

DYNAMIC AND LASTING IMPACTS:
SOCIOECONOMIC EFFECTS OF PROTRACTED REFUGEE
CAMPS ON HOST COMMUNITIES IN TANZANIA

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Abstract	8
Introduction	9
The Refugee-Host Relationship in Theory and Practice	12
Political Context of Refugee Protraction in Africa	12
The Effects of Protraction on Refugee-Host Relationships	14
Refugee-Assisting Organization Impacts in Refugee-Affected Areas	20
Integration Attempts to link Local Populations with Refugee Assistance	23
Methods of Investigation	26
Western Tanzania as Case Study	29
Country Context	29
Host Community Context	31
Kilemba	34
Kazilamihunda	38
Kasuga	40
Dynamic Impacts of Refugee Presence Across Villages	42
Trade and Markets	42
Income-Generating Activities	45
Health Effects	46
Regional Insecurity	47
Evolving Perceptions of Refugees	49
Refugee-Affiliated NGO Presence Lags Behind Refugee Presence	51
Discussion Of Findings	53
Four Stages of Interaction in Camp Presence	53
Lasting Impacts of Camp Presence on Village Wealth	56
Lasting Impacts of Camp Presence on Household Wealth	61
High Impact Ngos and Projects	64
Local Capacity Affects the Impact of Refugee Camp Presence on Hosts	66
Policy Implications	70
Future Research and Application	74
Appendix	76
A. Constructing Household Wealth	76
B. Village Wealth Comparison	78
C. Village Ngo Contact By Organization	80

D. Focus Group Guiding Questions	83
E. Household Survey	85
References	100

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ABBREVIATIONS

CSFM	Center for the Study of Forced Migration, University of Dar es Salaam
CONCERN	Concern Worldwide
DANIDA	Danish International Development Agency
DRC	Democratic Republic of the Congo
EU	European Union
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
GOT	Government of the United Republic of Tanzania
INGO	International Non-governmental organizations
IRC	International Rescue Committee
KDC	Kibondo District Council
KSP	Kigoma Socioeconomic Profile
KIDEREA	Kibondo Development and Relief Agency
LDC	Least Developed Country
MHA	Tanzanian Ministry of Home Affairs
NGO	Non-governmental organization
RAD	Refugee aid and development theories
REDESO	Relief to Development Society
SAEU	South African Extension Unit
SRS	Self-Reliance Strategy
TASAF	Tanzania Social Action Fund
TLTC	Tanzania Leaf Tobacco Company
TCRS	Tanganyika Christian Refugee Service
TWESA	Tanzanian Water and Sanitation Association
UDSM	University of Dar es Salaam
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
VEO	Village Executive Officer
WFP	World Food Program

TABLES AND FIGURES

Table 1. Geographic Context Of Surveyed Villages.....	32
Table 2. Village Ngo Contact	34
Table 3. Kilemba Crop Yields Over The Past Year Compared To Kazilamihunda And Kasuga.....	36
Table 4. During Camp Refugee Demand And Supply (1995-2006).....	43
Table 5. Refugee Presence In Each Village By Impact	59
Table 6. Ngo Contact In Wealthiest And Poorest Households	63
Figure 1. Hierarchy Of Influence Concentrates Power On National And International Players	14
Figure 1. Average Households Wealth By Village.....	57
Figure 2. Bar Graph Items Purchased In The Past Week By Villages.....	58
Figure 3. Refugee-Affiliated Ngo Saturation In Three Surveyed Villages.....	60
Figure 4. Box Plot Of Basic Wealth Comparisons By Village	62
Figure 5. Policy Interventions In The Host-Refugee Framework.....	71

MAPS


Map 1. Tanzania Regional Boundaries (NBS, June 2008)	6
Map 2. Refugee Camps In Western Tanzania (UNHCR, Jan 2009).....	7

Map 1. Tanzania Regional Boundaries (NBS, June 2008)

MAP OF TANZANIA: REGIONAL BOUNDARIES



Map 2. Refugee camps in western Tanzania (UNHCR, Jan 2009)



ABSTRACT

Poor sub-Saharan African countries are more likely to host long-term refugee situations in the 21st century than in previous decades. Many hosting governments have restricted refugees to camps because they consider long-term refugees to be economic burdens. Refugee-affiliated organizations have attempted to address this complaint by exploring development projects for locals living in refugee-affected areas. To investigate how refugees and NGOs actually impact host communities during and after camp protraction, three Tanzanian villages near a recently closed fourteen-year-old refugee camp were assessed using a mixed-methods research approach. Impacts from camp presence were analyzed based on those caused by refugees themselves, and those by refugee-affiliated humanitarian organizations. Focus groups discussions provide evidence of four different stages of camp presence effects: high instability during initial presence, positive interactions for eight years, increased crime and tensions ten years after initial contact, and lagging NGO development and compensation interventions during and after camp disbandment. NGO benefits for hosts also grew 5-6 years after camp construction. Household surveys indicated that refugee camp presence did not appear to noticeably affect village wealth, but could contribute to large economic impacts on specific households based on the household's absorption capacity to take advantage of refugee-related opportunities. To reduce tension, increase absorption capacity and protect vulnerable host populations, NGOs should coordinate skill-exchange programs, community-level governance structures and community crime watch programs between refugees and hosts.

INTRODUCTION

In the early 1990s, to accommodate thousands of displaced Burundians in northwestern Tanzania, emergency relief organizations found themselves in need of materials to build refugee camps. Residents in nearby Kazilamihunda village had long since made bricks on their homesteads for themselves or for neighbor's houses, but they seized the opportunity relief organizations brought and began to make bricks on a larger scale. Instead of producing them as a cottage industry,¹ several villagers devoted a large piece of land to exclusively make and burn bricks for organizations such as the International Rescue Committee (IRC) and the Tanganyika Christian Refugee Service (TCRS). By the time high demand for bricks by refugee-assisting non-governmental organizations (NGO) shrank ten years later, Kazilamihunda's brick-making industry had established a reputation in Kibondo District. Villagers bought from and worked in the brick-making business, and staff from humanitarian organizations and government projects in surrounding areas continued to travel to Kazilamihunda to purchase them. The village had found a lasting industry with consistent demand through word of mouth.

Save brick ovens, few physical reminders in Kazilamihunda remain of the hundreds of thousands of Burundian refugees² who only until recently lived less than five miles away. When Kazilamihunda residents are asked about their refugee neighbors however, they nostalgically recall a time when Burundian women swept Saturday local markets to buy cassava and sell rationed maize flour, rope and blue-and-white canvas sheets bearing the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) logo. Like many other villages in western Tanzania,

1 A cottage industry involves the manufacturing of goods and services at home and as part-time employment by many individual households.

2 According to the 1951 United Nations Convention on the Status of Refugees and Stateless Persons (2009), a refugee is any person who is outside his or her country of origin because of a well-founded fear of persecution based on race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion. A more simple interpretation of a refugee could be any individual unwillingly forced to leave his home country.

Kazilamihunda shouldered a variety of consequences—some positive, other negative—that came with living next to a multi-million dollar foreign-run “surrogate state” with the population of a small city (Slaughter, 2009).³

Until refugees from Burundi, Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of Congo repatriated in 2008, Tanzania was one out of thirty-three protracted refugee situations in the beginning of the 21st century. Defined as cases where refugee populations of over 25,000 persons have been exiled in a developing country without a clear resettlement or repatriation plan for five or more years, refugee camp protraction has become more common in the past two decades (UNHCR, Global Trends Report 2009). According to a UNHCR report (2009), protracted refugee situations rose from 50% of total refugee cases in the early 1990s to include two-thirds out of the 10.5 million refugees worldwide in 2008. The average lifespan of a camp also increased from nine to seventeen years in the past decade (USCRI, 2004). An article in an August 2009 print edition of *The Economist* (2009) predicted that the remaining refugee cases were likely to continue to grow harder to solve. If this ominous prediction is true and existing situations remain unresolved, refugees are likely to become more financially and emotionally vulnerable, dependent on donor money and more likely to engage in crime (Crisp, 2003).

Protraction affects hosting areas as well. Since over four-fifths of refugee camps are in developing countries, prolonged presence often exacerbates strains on limited local resources (UNHCR Global Trends Report, 2009). Particularly in sub-Saharan Africa,⁴ home of two

³ Refugees in Kigoma Region, where Kazilamihunda is located, were so prevalent that they drove a 4.8 percent annual average population growth rate from 1988 to 2002, compared to a 2.92 national average (Tanzania Population and Census, 2002).

⁴ According to UN-OHRILLS (2009), 70% of countries in sub-Saharan Africa are classified by the United Nations as least developed countries (LDCs), or countries with Gross National Incomes per capita of less than 750USD.

million, or roughly twenty percent, of the world's refugees,⁵ poverty, destructive conflicts, and little strategic interest by western political powers further damage host areas (UNHCR, 2009). Operating in these conditions has forced the international refugee aid regime to scramble for intermediate solutions to the economic, political and rights-based problems that tend to arise in protracted refugee situations.

Over the past several decades, host governments in sub-Saharan Africa have argued that long-term refugee presence has negative effects on their economies. Consequently, 7 out of 10 African refugees live on camps that are often located in isolated, marginalized and sparsely populated parts of the host country (UNHCR Global Trends, 2009). Noting these host government restrictions, Jeff Crisp, head of the UNHCR Policy Development and Evaluation Service, wrote that for refugees to live a “peaceful and productive life in exile,” the refugee aid regime must “demonstrate that the economy and security of [the] refugee-hosting countr[y] will...be strengthened” (Crisp, 2003, p. 29). Fortunately, no longer preoccupied with violent global adjustments to a new post-Cold War world, UNHCR and relief organizations have recently been able to shift their attention to searching for host-friendly strategies to help refugees in chronic camp environments.

