

Modernization, Inequality and Ethnic Civil Conflict

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Thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of
the requirements for the degree of or Master of Arts
in the Department of Political Science in the Graduate School
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Abstract

Recent studies have revealed that the inequality between different ethnic groups can better explain and predict the onset of ethnic civil conflicts than traditional inequality indicators do. Based on their findings, this article uses the modernist theory on nationalism to further illustrate the mechanism of the horizontal inequality on ethnic civil conflicts. Introducing the modernist nationalism's dimension, this article finds that with the increase of the degree of modernization, the positive effect of political horizontal inequality on the possibility of ethnonationalist civil conflict onset increases, while horizontal inequality's effect diminishes in the less modernized countries. This finding matches the expectation of the modernist theory on nationalism, providing a better understanding about ethnonationalist civil conflicts in the context of horizontal inequality.

Keywords: Ethnonationalist civil conflicts, modernization, horizontal inequality, nationalism

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1. Introduction

With systematic studies through decades, researchers have made a lot of progress in finding out the social and political causes of civil conflicts. Among these studies, ethnicity is an essential aspect that can hardly be overlooked. It may not be included in the main hypotheses, but it is at least a control variable in these conflict studies. Researchers still have not reached a consensus on the role of ethnicity in the civil war.

Although the specific mechanism of ethnicity on civil conflicts varies in different studies, most of them mention the theory of nationalism as one explanation for the relationship between ethnicity and civil conflicts. However, despite being widely cited in papers, the theory of nationalism has been simplified too much in large-sample studies of civil conflicts. For example, Fearon and Laitin (2003, p78) simply interpret modernist nationalism theory into the higher per capita income (a very rough proxy for modernization), the higher effect of ethnic diversity on the probability of civil conflict would be. Their interpretation misses the essential part of the mechanism in the causal chain, thus using unsuitable data to test the hypothesis and coming up with a misleading conclusion. Because of the oversimplification, the modernist concepts in nationalism theory almost disappeared in the large-sample studies on civil conflicts.

On the other hand, the all-encompassing modernist paradigm of nations and nationalism has been increasingly abandoned in qualitative studies. Scholars tend to use modernist nationalism theory to illustrate particular cultural and political problems rather than further framing the perspective which covers the nationalism phenomena over the world (Smith, 1998, p145). The problem of lacking suitable data also prevents

scholars from doing cross-national studies of the effect of modernization on the nationalism phenomena.

Thanks to the horizontal inequality data, which captures the inequality between groups, provided by Buhaug, Cederman & Gleditsch (2017), it is possible to combine the strong points of large-sample studies and case studies together. In this article, I introduce the modernization aspect of nationalism into the ethnic civil conflict research to consider the heterogeneous effects of horizontal inequality. I find that horizontal inequality matters more at high levels of modernization and matters less in countries that are less developed. This finding fits the modernists' argument, helping us better understand ethnonationalist civil conflicts.

In the following article, I will first explain the principles to identify ethnonationalist civil conflict, which is the specific type of conflict I discuss in this article. Then I will discuss the reason why modernization arouses people's national consciousness, making them demand people's sovereignty and equality, thus causing ethnonationalist civil conflicts when combined with ethno-inequality. Next, I will discuss the empirical measures and analyze the data outcome. Finally, I would introduce a new method in the out-of-sample prediction.

2. Literature Review

Generally speaking, there are three ways the existing studies of civil conflicts deal with ethnicity. The first is to use macro-level indexes of ethnicity, such as “ethnic fractionalization” (many small groups) or “ethnic polarization” (few large groups), as an approximation to ethnic grievances (Buhaug, Cederman & Gleditsch, 2014, p420). In other words, the more ethnically diversified a state is, the more likely it is for the people to have conflicting interests and to feel injustice with other groups of people, thus increasing the ethnic grievances (Vanhanen, 1999). The grievance is likely to generate civil conflicts (Cederman, Weidmann & Gleditsch, 2011, p482). Although these indexes sometimes exhibit significant correlation with civil conflicts, they are quite poor predictors of the onset of civil conflicts. Some countries with high fractionalization or polarization repeatedly plunged into the quagmire of civil conflicts, while more countries that are similar in these indexes have managed to completely avoid such things to happen (Sambanis & Shayo, 2013, p294). Using such aggregated data, which only captures the demographic condition of the state, may obscure the real mechanisms (Buhaug, Cederman & Rød, 2008, p531).

The second way uses formal theory to solve this flaw. They usually treat ethnicity as a means to strengthen group membership and compete for the economy’s resources with other groups or the state (Caselli & Coleman, 2013; Chatagnier & Castelli, 2019). Rebellion is a rational calculation between the cost and payoff. These kinds of studies argue that ethnicity is a natural means to lower the cost of mobilization, so discriminatory governments are more likely to experience civil conflicts with higher

ethnic fractionalization (Esteban & Ray, 2011). These studies provide a clearer explanation of ethnicity and civil conflict. In their context, ethnicity is naturally related to civil conflict. Such methods are still problematic, as not all discriminated ethnic groups are politically relevant to civil conflicts (Cederman, Andreas & Min, 2010, p89). Some ethnic groups are more politically active in conflict than others, and we need to figure out what makes them more politically active.

In order to deal with this problem, the third type of study focuses only on the ethnonationalist civil war, introducing the theory of nationalism to explain ethnic civil conflicts. As nationalism is the source of legitimacy in the modern state, excluded ethnic groups' grievance is likely to stimulate ethnonationalist conflict (Cederman, Wimmer & Min, 2010, p95). Based on the theory of nationalism, these studies put more emphasis on the horizontal inequality between different groups. They argue that the more horizontal inequality, which means political discrimination and wealth differentials between groups, the more intense the grievance is to overcome the collective-action dilemma, thus causing more ethnonationalist civil conflicts (Buhaug, Cederman & Gleditsch, 2014, pp421-422). Developing a new dataset, Buhaug, Cederman & Gleditsch (2014) conclude that political discrimination and wealth differentials between ethnic groups, which are political horizontal inequality and economic horizontal inequality, are strongly related to ethnonationalist civil conflicts.

