislation if elected. Because the clientelistic distribution of public resources carries legal and political risks, allied incumbents may request costly concessions and payments from the non-incumbent to offset the risks of the transaction. Secondly, interactions between allied incumbents and non-incumbents are susceptible to the commitment problem that pervades much of the political landscape (Issacharoff and Ortiz, 1999; Stephenson and Jackson, 2010). As both parties are apprehensive that they will incur the cost of the exchange without reaping the benefits, the commitment problem serves as a deterrence that prevents exchanges between non-incumbents and allied incumbents from taking place. Third, the advantages of relying on allied incumbents may be limited, as benefit recipients may not discern that the non-incumbent is responsible for the benefits that they receive. Voters often struggle to differentiate and identify the source of the benefits that they receive (Bueno, 2018), with recipients of the benefits instead attributing them to the allied incumbents. The difficulty in claiming credit may consequently diminish the benefits expected from relying on allied incumbents for the distribution of public resources.

As public resources for distribution remain unavailable at worst and inefficient at best for challenger politicians, the limited access to such resources renders public sector resource distribution an unviable strategy for many of these candidates. Examining the case of Thailand, we find that an overwhelming majority of electoral candidates are indeed challengers. In the 2019

election, out of 13,991 candidates, only 2.5% (i.e., 343 individuals) were incumbents who had won seats and served as MPs after the 2011 election (*Luaktang 2562: kang khomun*, 2019). Given that the majority of electoral candidates in Thailand are challengers, they are unlikely to have access to public resources and will inevitably have to rely on alternative electoral tactics.⁵

b.) Regulatory Restrictions

While being an incumbent politician may be advantageous, it does not guarantee easy access to public resources. Often, regulations exist that govern the use of these resources, thus curtailing the discretion politicians have in their distribution (Hagopian et al., 2008; Takahashi, 2017). Social programs, such as unemployment, housing, and disability benefits, as well as public services like water and electricity, frequently come with formal criteria that dictate who can access them and how resources are to be distributed. For instance, unemployment benefits may require recipients to have earned a certain minimum amount of income in the previous quarters, while housing benefits may necessitate that individuals have an income below a particular level to qualify. When such criteria are enforced, politicians are left with limited autonomy in targeting individuals with preferential access to social programs and public services (Swamy, 2016; Stokes et al., 2013; Wantchekon, 2003). Consequently, politicians cannot utilize public resources for clientelistic purposes to solicit political support or win votes.

Regarding public employment, many governments have adopted meritocratic systems that restrict the discretion of politicians in appointing supporters who may not meet the meritocratic standards to public sector positions (Sundell, 2014). Regulations may stipulate

⁵ Incumbents in the 2019 election also had limited access to public sector resources given that they were removed from their position after a military coup in May 2014.

various criteria, such as educational qualifications and prior experience, that curtail politicians' autonomy in hiring decisions. Furthermore, certain positions may require candidates to take performance-based exams, further limiting politicians' influence in the appointment process. When enforced, such criteria present obstacles that hinder politicians from placing their preferred candidates in public sector positions. Nonetheless, this is not to suggest that politicians cannot circumvent these obstacles altogether, as some positions may not require a high level of qualifications, and fraud and manipulation may occur during the hiring process.

In Thailand, bureaucratic agencies typically publish comprehensive formal guidelines that establish qualifications for various social protection schemes. For example, an individual can only qualify for unemployment benefits if they have contributed to social security for at least six months during the preceding fifteen months, and they must register with the Department of Employment within 30 days of becoming unemployed (Department of Employment, n.d.). Similarly, elderly benefits are only available to individuals over 60 years of age (Department of Older Persons, n.d.). Such formal criteria inhibit the ability of politicians and their loyal bureaucrats to selectively target specific voters with access to social benefits. Politicians also find it difficult to use healthcare benefits for clientelistic purposes. In Thailand, citizens qualify for one of three healthcare schemes: the social security scheme, civil service health coverage scheme, or universal health coverage scheme (30-baht healthcare). The universal access to healthcare means that politicians cannot exploit resource scarcity to sway voters' political decisions since they cannot selectively grant access to supporters or deny access to non-supporters (Mares and Young, 2016; Nichter, 2018). As a result, voters are not required to support a particular politician to receive healthcare benefits.

The existence of an independent bureaucracy is yet another obstacle to providing preferential access to social benefits. This is because an independent bureaucracy is more likely to enforce the formal criteria that determining eligibility for social programs, thereby preventing politicians from capturing the electorate in a clientelistic manner (Kopecky and Scherlis, 2008). In Thailand, the bureaucracy has been deemed to be moderately independent of politicians, which means that Thai politicians do not hold full control over bureaucratic actions. In fact, bureaucrats often take actions to protect their interests, and they do not always take orders from politicians (Ricks, 2018). Notably, even under military juntas, constitution-drafting committees, predominantly comprising bureaucrats, have drafted constitutional provisions aimed at limiting the power of civilian politicians. The relative independence of the bureaucracy vis-à-vis politicians serves to curb politicians' autonomy in bending the formal criteria of social policies and targeting benefits from social programs to their preferred recipients.

Although it can be argued that politicians can reduce the independence of bureaucrats by placing supporters in the bureaucracy such that these individuals will bend the rules to provide voters with preferential access to social program benefits, placing supporters within the bureaucracy to manipulate the distribution of social benefits is not an easy task for Thai politicians. In Thailand, civil service hiring for general entry-level officials requires individuals to take and pass examinations (Sivaraks, 2011), which are competitive with clear meritocratic selection criteria. Recruitment for higher-level and highly skilled positions is more arbitrary, with ministries and departments setting their own recruitment criteria (Sivaraks, 2011). As studies have found that patronage employees that provide political services to candidates by targeting administrative favors to political supporters tend to be those at the entry level (Muller, 2007; Toral, 2020), the existing meritocratic nature of recruitment at the entry level serves as a barrier

that prevents Thai politicians from manipulating the hiring process to hire supporters to provide political services in the bureaucracy.⁶

c.) Budgetary Restrictions

Budgetary constraints can hinder the effectiveness of distributive strategies in the pursuit of electoral victory. When there are budgetary restrictions, politicians have limited resources available for distribution, and they are restricted in how much they can spend (Allen, 2015, Kitschelt and Yildirim, 2020). When incumbents have limited resources, it becomes challenging to distribute both programmatic and non-programmatic resources to a large number of voters, leading to difficulties in maintaining existing supporters and winning new ones. The size of the public budget has been shown to have implications for incumbent politicians in terms of their ability to shore up political support and dictate the competitiveness of an election (Boulding and Brown, 2014).

Reducing expenditure on social programs and public services can curtail politicians' ability to forge clientelistic ties with voters. When confronted with budget constraints, politicians are faced with a choice: they can either target fewer voters while keeping the size of public resources distributed per individual constant, or they can reduce the size of benefits allocated to each individual while maintaining a constant number of recipients. However, if the quantity of benefit recipients is reduced to only a handful of voters, politicians may not be able to influence enough voters to secure an electoral victory. Furthermore, reducing the size of benefits

⁶ Highly-skilled patronage employees are hired more to enhance a politician's policy-making capacity than for direct campaigning purposes (Muller, 2007). Politicians strategically position these skilled individuals in policy areas they deem important, which enables them to limit the extent of bureaucratic shirking during the implementation of their policies (Torales, 2020).

distributed to each individual may lessen the effectiveness of the distributive strategy in mobilizing political support, as individuals might find the diminished benefits insufficient compensation for their political support provided. In both scenarios, budgetary constraints can diminish the effectiveness of public resource distribution in garnering political support, thereby reducing its appeal as an electoral strategy.

Budgetary restrictions can also significantly affect the availability of patronage jobs, as fewer individuals can be hired for such positions. Research has shown that when budgets permit, politicians tend to increase the size of public administration beyond what is necessary for administrative purposes, thereby creating excess positions that can be used to serve their electoral needs (Kemahlioğlu, 2012). However, a reduced budget can curtail the number of available positions, giving politicians fewer jobs to allocate to their supporters. As a result, the scarcity of public sector jobs diminishes the effectiveness of patronage as an electoral strategy as politicians will be unable to build a substantial political workforce to provide political services in support of their electoral campaigns. In other words, when budgetary constraints limit the number of jobs available, politicians will find it challenging to assemble a large army of political workers to help secure an electoral victory.

A smaller budget can also impact the salaries of patronage employees, which, in turn, can affect the strategy's effectiveness. When salaries for patronage jobs are low, the utility derived by the recipients decreases, making it more challenging for politicians to recruit supporters to provide political services (Brinkerhoff and Goldsmith, 2004). a constrained budget for personnel activities means fewer resources are available for promotions, resulting in limited upward career mobility. This reduces the attractiveness of public sector jobs and lowers the utility obtained by clients. Collectively, these factors narrow the contexts under which public sector patronage hiring

is an effective clientelistic strategy for an electoral candidate. In summary, budgetary restrictions can significantly impact the effectiveness of the public sector patronage strategy, influencing not just the recruitment but also the retention of supporters who provide political services.

Previous studies have argued, and provided empirical evidence to support the assertion, that public sector job distribution can be an effective means of soliciting electoral support in areas where the private sector is underdeveloped, the public sector is a major employer, and potential clients come from low-income backgrounds (Calvo and Murillo, 2004; Toral, 2020). However, in societies with stronger private sectors and higher levels of income, budgetary constraints on public sector hiring can render public sector employment less attractive to citizens, particularly those with access to more lucrative opportunities in the private sector. As a result, individuals are less likely to be drawn to public sector jobs and thereby make public sector patronage employment even less effective in establishing a political support base.

To gain insight into the budgetary constraints faced by Thai politicians in distributing public sector resources to pursue electoral goals, it is helpful to compare government expenditures as a percentage of GDP across various countries to those of Thailand. Current literature on public sector resource distribution mostly investigates the use of this electoral strategy in countries where government spending makes up a large percentage of the nation's GDP. Many hallmark studies on public sector clientelism look at cases in countries with a comparatively large public sector such as Argentina, Italy, Mexico, India, and Brazil (Golden, 2003; Calvo and Murillo, 2004; Auyero, 2000; Piattoni, 2001; Chubb, 1981; Diaz-Cayeros et al., 2016; Nichter, 2018; Toral, 2020; Chandra, 2004). In 2019, government expenditures accounted for 57%, 43%, 42%, 31%, and 29% of GDP in Italy, Brazil, Argentina, India, and Mexico, respectively (IMF, n.d.). In contrast, Thai government expenditure amounted to only about 25% of its GDP in

2019 (IMF, n.d.). Several countries with high levels of businessperson participation in politics also have lower government expenditures. For example, government expenditures in Bangladesh, Indonesia, and Benin were 15%, 18%, and 20% of GDP, respectively, in 2019 (IMF, n.d.). Examining public employment, the proportion of total employees working in the public sector stands at 16%, 12%, 17%, 4%, and 12% in Italy, Brazil, Argentina, India, and Mexico, respectively (International Labour Organization, n.d.). In Thailand, public sector employment accounts for approximately 9% of total employment (International Labour Organization, n.d.). Bangladesh and Indonesia, where businesspeople play a prominent role in politics, also have smaller public sectors, with public employment accounting for 8% and 9.5% of total employment, respectively (International Labour Organization, n.d.). Given the limited public resources available, Thai politicians may not view the clientelistic use of public sector resources as an effective electoral strategy, unlike their counterparts in countries where public sector resource distribution has been extensively studied.

To provide further context on the effectiveness of public sector employment as an electoral strategy in Thailand, it is helpful to compare public and private sector wages in various countries. While all of the countries discussed show a public sector wage premium, the extent of the premium varies greatly between countries. For instance, Mexico, Argentina, and Brazil have a high public sector wage premium with public sector employees earning 34%, 19%, and 16% higher wages than private sector employees in 2012 for Mexico and in 2011 for Argentina and Brazil (The World Bank, n.d.). On the lower side, public sector employees in Italy, Thailand, and India only earn a 9.5%, 6.9%, and 4.2% higher wage than private sector employees in 2011 (The World Bank, n.d.). Compared to countries with a more substantial public sector wage premium, public sector job offers in Thailand are unlikely to hold a substantially higher appeal in terms of

compensation to workers, making them a less effective tool in influencing the political loyalty of individuals.

2.3.2 Alternative Sources of Benefits for Distribution?

In this chapter, we have discussed how various restrictions can dissuade most electoral candidates from relying on private, party, or public sector resources when selecting non-programmatic distribution as an electoral strategy. However, these restrictions do not necessarily lead to a decline of distributive politics. Instead, candidates can adapt and look for alternative resources to build non-programmatic linkages with their electorate.

In this dissertation, I depart from existing literature and contribute to the discourse on non-programmatic distributive politics by introducing a theory on private sector resource distribution. I examine how politicians, particularly those who are businesspeople, distribute private sector resources, such as jobs and goods and services produced by their firms, to secure political support. This support comes in the form of political services from their employees and votes from voters. The theory proposed in the next chapter seeks to address the gap in the literature concerning the sources of distributive resources available to politicians. It argues and demonstrates that private sector resources can also serve as a useful and effective source of materials for non-programmatic distribution. The use of private sector resources is not bound by stringent regulatory restrictions and does not come under intense public scrutiny, providing businesspersons with increased flexibility when employing distributive electoral strategies.

2.4 Private Sector and Electoral Politics

2.4.1 Political Mobilization Within the Workplace

Existing research has delved into numerous ways in which employees can be mobilized politically within the workplace. One avenue of inquiry focuses on horizontal mobilization, where colleagues can act as catalysts for electoral engagement, urging employees to cast their ballots or shaping their voting decisions. Through dialogue with their peers, individuals can gain exposure to diverse perspectives and exchange knowledge, thereby broadening their political horizons as well as motivating colleagues to become more politically active (Estlund, 2003; Mutz and Mondak, 2006). Furthermore, relationships between labor unions and workers can also foster political participation, as unions can mobilize voters to turn out and furnish employees with vital political information (Leighley and Nagler, 2007).

The second area of research investigates vertical mobilization within the workplace, where employers may attempt to influence their employees' political behavior in various ways, from providing electoral information to exerting pressure to vote for specific candidates (Hertel-Fernandez, 2016). Employers may opt to mobilize their employees to support certain politicians for a variety of reasons, ranging from personal ideology to policies that are favorable to their businesses. Within this strand, several studies examine the conditions that make it more likely for employers to mobilize their employees to provide support to certain politicians. For instance, mobilization of employees is more likely when employers endorse specific candidates, operate in a location where they have a labor market monopoly, or when the labor market is slack (Frye et al., 2014; Hale, 2003; Mares et al., 2018; Medina and Stokes, 2007).

The research on political mobilization in the workplace reveals that both horizontal and vertical mobilization can serve as effective means not only to enhance political participation among employees, but also to influence their electoral choices.

2.4.2 Politicians' Manipulation of Private Sector Activities for Electoral Purposes

Extant literature has discussed several ways in which politicians can manipulate the activities within the private sector when pursuing electoral offices. One approach examines how politicians can pressure individual private firms to mobilize political support through business operations, such as rallying their employees to vote for a particular candidate (Frye et al., 2014, 2019; Mares et al., 2018; Baland and Robinson, 2007, 2008; Medina and Stokes, 2007; Hale, 2003). Studies suggest that politicians, especially incumbents, are more likely to mobilize support from firms in sectors with immobile assets and those heavily reliant on the state, particularly firms that typically sell to the government or frequently receive contracts and benefits from it (Frye et al., 2014; Hale, 2003). In fear of retaliation and with limited ability to avoid sanctions, such firms are often more likely to yield to pressure and offer political support to incumbents. This strategy underscores politicians' capacity to leverage private firms at a micro-level to further their electoral interests.

A separate body of work looks at the way that incumbent politicians indirectly influence firms and private sector employment at the macro-level for electoral gains. Due to constraints on public hiring and spending before an election in many countries, a number of studies highlight how incumbent politicians invest in last-minute infrastructure projects through the private sector. This strategy is aimed at boosting the employment rate in their constituency and, hopefully, enhancing the public's evaluation of the incumbent's economic performance (Labonne, 2016;

Cahan, 2019; Bertrand et al., 2018). These studies consistently find an uptick in the private employment rate in the months leading up to an election.

These two sets of study highlight the different ways in which politicians can manipulate the private sector to advance their electoral interests, either at the micro-level by directly mobilizing individual firms, or at the macro-level through public policies.

2.4.3 Diverging from Existing Work on Private Sector and Electoral Politics

The theory proposed in the next chapter expands and builds on these two sets of work at the intersection of private sector and electoral politics. It takes a micro-level vertical mobilization approach where private sector employees are the direct target of mobilization efforts by employers, namely the businessperson politicians. However, past studies tend to focus primarily on turnout and voting as the key political activities of interest, leaving room for additional investigation into the mobilization of employees for other political activities. Subsequent chapters diverge from the existing work on vertical mobilization and contribute to studies on workplace mobilization by expanding on the range of political activities engaged in by mobilized employees. These activities require more effort from the employees than merely turning out to vote for certain politicians on election day, and include actions such as attending rallies and persuading acquaintances to support a particular politician.

In addition, subsequent chapters build on and contribute to the idea that politicians can use private sector jobs as a strategic resource to garner political support. Rather than indirectly manipulating private sector employment through investments in infrastructure projects, these chapters diverge from previous works by pointing to the fact that businessperson-politicians, in particular, can adopt a hands-on approach in directly creating and distributing jobs from their

firms. Given their access to hiring decisions within their firms, businessperson-politicians can directly control, target, and distribute private sector jobs to individuals with the aim of gaining political support.

Finally, an aspect that the next chapter diverges from previous studies, specifically the second set of work, concerns the primary actor under analysis. The central focus of past studies is on politicians who may not necessarily be active businesspeople, but who choose to rely on businesspeople for support. Non-businessperson electoral candidates, however, do not directly internalize the financial costs firms incur from the use of firm resources for electoral purposes. Differences in the payoff functions of businessperson candidates and non-businessperson candidates mean that these two groups may vary in when and how often they select private sector resource distribution as part of their electoral strategy. Consequently, the previous focus on the strategic calculus of non-businessperson candidates, but not that of businessperson candidates, leaves us with an incomplete characterization of the electoral use of private sector resources. This dissertation puts active businesspeople running for elected offices at center stage to achieve a more complete understanding of this electoral strategy.

2.5 Conclusion

Previous studies have primarily focused on the utilization of personal, party, and public sector resources for distributive electoral strategies. However, the distribution of these resources has constraints that render such strategies unavailable or unviable for many electoral candidates. In this dissertation, I aim to show that politicians can adapt and work around these constraints. Specifically, I will examine an understudied set of resources available to businessperson politicians: private sector resources. In the subsequent chapters, I will argue and provide

evidence of the electoral use of private sector resources by businessperson candidates. By shedding light on the use of an alternative set of resources in non-programmatic distribution, I hope to provide a more comprehensive understanding of the types of resources that can be used for distributive purposes.

This dissertation also aims to advance the study on the interactions between the private sector and electoral politics. In particular, the following chapters will elucidate on how jobs in private firms can be targeted to supporters and thereby be used to pursue electoral gains. Additionally, this dissertation also hopes to further illuminate the political mobilization that occurs within the workplace and how such mobilization impacts the political activities engaged by private sector employees.

Chapter 3

A Theory of Private Sector Resource Distribution

3.1 Introduction

Businesspeople frequently participate in politics in developing countries, with their representation in parliament often being significant. In Thailand, for instance, since the late 1960s, businesspeople have been the most or second-most represented occupational group, with approximately 20-40% of MPs coming from a business background in each parliamentary session. Moreover, businessperson politicians are not only highly represented in many countries, but they are also more successful in elections than other occupational groups in some nations. In Thailand, despite only around 20%, 27%, and 24% of MP candidates in the 2001, 2007, and 2019 Thai elections being businesspeople, 27%, 35%, and 31% of successful candidates are businesspeople in 2001, 2007, and 2019, respectively (Electoral Commission of Thailand, 2001, 2007, 2019). This prompts the question: what electoral strategies do businessperson-politicians employ to win votes and achieve such electoral success?

In this chapter, I argue that businessperson candidates' electoral success can be attributed to their access to private sector resources. They can leverage these resources to form linkages with voters, giving them an advantage over candidates from other occupational groups. With access to an alternative set of resources, businessperson candidates are more adaptable when faced with significant constraints to the particularistic distribution of personal, party, and public sector resources. Businessperson candidates can create a network of political workers by offering private sector jobs and use these patronage employees to provide political services. Furthermore,

these patronage employees can distribute goods and services produced by their firms to incentivize voters to support them at the polls.

Second, I explore how businessperson politicians navigate the commitment problem that arises when hiring patronage employees. Due to the non-simultaneous nature of the exchange between businessperson politicians and patronage workers, a commitment problem exists where both sides have incentives to renege on their end of the bargain. I argue that businessperson politicians rely on the existing hierarchical organizational structure within the firm to monitor patronage employees to ensure that they provide the required political services. Monitoring is complemented by positive or negative inducements that alter the payoff functions of employees, either increasing the benefit of compliance or the cost of non-compliance.

This chapter proceeds as follows. First, I argue that businessperson politicians, who face constraints in using party and public sector resources, can resort to private sector resources to establish linkages with supporters. To provide a better understanding of these concepts, I define private sector clientelism and private sector patronage employment in this section. Second, I suggest that businessperson politicians distribute private sector jobs with the expectation that these patronage employees will provide various political services. I identify those political services in this section. Next, I discuss how businessperson politicians overcome the commitment problem and mobilize patronage employees to provide political services. I argue that businessperson candidates mobilize patronage employees by monitoring and targeting these employees with negative inducements, while targeting non-patronage employees with positive inducements.

3.2 Defining Private Sector Clientelism

When faced with constraints on the distribution of personal, party, and public resources, electoral candidates must seek alternative resources for distribution if they intend to build clientelistic linkages with their electorate. This dissertation aims to contribute to the study of distributive resource sources by proposing that businessperson politicians have privileged access to an alternative source of distributive benefits, namely resources from their own firms. In this dissertation, I define the direct exchange of goods, services, or jobs from the private sector in return for votes and other forms of political support as private sector clientelism.

As individuals who manage their firms' daily operations or hold significant influence over resource allocation, businessperson politicians possess the authority and capability to distribute their firm resources in a way that helps them garner political support and secure votes. With an alternative set of distributive resources at their disposal, businessperson politicians enjoy greater flexibility and viability in selecting clientelism as an electoral strategy. This gives them an electoral advantage over other occupational groups in contexts where non-programmatic distribution of benefits is common.

H1: Businessperson politicians can build political support by distributing private sector jobs, as well as goods and services produced by their firms.

3.2.1 Defining Patronage Employment in the Private Sector

Businessperson candidates can access a valuable resource from the private sector - namely, private sector jobs from firms which they have connections. The distribution of such positions, which I term private sector patronage employment, constitutes a subset of private

sector clientelism. Businessperson politicians distribute these private sector jobs in return for votes or other forms of political support. While numerous studies have examined the distribution of public sector jobs in exchange for political support, private sector jobs have not received as much attention in the literature (Oliveros, 2021; Piattoni, 2001; Kuo, 2018; Robinson and Verdier, 2013). However, both public and private sector jobs can serve a particular goal - to build a group of political workers who can provide political services to their patrons.

The distinguishing features of patronage hiring, as compared to non-clientelistic job allocation, are its discretionary and contingent nature. While a meritocratic system distributes positions based on objective criteria such as work experience and test scores, patronage employment lacks clear employment criteria, rendering it susceptible to manipulation. As a result, politicians enjoy significant autonomy in deciding who receives patronage jobs (Oliveros, 2021). Moreover, the allocation of patronage jobs operates on a quid-pro-quo basis (Kitschelt and Wilkinson, 2007; Stokes, 2009). Receipt of a position is contingent on the recipient's actions, where patronage employees are expected to engage in activities that advance the politician's electoral campaign. Given the high cost of patronage jobs, they are seldom exchanged for mere turnout and a vote (Stokes, 2009). In the public sphere, research indicates that patronage employees provide political services, including campaign support, rally attendance, election monitoring, and granting voters preferential access to public services (Oliveros, 2021).

Patronage jobs are distinguishable from other forms of clientelistic benefits such as consumable goods or preferential access to services in several crucial ways. First, politicians can directly target jobs at specific individuals and exclude others from receiving them. Second, jobs are less vulnerable to rent seeking by brokers and intermediaries because they cannot siphon off benefits from the jobs as they can with cash or other goods (Stokes et al., 2013). Third, jobs are

highly valued by voters since they provide a continuous source of income, particularly in areas where job opportunities are scarce (Calvo and Murillo, 2004). Furthermore, jobs are more effective in overcoming the commitment problem than other forms of clientelistic benefits because they can be revoked by politicians (Robinson and Verdier, 2013). The revocability of jobs enables politicians to hold clients accountable by monitoring their behavior and threatening to withdraw the job if the client fails to fulfill their end of the bargain or if the politician loses the election. The fear of losing access to a steady source of income motivates clients to uphold their part of the agreement and carry out the tasks assigned to them.

Much like incumbent politicians who possess discretionary power over public sector hiring, businessperson politicians, who have influence over private firms' hiring decisions, can distribute private sector jobs in a targeted and contingent manner at their discretion. These businessperson politicians allocate these jobs with the expectation that the recipients will reciprocate by providing political support that bolster the businesspeople's electoral prospects.

3.2.2 Partisan Services Undertaken by Patronage Employees

Handing out private sector jobs is not without cost to businessperson politicians. Firms owned by them must bear the direct expense of paying salaries to these patronage employees. Additionally, the potential misallocation of jobs to less capable and less productive candidates could indirectly impact the firm's overall performance. Prior research has uncovered a trade-off between loyalty and competence (Hollibaugh, 2015; Krause and O'Connell, 2019), indicating that businessperson politicians must choose between candidates who are loyal but less competent with firm-related tasks, or those who are more competent but less willing to take partisan actions in support of the businessperson. When loyalty is prioritized over competence, candidates with

superior abilities may be overlooked if businessperson politicians anticipate that these job candidates would not participate in political activities for their electoral campaign.. As a result, firms may suffer a loss of productivity and a decline in profits due to having a less competent workforce. Given the high cost of patronage hiring, businessperson politicians are likely to expect more from their patronage employees than mere voting support. These employees are typically required to provide political services that demand a greater level of effort than just turning out to vote for the businessperson.

H2: Patronage employees hired by businessperson politicians are required to provide several political services prior to and in between elections.

To expand on H2, I argue that patronage employees provide several political services: 1) turning out to the poll to vote for the businessperson politician they work for; 2) attending political rallies of businessperson politicians; 3) persuading individuals within their social network to support and vote for businessperson politicians; and 4) distributing business benefits to voters as a way to influence their vote choice. By offering these partisan services, patronage employees assist in promoting the electoral campaign of businessperson candidates and increasing the likelihood of their electoral success.

This section will delve deeper into the activities performed by patronage employees in the private sector. These activities can be classified into two types: electoral campaign activities and distributive activities.

a.) Electoral Campaign Activities

H2a: Patronage employees turn out to vote for businessperson politicians.

Among all the activities expected of patronage employees, voting for the businessperson candidate is expected to be the least costly. This requires patronage employees to travel to the polling station on Election Day, which typically occurs on a Sunday in Thailand, and cast their vote for the businessperson for whom they work for. While a patronage employee may be hired before an election to provide political services to a specific businessperson politician standing for election, their responsibilities may extend beyond that individual to other family members also running for public office. Family businesses and dynasty politics remain highly prevalent in Thailand, and it is not uncommon for a business clan to field several family members as candidates for various political positions (Thananithichot and Satidporn, 2016). As such, patronage employees may be expected to turn out and vote for family members and associates of the businessperson politician running for other political offices. To verify turnout, businessperson politicians can request photographic evidence of patronage employees at their designated polling stations.

Turning out to vote entails an opportunity cost for patronage employees as it requires a few hours of their time, depending on when elections take place (Niemi, 1976; Cox, 1997). In addition to the time spent turning out to the poll and voting, patronage employees may also incur the cost of traveling to the poll on Election Day. Finally, voting also involves a potential gain or loss in utility, depending on whether the patronage employee supports or opposes the candidate they are voting for (Overbye, 1995; Riker and Ordeshook, 1968; Fiorina, 1976).