This research examines the economic burden argument host governments have made by looking at protracted refugee impacts from the local host population's point of view. Specifically, it examines the dynamic and lasting socioeconomic effects of protracted camps on host populations through western Tanzania as a case study. Drawing from empirical findings, the paper then explores policy interventions that can help local hosts gain from the positive and mitigate the negative impacts of long-term camps. By involving refugees, such recommendations

⁵ As of the end of 2008 (UN World Refugee Survey, 2009).

also contribute to self-reliance strategies sought by the refugee aid regime to relieve problems commonly associated with prolonged camp residence.

THE REFUGEE-HOST RELATIONSHIP IN THEORY AND PRACTICE

Political Context of Refugee Protraction in Africa

Legally established in the middle of the 20th century, refugee relief was originally designed as a partnership between the international refugee aid regime and the governments of refugee-hosting countries (UNHCR Statute, 2007). The international refugee aid regime is comprised of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), international donors and humanitarian organizations. UNHCR was mandated by the United Nations to serve as the primary implementer of refugee protection. In this role, the organization coordinates emergency relief efforts and runs ‘care and maintenance’ programs until refugee cases are safely resolved under one of three ‘durable solutions.’ The three possible solutions include 1) voluntary repatriation to the country of origin, 2) local integration in the host country, and 3) resettlement in a third country. Host countries were requested to maintain their responsibility in burden-sharing arrangement by respecting the principle of *non-refoulement*⁶ and providing security to both refugees and humanitarian support staff.

The conditions of this relationship were forged to primarily address mass refugee displacement in Europe through resettlement arrangements after World War II. However, by the 1960s, refugee movements became more prominent in developing regions of the world. Refugees were particularly common in sub-Saharan Africa, where many countries were struggling for

⁶ *Non-refoulement* refers to the principle in international law that protects refugees from being returned to places where their lives or liberty would be endangered.

independence. Many industrialized countries balked at the idea of absorbing mass populations of exiled people from these poor areas (Crisp, 2001). They began to promote ‘regional’ and ‘protection in regions of origin’ solutions to mass refugee exoduses (Slaughter, 2009). In fact, for two decades, the international refugee aid regime focused on ‘care and maintenance’ strategies for refugee populations in Africa and strove for refugee ‘self-sufficiency’ on non-restricted refugee settlements in host countries (Harrell-Bond, 1986; Crisp, 2001).


During this time—around the 1970s—the nature of conflict in Africa began to evolve. Instead of fighting for freedom from colonial powers, conflicts over power and resources within autonomous states became more common. Messy and ongoing, resource-driven conflicts amongst militias and bandit groups subsequently fractured the pan-African socialist solidarity of the 1960s. Host governments in African countries began to regard refugees as a greater threat to regional stability. They also interpreted industrialized country enthusiasm for ‘regional solutions’ as First-World attempts to sequester poor exiled peoples to the less developed areas from which they originated (Slaughter, 2009). African host countries believed that the international community was avoiding their burden-sharing responsibilities.

As new waves of refugees from war-torn nations continued to cross into their borders, host governments in some sub-Saharan African countries began to respond by reducing refugee political, social and legal rights, restricting refugee movement and refusing local integration as a durable solution (Kaiser, 2005; Slaughter, 2009). The governments of Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania, for example, began to move refugees to poorly resourced and marginalized parts of their countries instead of providing land and resources to live self-sufficiently on designated settlements (Veney, 2007). These policies contradicted the actual need for restricted, demilitarized zones during initial refugee arrival and relaxed restrictions after refugee presence

stabilized. ‘Self-sufficiency’ was no longer a viable option for refugees living in many African countries of asylum.

The following figure illustrates the power hierarchies present in the majority of existing refugee situations across sub-Saharan Africa.

Figure 1. Hierarchy of Power in Recent International Refugee Relief Operations⁷



Refugees and local host populations form the lowest level of the hierarchy because their domain of control is restricted to their immediate surroundings. For many refugee situations in Africa starting in the late 1980s, these surroundings were the limits of the refugee camp itself.

The Effects of Protraction on Refugee-Host Relationships

⁷ Figure produced by author to illustrate typical power structures in refugee situations.

The decision many African governments made to move and confine these unwanted populations did not only affect refugees themselves. Location affects refugee-host relationships, which can strongly influence hosts. Although somewhat dependent on social, political, historical and policy conditions, past research has shown that interactions between refugees and local hosting populations tend to evolve in similar ways. Initially, some governments and even local populations view refugee presence as positive opportunities. In Nairobi for example, local populations welcomed Somali refugees who were typically wealthier and more willing to pay high rents, start businesses, buy goods and services, and generate new economic opportunities (Veney, 2007). For populations that share a common language and cultural similarities, hosts and refugees naturally socialized and formed friendships when they interacted. According to Veney (2007), local Kenyans frequented Somali refugee camps to talk, exchange gossip and discuss political events in restaurants, teashops and stores. The same positive initial reception occurred in west Africa. In the early years of refugee presence, Kaiser (2001) noted that “relations between [Sierra Leone] refugee communities and the [Guinean] local population are said to be good” (pp. 13-14).

Refugee presence changed market composition and introduced new business opportunities for traders in surrounding areas. Trade opportunities often occurred in the camp marketplace, camp sections, local villages and along main roads (Callamard, 1994). In Kenya, Somali refugees and Kenyan hosts sold agricultural products, clothing, radios, firewood, and other commodities to one another in expanded local markets (Veney, 2007). According to Turner (2001), one Congolese camp in Tanzania boasted “48 restaurants, 32 bars, 95 shops...and 116 market stalls” (p.161). In Kakuma, Kenya, commercial activities in ‘shopping centers’ “stretched for more than one kilometer” including “butcheries, groceries...hotels, satellite TV and video

theatres, hair salons...[and] even a place where international fax and telephone services are available (Kurimoto, 2002, p. 5).

These market expansions typically generated new cash-exchange opportunities for local populations that consisted of subsistence farmers with little hard money. In Malawi for example, Callamard (1994) noticed that the lack of variety in refugee food baskets, high populations of subsistence farmers in the local population, the absence of local traders and locally-based cash opportunities fostered a complex trading and income-generating system that benefited refugees and hosts alike. Similarly, Harrell-Bond (1986) observed that Ugandan refugee-driven capital injections resulted in a positive contribution to the local economy in southern Sudan. Sudanese hosts also enjoyed new market opportunities with Ethiopian and Eritrean refugees, but broader gains were limited by the politics of refugee assistance and pre-existing economic conditions (Kuhlman, 1994; Callamard, 1994).

Although these opportunistic interactions reflect potential wealth benefits for locals during camp presence, researchers could only speculate about their long-term effects (Whitaker, 1999; Ohta, 2001). Whitaker (1999) noted that if, over the course of refugee presence, local farmers learned to change production patterns to cater to new local market demands, then such farmers could face food insecurity and loss of income after camp disbandment returns market demand to pre-refugee levels. Callamard (1994) hypothesized that for Malawian villagers to continue gaining or avoid wealth shocks after refugees left, the government would need to replace the market role of refugees with civil servants and extensive rural development programs. Indeed, reports examining the refugee-host relationship did not substantially discuss lasting effects.

Refugee presence over time often also affected hosts in different magnitudes based on gender and class differences (Kuhlman, 1990; Sorenson, 1994). Typically, local women benefited less than men from refugee presence because men were able to participate in camp market activities as local traders (Whitaker, 1999).⁸ One exception occurred in a Malawian camp, where inadequate refugee food baskets created new income-earning opportunities for local female vegetable farmers (Callamard, 1994). Whitaker (2002) pointed out that younger populations also tended to be more equipped to take advantage of new business opportunities than older hosts, which altered patterns of authority in host villages.

Documentation from previous field work showed that communities in refugee-affected areas also tended to develop more negative perceptions of refugees over time. In Guinea, where initial relations between Sierra Leoneans and hosts were at first positive, local populations grew less welcoming towards refugees and “in some cases...[hosts] panick[ed]...about the effects of the refugees on their farming land” (Kaiser, 2001, p. 13). Similarly in Nairobi, once Somali refugees squeezed host populations out of economic opportunities and Kenyan landlords began to evict locals who could no longer afford higher property rates, local populations developed highly negative perceptions of the refugees that had settled around them (Veney, 2007).⁹

Several past researchers have pointed to UNHCR’s ‘care and maintenance’ approach to refugee camps as a major contributor to the development of negative host population perceptions of refugees. ‘Care and maintenance’ established services exclusively for refugees that were frequently better than local resources. Harrell-Bond (1986) wrote that these reserved services

⁸ Interestingly, refugee women on camps often experienced greater social and psychological benefits than refugee men because NGOs hosted women’s empowerment programs that detracted from the traditional male role as head of the household (Eruesto, 2002).

⁹ See Kaiser (2001) and Veney (2007) in the first paragraph of this section.

fostered resentment against refugees amongst locals. In Kenyan camps for example, local populations were bitter that food rations were “directly and unconditionally meant for refugees” (Veney, 2007). Similarly, villagers in the Central African Republic felt they were “short-changed” in comparison to the projects and services Sudanese refugees were receiving from aid organizations (Ketel, 2002).

Resentments over food and service allocations often drove hosts to describe refugees as idling, lazy, coddled and undeserving of humanitarian support (Crisp, 2003). Hosts also used refugees as scapegoats for the slow pace of regional development, lack of infrastructure, and endemic poverty. Often, jealousies induced exploitative practices and caused retaliations. For example, host farmers in northern Uganda hired Sudanese refugees for illegal casual labor in their farms and compensated them “very small [payments] and...in kind rather than in cash” (Kaiser, 2000, p. 19). Farmers believed low compensation was necessary because of the high risk of crop theft by refugees, but low compensation also likely provoked refugees to steal crops as a form of self-compensation for what they believed they deserved. Mutually reinforcing cycles of exploitation between hosts and refugees built on common suspicions and played a role in exacerbating tensions.