The third type of study greatly improves people's understanding of ethnicity. However, they assume that, after the French Revolution, nationalism is an undeniable principle accepted by people all over the world (Buhaug, Cederman & Gleditsch, 2014,

p421), which ignores the effect of modernization in the casual chain between nationalism and ethnonationalist civil conflict. Nation and nationalism have no room in a non-developmental era (Smith, 1998, p21). Modernist theorists', such as Gellner (1983), Anderson (1991) and Giddens (1985), argue that modernization arouses people's awareness of people's sovereignty and the sense of being created equal, which are the nationalism requirements. With the process of modernization, nationalism gradually becomes the source of legitimacy in the modern state, thus making horizontal inequality more and more unbearable. In other words, horizontal inequality between different groups and the groups' grievance is only part of the story of the ethnonationalist civil conflicts. Without the requirement of people's sovereignty and equality, the political discrimination and wealth differentials between ethnic groups is less likely to create enough grievance to enable the group members to form their national identity and overcome the collective-action dilemma, thus lowering the positive effect of horizontal inequality on ethnonationalist civil conflicts.

To sum up, introducing the theory of modernist nationalism is likely to fill in the missing details in the existing literature about ethnonationalist civil conflict. However, as the mechanism of modernist nationalism is distinct and has its scope of application, it needs to be carefully theorized.

3. From ethnicity to nation

It is necessary to point out that ethnicity is a relatively broad concept that is quite different from the nation. In his important work on ethnic conflict, Horowitz (1985, p53) argues that “ethnicity easily embraces groups differentiated by color, language, and religion; it covers ‘tribes’, ‘races’, ‘nationalities’ and casts.” Nations may have similar characteristics, but it is the appeal of the “popular and democratic” that makes nation distinct from other types of identity. (Smith, 1992, p1). Greenfeld (1992, p3) introduces two principles to illustrate these two requirements more clearly. First,

Nationalism locates the source of individual identity within a "people," which is seen as the bearer of sovereignty, the central object of loyalty, and the basis of collective solidarity.

Second,

The "people" is usually perceived as larger than any concrete community and always as fundamentally homogeneous, and only superficially divided by the lines of status, class, locality, and in some cases even ethnicity.

For convenience, I simplify the first requirement as “people’s sovereignty,” and the second requirement as “fundamentally homogeneous”. The boundary of the assumed fundamentally homogeneous people who are willing to share sovereignty with each other is the boundary of a nation. The nation’s self-derived desire to achieve political sovereignty shared by its people distinguishes it from ethnic group or other collectivities (Dawisha, 2016, p7). In this article, I define nation as the ethnic group with the requirement of people’s sovereignty and the sense of being created equal among its people. At the same time, I define nationalism as a political desire of people’s sovereignty among a certain homogeneous people. It is undeniable that national identity does not require shared ethnicity. For example, a coherent Indonesian identity survives

under a variety of ethnolinguistic groups (Anderson, 1991, p132). I narrow the meaning of nation for the convenience and logical consistency on the issue of ethnonationalist civil conflicts.

Although some scholars believe that nationalism is the real source of ethnic rebellion (Connor, 1994), there are still many ethnic civil conflicts that are not caused by nationalism. First, the conflicts conducted by a group of people may not have a clear political claim which is in the name of an ethnic group. They may just be riots engaged in by a group of people with distinct features, such as the February 28 incident in Taiwan in 1947. We can regard the Taiwanese as an ethnic group, but, as they did not fight for Taiwanese people's sovereignty (Vogt et al., 2017), such riot does not fit the "people's sovereignty" principle to distinguish a nation. Only the conflicts in the name of ethnicity can reflect the group's political desire to achieve people's sovereignty, as it reflects the sovereignty that comes from the people of the ethnic group.

Second, a conflict that is in the name of ethnicity cannot be an ethnonationalist conflict without receiving large support from its group. Many leaders in former colonial countries describe their independence movements as nationalism movements, but failed to spread a national identity to surmount tribalism or communalism after independence (Hobsbawm, 1992, p179). This is because the national identity only exists in the mind of a few elites, but the majority of populations do not have the same identity. Hobsbawm (1992, p179) argues that these movements are internationalism rather than nationalism. Similar things could also happen in ethnic conflicts. For example, although July 2009 Ürümqi riots had a clear political claim in the name of Uyghur, the conflict received

little support from the total Uyghur population (Vogt et al., 2017). Mutual recognition is essential in national identity, as Gellner (1983, p7) believes that “two men are of the same nation if and only if they recognize each other as belonging to the same nation.” It is impossible to follow such strict meaning, arguing that only the conflict supported by all the people in an ethnic group can be called an ethnonationalist conflict, as every collective action has free riders and dissidents. However, as the support from the group members in a conflict reflects “the members of the category firmly recognize certain mutual rights and duties to each other in virtue of their shared membership of it” (Gellner, 1983, p7), a conflict with few supporters may show that a large proportion of the group members do not recognize the same mutual rights and duties as the leaders of the conflict perceived. In this sense, only the civil conflicts with large support can be called ethnonationalist civil conflicts.

Different scholars may have different standards in selecting ethnic, or ethnonationalist civil conflicts. However, in this article, as the theory I plan to introduce is nationalism theory, the selecting standards must fit the theory of nationalism. Nationalism theory is not likely to be applied to other types of civil conflicts. In this article, ethnonationalist civil conflicts mean the civil conflicts meet the above two conditions, which are having a clear political claim which is in the name of an ethnic group, and receiving large support from the ethnic groups in conflicts.

4. Nationalism and Modernization

4.1 Traditional society

The ruled and rulers were clearly divided in traditional society. Rulers only cared about the ideological hegemony of the dominant class, and did not require the “overall ideological consensus” to govern (Giddens, 1985, p76). The main overall link connecting the state with ordinary people was its requirement for taxation. (Giddens, 1985, pp57-58). As long as ordinary people did not rebel and were compliant in respect of the payment of taxes, rulers would not interfere in their lives. (Giddens, 1985, p59) In turn, political participation is limited to a very small group at the levels above the village (Huntington, 2006, p36). This is partly because traditional states did not have efficient transportation or communication methods to conduct modern governing, as well as they did not have the reason to do so. Rulers allowed rural people to mostly be regulated by their regional authorities, such as clan groups or local temples, to maintain their different customs and traditional way of life, as such tolerance usually solidified state power rather than undermined it (Giddens, 1985, p59). It could solidify state power because elites could use the difference in culture to justify the inequalities between them and ordinary people, endowing the inequalities with the aura of inevitability, permanence and naturalness (Gellner, 1983, p11).