A patronage employee is expected to turn out and vote for their patron when the combination of opportunity cost, transportation cost, and utility change from voting for the businessperson politician is less than the cost incurred from punishment when the patron finds out that the patronage employee failed to provide political services. As turning out to vote does not require a significant amount of time and polling station is typically not far from an employee's place of residence, the opportunity and transportation costs are not expected to be high. Furthermore, it is worth noting that patronage employees are more likely to be supporters of the politician who provided them with their job (Oliveros, 2021; Toral, 2020). Therefore, voting for the businessperson politician and their political allies is more likely to result in a gain of utility for these patronage employees, rather than a loss. As a result, turning out to vote is generally considered a low-cost form of political service for patronage employees.

H2b: Patronage employees attend rallies of businessperson politicians.

Existing research provides evidence that patronage employees in the public sector attend rallies of their patron (Zarazaga, 2014; Oliveros, 2021). Similarly, patronage employees in the private sector are also expected to attend rallies of their businessperson candidates. Political rallies hold significant importance for politicians, including in Thailand, as they serve multiple purposes (Walker, 2008; McCargo and Alexander, 2019). First, rallies serve as a signal of the politician's political support and electoral viability (Muñoz, 2014, 2019; Kramon, 2018). Therefore, it is crucial for politicians to ensure that rally attendance is not lackluster. To ensure that there are enough attendees at rallies, businessperson politicians can mobilize their employees to attend these events.

Second, attendance at rallies serves as an effective screening mechanism that allows politicians to determine whether patronage employees are providing the required political services (Auyero, 2001; Szwarcberg, 2015). Similar to voting, attending rallies involves opportunity cost, transportation cost, and utility loss or gain from expressing support for the businessperson politician. As rallies in Thailand often occur in the evening, after work hours, patronage employees incur opportunity costs from spending their off-work hours attending rallies. Moreover, political rallies may occur at various locations within the constituency, requiring patronage employees to travel to several locations and thereby adding to their transportation costs. Additionally, attendance at rallies means that these patronage employees are publicly expressing their political affiliation, which can entail utility gain if the employee declares support for a favored candidate and a utility loss if the employee declares support for a disfavored candidate.

Businessperson politicians can gain new information on the willingness of patronage employees to provide political services by monitoring their attendance at rallies. Rally attendance is a straightforward screening system as it can be easily observed, and politicians can request evidence of attendance from patronage employees, such as photographs taken at the rallies.¹ Failure to attend rallies allows businessperson politicians to identify patronage employees who are likely to be unwilling to provide the required political services and terminate their employment, minimizing their losses (Auyero, 2001; Lazar, 2004).

¹ Because attending rallies is likely to incur a higher cost than turning out to vote, there is greater incentive for patronage employees not to attend the rallies, making it a better screening mechanism than turnout. With the low cost of turnout, most patronage employees will be willing to provide this service, but they may not be willing to provide other higher-cost political services. Therefore, observing turnout alone does not provide businessperson candidates with new or useful information regarding patronage employees' willingness to provide more demanding political services.

Patronage employees have the option not only to attend rallies themselves but also to invite their acquaintances to attend. By doing so, they reap several benefits. First, mobilizing acquaintances allows them to demonstrate their loyalty to the businessperson politicians. Additionally, it serves the purpose of building a positive reputation among their acquaintances. As politicians often provide a small sum of cash as a reward to rally attendees (Ockey, 2004; Muñoz, 2014), patronage employees can be viewed as individuals who can financially assist their acquaintances by connecting them to these funds. Building a good rapport with acquaintances can prove beneficial in the long run when patronage employees attempt to persuade their acquaintances to support the businessperson politician at the polls. As such, although not required, mobilizing acquaintances to attend rallies still occurs, given the signaling and relationship-building value of these actions.

H2c: Patronage employees persuade acquaintances to support businessperson politicians.

Patronage employees have social connections beyond their workplace. To gain more support and votes for businessperson politicians, they may campaign and persuade people within their social networks to back and vote for the candidates they work for. By highlighting the positive aspects of their candidate, patronage employees aim to enhance their candidate's appeal to their acquaintances. Previous research has demonstrated that personal canvassing can increase voter turnout (e.g. Gerber and Green, 2000; Shaw et al., 2000). In this regard, the persuasion attempts of patronage employees can be viewed as a form of direct canvassing, potentially mobilizing their acquaintances to turn out and vote.

Similar to the cost of rally attendance, persuading acquaintances to support a candidate is a more costly partisan activity for patronage employees than simply turning out to vote. In addition to opportunity cost, transportation cost, and utility loss or gain from expressing political preferences, persuasion can also involve a relationship cost. Patronage employees are expected to provide this type of political service on their personal time, paying the opportunity cost of doing so. Some may also incur an opportunity cost from spending time planning their persuasion strategy and preparing their speeches. The transportation cost for persuasion may also be significant. While opportunities for persuasion may arise spontaneously during conversations, patronage employees may have to travel to meet certain acquaintances specifically for the purpose of persuasion. Similar to other partisan activities, persuasion entails a potential utility loss or gain as patronage employees disclose their political preferences to their acquaintances.

In addition to the aforementioned costs, patronage employees may also face the cost of jeopardized relationships. In Thailand's polarized political climate, politics is often considered a sensitive topic, and people tend to avoid political discussions with those whose political views are unknown. Raising political issues and taking a particular side can make acquaintances feel uncomfortable and potentially lead them to distance themselves from or sever ties with the patronage employees. The resulting cost of strained relationships can make persuasion a costly partisan activity. Thus, patronage employees must be strategic when selecting targets for persuasion to minimize any harm to their relationships.

Unlike attending a rally or turning out to vote, persuasion is not easily observable by businessperson politicians because it typically occurs during patronage employees' personal time and in personal conversations. The unobservability of this activity makes it difficult for businessperson politicians to punish or exclude shirking employees from rewards. Instead, a

sense of reciprocity is expected to play a more prominent role in determining whether employees will provide this political service. Patronage employees with a stronger sense of reciprocity are more likely to undertake the task as a way of returning the favor for their job (Finan and Schechter, 2012). Additionally, patronage employees embedded in dense social networks might feel motivated to persuade their acquaintances due to social pressure from their network, encouraging them to reciprocate and provide this type of political service to businessperson politicians (Cruz, 2019). Due to the difficulty in monitoring this activity, businessperson politicians may not expect persuasion to yield a large number of votes. However, gaining even a handful of votes could prove significant in highly competitive elections.

b.) Distributive Activities

In addition to providing electoral campaign support, patronage employees are also expected to engage in distributive activities aimed at garnering political support from voters by targeting particularistic benefits to voters. These benefits can be either short-term or long-term.

In terms of the distribution of firm benefits, patronage employees have two main responsibilities: distributing benefits directly to voters and gathering information on potential clients who will receive the benefits. For lower-value benefits, patronage employees often have the discretion to make the final decision on distribution. They can decide who will receive the benefits and how much these recipients will receive. However, as the size of the benefits increases, businessperson politicians retain autonomy over the final shape and form of distribution. In such cases, patronage employees are responsible for collecting information about potential clients and delivering those information to the businessperson politicians. The final decision on which clients will receive benefits, if any, and how much they will receive, ultimately

rests with the businessperson politicians, occasionally with input from top managers within the firm.

The distribution of business benefits by patronage employees has a counterpart in the public sector, where several studies have provided evidence of similar activities by public sector patronage employees distributing various forms of benefits to voters. For example, in Argentina, partisan social workers offer preferential access to an emergency food program in exchange for support for the incumbent mayor (Weitz-Shapiro, 2012). Similarly, in Mexico, the PRI utilized the government's Pronasol program to provide voters with particularistic benefits such as subsidized credits, scholarships, and livestock (Diaz-Cayeros et al., 2016). At the same time, patronage employees in the public sector are also capable of utilizing negative inducements to gain political support, such as in Ukraine, where patronage employees have threatened voters with the withdrawal of their access to administrative resources like health care, food supply, educational opportunities, and permits if they do not show support for a particular politician (Allina-Pisano, 2010). Similarly, patronage employees in the private sector can also gain political support by offering promises of preferential or restricted access to business benefits.

H2d: Patronage employees distribute short-term benefits.

At the most basic level, businessperson politicians can direct their patronage employees distribute goods and services from their firms to voters, free of cost, in exchange for their votes. Firms of businessperson politicians in Thailand, for instance, have been known to distribute food items like vegetables and meats, as well as agricultural seeds to voters (Ockey, 1992, 2004). Businessperson politicians also allow their patronage employees to offer discounts on goods and

services produced by their firms to clients. These discounts are more likely to be offered for small items like grocery items, agricultural seeds, and fertilizers. Since the discounted items are not monetarily expensive, the unique feature of these discounts is that the payment for the entire order can be made in a single payment. As such, the distribution of small gifts and discounted transactions is a form of short-term distribution that tends to occur only before the election, without a continued relationship with a particular client between elections (Nichter, 2018).

Since benefits are distributed before the election, this type of exchange is susceptible to opportunistic defection by voters, where recipients of benefits may decide not to vote for businessperson politicians on election day. The inefficiency resulting from such shirking, however, does not necessarily deter businessperson politicians from engaging in the distribution of firm resources, even when monitoring of these voters is lacking. Although vote-buying is expected to win some votes, it can also be seen as a form of credibility buying, where politicians engage in it to be perceived as viable candidates capable of future distributions (Kongkirati, 2019; Kramon, 2017; Hicken et al., 2022). Such distribution does not necessarily have to be targeted at any particular individuals. Moreover, distribution of private sector resources can serve as a form of "turf protection," where candidates attempt to preserve the loyalty of their core supporters and prevent opponents from poaching them (Hicken et al., 2022). Therefore, businessperson politicians continue to distribute short-term goods and services, even when they cannot monitor the behavior of their clients and are expected to suffer efficiency losses due to the commitment problem.

Firms of businessperson politicians can also distribute goods and services to social organizations. Such a short-term arrangement involves a one-time donation to a social organization before an election in return for political support, with no commitment to continuing

the relationship after the election. It is not until the next election that the firm will donate to the social organization again. Given the potentially large sum of money or resources involved in such transactions, patronage employees are expected to vet the social organizations, but not make the final decision as to which organizations will receive donations from the firm.

Distribution to social organizations serves two purposes. First, these donations are part of a firm's corporate social responsibility (CSR) portfolio, and the firms can claim that they are attempting to promote community welfare. This can help create a positive perception of the firm among voters (Chaudhary et al., 2016), which can reflect positively on the businessperson politician associated with that firm. Second, firms of businessperson politicians may have a second underlying purpose, where they use these donations to mobilize political support from social organizations. Donations are made with the expectation that influential figures within these social organizations will persuade their members to support the businessperson politicians that donate the goods and services.

H2e: Patronage employees distribute long-term benefits.

Businessperson politicians can also offer voters access to long-term business benefits and services, where relationships between businessperson candidates and voters are maintained between elections. Businessperson candidates may instruct their patronage employees to distribute free or discounted goods or services to certain individuals not only prior to a specific election but also between elections, as long as these individuals provided political services in the previous election. For instance, a targeted individual may be able to purchase groceries at a discounted price between elections, in addition to the free groceries they receive prior to an

election. The long-term nature of this type of distribution aligns with Nichter's (2018) relational clientelism.

Long-term distribution is expected to be more costly for businessperson politicians, as benefits are not distributed only at election time but also between elections. Therefore, these politicians will incur a higher cost from multiple rounds of payment compared to a one-shot payment during election time, like short-term benefits. Given the higher cost, businessperson politicians may allow patronage employees to distribute long-term benefits only to limited individuals, potentially local influential figures who are capable of mobilizing a large number of voters, thus providing greater returns to businessperson politicians for this form of costly distribution.

Businessperson politicians can also establish long-term relationships with social organizations where donations are made not only before an election but also continuously in the periods between elections. Social organizations then provide political services to businessperson politicians when election time comes around. Long-term relationships between businessperson politicians and social organizations often rest on citizens' desire for insurance against adverse shocks, which is in line with the argument proposed by Nichter (2018). Social organizations, on behalf of their members, may request donations from businessperson politicians during a time of adverse shocks.

Similar to the distribution of short-term benefits to social organizations, the larger monetary cost of these donations to social organizations means that businessperson politicians do not give patronage employees full autonomy in deciding which social organizations will receive long-term donations from the firm. Patronage employees will likely only vet and gather information about social organizations on behalf of businessperson politicians.

3.2.3 Employment Prospects for Patronage Employees After the Election

As previously mentioned, businessperson candidates face a tradeoff between competence and loyalty when hiring patronage employees. During the campaign period, they may prioritize loyalty, as loyal patronage employees enable them to maximize election-related outputs from political service provision. Loyal employees are more likely to put forth significant effort in providing the political services described above, as they derive greater satisfaction from supporting the businessperson politicians. Consequently, hiring loyal patronage employees can boost a businessperson candidate's electoral prospects more effectively than hiring competent but non-loyal employees.

However, prioritizing loyalty over competence can negatively impact a firm's productivity if loyal candidates are less competent in firm-related tasks. Less competent candidates are expected to produce lower firm-related output, leading to a decline in the firm's profit margin. The costs of hiring loyal but less competent employees become more apparent post-election when the primary task of employees shifts towards producing firm-related outputs. . In this phase, businessperson politicians and their firms bear the cost of lower productivity from hiring less competent employees without gaining any benefits, as electoral outputs are less paramount. The costs are exacerbated when businessperson candidates exceed the profit-maximizing level of employment, hiring a surplus of patronage employees before elections in hopes of mobilizing more political support with a larger army of political workers. As such, the larger the level of employment exceeds the profit-maximizing level, the more significant the decline in profit.

With the potential decline in productivity and profit after the election, businessperson candidates have a strong motivation to terminate the employment of patronage employees.

Ideally, they would replace all patronage employees with competent workers at the profit-maximizing level to maximize firm profits. However, this strategy risks discouraging patronage employees from providing political services before the election. If they anticipate employment termination post-election, they lack incentive to offer political services, knowing that they will lose their job regardless.

To mitigate the costs of productivity and profit loss, while simultaneously preserving the incentives for patronage employees to provide political services, businessperson candidates are anticipated to retain some patronage employees after the election while terminating the employment of others.² In Section 3.3, I will discuss in further detail how conditioning post-election employment on the level of political services provided before the election can incentivize patronage employees to exert effort in providing political services.

Patronage employees that are retained after an election can serve as political workers in future elections. Retaining patronage employees for future elections offers several benefits. First, it saves costs on having to train new patronage employees for the next election. Existing patronage employees are expected to effectively provide political services in future elections without substantial additional training, given their experiences from the previous election. Additionally, if patronage employees remain with the firm, they can build relationships with voters between elections, which can be valuable when these employees have to select and target benefit recipients in the next election.

² In cases where there is no tradeoff between competence and loyalty, where all patronage employees are both loyal and competent, businessperson politicians will not need to terminate employment of any patronage employees if the level of employment is already at the profit-maximizing level. However, if excess patronage employees were hired before the election, some employees may need to be terminated to bring the level of employment down to the profit-maximizing level.

3.2.4 Why not hire these private sector patronage employees as campaign workers?

There are two potential reasons why businessperson candidates may choose to hire patronage employees in the private sector rather than as campaign workers. First, budget constraints often limit the number of campaign workers a candidate can hire. Campaign finance laws restrict the amount of money that can be spent on campaigns, which in turn limits the number of campaign workers that can be hired. Although some candidates may choose to employ campaign workers off the books by not reporting their employment to the relevant authorities, this comes with the risk of legal repercussions if they are caught overspending during an election. In contrast, hiring private sector employees reduces this risk because businessperson candidates can argue that these patronage employees are being hired for business operations, which are not governed by campaign finance laws. As a result, businessperson candidates can build a large army of political workers in the private sector without facing significant risks of campaign spending violations.

Second, the distribution of benefits by private sector patronage employees provides businessperson candidates with plausible deniability in accusations of clientelism. By having a private sector employee distribute goods and services produced by their firms to voters, businessperson candidates can argue that the distribution is part of a corporate social responsibility (CSR) campaign or a product promotion campaign, should there be an allegation that they are "buying votes" through this distribution. While traditional campaign workers can distribute firm resources, claims of CSR and product promotional campaigns are less credible when the actors responsible for the distribution are not directly tied to the firm, but rather to an electoral campaign. Therefore, patronage employees can serve as an effective cover for businessperson candidates when they engage in particularistic distribution.

3.3 Resolving the Commitment Problem Between Businessperson Politicians and Patronage Employees

Similar to the way public sector jobs are distributed by incumbent politicians, private sector jobs are allocated by businessperson politicians with the goal of creating a group of political supporters who can provide political services to businessperson candidates (Oliveros, 2021; Chubb, 1981; Kuo, 2018; Robinson and Verdier, 2013). However, this arrangement presents a commitment problem between the businessperson candidates and the patronage employees. Patronage employees have to invest their effort and energy in carrying out partisan tasks, while businessperson politicians bear the cost of paying these employees. Because the exchange is not simultaneous, each side may attempt to extract benefits from the other without bearing the costs.

By handing out the jobs before the election, employees hired under a patronage contract can renege on the arrangement and choose not to put in any effort to support the businessperson politician that hired them. Promising the jobs after the election is also problematic as this arrangement allows the businessperson politicians to back out of the promise and not deliver the jobs after political services have already been provided. As this commitment problem plagues the relationship between businessperson politicians and patronage employees, one might expect that such distribution of private-sector jobs should not take place, as neither side can trust the other to fulfill their end of the bargain after receiving benefits. Furthermore, businessperson politicians cannot rely on written contracts that require employees to provide political services, as agreements like these could be construed as vote-buying, which makes such contracts illegal and unenforceable. To enable patronage employment, both parties must find mechanisms to overcome this commitment problem.

Scholars have proposed various mechanisms to tackle the commitment problem, with the most extensively debated mechanism being monitoring, coupled with threats of punishment or promises of rewards (Stokes, 2005, 2009; Kitschelt and Wilkinson, 2007; Chubb, 1981; Brusco et al., 2004). The monitoring process involves observing the client's behavior to ensure they fulfill their end of the bargain. If the client performs as promised, they will be exempted from punishment or receive rewards. Conversely, if the client fails to deliver on their promises to provide political services, they will face punishment or have their rewards withheld.

While the mechanism of monitoring and making future rewards or punishments contingent on the performance of brokers during the election season is applicable to the relationship between politicians and their brokers, existing studies have relied on assumptions that patrons can rely on the strong organizational capacity of political parties to fulfill the responsibility of monitoring and rewarding or punishing brokers. However, this assumption may not hold true in all countries. As pointed out by Hicken et al. (2022), politicians in weak party states may not have the luxury of monitoring and enforcing the terms of the clientelistic exchanges with brokers, resulting in inefficiency in terms of vote yield per unit of resources distributed.

Alternatively, politicians can rely on brokers' norms of reciprocity to overcome the commitment problem (Finan & Schechter, 2012). Brokers who feel a social obligation to return the favor to patrons who have provided them with a job may be more inclined to deliver political services in support of these politicians. Politicians can also leverage social pressure to mobilize brokers to reciprocate by selecting individuals embedded within dense social networks (Cruz, 2019). However, relying on this solution to overcome the commitment problem can be costly, as

politicians would need to invest resources, both time and effort, in identifying individuals with a strong sense of reciprocity and robust social connections.

Finally, monitoring may be unnecessary if brokers internalize politicians' incentives for re-election. This is particularly true in the case of public sector patronage employees. These employees are often hired based on their loyalty to the incumbent and will lose their jobs if the incumbent who appointed them loses the election. As a result, they are motivated to provide the necessary political services to increase the odds of their patrons' electoral victory and, in turn, their chances of retaining their jobs (Oliveros, 2021). Since these employees internalize the candidates' incentives for re-election, politicians do not need to monitor or issue threats of punishment to extract political services from these employees. However, this solution may be less effective for private sector brokers. The risk of employment loss is not as evident to private sector brokers, as businessperson candidates do not usually give up their private sector positions when they lose the election. As a result, the lack of turnover at the workplace can lead patronage employees to believe that they will retain their jobs even if the businessperson candidate loses the election, thereby increasing the necessity for monitoring and explicit threats of repercussions for shirking.

By relying on the firms' organizational structure, businessperson candidates can overcome the commitment problem and prevent brokers from shirking without having to rely on party machinery, norm of reciprocity, or internalization of incentives. Pre-existing hierarchical organizational structures and social networks within private firms can facilitate the monitoring of patronage employees. Businessperson politicians can instruct managers and supervisors to collect information about the level of political services provided by patronage employees. As lower-level employees are required to regularly report their work activities to their supervisors, there is

already a mechanism in place through which businessperson politicians can extract information on and ascertain the extent of political services provided by these employees. For instance, during routine work meetings, supervisors can request evidence of turnout and rally attendance. Furthermore, in addition to direct reporting, supervisors may also learn about political services provided by patronage employees through daily interactions such as conversations during breaks (Frye et al., 2014). The existing organizational structure and mechanisms for work reporting provide businessperson politicians with the capacity to monitor patronage employees without incurring the cost of establishing a new monitoring mechanism from scratch.

Repeated interactions between employers and employees within the workplace further facilitate the resolution of the commitment problem between businessperson politicians and patronage employees (Stokes, 2005, 2009). By engaging in sustained exchanges, both parties have the opportunity to punish the other in case of defection. Patrons can penalize clients who renege on their promises by cutting them off from future benefits, while clients can punish patrons who defect by withholding political support. Workplace interactions create opportunities for businessperson politicians to have iterated interactions with patronage employees, enabling them to punish employees who fail to deliver on their promises and reward those who hold up their end of the bargain.

Although some doubts have been raised about the ability of politicians in Thailand to effectively monitor clients due to weak political party organization, private firms are likely to have a stronger organizational capacity than political parties, making monitoring less of an obstacle for businessperson politicians overseeing the patronage employees within their firms. In fact, many Thai firms already have well-established systems in place that enable them to monitor the activities and productivity of their employees (Jeenanunta et al., 2017). This pre-existing

productivity tracking system can serve as a useful platform for businessperson politicians to monitor the level of partisan services provided by their private sector patronage employees. Due to the expected lower costs involved in monitoring patronage employees, individual monitoring could be a viable strategy for businessperson politicians to overcome the commitment problem.

H3: A higher level of monitoring of patronage employees leads to an increase in the level of political services provided by these employees.

Because the pre-existing organizational structure and social networks within private firms allow businessperson candidates to effectively monitor the political services provided without incurring substantial costs from building a monitoring system from scratch, hiring private sector patronage employees becomes an attractive option for businessperson candidates due to its greater efficiency compared to employing traditional brokers. Although scholars of Thai electoral politics have pointed out that Thai politicians have relied on influential local figures such as village chiefs, teachers, and religious leaders to serve as brokers during the election season (Ockey, 2004; Chattharakul, 2010), relying on these traditional brokers can be an inefficient strategy, particularly in a context where parties lack strong organizational capacity to monitor these brokers (Hicken et al., 2022). This enhanced efficiency provides insight into the rationale behind businessperson candidates' decision to hire private sector employees rather than depending exclusively on traditional brokers.

3.3.1 Positive and Negative Inducements Experienced by Patronage Employees

Merely monitoring patronage employees is unlikely to incentivize them to provide political services, as it does not alter their payoff functions. Therefore, to complement monitoring, businessperson politicians can employ inducements to modify the payoffs such that renegeing on the promise to provide political services would yield a lower payoff than providing such services. By doing so, patronage employees are more likely to provide the expected political services.

a.) Negative Inducements

Businessperson politicians can use negative inducements to increase the costs incurred by patronage employees who shirk or fail to provide political services. By doing so, the cost of renegeing reduces the payoff of shirking, making it less than the payoff from providing political services. Business politicians have access to an effective form of negative inducement: the threat of employment termination. For patronage employees, losing a job and a steady source of income can be more costly than expending their effort on partisan tasks.

Baland and Robinson (2007, 2008) argue that patronage jobs often involve the distribution of rents to hired employees, resulting in higher salaries than their skill levels would typically warrant. This allows employers to leverage the threat of termination and the ensuing loss of rents to coerce their employees into taking specific actions. While providing political services requires effort and thus incurs a cost for these employees, the potential loss of their jobs and income is expected to be even more costly. Therefore, the threat of termination creates a risk of rent loss that motivates patronage employees to provide the political services demanded by their employers.

Patronage employees are likely to perceive threats of termination from businessperson politicians as credible. As discussed in the previous section, businessperson politicians and their firms incur costs from hiring less competent patronage employees and thus have an incentive to terminate the employment of these patronage employees. Given the knowledge of this incentive structure among patronage employees, threats by businessperson politicians to only retain patronage employees that can contribute significantly to the electoral campaign will be taken seriously by patronage employees and thus drive them to provide the required political services.

While negative inducements can be effective in mobilizing employees to provide political services, this strategy comes at a cost to businessperson politicians. The use of negative inducements could potentially lead to a loss in productivity, spurred by a fear-driven workplace culture resulting from termination threats. Such an atmosphere could incite discomfort and resentment among employees, subsequently diminishing productivity (Kline and Lewis, 2018). This decline in productivity could, in turn, reduce the firm's output and impact its profit margin. Additionally, the firm may suffer reputational costs, as employees facing threats could publicly criticize the work environment, deterring future applicants and shrinking the pool of potential capable candidates. Negative comments from employees about a fear-inducing and unpleasant work environment could also tarnish the reputation of businessperson politicians. Such a negative reputation could be politically and electorally costly, as it could damage their public approval and potentially affect their electoral prospects (Frimer and Skitka, 2018).

b.) Positive Inducements

Businessperson politicians can also use positive inducements, which can increase the benefits of providing political services to such an extent that the payoff exceeds that of shirking.

For instance, businessperson politicians can promise employees bonuses if they provide political services or when they win the election (Ockey, 2004). Rewards that are contingent on the provision of political services or electoral victory can positively impact the employees' payoff from service provision, thereby incentivizing them to provide political services.

However, businessperson politicians and their firms incur costs from rewarding employees with material benefits. These financial costs increase the firms' expenditures and reduce their profit margins. The magnitude of positive inducements that businessperson politicians must offer to successfully mobilize employees to provide political services is likely influenced by the wealth of these employees. Wealthier employees are likely to anticipate larger inducements from their employers (Weitz-Shapiro, 2014; Stokes et al., 2013).

c.) Targets of Positive and Negative Inducements

Given that positive and negative inducements entail different types of costs, the optimal mobilization strategy for employees will vary depending on the target of the inducement. Within the firms of businessperson politicians, some employees are patronage employees, hired with the expectation of providing political services alongside firm-related tasks, while others are non-patronage employees primarily tasked with executing firm-related activities. However, it is important to note that non-patronage employees may be mobilized to provide political services. I argue, however, that businessperson politicians utilize different types of inducements to mobilize patronage and non-patronage employees.

Patronage employees are less likely to have alternative employment opportunities if they lose their patronage jobs, as noted by several studies (Oliveros, 2021; Toral, 2020; Medina and Stokes, 2007, Calvo and Murillo, 2004). Consequently, they are more inclined to do whatever it

takes to keep their job, making the threat of termination a potent mobilization tool. Failure to provide political services could result in prolonged income loss, thus increasing the likelihood of compliance. Additionally, the fear of dismissal and potential long-term unemployment dissuades patronage employees from criticizing the firm in a manner that could negatively impact its operation. Thus, utilizing negative inducements on patronage employees is unlikely to elicit strong adverse reactions, limiting the cost of negative inducements for businessperson politicians. As such, the lower cost of negative inducements makes it more likely that businessperson politicians will utilize them in mobilizing patronage employees.