Refugees were also susceptible to regarding local host populations with caution, and their own warped perceptions of hosts likely contributed to negative sentiment between the two populations. Anthropologist Liisa Malkki (1996) noted that Hutu refugees in Tanzania adopted perceptual comparisons between UNHCR and Belgians in Burundi, treating the aid organization as champion and protector against host government officials who they nearly equated to enemy Tutsis in the civil war from which they recently escaped. Tanzanian administrators were

regarded as "exploitative and illegitimate," which alienated refugee populations from their local hosts (Malkki, 1996).

As a result of mutual suspicions, violence and crime between hosts and refugees were not uncommon. Deteriorating refugee conditions on highly restricted and protracted camps likely contributed to refugee-driven violence. For idling camp residents with few job opportunities, "dependency syndrome" created psycho-social symptoms of apathy, despair and frustration that increased the risk of antagonistic coping behaviors (Slaughter, 2009).¹⁰ Young men on camps were especially vulnerable to symptoms of frustration, boredom, hopelessness, which were exacerbated by the lack of role models, education or job opportunities (Turner, 1999). On Congolese camps, male teenagers that Simon Turner (1999) called "angry young men" imitated American gangster styles and participated in armed robberies, petty disturbances and other forms of disruption. Similarly, Liberian refugees in Ghana were concerned that negative behaviors in restless youth on their camps would antagonize host populations and give "the Ghanaian authorities a good excuse for closing down the camp" (Dick, 2002, p. 21). These were high risk symptoms for violence on camps and in surrounding areas.

The lack of productive activities on long-term camps also rendered refugees reliant on dwindling rations from humanitarian organizations. Older camps tend to receive smaller amounts of attention and funding from donors, which resulted in food shortages and subsequent robberies on main roads or from farms in areas surrounding refugee camps. Falling food rations often occurred alongside livestock raids, higher instances of illegal natural resource collection to make money at the market, and illegal cultivation of locally-owned land that often provoked

¹⁰ "Dependency syndrome" is a commonly cited problem on highly restricted protracted camps. For example, on one six-year-old Tanzanian camp, a refugee commented that "people are not taking care of their own life. They are just living like babies in UNHCR's arms" (Turner, 1999, p.6).

skirmishes with nearby host farmers (Crisp, 2003). The IRC reinforced this trend, noting that the physical and psychological effects of prolonged camp residence leads to coping strategies such as “theft, banditry and violent conflict with neighbors in order to access food...[Refugees] will steal from neighbors...engage in fraud and misrepresentation (Phillips, 2002, p. 5). The lack of activities and outlets for refugees on confined long-term camps typically increased the likelihood of violence and theft on local populations.

However, past research shows that host perceptions of refugees as the cause of increased crime, prostitution, and theft in local areas are only partially supported by statistical evidence (Veney, 2007). According to Rutinwa’s study of crime and prison rates in refugee-affected areas of Tanzania (2003), refugees themselves may not been responsible for elevating crime rates, but the weapons they brought armed local bandit groups. Hence, members of the host community sometimes initiated and participated in robberies too. Additionally, hosts have been known to react violently to refugee presence. Jealousy over assistance offered to refugees but not local Kenyans led to an outbreak that killed twelve people in Kakuma refugee camp (IRIN, 2003). After Guinean President Lansana Conté accused Liberian and Sierra Leonean refugees of creating local insecurity, militia groups and civilian vigilantes, backed by popular national support, enacted “human rights abuses, including arbitrary arrest, harassment, sexual abuse, extortion [and] eviction” on refugees (Studdart, 2002, p.10). Hence higher crime rates in refugee-affected areas could be caused by mass refugee presence rather than refugees themselves.

Refugee-Assisting Organization Impacts in Refugee-Affected Areas

Refugees are not the only group that affects local host communities in protracted camp situations. As long as refugees are present, the international refugee aid regime must remain to

meet its 'care and maintenance' mandate. Refugee-affiliated humanitarian organizations can thus affect local hosts in various direct and indirect ways, five of which are explored below.

First, refugee-hosting areas tend to benefit from international media attention and variety of new, high-paying job opportunities that refugee-affiliated NGOs bring with them. The initial international media appeal of mass civilian displacement raises public awareness and sympathy for the development needs of poor and remote host regions (Whitaker, 1999). Publicity can increase donations and/or improve development projects, as they did in Kagera, Tanzania during Rwandan and Burundian refugee presence in the 1990s (Whitaker, 1999). The odds of becoming a media darling through refugee presence is difficult to control and too often short-lived. More practically, INGOs such as the IRC, Catholic Relief Services, Concern Worldwide and Oxfam benefit host communities because they require staff, housing and maintenance of which locals attempt to take advantage.

The second major effect of refugee-affiliated NGOs on hosts is through purchases NGOs make on behalf of refugee 'care and maintenance' programs. Relief and aid organizations can dramatically change regional demand for food and supply, and have a significant impact on prices and supply decisions in local markets as well. For example, to supply Congolese refugees in western Tanzania, Whitaker (2002) noted that the World Food Program (WFP) purchased food and supplies from regional sources or neighboring countries. These well-intentioned trade agreements with supplier countries for camp rations could potentially induce volatility in local prices and damage long-term production patterns in affected communities (Whitaker, 1999). In other cases where purchasing organizations are more nuanced in their knowledge of local productivity, purchasing certain types of local materials can stimulate the regional economy by

building on local capabilities and spreading benefits beyond the displaced population (Corsellis, 2005).

A third NGO benefit indirectly affects locals when refugee-related organizations knowingly or unknowingly share facilities and services designed for refugees with the host population. Cases where benefit from services intended for refugees have been noted in several African camps. In Dadaab, for example, Kenyans have been known to register as refugees and enter camps to take advantage of donated food rations, water, sanitation, education, medical, and livelihoods workshop services (Veney, 2007). Access to these services could significantly improve socioeconomic development in villages if better health services, education and skills seminars are sustained long enough to build habits.

The fourth refugee-affiliated NGO effect originates from the “fairness claim,” which argues that host populations should be integrated in development programs because they are not better off than refugees and are likely to become more impoverished by refugee presence (Chambers, 1986). INGOs have attempted to engage in local development directed at hosts in pursuit of improving “fairness.” Many of these initiatives come after camp protraction end. UNHCR and the WFP for example, have transferred closed camps to local committees as new schools or training centers. Some relief and church-based organizations also commit partial funding for local projects in an effort to help compensate patient hosts. However, development projects for local communities are typically difficult because donor funding channels separate emergency relief from development aid (Slaughter, 2009). Development projects for locals during refugee camp presence are likely to remain compressed until funding structures are revised and donors are convinced of the value of investing in the development of refugee-affected areas.

Finally, hosts may benefit by active political bargaining. Sometimes strict host national or District-level government demands are necessary to secure development aid from INGOs during refugee presence. Funding that follows from political appeals align with the “efficiency claim” in refugee relief, which argues that NGOs should compensate host communities to appease and prevent them from hindering relief efforts such as retaliation and forced repatriation of refugees (Callamard, 1994). In 1993, Daley (1993) noticed that several African host governments appeared to be seizing opportunities to use refugees to secure funding for broader national development plans. The Malawian government, for example, used 1.3 million Mozambican refugees within its borders to negotiate a five-to-one host-refugee benefit plan (Whitaker, 1999). The ensuing donor assistance funded various services and projects for local hosts in exchange for permitting refugees to stay within the country. In fact, Crisp (2003) has admitted that some host governments may be purposefully isolating refugees to temporary camps because they are more politically attractive for donor aid.

Integration Attempts to Link Local Populations with Refugee Assistance

Over the past five decades, the refugee aid regime has piloted several strategies in attempts to appease host country economic concerns. As early as the 1960s, international humanitarian organizations and African governments discussed an ‘integrated zonal development approach’ to refugee assistance. Twenty years later, the regime introduced refugee aid and development (RAD) strategies that sought to initiate development assistance for refugees at the beginning of refugee situations (Crisp, 2002). Notably, the 1984 UNHCR and UNDP co-sponsored Second International Conference on Assistance to Refugees in Africa (ICARA II), organized under the theme “Time for Solutions,” argued for such an ambitious development-

oriented refugee strategy (Callamard, 1994). RAD strategies were designed to help push refugees more quickly towards self-sufficiency and simultaneously contribute to the sustainable development of local host villages (Crisp, 2002). Unfortunately, Kaiser (2005) writes that these attempts have received little international support and were largely regarded as a failure.

Despite its theoretical sensibility, RAD projects failed to spread across host countries because of a lack of donor interest. Donors wanted to reduce the total number of refugees, did not want to invest money in long-term camps or pay large sums for areas where refugees would be repatriated quickly. Host countries wanted greater international burden sharing and compensation for the cost of refugees, but they did not want to give refugees the social, economic and legal rights of full citizens. Consequently, Crisp (2001) wrote that donors perceived host government interest in RAD programs to be a ploy to increase development funding, not to solve refugee problems. Weak coordination between refugee and development bureaucracies and difficulties integrating increasing numbers of refugees into structure development programs have greatly hindered practitioners from turning refugee-development discussions into action (Gorman, 1994; Crisp, 2003; Kaiser, 2005; Slaughter, 2009).