If, in the traditional society, the overall link connecting the state with ordinary people was taxation, and central authority seldom interferes with ordinary people’s life, grievance because of being excluded is unlikely to be common among ordinary people. The perception of unjust deprivation can only be generated by social comparison

(Folger, 2012, p153). Grievance and civil conflicts are unlikely to be generated as the ruled almost have no chance to interact and compare their situation with central rulers. Moreover, unjust deprivation also occurs when a person or group is denied deserved outcomes (Folger, 2012, p161). The different culture between the ruled and rulers in traditional society is helpful to make the ruled believe they deserve such inequalities. (Gellner, 1983, p11). These reasons help make traditional society stables although it is ignorant and poor (Huntington, 2006, p41). Based on the theory of traditional society, I expect that in traditional society, the probability of ethnonationalist civil conflict is not likely to increase with horizontal political or economic inequality, which is different from Buhaug, Cederman & Gleditsch's (2014) argument.

4.2 Industry, State apparatus, and National Consciousness

There are at least two changes that are irresistible in modernization -- the emergence of an industrial economy and the emergence of a bureaucratically organized state (Taylor, 1997, p43). The industrial economy changes society permanently. Perpetually growing productivity in the industrial economy requires that division of labor be not merely complexly, but also perpetually and often rapidly, changing (Gellner, 1983, p24). People can no longer spend most of their time living a circular life in a familiar community. They have to find and change their jobs in a mobile society, which needs generic knowledge to quickly comprehend instructions and understand what to do in the new jobs (Gellner, 1983, p35). During the work, they must communicate with a large number of other people and quickly understand what they are talking about in

order to cooperate with each other, which requires a shared standardized linguistic medium and culture knowledge background (Gellner, 1983, p35). Now, culture becomes the necessary shared medium, the life-blood, within which alone the members of the society can breathe and survive and produce (Gellner, 1983, pp37-38). Moreover, it must be a great or high culture which can be available to all people in the state, rather than the little culture which can only exist in local area (Gellner, 1983, p38). The state must impose the chosen high culture on its citizens to function its industrial economy, and this process stimulates a shared cultural identity among people.

Meanwhile, as high culture is no longer monopolized by elites, elites cannot use the difference in culture to justify the inequalities between them and ordinary people. The same culture directly accessed by every people creates a sense of fundamental homogeneity, which turns hierarchical societies into horizontal, direct-access society, at least in people's imagination (Taylor, p36). This conceptual shift and the mobility in industrial society need the sense of being created equal, which stimulates the idea that people are equally the bearer of sovereignty.

At the same time, a bureaucratically-organized modern state means a monopoly of the means of violence (Gerth & Mills, 1946, p83). Such monopoly needs to break the local, religious, ethnic, and other authorities and to centralize the power to the central government (Huntington, 2006, p142). In order to do so, it often needs to mobilize new groups into the political system (Huntington, 2006, p142). Administrative power that depends upon the mobilization of social activities increases the reciprocal relations between the ruled and rulers (Giddens, 1985, pp201-202). By interacting with

other people in the new political system, which is far beyond the village or town level, the new groups of people become increasingly aware of their interests and claims by comparing with other people in the state (Huntington, 2006, p37). This is the reason why people acquire political consciousness, demanding equal participation in the political system when the state actually endows them rights of political participation during the process of modernization (Huntington, 2006, pp142-143). In other words, the expansion of power stimulates the sovereignty consciousness of ordinary people. This is called the “dialect of control” used by Giddens (1985, p201), describing that the state’s action to control its citizens in turn stimulates the citizens’ sovereignty consciousness to control the state. The more the state wants to control its citizens, the more unbearable political inequality would be.

In general, it is the industrial economy and the expansion of state apparatus that stimulate national consciousness. Such consciousness makes people believe they should be the bearer of sovereignty and be treated equally.

4.3 Barriers to mobility

The path of modernization in a state stimulates national consciousness, which means awareness of people’s sovereignty and the requirement of equality. If the state deals with these two requirements well and treats its citizens equally, provide social justice, modernization usually creates a coherent national identity in the state, decreasing the possibility of ethnonationalist civil conflict (Ahlerup, Baskaran & Bigsten, 2017). The reality is usually not ideal. The uneven spread of industrialization

in the entire state caused by historical accident creates advanced and less advanced groups (Gellner, 1969, p171). This cleavage creates an uneven division of labor, and the superordinate groups seek to reserve high-status social roles for their members (Hechter, 1977, p39). This kind of stratification system creates core and periphery groups among the state. The periphery groups are at the bottom of the division of labor in industrial society, depending on the core groups to provide them with investment, credit and wages (Hechter, 1977, pp9-10). Because of their lack of resources, the periphery groups' political position is also likely to be feeble as they have little bargaining power (Hechter, 1977, p40).

The unequal distribution of resources and political power is quite common, as class differentiation has always been a problem in every modern society. People are not likely to identify themselves as a member of the less advanced class and conduct collective action, since class is quite abstracted from daily social life (Hechter, 1977, pp38-40). The comparison within the classes rather than the comparison between the classes is more common in daily life (Runciman,1966). However, if the kinds of social roles an individual is allowed to play, both economically and politically, can be largely distinguished by her visible signs, such as lifestyles, language, or religious practice, the individual would be able to easily categorize herself and the other dominating groups (Hechter, 1977, p40). When group members are able to differentiate themselves from nongroup members, they often obtain group identity (Folger, 2012, p160). As these visible signs are also used to distinguish ethnic groups (Horowitz, 1985, p53), such group identity is usually an ethnic group identity. At the same time, as such culture

division of labor makes constrains on the less advanced groups' job choice and political participation, the possibilities for intercommunication will be maximized in the operation of the economy, which strengthens the solidarity among the less advanced groups (Hechter, 1977, pp42-43). Now, despite the imposed high culture chosen by the state, the industrial economy is more likely to create a sense of fundamental homogeneity among the discriminated people who work and communicate with each other in daily life, rather than fundamental homogeneity among the people in the entire economic system. This is the reason why modernization causes ethnonationalist civil conflicts when class cleavages and ethnic cleavages overlap (Sambanis, 2001, p263). Folger (2012, p160) argues that group grievance and deprivation happen when a person feels that "(1) he is part of a group; (2) which is entitled to an outcome; (3) the outcome being desired by the person for the group." Following his logic, the barriers to the mobility and culture division of labor make the people in the less advanced group identify with their less advanced ethnic group. The industrial economy and bureaucratically organized state make them believe they are entitled to be the equal bearer of sovereignty. They desire to achieve people's sovereignty and equality, but the reality of discrimination stops them from fulfilling their desire. These three conditions altogether generate group grievance, which may lead ethnic groups to overcome the collective action dilemma, causing the ethnonationalist civil conflicts which fight for the people's sovereignty and equality which discriminated group members believe they deserve.