In contrast, non-patronage employees are likely to have alternative employment options and are therefore less dependent on their current job. Consequently, negative inducements are less effective in extracting political services from this group. In fact, non-patronage employees may respond forcefully to negative inducements, as they hold fewer concerns about potential repercussions from their employer. Given their limited reliance on employment at firms of businessperson politicians, non-patronage employees may reduce their work and political service efforts, and openly criticize their employer for mistreatment and a hostile work environment. Therefore, targeting non-patronage employees with negative inducements can be a costly strategy that lowers productivity, profit margins, and damages the reputation of businessperson politicians and their firms. For non-patronage employees, the cost incurred by businessperson politicians from negative inducements is more likely to outweigh the cost associated with positive inducements. As a result, businessperson politicians are more likely to mobilize this group of employees using positive inducements.

H4: Patronage employees are more likely to experience negative inducements than non-patronage employees.

H5: Non-patronage employees are more likely to experience positive inducements than patronage employees.

3.4 Conclusion

Businessperson politicians, faced with constraints that limit their ability to leverage personal, party, and public resources for electoral gain, can allocate company resources to rally electoral support. These politicians can distribute private sector jobs to build an army of political workers who can provide political services aimed at helping improve the chances of businessperson candidates' electoral victory. In exchange for employment, these patronage employees are expected to turn out and vote for businessperson politicians, attend rallies, persuade acquaintances to support the businessperson candidates, and distribute short-term and long-term goods and services produced by the firm.

However, the relationship between patronage employees and businessperson politicians is plagued by the commitment problem due to the non-simultaneous nature of the exchange. To overcome this problem, businessperson politicians monitor and issue threats of sanction to ensure that patronage employees provide the necessary political services. Although direct monitoring can be costly, the existing hierarchical organizational structure in private firms can mitigate this cost. Businessperson politicians can exploit the established chain of command within the workplace, having patronage employees report their political services to their immediate supervisors. Alongside monitoring, businessperson politicians may issue termination threats contingent on the employees' failure to deliver political services. Fear of job loss and

reduced income discourages patronage employees from neglecting their assigned political services. Although positive inducements are also an option, they are financially costly, so businessperson politicians are more likely to reserve them for non-patronage employees who may react adversely to negative inducements.

In the following three chapters, I present a combination of quantitative and qualitative evidence that illustrates how businessperson candidates utilize their firm resources to pursue public offices, and how they overcome the commitment problem and effectively mobilize their patronage employees.

Chapter 4

Quantitative Evidence of the Distribution of Private Sector Resources from List Experiments

4.1 Introduction

In Thailand, businessperson candidates have demonstrated success in winning votes and elections. As discussed in the previous chapter, these politicians capitalize on their access to firm resources, using them to garner political support. They distribute private sector jobs with the expectation that the hired individuals will provide political services, such as voting on election day, attending rallies, persuading others to support the businessperson politicians, and distributing goods and services produced by their firms to voters. This chapter presents a quantitative analysis of the arguments made in Chapter 3, focusing on the types of political services provided by patronage employees. The analysis utilizes individual-level data obtained through a list experiment survey of employees working in firms owned by businessperson politicians.

Because some of the behaviors studied in this chapter are considered illegal in Thailand while others can lead to negative career consequences, employing a traditional survey methodology may not elicit truthful responses from employees. First, social desirability bias is a concern, as it would drive respondents to deny their involvement in illegal clientelistic activities. Additionally, employees may be hesitant to admit failure to provide political services, as such admissions could lead to dismissal if discovered by businessperson politicians. Therefore, respondents have incentives to lie if asked directly about these activities through traditional survey methods. To mitigate this problem of social desirability bias and to elicit truthful answers

to sensitive questions from respondents, recent studies in the field have begun using list experiments (Oliveros, 2021; Kramon, 2016; Gonzalez-Ocantos et al., 2012). These list experiments avoid directly asking respondents about their involvement in sensitive activities, offering respondents plausible deniability and anonymity, which facilitates gathering information about their engagement in sensitive behaviors.

The list experiments reveal that employees in firms owned by businessperson politicians provide various political services to support their employers' electoral campaigns. Consistent with the theory outlined in the previous chapter, approximately 39.9%, 28.8%, and 19.1% of these employees vote for the businessperson candidate, attend rallies, and persuade others within their social network to support the businessperson candidate they work for, respectively. Additionally, the list experiments show that these employees partake in the distribution of firm benefits, with a higher proportion engaging in the distribution of short-term business benefits to voters, 19.3%, compared to long-term benefits, 8.8%.

To demonstrate that it is primarily the patronage employees providing these political services and that businessperson candidates do not simply mobilize existing employees, this chapter examines the variation in the level of political activities undertaken by employees hired just before an election compared to those hired during other time periods. The list experiment results suggest that employees hired two months or less before the election are more involved in providing political services than those hired outside of this timeframe. This evidence supports the theory that businessperson politicians strategically increase hiring around election time to assemble a workforce dedicated to providing political services, while employees hired at other times are not expected to engage in such activities.

4.2 Research Design

Given the potential legal and career repercussions of admitting or denying involvement in political service provision, it can be challenging to accurately measure the frequency of such behavior in the firms of businessperson politicians using traditional survey methods. Directly asking whether they have provided political services may yield untruthful responses because employees might fear legal consequences if they admit to receiving jobs in exchange for political services or serving as brokers, distributing firm resources to clients in return for votes. Conversely, employees may worry about workplace repercussions if they deny providing political services and are found to be shirking on their agreement to provide political services in exchange for employment.

To address these concerns arising from employing traditional surveys, I conducted online list experiments with employees in an attempt to elicit truthful responses. In list experiments, survey respondents were randomly assigned to treatment and control groups, where they were asked how many of the items on the list apply to them, but not which items. This method provides plausible deniability, as no one can determine whether respondents participated in sensitive activities unless they claim the entire list applies to them. For this study, each list experiment contained five items, with four common items between the control and treatment groups. The fifth item in the treatment group was the sensitive behavior of interest, while the fifth item in the control group was a placebo.¹ The difference in the mean number of items reported by the control and treatment groups provides an estimate of the frequency of the sensitive behavior under investigation.

¹ A placebo item is added to the control list to prevent bias stemming from mechanical inflation in the mean of the treatment group due to the greater number of items on the list (Riambau and Ostwald, 2021).

In selecting the items for the lists, I included both low- and high-prevalence items to prevent floor and ceiling effects (Blair and Imai, 2012).² Ceiling and floor effects occur when respondents in the treatment group feel that all non-sensitive items apply or do not apply to them, thereby making them hesitant to answer truthfully for fear of revealing their involvement or non-involvement in the sensitive activity. Therefore, the estimate of the prevalence of sensitive behavior may not accurately represent its true frequency in the presence of floor and ceiling effects.

To reduce variance in the mean estimates for treatment and control groups, I included two negatively correlated items in each list (Glynn, 2013). Additionally, the order of the lists was randomized for each respondent to avoid list-order effects, where exposure to a specific list may influence how a respondent reacts to subsequent lists (Glynn, 2013). The specific questions and items used in the list experiments are provided in Appendix 4A.

The list experiments used in this study are designed to test whether employees in these firms provide political services in support of the businessperson politician in exchange for their employment. Such political services include voting for the businessperson candidate, attending political rallies, persuading acquaintances to support the businessperson candidate, and distributing business benefits such as discounts and access to free goods and services to voters in order to bolster political support for the businessperson candidate.

In addition to the list experiments, respondents were asked to report demographic and background information, including age, gender, educational level, salary level, position level,

² A pilot study was conducted in December of 2021 to pre-test the lists to ensure that there are no ceiling and floor effects. There is no strong evidence of floor and ceiling effects. The pre-test does not provide strong evidence of floor and ceiling effects. The distribution of respondents' answers to all the lists is shown in Appendix 4B, indicating that only a few respondents answered the maximum number of items or zero items on all the lists.

month and year of their hiring at the current firm, interactions with customers, frequency of reporting to the supervisor, their views on redistribution, and their perspectives on reciprocity.

4.2.1 The Survey and Sample Selection

In selecting the firms to conduct list experiments, I first obtained a list of firms from the Department of Business Development (DBD) under the Ministry of Commerce. Next, I identified firms linked to businessperson candidates in the 2019 election using data from Elect.in.th, which collates information on connections between MP candidates and firms. I included only firms connected to businessperson candidates as firms lacking these connections are less likely to mobilize their employees in the manner discussed in the previous chapter. Out of these firms, I randomly contacted 500 firm representatives to request permission to survey their employees. I received approval from 72 firms, constituting 14.4% of those contacted, to conduct the study.

Once I received approval to conduct survey, I created a random sample of employees for each firm based on their employee list. Employees with a work email address that was randomized into the received an email with the survey link. For employees without a work email address, I asked the firm representative to contact those employees and to allow them to complete the survey on a computer or a tablet at the firm using the link sent to the representative. Between December 2021 and September 2022, a total of 986 employees from these firms participated in an online survey on Qualtrics.

Given that the implementation of this survey requires permission and support from the firm representative, I took steps to ensure that the survey did not encroach too much on the personal space and time of everyone involved. First, the survey was sent to the firm representative for approval before being conducted within their firm. Second, the survey was

designed to take less than 20 minutes to complete. Additionally, any direct questions about the employers were excluded to avoid upsetting the firm representatives and those in high-level positions at the sampled firms.

As the survey was conducted online, employees had the option to complete it either at home or at their workplace. However, some employees might be reluctant to provide truthful answers if they were to complete the survey at their workplace, fearing that their jobs might be compromised if their responses displeased those in high-level positions. To assuage such concerns, the consent page of the online survey outlined the purpose of the study and assured participants of the confidentiality of the data collected. Participants were informed that none of their responses would be shared with anyone at the firm or with anyone other than the researcher. Once consent was obtained, respondents were automatically randomized by Qualtrics into either the treatment or the control group. Qualtrics was configured to ensure an equal number of respondents in both groups. The balance test for the study, shown in Table 4.1, confirms that the treatment and control groups in this study were indeed balanced on all important observable characteristics.

Table 4.1: Balance Test for Observable Characteristics

Variables	Mean		t-test		
	Control	Treatment	Means Difference	p-value	T-statistics
Gender	0.604	0.560	0.044	0.156	1.421
Age Group	1.099	1.123	-0.024	0.780	-0.279
Educational Level	1.738	1.695	0.043	0.479	0.708
Position Level in Firm	0.736	0.696	0.040	0.453	0.751
Salary Level	1.035	0.980	0.055	0.286	1.067
Contract Term	1.227	1.151	0.076	0.137	1.490
Direct Customer Contact	0.627	0.594	0.033	0.297	1.045
View on Redistribution	2.320	2.326	-0.006	0.937	-0.079
View on Reciprocity	2.343	2.358	-0.015	0.851	-0.188
Reporting to Supervisor	2.128	2.121	0.007	0.938	0.078
Months of Emp. from 2019 Election	-31.021	-31.562	0.541	0.791	0.265

As firms voluntarily participate in this study by allowing me to survey their employees, there is a risk of selection bias because the firms that agree to the survey may differ from those that decline. However, firms with more patronage employment and more distribution of firm resources are expected to be more likely to reject my request to conduct a survey, given the illegal nature of the activities. Consequently, the sampled firms are likely those that either do not employ this electoral strategy or do not rely excessively on this strategy. As a result, the list experiment estimates probably represent lower-bound estimates of the activities under investigation. These activities could be more prevalent if all firms owned by businessperson politicians were considered.

To briefly evaluate this possibility, Appendix 4C provides a balance test between firms that permitted me to conduct the survey and firms that denied my request or did not respond. While these two groups of firms are balanced on most observable characteristics, certain unbalanced characteristics provide probable evidence that firms that actively engage in distributive activities are more likely to not participate in the study. First, participating firms are, on average, younger than non-participating firms. Older firms are expected to be more established and thus have the organizational capacity to effectively engage in the distribution of firm resources, thereby more likely to view the distribution of firm resources as a plausible electoral strategy. The sample's higher representation of younger firms, which may not find the distribution of firm resources as a viable strategy due to their limited capabilities in employing this strategy, could lead to an underestimation of the magnitude of the activities under consideration.

Another unbalanced characteristic between the two groups is the firms' location. A higher proportion of non-participating firms are located in rural areas. Since patronage

employment and resource distribution are anticipated to be more effective in mobilizing political support in rural areas³, businessperson candidates associated with rural firms might be more inclined to distribute private sector jobs and benefits than their urban counterparts. Consequently, the overrepresentation of urban firms in the sample could result in smaller estimates of the activities in question than if the characteristics of the sample and non-sample firms were balanced.

Despite the potential selection bias, the firms that participated in this study exhibit a wide range of political, economic, and demographic characteristics. Table 4.2 displays the distribution of the sample firms across these diverse characteristics. The variety demonstrated in Table 4.2 helps ensure that no specific characteristic is left unrepresented in the sample, thus making generalizations from the sample firms more plausible.

³ Patronage employment and vote buying are anticipated to be more effective at securing votes and political support in rural areas. For patronage employment, rural firms are likely to face less competition for labor, thereby limiting alternative career opportunities for patronage employees. Consequently, rural patronage employees are more inclined to exert effort in providing political services to maintain their positions at the firm, resulting in a greater effectiveness of patronage employment in extracting political services. Furthermore, the distribution of benefits in exchange for votes is expected to be more effective in rural settings, as voters can be monitored more easily and have a higher marginal utility from the benefits received (Stokes, 2005).

Table 4.2: Political, Economic, and Demographic Characteristics of Sample Firms

Political, Economic, and Demographic Characteristics	Number of Firms
Region:	
North	14
Northeast	17
Central	28
South	13
Number of Employees:	
1-10	10
11-50	22
51-100	24
101-500	10
501-1000	6
Registered Capital:	
More than 5 million THB	5
4.5 million - 5 million THB	10
4 million - 4.49 million THB	9
3 million - 3.99 million THB	3
2 million - 2.99 million THB	10
1 million - 1.99 million THB	11
0.5 million - 0.99 million THB	18
Less than 0.5 million THB	6
Sector:	
Primary (Natural Resources Extraction)	35
Secondary (Processing and Manufacturing)	24
Tertiary (Services)	13
Party of Businessperson Candidate:	
Phuea Thai	20
Palang Pracharath	21
Future Forward	2
Democrat	13
Bhumjaithai	16
Absolute Value of 2019 Election Margin of Victory:	
0-5%	11
5.01-10%	19
10.01-15%	17

	15.01-20%	17
	More than 20%	8
Types of Electoral System Businessperson Candidate is Competing in:		
	Party List	11
	Constituency	61
Average Household Income (2019) of Firm's Provincial Location:		
	More than 40,000 THB	13
	35,001 THB - 40,000 THB	7
	30,001 THB - 35,000 THB	15
	25,001 THB - 30,000 THB	16
	20,001 THB - 25,000 THB	12
	Less than 20,000 THB	9

4.3 Results from List Experiments

Table 4.3 presents the list experiment estimates for partisan services, including voting for the businessperson politician, attending their political rallies, and persuading people within employees' social networks to support the businessperson candidate. The control group averages for these activities are 1.927, 1.838, and 1.943, while the treatment group averages are 2.326, 2.126, and 2.134. The difference-in-means between the control group and the treatment group provide an estimate of the proportion of employees engaged in each of the activities of interest. Specifically, this study finds that 39.9 percent of employees working for businessperson politicians turned out to vote for the businessperson candidate they work for, while 28.8 percent attended their employer's political rallies, and 19.1 percent engaged in persuasion activities with members of their social networks. The estimates are statistically significant at the 95% level for all three activities. These findings suggest that private sector employees do indeed provide political services in support of businessperson politicians, similar to their counterparts in the public sector.

To substantively evaluate the magnitude of political service provision within firms of businessperson candidates, I will compare the estimates in this section to previous studies that investigate the provision of political services by public sector patronage employees. Considering that over a third of employees (39.9%) turned out to vote for the businessperson candidate associated with their firm, the proportion is slightly higher compared to a previous study analyzing the political behavior of employees within the New Haven political machine in 1974 (Johnston, 1979).⁴ The New Haven study finds that 33.4% of employees within the machine turned out to vote “often” or in “almost every election”.

While it is possible that the higher estimate among private-sector employees can be attributed to the fact that businessperson candidates are able to hire a larger army of patronage workers, as they are not bound by regulatory and budgetary restrictions like their counterparts in the public sector, it is important to note that the larger estimates may not be solely due to this reason. It is possible that this task is likely to be undertaken not only by patronage private sector employees, but also by non-patronage private sector employees who were not specifically hired to provide political services. Non-patronage employees may be motivated to turn out and vote for businessperson politicians, as a businessperson's electoral success could lead to business growth and potentially improved benefits and salaries for these employees. In contrast, non-patronage employees in the public sector typically do not personally benefit from the incumbent's electoral victory and are likely to retain their jobs regardless of the election outcome

⁴ If the distribution of these private sector jobs is viewed as an attempt at vote-buying, the estimate from this study is on the high end compared to existing estimates from studies on vote-buying. Kramon (2016) finds that 23% of respondents in Kenya reported that vote buying influenced their votes. Muhtadi (2019) finds that only 10% of respondents in Indonesia said that receiving money influenced their vote choice. Munoz (2014) presents data from two surveys where 14.7% and 12.3% answered affirmatively that they would honor the promise to vote for a candidate after receiving benefits from a candidate. Greene (2021) finds that vote buying increased the support for Peña Nieto by 11.7% in Mexico's 2012 election. On patronage employment, Calvo and Murillo (2004) find that a 1% increase in provincial public employment is associated with a 0.066% increase in votes for Peronism.

(Oliveros, 2021). As a result, public sector patronage employees have less motivation to support the incumbent candidate compared to their private sector counterparts

Table 4.3: Estimates of the Incidence of Political Service Provision in Firms of Businessperson Politicians from List Experiments

Clientelistic Activity	Differences	SE	p-value	T-statistic	Mean Control	Mean Treatment
Employee votes for businessperson tied to her/his firm	0.399	0.050	0.000***	8.036	1.927	2.326
Employee mobilizes acquaintances to attend rally of businessperson candidate	0.288	0.050	0.000***	5.757	1.838	2.126
Employee persuades acquaintances to vote for businessperson candidate	0.191	0.050	0.001***	3.816	1.943	2.134
Employee distributes short-term business benefits to voters	0.193	0.052	0.000***	3.713	1.972	2.165
Employee distributes long-term business benefits to voters	0.088	0.042	0.037**	2.086	1.884	1.972
Employee receives positive inducements from engaging in political activities	0.156	0.043	0.000***	3.508	1.888	2.041
Employee faces threats of punishments for not engaging in political activities	0.204	0.049	0.001***	4.173	1.911	2.116

*p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01

Around 28.8% of employees surveyed reported attending rallies of a businessperson politician, a figure that closely aligns with the estimate for public sector employees. Oliveros (2021) finds that about 22% of low-level and mid-level municipality employees attended political rallies. As mentioned above, the slightly larger estimate among private sector employees compared to public sector employees can be attributed to the greater flexibility businessperson candidates have when it comes to patronage hiring. However, it also points to the possibility that not only patronage employees in the private sector attend rallies, but also non-patronage employees in private firms. Non-patronage private sector employees are incentivized to attend these rallies to assist their employers in signaling their electoral strength and enhancing their employers' electoral prospects, as they stand to gain from their employers' ability to extract rent from their elected offices. Despite this, the proportion of private sector employees attending rallies is lower than those who vote. This may be due to the higher opportunity cost associated with rally attendance, which demands more personal time compared to voting. Consequently, a larger number of employees may be deterred from attending rallies than from voting for their employers.

Assessing the magnitude of persuasion of acquaintances is challenging due to the absence of research estimating the magnitude of persuasion activities carried out by public sector patronage employees.¹⁷ Compared to other types of political services in this study, the percentage of employees involved in persuasion activities is lower, which could potentially be attributed to the businessperson politicians' limited ability to monitor such activities. Persuasion often occurs

¹⁷ Despite the absence of research specifically addressing persuasion activities among public sector patronage employees, persuasion activities by beneficiaries of clientelistic exchanges are not unique. Gottlieb (2017) finds evidence that brokers in Senegal persuade and motivate voters to turn out and vote with ideas, rather than utilizing positive or negative inducements. Schaffer and Baker (2015) find that individuals who engage in frequent persuasion are more likely to be targeted for clientelistic gifts.

spontaneously during personal conversations, making it difficult for businessperson candidates to ascertain whether employees dutifully perform this task. The low visibility of persuasion creates an opportunity for patronage employees to shirk and potentially not provide this political service.

Table 4.3 also provides estimates of the proportion of employees engaging in distributive activities. The average numbers of activities reported by employees in the control group and the treatment group are 1.972 and 2.165, respectively, for short-term benefit distribution. Therefore, 19.3% of employees engaged in short-term benefit distribution. The difference-in-means is statistically significant at the 95 percent level. Distribution of long-term benefits was less common among employees in firms of businessperson politicians. Employees in the control group reported an average of 1.884 activities, while those in the treatment group reported an average of 1.972 activities. Thus, it is estimated that 8.8% of employees distributed long-term benefits to business clients. The difference-in-means is statistically significant at the 95 percent level.

The lower prevalence of long-term benefit distribution is unsurprising due to the high cost of this strategy, which requires firms to commit more monetary resources for each client, as distribution occurs not only prior to elections but also between elections. With a larger financial impact on the firm, businessperson politicians would, therefore, be more cautious in granting patronage employees the authority to decide on the size and target of the distribution. While only a small percentage admitted to direct distribution of long-term benefits, a larger proportion of respondents may still play a role in the long-term benefit distribution process, a role not captured by the sensitive item on the list experiment. For example, qualitative interviews in the Chapter 7 suggest that patronage employees collected information and vetted potential clients on behalf of businessperson politicians.

When comparing the magnitude of the two distributive activities to a previous study that examined the extent of favor-granting by public employees at City Hall to citizens, the estimates for the distributive activities in private firms found in this study are lower than those from the earlier study in the public sector. Approximately 44% of municipality employees in Argentina reported that they helped someone in the City Hall (Oliveros, 2021). A lower prevalence of distribution in private sector firms is unsurprising because businessperson candidates personally internalize the cost of distributing goods and services produced by the firm in the form of reduced profit margins. In contrast, politicians using public resources do not fully internalize the cost of distribution since public resources are funded by taxes. In addition to the cost from goods and services distributed to voters, businessperson candidates and their private firms also directly incur productivity decline costs from the diversion of patronage employees from firm-related tasks to election-related tasks. As such, businessperson candidates are not able to divert as many employees to work on the campaign as politicians can in the public sector, where profit is not as important of a concern.

4.4 Evidence of Patronage Employment

In order to examine whether businessperson candidates leverage private sector jobs to create a network of political supporters who provide services aimed at boosting the candidates' electoral prospects (H1), I examine the behavioral differences between employees hired near election day and those recruited outside this timeframe. Businessperson politicians stand to benefit most from patronage employees in the months leading up to an election, as this is when they can maximize rent extraction in the form of political services from patronage employees. While patronage employees may produce election-related output between elections by building

and maintaining relationships with voters and clients, the majority of the expected political services, such as voting for the businessperson candidate, attending rallies, persuading acquaintances to support the businessperson candidate, and distributing business benefits, are carried out around election time.

Assuming that these businessperson politicians discount their utility for future rent extraction (Byrd and Richey, 1998), businessperson candidates will derive maximum utility if they can extract political services from patronage employees soon after hiring them. The utility gain from patronage hiring is expected to decline if the provision of political services occurs further away from election time due to discounting. Hiring patronage employees when there is no upcoming election means that businessperson politicians have to pay the salaries of patronage employees, but do not receive any tangible returns until the next election. If this businessperson candidates' calculus holds, businessperson candidates are expected to intensify patronage hiring a few months leading up to election day, but not engage in extensive patronage hiring long before an election. As a result, I anticipate a hiring cycle in the firms of businessperson politicians that mirrors the hiring cycle in the public sector (Toral, 2020; Pierskalla and Sacks, 2019; Cahan, 2019).

Given that employees hired close to an election are more likely to be patronage hires, an observable implication is that employees who are hired in the months leading up to an election will provide more partisan services than employees that are hired outside of this time period.¹⁸ Employees hired long before an election or post-election are more likely to be non-patronage

¹⁸ I am not arguing for a clear cut-distinction where employees hired within the two-month time period prior to the election are all patronage employees, while those hired outside of this time period are non-patronage employees. Businessperson candidates can hire non-patronage employees in the said two-month period. At the same time, patronage employees hired during previous election cycles may still be working at the firm and providing political services. I expect that the proportion of patronage employees among respondents hired in the two-month time period is greater than the proportion of patronage employees among respondents hired outside of this time period.

employees who are not expected to provide political services. To evaluate whether employees hired closer to an election exhibit different behaviors from those hired well before an election or after the election, I estimate and compare the difference-in-means between the control and the treatment groups for two subsamples: employees hired two months or less prior to the 2019 election, and employees hired outside this two-month pre-2019 election timeframe.¹⁹ The Electoral Commission of Thailand announced on January 23, 2019, that the MP election would take place on March 24, 2019. With the election date officially set, businessperson candidates were motivated to initiate patronage hiring, as they could immediately benefit from a range of political services offered by patronage employees. Prior to the two-month mark, however, businessperson politicians likely had less incentive to hire patronage employees, as the uncertainty surrounding the election date increased the risk that they would have to pay salaries to patronage employees without being able to extract political services.

Table 4.4 presents estimates from list experiments for two subgroups conditional on the time of employment, displaying results for five political services. The differences-in-means between the control and treatment groups among those hired two months before the election, as shown in the first row of the table, are statistically significant at the 95 percent level for all political services except for the distribution of long-term benefits. To explain the null result for long-term distribution, it is important to note that the wording of the sensitive item on the list experiment only asks respondents whether they engaged in direct distribution of long-term benefits. It is possible that these patronage employees only took part in the process indirectly, such as by gathering information on potential clients.

¹⁹ This includes those who were hired more than two months prior to the 2019 election day and those who were hired after election day.

For respondents who were hired outside the two-month period before the election, only two political services showed statistical significance at the 95 percent level: turning out to vote for businessperson politicians and attending rallies. As previously discussed, non-patronage employees had incentives to support businessperson candidates due to potential personal gains from business expansion if their employers were to win the election. However, for distributive activities, non-patronage employees were not hired for electoral purposes, and businessperson politicians may not have granted them the authority to distribute firm benefits to voters, thus explaining the lack of statistical significance for the two distributive activities among employees hired outside of the two months period.

Table 4.4: List Experiment Estimates for Political Services Conditional on Time of Employment

Time of Hiring	Political Services				
	Turning out to vote	Attending Rallies	Persuading Acquaintances	Distributing Short-term Benefits	Distributing Long-term Benefits
Two Months Prior to the Election	0.655*** (0.144)	0.603*** (0.159)	0.406** (0.151)	0.524*** (0.198)	0.233 (0.144)
Outside of Two Months Timeframe	0.291*** (0.097)	0.156** (0.073)	0.101 (0.088)	0.054 (0.107)	0.027 (0.071)
Differences between Two Groups (Row (1) – Row(2))	0.364** (0.174)	0.447** (0.175)	0.305* (0.175)	0.470** (0.225)	0.206 (0.161)

*p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01

For the magnitude of the estimates, 65.5, 60.3, 40.6, and 52.4 percent of employees who were hired within two months prior to the election turned out to vote for the businessperson politician they work for, attended rallies, persuaded acquaintances, and distributed short-term firm benefits, respectively. Although these figures may initially suggest that patronage hiring is inefficient, as less than two-thirds of recent hires provided political services, it is important to

note that not all employees hired during this period were patronage hires and were therefore not expected to provide political services. As a result, the true efficiency of this strategy is likely higher than the estimates presented here.

When comparing the magnitude of various activities, voting for businessperson politicians is likely the least costly service, so it comes as no surprise that it has the highest prevalence. Both rally attendance and short-term benefit distribution also exhibit higher prevalence, possibly because supervisors can easily track employee provision of these services. On the other hand, monitoring persuasion can be challenging, as it often takes place during employees' personal time and arises spontaneously in casual conversations. This difficulty in tracking makes it more likely that patronage employees shirk from persuasion, resulting in it being the least prevalent among all political services.