Past projects have shown that theoretically appealing initiatives that do receive funding can be disastrous in practice. One attempt to avoid parallel aid structures to hosts and refugees in Uganda resulted in embarrassment for UNHCR to its donor constituency (Kaiser, 2005). In 1999, the Ugandan government and UNHCR agreed to implement a Self-Reliance Strategy (SRS) that moved from “relief to development,” and sought to “integrate the services provided to the refugees into regular government structures and policies” (Kaiser, 2005). Notably, the plan was not a tactic by UNHCR to move towards a local integration solution for refugees, but rather to integrate refugee assistance, not refugees, into district-level development and service delivery

strategies (Kaiser, 2005). Once approved, SRS transferred the power to implement refugee policy and services from INGOs to the Ugandan government, but a number of policy decisions indicated that the government used the strategy to advance its broader goals while jeopardizing refugee social and political rights (Kaiser, 2005). Thus power hoarding can render “equal” divisions of aid for hosts and refugees impractical in reality, and demonstrated how liberal development-based relief initiatives could be at the mercy of opportunistic host governments.

Despite professed INGO interest in compensating and improving refugee-affected areas with development aid and support, actual successful projects are hard to find. Meanwhile, host governments continue to pressure INGOs to compensate them for the disproportionate share of the refugee burden they feel they take on. Most recently, host governments are using the economic burden argument against refugee presence. NGOs have suggested that the development projects they are funding in refugee-affected areas are helping to compensate and even accelerate development in refugee-affected areas. This research seeks to examine these two claims in practice.

Host populations are the focus of little academic research in the refugee studies context, but their needs and reactions to refugees are important for fairness and project management reasons (Chambers, 1986; Harrell-Bond, 1986; Ohta, 2001). Existing studies tend to focus on refugee impacts during the initial and intermediate periods of refugee presence. How refugee presence affects the environment, infrastructure and national political integration of the host country has also been documented and policy options considered (Stein & Clark, 1985). The dynamic and lasting economic effects of refugee presence on hosts are somewhat less covered because they are harder to assess and measure.

In attempts to fill this gap, the following report investigates how local host communities in Tanzania's refugee-affected Kibondo District are socioeconomically affected during and after protracted refugee camp presence.¹¹ Impacts are divided into refugee presence and refugee-affiliated organizations projects, and measured by the size, scope and long-term effects on local hosts. Answering these questions can provide insight into the legitimacy of political bargaining tactics used by power players, to better understand the actual burden of refugees and to create mutually beneficial policy interventions for hosts and refugees.

METHODS OF INVESTIGATION

Peaceful but consistently poor, the east African country Tanzania was chosen as the site for the representative case study. A mixed methods approach using interviews, focus groups, household surveys and observation was used over five-and-half-weeks of in-country, cross-sectional research in the late summer of 2009. Two local translators assisted in primary data collection in three villages 4-10 miles away from a Tanzanian refugee camp(s).¹²

Refugee-hosting areas tend to be defined by the political limits of the host District and its government. However, a definition more reflective of actual refugee impact, to which this research is based on, defines local host communities are those within one day's walking distance via major road or shortcut, to a designated UNHCR camp site where refugees live. Additionally, protracted refugee camps were selected over urban residents living near urban refugees because refugee presence on camps include both refugees as well as refugee-assisting NGOs compared to

¹¹ Refugee camp presence implies the presence of both refugees and refugee-affiliated organizations under the assumption that both must be present for camps to operate.

¹² The final paper will be shared with TCRS and the translators, who have agreed to forward the information to the Kibondo District Council.

only refugees in the urban context. Refugee presence is also more concentrated in camps, making impact assessment in the surrounding communities easier to measure.

First, key informant interviews were conducted with stakeholder representatives in the protracted camp context. Discussions were held with officials at the national Dar es Salaam, Kigoma Region and Kibondo District UNHCR offices; with Professor Sifuni Mchome, Associate Director at the Center for the Study of Forced Migration in the Department of Law at the University of Dar es Salaam regarding previous research he conducted around refugee impact in Kigoma and Kagera regions; with District-level government officials, namely the Kibondo District Executive Officer, Economic Planning Officer and Agricultural Officer over local growth and refugee impacts; and the community development coordinator at Tanganyika Christian Refugee Service (TCRS), the major relief and development organization in Kibondo. Lastly, officials at the National Bureau of Statistics in Dar es Salaam were asked about basic development indicators in Kigoma compared to other regions in Tanzania.

In each village, focus groups were critical because they helped build a broader socioeconomic development depiction of local conditions. Discussions also helped clarify potentially unusual data results and reduce reductionist tendencies in the quantitative data. Occurring at the beginning of each village visit, they were conducted in a participatory group discussion fashion with village key informants as participants. Topics included a discussion of refugee presence, seasonality calendars, categories of wealth, village self-perception and local development goals and attitudes. Focus group informants also shaped survey strategy and shaped living arrangements for the week. See Appendix for script.

Since village socioeconomic development is related to household wealth,¹³ surveys created a sharper and more accurate picture of current household and village¹⁴ socioeconomic status. Each household's accumulated wealth over the past year was unpacked to tease out reasons for one household's wealth over another, and examined specifically for their past relationships with refugees and refugee-affiliated NGOs. Quantifying village wealth also enables the research to focus more directly on wealth impact on households by NGOs rather than the quantity of NGO services in each village. A seven-part survey measured household¹⁵ wealth and contact with NGOs. Survey components were adapted from the UK Department for International Development (DFID) assets framework tailored to households in elevated conflict situations. To ensure every third household was randomly sampled, each street Chairman was contacted either on the initial arrival date or the evening before to provide sufficient time for him to ask participating households to stay home from the farm. Each household surveyed a bar of soap as appreciation for their participation. See Appendix for detailed explanation and complete survey.

Throughout surveys, observations were used to gain a better understanding of general wealth levels for each village and household. Factors indicating higher wealth included tidiness, paint or flowers decorating the front of the house, proximity to the main road; high ceilings, private bath, separated rooms within the home; brick, plaster or iron material to build the house; animals tied up or kept in a pen instead of allowed to roam free, and cattle, which often gave both milk for drinking and manure for crop fertilizer. Indicators of a poorer household included illness, goiters, sick animals, thatched and mud dwellings, and low roofs.

¹³ As a concept more broad than financial wealth, socioeconomic development applies more broadly to quality of life and includes conditions such as life expectancy, literacy rate and personal autonomy. In the village context, socioeconomic development is a more reflective indicator of household conditions because wealth tends to be a highly fluctuating flow variable compared to socioeconomic development, which tends to be more enduring.

¹⁴ Surveyed households made up 6-7% of total households in each village.

¹⁵ Household membership was determined by individuals who shared from the same pot at meals.

WESTERN TANZANIA AS CASE STUDY

Country Context

Tanzania is an excellent representation of protracted refugee camp situations common to sub-Saharan Africa. As early as the 1960s, Tanzania housed people seeking refuge from conflict in Burundi. Refugees from Rwanda and Uganda who entered Tanzania in the 1970s were awarded full socioeconomic rights (Adepoju, 1982). Under the generous “Open Door Policy”¹⁶ promoted by then President Julius Nyerere, refugees were given land to cultivate, relocated to settlements and were well supplied with services regardless of their country of origin (Fielden, 2008). Settlements also received seeds and tools to help refugees become self-sufficient with food production several years after arrival (Tanzania MHA, 2009). In fact, three Burundian refugee “Old Settlements” from 1972 remain in existence today (UNHCR, 2009).

Most recently, large influxes of refugees from three historically violent countries in the Great Lakes Region (GLR) entered and lived between 9 and 15 years on highly restricted camps in Tanzania’s Kigoma and Kagera Regions until the end of 2008. Around 550,000 Burundian refugees broke into western Tanzania in October 1993 (KSP, 2009). A year later, more than 170,000 Rwandans crossed the Kagera River that separated Rwanda and Tanzania over the span of two days to escape from genocide in their home country (Whitaker, 1999). Hutu refugees in the Democratic Republic of Congo exacerbated regional tensions that in 1998 sent 98,000 DRC refugees into Kigoma Region (UNHCR, 2009). The GLR refugee populations constituted nearly three quarters of what UNHCR considered “persons of concern” for Africa in 2003 (Khamanga,

¹⁶Tanzania received international recognition for its Open Door Policy through the Nansen Refugee Award in 1983 for outstanding service to the cause of refugees.

2005). Nearly 1.3 million people from Burundi, Rwanda and the DRC arrived and settled over the fourteen year protraction period (Whitaker, 1999).

After three decades of accommodating refugees, Tanzania abandoned the Open Door Policy in the 1990s (Chaulia, 2003). Newspaper articles increasingly began to portray refugees as a national burden and calling for repatriation. The Republic of Tanzania's *New Foreign Policy* (2001) reflected negative perception of refugees by noting a need to "mainstream economic considerations in the formulation and conduct of URT's foreign policy...to ensure that URT's relations with other nations and international entities are driven in line with economic interests." The new policy sacrificed former political commitments such as conflict resolution and human rights if they happened to threaten economic considerations that were of higher priority. Refugees and their rights became secondary to economic interests for Tanzania. In 2002, when the number of refugees rose and food rations were cut, services and refugee protection were especially challenged. By 2003, the national government began to officially limit refugee movement and economic activities to try to speed up voluntary repatriation.

On the local level, strong reactions to prolonged refugee presence also emerged in the early 2000s. Tanzania's civil society evolution towards "districtization," a term used to describe the process of elite re-configurations and struggles for control of local Tanzanian institutions, concentrated political power at the local level (Gibbon, 1998; Kelsall, 2000). Consequently, local governments began to exercise greater discretion and flexibility to implement and interpret national policies. In 2003, then District Executive Officer Kanal John Mzurikwao installed an unofficial but enforced "4 kilometer Zone Policy," nicknamed "Mzurikwao's policy," in

Kibondo, where UNHCR operated a field office and four camps.¹⁷ Like its name suggests, the policy restricted refugee movement to a 4-km radius around camps. Refugees who depended on local markets were not permitted to purchase goods from outside this zone, or to sell goods to hosts who ventured into the 4-km radius. As a result, market interactions between hosts and refugees in surrounding areas significantly decreased.