Figure 1 Conceptual model

In general, modernization is an essential part of how political horizontal inequality and economic horizontal inequality create group grievance in less advanced ethnic groups. Modernization itself does not create such grievance. However, it helps create a group identity, and it makes more and more people believe they have the right to be the equal bearer of sovereignty and to be treated equally in the industrial economy. Political horizontal inequality captures how much the desire to be the bearer of sovereignty is not fulfilled, and economic horizontal inequality captures how much the desire to be treated equally in the industrial economy is not fulfilled. At the same time, the story of horizontal inequality is not sound without the national consciousness stimulated by modernization. Neither horizontal inequality nor modernization is a sufficient condition for group grievance. The following two hypotheses capture all my arguments:

H1: The effect of political horizontal inequality on the possibility of ethnonationalist civil conflict onset increases with the degree of modernization.

H2: The effect of economic horizontal inequality on the possibility of

ethnonationalist civil conflict onset increases with the degree of modernization.

5. Research design

As this article analyzes the probability of the onset of ethnonationalist civil conflict, it must have a clear political claim in the name of an ethnic group and receive large support from its group as I mentioned before. Previous literatures also use similar standard to select ethnonationalist civil conflicts (Cederman, Wimmer & Min, 2010, p101). To fit this requirement, I use the ACD2EPR 2018 dataset (Vogt et al.), and select the civil conflict which both have direct evidence for an exclusive claim to fight on behalf of an ethnic group and have the support from at least 50% of the members of an ethnic group. The conflicts included in this dataset count all conflicts between a state and one or more rebel groups that generated at least 25 battle-related deaths in a calendar year. The civil conflict onset is coded in the initial year of a new ethnonationalist civil conflict, and the civil conflicts in the same country that happened in the same year will only be counted one time. There are totally 85 ethnonationalist civil conflict onsets out of 306 total civil conflicts onsets between 1960 and 2005 that meet this standard. At the same time, as the onset of ethnonationalist civil war is a binary indicator, it is suitable to use logistic regression to test my hypothesis.

About the measurement of the degree of modernization, scholars usually use GNP per capita, electrical energy production, proportions of population in cities, primary school enrollment rate, literate population, and other variables depending on their topics (Morrison & Stevenson, 1972, p.100). As is mentioned previously, the two critical changes in the modern society that arouse the national consciousness are the industrial economy and the bureaucratically organized state. For the degree of bureaucratically

organized state, I choose the “Urban population (% of total population)” to measure. The urban citizens usually demand some form of participation in the political system while directly under the bureaucratic system’s control, and the people in villages are less participative in modern politics, living in a relatively traditional way of life (Huntington, 2006, p73). For this reason, I expect that the more percentage of the urban population, the more people are likely to be under the central government’s direct control, so the more likely for them to have the consciousness of people’s sovereignty. At the same time, as only 78 out of 5219 total observations are missing in that index, missing data issue may not cause serious bias. This index is from World Bank Data (The World Bank Group, 2020).

The degree of the industrial economy is more complicated. Although a lot of indexes such as electrical energy production or consumption, the proportion of industrial sector in the total GDP, CO2 emission, are closely related to the degree of the industrial economy, I choose “Employment in industry (% of total employment)” to measure this variable. According to the theory, I expect that the percentage of people working in the industrial sector can better measure the widespread of the concept of equality aroused by the process of working and job finding in the industrial economy. The flaw of this index is it only has the data after 1990, so I would consider the effect of industrialization and urbanization separately. At the same time, some people may argue that post-industrial economies do not fit into this narrative. The proportion of workers in the industrial sector may not reflect the widespread of the concept of equality. This is a potential weakness. However, only 8 countries have GDP per capital above

the third quarter with a percentage of employment in industry sector below the median of the total data, and only Netherland is the OECD country among these 8 countries. So, post-industrial economies may create some bias, but they would not be completely missed out by using this index. Almost all the post-industrial economies have a decent proportion of employment in the industrial sector. The data of this index are also from World Bank Data (The World Bank Group, 2020).

As urbanization and industrialization both are indicators of modernization, and they are highly correlated with each other, I expect the political and economic horizontal inequality both do not have a significant relationship with the onset of ethnonationalist civil conflicts in the countries with relatively low urbanization and relatively low industrialization. However, since urbanization and industrialization have different concentrations, I expect them to have different effects on political and economic horizontal inequality. As urbanization reflects traditional authority shift into the state bureaucracy and the increase of the awareness of people's sovereignty, I expect it makes political horizontal inequality more unbearable and will not change significantly change the effect of economic horizontal inequality. At the same time, as the sense of homogenous arises through the job finding and working in the industrial economy, I expect the proportion of employment in the industrial sector makes economic horizontal inequality more unbearable while has little effect on political horizontal inequality. I then revise the two hypotheses into

H1a: When the percentage of urban population increase, the effect of political horizontal inequality on the possibility of ethnonationalist civil conflict onset will

significantly increase.

H1b: When the percentage of urban population increase, the effect of economic horizontal inequality on the possibility of ethnic ethnonationalist conflict onset will not significantly increase.

H2a: When the percentage of employment in the industrial sector increases, the effect of political horizontal inequality on the possibility of ethnonationalist civil conflict onset will not significantly increase.

H2b: When the percentage of employment in the industrial sector increases, the effect of economic horizontal inequality on the possibility of ethnonationalist civil conflict onset will significantly increase.

I follow the research design of Buhaug, Cederman & Gleditsch's (2014) paper to measure political inequality and economic horizontal inequality. In their paper, they use "the demographic size of the largest discriminated ethnic group (LDG) relative to the joint size of the discriminated group and the group(s) in power" to calculate political horizontal inequality. In other words, the greater the proportion of the excluded population from power in the entire country is, the deeper the degree of discrimination in that country would be (Buhaug, Cederman & Gleditsch, 2014, p421). The range of LDG is from 0 to 0.98. At the same time, they also have a dummy variable to capture whether one or more ethnic groups in a country lost political status in the preceding year. As this variable reflects the possible grievance caused by losing political status, I expect urbanization will also increase losing political status' positive effect on the onset of ethnonationalist civil conflict.