Among employees hired outside the two-month timeframe, 29.1 and 15.6 percent reported turning out to vote for the businessperson politician they work for and attending rallies, respectively. This implies that close to two-thirds either did not vote or chose not to vote for their employers. Assuming the turnout rate for these respondents was similar to the general population, with 74.69% participating in the 2019 election ²⁰, approximately 45% of respondents reported not voting for businessperson candidates from their firms. The reason for this seemingly low support among non-patronage employees is unclear and warrants further investigation in future research. A previous study suggests that a partisan workplace can have a polarizing effect on employees (Jones, 2013). Given that firms led by businessperson politicians are likely to foster partisan environments, this may prompt non-patronage employees, who may have minor grievances against their employers, to develop a stronger dislike of the businessperson candidate

²⁰ The voter turnout rate comes from the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA).

while working there, ultimately resulting in weak turnout and support at the polls among these employees.

To visualize the results, Figure 4.1 shows the differences in the proportion of respondents providing the five political services between the two subgroups. The results offer compelling empirical evidence that employees hired within two months of the 2019 election were more likely to provide partisan services to businessperson politicians than those hired more than two months before or in months following the election. Panels (a) through (d) in Figure 4.1 reveal that the proportions of patronage employees voting, attending rallies, persuading acquaintances, and distributing short-term benefits are higher than the proportions of non-patronage employees providing the same political services by 36.4%, 44.7%, 30.5%, and 47.0%, respectively. The differences in proportions between the two subgroups are statistically significant at the 95 percent level for three activities: voting, attending rallies, and distributing short-term benefits. The difference in proportions for persuading acquaintances is statistically significant at the 90 percent level. However, the difference in proportions for long-term benefit distribution is not statistically significant, providing no conclusive evidence that those hired within two months of the election engaged more in long-term benefit distribution than those hired outside that time period. As previously discussed, this lack of difference possibly stems from the fact that both patronage and non-patronage employees did not primarily engage in the direct distribution of long-term benefits. However, unlike non-patronage employees, patronage employees collected information and vetted clients, assisting businessperson politicians in making the final decision on distribution.




Figure 4.1: Differences in Proportions of Employees Providing Services for Employees Hired Two Months Prior to Election vs. Employees Hired Outside the Two-Month Period

Examining the subsamples of employees hired within two months prior to the election and those hired outside of this period, strong evidence emerges indicating that businessperson candidates engaged in patronage employment just prior to elections. Those hired in close temporal proximity to the election were recruited to provide political services, in addition to carrying out their usual firm-related duties. These findings support H1 and demonstrate that

distributing private sector jobs can be an electoral strategy employed by businessperson candidates in order to enhance their likelihood of winning an election.

4.4.1 Sensitivity Analysis

To conduct sensitivity analysis, I test the differences in the proportions of political service provision using different time cutoff points for the subgroups under analysis: six, three, and one month(s) prior to the election. The results are provided in Table 4E.1, 4E.2, and 4E.3 in Appendix 4E. In Figure 4.2, I provided a plot that displays the differences in proportions of employees' provision of five political services between those hired within a specific timeframe and those hired outside that timeframe (row 3 from Table 4E.1, 4E.2, and 4E.3).




Figure 4.2. Differences in Proportions of Employees Providing Political Services Between Employees Hired Within a Timeframe and Outside the Timeframe

The proportions of respondents providing services between employees hired within six months prior to the election and those hired outside this period do not exhibit statistically significant differences for any of the five activities (row 3 of Table 4E.1). These findings support my argument that patronage employment predominantly occurs in the months leading up to the election. These smaller differences observed when employing a six-month cutoff, compared to those observed when using a two-month cutoff (row 3 of Table 4.4), can be attributed to the increased similarity between the two subgroups. This similarity arises due to the inclusion of more non-patronage employees, specifically those hired between three to six months before the

election, in the subgroup of employees hired within six months of the election. Consequently, this subgroup begins to resemble the subgroup of employees hired outside the six-month period, which predominantly consists of non-patronage employees. As a result, smaller differences between these two subgroups are observed when using a six-month cutoff, in contrast to the findings when employing a two-month cutoff.

The differences in proportions of employees providing political services between those hired within three months of the election and those hired outside this period are statistically significant at the 95 percent level for election day turnout, rally attendance and the distribution of short-term benefits. However, when comparing the magnitude of the differences between the two subgroups (row 3 of Table 4E.2) to the analysis using a two-month cutoff for all activities (row 3 of Table 4.4), the magnitude from the analysis using a three-month cutoff is smaller. Similar to the case of six-month cutoff point, the smaller magnitude of differences between the two subgroups for the three-month cutoff point can be explained by their increased similarity. As more non-patronage employees are included in the subgroup of employees hired closer to the election, the two subgroups become more alike, resulting in smaller differences between employees hired near the election and those hired outside this timeframe.

The results from the one-month cutoff reveal smaller differences in the proportions of employees providing political services between those hired within one month of the election and those hired outside this period (row 3 of Table 4E.3) for all political services, except for rally attendance, compared to the differences in proportions observed in the analysis using a two-month cutoff (row 3 of Table 4.4). These smaller differences between the two subgroups can be attributed to the higher means of the treatment group among those hired outside the one-month timeframe when employees hired two months before the election are included in this subgroup.

The increased means of the treatment group for those hired outside the one-month timeframe lead to higher estimates of the proportion of employees hired outside the one-month period providing political services. As the proportion of employees hired outside the one-month timeframe providing political services rises, while the proportion of employees hired within one month providing political services remains relatively unchanged, a smaller difference emerges between the two subgroups when using a one-month cutoff, as opposed to the two-month cutoff.

In conclusion, the patterns found in Table 4.4 remain consistent when employing three-months and one-month cutoff points, with a higher proportion of employees hired closer to the election day (one, two, or three months prior) providing political services compared to those hired outside of these timeframes. However, the magnitude of the differences between subgroups varies when changing the cutoff point. For all activities, excluding rally attendance, the largest magnitude of the differences between two subgroups is observed when the cutoff point is set at two months before the election. The results indicate that the two subgroups—those hired in close proximity prior to an election and those hired outside of this timeframe—exhibit the greatest divergence in behavior when the cutoff point is closer to the election, suggesting that businessperson candidates tend to engage in more intensive patronage hiring as the election day approaches, compared to periods further away from the election.

4.4.2 Potential Confounder to the Observed Pattern of Behavior

One potential confounder that may explain why employees hired within the few months leading up to the election are more likely to provide political services than those hired at other times is the new employees' drive to fit into the new workplace, rather than because it is an obligation imposed by businessperson candidates. In this line of reasoning, employees hired

closer to the election day may see the provision of political services as an opportunity to show solidarity with the new employer, blend in with the existing workplace culture, and present themselves as a team player, thereby gaining a firm footing in their new position. With this argument, employees will take the initiative to provide political services voluntarily without the employer expecting them to do so. Employees hired well before the election may have already settled into the job and feel secure enough in their position that they do not see the need to provide political services to fit into the workplace. In other words, the provision of political service is a one-way action, with only the employees voluntarily providing political services as a way of adjusting and blending into a new work environment, rather than an exchange where businessperson candidates actively expect the provision of services from employees. With this alternative argument, businessperson candidates would not terminate these employees due to their failure to provide political services.

This confounder is, however, unlikely for two reasons. First, if the greater provision of political services is due to personal attempts by newly hired employees to assimilate into the workplace culture and firm up their position within the firm, it would be expected that these employees would provide these services out of their own volition and thus would not require monitoring and inducements by businessperson candidates. However, I find evidence of monitoring and punishments by employers, as will be demonstrated in the next chapter. The existence of monitoring and punishments suggests that businessperson candidates are not passive in this relationship. They expect certain actions from employees and would punish them if their expectations are not met. Therefore, it is unlikely that employees newly hired near the election are more likely to provide political services because they personally view this as an opportunity to fit into a new work environment.

Secondly, I address this confounder by examining the variation in the provision of political services between customer-facing and non-customer-facing employees hired within two months of the election. Since one of the political services expected from these employees is to distribute goods and services produced by firms to voters, it is reasonable to expect that businessperson candidates will place patronage employees in customer-facing positions such that these employees can effectively distribute firm benefits to voters. Thus, I expect that customer-facing employees are more likely to be patronage employees and to provide political services than non-customer-facing employees, if patronage employment exists. If the explanation that those hired in close proximity to the election provide political services to fit in with the new workplace holds true, and there is no patronage employment, we should see both customer-facing and non-customer-facing employees providing political services by turning out to vote, attending rallies, and persuading acquaintances at the same rate. This is because there is no strong reason to believe that customer-facing employees have a stronger need to fit in to the workplace than non-customer-facing employees.

In Appendix 4F, I show that customer-facing employees were more likely to turn out and vote for the businessperson candidates and attend rallies than non-customer-facing employees. This finding provides suggestive evidence that employees hired closer to the election day were more likely to provide political services because of patronage employment rather than a desire to fit in.

4.5 Robustness Test for the List Experiments

To obtain unbiased estimates from the list experiment, it is crucial that respondents provide an accurate count of applicable items from the list. Considering that the survey is

conducted online without direct supervision, there is a possibility that respondents may not carefully read the instructions, questions, or answer choices when completing the survey. To address this issue, we can exclude observations where the survey duration is too short, as it is highly likely that these respondents rushed through the survey and thus did not give thoughtful responses. With an average survey duration of 18 minutes, I exclude respondents who spent less than 9 minutes on the survey.

Table 4.5 presents the estimates of the proportion of employees providing political services, excluding respondents who completed the survey in less than 9 minutes. The top row displays results for all respondents who took over 9 minutes to finish the survey. When compared to the previous analysis that included all employees, the estimates derived from excluding employees who spent less than 9 minutes exhibit only minor differences. The proportion of respondents providing services for all activities, except for rally attendance, increases by a few percentage points and remains statistically significant at the 95 percent level.

I further divide the respondents who took more than 9 minutes into two subsets: those hired within two months of the election and those hired outside of this timeframe. The second and third rows of Table 4.8 display the results for these subsets. Once again, the estimates only differ by a few percentage points for all activities compared to the full sample, and the statistical significance remains unchanged. These findings indicate that the magnitude and significance observed in the full sample are not driven by responses from those who may have lacked attentiveness to the survey's instructions and questions.

Table 4.5: Results for List Experiments Excluding Respondents Taking Less than 9 Minutes to Complete the Survey

	Turning out to vote	Attending Rallies	Persuading Acquaintances	Distributing Short-term Benefits	Distributing Long-term Benefits	Neg. Inducements	Pos. Inducements
All	0.411*** (0.059) N = 773	0.296** (0.058) N = 773	0.187** (0.058) N = 770	0.214*** (0.059) N = 769	0.092** (0.046) N = 769	0.174*** (0.048) N = 771	0.236*** (0.055) N = 771
Two Months Prior to the Election	0.692*** (0.159)	0.624*** (0.185)	0.409** (0.157)	0.548** (0.217)	0.238 (0.152)	0.457*** (0.162)	0.040 (0.069)
Outside of Two-Month Timeframe	0.314*** (0.101)	0.161** (0.080)	0.105 (0.092)	0.062 (0.117)	0.029 (0.078)	0.100 (0.015)	0.207*** (0.071)
Differences between Two Groups	0.378** (0.188)	0.463** (0.202)	0.304* (0.181)	0.486** (0.247)	0.209 (0.171)	0.357** (0.163)	0.167* (0.100)

*p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01

4.6 Conclusion

Businessperson politicians can leverage private sector resources to establish non-programmatic linkages with voters. Specifically, they can offer private sector jobs to create a network of political workers who provide services aimed at enhancing businessperson candidates' chances of electoral success. In exchange for these jobs, patronage employees are expected to vote for the businessperson politician they work for, attend rallies, persuade acquaintances to support them, and distribute goods and services produced by the firm.

This chapter presents quantitative evidence of political service provision by employees in firms owned by businessperson candidates. The findings from list experiments confirm that employees in these firms provide various political services in return for their jobs, such as voting for their employer, attending rallies, convincing acquaintances to back the businessperson candidate, and distributing short-term and long-term benefits. To demonstrate that

businessperson candidates employ private sector jobs to increase their chances of winning elections, the chapter also shows that a higher proportion of employees hired within two months before the election provide political services compared to the proportion of those hired outside this time period. This indicates that businessperson candidates ramp up patronage hiring in close temporal proximity to an election so that these new employees can provide political services that boost the businessperson candidates' electoral prospects.

The presence of the distribution of private sector resources indicates that even if politicians' access to public sector resources is restricted to curb non-programmatic politics, this may not completely eradicate particularistic distributive electoral strategies. Instead, businessperson candidates can still resort to using private sector resources to establish non-programmatic ties with voters. Ironically, stricter regulations on the use of public sector resources may actually work in favor of businessperson candidates. These limitations could provide them with an edge in utilizing distributive strategies to further their electoral goals. Consequently, such measures may inadvertently promote the success of businesspeople in politics and increase their representation.

Chapter 5

Preventing Patronage Employees' Shirking and Mobilizing Non-Patronage Employees

5.1 Introduction

To mobilize employees to provide political services, Chapter 3 argues that businessperson candidates take advantage of their firms' hierarchical organizational structure to monitor the level of political services provided by employees. Businessperson candidates can supplement monitoring with negative inducements to alter the payoff function, making shirking costly for patronage employees. In particular, Chapter 3 argues that businessperson candidates can condition future employment (or unemployment) to motivate patronage employees to provide the required political services. For non-patronage employees who are not hired to provide political services, Chapter 3 argues that businessperson politicians will utilize positive inducements to mobilize these employees. Positive inducements can increase the expected payoffs for non-patronage employees, making the provision of services more attractive. After observing the provision of political services through monitoring, businessperson candidates will reward non-patronage employees that provide services.

Using two-stage nonlinear least squares (NLS) estimation on the data obtained from the list experiments, this chapter shows that while a non-negligible proportion of employees provide political services without monitoring, monitoring can be an effective strategy in boosting the provision of political services by employees. I find that firms where employees regularly report their work activities see a higher proportion of their employees providing political services than in firms where employees report their work activities less frequently.

Results from list experiments show that approximately 15.6% and 20.4% of employees in firms connected to businessperson candidates experienced positive and negative mobilization by their employer, respectively. By disaggregating the data into subsamples based on their time of employment, the results show that negative inducements are the main method of mobilization for patronage employees who were hired two months before the election. On the other hand, non-patronage employees who were hired outside of the two-month pre-election period are mainly mobilized through positive inducements. This supports the argument that businessperson candidates are more likely to use negative inducements to mobilize patronage employees due to their limited alternative career prospects and their lower likelihood of reacting adversely to threats. Conversely, targeting non-patronage employees with negative inducements invites greater backlash that can be more costly to businessperson candidates and their firms. Therefore, non-patronage employees are more likely to be mobilized by positive inducements than patronage employees.

5.2 Impact of Monitoring on the Provision of Political Services by Patronage Employees

In Chapter 3, I argue that a commitment problem exists between businessperson candidates and patronage employees. To overcome this issue, businessperson candidates monitor the activities of patronage employees to ensure that they provided the promised political services. Monitoring is also expected to be utilized when mobilizing non-patronage employees to provide political services. Businessperson candidates can distribute rewards to non-patronage employees once they observe the provision of political services by these employees.

I demonstrate that monitoring is employed by businessperson politicians to mobilize more employees to provide political services by conducting a multivariate analysis using a two-stage nonlinear least squares (NLS) estimation (Imai, 2011). The NLS approach offers a notable advantage over the standard OLS method, as it provides consistent estimates of the impact of monitoring on the provision of political services when conditional mean functions are correctly specified.¹ While the maximum likelihood estimator (ML) developed by Imai (2011) is more efficient than NLS, it has been proven to be biased in cases where measurement errors occur due to poorly designed or implemented list experiments (Blair, Chou, and Imai, 2019). Consequently, I will employ the NLS estimator to analyze the influence of monitoring on employees' political service provision.

The two-stage nonlinear least squares approach involves two steps of estimation procedures. In the first step, I model the number of control items reported by the respondents, $f(\mathbf{x}_i, \gamma)$, as a function of the covariates, using data from the control group only. From this step, I get the coefficients ($\widehat{\gamma}$) that tell the relationship between the number of items on the control list and each independent variable. In the second step, I fit the $g(\mathbf{x}_i, \delta)$ to the treatment group using the response variable $Y_i^* = Y_i - f(\mathbf{x}_i, \widehat{\gamma})$, where Y_i is the total number of activities reported by the respondents. This process allows us to obtain $\widehat{\delta}$, which reveals the relationship between the treatment list's number of items and each independent variable.

To get the predicted proportion of employees engaged in political services, I use the following equation:

$$g_{ijk} = \widehat{\delta}_0 + \widehat{\delta}_1 \text{reporting}_{ijk} + \widehat{\delta}_2 \text{reciprocity}_{ijk} + C_{ijk} + \varepsilon_{ijk}$$

¹ Results from multivariate OLS regressions are provided in Appendix 5A.

where g_{ijk} is the predicted proportion of employees engaging in each political service, *reporting* is the frequency of report to the supervisor, *reciprocity* is the employee's view on reciprocity, C_{ijk} is a matrix of control variables, and the subscripts i , j , and k are an index of employees, firms and provinces, respectively. The individual-level control variables are age, level of education, gender, position in firm, and salary level. Firm-level controls are asset size and age of firms. Provincial-level control variables are income per capita.

To measure the level of monitoring, I use a question on the survey that asked: "On average, how often do you report your work activities to your supervisor?"² The response choices range from reporting every day to less than once a month, with a value of 0 indicating the lowest frequency and 4 representing the highest frequency. Employees who report to their supervisors regularly are expected to be more likely to have their political service provision monitored. In turn, employees who are consistently monitored by their employers are expected to provide more partisan services compared to those who are not regularly monitored.

An alternative strategy to mobilize employees, especially patronage employees, as argued in the literature, is through the norm of reciprocity (Finan and Schechter, 2012). To show that reciprocity is not the primary strategy that businessperson politicians rely on to solve the commitment problem, I control for reciprocity. I measure an employee's view on reciprocity using a survey question where each respondent was asked, "How much do you agree with the following statement: we should return the favors to people who have helped us in the past?" Answer choices are on a five-point Likert scale that ranges from strongly disagree to strongly

² The question does not directly ask whether an employee feels that her effort in providing political services was monitored as the employee may be disinclined to admit that they engaged in activities that violate electoral laws. As an existing system of workplace monitoring provides businessperson candidates with the capacity to monitor patronage employees' efforts in providing political services as well, asking about monitoring of work activities should dampen the impact of social desirability bias while getting at the level of monitoring experienced by patronage employees.

agree, where 0 is strongly disagree and 4 is strongly agree. If businessperson candidates do indeed rely on employees' sense of reciprocity, I should find that respondents with a stronger sense of reciprocity provide more political services.

Table 5.1 displays the results from the NLS estimation. When no covariates are included in the NLS estimation, the difference-in-means estimator is obtained. The constants that are shown in Columns 1, 4, and 7 of Table 5.1 match the values calculated from the difference-in-means between the control and the treatment groups for each of the political services shown in Table 4.3 in Chapter 4.

Table 5.1: Results from NLS Regression for the Impact of Monitoring and Reciprocity on Provision of Political Services

	Turn out to vote			Attend rallies			Persuasion of acquaintances		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Reporting		0.040*** (0.015)	0.039*** (0.014)		0.055** (0.027)	0.054** (0.026)		0.011 (0.013)	0.010 (0.011)
Reciprocity			0.028 (0.029)			0.032 (0.028)			0.012 (0.020)
Constant	0.399*** (0.061)	0.312*** (0.052)	0.254*** (0.048)	0.288*** (0.065)	0.168*** (0.058)	0.102** (0.050)	0.191*** (0.057)	0.104** (0.053)	0.099* (0.051)
Control Variables	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Observations	482	482	482	480	480	480	480	480	480

Note: The coefficients for the control variables are reported in Appendix 5B. Standard errors are clustered at firm levels. The number of observations is around half of the total sample size because the second stage is performed only on the treatment group.

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

The constants in Columns 2, 5, and 8 in Table 5.1 provide the average proportion of employees in firms of businessperson politicians that provide the three political services for the base category, those who said they reported their work activities to their supervisor less than once a month. Among employees who report to their supervisor less than once a month, 31.2%, 16.8%, and 10.4% of these employees turn out to vote, attend rallies, and persuade members of

their social network to support the businessperson politician they work for. These results suggest that a substantial proportion of employees provide political services with minimal monitoring by businessperson candidates and their firms. The coefficients on *reporting* in these columns give the marginal effect of being one category higher in the frequency of reporting on the proportion of employees providing political services. Moving one category up the reporting frequency variable leads to a 4.0, 5.5, and 1.1 percentage points increase in the proportion of employees turning out to vote, attending rallies, and engaging in persuasion. As such, there is evidence that monitoring can increase the proportion of employees providing political services.

The coefficients on the reporting frequency to the supervisor are statistically significant at the 95 percent level only for two political services: turning out to vote and attending rallies. The coefficient for persuasion of acquaintances is not statistically significant with NLS estimation. These coefficients provide supporting evidence for my argument that employees who are monitored more regularly, through more frequent reports of work activities to their employers, are more likely to turn out to vote for businessperson politicians and attend rallies. However, there is not sufficient evidence to confidently conclude that businessperson politicians rely on monitoring to ensure that employees are persuading their acquaintances on behalf of their employer. Because persuasion usually occurs through private conversations between employees and their acquaintances, obtaining evidence of persuasion can be difficult. Therefore, monitoring through frequent reporting at work may not help prevent employees from shirking on this activity.

The constants in Columns 3, 6, and 9 in Table 5.1 show the average proportion of employees providing the three political services for those who say they report their work activities to their supervisor less than once a month and that they strongly disagree with the

statement that favors need to be returned to those who have helped them in the past. Among employees who report to their supervisor less than once a month and strongly disagree with the idea of returning the favor to someone who helped them, 25.4%, 10.2%, and 9.9% of these employees turn out to vote, attend rallies, and persuade members of their social network to support the businessperson politician they work for. The coefficients on *reciprocity* provide the marginal effect of being one category higher on whether they believe favors should be returned. The coefficients on the view of reciprocity are not statistically significant at the 95 percent or 90 percent level for all three political services. This suggests that the norm of reciprocity does not play a substantive role in mobilizing employees to provide political services. Once reciprocity is controlled for, moving one category up the reporting frequency variable results in a 3.9, 5.4, and 1.0 percentage points increase in the proportion of employees turning out to vote, attending rallies, and engaging in persuasion. Once again, the coefficients on the first two political services are statistically significant at the 95 percent level, but the coefficient on persuasion is not statistically significant even at the 90 percent level. In summary, although a substantial proportion of employees provide these three political services with limited monitoring, businessperson candidates leverage monitoring as a strategy to increase the proportion of employees providing political services.

NLS estimation is also used to examine the impact of monitoring and reciprocity on distributive activities. The results from the NLS estimation for the distributive activities are shown in Table 5.2.³ The specification of the equation is identical to the one in the previous section, but with the number of affirmative responses on the lists for distributive activities as the dependent variable instead.

³ The corresponding results from the OLS regressions are shown in Appendix 5A.

The constants in Columns 2 and 5 in Table 5.2 suggest that the average proportions of employees engaged in short-term and long-term benefit distribution are 12.6% and 6.0%, respectively, among employees who report to their supervisor less than once a week. The marginal effects of moving one category up on the reporting frequency variable are a 3.1 and 0.6 percentage point increase in the proportions of employees distributing short-term and long-term business benefits to voters, respectively. The coefficient for the reporting variable is statistically significant at the 95 percent level for the distribution of short-term business benefits, while it is statistically significant at the 90 percent level for the distribution of long-term business benefits. Therefore, a non-negligible proportion of employees distributes short-term benefits with minimal monitoring, and while monitoring is effective in boosting this proportion for short-term benefit distribution, it does not yield significant impact for long-term benefit distribution.

Table 5.2: Results from NLS Regression for the Impact of Monitoring and Reciprocity on Distributive Activities

	Short-term benefit distribution			Long-term benefit distribution		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Reporting		0.031*** (0.011)	0.030*** (0.010)		0.006* (0.004)	0.006* (0.004)
Reciprocity			0.020 (0.017)			0.005 (0.010)
Constant	0.193*** (0.058)	0.126*** (0.047)	0.089** (0.042)	0.088** (0.045)	0.060 (0.035)	0.054 (0.030)
Control Variables	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Observations	482	482	482	480	480	480

Note: The coefficients for the control variables are reported in Appendix 5B. Standard errors are clustered at firm levels. The number of observations is around half of the total sample size because the second stage is performed only on the treatment group.

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Examining the coefficients for the norm of reciprocity in Columns 3 and 6, the norm of reciprocity plays negligible role in mobilizing employees to engage in distributive activities. The coefficients on the view of reciprocity are not statistically significant at any traditional level for both types of distributive activities. Once the reciprocity control is added to the model, the marginal effects of moving up one category in the reporting frequency variable are a 3.0 percentage point increase in the proportion of employees distributing short-term business benefits and a 0.6 percentage point increase in the proportion of employees distributing long-term business benefits. Similar to when reciprocity is not controlled for, the coefficient of the reporting variable for the distribution of short-term business benefits is statistically significant at the 95 percent level, but the coefficient is only statistically significant at the 90 percent level for the distribution of long-term business benefits. Therefore, there exists evidence that monitoring of activities plays a prominent role in boosting the proportion of employees engaged in the required distributive activities, albeit with weaker evidence for the distribution of long-term benefits.

Further analysis using NLS estimation, by breaking down the sample into those hired two months or less before the election and those hired more than two months before the election or post-election, shows that monitoring has a stronger impact on mobilizing patronage employees to provide political services than it does on mobilizing non-patronage employees. The results from this disaggregated data are provided in Appendix 5C.

5.3 Supplementing Monitoring with Positive and Negative Inducements

Since monitoring alone is unlikely to prevent shirking due to its limited impact on employees' payoff functions, I argue that businessperson candidates bolster monitoring efforts

with positive and negative inducements. This approach makes patronage employees worse off when they shirk, compared to when they comply with the promise to provide political services.

Table 5.3 presents the estimates from list experiments that explore employees' experiences with negative and positive inducements in the workplace. In the list that includes negative inducements as the sensitive item, employees in the control group reported an average of 1.911 activities, while those in the treatment group reported an average of 2.116 activities. This indicates that 20.5% of employees in firms of businessperson politicians experienced negative inducements from their employers. In the list that includes positive inducements as the sensitive item, respondents in the control group reported an average of 1.888 activities, and those in the treatment group reported an average of 2.041 activities. This indicates that 15.3% of employees in firms of businessperson politicians experienced positive inducements from their employers. The differences-in-means for both negative and positive inducements are statistically significant at the 95 percent level. The results from these two list experiments provide evidence that businessperson candidates mobilize employees by leveraging negative and positive inducements to augment the monitoring process, thereby ensuring the employees' commitment to providing political services.

Table 5.3: Estimates of Incidence of Mobilization Activities by Employers in Firms of Businessperson Politicians from List Experiments

Mobilization Activity	Differences	SE	p-value	T-statistic	Mean Control	Mean Treatment
Employee faces threats of punishments for not engaging in political activities	0.204	0.049	0.001***	4.173	1.911	2.116
Employee receives positive inducements from engaging in political activities	0.156	0.043	0.000***	3.508	1.888	2.041

*p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01

While the results of these two list experiments indicate that businessperson candidates employ both positive and negative inducements to mobilize employees to provide political services, it is crucial to determine if the targets for these mobilization strategies differ. Table 5.4 demonstrates that businessperson candidates strategically target patronage employees with negative inducements and non-patronage employees with positive inducements.