In the beginning of 2006, refugee settlements in Kigoma Region's Kasulu and Kibondo Districts remained at a quarter million (KSP, 2009). Mass repatriation efforts successfully brought these populations down over the next three years. By July 2009, only 37,000 Burundians and 65,000 DRC refugees remained in three refugee camps across Kigoma Region (UNHCR Tanzania Fact Sheet, July 2009). After 14-15 years of protraction since the first refugees arrived in 1993, UNHCR closed all but Kanembwa camp in December 2008, with the latter converted to a Resettlement Processing Center (RPC) for refugees across sub-Saharan Africa the year before. As of July 14, 2009, Kanembwa camp hosted a population of just fewer than three thousand people (UNHCR Tanzania Monthly Statistics, 2009).¹⁸

Host Community Context

Kibondo District, where this research was conducted, is bordered by Kasulu and Kigoma rural Districts and the Republic of Burundi to the west. 97% of Kibondo's residents participate in agriculture with farm sizes on average between 1-4 acres per household. The three surveyed villages were all proximate to at least one protracted, high population camp closed or in its final

¹⁷ UNHCR operations included one Kibondo field office and Mtendeli, Kanembwa, Nduta and Mukgwa refugee camps that were primarily inhabited by Burundian refugees.

¹⁸ Camp locations were chosen by the Kigoma Representative in the Ministry of Home Affairs, Refugee Department after consultation with the District Commissioner and District Council (MHA, 2009; Rwenyagira, Phocus. Associate Program Officer in the UNHCR Kigoma office, July 24, 2009. (Personal Interview). Local villages were not consulted about camp placement.

stage of operation between 4 and 10 miles away from the nearest refugee camp and between 4 and 15 miles from the nearest major town.

Table 1. Geographic Context of Surveyed Villages

Quality	Kilemba	Kazilamihunda	Kasuga
Distance to nearest camp (miles)	4 (Kanembwa)	5 (Kanembwa)	9.4 (Karago)
Distance to nearest town (miles)	6 (Kibondo)	15 (Kibondo)	4.7 (Kakonko)
Households (Village Census)	687	782	750

The majority of residents of all surveyed villages belonged to the Ha tribe and spoke Kiha, a dialect similar to the dialect spoken by Burundian refugees. Locals could only identify a refugee by his or her speech. The language similarity enhanced transactions in the market and casual labor employment on farms. In dress and demeanor, hosts and locals were also indistinguishable.

After Tanzania's economic liberalization in 1985, villages no longer operate as planned economies, but the village government still maintained a significant role in the household's productivity. All land in Kibondo District remains publically owned and allocated by the village government (KDC, 2005). Farmers present their requirements to the village agricultural officer who assesses the farmer's need and ability to utilize the requested land.¹⁹ Every household is legally permitted one acre of land, but villagers can also purchase or lease higher quality land. Leases and purchase receipts could be used as collateral for loans, but the majority of village-level land was acquired by inheritance, in 1973, when villages were officially divided, through new government allocations, or through customary ownership negotiations without official documentation.

Each surveyed village was governed by a 25-member Village Council, an elected Village Chairman, elected Street Chairmen and a government-appointed Village Executive Officer.

¹⁹ Land ownership and valuation in the western Tanzanian village setting made it unfeasible to value land or housing with a monetary sum, so land and homestead appraisal was left out of wealth calculation in the survey.

Officers for agriculture and health were responsible for various administrative tasks and also received salaries from the government. Each village was divided into sub-villages, or Vitongoji.²⁰ Residents of each Kitongoji elected a Kitongoji Chairman to represent the Kitongoji to the local government as well as to respond to particular conflicts or needs. Amongst their local administrative responsibilities, Kitongoji Chairmen help the Village Executive Officer construct an annual village census. Villagers heavily relied on local authorities to tell them whether or not a new project, scheme or guest they came across was trustworthy.

Education, sanitation and health services in each village were under the responsibility of the local government. While all three villages later unanimously complained about the shortage of health services in their villages, all had access to one local dispensary that was refreshed with medicine from the District once a month. Under a new medical insurance program, families pay 5000Tsh²¹ for a year or 1000Tsh per visit that includes the cost of any medicine. Villagers across all three villages noted that wait time at the village dispensary was between 2-4 hours, free allocated medicine usually ran out by the 3rd or 4th day of restock every month, and firewood collection took a three hour one way trip to last approximately 2-3 days.

To contextualize NGOs that will be discussed in later pages, a full list of all NGOs mentioned by villagers as those that provide some type of aid are listed below. Although the type of NGO ranged from national, international to church-based organizations, the majority received some degree of project funding from UNHCR. The following list includes organizations that were attracted to the Kibondo area because of refugees. Fourteen unique organizations were cited

²⁰ The Swahili plural form changes one sub-village, Kitongoji, into Vitongoji.

²¹ Average Tanzanian shillings (TZS) per US dollar - 1,178.1 (2008 est) according to the CIA Online World Factbook (2009).

in at least one village from household or focus group discussion. Additional NGOs that operated in the Kibondo area were not included to reflect perceived village impact from refugee presence.

Table 2. NGO presence in Kibondo District

Org	Category	Coverage	Refugee-Affil
UNHCR	UN Agency	4 camps, 6 villages, 8 secondary schools	Yes
TCRS	National NGO	26 villages, 4 camps	Yes
REDESO	National NGO	16 villages, 4 camps	Yes
CONCERN	INGO	capacity-building for 8 local NGOs	Yes
TWESA	National NGO	12 villages, 8 schools, Nduta camp	Yes
IRC	INGO	4 camps, 59 health facilities	Yes
CARITAS	INGO		Yes
UNICEF (CSPD)	UN Agency	All 67 villages, 4 camps	Yes
SAEU	National NGO	4 camps	Yes
TASAF	National fund facility		No
Anglican Church	Church		No
DANIDA	INGOV		No
KIDEREA	Local NGO	8 villages in 2 divisions	No

(Select coverage obtained from the KDC 5-Year Strategic Report, 2005-2011, 2006)

Kilemba

Flat, barren and deserted, Kilemba village straddled the main road and sat about five miles equidistant from Kibondo town and Kanembwa refugee camp. 687 households relied on eight water sources, but only three—a hand pump, spring and river about three miles away—operate year round. Kilemba is a poor village, and over half (58%) of surveyed households lived in poorly constructed homes made of mud and thatched grass. The vast majority of households engaged in agriculture, and farms were approximately 1.5 miles away from homesteads. Nine of the forty-two households surveyed (21.4%) did not sell any crops in the past year. Households who did sell to the market cultivated and sold some combination of maize, beans, cassava, groundnut and millet. Although Kilemba was optimally situated next to Kibondo town, which

holds two large common markets a week, average prices for its crop sales were comparable or lower than values sold in both Kazilamihunda and Kasuga villages.

Focus group discussions built a picture of stagnating poverty. Attitudes in focus group members and surveyed villagers tended to be pessimistic and hopeless, as well as focused on blame and dependency on external assistance to fulfill village needs. Extreme poverty likely contributed to negative attitudes. According to focus group discussions and calculations, it is not uncommon for today's households to survive on less than 800 Tsh (0.60USD equivalent) a day in the dry season.²² For example, a typical household of two adults and four children can survive on one tin of maize and 3.5 kilo of beans over two weeks at two meals per day. At average market prices in August 2009, the cost of the household's daily food consumption would have been 486 Tsh.²³ According to focus groups, the price of a kilo of beans rose from 700Tsh to 1,200 Tsh between 1994 and 1995. For the same six person household, this price rise in beans alone would have increased the cost of a day's food by 27% percent.

Low crop yield may contribute to Kilemba's poverty. The average surveyed acreage per household (5.3) in Kilemba was higher than the average acreage per household in Kazilamihunda or Kasuga as well as the average in Kibondo District (KDC, 2006). However, crop sales in Kazilamihunda and Kasuga were two and three times higher, respectively.

²² Total daily food consumption falls more during the wet season (Nov-Feb), when many families eat only one meal a day.

²³ One tin of maize cost at 4000Tsh and one kilo of beans cost at 800Tsh.

Table 3. Kilemba Crop Yields over the Past Year Compared to Kazilamihunda and Kasuga

	Kilemba AVG	Kazilamihunda AVG	% Diff from Kilemba	Kasuga AVG	% Diff from Kilemba
Acres	5.32 (3.68)*	4.91 (3.46)	-7.7%	4.31 (2.2)	-19%
Total AgrSale	81,012 (143,264)	158,702 (449,696)	95.9%	196,144 (428,394)	142.1%
Sales/ Acre Planted	15,223.7 (38,890)	32,334.3 (129,835)	112.4%	45,499.7 (19,443)	198.9%

*Standard Deviations in parentheses

Poor soil fertility, inability to afford fertilizers, negative climatic conditions and rudimentary agricultural habits contribute to low yields. Additionally, lack of high-value external markets could have contributed to low crop sales. Only two households planted potentially lucrative cash crops cotton and tobacco, but both produced them in small quantities: the cotton farmer planted two acres to sell to a middleman, and the tobacco farmer sold his 1/8 acre crop to the local market. In wealthier villages such as Kasuga, such cash crop producers were linked to a cooperative that sold to a larger private company, and consequently received much higher payments. The ten wealthiest households owned on average twice as many acres as the average Kilemba household. Those acres yielded significantly more crop. Wealthier households also grew more beans and maize but sold more maize at the market.

Although agriculture remains the mainstay for the vast majority of Kilemba's residents, 2/3 of households participated in some supplementary form of income-generation. 60% of households surveyed hired casual laborers in the past year who typically worked 3-4 yards a day and received 0-1000Tsh per yard. These wages are 300% higher than wages paid for casual labor in the mid-1990s, when refugees took the majority of casual labor jobs (Whitaker, 1999). Other income-generating activities included carpentry, renting out a sewing machine, shoemaking; producing sisal twine, and repairing broken radios. These incomes supplemented sales from

agriculture and were more commonly found in wealthier households. More than 70% of surveyed households, especially poorer households, made and/ or sold alcohol from maize, millet or cassava.