To measure economic inequality, they construct two indicators. The first is negative horizontal inequality (NHI), where country-level GDP per cap is divided by the mean per capita income of the poorest group. The second is positive horizontal inequality (PHI), where the mean per capita income for the richest group is divided by country-level GDP per capita. However, according to the theory, the sense of group grievance and deprivation occurs when the less advanced groups compare their situation to the advanced groups, so I believe using the index which reflects the income gap between the richest group and the poorest group in a country may better measure the degree of economic horizontal inequality and group grievance. For this reason, I multiply NHI and PHI, creating a new index “Maxmin” where the mean per capita income for the richest group is divided by the mean per capita income of the poorest group. The range of this new index is from 1 to 15.661.

As this research is largely built on the former one, other control variables I used are the same variables as Buhaug, Cederman & Gleditsch’s(2014) used in their paper, which are Gini index of income dispersion (World Income Inequality Database, WIID), ethnic fractionalization index (ELF) (Fearon and Laitin's, 2003), lagged logged GDP per capita (Heston, Summers and Aten 2009), lagged democracy (Gates, Hegre, Jones and Strand 2006), lagged logged population size (Heston, Summers and Aten 2009), a dummy variable capture the division of executive power between leaders of different ethnic groups (power-sharing), and civil war lag indicator.

As the interaction terms are very likely to have multicollinearity problem with the original variable, influencing the significance, and logistic regression is more sensitive

to the multicollinearity problem, the two interacted variables are decreased by their mean first, and then multiply with each other (Wooldridge, 2016, p.178). For example:

$$\text{urbLDG}=(\text{urban}-\text{urban}_{\text{mean}})*(\text{LDG}-\text{LDG}_{\text{mean}})$$

By doing so, the multicollinearity problem can be eliminated.

6. Regression Analysis

A series of logistic regression models are estimated to testify the hypotheses. The first and second table are used to test my hypotheses preliminarily. In the first table, I first present the model with total data, and then divide the dataset into four subsets where the percentage of the urban population or the percentage of employment in the industrial sector is greater than the first quartile and is less than the first quartile, to exam whether the story of horizontal inequality is still valid in the less modernized situation. The result is the same as expected. Although the political horizontal inequality still shows its significance in the total data and the data after 1990, its coefficient and significance quickly decrease when the degree of urbanization or industrialization is relatively low. At the same time, the economic horizontal inequality fails to show its significance in the model with full data, but it appears to be somehow related to the onset of ethnonationalist civil conflicts after 1990. It shows significance at 95% level when the samples with a relatively low degree of industrialization are excluded. Meanwhile, the coefficient and significance of both political and economic horizontal inequality decrease in the samples with a relatively low degree of industrialization. The results confirm the theory of traditional society. Political or economic horizontal

Table 1 The effect of horizontal inequality in low urbanized sample

	Full data (1)	Urbanization \geq 25% (2)	Urbanization \leq 25% (3)
Political Inequality	1.959*** (0.570)	3.121*** (0.864)	0.737 (0.951)
Economic Inequality	0.075 (0.055)	0.067 (0.063)	0.199 (0.255)
Political Downgrading	0.629 (0.460)	0.700 (0.658)	0.575 (0.653)
Ethnic Fractionalization	0.121 (0.570)	-0.037 (0.946)	-0.068 (0.821)
Gini	-0.013 (0.015)	0.003 (0.022)	-0.032 (0.028)
Power-sharing	0.492 (0.307)	1.084** (0.439)	-0.100 (0.490)
Democracy	0.224 (0.443)	-0.399 (0.606)	0.982 (0.663)
Population lag	0.324*** (0.102)	0.312** (0.152)	0.248 (0.161)
GDP per capita lag	-0.223 (0.268)	0.134 (0.364)	-0.382 (0.452)
Civil Conflicts lag	1.398*** (0.291)	1.612*** (0.407)	1.181*** (0.420)
Urban Population%	-0.003 (0.011)	-0.006 (0.018)	-0.009 (0.042)
Constant	-7.852*** (1.378)	-8.899*** (2.165)	-5.890*** (2.193)
Observations	5,141	3,855	1,286
Log Likelihood	-296.986	-164.392	-126.611
Akaike Inf. Crit.	617.972	352.784	277.223

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 2 The effect of horizontal inequality in low industrialized sample

	Full data (after 1990) (1)	Industrialization \geq 25% (2)	Industrialization \leq 25% (3)
Political Inequality	3.609*** (1.175)	4.533*** (1.976)	2.593 (1.804)
Economic Inequality	0.139* (0.080)	0.183* (0.094)	-0.050 (0.604)
Political Downgrading	-0.217 (1.114)	-15.423 (1464.27)	0.750 (1.348)
Ethnic Fractionalization	-0.366 (1.076)	-0.235 (1.802)	-0.502 (1.670)
Gini	-0.021 (0.031)	-0.002 (0.042)	-0.043 (0.058)
Power-sharing	0.957* (0.576)	2.209** (0.915)	-0.781 (0.985)
Democracy	-0.419 (0.949)	-0.496 (1.360)	-0.902 (1.537)
Population lag	0.421** (0.187)	0.541** (0.273)	0.180 (0.500)
GDP per capita lag	0.512 (0.417)	0.299 (0.543)	0.835 (0.827)
Civil Conflicts lag	1.323*** (0.508)	1.276* (0.690)	1.276 (0.804)
Industry Employment%	-0.083* (0.047)	-0.022 (0.071)	-0.026 (0.141)
Constant	-8.092*** (2.489)	-12.088*** (4.351)	-3.946 (5.386)
Observations	1,903	1427	476
Log Likelihood	-96.716	-55.500	-34.876
Akaike Inf. Crit.	217.432	135.000	93.753

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01




Figure 2 Comparing the effects and 95% confident interval of horizontal inequality under different degree of urbanization




Figure 3 Comparing the effects and 95% confident interval of horizontal inequality under different degree of industrialization

inequality is not likely to generate group grievance which may lead the ethnic groups to engage in ethnonationalist civil conflicts to fight for their sovereignty in less modernized states.