Table 5.4: List Experiment Estimates for Experience with Inducements Conditional on Time of Employment

Time of Hiring	Types of Inducements	
	Negative Inducements	Positive Inducements
Two Months Prior to the Election	0.456*** (0.150)	0.039 (0.069)
Outside of Two-Month Timeframe	0.098 (0.097)	0.205*** (0.066)
Differences between Two Groups (Row (1) – Row (2))	0.358** (0.179)	0.166* (0.095)

*p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01

Among employees hired within two months of an election, 45.6% reported experiencing threats of punishment. This estimate is statistically significant at the 95 percent level. In addition to the fact that not all employees hired within two months of the election are patronage employees, the relatively small size of this estimate could be attributed to the research design, as the sensitive item only inquired about threats of punishment contingent on providing political services. It is plausible that some patronage employees may face threats of punishment contingent on electoral outcomes rather than political service provision. Chapter 7 will further explore this notion through employee interviews. In contrast, the list experiment found no

statistically significant evidence that employees hired close to election day were promised rewards contingent on their political services for positive inducements.

Among employees hired outside of the two-month period before the election, a statistically significant 20.5% reported that their employers promised rewards for their political services. The small size of this estimate could be due to businessperson candidates incurring tangible monetary costs when distributing rewards, leading them to use this strategy sparingly. Interviews with employees also reveal that businessperson candidates may make rewards contingent on electoral victory rather than the provision of political services. This suggests that the actual proportion of employees who experienced positive inducements might be higher than the estimate presented here, given that the sensitive item in the list experiment asked employees only about positive inducements contingent on the provision of political services. In line with the argument made in Chapter 3, the estimate for experiences with negative inducements is not statistically significant for employees hired outside the two-month timeframe, suggesting that businessperson candidates do not usually target non-patronage employees with negative inducements.

Figure 5.1 illustrates the differences in the prevalence of positive and negative inducements experienced by employees across two subgroups: those hired two months prior to the election and those hired outside of this time frame. For negative inducements, there is a statistically significant 35.8 percentage point difference between the proportions of employees who have encountered these experiences in the two groups. Specifically, employees hired within two months of the election are more likely to face employer threats than those hired outside of this timeframe. This finding is significant at the 95 percent confidence level. In terms of positive inducements, a 16.6 percentage point difference is observed between the proportions of

employees who have experienced them in the two subgroups. Notably, a higher proportion of employees hired outside the two-month window reported positive inducements compared to those hired within two months prior to the election. This difference is statistically significant at the 90 percent level. Although the evidence is less robust, it does suggest that businessperson politicians primarily target non-patronage employees with positive inducements, while rarely relying on such incentives to mobilize patronage employees.




Figure 5.1. Differences in Proportions of Employees Experiencing Inducements for Employees Hired Two Months Prior to Election vs. Employees Hired Outside the Two-Month Period

5.3.1 Sensitivity Analysis

To conduct a sensitivity analysis, I use alternative cutoff points of six, three, and one month(s). Results from these alternative cutoffs are provided in Table 5E.1, 5E.2, and 5E.3 in Appendix 5E. Figure 5.2 below illustrates the differences in proportions of employees' experiences with inducements, between those hired within a specific timeframe and those hired outside that timeframe (row 3 from Table 5E.1, 5E.2, and 5E.3).

For the six-month cutoff, the differences in proportions between the two subgroups—those hired within six months and those hired outside of six months—are not statistically significant at any conventional level for both negative and positive inducements (row 3 of Table 5E.1). This finding supports my argument that businessperson candidates tend to increase patronage hiring only a few months before the election. Considering that many non-patronage employees are likely to be included in the group of employees hired within six months of the election, it is not surprising that the differences in proportions of employees who experienced inducements between those hired within six months and those hired outside of this period are not markedly different, as they both would consist substantially of non-patronage employees. In contrast, the two-month cutoff point would yield two distinct groups: one group composed mostly of patronage employees, and the other group comprised largely of non-patronage employees.




Figure 5.2 Differences in Proportions of Employees Facing Inducements Between Employees Hired Within a Timeframe and Outside the Timeframe

The differences in proportions between the two subgroups when a three-month cutoff point is used (row 3 of Table 5E.2) exhibit slight changes for both types of inducements compared to the two-month cutoff. The difference is marginally smaller for negative inducements and slightly larger for positive inducements for the analysis using the three-month cutoff, but the statistical significance remains consistent with the analysis using the two-month cutoff. The smaller magnitude of the difference for negative inducements suggests that the two subgroups—those hired three months prior to the election and those hired outside this timeframe—are more

similar to each other than the subgroups for the two-month cutoff point. This observation aligns with my argument, assuming that those hired three months before the election, prior to the election announcement date, are non-patronage employees. Including these non-patronage employees in the subgroup of those hired within three months of the election should lower the estimate of the proportion of employees hired within that timeframe facing negative inducements, while leaving the estimate of the proportion of those hired outside the timeframe facing negative inducements relatively unchanged. This results in a smaller magnitude of difference between the two subgroups.

For positive inducements, the slight increase in the difference between the two subgroups, compared to the analysis using the two-month cutoff, can primarily be attributed to the larger proportion of employees hired outside the three-month timeframe reporting experiences with positive inducements (row 3 of Table 5E.2). This may potentially be due to the fact that employees hired exactly three months prior to the election did not encounter any positive or negative inducements. Consequently, excluding employees hired exactly three months prior to the election from the subgroup of employees hired outside the three-month timeframe results in a larger estimate of the proportion of employees in this group reporting experiences with positive inducements, compared to the estimate of the proportion experiencing positive inducements among employees hired outside the two-month timeframe (row 3 of Table 5.4).

Lastly, the magnitude of the differences between the two subgroups for the one-month cutoff (row 3 of Table 5E.3) remains similar to the differences found using a two-month cutoff, and the results retain their statistical significance at the 90 percent level. The marginally smaller difference for negative inducements could potentially be attributed to the fact that patronage

employment is primarily concentrated in the two months before the election and declines slightly in the month preceding the election. As a result, a smaller proportion of employees hired within one month prior to the election are patronage employees who are more likely to face negative inducements, thus slightly reducing the difference in proportions between the two subgroups. Regarding positive inducements, the difference in proportions between the two subgroups experiencing positive inducements shifts very slightly when changing from a two-month cutoff to a three-month cutoff. This subtle change may be a result of noise rather than any alteration in the pattern of employment.

5.4 Conclusion

This chapter's results indicate that while a substantial proportion of employees in firms of businessperson candidates provide political services with minimal monitoring, businessperson candidates still rely on monitoring to mobilize more firm's employees to provide political services. Businesspeople can assess each employee's efforts in delivering political services through routine work meetings, during which employees may be required to present evidence of their political service contributions. I find that in firms where employees are required to report their work activities more frequently, a larger proportion of employees tend to provide political services compared to firms where employees report their work activities less frequently.

In addition to monitoring, businessperson candidates utilize the threat of punishment to mobilize patronage employees to provide political services. Being aware that their employers will discover and penalize any shirking, patronage employees are motivated to deliver political services to avoid losing their jobs. However, businessperson candidates resort to positive inducements when mobilizing non-patronage employees, due to the potential costly backlash

from this group. By promising rewards, businessperson candidates can motivate non-patronage employees to provide political services, even if they were not initially hired with the expectation of performing such roles during election season.

Chapter 6

Qualitative Interviews with Employees in Firms of Businessperson Politicians

6.1 Introduction

List experiments from the previous chapter provide an estimate of the prevalence of political service provision among employees in firms of businessperson politicians and the extent to which businessperson politicians mobilize their employees with inducements. To complement the list experiments, I conduct qualitative interviews with employees in firms of businessperson politicians to provide a narrative that specifically portrays how businessperson politicians use firm resources for electoral purposes. These interviews aim to elucidate the details of the campaign support activities that these employees provided to businessperson candidates, the distribution of goods and services produced by the firm to voters, and the mobilization strategy used by businessperson politicians to incentivize employees to carry out political tasks in support of the businessperson candidates.

I conducted semi-structured interviews with 28 employees working in firms of businessperson politicians in Thailand. Through these interviews, I provide an account of the inner workings of the political machine built by businessperson politicians in the private sector. Specifically, these interviews aim to confirm that the quantitative findings from the previous chapter reflect reality and are not just statistical artifacts. Through the interviews, I find evidence that employees in firms of businessperson politicians turn out and vote for the businessperson politician they work for, attend rallies, persuade members of their social circle to support businessperson politicians, and distribute both long-term and short-term benefits to voters and

social organizations. In addition, I also find evidence that businessperson politicians monitor the effort of their patronage employees by having employees report the provision of political services to their work supervisors. Finally, there is evidence of both positive and negative inducements among employees interviewed.

This chapter will proceed as follows. First, I described the research design for the interviews conducted. Second, I report and discuss the general campaign activities that employees participated in. I also attempt to gather information about the perceived cost of providing those services. Third, I focus on the distributive activities undertaken by employees, investigating the types of benefits distributed and targets of distribution. Fourth, I discuss how these patronage employees have to engage in firm-related tasks in addition to the political services that are expected of them. Due to the diversion of their efforts to partisan tasks, patronage employees are expected to be less productive and provide less business-related output than non-patronage employees. Fifth, I look into how businessperson politicians monitor employees' provision of political services to overcome the commitment problem. I also report the two types of inducements used by businessperson politicians to mobilize employees politically.

6.2 Research Design

The recruitment of interviewees began in March 2022 and continued through August 2022. For each firm that permitted me to conduct the list experiment survey, I asked the contact person at those firms to suggest employees who work in various departments at the firm (e.g., sales, logistics, human resources, etc.) and serve at different position levels (e.g., rank-and-file employees vs. supervisors) who would be willing to be interviewed. Participation in the interviews was on a voluntary basis. After receiving the contact information from the contact

person, I contacted the employees directly to set up an interview. These interviews, conducted either in-person or through a phone call on the LINE application, took place between May 2022 and October 2022. The interviews ranged from approximately 20 minutes to around 90 minutes.

Given that the interviews were voluntary, I did not have full control over the variation in the demographic, personal, and business background of the employees interviewed. A summary of the background characteristics of the employees interviewed is provided in Appendix 6A.

Generally, the interviewees exhibited diverse demographic and personal backgrounds, representing firms from various sectors and provinces, as well as having affiliations with different political parties. Summary statistics of the demographics and characteristics of interviewees are provided in Table 6.1. These variations will help me understand the impact employees' personal characteristics and firm characteristics on their patronage status and their willingness to provide political services.

Table 6.1: Characteristic Breakdown of Interviewees

Characteristics	Percentage (%)
Gender:	
Female:	29%
Male:	71%
Age Group:	
20-30	50%
31-40	32%
41-50	14%
51-60	4%
Educational Level:	
Elementary School	4%
High School	21%
Vocational Certificate	25%
Higher Vocational Certificate	18%
College Degree	32%
Region:	
North	11%
Northeast	21%
Central	50%
South	18%
Position Level:	
Entry-Level	71%
Supervisor-Level	29%
Sector:	
Animal Husbandry	11%
Agricultural Product Sales	25%
Chemical Product Sales	11%
Food Services	3.5%
Food Manufacturing	3.5%
Grocery Store	7%
Construction	7%
Consulting	3.5%
Hotel	3.5%
Jewelry Sales	3.5%
Real Estate	3.5%
Shipping	3.5%
Textiles	7%
Vehicle Dealership	7%

Patronage Employment ¹ :	Yes	32%
	No	68%

The names of the interviewees are anonymized to protect the identities of the employees interviewed due to the sensitive nature of the questions asked. If their employers find out that these employees did or did not engage in some or all of these activities, the employees may face negative consequences at work. Simultaneously, admission to the distribution of benefits in return for political support could lead them to legal trouble, as such actions violate electoral laws in Thailand. Therefore, revealing their identities could expose them to career or legal repercussions. Additionally, these employees are likely to be more candid about their experiences knowing that the information they provide cannot be traced back to them. In this chapter, codes in parentheses refer to interviewees who are the source of information. More information about the interviewees and their associated codes is provided in Appendix 6A.

The questions used to guide the semi-structured interviews are included in Appendix 6B. I asked all employees the predetermined questions listed in Appendix 6B, but also posed additional questions that varied between interviewees based on the content of the answers they provided to the predetermined questions. I followed up on answers to the predetermined questions with additional inquiries to encourage interviewees to elaborate and provide more details on their responses. Therefore, the questions asked and the topics discussed with each employee are not completely identical. The interviewees were informed that they could refuse to answer any questions for any reason without penalties. The predetermined questions are

¹ To categorize interviewees into patronage and non-patronage employees, I use the heuristic that employees hired two months prior to the election are patronage employees and those hired outside of this time period are non-patronage employees. As shown in Chapter 4, employees hired within two months were more likely to provide political services, indicating a higher likelihood of being patronage employees.

designed to gather evidence that would either support or refute the arguments I made in Chapter 3. The semi-structured interviews are expected to allow employees to discuss their personal experiences concerning the distribution of private sector resources for electoral purposes and their roles in supporting businessperson politicians. These qualitative interviews are expected to complement and elaborate on the results found in the quantitative list experiments in Chapters 4, 5, and 6.

Bear in mind that, even with guaranteed anonymity, these employees might still be unwilling to provide truthful responses about the political services provided and the mobilization attempts experienced due to fear of retaliation from their firms. Therefore, the interviews may provide inaccurate estimates of the prevalence of political service provision and experiences with inducements. Even if these interviews do not capture the full extent of employees' political services and their experiences with inducements, some affirmative responses from these interviews at least provide evidence that the political activities and inducements discussed in the previous chapters occur to some extent. Results from the list experiments in the previous chapters should provide more accurate estimates of the magnitude of political services provided by employees and inducements experienced by employees in firms of businessperson politicians.

6.3 Campaign Support Activities

Interviewed employees reported that they participated in several campaign support activities in line with the results from the list experiments in Chapter 4. Numerous interviewed employees said that they turned out on election day to vote for their employers, attended rallies, and attempted to persuade people in their social network to support the businessperson

politician they work for in the 2019 election. The interviews conducted also provide evidence of these employees being monitored by businessperson politicians, who track the level of effort provided by the employees by having them report their activities to their workplace supervisors.

a.) Turning out to vote for the businessperson candidate

The majority of the interviewees in firms of businessperson politicians, 18 in total, responded affirmatively when asked whether they turned out to vote for the businessperson for whom they work for.^{2,3} As argued in Chapter 3, this is not surprising given that turning out to vote is not costly to employees because it only requires a minimal amount of effort from them. These employees have to spend two hours or less on a Sunday now and then when there is an election that the businessperson politicians or their family members and acquaintances are running in. Eak, a worker at an automobile dealership, said that it took him roughly around forty-five minutes an hour to “ride the motorcycle to the polling place up until [he] finished voting” (TH-7). Other interviewees provided similar estimates for the time required to turn out and vote, ranging from twenty minutes to an hour and a half. When asked about traveling to the poll, none of the interviewees suggested that they had difficulty finding transportation to the poll.

This task is not always limited to simply turning out and casting a vote for one businessperson politician. A few of these employees recollected that they also turned out to vote

² Four mentioned that they did not vote for the businessperson they work for. Three claimed that they did not vote in the 2019 election. Three stated that they did not remember who they voted for in 2019.

³ Since the sampling of interviewees is non-random, there is a potential for the contact person at each firm to have primarily suggested loyal employees for interviews. The contact person may have wanted to ensure that the interviewed employees would not make any negative remarks about the firm. As a result, the high loyalty of these employees leads to a higher percentage of interviewed employees turning out to for the businessperson candidate they work for compared to the estimate of the same activity obtained from the list experiment in Chapter 4.

for family members and acquaintances of the businessperson politician for whom they work for. For example, Chai, an employee at a family business that sells textiles where several members of the family were running for political offices, was hired prior to the election in which the head of the company was running for an MP seat (TH-5). He stated that not only did he vote for the businessperson politician who is the head of the company, but he was also told by his supervisor "to go out and vote for [the head of the company's brother] who was running for the head of the subdistrict administrative organization" (TH-5). The brother is also affiliated with the firm where Chai worked, as the brother is a shareholder in the company. Therefore, patronage employees serve as a vote bank not only for businessperson politicians, but also for their associates.

From the perspective of businessperson politicians, monitoring turnout is an easier task than monitoring the vote choice of employees. There are several ways in which businessperson politicians can monitor turnout. Employees can snap a photo of them at the polling station as proof of turnout and show it to their supervisor (TH-18). The process of reporting turnout to the supervisor portrays how businessperson politicians can take advantage of the existing hierarchical organization within firms to aid in the monitoring of employees' provision of political services. As supervisors serve as natural contact people that can act as intermediaries between businessperson politicians and patronage employees, businessperson politicians reduce the monitoring costs they would have incurred from having to identify and create a new monitoring system from scratch.

However, some of these employees pointed to the fact that they were afraid that they might get into trouble for taking photos in front of the polling station (TH-19). This fear among employees is not unfounded. Although taking a photo in the voting booth is illegal, taking photos in front of the polling station is legal. Still, there were reports of poll workers warning

people not to take photos outside of the polling station in Thai elections (*'Yingcheep' chee chaonathi mai get*, 2022). Some of the interviewed employees said that if they lived in the vicinity of other employees other and were assigned to vote at the same or nearby polling stations, they would travel to the poll together. Although the interviewees did not directly say that traveling together with a colleague to the polls potentially provided proof of turnout, it is possible that these employees traveled with a friend so they could vouch for each other at the workplace if they were too afraid to take pictures at the polls.

Monitoring vote choice, however, is more difficult. Interviewed employees did not seem to know with certainty whether their employers knew who they voted for. Chai said that his boss “may or may not know who I voted for”, but his employer “could probably tell because I am a long-time supporter of [the businessperson politician]” (TH-5). None of the employees interviewed provided a clear picture of a mechanism that would allow supervisors and businessperson politicians to know who the employees voted for with complete certainty. Piak, a supervisor at a firm that sells grains, said that he strongly believed that employees at the company voted for his employer (TH-20). He casually claimed that he believed so because employees at the firms are all supporters of businessperson politicians. Hiring people who are supporters, or at least those who are politically neutral, increases the chance that patronage employees will turn out and actually vote for the employer. Although this suggests that political views may have been used as a screening mechanism in patronage hiring, the result from the list experiment in Chapter 4 suggests that businessperson candidates and supervisors are not always accurate judges of new patronage employees' loyalty to the businessperson candidate, as only 65.5% of patronage employees, specifically those hired within two months of the election, claimed they voted for the businessperson candidate.

The discrepancy between Piak's statement and the survey result may be due to brokers' tendency to overestimate the loyalty of clients, as reflected in a previous study that finds brokers in Indonesia exaggerate the proportion of loyal voters (Hicken et al., 2022). This overestimation may not be surprising, given that businessperson candidates and supervisors may have imperfect information on the loyalty of new patronage employees. To recruit new patronage employees, businessperson candidates often relied on recommendations from existing employees within their firm, who often recommended their relatives and close friends (TH-20). Even if existing employees insisted that the recommended individual was a loyal supporter of the businessperson candidate, there was no mechanism that could evaluate and guarantee the new employees' loyalty. Ensuring the loyalty of new patronage employees at the ballot box was further complicated by a secret ballot, which made it difficult for businessperson candidates and supervisors to know patronage employees' vote choice. Thus, supervisors like Piak may overestimate the level of loyalty if they truly believed the recommendations of existing employees without verifying the information through other means.

b.) Attending rallies of businessperson candidate

Attending rallies is also a common activity that was partaken by the majority of the interviewed employees, where 18 interviewees claimed that they attended the rallies of the businessperson politician whom they work for.^{4,5} Rally attendance requires employees to spend

⁴ Two said they were unsure whether they attended any rallies of the businessperson they work for. Eight said that they did not attend any rallies of the businessperson they work for.

⁵ Similar to turnout, the proportion of interviewees who attended rallies of businessperson candidates is higher than the proportion of survey respondents who attended rallies as found in Chapter 4. This discrepancy can again be attributed to the non-random sampling of interviewees. Firm representatives may have suggested politically loyal employees for interviews, leading to a higher rate of rally attendance among the interviewees than the survey respondents from Chapter 4.

around 3-4 hours of their personal time per event, including the time needed to travel to the rally location (TH-7, TH-13, TH-19). In line with the expectation set forth in Chapter 3, the opportunity cost from the time spent attending rallies is higher than that for election turnout. This higher opportunity cost helps explain why a lower proportion of employees in firms of businessperson politicians attend rallies than turnout to vote as shown by the list experiments in Chapter 4.⁶ As rallies often happen in the evening several of the interviewees said that they traveled directly from their workplace to the rally location immediately after work. Several interviewees said that they would travel in a friend's or a company's vehicle to the rally (TH-7, TH-5, TH-18). None of the interviewees cited transportation as an obstacle to rally attendance.

Given that the main output required of patronage employees is their presence at the rallies, Mai, a patronage employee at a fertilizer firm, said that he had to “make sure that his manager knows that he attended all the rallies” and that “he knows that I am doing everything he can to support the boss” (TH-13). Mai said he would post a picture of him at the rally on his social media account as a way to show his supervisor that he was at the rally. When asked whether he was worried that posting such photos would alienate some of his acquaintances who may not agree with him politically, Mai said that he has always been publicly clear on his support of the political party of his employer and he “is not concerned about what people will think when they see those photos” (TH-13). This further suggests that some, if not all, of those who are hired as patronage employees are supporters of the businessperson politician they work for. By hiring political supporters, businessperson politicians can maximize the utility employees derived from expressing partisanship publicly through the provision of political services and

⁶ The proportion of interviewees in this chapter who turned out to vote and attended rallies, however, is identical. The high level of loyalty among interviewees may make opportunity cost less of an obstacle to providing both of these political services, resulting in an equal proportion of interviewees providing these two services.

thus reduce the likelihood of renegeing. Similar to the system used to monitor employees' election day turnout, workplace supervisors are tasked with keeping track of patronage employees' attendance at rallies. Noi, who is a manager at a rice mill, explained that patronage employees at her firm reported their attendance to her during their regular interactions at work by showing her pictures of them at the rallies (TH-17).

Patronage employees are expected to attend the rallies themselves at the very least, but some of them may also mobilize people that they know to attend rallies as well. Eak said that he always took his family to the rallies and occasionally took his neighbor with him to the rally (TH-7). In contrast, Nop, a worker at a textile company, said he attended the political rallies of his employer alone and rarely brought friends or family members with him (TH-19). Therefore, mobilizing relatives and acquaintances to attend rallies may not be a requirement set forth by businessperson candidates, but some employees may do so as an attempt to improve their prospects of retaining the patronage job after the election.

As argued in Chapter 3, businessperson candidates are expected to retain some patronage employees after the election as a way to incentivize these employees to provide political services. By making post-election employment of patronage employees dependent on the level of political services provided, patronage employees are incentivized to deliver those services. However, patronage employees may not always have complete information on the specific details of the political services that are used by businessperson candidates to evaluate their performance when making decisions on which employees get to keep the job. For instance, while all patronage employees may know that they were required to attend rallies themselves, they may not know with certainty if mobilizing acquaintances to attend rallies was also a criteria in the evaluation of their performance by businessperson politicians. This lack of complete

information on the evaluation criteria may result in diverging behaviors among patronage employees.

Because Thai politicians have been known to reward audiences with a small sum of cash for attending a political rally (Ockey, 2004), bringing acquaintances to rallies can be beneficial to these patronage employees because it allows these patronage employees to build a good reputation among the acquaintances as someone who “can bring them a small amount of money, maybe a few hundred bahts” to supplement their income (TH-17). Eak said that these acquaintances were likely to feel that they “need to reciprocate” him for the financial benefits handed to them through him (TH-7). A positive reputation as a “giver” among acquaintances and reciprocal ties formed with their friends and relatives can prove useful because any future persuasion attempts by these patronage employees will be better received by their acquaintances. Noon, an employee from an agricultural product company, said that her invitation to acquaintances to attend rallies was not hostile or aggressive, but more friendly in nature (TH-18). She said attendance was completely voluntary and that she was “just letting them know” about the rallies (TH-18).

Looking at rally attendance from the perspective of acquaintances, rally attendance is also an opportunity for these acquaintances to build a relationship with the businessperson politicians. As businessperson politicians often distribute benefits to constituents, Eak said that he told his acquaintances that they can “show [their] gratitude” and “reciprocate the generosity received” by supporting the businessperson politician on election day (TH-7). If these acquaintances returned the favor by voting for the businessperson politician on election day, Eak claimed that this reciprocity is an opportunity for these acquaintances to “increase the odds that these acquaintances will be invited to future rallies and receive remuneration [in the future] for

the attendance” as they can be seen as a “reliable supporter” in the eyes of the businessperson politician and the businessperson politician will be more likely to tell Eak to invite them again (TH-7). If these acquaintances fail to show political support for the businessperson politician, they may lose access to future benefits as they will be deemed “unreliable supporters” (TH-7).

c.) Persuading acquaintances to support the businessperson candidate

Another political service provided by private sector patronage employees is the persuasion of acquaintances to support businessperson politicians. As argued by Hicken et al. (2022), politicians “buy brokers” to get access to their networks, comprised primarily of friends and family members. Similarly, businessperson candidates aim to gain access to numerous social networks by hiring patronage employees to work at their firms. Patronage employees are expected to converse with people within their social network and persuade them to support and vote for the businessperson politician they work for. Mai from the fertilizer firm said that there was an implicit agreement between him and his employer where patronage employees should “spread words about the [businessperson politician] to the people that they know” during the campaign season (TH-13).

There are two goals that businessperson candidates attempt to achieve from gaining access to the networks of patronage employees. First, conversations with members of their social network can increase turnout as direct conversations about the election can be a form of canvassing that has been shown to raise turnout (e.g. Gerber and Green, 2000; Shaw et al., 2000). Kob said that he would also emphasize the election date, time, and the ballot number of the businessperson politician in the conversations he had with his friends (TH-12). The information

about the logistics of the election provided through these persuasion attempts could help remind these acquaintances to turn out on election day.

Second, patronage employees also aim to influence the vote choice of acquaintances. In their persuasion attempts, patronage employees provided positive descriptions of the businessperson politicians, mainly focusing on how "giving" their employer is. Aoi, an employee working at an agricultural supply firm, recalled that she would tell her acquaintances "how great [her] boss is" and that he is a "kind and very generous man who will do a lot of good for us villagers" (TH-2). Kob said that he told people that he knew how his boss "loves charity and likes to make merit through donations" (TH-12). Among the employees who said that they tried to persuade acquaintances, the size of their audiences varied from between "5-6 people" to "hundreds of people" during the most recent election.

Persuasion usually occurs spontaneously and on personal time. Patronage employees do not seem to elaborately plan in advance about what to say. For example, Mai mentioned that "persuasion occurred in personal conversations with people within his social circles" and "often during social gatherings with people he knows" (TH-13). Nop revealed that he would "sometimes raise politics as a topic of conversation when going out to lunch with his friends" (TH-19). Nop said that he would talk about the election casually to avoid intimidating anyone. A few of Nop's friends knew that he worked for an electoral candidate, so Nop saw it as an opportunity to advertise his employer to them. Eak's experiences seem to concur with those of Nop's where Eak said that he may occasionally discuss and promote his employer with some of the neighbors he met during his daily walk (TH-7, TH-19). The time it took for persuasion varies greatly among the interviewees. Some said that a persuasion speech took a few minutes, while others like Nop said that discussion with his friends took over an hour (TH-7, TH-12, TH-13, TH-

19). Thus, the opportunity cost from the time spent on persuasion varied significantly among patronage employees.

Because discussions about politics carry the risk of angering those who may disagree patronage employees, these employees have to be tactful when attempting to persuade others to support the businessperson politician they work for. To minimize the cost of strained relationships, Eak noted that he had to be careful when engaging in this political task as it can “destroy a relationship” if not handled correctly (TH-7). Patronage employees often target acquaintances whom they believe are independents and are likely to not have made up their minds as to who they will throw their support behind on election day. Mai claimed that he only tried to persuade people who he had a “hunch that they were not tied to any candidate in particular” as these individuals were easier to persuade (TH-13). Among close acquaintances, Eak said that he had to be sure that they were at least indifferent between the candidates to avoid upsetting them when he tried to persuade them to vote for the businessperson politician (TH-7). For people who may “not be close to” or “on the outer circle” of his social network, Eak said that he “could manage to be less careful” about how and what he said to them as those relations were not as significant and valuable to him (TH-7).