Refugee Contact

Located extremely close to both Kanembwa camp and Kibondo town, which both housed an array of refugee-assisting INGO and NGO compounds, Kilemba has had an extensive history with refugees that began before camps were constructed. When conflict in Burundi first started, refugees streamed into Kilemba village and received shelter until camp construction was completed. Later, refugees continued to return to Kilemba to exchange food from UNHCR rations, selling maize flour and special beans in exchange for bananas, local beans, cassava and sweet potato. Interactions between hosts and refugees were mostly confined to the market setting or to farms, where refugees worked as day laborers. These interactions were enough to result in sixteen host-refugee marriages. Ten couples settled in Kilemba, while six chose to move to the camp. No Burundians, other than those married, currently live in Kilemba. This is a surprising statistic, given the volume of District government and local government complaints about undocumented refugees settling in local areas. Perhaps refugees disliked Kilemba's dry, meager conditions and high instances of poverty to settle down.

Refugee-Affiliated NGO Contact

Given its proximity to Kibondo town and high poverty rates, Kilemba should have been saturated with NGO aid projects. Villagers cited Tanzania Water and Environmental Sanitation organization (TWESA), a UNHCR national implementing agency, to be particularly helpful for its rainwater harvesting seminar. Another national NGO, the South Africa Extension Unit (SAEU), funded materials for vulnerable children, including uniforms, rubber shoes, exercise

books and pens attending the local primary school. The INGO turned national NGO Tanganyika Christian Refugee Service (TCRS) provided the widest arrange of services that spanned employment, skills transfer, asset transfer and infrastructure-oriented projects.

Several wealthier households took advantage of skills transfer services and lauded them in surveys. For example, one man received three months of training from TCRS before employment, and has since been able to find occasional employment in casual building. Another farmer in Kilemba received free supplies and training in 1994 from TCRS for fish farming. Given fishing gear, live fish, flown to Arusha, northern Tanzania, for lessons, the farmer made a channel from a river near town and continues to sell fish from his several ponds that are watched over by his small children. He was reportedly asked to teach others to fish as well, and the area once housed nearly 50 ponds until too many thieves made the enterprise unproductive. Also, the second wealthiest household in Kilemba specifically mentioned TCRS's seminars in modern agriculture and irrigation as a chief reason for their successes in agricultural productivity.

Kazilamihunda

Kazilamihunda's population was younger than populations in Kilemba and Kasuga, with an average adult age of 37.8 compared to 41 and 43.6 years, respectively. In fact, the average age of a household head male was nearly a decade younger than household heads in the other two villages.²⁴ Focus group discussions emphasized that Kazilamihunda's population was growing rapidly, and the Village Health Officer noted that 20-25 births occurred each month in the past

²⁴Kazilamihunda average household head ages: man (38) and wife(s) (33) was far lower compared to Kilemba: man (45) and wife (38), and Kasuga: man(48) and wife(39).

three years.²⁵ With a total village population of 5,154 people,²⁶ Kazilamihunda's village birthrate, at 52.39 births per 1000 people, is significantly higher than the national birthrate of 34.29 births to 1,000 people.²⁷ The Health Officer attributed this growth to rising economic opportunities and good crop sales in recent years. Another villager commented that "when the belly is full, the man and woman play." Despite their youth, households in Kazilamihunda seem to be acquiring wealth quickly: the majority of brick and iron houses amongst survey respondents were built in the early to mid- 2000s. Young couples and their children tended to live and socialize near to each other.

Refugee-Affiliated NGO Contact

Infrastructure and asset transfer services were the most common types of NGO engagement in Kazilamihunda. Unlike Kilemba and Kasuga, Kazilamihunda does not cite a water problem amongst its top development priorities. Villagers thanked TWESA, a UNHCR-implementing partner, as the organization that "did the most because they solved the water problem." Location may also play a role in providing available water; the village is situated in a valley that collects catchment water year-round. In 2003, Concern Worldwide, the Irish INGO, enhanced the valley's water capability by building a spring and helping villagers irrigate a cabbage patch in the valley. This specific engagement was profitable for villagers, half of whom now participate in gardening, because cabbage is a cash crop that enjoys rising prices in surrounding regions. Since 2003, TCRS has also contributed to a lucrative mango, guava and palm tree scheme in Kazilamihunda. Four times a year, TCRS brings four 10-ton trucks with

²⁵ Despite this high birth rate, the average number of children per household in Kazilamihunda (4.5) was lower than that in Kilemba and Kasuga (5.1 and 5.3, respectively). This could be because younger families are unlikely to have accumulated as many children as households with older parents.

²⁶ Total village population acquired from village census data recorded in June 2009.

²⁷ National birthrate taken from the CIA World Factbook 2009 estimate for Tanzania.

1,200 young plants. TCRS alerts village authorities about each drop off date, and villagers put their names on an interest list.

Kasuga

Many homesteads in Kasuga , a village about two and a half hours north of Kibondo town, gave evidence of old money. The majority of households owned a new home constructed with brick and iron sometime after 2000, with one or two older mud homes now used as storage space or a kitchen. In addition, wealthy households almost ways owned a large tobacco drying house made from brick that was sometimes twice as tall as the house itself. Tobacco drying houses were unseen in Kilemba or Kazilamihunda. Additional variation in the size, building material, height, decoration and maintenance of homes suggested instances of greater accumulated wealth. Kasuga villagers could also afford significantly more cattle than residents in the other two villages. Eight Kasuga households owned 66 cattle compared to two households owning a total of four in Kilemba, and two households owning a total of eleven in Kazilamihunda.²⁸

A major reason for Kasuga's high wealth is likely contributed to tobacco production. In 1998, the private Tanzania Leaf Tobacco Company (TLTC) introduced a village tobacco cooperative that contracted farmers to grow tobacco at pre-determined prices. One cultivated ton of tobacco could be produced from one acre and sold for up to 1.2 million Tsh.²⁹ The cooperative also provided credit, seeds, insecticides and opened a bank account for members to receive direct

²⁸ Cattle-owning households tended to be wealthier than average even without including the value of cattle. Including cattle worth, the average household wealth for cattle owners is 2,403,916.67Tsh, which is 3.45 times greater than the average total wealth for all 136 sampled households (697,785.15 Tsh). Cattle manure can be used as fertilizer and local cows provide 2 liters of milk per day.

²⁹ Sixty-three grades of tobacco contribute to its large price variation.

deposits. From survey statistics, tobacco farmers received greater yield on average for non-tobacco crops. TLTC advanced members fertilizer for one acre of maize so households could continue to maintain a steady supply of food. The high income from tobacco sales also likely enabled farmers to purchase high quality fertilizer in towns. 7 of the 10 wealthiest surveyed households in Kasuga engaged in tobacco cultivation.³⁰

Kasuga village's total wealth from surveys was likely downward biased in data results because wealthy households did not include the value of their shares in the tobacco cooperative when counting savings. To participate in the cooperative, farmers were required to purchase five shares of 10,000Tsh per year for five years. The liquid value of these shares was enough to purchase two to three local cows, a large asset for households that produces milk for drinking and manure for fertilizer.³¹ Kasuga's non-tobacco farmers also enjoyed higher crop sales than the other two villages. Soil and weather conditions enabled farmers to cultivate crops in 3-3.5 months compared to 4 months in Kilemba and Kazilamihunda.

Refugee Contact

Since the nearest refugee camp to Kasuga was over 9 miles away by shortcut, interaction between Kasuga villagers and refugees was relatively minimal. Refugees entered Kasuga around 2002 when ration cuts and relaxed camp restrictions enabled them to look for food and wage labor. Over the next two years, hundreds of refugees visited Kasuga daily to work on farms. According to locals, refugees stole cattle and crops around 2004.

Refugee-Affiliated NGO Contact

Kasuga residents cited 65% fewer cases of refugee-affiliated NGO contact than residents in Kilemba and Kazilamihunda villages. This reduction in refugee-affiliated services was

³⁰ The remaining three wealthy households tended were employed by the government or were middlemen for maize.

³¹ Five-year value of cooperative shares is equivalent to 250,000Tsh, and local cattle cost between 80-110,000Tsh.

attributed to the greater distance to camps. Village representatives said Kasuga's water problem is its biggest concern. Refugee-affiliated NGOs TWESA, TCRS and Caritas built wells for the village, and the village council successfully received TASAF funding for three hand pumps in 2005. However, none of the refugee-affiliated NGO wells are useful year round, and the village continues to rely on three traditional cement ring wells dug by another government program during the dry season.

Similar to its involvement in Kazilamihunda and Kilemba, TCRS remains the NGO with the highest saturation, providing 32% of total NGO-related services to Kasuga residents. Kasuga also received direct skills-based support from the UNICEF Child Survival Protection and Development Program (CSPD) that the other two villages did not. Since 2000, CSPD continues to immunize children under five years against five diseases, distributes mosquito nets to pregnant women and conducts health education programs on HIV and in nutrition. Until 2007, some Kasuga residents also sold stone slabs to TCRS and the International Rescue Committee (IRC) to construct camp buildings and hospitals. Several surveyed households used stone slabs in and around their homesteads.

Dynamic Impacts of Refugee Presence Across Villages

Trade and Markets

Refugees were most active in markets between 1995 and 2006 and declined by 2006. In the summer of 1999, for example, Kazilamihunda residents recalled that over 75% of Tuesday and Saturday market days were flooded with thousands of refugees. Villagers also visited markets at camps as well. Starting around 1996, after the camps became more established, 30-40

Kilemba residents visited Kanembwa daily to conduct petty business. One surveyed farmer recalls riding his bicycle to Mtendeli and Karago camps to sell charcoal.