Next, in order to test whether modernization intensifies the group grievance caused by the horizontal inequality, I interact the percentage of urban population and the index of political and economic horizontal inequality. The first model in the table is the original model without introducing the effect of urbanization. Then I add interaction terms separately into the original horizontal inequality model. The results confirm H1a. The increase in the percentage of the urban population would increase the positive effect of horizontal political inequality on the possibility of the onset of ethnonationalist civil conflicts. At the same time, losing political status in the previous year does not show significance in the original model. However, when the interactive effect of modernization is taken into account, both political downgrading and its interaction term show their positive relationship with the possibility of the onset of the ethnonationalist civil conflicts. These results strongly support Giddens's idea about the "dialect of control". When the state wants to control its citizens, it stimulates the citizens' sovereignty consciousness to control the state, which makes losing the right to be the bearer of sovereignty much more unbearable compare with the people live in traditional society.

Meanwhile, economic horizontal inequality and its interaction term are consistently not significantly related to the onset of ethnonationalist civil conflicts, which testify H1b. In the full model, I do not include the interaction term between

Table 3 Determinants of Ethnonationalist Civil Conflict Onset, 1960-2005 (Urbanization)

	Original model (1)	LDG*urban (2)	urban*Downgrade (3)	urban*Maxmin (4)	Full model (5)
Political Inequality(LDG)	1.966*** (0.571)	2.616*** (0.627)	1.898*** (0.570)	2.020*** (0.574)	2.531*** (0.637)
urbanization* Political Inequality		0.050** (0.022)			0.046** (0.023)
urbanization* Political Downgrading			0.039** (0.019)		0.035* (0.019)
urbanization* Economic Inequality				-0.003 (0.004)	
Economic Inequality(Maxmin)	0.074 (0.055)	0.092 (0.057)	0.069 (0.056)	0.138 (0.088)	0.086 (0.058)
Political Downgrading	0.626 (0.460)	0.636 (0.461)	0.946** (0.481)	0.603 (0.462)	0.909* (0.485)
Power-sharing	0.491 (0.308)	0.446 (0.307)	0.452 (0.310)	0.524* (0.308)	0.422 (0.308)
Ethnic Fractionalization	0.154 (0.560)	0.093 (0.569)	0.194 (0.579)	-0.021 (0.593)	0.151 (0.576)
Gini	-0.013 (0.015)	-0.019 (0.016)	-0.012 (0.016)	-0.015 (0.016)	-0.018 (0.016)
Democracy	0.227 (0.443)	0.248 (0.443)	0.218 (0.447)	0.265 (0.447)	0.248 (0.447)
Population lag	0.326*** (0.101)	0.309*** (0.100)	0.321*** (0.102)	0.299*** (0.105)	0.306*** (0.100)
GDP per capita lag	-0.278 (0.173)	-0.124 (0.269)	-0.182 (0.269)	-0.229 (0.268)	-0.100 (0.270)
Civil Conflict lag	1.392*** (0.290)	1.314*** (0.290)	1.346*** (0.294)	1.421*** (0.292)	1.275*** (0.293)
urbanization		-0.015 (0.012)	-0.007 (0.012)	-0.003 (0.011)	-0.017 (0.012)
Constant	-7.954*** (1.327)	-7.117*** (1.394)	-7.735*** (1.385)	-7.598*** (1.404)	-7.046*** (1.406)
Log Likelihood	-297.023	-294.412	-294.722	-296.621	-292.601
Akaike Inf. Crit.	616.045	614.823	615.444	619.242	613.203

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Observations: 5,141

economic horizontal inequality and urbanization.

It is quite hard to use the odds language to illustrate the interaction term, so I present the figure of the marginal effect of the political horizontal inequality (LDG) to ethnonationalist civil war under different level of the urban population in normal states¹ that did not experience civil conflict and at least one group lost its political status in the previous year. We can clearly see the effect of political horizontal inequality changes a lot under different levels of the urban population. Compared to the marginal effect in a normal state with 1st quartile urbanization, the marginal effect of LDG doubles in a normal state with 3rd quartile urbanization when LDG is around 0.4. I also present the figure of the first difference in the probability of the onset of ethnonationalist civil conflict between a normal state with 3rd quartile urbanization and another normal state with 1st quartile urbanization. When LDG equals 0.6, the possibility of the normal state with 3rd quartile urbanization to have the onset of ethnonationalist civil conflict is 10% bigger than the normal state with 1st quartile urbanization. As the onset of ethnonationalist civil conflict is a rare event whose probability of occurrence is around 1.26%, the first difference between a highly urbanized normal state and a low urbanized normal state is relatively big.

¹ A normal state means that state's other variables are all at the mean of the total data, while it did not experience civil conflict and at least one group lost its political status in the previous year.




Figure 4 The marginal effects of LDG under different rate of urbanization




Figure 5 First Difference between a normal state with 3rd quartile urbanization and a normal state with 1st quartile urbanization

In order to test the effect of industrialization, I follow the same process to add the interaction terms separately into the original horizontal inequality model. This time the results are different from expected. Although the interaction term between industrialization and political horizontal inequality is positive and insignificant as expected, the interaction term with economic horizontal inequality fails to show its significance. It seems that although the horizontal inequality is not likely to generate the onset of ethnonationalist civil conflicts in the state with a low level of industrialization, the grievance caused by the horizontal inequality is not likely to increase when the degree of industrialization deepens. There are two possible illustrations for these results. First, although most of the post-industrial economies have a relatively high percentage of employment in the industrial sector, their citizens' consciousness of equality is much stronger than the citizens in the developing countries with similar a percentage of employment in the industrial sector. This is the reason why the coefficient of horizontal inequality is much smaller in the states with a low level of industrialization, but its interaction term with industrialization does not show any significance. The second possible reason is the percentage of employment in the industrial sector only has a threshold effect. When a state has a certain degree of industrialization, its citizens begin to be aware of the problem of economic equality. I prefer to accept the first explanation. Imagine a quite industrialized country with two groups of people. Most of the people in the advanced group work in the industrial sector, while most of the people in the less advanced groups are farmers. Although the percentage of employment in the industrial section may be bigger than the 1st quartile

Table 4 Determinants of Ethnonationalist Civil Conflict Onset, 1960-2005 (Industrialization)