Though Mai said he was occasionally asked about whether he has been promoting his employer by his supervisors, he felt those conversations were casual in nature, and he was not asked to produce any proof (TH-13). Interviewed employees saw no strong pressure from their employers to provide this political service as they were not required to produce any observable output to their supervisors. Therefore, there exists a greater window of opportunity for employees to renege on this activity. This is confirmed by the result from the list experiments in Chapter 4, where a smaller proportion of employees in firms of businessperson politicians engage

in persuasion than turning out to vote and attending rallies. Of the 28 employees interviewed, 12 provided responses indicative of persuasion activities, representing a smaller proportion than those who voted for the businessperson candidate and attended rallies. Interviews suggest that employees' decision to engage in the persuasion of acquaintances was mainly driven by their desire to "support [the businessperson politician] who has been kind to [them]" (TH-5). In a sense, this can be a sign of reciprocity on the part of patronage employees. They wanted to return the favor to businessperson politicians for the job that has been given to them.

The lack of strong pressure from employers, as patrons, on employees is in stark contrast with previous studies that find that patrons closely follow-up on brokers' efforts in providing electoral services by requiring brokers to produce and submit lists of voters who are targets of persuasion (Hicken et. al, 2022). To explain this deviation from past work, it is possible that businessperson candidates do not only rely on patronage employees in the private firms when campaigning during elections. Potentially, businessperson candidates also operate a parallel campaign machinery outside of their private firms. In a similar fashion as non-businessperson candidates, businessperson candidates are also expected to also employ traditional campaign workers and traditional brokers⁷ whose primary task is to provide political and electoral support, but not engage in firm-related tasks.⁸ It is these traditional campaign workers and traditional brokers that businessperson candidates place the responsibility of

⁷ In the case of Thailand, traditional brokers include influential local figures such as members of local councils, headmasters of local schools, and religious leaders (Chattharakul, 2010).

⁸ As discussed previously, electoral candidates who engage in benefit distribution can run into several constraints when relying on traditional campaign workers, from budget to legal restrictions. As such, businessperson candidates rely on both traditional campaign workers, who can deliver a higher level of election-related output per individual, and private sector patronage employees, who may offer comparatively less electoral output but are subjected to fewer constraints in certain areas, such as campaign spending limit.

persuasion and mobilization of acquaintances as observed in past studies, while making it voluntary among private sector patronage employees.

Because private sector patronage employees are expected to provide both election-related and firm-related tasks, businessperson candidates have to balance the services expected from these private sector patronage employees. If businessperson candidates require private sector patronage employees to produce substantial election-related output, businessperson candidates' firm will suffer a greater productivity decline as private sector employees will have to divert their effort from firm-related tasks to campaign tasks. Businessperson candidates, however, face a different calculus when it comes to traditional campaign workers and brokers. Traditional campaign workers' only task is electoral task. The sole task of traditional campaign workers is the electoral task. Therefore, tasking these campaign workers with more effort-intensive services will not lead businessperson candidates to incur costs from a firm's productivity decline. Although traditional brokers often have non-election-related jobs and responsibilities, they do not work directly for the businessperson candidates, and thus any productivity loss from the diversion of effort to campaign-related tasks is not incurred by businessperson candidates. Given this different decision calculus, businessperson candidates, therefore, may have lower expectations for persuasion activities from private-sector patronage employees than from traditional campaign workers and brokers.

6.4 Distributive Activities

Interviews with employees in firms of businessperson politicians provide evidence of distributive activities, supporting the list experiments results from Chapter 4. Employees in firms of businessperson politicians are tasked with the responsibility of distributing goods and services

produced by their firms to voters. The interviews suggest that there exist various dimensions to the distributive activities, and they are not characteristically uniform. Benefits distributed can be either short-term, those that are distributed around election time, or long-term, those that continue after the election and occur between elections. Employees may distribute goods and services either at no cost or at discounted cost. Employees can also target the distribution to specific individuals or randomly distribute these benefits. The recipients of these benefits can be individuals or organizations. Below, I illustrate the variations I find from the interviews in greater detail.

a.) Distribution of short-term benefits

Among the 28 employees interviewed, only 7 provided information suggesting that they engaged in distributive activities.⁹ Although employees interviewed include both those that regularly interact with business clients and those that do not, distributive activities were more prevalent among employees who have regular and direct contact with voters. For comparison, I provide an example of an employee serving in a position that requires regular and direct contact with voters and one that does not. Chate, a cashier at a local grocery store who regularly interacts with customers during checkout, remembered distributing food items as gifts to villagers who visited the grocery store. While doing so, he highlighted his employer's benevolence towards the customers (TH-6). In contrast, Thep, a driver at a frozen food firm, made no indication that he

⁹ In contrast to the results from the list experiments in Chapter 4, where approximately the same proportion of survey respondents reported engaging in short-term distribution and persuasion activities, the proportion of interviewees involved in short-term distribution is smaller than the proportion engaged in persuasion. This disparity can be attributed to the potential legal issues associated with distributing benefits in exchange for votes, which may make interviewees more cautious about admitting their involvement in such activities. It is not surprising, therefore, that a smaller proportion of interviewees admit to distributing short-term benefits to solicit electoral support, considering the potential legal consequences involved.

distributed benefits of any kind to anyone (TH-24). The contrast between these two employees is that Chate, due to his position, routinely interacts with store customers. These regular interactions provide Chate with frequent opportunities to distribute “free” gifts to store patrons. Thep, who drives for executives at the frozen food firm, does not typically engage directly with firm clients. Consequently, his opportunities to distribute benefits from the firm are limited. Additionally, because Thep does not directly handle the goods his firm sells, this further restricts his ability to distribute benefits to clients.

Interviews with employees paint a picture that point to various form of short-term distribution, varying on two dimensions: targeting and contingency. First, businessperson candidates can have patronage employees distribute goods from their firm in an untargeted and non-contingent manner. These free gifts, handed out to acquaintances during election season, are usually not high in value, and their primary purpose is to demonstrate goodwill to the recipients. When asked about the recipients of the free gifts, Chate pointed to the “one-shot” nature of the distribution of such small gifts by saying that “villagers that are targeted with these groceries items are not necessarily the same in every election” (TH-6). The distribution of these low-value gifts is, therefore, not targeted to any particular individual, but is given to any voters that these patronage employees may encounter. The “one-shot” nature of the distribution also points to the non-contingency nature of this exchange, where businessperson candidates do not expect to punish shirking, as future interactions are not guaranteed.

Handing out these small gifts is a sign that the businessperson politician is “charitable” and “generous” (TH-6). In a way, this distribution can also be seen as a form of “credibility buying” in which candidates signal their ability to distribute benefits and, therefore, their viability in the electoral race (Kramon, 2017; Hicken et al., 2022). If these small gifts are not

distributed, voters may perceive the candidate as unviable, leading them to abandon their support and instead back another candidate. Additionally, these small gifts are also a way for businessperson politicians to advertise their names, build their brands, and create name recognition among voters such that voters would remember them on election day.

Second, businessperson candidates may target benefits to certain individuals, but do not require recipients to return the favor. Piak said that he gave out free grains to specific individuals whom he claimed are supporters of his employers (TH-20). However, when asked whether there were repercussions if they did not vote for the businessperson politician, Piak said no but trusted that "they did what they were supposed to do" (TH-20). He did not attempt to follow up on whether they did actually turn out to vote for his employer. He said that the distribution of free grains was done to keep the supporters content so that they would not vote for other candidates. In a way, Piak's distributive activities can be classified as "turf protection", where electoral candidates distribute benefits to core supporters in order to maintain their support and prevent other candidates from poaching these supporters (Hicken et al., 2022).

Finally, businessperson candidates may distribute benefits that are both targeted and contingent. Aoi, a salesperson at a local agricultural supply firm, said that "farmers in the surrounding areas" are her customer base (TH-2). Many of her customers are repeat customers who come to buy seeds, tools, and fertilizers from her store every few months. To elicit support from her customers, patronage employees can offer discounts on goods and services produced by their firms prior to each election.¹⁰ Aoi stated that she gave out 30-40% off on products sold at the store to these farmers before the election. When asked about the recipients of these discounts, Aoi

¹⁰ Short-term discounts typically apply to small to medium-sized items, such as water filters, batches of agricultural seeds, and fertilizers (TH-2, TH-18).

mentioned that she selectively offered discounts to people who she knew “liked” the businessperson politician she works for. Hence, Aoi targeted the discounts to supporters of her employer. Aoi's discounts also seemed to be contingent in nature. When asked what she would do if she found a customer “does not like [the name of the businessperson politician] well enough to vote for them,” Aoi responded that she “probably” would not offer them discounts in the run-up to the next election (TH-2). Thus, future benefits are contingent upon clients’ electoral support in the current election, in this case.

Although the interviews do not offer a definitive explanation for why some businessperson candidates target their distribution or make it contingent on political support, a potential explanation for these variations could be related to the characteristics of a firm's customer base. Firms with a customer base that primarily consists of repeat customers face lower costs when gathering information for targeting and are better equipped to penalize voters who renege on their support. In firms that mainly serve repeat customers, patronage employees can develop relationships with customers through ongoing interactions. This allows them to discern the political loyalty of these customers and occasionally determine if they have reneged on their support after an election. Furthermore, a repeat customer base allows businessperson candidates and patronage employees to enforce punishments by withholding benefits from shirking customers during subsequent transactions.

In the absence of a repeat customer base, patronage employees must expend extra effort, possibly outside of work hours, to establish relationships and determine a customer's political loyalty, thereby complicating the targeting of benefits. Moreover, penalizing shirking customers is challenging, as employees may not have the opportunity to interact with them again.

Consequently, distribution in firms without a repeat customer base is more likely to be untargeted and non-contingent.

In summary, the interviews suggest that the distribution of short-term benefits at the individual level can either be targeted or non-targeted. For non-targeted distribution, patronage employees tend not to keep track of recipients and thus are unable to make the distribution contingent upon political support. Targeted distribution can either be contingent or non-contingent on political support. Patronage employees can make eligibility for future benefits dependent on the clients' support in the current election if desired. The goal of these distributions is to influence the vote choice, either to retain support from existing supporters or to win support from swing voters, thereby increasing the likelihood of an electoral victory.

Businessperson politicians can also distribute benefits at the organizational level. After these goods and services are distributed to organizations, there is an expectation that organizational leaders will mobilize members of their organization to vote for the donor politicians. Noi said her firm would donate rice that was milled at her firm and other food staples to surrounding temples (TH-17). Support from religious actors is useful to electoral candidates as it can provide candidates with an "aura of respect" (Ockey, 2004). Noi claimed that she would talk to temple liaisons from several temples a few months before the election. They would tell her the items that would be useful to the future operation of the temple (TH-17). Noi's role in researching potential distribution targets is a task that was not captured by the list experiments from Chapter 4. Patronage employees do not always play a direct role in the distribution of benefits, but indirectly play a role in narrowing the pool of recipients for businessperson politicians. Noi vetted them by assessing whether the temples are frequently visited by the villagers and whether the monks residing at each temple are "reputable" (TH-17). Noi said she

reported the information that she collected back to the businessperson politician, and the businessperson politician used the information to make the final decision on the recipient organizations.

b.) Distribution of long-term benefits

Firms can distribute benefits that are long-term in nature, where the flow of benefits continues between elections rather than ending after election day. One such form of long-term distribution involves offering free or discounted goods and services to voters not only prior to an election but also between elections. Kob, who works at a grocery store, admitted that in addition to handing out free groceries around election time, he allowed certain customers to purchase products from his store at discounted prices between elections as a way to maintain relationships with these customers (TH-12). When asked about the target of these long-term benefits, Kob mentioned that he tended to focus on customers whom he believed can serve as a "mouthpiece that can provide information about my employer to other people" (TH-12). Although Kob did not explicitly explain, a "mouthpiece" can potentially be interpreted as someone who is well-connected and thus able to mobilize many voters to support the businessperson candidate.

Social organizations can also be the target of long-term benefits. Aoi, who works at an agricultural supply firm, recalled that her company routinely distributed substantial amounts of agricultural seeds and supplies to several local agricultural collectives (TH-2). This distribution was not limited to election seasons but also took place between elections. Around election time, the firm donated agricultural supplies such as seeds, sprinklers, wheelbarrows, and rakes to the collectives (TH-2). In addition, the firm also distributed agricultural seeds during non-election drought years. These donated seeds could be particularly beneficial for collective members in the

years following droughts, as reduced crop yields often leave many farmers without the financial resources to invest in agricultural seeds for the subsequent farming season.

While Aoi did not explicitly state that donations were made to secure electoral support from the leaders and members of the organization, it is not far-fetched to consider exchanges between her employer and the collectives to be contingent. Because supplies of agricultural seeds are vital to the livelihood of these farmers, especially after drought years, businessperson politicians have leverage over these farmers when it comes to making future donations contingent on electoral support from the members of the organization. If a collective fails to mobilize enough votes for the businessperson candidate in the upcoming election, Aoi's employer could revoke the collective's continued access to the donated agricultural supplies. This is consistent with Nichter's (2018) concept of relational clientelism, in which the patron, Aoi's employer, and the clients, the agricultural collectives, form an ongoing relationship that extends beyond election day. Such relationships serve as a social safety net, helping farmers overcome adverse shocks caused by the unpredictability of the climate.

6.5 Additional Responsibilities of Patronage Employees

Although patronage employees are hired with expectations that they will provide political services, these employees also have to engage in non-electoral, firm-related tasks. For example, Chate mentioned that his usual responsibilities at the grocery store during election time included not only handing out free grocery goods but also traditional tasks of a grocery store employee, such as checking product stock and restocking shelves (TH-6). Similarly, Aoi shared that she still engaged in non-political tasks at the agricultural supply firm, such as learning about

new products that were coming to the store and advising customers on products that were suitable for them.

Political services, such as turning out to vote and attending rallies, may not substantively reduce firms' productivity, given that those tasks are usually carried out outside of work hours. However, tasks such as distributing goods and services require patronage employees to divert substantial effort and time away from firm-related tasks. For targeted benefits, patronage employees have to converse regularly with clients to learn about their political leanings, inform them of the contingent nature of the benefits distributed, and find out whether they voted for the businessperson politicians. For non-targeted benefits, patronage employees will have to converse with clients to advertise the businessperson politicians. Because patronage employees have to divert some of their efforts from firm-related tasks to political tasks and spend time during work hours to engage in these conversations, patronage employees are less productive on firm-related tasks and contribute less to firms' output than non-patronage employees.

6.6 Overcoming the Commitment Problem between Businessperson Politicians and Patronage Employees

To overcome the commitment problem, I argue in Chapter 3 that businessperson politicians rely on workplace monitoring along with negative inducements to mobilize patronage employees. For non-patronage employees, businessperson politicians rely more on positive inducements. Negative and positive inducements are expected to shift the payoffs received by employees from renegeing and from providing political services, respectively. Businessperson politicians monitor the level of effort provided by the employees and then punish or reward the

employees based on the level of effort observed. Knowing that they are being observed, employees will choose the level of effort that would maximize their payoffs.

Although monitoring can be costly, the existing hierarchical organizational structure of many private firms can help reduce the cost of monitoring. Businessperson politicians can rely on workplace supervisors to serve as information aggregators that collect information on the political services provided by patronage employees. As Noi recalled, her subordinates in her team at the rice mill had to report their attendance at the rally (TH-17). Interviews with subordinates reinforce these points, as several of these employees claimed that they took pictures of themselves at the poll on election day and at rallies as proof to show their supervisors. Noi mentioned that her team consists of around 6-8 employees and she would only report to businessperson politicians when a patronage employee repeatedly reneges on their duties.

Because each supervisor is in charge of managing a handful of subordinates and can aggregate the information on the level of political services provided by these subordinates, businessperson politicians can reduce the opportunity cost incurred from the time they would have to spend monitoring each employee directly. Given that these supervisors are already part of the firm and are already managing the work activities of subordinates, businessperson politicians also do not incur the full cost of recruiting and training new actors to serve as information aggregators. Therefore, monitoring patronage employees in a private firm setting is expected to be less costly, thus making monitoring possible for businessperson candidates in a context where political parties lack robust machinery to monitor patronage hires.

a.) Negative Inducements

The primary objective of negative inducements is to raise the cost of renegeing such that the payoff from renegeing is lower than the payoff from providing political services. An effective form of negative inducement is threats of employment termination. The fear of termination and loss of a steady source of income is expected to increase the cost of renegeing, which incentivizes patronage employees to provide political services.

An explicit threat is more vital to the mobilization of employees in a private setting than in the public sector. Public sector patronage employees expect to lose their jobs if the incumbent loses the election because the new politician has strong incentives to remove those that are loyal to the incumbent. Given the high risk of termination if the incumbent loses, patronage employees internalize the incumbent's incentives and are incentivized to provide political services to increase the odds of the incumbent's electoral victory and thus the chance that they will get to keep their patronage jobs (Oliveros, 2021). In contrast, the electoral loss of businessperson politicians does not necessarily equate to businesspeople leaving their private sector positions. The lack of a turnover at the firm after an electoral loss makes it less clear whether patronage employees will get to keep their job after the election. If businessperson politicians do not make it clear to employees that they are being monitored and inform them about the consequences of renegeing and of electoral loss, it may lead patronage employees to believe that they may still be able to hold on to the job after the election and, therefore, would not have as strong an incentive as their counterparts in the public sector to provide political services.

Interviews with patronage employees in the private sector suggest that explicit threats of termination by businessperson politicians, through their supervisors, were not uncommon around election time. New, an employee at a motorcycle dealership, said that it was made clear

by her supervisor on her first week on the job that “[she] either complete all of the tasks asked of [her] or [she] will no longer have [her] job” (TH-16). Given that the job is an important source of income for her family, New said that she was willing to engage in any activities that would “not hurt others” in order to keep the job” (TH-16). Similarly, Noon said that she was told that there were “certain responsibilities that I had to fulfill to pass the probationary period” (TH-18). She knew that there was a risk that she may be removed from her position during the probationary period if she did not provide political services to businessperson politicians. Patronage employees know that threats like the one that Noon experienced are credible because businesspeople have strong incentives to terminate the employment of shirking employees during the probationary period. Businessperson politicians can save costs given that the Thai labor law exempts employers from having to pay compensation to employees whose contract is terminated within 120 days of employment.

Threats of termination do not only impact employment during the probationary period but also implications for employment after the election. As Chapter 3 argues, businessperson candidates have incentives to make it clear to patronage employees that some of them will be retained to motivate them to provide services, while terminating others to save costs. As a result, patronage employees are not only required to do the bare minimum to avoid being fired before the election, during the probationary period, but also need to do more than what was requested of them to increase their chances of retaining their job post-election. Although not explicitly stated, Eak's statement that he was "helping out [the businessperson candidate] as much as he could during the electoral season" (TH-7) can be seen as evidence that patronage employees may be incentivized to provide as much political services as possible to increase their chances of job retention after the election. Eak's continued employment at the firm in 2022 provides an example

of businessperson candidates retaining some patronage employees post-election, potentially due to their substantial effort in providing political services during the 2019 election.

Not all patronage employees, however, were as fortunate as Eak. Noi mentioned that "many [patronage] employees come and go," particularly after the election (TH-17). While Noi did not provide details on the reasons and methods for the departure of these patronage employees, it is possible that some were forced out of the firm after the election to save salary costs, particularly if businessperson candidates had hired more employees than necessary for the daily operation of the firm and if these patronage employees were not capable of producing business-related outputs.

When asked about experiences with threats of salary cuts, none of the interviewees say that they have experienced such threats. As there is no guarantee that reneging employees will provide political services after salary cuts, businessperson politicians may find that it is in their best interest to terminate reneging employees and recruit new ones. Because the electoral season only lasts a few months, businessperson politicians may not even recruit new employees if they hire more patronage employees than the profit-maximizing level in order to build a large army of political workers and extract political services.. In this case, they would downsize the employee size to the profit-maximizing level and would ramp up hiring again in the next election.

Punishments may not only be contingent upon employees' provision of political services, but also on the electoral outcome. Businessperson politicians may further mobilize efforts by issuing threats that future employment at the firm may be impacted because the firm will have to downsize if the businessperson politicians were to lose the election. Boon, a worker at a shipping company working for an incumbent politician, said that he was told at work that some workers "may get laid off if [the incumbent] loses the election" (TH-4). An electoral loss can result in the

loss of access to state contracts and insider information, which reduces firms' income flow and thus requires businessperson politicians to downsize their businesses. Layoff threats from electoral loss, therefore, serve as additional incentives that can drive employees to provide political services.

b.) Positive Inducements

Positive inducements are expected to increase the employees' payoff from dutifully providing the required political services. Not only businessperson politicians can promise rewards if patronage employees provide electoral support, but businessperson politicians can also make future rewards contingent upon businessperson politicians' electoral victory. This contingency serves as a potent incentive that will drive patronage employees to exert greater effort to reap the rewards from the provision of political services and businessperson politicians' electoral victory.

Based on the interviews with employees, positive inducements are typically tied to the businessperson politicians' electoral victory. A few of the employees interviewed said that they were promised bonuses at the end of the year if the businessperson politicians were to win the election. Gla, an employee at a plastics processing plant, said that he could use the additional income from promised bonuses to pay off his loans, so he wanted his employer to win the election (TH-8). As a result, he encouraged and mobilized his friends to go out and vote for his employer. Another form of benefit that seems common among the interviewees were the promise of a company trip after an electoral victory. Businessperson politicians at the jewelry store where Pim works told the employees that there would be a "big trip to the beach if [the employer] wins

the election” (TH-21). Pim's employer, however, lost the election, and the promised trip to the beach never materialized.

None of the employees interviewed reported that businessperson politicians made rewards contingent upon their provision of political services. Making positive inducements dependent on electoral victory is potentially more financially efficient for businessperson politicians. In the case where businessperson politicians make rewards contingent on effort but lose the election, they bear the cost of those financial rewards but are unable to extract benefits from holding a public office to cover these costs. In contrast, when businessperson politicians make rewards contingent on electoral victory, they can expect that the financial benefits their firms will accrue from holding public offices will offset the cost of those rewards.

Since these interviews only provide evidence of cases where businessperson candidates made positive rewards contingent on electoral victory, but do not provide evidence of cases where rewards were contingent upon the provision of political services, they do not support the result from the list experiment indicating that approximately 15.6% of employees in firms of businessperson politicians received positive inducements contingent upon providing political services. To explain this discrepancy, it is possible that the interviewed employees were not among the 15.6% who reported that rewards were contingent on political services in the list experiment. Therefore, there is no evidence from the interviews to support the idea that rewards were given in exchange for political services.

6.7 Conclusion

This chapter presents qualitative evidence gathered from interviews with employees in firms associated with businessperson politicians, shedding light on the distribution of private

sector resources for electoral purposes. It delves into the intricate workings of this distributive electoral strategy, revealing how businessperson politicians leverage resources from their firms to mobilize a political workforce and secure political support from voters.

As argued in the previous chapters, businessperson politicians hire patronage employees with the expectation that they will provide political services. Numerous interviewed patronage employees confirmed that they provided different types of political services to these politicians. First, patronage employees engage in campaign support activities. Many interviewees disclosed that they not only cast their votes for their employer on election day but also attended rallies where the businessperson politician they work for delivered speeches. Furthermore, they also played a role in persuading and mobilizing their acquaintances to attend these rallies and vote for the businessperson politician they work for.

Second, these patronage employees also undertake distributive activities. Multiple employees interviewed answered affirmatively that they distributed goods or services produced by the firms to employees. The benefits distributed can be one-off or long-term, and may take the form of free goods and services or discounts. Some benefits were targeted at certain customers, while others were distributed to any customers of the business. Targets of benefits could be individuals or organizations. For benefits that were larger in size, the employees did not make the final decision on the recipients but helped collect information and screen potential beneficiaries.

As employees incur costs from providing political services, they have incentives to renege and not provide such services after securing their jobs. Based on the interviews, businessperson politicians rely on workplace supervisors to monitor the patronage employees and their level of effort in providing political services. In addition to monitoring, businessperson

politicians use threats of employment termination and promises of rewards to mobilize these patronage employees. Employers make termination contingent on the level of service provision and the electoral outcome. For positive inducements, businessperson politicians seem to promise rewards contingent on electoral victory, but not on the provision of political services.

Chapter 7

Conclusion

7.1 Summary of Findings

The high level of political participation by businesspeople in various countries poses questions regarding their motivations for running for office, the reasons parties nominate them, and the strategies these individuals employ to gain voter support. Previous studies have provided insight into why these businessperson politicians opt for direct political participation rather than relying on indirect strategies, thereby helping us understand the supply side of businessperson candidates (e.g. Szakonyi, 2020; Gehlbach et al., 2010; Li et al., 2006). However, the existing literature leaves a gap in understanding the demand for businessperson politicians. This dissertation aims to address this void by offering theories on the demand for such politicians. To hold a public office, businesspeople often have to surmount two additional challenges. In countries where electoral laws mandate running under a party banner, these individuals must secure nomination from a political party to compete in the election. Once nominated, businessperson candidates need to get voters to vote for them.

I argue that businessperson candidates leverage the resources from their firms to attract political support and win votes. When there are significant constraints to the non-programmatic distribution of personal, party, and private resources, private sector resources present a viable alternative. Private sector resources afford businessperson candidates greater flexibility in the particularistic distribution of benefits as part of their electoral strategy. Businesspeople have the capability to distribute private sector jobs to construct an army of political workers, who can provide various political services. Through a series of list experiments and semi-structured

interviews with employees in the firms of these businessperson politicians, I discovered that these employees provided a range of political services. These include turning out to vote, participating in rallies, mobilizing support among their acquaintances, and sharing both short-term and long-term firm benefits. As evidence of patronage employment, I find that these political services were more likely to be provided by employees hired a few months prior to the election. This observation suggests that businessperson politicians strategically distribute jobs in close proximity to elections to assemble a team of political workers who can assist with their electoral campaigns.

To address the commitment problem arising from the non-simultaneous exchange between businessperson politicians and patronage employees, I argue that these politicians primarily rely on monitoring and negative inducements. The threat of penalties such as job termination can decrease employees' expected payoffs from shirking, thereby motivating them to provide political services. An analysis of the results from the list experiment provides evidence that is consistent with the mechanism I proposed for resolving the commitment problem. While I find that a significant proportion of employees provide political services with minimal monitoring, monitoring remains an effective strategy used by businessperson candidates to increase the proportion of employees engaged in political services provision. I find that firms where employees reported their work activities more frequently to their supervisors had a higher proportion of employees involved in political services provision. Work reporting enables supervisors to track political service provision and thereby mobilize these employees to provide political services to their employers. Additionally, a larger proportion of patronage employees, those hired a few months prior to the election, reported experiencing negative threats than non-patronage employees.

Given the financial costliness of positive inducements, businessperson politicians reserve the use of positive inducements for non-patronage employees because negative inducements are expected to create a stronger backlash from non-patronage employees. As a result, businessperson candidates incur higher costs from utilizing negative inducements on non-patronage employees. An analysis of the data from the list experiment reveals that a larger proportion of non-patronage employees, those hired more than two months before the election and post-election, reported experiences with positive inducements compared to patronage employees. Interviews with employees suggest that businessperson politicians often made the delivery of positive inducements contingent on electoral victory, rather than merely the provision of political services.

This set of studies introduces a new perspective on the source of non-programmatic distributive materials that has not received as much attention in the literature: private sector resources. Existing research on non-programmatic distribution strongly emphasizes the use of party and public resources, but lacks a comprehensive discussion on the utilization of resources from the private sector. The argument I propose in this dissertation draws attention to the crucial role of private sector resources in non-programmatic distribution. When confronted with cumbersome constraints with public resources distribution and a weak party system, politicians, particularly businessperson politicians, are able to distribute resources from their firms. Consequently, stricter regulations and distribution criteria for party and public resources that limit politicians' capacity to distribute such resources may inadvertently enable business interests to compete more effectively in electoral politics. This is because they have access to alternate sources of distributive resources that are not as available to other occupational groups.