Refugees particularly demanded millet to make local alcohol, and cassava to make ugali, a polenta-like staple. One 150 kg sack of cassava in 2009 was 30% lower than prices between 1999 and 2006, and about 70% lower taking into account inflation.³² Disease killed a high percentage of cassava crop between 2004-06, and may have contributed to elevated cassava prices through 2006 when refugee presence in local markets had started to decline around two years earlier. Changes to the composition of cassava in a farmer's planting decisions would have been helpful to explore whether high refugee demand for cassava resulted in greater cassava acres after camp disbandment, but the blight interferes with the accuracy of these statistics.

Table 4. During Camp Refugee Demand and Supply (1995-2006)

Refugees Demanded	Refugees Supplied
Cassava tubers*	Rope*
Brown millet	UNHCR canvas sheeting
Bananas*	Chairs
Yams*	Utensils
Cabbage	Maize Flour
Spinach	Special Beans
Local Beans	Peas
Kisamvu tree leaves	Oil*

*Starred items were in highest demand

Since refugees preferred cassava over their UNHCR maize rations, maize was notoriously cheap in Kazilamihunda during refugee presence. People would travel from all over the region to buy

³² Between 1999 and 2006, 150 kg sacks of cassava sold for 25,000Tsh, while the same sack cost 18,000Tsh in August 2009 for a price ratio of 1: 0.72. Real 2009 cassava price was calculated with a forecasted 2009 GDP deflator at 195.8 (Index, Base Year at country's accounts =100) using a 2008 GDP deflator of 176.2 indexed in year 2000 = 100 by IMF estimates. This means one sack of cassava at the nominal price of 18,000Tsh today would have cost 9,195 Tsh in 2000.

maize from local residents, who purchased 25 kilogram bags for 2000 Tsh. At 80 Tsh per kilogram, this value was over three times cheaper than maize in August 2009, which sold for an average price of 250 Tsh per kilogram. Locals were also proactive; traders travelled by bike or foot to buy and sell in nearby villages. Others collected maize from refugees and sold them to Kahama town in Shinyanga Region after Kibondo markets became saturated.

The 4-km policy had some effect to decrease market interactions between hosts and refugees. Around 2003-04, villagers had to receive permission from the Village Executive Officer to visit the camp. Fewer villagers visited the camps starting around 2004-05, because refugees began to repatriate and camp services, market opportunities and supplies concomitantly shrank. By 2006, refugee presence was rare in markets. For households that had grown accustomed to high demand moved to Kasanda, Kakonko or Kahama towns to look for business.³³ One farmer still sells charcoal twice a week to people at Kanembwa resettlement center. Burundian women stationed at the Kanembwa resettlement center could still be seen walking past Kilemba with produce stacked in baskets on their heads in August 2009.

When camps were operating, prices for basic items such as meat, salt and soap rose by 100-400% (Whitaker, 2002). Since camps disbanded starting in the mid-2000s, government officials and TCRS employees have said that the cost of living in the deserted Kibondo town have remained high (Kibondo Economic Planning Officer, TCRS Community Development Officer (personal interview), July 26, 2009). The price of bricks for example, is now 500% higher than prices in 1994-5, growing from 20 TSH to 100 TSH per brick today. This elevation may be attributed to high NGO demand during refugee presence to build extension facilities for

³³ According to Beda Mwanakulya, TCRS community service development coordinator, July 26, 2009. (Personal interview).

camps, and high current demand for households in the area that are becoming wealth enough to be able to afford brick homes.

For the majority of goods in the three villages, price fluctuations for cabbage or maize are predominantly affected by weather in other Regions that affect production. For example, maize prices rose in Kazilamihunda because of droughts in Shinyanga Region the year before. Prices for essential items fluctuated from the late 1990s to 2009 depending on a combination of inflation and demand and supply impacts from refugee presence, neighboring regions, the past year's harvest yield, evolving tastes and time of year.

Income-Generating Activities

Once refugees knew the land better and needed more money to supplement falling rations, they provided a tremendous labor boon to local productivity. In Kilemba, casual laborers peaked in the early 2000s when 50-100 people would work on farms per day. Even before its peak, around 20-30 refugees snuck out of camps in the morning and worked as day laborers in Kilemba farms until 5-6 pm between the late 1990s and 2006.³⁴ Although casual labor continued past 2003, villagers were reticent to reveal this in surveys because hiring casual labor was illegal. In Kasuga, refugees entered the village around 2002 when ration cuts and relaxed camp restrictions enabled them to look for wage labor. Over the next two years, hundreds of refugees visited Kasuga daily to work on farms. Farmers often provided their day laborers one ugali, potato, or cassava meal (valued at 300-400Tsh) free, and sometimes housed them overnight.

The past decade's heightened agricultural productivity may have turned into a long-term burden. One farmer complained that the new acre of maize he acquired from the government

³⁴ One local yard is roughly 12 feet in width and 18 feet in length.

yielded less than one bag because refugees had leached the soil of its nutrients. Several other young households complained that the government was assigning them land that was previously overused by refugees. Subsequently, many couples just starting to build their wealth were struggling with poor quality soil and low harvests.

Another instance of a former boon turned burden is the loss of livelihood for timber men. When camps and NGO compounds needed to be constructed, Kilemba timber men thrived. Several households that engaged in lumbering made 200,000 Tsh (USD150) in the initial years of presence. New NGOs and existing NGOs that wanted to expand buildings required materials past 1996. By the time Kanembwa was closing however, all unregulated lumbering practices were banned by the District government, which only issued permits to select individuals in restricted areas. Timber men who previously relied on cutting and selling trees to generate income lost one of their chief productive activities.

Health Effects

At the initial stage of refugee presence, villagers in Kilemba cited water contamination as a major problem. Similarly, shortly after tens of thousands of refugees arrived, Kazilamihunda residents complained about numerous cases of dysentery and typhoid. Every village homestead is legally obligated to build and maintain a pit latrine, but refugees overpopulated the available stock of pit latrines and resorted to nearby rivers to dispose their waste, which then contaminated local water sources.

After camp facilities were established, people from all three villages legally benefited extensively from health services. No longer needing to wait eight hours at the Kibondo District Hospital, residents of all three villages cited the benefits of received free and high quality

services at refugee camps because health officials did not distinguish locals from refugees. One TCRS employee noted the benefits hosts enjoyed from refugee camp hospitals first-hand.

We picked a child and woman in Akinazi and I asked her what happened. She said she was hospitalized in Ngengara far away, so she decided to go to Mtenderi refugee camp hospital and was able to get well in several weeks after suffering for a long term. Medical personnel were very serious and cared for everyone (Mwanakulya, 2009).³⁵

Village authorities also openly encouraged villagers to use refugee camp facilities. The sick in Kasuga were formally referred to Kakonko town by the village government, and severe emergencies were taken to Kanembwa camp for blood transfusions and complicated pregnancies, and Mtenderi camp for general emergencies. For all three villages, the ill were able to use both camps' medical facilities from 1998 to around 2006 when camp services began to shrink.

Villagers in Kazilamihunda noted that refugee presence elevated HIV rates past camp disbandment. Focus group members reflected that the instance of positive HIV tests in pregnant women who went to Mtenderi camp for delivery had risen over the years. Local men likely contributed to such higher instances; several men said they missed the refugees because refugee women "were beautiful." Higher HIV rates almost inevitably accompany any large increase in population, and left a lasting mark on the health of surrounding villages. NGOs have attempted to increase education about HIV to mitigate these effects.

Regional Insecurity

Insecurity, both perceived and realistic, was a major physical and psychological barrier that fluctuated throughout refugee presence. Past research has shown high insecurity and crime occurred in the initial stages of camp establishment (Whitaker, 1999). When they first arrived,

³⁵ Beda Mwanakulya, TCRS community service development coordinator. (Personal interview). July 26, 2009.

Burundian refugees took over land owned by Kilemba residents to cultivate crops, while others chopped down trees for firewood. One man in the focus group admitted, “I did not feel good about the refugees. Even after they stopped coming, there was still a lot of armed robberies, bicycles stolen, people killed, maimed” (Kilemba Focus Group, 2009). Insecurity was not confined to the physical. In the earlier years of camp protraction, certain farmers experienced food insecurity as they sold too much of their cassava—the most disease and drought resistant food crop in the area—to the refugees, who were willing to pay high prices. By November and December, some households found themselves starving.

Villagers tended to cite actual cases of crime in later years after 2002. A string of robberies occurred in Kazilamihunda around 2004, ten years after refugees arrived. Refugees supplied weapons and locals identified who and how best to attack. According to locals, Kasuga refugees stole cattle and crops from Kasuga also around 2004. Kilemba residents blamed robberies as a reason for lower market interactions. In 2002, increased robberies made villagers more hesitant to participate in markets in Kibondo and at Kanemwba camp. Villagers became afraid to travel to Kibondo on bicycle even though the distance was less than 5 miles because they feared robbers would steal their goods or bicycle. While the actual case of robbery may have been relatively low and confined to two or three specific instances, the fear of losing one’s hard-earned labor kept farmers at home instead of at the Kibondo market. Participants in Rutinwa’s 2002 Kibondo study focus group also mentioned that “livestock refugees” were people who fled Mabamba village to Katanga to avoid livestock and thief raids. Some families sold their animals or built stricter pens to avoid losing their animals by gunpoint (Rutinwa, 2003).

Since camps began operating, focus group residents in Kilemba recalled four locals killed, three maimed and four raped in refugee-related incidents. Approximately 50 people were robbed since 1993 in Kazilamihunda. Considering the fifteen year time-span, these instances of violence are relatively low. Other conversations with Kilemba residents and with farmers in the two other surveyed villages reflected a similar fear of refugee-related violence. In discussion groups and surveys, villagers said refugees endangered their lives, but when asked to recount direct experiences, few could recall a specific example.