	Original model (1)	Indus*LDG (2)	Indus*Downgrade (3)	Indus*Maxmin (4)
Political Inequality(LDG)	3.609*** (1.175)	2.361 (2.118)	3.312*** (1.225)	3.601*** (1.172)
Economic Inequality(Maxmin)	0.139* (0.080)	0.155* (0.083)	0.136* (0.079)	0.041 (0.167)
Industrialization* Political Inequality		0.092 (0.120)		
Industrialization* Political Downgrading			-1.070 (2.961)	
Industrialization* Economic Inequality				0.009 (0.013)
Political Downgrading	-0.217 (1.114)	-0.122 (1.110)	-17.550 (53.146)	-0.375 (1.169)
Ethnic Fractionalization	-0.366 (1.076)	-0.487 (1.072)	-0.207 (1.096)	-0.213 (1.095)
Gini	-0.021 (0.031)	-0.022 (0.031)	-0.015 (0.031)	-0.019 (0.032)
Power-sharing	0.957* (0.576)	0.937 (0.571)	0.978* (0.580)	0.926 (0.582)
Democracy	-0.419 (0.949)	-0.347 (0.949)	-0.575 (0.954)	-0.430 (0.952)
Population lag	0.421** (0.187)	0.446** (0.191)	0.420** (0.186)	0.442** (0.191)
GDP per capita lag	0.512 (0.417)	0.538 (0.419)	0.497 (0.421)	0.543 (0.419)
Civil Conflict Lag	1.323*** (0.508)	1.259** (0.509)	1.362*** (0.513)	1.296** (0.511)
Industrialization	-0.083* (0.047)	-0.100* (0.054)	-0.106 (0.123)	-0.085* (0.047)
Constant	-8.092*** (2.489)	-8.008*** (2.488)	-7.738** (3.362)	-8.277*** (2.497)
Observations	1,903	1,903	1,903	1,903
Log Likelihood	-96.716	-96.404	-95.214	-96.464
Akaike Inf. Crit.	217.432	218.808	216.428	218.928

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

of the total data, the consciousness of equality is still rare among the less advanced group's members. At the same time, I believe such countries are not rare. In the total 46 countries whose economic horizontal inequality is above the median and the percentage of employment in the industrial sector is above the 1st quartile, 39 of them have not experienced ethnonationalist civil conflicts. In order to testify Gellner's theory about industrialization, we need better data to deal with the bias caused by the post-industrial economies in this model.

7. Out-of-sample prediction and robustness test

So far, I have shown that by introducing the aspect of modernization, we can better understand the effect of horizontal inequality on the onset of ethnonationalist. Next, I am going to introduce a new method of out-of-sample prediction and compare the predictive performance of the original model in Buhaug, Cederman & Gleditsch's paper and the extended full model which includes the interaction terms between urbanization, political horizontal inequality and political downgrading. The ethnonationalist civil conflict data is extremely imbalanced. The positive cases are only 1.26% of the total data. Logistic regression is not the best choice for the prediction in imbalanced data, as the conditional probabilities of rare cases are often underestimated (King and Zeng, 2001). In other words, in order to fit most of the data, the logistic regression is likely to underestimate the effect of variables, which makes none of the predicted probability of ethnonationalist civil conflicts exceeds the 0.5 threshold. In the prediction of conflicts, the overall error rate and ROC curve would be meaningless. If none of the predicted probability can exceed 0.5, then the overall error rate would definitely be lower than 1.5%, which has no practical meaning. Traditionally, logistic regression is better in explanation rather than prediction in imbalanced data.

Recently, data scientists have developed a method to balance these two goals. To better deal with the classification problem in the presence of imbalanced classes, the traditional method in machine learning is to add different weights to the imbalanced classes to make them balanced (Menardi and Torelli, 2014, p97). In my case, as the cases of non-onset are extremely more common than the cases of onset, I need to

oversample the positive cases or undersample the negative cases to get a balanced sample in the training set for the purpose of prediction. Both of these methods improving the overall accuracy of the classifier (Menardi and Torelli, 2014, p97). Also, they have drawbacks. Undersampling may throw away useful data when reducing the sample size, while oversampling may increase the problem of overfitting when replicating the positive cases (McCarthy et al., 2005). By doing so, the coefficient of each variable would certainly change a lot. However, as the effect of variables has been explained in the data analysis section and the artificial data would only be used in the prediction section, I do not think the process of rebalancing the training data would decrease my model's explanatory power.

Meanwhile, the overall error rate would increase after rebalancing the training data, but it is worth it. Policymakers may not care much about how many negative cases are correctly classified as negative. Precision and recall are better performance measures (Menardi and Torelli, 2014, p99). Precision is the percentage of truly predicted positive cases in the total predicted positive cases, while recall is the percentage of truly predicted positive cases in the total actual positive cases. For example, in predicting the civil conflicts, policymakers may want more onset cases to be foreseen in order to develop plans to lower the loss caused by the conflicts, so they want to increase recall. At the same time, they also want the predicted positive cases to be more precise, or they will waste a lot of time and money to prepare for the civil conflicts which actually do not happen, so they also want to increase precision. These two measures have to be used jointly, combining into a function called F measure, which is the

$\text{Precision} \times \text{Recall} / (\text{Precision} + \text{Recall})$ (Menardi and Torelli, 2014, p99). The bigger the F measure, the better predictive power the model has. The F measure is more important in predicting rare events such as ethnonationalist civil conflicts.

The ROSE package in R uses the approach of oversampling rare cases by generating some clones of the observed data without producing ties (Menardi and Torelli, 2014, p103). In other words, the artificial data are generated according to a smoothed bootstrap approach rather than merely increase the multiplicity of the rare events (Lunardon, Menardi & Torelli, 2014). Such a method can reduce the possibility of overfitting (Menardi and Torelli, 2014, p104). In this section, I use the ROSE package (Menardi and Torelli, 2014; Lunardon, Menardi & Torelli, 2014) to conduct out-of-sample prediction. Similarly, the data between 1960 and 2000 are selected as training data, while the data between 2001 and 2005 are testing set. Originally, there are 4437 negative cases and 59 positive cases in the training set. After generating artificial data, there are 2253 negative cases and 2233 positive cases in the training set now. Next, the prediction is just like the process in the normal logistic regression prediction, except now we are using this revised balanced training dataset. As the positive and negative cases have already been balanced, the predicting threshold would be 0.5 as normal.