This dissertation also sheds light on politics within the workplace. Recent studies have started to investigate how employees are politically mobilized at work, but past research primarily scrutinizes employers who may not be running for public office themselves. Employers who are not running do not necessarily have the same utility and payoff functions as employers who are running for offices. For those running for elected positions, gaining access to public offices can be pivotal to their firm's survival (Szakonyi, 2020). Consequently, they may be more inclined to invest significant company resources in elections. Empirical evidence from list experiments demonstrates that businessperson politicians exhibit a willingness to bear significant costs to the firm in the form of salaries for patronage employees, all with the purpose of cultivating a network of political workers capable of providing political services. Additionally, contrary to previous studies, I find evidence that the political activities of employees are not confined to voting for specific candidates, but also extend to other activities requiring more effort than just casting a vote.

7.2 The Continued Demand for Businessperson Politicians in Thailand

In the context of Thailand, the continued effectiveness of firm resources distribution to garner political support and win votes in the Thai context is less certain. The 2019 election introduced a mixed-member apportionment electoral system, which gives voters only one ballot. A vote on the ballot counts both as a vote for the candidate and a vote for that candidate's party for the calculation of party list seats. Subsequent analysis of the 2019 election results suggests some voters treated their vote as a constituency vote, selecting the candidate they want to represent their constituency, while others treated their vote as a party vote, selecting the candidate that represents their preferred party (Wattanasuk, 2020). Given that only some voters

were expected to treat their votes as party votes in 2019, parties and candidates had less motivation to promote and campaign on party platforms and more incentive to campaign using personalistic strategies than in the 2011 election, where voters had two ballots, one for a constituency seat and one for a party list, thus all voters had to vote directly for a party (Hicken, 2006, 2009). As a result, the 2019 election saw the resurgence of patronage politics and rampant vote-buying (Charoensuthipan, 2019). This environment favored businessperson politicians who could effectively cultivate personal votes through the distribution of private sector jobs and firm benefits.

However, for the 2023 election, a constitutional amendment has mandated a return to a two-ballot system, one for the constituency seat and one for the party list. This change should incentivize parties and candidates to divert some effort away from personalistic strategies and put more emphasis on campaigning on party platforms, thereby reducing personalistic campaigning (Hicken, 2006, 2009). This change in the electoral system and the anticipated decline in the effectiveness of non-programmatic strategies could potentially reduce the prevalence of non-programmatic distribution of firm resources. Although a decline is expected, it is highly unlikely that clientelism will vanish completely from Thai politics, given that vote-buying and patronage politics are ingrained in Thai political culture. Vote buying has been commonplace in previous Thai elections, including those with similar electoral rules where voters had two ballots (Macfie, 2011; "Vote Buying Rampant", 2009; "Thailand Strives To Halt", 2001).

The continued entrenchment of non-programmatic distribution of private sector resources as an electoral strategy among Thai electoral candidates could and should be a matter of concern. One might argue that the distribution of private sector resources is less detrimental to public welfare, as businessperson politicians are using their firm resources rather than public

resources funded by taxpayers. However, indirect costs to the public may arise when businessperson politicians utilize private sector resources. Higher operational costs incurred by firms from distributing jobs and products for electoral purposes could potentially be passed on to consumers, thereby reducing consumer surplus.

Additionally, the effectiveness of this electoral strategy in increasing businessperson candidates' likelihood of electoral victory can also have downstream impacts on public welfare once they are in office. Businessperson officeholders gaining preferential access to public contracts can diminish competition in the public procurement process, resulting in the government not receiving value for money in the procurement process (Williams-Elegbe, 2012). It has also been found that businessperson politicians tend to increase investment in infrastructure projects that benefit their firms' operations and decrease spending on social programs (Szakonyi, 2018; Kirkland, 2021). An overrepresentation of businesspeople in politics can significantly distort the policy-making process and may lead to policies that do not serve the public interest.

7.3 Future Work

This dissertation paves the way for new lines of inquiry in various fields of study. First, the use of firm resources for electoral purposes potentially involves firms engaging in non-profit maximizing activities. Businessperson politicians' firms may increase hiring at non-profit-maximizing levels before an election to build a network of political supporters to provide political services. Additionally, offering free and discounted goods and services is also expected to be profit-reducing. To cover these additional costs, businessperson politicians may pass these costs onto consumers either during or after the election, especially in a market where firms of businessperson politicians have monopolies. However, rising prices can also anger the public and

cause support for businessperson politicians to decline. Facing these two opposing forces, future work could investigate whether businessperson politicians pass on the costs to consumers, and if so, when these price hikes occur and by how much.

To investigate this, I will conduct a difference-in-differences analysis to compare the prices of commodities such as rice, rubber, or animal feed in constituencies with and without businessperson candidates using time-series data on the price of commodities at various major agricultural firms and factories across the country collected by Thailand's Office of Agricultural Economics. I plan to use the election announcement date and the day after the election as two separate treatment cutoff points to determine when and by how much prices increase. The assumption is that commodity prices should have parallel trends prior to the treatment cutoff. If businessperson candidates do pass on costs to consumers, then after the treatment cutoff, prices in constituencies with businessperson candidates selling those commodities will increase more sharply than those without.

Second, the non-programmatic distribution of firm resources to voters is expected to be effective in winning votes for businessperson politicians, otherwise, they would not select this electoral strategy. But how effective is this distribution in winning votes? Future work could assess the increase in vote shares as a result of the distribution of goods and services produced by firms of businessperson candidates to voters.

To gauge the magnitude of vote gain from the distribution of private sector resources, I plan to take advantage of the cases where the area of the firm's operation does not cover the entire electoral constituency of the businessperson candidate. This will allow me to use spatial regression discontinuity to evaluate the effectiveness of this electoral strategy by comparing election results in polling stations on the two sides of the business' operational border. Voters

living and voting at polling stations outside the area of business operation will potentially have a reduced probability of being contacted by patronage employees and receiving handouts from firms of businessperson candidates. This discontinuity in the probability of receiving the treatment is fuzzy because being outside of the area of business operation does not completely eliminate the probability that a voter will get mobilized and being inside does not guarantee that a voter will get mobilized. It is just that there is a jump in the probability of getting mobilized when you cross over between the area of operation of the business within the constituency. Therefore, the running variable in this study will be the geographic distance of the polling station from the boundary. An assumption made when conducting the spatial regression discontinuity is that there is a random assignment of the control and treatment group around the border area of business operation, where the only difference between those who live close to either side of the boundary is the probability of coming into contact with the patronage employees of private companies.

To conduct this analysis, I will utilize the election results from 2023, as it was the first time that the Electoral Commission of Thailand publicly released vote counts at the polling station level. To gather information on firms' areas of operation, I plan to either visit their websites or directly contact firms associated with businessperson politicians.

Third, another line of inquiry is to explore the applicability of the arguments presented in this dissertation beyond Thailand by examining other countries with varying characteristics across different dimensions. Notably, Russia, Ukraine, Indonesia, Paraguay, and the U.S. exhibit high participation rates of businesspeople in politics (Szakonyi, 2020; Semenova, 2012; Aspinall, 2013; Kirkland, 2021; Carnes and Lupu, 2015). These countries present varying levels of political parties' financial resources and organizational capacity, private sector strength, and prevalence of

non-programmatic electoral activities. Although Thailand demonstrates political and economic variation across firms, parties, and provinces, its private sector is relatively well-developed compared to other developing nations. Conversely, its party system is comparatively weak, and non-programmatic activities are more prevalent than in developed nations. By analyzing other countries with characteristics outside the range found in Thailand, valuable insights on the scope and conditions under which the dissertation's arguments hold can be gained.

Private sector characteristics, along with electoral regulations and enforcement of these regulations, can all have an impact on businessperson candidates' ability to distribute firm resources. Specifically, businessperson candidates in countries with stricter corporate finance regulations and more robust enforcement of electoral law violations than Thailand might face greater challenges in utilizing their firm resources for electoral purposes. Investigating such countries with a high prevalence of businessperson candidates, but without the non-programmatic distribution of firm resources, could help identify specific corporate finance regulations or election laws that effectively limit the use of firm resources for electoral objectives. For example, more stringent corporate reporting requirements could increase the transparency of businessperson candidates' conduct and management decisions, subsequently limiting their flexibility in allocating firm resources toward electoral goals. Additionally, election laws that restrict the distribution of private sector benefits around election time may reduce the occurrence of non-programmatic distribution of firm resources.

Furthermore, this dissertation posits that businessperson candidates are more likely to choose the distribution of particularistic benefits from the private sector as an electoral strategy when a well-developed private sector exists, allowing firms to accumulate sufficient resources for distribution, and when there is limited access to public sector resources for distribution.

However, it is unclear from the findings in this dissertation whether limited access to public sector resources is a necessary condition for businessperson candidates to shift their source of distributive resources to private sector resources. To explore this, we can examine the prevalence of non-programmatic distribution of private sector resources in countries with a robust private sector and a large public sector, such as Russia. If we observe this form of distribution in these countries, we may conclude that abundant private sector resources alone are sufficient to incentivize businessperson candidates to utilize their firm resources electorally, without requiring the limited availability of public sector resources to be a necessary condition.

In summary, investigating countries with a broader range of variation in several dimensions beyond Thailand should be fruitful in determining the scope conditions under which the dissertation's arguments apply.

Finally, future research could explore political parties' demand for businessperson candidates. To access elected office, in addition to winning votes, businessperson candidates often need to secure nominations from a political party. Existing studies suggest that political parties, particularly those in developing democracies, rely on businessperson candidates for financial resources to fund their operations and campaigns (Buehler and Tan, 2007; Gherghina and Chiru, 2010; Samuels, 2008; Protsyk and Matichescu, 2011; Reuter, 2015; Fukuoka, 2012). However, previous research has yet to investigate the nomination strategies of political parties regarding businessperson candidates. Therefore, one potential area for future research is to investigate the mechanism enabling political parties to maximize the extraction of financial resources from these candidates. By conducting a thorough analysis of political parties' demand for businessperson candidates, a more comprehensive understanding of this demand can be obtained.

Appendix 4A: Items Included on the List Experiments

[Sensitive items on the list for the treatment group are highlighted in bold]

[Placebo items on the list for the control group are in italics]

The answer to this part of the survey will be stored separately from your answers to the demographic and background questions in the previous section. Since your answers in this section will not be directly linked to your personal information, your identity will be protected.

For each question, you are provided a list of items. **Please answer the number of items that apply to you in each question, but NOT which items, based on your experience from the 2019 general election.**

1. How many of the actions below apply to you?
 - Discussed politics with your family
 - Arrived to vote at the wrong precinct
 - **Voted for the businessperson candidate connected to your firm**
 - *Voted on a ballot that is in English*
 - Held a different political view from other members of your family
 - Traveled to your electoral precinct by motorcycle

- 0
- 1
- 2
- 3
- 4
- 5

2. How many of the electoral activities below apply to you?

- Saw a campaign poster of the businessperson candidate connected to your firm
- Had a one-on-one meeting with the businessperson candidate connected to your firm
- **Attended a political rally of the businessperson candidate connected to your firm in-person with people within your social network**
- *Voted on an electronic ballot*
- Watched the news about the businessperson candidate connected to your firm on television
- Listened to the news about the businessperson candidate connected to your firm on the radio

- 0
- 1
- 2
- 3
- 4
- 5

3. How many of the actions below apply to you?

- Decided on who to vote for before the election day
- Traveled to the electoral precinct with acquaintances
- **Persuaded voters within your network to vote for the businessperson candidate tied to your firm**
- *Arrived at the precinct to vote at 2A.M.*
- Checked the candidate information board in front of your electoral precinct
- Registered for early voting and voted early

- 0
- 1
- 2
- 3
- 4
- 5

For each question, you are provided a list of items. **Please answer the number of items that apply to you in each question, but NOT which items, based on your experience since you have started working for your current firm.**

4. How many of the activities below apply to you?

- Talked to your family about what is going on at work at least once a week
- Promoted and advertised goods or services produced by your firm to acquaintances
- **Distributed short-term business benefits (e.g. short-term deals for discounted goods and services, several months of free goods and services, reduced interest rates for the first few months of payment) to voters**
- *Commuted from home to work on a private airplane*
- Recruited people to work for your company
- Attended a business conference on behalf of your company

- 0
- 1
- 2
- 3
- 4
- 5

5. How many of the activities below apply to you?

- Had a work-related conversation with your co-worker(s) outside work at least once a week
- Purchased goods or services produced by your firm at a discounted rate
- **Distributed long-term business benefits (e.g. long-term deals for discounted goods and services, continuous flow of free goods and services, reduced interest rates for the whole duration of payment) to voters**
- *Commuted from home to work on a hot air balloon*
- Invited your co-worker(s) to your house
- Never been out for a meal outside of work with your co-worker(s)

- 0
- 1
- 2
- 3
- 4
- 5

6. How many of the following are true?

- Arrived to work late only once per year
- Lived more than 50 km. away from your workplace
- **Received a gift, a raise, or a bonus from the firm in return for providing political services to the businessperson candidate from your firm**
- *Had a one-on-one meeting with the president of the company everyday*
- Traveled to work on a motorcycle on most days
- Had lunch with your co-worker(s) regularly


- 0
- 1
- 2
- 3
- 4
- 5

7. How many of the following are true?

- Always inform your supervisor when you expect to miss work
- Discussed politics with your co-worker(s)
- **Faced threats or consequences for not providing political services to the businessperson candidate from your firm**
- *Ordered in food from the Mandarin Oriental Hotel for lunch everyday*
- Commuted to work regularly with your co-worker(s)
- Had a discussion with your supervisor about workplace attendance

- 0
- 1
- 2
- 3
- 4
- 5

Appendix 4B: Floor and Ceiling Effects






Figure 4B.1: Histogram of List Experiments Responses Disaggregated by Question and Treatment Status

Appendix 4C: Balance Test Between Sample Firms and Out-of-Sample Firms

Table 4C.1: Balance Test for Observable Characteristics Between Sample Firms and Out-of-Sample Firms

Variable	Means			t-test		Observations
	Sample	Non-Sample	Difference-in-Means	T-statistics	p-value	
<i>Individual-level variable</i>						
Gender of businessperson candidate (female = 1)	0.208	0.278	-0.070	1.319	0.190	500
Incumbency	0.167	0.217	-0.050	1.043	0.299	500
Electoral system (constituency election = 1)	0.847	0.766	0.081	1.708	0.091	500
Party						
Phuea Thai	0.278	0.259	0.019	0.322	0.748	500
Palang Pracharath	0.292	0.285	0.007	0.114	0.910	500
Future Forward	0.027	0.026	0.001	0.099	0.921	500
Democrat	0.181	0.154	0.027	0.539	0.591	500
Bhumjaithai	0.222	0.255	-0.033	0.605	0.547	500
Chartthaipattana	0.000	0.012	-0.012	2.247	0.025	500
Chartpattana	0.000	0.009	-0.009	2.007	0.045	500
<i>Firm-level variable</i>						
Years in business	14.500	15.727	-1.227	2.142	0.035	500
Capital size (8-point scale)	3.083	3.617	-0.534	1.935	0.056	500
Rural location = 1	0.229	0.361	-0.132	2.183	0.032	500
Sector						
Primary Sector	0.486	0.532	-0.046	0.728	0.468	500
Secondary Sector	0.333	0.374	-0.041	0.668	0.506	500
Tertiary Sector	0.181	0.093	0.088	1.823	0.072	500
Region						
North	0.194	0.222	-0.028	0.539	0.591	500
Northeast	0.236	0.236	0.000	0.002	0.998	500
Central	0.389	0.357	0.032	0.504	0.616	500
South	0.181	0.185	-0.004	0.082	0.935	500
<i>Constituency-level variable</i>						
Average Household Income	2.472	2.505	-0.033	0.155	0.877	500
Provincial Population Size (in million)	2.440	2.081	0.359	1.322	0.189	500
Absolute 2019 Margin of Victory/Loss	1.889	2.005	-0.116	0.715	0.476	358

Appendix 4D: Full Table for Estimates of Incidence of Political Service Provision in Firms of Businessperson Politicians from List Experiments

Table 4D.1: Estimates of Incidence of Political Service Provision in Firms of Businessperson Politicians from List Experiments

Political Services	Mean Control	SE	95% CI		Mean Treatment	SE	95% CI		Differences	SE	p-value	T-statistic
Employee votes for businessperson tied to her/his firm	1.927	0.065	1.862	1.992	2.326	0.073	2.253	2.400	0.399	0.050	0.000***	8.036
Employee mobilizes acquaintances to attend rally of businessperson candidate	1.838	0.068	1.769	1.906	2.126	0.070	2.055	2.196	0.288	0.050	0.000***	5.757
Employee persuades acquaintances to vote for businessperson candidate	1.943	0.056	1.887	1.999	2.134	0.080	2.053	2.214	0.191	0.050	0.001***	3.816
Employee distributes short-term business benefits to voters	1.972	0.061	1.911	2.032	2.165	0.082	2.082	2.246	0.193	0.052	0.000***	3.713
Employee distributes long-term business benefits to voters	1.884	0.060	1.825	1.944	1.972	0.056	1.915	2.028	0.088	0.042	0.037**	2.086

*p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01

Appendix 4E: Sensitivity Analysis for the Differences in Proportions of Employees Providing Political Services Using Different Cutoff Points

Results from the alternative cutoff points of six months, three months, and one month are provided in Table 4E.1, 4E.2, and 4E.3, respectively. In Table 4E.1, the proportion of employees hired within six months of the election, providing political services (row 1 of Table 4E.1), is smaller in magnitude than the proportion of employees hired within two months of the election (row 1 of Table 4.4) for all political services. The differences-in-means between the control and treatment groups for employees hired within six months of the election (row 1 of Table 4E.1) are statistically significant at the 95 percent level for turning out to vote and at the 90 percent level for attending rallies. The differences-in-means are not statistically significant at any conventional level for the other three activities. Results from the six-month cutoff suggest that businessperson candidates do not hire patronage employees too far in advance of an election, potentially as an attempt to limit the cost from patronage employees' salaries.

Table 4E.2 provides results from using a three-month cutoff point for analysis. The difference-in-means between the treatment and control groups for those hired within three months of the election (row 1 of Table 4E.2) is statistically significant at the 95 percent level for four out of five activities. The proportion of those hired within three months of the election providing political services is smaller than the proportion of those hired within two months of the election providing political services (row 1 of Table 4.4) for all types of political services. This smaller proportion is potentially due to the fact that those hired three months prior to the election are non-patronage employees and thus bring down the estimate once I calculate the proportion of employees hired within three months of the election who provide political services.

The proportion of employees hired within one month of the election providing political services (row 1 of Table 4E.3) is similar to the proportion estimated for employees hired within two months of the election (row 1 of Table 4.4). The proportion is slightly higher for vote turnout, rally attendance, and persuasion of acquaintances, and slightly lower for short-term benefit distribution. The results suggest that businessperson candidates actively hire patronage employees both within one and two months of the election.

Table 4E.1: List Experiment Estimates for Political Services Conditional on Time of Employment with Six-month Cutoff Point

Time of Hiring	Political Services				
	Turning out to vote	Attending Rallies	Persuading Acquaintances	Distributing Short-term Benefits	Distributing Long-term Benefits
Six Months Prior to the Election	0.266** (0.134)	0.227* (0.125)	0.195 (0.121)	0.204 (0.126)	0.083 (0.114)
Outside of Six Months Timeframe	0.218* (0.113)	0.120 (0.080)	0.101 (0.093)	0.046 (0.117)	0.026 (0.092)
Differences between Two Groups (Row (1) – Row (2))	0.048 (0.175)	0.107 (0.148)	0.094 (0.153)	0.158 (0.172)	0.057 (0.146)

Table 4E.2: List Experiment Estimates for Political Services Conditional on Time of Employment with Three-month Cutoff Point

Time of Hiring	Political Services				
	Turning out to vote	Attending Rallies	Persuading Acquaintances	Distributing Short-term Benefits	Distributing Long-term Benefits
Three Months Prior to the Election	0.607*** (0.138)	0.503*** (0.141)	0.360** (0.143)	0.485*** (0.135)	0.118 (0.129)
Outside of Three Months Timeframe	0.246** (0.102)	0.143* (0.073)	0.130 (0.090)	0.042 (0.098)	0.028 (0.084)
Differences between Two Groups (Row (1) – Row (2))	0.361** (0.172)	0.360** (0.159)	0.230 (0.169)	0.443** (0.167)	0.090 (0.152)

Table 4E.3: List Experiment Estimates for Political Services Conditional on Time of Employment with One-month Cutoff Point

Time of Hiring	Political Services				
	Turning out to vote	Attending Rallies	Persuading Acquaintances	Distributing Short-term Benefits	Distributing Long-term Benefits
One Month Prior to the Election	0.658*** (0.182)	0.607*** (0.195)	0.414** (0.165)	0.506** (0.202)	0.217 (0.165)
Outside of One Month Timeframe	0.317*** (0.070)	0.200*** (0.059)	0.106 (0.069)	0.066 (0.082)	0.036 (0.061)
Differences between Two Groups (Row (1) – Row (2))	0.341* (0.195)	0.407** (0.204)	0.308* (0.179)	0.440** (0.218)	0.181 (0.176)

Appendix 4F: Results from List Experiments Conditional on Interaction with Customers

Another potential concern is whether the provision of political services is truly a part of a patronage ties between an employee and a businessperson politician. It is possible that employees provide these political services because they want to fit in at their workplace or please their employers. After accepting the job, employees may believe that they can enhance their work performance evaluation by providing political services to their employers. However, the key distinction here is that the businessperson candidates do not explicitly require or make job offers contingent upon the provision of political services. In other words, the provision of political services stems from the personal ambition and motivation of the employees, rather than being a deliberate electoral strategy by the businessperson candidates. There is no expectation in employment where patronage employees are obligated to provide political services, thus moving the provision of these services beyond the scope of patronage employment.

One way to test whether the provision of political services is a result of patronage ties between businessperson candidates and employees is to divide the sample into respondents who work in customer-facing positions and those who do not. Since one of the expected responsibilities of patronage employees is to distribute firm benefits to clients, businessperson candidates are more likely to fill customer-facing positions with patronage employees, as these employees have a higher likelihood of interacting with and distributing benefits to clients. Based on this assumption, there should be a divergence in the likelihood of political service provision between these two groups, with respondents in customer-facing positions more likely to report providing political services compared to those in non-customer-facing positions, if patronage employment truly exists. The difference in behavior between these two groups could potentially

serve as evidence of patronage employment, as there is no clear reason to believe that employees in customer-facing positions have a stronger need to fit in or please the businessperson politicians by providing political services.

Table 4F.1 displays the results when the sample is divided into two subgroups: customer-facing and non-customer-facing employees. To determine whether a respondent is in a customer-facing position, a survey question asked, "Do you regularly interact with the clients of the company?" with binary answer options of "Yes" and "No." Those who responded affirmatively are classified as customer-facing employees, while those who do not interact with clients are considered non-customer-facing employees. The results in Table 4F.1 indicate that a higher proportion of customer-facing employees engage in political tasks compared to non-customer-facing employees. The differences in proportions are statistically significant at the 95 percent level for three activities: turning out to vote for businessperson candidates, attending rallies, and distributing short-term benefits.

If we assume that employees across departments have the same desire to please their employers and the same need to fit in, we would expect no variation in the level of political services provided by these two subgroups, as all employees would provide services to please their employers and fit in, regardless of their positions. The differences in the level of services between the customer-facing and non-customer-facing subgroups provide evidence of patronage employment.

Furthermore, a greater proportion of customer-facing employees report experiencing negative inducements compared to non-customer-facing employees. Since there is no apparent reason why customer-facing employees would be more targeted with threats from their employers, other than the fact that these employees are patronage hires, it is highly plausible that

the provision of political services is a result of the contingent nature of their jobs, rather than employees simply wanting to fit in or please their employers.

Table 4F.1: List Experiment Estimates for Political Services Conditional on Level of Interaction with Customers

	Turning out to vote	Attending Rallies	Persuading Acquaintances	Distributing Short-term Benefits	Distributing Long-term Benefits	Negative Inducements	Positive Inducements
Customer-Facing	0.687*** (0.163)	0.689*** (0.154)	0.375*** (0.144)	0.647*** (0.183)	0.314** (0.141)	0.585*** (0.185)	0.248* (0.130)
Non-Customer-Facing	0.249** (0.128)	0.260** (0.106)	0.099 (0.102)	0.032 (0.112)	0.015 (0.086)	0.139 (0.117)	0.104 (0.109)
Differences between Two Groups	0.398** (0.207)	0.429** (0.181)	0.276 (0.176)	0.615*** (0.215)	0.299* (0.148)	0.446** (0.219)	0.144 (0.170)

*p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01

Appendix 5A: OLS Regression Results for the Impact of Monitoring on Political Service Provision

Multivariate OLS regressions are also used to analyze the strategy employed by businessperson politicians to mobilize employees in providing political services. The regressions involve interaction terms between a treatment assignment dummy variable and variables related to monitoring and reciprocity. The dependent variable is the number of affirmative responses given by an employee in each list experiment. The estimates from the interaction terms indicate whether employees who report higher levels of monitoring by their supervisors and those with a stronger sense of reciprocity engage in more partisan tasks on behalf of the businessperson politicians. The following multivariate OLS regression equation is used to assess the impact of monitoring and reciprocity on the provision of political services:

$$Y_{ij} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 treatment_{ij} + \beta_2 reporting_{ij} + \beta_3 reciprocity_{ij} + \beta_8 treatment_{ij} \times reporting_{ij} + \beta_9 treatment_{ij} \times reciprocity_{ij} + C_{ij} + \varepsilon_{ijk}$$

In the equation, Y_{ij} is the list response of respondent i who comes from firm j . $TREATMENT_{ij}$ is a treatment dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the respondent received the treatment version of the list experiments, and 0 otherwise. $reporting_{ij}$ is the response on how often an employee reports to the supervisor. $reciprocity_{ij}$ is the employee's reported view on reciprocating those who helped them in the past. C_{ij} is a matrix of control variables that include age, gender, education, and salary level. All of the covariates are interacted with the dummy variable for the treatment term $treatment_{ij}$. For all the specifications, the standard errors are clustered at the firm level to take into account potential correlations within each firm as these firm-level characteristics could bias our standard errors. Firm and provincial fixed effects are included in all models.

Table 5A.1 presents the results from the OLS multivariate regressions for the three campaign support activities. The positive interaction term between the level of monitoring variable and the treatment dummy variable for the three political activities indicates that employees who report their work activities to their supervisors more frequently are more likely to turn out and vote for the businessperson politicians, as well as attend rallies. The coefficients of the interaction term for these two activities are statistically significant at the 95 percent level. However, the evidence regarding the mobilizing impact of monitoring on the persuasion of acquaintances is weaker. The coefficient of the interaction term is statistically significant only at the 90 percent level. These levels of statistical significance remain when controlling for the sense of reciprocity. Having a stronger sense of reciprocity does not lead patronage employees to have a higher likelihood of turning out to vote, attending rallies, or persuading acquaintances within their social network, as there is no statistically significant effect at the 90 percent level.