Using such a method, the prediction results are much better. Both of the model's recall is 0.833, which means only one out of six ethnonationalist civil conflicts from 2001 to 2005 has not been foreseen by both of the models. Meanwhile, the precision of my new model is slightly better than the original horizontal model. It reflects that the

original model wrongly attributes three more negative cases into the positive ones than my new model. Although the precision 0.043 seems to be relatively small, 0.043 is 4.6 times the probability of the ethnonationalist civil conflict from 2001 to 2005. Generally speaking, if policymakers keep an eye on 23 out of the total 129 countries in the dataset each year on average, they can foresee 5/6 of the ethnonationalist civil conflicts based on my model. If they use the original horizontal inequality model, they need to keep an eye on one more country each year.

Table 5 The Out-of-Sample Prediction conducted by the method used in Buhaug, Cederman & Gleditsch's(2014) paper, 2001--2005

	New model		HI model	
Predicted \ Observed	No onset	Onset	No onset	Onset
No onset	595	5	595	5
Onset	25	0	25	0
Precision	0		0	
Recall	0		0	
F measure	0		0	

Table 6 The Out-of-Sample Prediction adjusted by ROSE, 2001--2005

	New model		HI model	
Predicted \ Observed	No onset	Onset	No onset	Onset
No onset	528	111	525	114
Onset	1	5	1	5
Precision	0.043		0.042	
Recall	0.833		0.833	
F measure	0.041		0.040	

Using this method provided by the ROSE package, I also use my model to testify Fearon and Laitin's (2003, p77) argument that the prevalence of civil conflict is not due to the effect of the end of the Cold War. As the Cold War ended in 1991, I use the data from 1960 to 1991 as the training set, and the data from 1992 to 2005 as the testing set. The results show a similar thing as Fearon and Laitin show in their article. There are totally 20 ethnonationalist civil conflicts between 1992 and 2005, and only three of them failed to be foreseen by the data during the Cold War in my model. In this sense, Huntington (1996) seems to be wrong to believe the clash of civilizations, rather than the same reason during the Cold War, is the main reason for the civil conflicts after the Cold War. My prediction results show that 17 out of the total 20 ethnonationalist civil conflicts can be explained by the same reason as the ethnonationalist civil conflicts during the cold war. The logic of ethnonationalist civil conflicts does not change because of the end of the Cold War.

Table 7 The Out-of-Sample Prediction adjusted by ROSE, 1992--2005

	New model		HI model	
Predicted \ Observed	No onset	Onset	No onset	Onset
Non-onset	1380	392	1359	413
Onset	3	17	4	16
Precision	0.042		0.037	
Recall	0.850		0.800	
F measure	0.040		0.036	

Then comes the robust test. This time I change my dependent variable into the dependent variable used in Buhaug, Cederman & Gleditsch's paper (2014). In their paper, they use the data from the Non-State Actor dataset (Cunningham, Gleditsch & Salehyan, 2009) and distinguish the conflicts into three categories: ethnic territorial conflict, ethnic governmental conflict and non-ethnic conflict. I select the ethnic territorial conflicts and ethnic governmental conflicts according to their standard and combine them together to form new data about the onset of ethnic civil conflict. I use this new dependent variable to rerun my new model with the interaction term.

The interaction term between urbanization and political horizontal inequality is still positive and significant. The log-likelihood number of my new model is also better than the horizontal inequality model. However, the interaction term between urbanization and political downgrading becomes insignificant and changes its sign. The effect of modernization on a certain ethnic group losing political status needs to be further

Table 8 Alternative Civil Conflict Data, 1960-1999, 1960-2005 (Urbanization)

	With Interaction (1)	Without Interaction (2)
Political Inequality(LDG)	2.456*** (0.597)	1.772*** (0.515)
urbanization* Political Inequality	0.040* (0.021)	
urbanization* Political Downgrading	-0.013 (0.021)	
Economic Inequality(Maxmin)	0.121** (0.053)	0.114** (0.051)
Ethnic Fractionalization Gini	1.578*** (0.539) -0.044*** (0.015)	1.594*** (0.524) -0.040*** (0.014)
Political Downgrading Power-sharing	0.918* (0.545) -0.155 (0.270)	1.151*** (0.354) -0.158 (0.269)
Democracy	0.810** (0.391)	0.792** (0.390)
Population lag	0.268*** (0.086)	0.276*** (0.087)
GDP per capita lag Civil Conflict lag urbanization	-0.632*** (0.240) -0.204 (0.282) -0.001 (0.012)	-0.588*** (0.156) -0.194 (0.285)
Constant	-5.919*** (1.216)	-6.202*** (1.125)
Observations	5,141	5,141
Log Likelihood	-349.766	-351.699
Akaike Inf. Crit.	727.533	725.398

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

analyzed. Overall, the main relationship between modernization and horizontal inequality does not change.

8. Conclusion

This article expands the understanding of modernization on the story of horizontal inequality. Horizontal inequality alone is not enough to explain the onset of ethnonationalist civil conflicts. It is the process of modernization that makes the horizontal political and economic inequality more and more unbearable to people, who form a national identity, and fight for their people's sovereignty and equality. Being applied to the cross-national conflict research for the first time, the modernist nationalism theory illustrates the ethnonationalist civil conflicts generated by horizontal inequality. At the same time, by using the ROSE package, the performance of the out-of-sample prediction of my new model is also slightly better than the original horizontal inequality model. Such a prediction method may be useful in future conflict studies which have imbalanced data.

This research still has several flaws that need further improvement. First, the percentage of workers in the industrial sector shows its threshold effect to distinguish the states with and without a decent degree of industrialization, but it fails to show its interactive effect. More advanced data or methods are needed to deal with the bias caused by the post-industrial economies. Second, although my new model with the interaction terms functions better in the out-of-sample prediction than the original horizontal inequality model, my model's precision is still quite small. In order to better predict the ethnonationalist civil conflicts, we need to use some advanced datasets such as The GDELT Project to improve our models.

Last but not least, the modernist nationalism theory is helpful to illustrate the

ethnonationalist civil conflicts related to horizontal inequality, but there are other types of ethnonationalist civil conflicts which horizontal inequality cannot explain. 31 of the total 67 ethnonationalist civil conflicts happen in the states whose percentage of urban population is lower than the 1st quartile, but the indexes of horizontal inequality fail to show their significance. This result reflects that the story of horizontal inequality, or the story of horizontal inequality and modernization, can only illustrate half of the ethnonationalist civil conflicts. The reason why ethnonationalist civil conflicts happen in the less modernized states needs further research.

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