Table 5A.1: Multivariate OLS Analysis for the Impact of Monitoring and Reciprocity on Provision of Political Services for Electoral Campaign Activities

	Turn out to vote		Attend rallies		Persuasion of acquaintances	
Report to Supervisor x Treatment	0.163*** (0.038)	0.162*** (0.038)	0.108*** (0.040)	0.110*** (0.039)	0.073* (0.038)	0.071* (0.038)
View on Reciprocity x Treatment		0.002 (0.042)		0.035 (0.043)		0.064 (0.044)
Female x Treatment	0.001 (0.101)	0.001 (0.102)	-0.079 (0.102)	-0.086 (0.102)	0.194* (0.100)	0.171* (0.101)
Age x Treatment	-0.041 (0.037)	-0.041 (0.037)	-0.099*** (0.037)	-0.095** (0.038)	-0.170*** (0.037)	-0.160*** (0.037)
Education x Treatment	-0.021 (0.051)	-0.022 (0.051)	0.043 (0.052)	0.041 (0.052)	-0.026 (0.051)	-0.032 (0.051)
Salary x Treatment	-0.005 (0.060)	-0.005 (0.060)	0.052 (0.060)	0.052 (0.060)	0.044 (0.060)	0.417 (0.059)
Position in Firm x Treatment	-0.024 (0.018)	-0.026 (0.018)	-0.029 (0.049)	-0.026 (0.038)	-0.028 (0.043)	-0.026 (0.018)
Log(Asset Size) x Treatment	0.286*** (0.097)	0.287*** (0.097)	0.310*** (0.110)	0.287*** (0.097)	0.361*** (0.109)	0.306*** (0.107)
Firm Age x Treatment	0.035 (0.043)	0.033 (0.042)	0.029 (0.049)	0.054 (0.043)	0.028 (0.043)	0.043 (0.044)
Log(Prov. Inc) x Treatment	0.152 (0.090)	0.153 (0.095)	0.108 (0.107)	0.103 (0.095)	0.196 (0.181)	0.153 (0.142)
Report to Supervisor	-0.021 (0.028)	-0.021 (0.029)	-0.026 (0.029)	-0.028 (0.027)	-0.038 (0.028)	-0.037 (0.028)
View on Reciprocity		-0.001 (0.031)		-0.032 (0.032)		0.019 (0.031)
Female	-0.039 (0.072)	-0.038 (0.072)	-0.040 (0.073)	-0.034 (0.073)	-0.027 (0.072)	-0.031 (0.072)
Age	0.017 (0.027)	0.017 (0.027)	0.079*** (0.027)	0.075*** (0.027)	0.007 (0.027)	0.009 (0.027)
Education	0.004 (0.037)	0.004 (0.037)	-0.074** (0.037)	-0.072* (0.037)	-0.024 (0.037)	-0.025 (0.037)
Salary	0.013 (0.041)	0.013 (0.041)	-0.049 (0.041)	-0.048 (0.041)	-0.028 (0.041)	-0.028 (0.041)
Position in Firm	-0.070 (0.046)	-0.069 (0.048)	-0.021 (0.046)	-0.018 (0.030)	-0.012 (0.067)	-0.018 (0.047)
Log (Asset Size)	0.077 (0.068)	0.076 (0.068)	0.056 (0.077)	0.076 (0.068)	-0.012 (0.068)	0.018 (0.064)
Firm Age	0.105 (0.080)	0.106 (0.079)	0.036 (0.038)	0.048 (0.033)	0.066** (0.030)	0.083 (0.035)
Log(Prov. Inc)	0.028 (0.058)	0.028 (0.059)	0.017 (0.034)	0.010 (0.022)	0.021 (0.033)	0.038 (0.041)
Treatment	0.104 (0.162)	0.100 (0.188)	0.059 (0.163)	-0.021 (0.190)	0.105 (0.161)	-0.027 (0.187)
Constant	1.956*** (0.120)	1.958*** (0.141)	2.012*** (0.121)	2.086*** (0.141)	2.104*** (0.120)	2.061*** (0.139)
Firm FE	Yes		Yes		Yes	
Provincial FE	Yes		Yes		Yes	

Observations	960	959	959
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Note: The dependent variable is the number of affirmative responses the respondent gave to each list experiment. Standard OLS is used where each covariate is interacted with the dummy variable for the treatment condition. Standard errors are clustered and firm level.

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

The same pattern observed in the previous three activities applies to short-term benefit distribution, as shown in Table 5A.2. The coefficient of the interaction term between the treatment dummy variable and the level of monitoring in the regression with short-term distributive activity as the dependent variable is positive and statistically significant at the 95 percent level. This indicates that employees who report regularly to their supervisors about their work activities are more likely to engage in distributing short-term benefits to voters compared to those who report their activities less frequently to their employers. When controlling for reciprocity, the coefficient of the interaction term remains statistically significant at the 95 percent level. A sense of reciprocity does not play a significant role in mobilizing employees to participate in the distribution of short-term business benefits, as the coefficient of the interaction term between the treatment dummy variable and the level of reciprocity is not statistically significant even at the 90 percent level.

Table 5A.2: Multivariate OLS Analysis for the Impact of Monitoring and Reciprocity on Provision of Political Services for Distributive Activities

	Short-term benefit distribution		Long-term benefit distribution	
Report to Supervisor x Treatment	0.118*** (0.040)	0.115*** (0.040)	0.067** (0.032)	0.066** (0.032)
View on Reciprocity x Treatment		-0.070 (0.045)		0.010 (0.036)
Female x Treatment	0.020 (0.106)	0.036 (0.106)	-0.100 (0.085)	-0.105 (0.086)
Age x Treatment	0.170*** (0.039)	0.161*** (0.039)	0.087*** (0.031)	0.089*** (0.032)
Education x Treatment	0.076 (0.054)	0.082 (0.054)	0.014 (0.043)	0.013 (0.043)
Salary x Treatment	-0.010 (0.063)	-0.009 (0.063)	-0.069 (0.051)	-0.069 (0.051)
Position in Firm x Treatment	-0.011 (0.027)	-0.026 (0.018)	-0.023 (0.027)	-0.026 (0.028)
Log(Asset Size) x Treatment	0.430*** (0.099)	0.287*** (0.097)	0.208 (0.095)	0.286*** (0.097)
Firm Age x Treatment	0.012 (0.035)	0.028 (0.020)	0.037 (0.043)	0.032 (0.048)
Log(Prov. Inc) x Treatment	0.106 (0.059)	0.103 (0.048)	0.108 (0.075)	0.054 (0.061)
Report to Supervisor	-0.089*** (0.030)	-0.086*** (0.030)	-0.025 (0.037)	-0.025 (0.024)
View on Reciprocity		0.059* (0.033)		0.009 (0.027)
Female	-0.040 (0.075)	-0.052 (0.076)	0.010 (0.061)	0.008 (0.061)
Age	-0.072*** (0.028)	-0.065** (0.028)	-0.012 (0.022)	-0.011 (0.022)
Education	-0.089** (0.039)	-0.093** (0.039)	-0.057* (0.031)	-0.058* (0.031)
Salary	-0.000095 (0.043)	-0.0006 (0.043)	0.042 (0.035)	0.042 (0.035)
Position in Firm	-0.010 (0.031)	-0.008 (0.030)	-0.032 (0.042)	-0.084 (0.050)
Log (Asset Size)	0.041 (0.069)	0.076 (0.068)	0.159 (0.068)	0.096 (0.072)
Firm Age	0.034 (0.041)	0.075 (0.046)	0.060 (0.049)	0.078 (0.068)
Log(Prov. Inc.)	0.011 (0.013)	0.015 (0.023)	0.016 (0.036)	0.011 (0.029)
Treatment	0.778*** (0.170)	0.618*** (0.197)	0.237* (0.137)	0.257 (0.159)
Constant	2.614*** (0.126)	2.476*** (0.147)	2.088*** (0.102)	2.067*** (0.119)
Firm FE		Yes		Yes
Provincial FE		Yes		Yes
Observations		960		958

Note: The dependent variable is the number of affirmative responses the respondent gave to each list experiment. Standard OLS is used where each covariate is interacted with the dummy variable for the treatment condition. Standard errors are clustered and firm level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Although patronage employees may not be heavily involved in the direct distribution of long-term benefits compared to short-term benefits, monitoring remains crucial in mobilizing them to distribute long-term benefits to voters when they are required to do this activity. The coefficient of the interaction term between the treatment dummy variable and the level of monitoring is positive and statistically significant at the 95 percent level. This finding provides empirical support for the importance of monitoring as a strategy to address the commitment problem. Similarly, controlling for reciprocity does not alter the statistical significance of the interaction term. The coefficient of the interaction term between the treatment dummy variable and the level of reciprocity is also not statistically significant at the 90 percent level for the distribution of long-term benefits. This suggests that there is insufficient evidence to conclude that businessperson politicians rely on the norm of reciprocity to overcome the commitment problem with patronage employees.

Appendix 5B: Full Table for NLS Regressions for the Effect of Monitoring on the Provision of Political Services

Table 5B.1: Full Results from NLS Regression for the Impact of Monitoring and Reciprocity on Provision of Political Services

	Turn out to vote				Attend rallies		Persuasion of acquaintances		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Reporting		0.040*** (0.015)	0.039*** (0.014)		0.055** (0.027)	0.054** (0.026)		0.011 (0.013)	0.010 (0.011)
Reciprocity			0.028 (0.029)			0.032 (0.028)			0.012 (0.020)
Female		-0.036 (0.069)	-0.036 (0.069)		-0.099 (0.071)	-0.032 (0.071)		-0.096** (0.047)	-0.033 (0.060)
Age		0.061** (0.026)	0.018 (0.026)		0.110*** (0.027)	0.076*** (0.027)		0.069*** (0.022)	0.010 (0.022)
Education		0.009 (0.035)	0.003 (0.035)		-0.058 (0.041)	-0.073** (0.037)		0.024 (0.030)	-0.026 (0.030)
Salary		-0.006 (0.039)	0.014 (0.039)		-0.140*** (0.051)	-0.049 (0.041)		-0.044 (0.033)	-0.028 (0.034)
Position in Firm		-0.003 (0.046)	0.012 (0.028)		-0.018** (0.008)	-0.013* (0.007)		-0.007 (0.005)	0.002 (0.003)
Log (Asset Size)		0.040 (0.035)	0.021 (0.035)		0.066 (0.042)	0.059 (0.040)		0.011 (0.038)	0.027 (0.032)
Firm Age		0.003 (0.052)	0.002 (0.050)		0.027 (0.069)	0.058 (0.065)		0.031 (0.055)	0.040 (0.052)
Log (Prov. Inc. per Capita)		-0.003 (0.020)	-0.005 (0.018)		-0.016 (0.033)	-0.024 (0.031)		0.004 (0.038)	-0.002 (0.040)
Constant	0.399*** (0.061)	0.312*** (0.052)	0.254*** (0.048)	0.288*** (0.065)	0.168*** (0.058)	0.102** (0.050)	0.191*** (0.057)	0.104** (0.053)	0.099* (0.051)
Observations	482	482	482	480	480	480	480	480	480

*p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01

Table 5B.2: Full Results from NLS Regression for the Impact of Monitoring and Reciprocity on Distributive Activities

	Short-term benefit distribution			Long-term benefit distribution		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Reporting		0.031*** (0.011)	0.030*** (0.010)		0.006* (0.004)	0.006* (0.004)
Reciprocity			0.020 (0.017)			0.005 (0.010)
Female		0.004 (0.086)	-0.038 (0.087)		0.003 (0.060)	0.013 (0.060)
Age		-0.095*** (0.032)	0.056* (0.032)		-0.079*** (0.022)	-0.010 (0.022)
Education		-0.085* (0.044)	-0.058 (0.044)		-0.018 (0.031)	-0.058* (0.031)
Salary		0.008 (0.049)	0.009 (0.049)		-0.066* (0.033)	-0.042 (0.034)
Position in Firm		-0.026** (0.012)	-0.021 (0.015)		-0.028* (0.015)	-0.021 (0.014)
Log (Asset Size)		0.036 (0.030)	0.034 (0.029)		0.055 (0.040)	0.048 (0.041)
Firm Age		0.013 (0.042)	0.016 (0.038)		0.012 (0.031)	0.011 (0.028)
Log (Prov. Inc. Per Capita)		-0.033** (0.016)	-0.028* (0.015)		-0.022* (0.013)	-0.020 (0.018)
Constant	0.193*** (0.058)	0.126*** (0.047)	0.089** (0.042)	0.088** (0.045)	0.060 (0.035)	0.054 (0.030)
Observations	482	482	482	480	480	480

*p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01

Appendix 5C: Impact of Monitoring on the Provision of Political Services Disaggregated by Patronage Status

Potentially, the impact of monitoring in mobilizing employees to provide political services may not be of the same magnitude between patronage and non-patronage employees given that businessperson candidates rely on different types of inducements to mobilize these two types of employees. Table 5C.1 and 5C.2 shows the results when the sample is divided into those hired within two months prior to the election and those hired outside of this timeframe, respectively. All models in Table 5C.1 and 5C.2 include the reciprocity variable along with other control variables.

Table 5C.1: Impact of Monitoring on the Provision of Political Services for Patronage Employees

	Turn out	Rally Attendance	Persuasion	Short-term Benefit Distribution	Long-term Benefit Distribution
Reporting	0.057** (0.029)	0.071** (0.035)	0.019 (0.022)	0.060** (0.027)	0.019* (0.010)
Reciprocity	0.045 (0.036)	0.042 (0.044)	0.021 (0.031)	0.011 (0.028)	0.014 (0.023)
Constant	0.455*** (0.064)	0.119 (0.078)	0.086 (0.065)	0.036 (0.083)	0.067 (0.040)
Control Variables	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	88	90	89	89	89

*p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01

Table 5C.2: Impact of Monitoring on the Provision of Political Services for Non-Patronage Employees

	Turn out	Rally Attendance	Persuasion	Short-term Benefit Distribution	Long-term Benefit Distribution
Reporting	0.035** (0.016)	0.050* (0.029)	0.008 (0.013)	0.023 (0.018)	0.003 (0.006)
Reciprocity	0.024 (0.030)	0.030 (0.031)	0.010 (0.024)	0.022 (0.020)	0.003 (0.015)
Constant	0.209*** (0.054)	0.098 (0.062)	0.102** (0.053)	0.101 (0.065)	0.051 (0.035)
Control Variables	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	394	390	391	393	391

*p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01

Two potential reasons can explain the larger magnitude of the impact of monitoring on effort mobilization among patronage employees compared to non-patronage employees. First, interviews with employees in firms of businessperson candidates, discussed in more detail in Chapter 7, indicate that these candidates often make the distribution of positive rewards contingent on electoral outcomes, rather than the provision of political services. This implies that businessperson candidates do not need to directly monitor the actions of non-patronage employees to decide on rewards distribution. They make such decisions based on observed election results. In such cases, the monitoring of non-patronage employees is not aimed at tracking the level of political services they provide. Consequently, any increase in monitoring should not impact the political services provided by non-patronage employees.

Second, past research has shown that individuals are more influenced by potential losses than equivalent gains (Tversky and Kahneman, 1979, 1992). As individuals value loss avoidance more than comparable gains, the need to provide political services is expected to be stronger among patronage employees who are at risk of job loss. This is in contrast to non-patronage

employees, who may not be as motivated by the prospect of benefits derived from providing political services. Therefore, monitoring non-patronage employees may not be as effective in motivating them to provide political services, especially if they do not highly value the potential gains. However, patronage employees, who are likely to be more sensitive to potential loss, may respond more proactively to monitoring as they will act in ways that limit their loss.

Appendix 5D: Full Table for Estimates of Incidence of Mobilization Activities by Employers in Firms of Businessperson Politicians from List Experiments

Table 5D.1: Estimates of Incidence of Mobilization Activities by Employers in Firms of Businessperson Politicians from List Experiments

Mobilization Activity	Mean Control	SE	95% CI		Mean Treatment	SE	95% CI		Differences	SE	p-value	T-statistic
Employee faces threats of punishments for not engaging in political activities	1.911	0.057	1.854	1.967	2.116	0.078	2.038	2.194	0.204	0.049	0.001***	4.173
Employee receives positive inducements from engaging in political activities	1.888	0.062	1.827	1.950	2.041	0.059	1.982	2.099	0.156	0.043	0.000***	3.508

*p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01

Appendix 5E: Sensitivity Analysis for the Differences in Proportions of Employees Experiencing Inducements Using Different Cutoff Points

Results from the alternative cutoff points of six months, three months, and one month are provided in Table 5E.1, 5E.2, and 5E.3, respectively. When examining employees hired within six months of the election, there are no statistically significant differences-in-means between the treatment and control groups for both negative and positive inducements. With a six-month cutoff, it is likely that many non-patronage employees are included in the group of employees hired within six months, resulting in a failure to detect any statistical significance in the provision of political services, as only a small proportion of this group actually engage in such activities. However, for those hired outside of the six-month timeframe, the difference-in-means between the control and treatment groups remains statistically significant for positive inducements. This finding supports my argument that non-patronage employees are more likely to be targeted with positive inducements.

With the three-month cutoff, the differences-in-means for negative inducements experienced by employees hired within three months and for positive inducements experienced by employees hired outside the three-month timeframe are statistically significant at the 95 percent level. While statistical significance is retained, the magnitude of the difference-in-means for negative inducements experienced by employees has declined compared to the analysis using a two-month cutoff. In line with my argument, this may be due to the fact that more non-patronage employees are now included in the group of employees hired within three months or less before the election, resulting in a smaller proportion of the group experiencing negative inducements.

The analysis employing a one-month cutoff demonstrates statistically significant difference-in-means for negative inducements experienced by employees hired within a three-month period, as well as difference-in-means for positive inducements experienced by employees hired outside the three-month timeframe. Notably, when comparing these results to the analysis using a two-month cutoff, there is only a minimal shift in the proportion of employees experiencing negative inducements within the three-month period and the proportion of employees experiencing positive inducements outside that timeframe.

Table 5E.1: List Experiment Estimates for Inducements Conditional on Time of Employment with Six-month Cutoff Point

Time of Hiring	Types of Inducements	
	Negative Inducements	Positive Inducements
Six Months Prior to the Election	0.171 (0.112)	0.082 (0.050)
Outside of Six-Month Timeframe	0.087 (0.104)	0.235** (0.084)
Differences between Two Groups (Row (1) – Row (2))	0.084 (0.153)	0.153 (0.098)

*p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01

Table 5E.2: List Experiment Estimates for Inducements Conditional on Time of Employment with Three-month Cutoff Point

Time of Hiring	Types of Inducements	
	Negative Inducements	Positive Inducements
Three Months Prior to the Election	0.408*** (0.124)	0.038 (0.058)
Outside of Three-Month Timeframe	0.090 (0.098)	0.216*** (0.072)
Differences between Two Groups (Row (1) – Row (2))	0.318** (0.158)	0.178* (0.092)

*p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01

Table 5E.3: List Experiment Estimates for Inducements Conditional on Time of Employment with One-month Cutoff Point

Time of Hiring	Types of Inducements	
	Negative Inducements	Positive Inducements
One Month Prior to the Election	0.446** (0.167)	0.036 (0.071)
Outside of One-Month Timeframe	0.105 (0.072)	0.198*** (0.052)
Differences between Two Groups (Row (1) – Row (2))	0.341* (0.182)	0.162* (0.088)

*p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01

Appendix 6A: List of Interviewees and their Background Information

Table 6A.1: List of Interviewees and their Background Information

Code	Name	Age	Level of Education	Gender	Position Level	Business Type	Region
TH-1	Aod	20-30	High School	Male	Entry-Level	Construction	Central
TH-2	Aoi	30-40	Higher Vocational Certificate	Female	Entry-Level	Agricultural Supply	Central
TH-3	Big	20-30	College Degree	Male	Entry-Level	Consulting	Central
TH-4	Boon	30-40	Vocational Certificate	Male	Entry-Level	Shipping	Central
TH-5	Chai	20-30	College Degree	Male	Entry-Level	Textiles	Central
TH-6	Chate	20-30	High School	Male	Entry-Level	Grocery Store	Northeast
TH-7	Eak	30-40	College Degree	Male	Entry-Level	Automobile Dealership	Northeast
TH-8	Gla	30-40	Higher Vocational Certificate	Male	Supervisor-Level	Plastics Processing	Central
TH-9	Jib	30-40	Higher Vocational Certificate	Female	Supervisor-Level	Hotel	South
TH-10	Job	20-30	College Degree	Male	Entry-Level	Pharmaceutical Production	Central
TH-11	Kade	40-50	College Degree	Female	Supervisor-Level	Real Estate	Central
TH-12	Kob	30-40	Vocational Certificate	Female	Entry-Level	Grocery Store	Central
TH-13	Mai	20-30	Vocational Certificate	Male	Entry-Level	Fertilizer Production	North
TH-14	Na	20-30	High School	Male	Entry-Level	Poultry Farm	Central
TH-15	Neung	40-50	College Degree	Female	Supervisor-Level	Cattle Farm	Northeast
TH-16	New	20-30	Vocational Certificate	Male	Entry-Level	Motorcycle Dealership	North
TH-17	Noi	40-50	Vocational Certificate	Female	Supervisor-Level	Rice Mill	Central
TH-18	Noon	20-30	College Degree	Female	Entry-Level	Agricultural Product	South
TH-19	Nop	20-30	Vocational Certificate	Male	Entry-Level	Textiles	Northeast
TH-20	Piak	40-50	Higher Vocational Certificate	Male	Supervisor-Level	Grains Sales	Central
TH-21	Pim	30-40	College Degree	Female	Entry-Level	Jewelry Sales	Central
TH-22	Poom	20-30	High School	Male	Entry-Level	Gas Station	Central
TH-23	Prem	20-30	Vocational Certificate	Male	Entry-Level	Wood Processing	North
TH-24	Thep	50-60	Elementary School	Male	Entry-Level	Frozen Food	South
TH-25	Ton	20-30	High School	Male	Entry-Level	Construction	Northeast
TH-26	Top	30-40	College Degree	Male	Supervisor-Level	Poultry Farm	Northeast
TH-27	Win	20-30	High School	Male	Entry-Level	Rubber	South
TH-28	Ying	30-40	Higher Vocational Certificate	Female	Supervisor-Level	Food Services	South

Appendix 6B: Pre-determined Questions for the Semi-structured Interviews

- 1.) A set of demographic questions:
 - a. How old are you? คุณอายุเท่าไร
 - b. What is your highest level of education? วุฒิการศึกษาสูงสุดของคุณอยู่ในระดับใด
 - c. What is your position level? คุณทำงานอยู่ในตำแหน่งใด
 - d. What department do you work in? คุณทำงานอยู่ในแผนกไหน
 - e. How long have you worked at the firm? คุณทำงานที่บริษัทนี้มานานเท่าไร
- 2.) Did you go out and vote in the 2019 election? คุณได้ออกไปเลือกตั้งเมื่อการเลือกตั้งเมื่อปี 2562 หรือไม่ครับ
 - a. If the interviewee answers yes: Approximately, how much time did it take? คุณใช้เวลาประมาณเท่าไรในการออกไปเลือกตั้ง
 - b. If the interviewee answers yes: Do you need to let someone at the firm know that you turn out to vote? คุณจำเป็นต้องให้ใครบางคนในบริษัททราบไหมว่าคุณได้ออกไปเลือกตั้ง
 - i. If yes: How do you let them know? คุณบอกให้ผู้อื่นทราบอย่างไร
- 3.) Did you vote for [name of businessperson candidate they work for]? คุณได้เลือก [ชื่อของผู้สมัครรับเลือกตั้งที่ทำงานให้] ไหมครับ
 - a. If the interviewee answers yes: Do you need to let your employer know that you vote for [name of businessperson candidate they work for]? คุณจำเป็นต้องให้ใครบางคนในบริษัททราบไหมว่าคุณเลือก [ชื่อของผู้สมัครรับเลือกตั้งที่ทำงานให้]
 - i. If yes: How do you let them know? คุณบอกให้ผู้อื่นทราบอย่างไร
- 4.) During election season in 2019, did you attend the rally of [name of businessperson candidate they work for]? ในช่วงเลือกตั้งปี 2562 คุณได้ออกไปร่วมการปราศรัยหาเสียงของ [ชื่อของผู้สมัครรับเลือกตั้งที่ทำงานให้] ไหมครับ
 - a. If the interviewee answers yes: Approximately, how much time did it take? คุณใช้เวลาประมาณเท่าไรในการออกไปร่วมการปราศรัย
 - b. If the interviewee answers yes: Do you need to let your employer know that you attend rallies? คุณจำเป็นต้องให้ใครบางคนในบริษัททราบไหมว่าคุณได้ออกไปร่วมการปราศรัยหาเสียง
 - i. If yes: How do you let them know? คุณบอกให้ผู้อื่นทราบอย่างไร
- 5.) Do you try to persuade people that you know to support [name of businessperson candidate they work for]? คุณได้เชิญชวนให้คนที่คุณรู้จักสนับสนุน [ชื่อของผู้สมัครรับเลือกตั้งที่ทำงานให้] ไหมครับ
 - a. If interviewee answers yes: On average, how much time did it take each time you have to persuade someone? โดยเฉลี่ยคุณใช้เวลาประมาณเท่าไรในการเชิญชวนให้คนที่คุณรู้จักสนับสนุน [ชื่อของผู้สมัครรับเลือกตั้งที่ทำงานให้] ในแต่ละครั้ง
 - b. If interviewee answers yes: How many people did you try to persuade in the last election? คุณพยายามที่จะเชิญชวนให้คนที่คุณรู้จักสนับสนุน [ชื่อของผู้สมัครรับเลือกตั้งที่ทำงานให้] ประมาณกี่คนในการเลือกตั้งครั้งที่ผ่านมา
 - c. If interviewee answers yes: Do you need to let your employer know that you attend rallies? คุณจำเป็นต้องให้ใครบางคนในบริษัททราบไหมว่าคุณได้การเชิญชวนให้คนที่คุณรู้จักสนับสนุน [ชื่อของผู้สมัครรับเลือกตั้งที่ทำงานให้]
 - i. If yes: How do you let them know? คุณบอกให้ผู้อื่นทราบอย่างไร
- 6.) Did you or your firm distribute any free or discounted goods and services produced by your firms to clients? คุณหรือบริษัทของคุณได้ทำการแจกจ่ายสิ่งของหรือบริการที่ผลิตโดยบริษัทของคุณ โดยไม่มีค่าใช้จ่ายหรือมีส่วนลดให้แก่ลูกค้า

- a. If the interviewee answers yes: I will ask them to elaborate on the types of goods and benefits distributed, the target of the distribution, the purposes of the distribution, and long-term or short-term distribution.
- 7.) Did you or your firm donate or distribute goods and services produced by your firm to organizations? คุณหรือบริษัทของคุณได้ทำการแจกจ่ายหรือบริจาคสิ่งของหรือบริการที่ผลิตโดยบริษัทของคุณ โดยไม่มีค่าใช้จ่ายหรือมีส่วนลดให้แก่องค์กรใดหรือไม่
- a. If the interviewee answers yes: I will ask them to elaborate on the types of goods and benefits distributed, organizations that are targeted, purposes of the distribution, and long-term or short-term distribution.
- 8.) Are there any other activities that you take during election season in support of [name of the businessperson candidate they work for]? มีกิจกรรมอื่นๆที่คุณได้ทำในช่วงการเลือกตั้งเพื่อสนับสนุน [ชื่อของผู้สมัครรับเลือกตั้งที่ทำงานให้] หรือไม่
- 9.) Did anyone at the firm suggest to you that there might be a negative impact on you or your position if you do not engage in activities supporting [name of the businessperson candidate they work for]? มีคนในบริษัทบอกคุณว่าคุณหรือตำแหน่งของคุณอาจจะได้รับผลกระทบในทางลบหาก你不ให้ความช่วยเหลือในกิจกรรมหาเสียงของ [ชื่อของผู้สมัครรับเลือกตั้งที่ทำงานให้]
- a. Did anyone at the firm suggest to you that there might be a negative impact on you or your position if [name of the businessperson candidate they work for] loses the election? มีคนในบริษัทบอกคุณว่าคุณหรือตำแหน่งของคุณอาจจะได้รับผลกระทบในทางลบหาก [ชื่อของผู้สมัครรับเลือกตั้งที่ทำงานให้] แพ้การเลือกตั้ง
- 10.) Were there any promises of some rewards if you engage in activities supporting the campaign of [name of the businessperson candidate they work for]? คุณได้รับคำสัญญาว่าจะได้รับรางวัลอะไรบางอย่างถ้าคุณช่วยกิจกรรมหาเสียงของ [ชื่อของผู้สมัครรับเลือกตั้งที่ทำงานให้]
- a. Were there any promises of some rewards if [name of the businessperson candidate they work for] wins the election? คุณได้รับคำสัญญาว่าจะได้รับรางวัลอะไรบางอย่าง [ชื่อของผู้สมัครรับเลือกตั้งที่ทำงานให้] ชนะเลือกตั้ง

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Biography

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