Crime was not always caused by human interaction. After repatriation, residents in Kazilamihunda complained that dogs Burundian refugees bred as guards and for hunting were left behind after individuals repatriated. Several hundred wild dogs now prey on village goats, depleting an important household asset that can sell for between 20,000 and 40,000Tsh. Increased physical security through police forces would be a poor solution to decreasing refugee-related “theft” of Kazilamihunda villagers’ goats.

Evolving Perceptions of Refugees

At the initial refugee arrival, many surveyed households recalled feeling “sympathetic” and “unsure” or “undecided” towards refugees. Some felt sympathetic because village authorities told them to do so, while others felt pity for their loss. Many described the situation as one beyond their control, and claimed that their opinions did not matter in a situation that could not be helped. Negative perceptions did not fully develop until after robberies and crime were suspected to come from refugee presence. These negative opinions were highest in the time periods after robberies occurred, around 2002-2004, and were likely compounded by feelings of resentment and lack of connection with refugees. Other than on farms, both Kilemba and

Kazilamihunda residents cited very low interaction with refugees. Almost no one invited refugees into their homes after the initial stage of camp construction. Negative perceptions and a lack of reason to sympathize with refugees likely contributed to the Kibondo District Commissioner's decision to create the 4-km restriction policy for refugees in 2004.

By 2009, villager opinions of refugees remained largely negative. Focus groups in all three villages unanimously agreed that they lost more than they benefited from refugee presence. Interestingly, these opinions contrasted with that of the Kibondo District government and Council³⁶ members. During refugee protraction, the Tanzanian media extensively covered District government disapproval towards refugees, and officials vehemently argued that refugees were nothing but a detriment to District conditions (Rutinwa, 2003). However, in interviews today, new District government officers tended to have more positive things to say about the refugee situation.³⁷ One conversation with the current Kibondo District Economic Planning Officer, revealed several ways locals benefited from refugee presence.

Distribution of social services gap was reduced by UNHCR. They helped indigenous people with health centers at camps like Kanembwa. Road services and road networks had problems because there were so many vehicles traveling. The government required a good sum of money to rehabilitate the roads...we benefited. This [refugee presence] just happened. But guns, AIDS accelerated, deforestation, cost of living is now too high. Employment was up but now it is too low (Mukungu, 2009).³⁸

Two reasons may have contributed to the more balanced opinion Kibondo government officials voiced three years after refugee presence diminished. First, being a part of a District Council that

³⁶ The Kibondo District Council operates on a committee basis and is formed with the approval of all village Councils across the ward. It meets every three months and invites NGOs such as RUDESO, TCRS and UNHCR to contribute to District-wide planning sessions.

³⁷ District-level government was charged with administering refugee policy throughout refugee presence. Today, they are responsible for identifying what and where local projects refugee-affiliated NGOs should create to compensate the District for the burden that refugee presence created.

³⁸ Jasphone I. Mukungu, Kibondo District Economic Planning Officer. (Personal interview). July 24, 2009.

works closely with NGOs implementing local projects may skew government officials disproportionately to the positive benefits of refugee-affiliated NGOs. Second, since Officials are government appointed and often reassigned to Kigoma from other parts of Tanzania, they failed to personally experience contacts with refugees, and are only familiar with their lingering effects.

Refugee-Affiliated NGO Presence Lags Behind Refugee Presence

Refugee-affiliated NGOs had several significant effects on the villages and the region during refugee presence. Initially, they had high demand for local goods to begin operations. NGO food purchases also affected demand and supply in other western Tanzanian regions. The WFP's local purchase policy bolstered local income and was careful to ensure that local grain purchases did not happen from areas with food insecurity. NGO construction needs also supported the creation of brick and stone slab cottage industries in Kazilamihunda and Kasuga villages from the beginning of camp presence to about 2007.

Direct services and benefits for local hosts tended to lag behind the direct effects of refugee presence. The majority of relief agencies began operations for locals at the end of 1996 to the beginning of 1997 after the initial stage of refugee presence (Whitaker, 1999). As of 1998, the end of past field research in western Tanzania, NGOs had only begun to respond to local proposals for development projects. In the initial stage, more funding was allocated towards emergency relief than humanitarian aid, so the brunt of development projects for the local area did not fully begin to materialize until 2000. Aid to the three surveyed villages focused most heavily on bolstering village infrastructure by building classrooms for schools, wells and offices for the head teacher, health officer or local government. 41% of total NGO projects in the three villages combined were infrastructure-related. Skill-transfers, asset-transfers, education and

employment followed in frequency, respectively. Some services, though helpful, were less traditional, such as providing free transportation services to return dead villagers from camp hospitals back to their homes.³⁹

In 2002, at around the same time refugee-host interactions were highest the WFP purchased 500 metric tons of grain in Kibondo villages from local cooperative societies (Rutinwa 2003).⁴⁰ Evidence of these grain purchases was not evident in the three surveyed villages. IRC also purchased 80% of goods such as fuel (about 6,000 liters a month), spare car parts and tires from Kibondo and drugs from Mwanda pharmacies (Rutinwa, 2003). Once camp facilities were running, hosts benefited from seminars and trainings at nearby camps. Kanembwa camp held vocational training centers for refugees that finally opened for locals in 2004-05.

TCRS is the one of the few refugee-affiliated NGOs that will remain in Kibondo after refugees leave. According to TCRS officials, the organization spends roughly 65% of its local currency budget in Kibondo. Several plans have been made to convert and transfer former camp facilities to the local community under the goal of changing UN presence from humanitarian relief to sustainable programs, with a focus on development programs that deliver services to both locals and integrated refugees. Kigoma Region will be a pilot project site of a United Nations Delivering as One Joint Program⁴¹ to synchronize previously autonomous UN agencies such as UNDP, the UN Trade Center (UNCTAD), WHO and UNHCR and deliver services as a coordinated unit. The District government will again be responsible for choosing sub-contracted projects that UNHCR partners will implement. Mkugwa refugee camp has already been

³⁹ IRC reportedly returned Kazilamihunda residents who passed away in Kanembwa camp hospitals back to their families for burial.

⁴⁰ In 2002, 500 metric tons of grain in Kibondo was sufficient for only two weeks of refugee food rations.

⁴¹ Classified as the JP6 Program under the title “Managing Transition from Humanitarian Assistance to Sustainable Development in Northwestern Tanzania.”

transferred into a girl's secondary school. Nduta camp is currently undergoing plans to be developed into an example village. Another camp is designated for agricultural extension activities, and a fourth camp is intended to be a center for youth in nearby villages. Other services will likely focus on the top five priorities Kigoma Region has outlined in their 2008 Socioeconomic Profile that focuses on infrastructure and environment damages.

DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS

Four Stages of Interaction in Camp Presence

Over fifteen years of contact from initial camp construction in 1993-94 to the majority of repatriations occurring by December 2007 and 2008,⁴² host-refugee interactions rose and fell in cycles. High insecurity, negative health effects, sympathy, large churns in demand provoked by rapid NGO presence characterized the initial stage of camp construction. After refugees settled into their surroundings and camps entered a 'care and maintenance' stage, interactions in local and camp markets flourished, health benefits for locals increased and casual labor began to rise. Refugees infused villages with labor several years after arriving (3-4 years) and volumes increased as rations and services on camps increased their need for money. These positive economic interactions occurred for a roughly seven year period starting two years after refugee camps were established. In the middle of this stage, NGO projects directed for refugee assisting areas also began to increase.

⁴² Kanembwa camp, roughly 4-5 miles away from both Kilemba and Kazilamihunda villages, was converted into a resettlement center in December 2007. All other camps including Karago, the camp closest to Kasuga village, closed in December 2008.

After 9-11 years, increased robberies and refugee presence in surrounding villages provoked greater tensions between the two populations and marked a turning point in the host-refugee relationship. Hosts developed more negative perceptions of refugees that were exacerbated by resentments, lack of understanding and connection. Economic opportunities diminished because of perceived threats. Strained conditions continued until 2006, twelve years into refugee presence, when mass repatriation reduced refugee presence in markets as well as crime and casual labor on farms.

Lasting impacts after camp disbandment heightened vulnerability for specific households that practiced livelihoods dependent on refugee-depleted resources. For example, timber men were no longer able to freely cut trees after forests were cut down to build camps. Soil fertility in Kilemba was also noticeably low after refugees illegally farmed on their land. Cost of living and prices for certain items remained elevated from refugee presence. Finally, benefits to local hosts from NGO presence tended to lag behind refugee impacts because funding in the first several years of refugee presence was primarily classified under emergency relief instead of humanitarian aid and camp facilities will be transferred to local populations after refugees leave.

These observations provide evidence of four different stages of camp presence: high instability during initial presence, positive interactions for eight years, increased crime and tensions ten years after initial contact, and lagging NGO development and compensation interventions during and after camp disbandment. Additionally, three major observations can be gleaned from this dynamic analysis of refugee presence in Kibondo District.

First, crime and insecurity began after 9-11 years of refugee presence, which is far later than the negative security effects implied under UNHCR's 5+ year definition of refugee protraction. In fact, the research showed that interaction between hosts and refugees after five

years of interaction was actually at its peak of economic and social cooperation in the Kibondo area. These results imply that common associations of refugee camp protraction discussed in previous studies: resentments, dependency, criminal behavior, positive market opportunities, labor market benefits, health effects, humanitarian assistance, all do occur, but not concomitantly or immediately; some occur in non-parallel patterns and stages. Thus, the case study provides some evidence for a revision of the existing definition for camp protraction that better reflects the specific timing of host-refugee interactions instead of categorizing all impacts the two populations have on one another under one general, holistic definition. A disaggregation of the term may help supporting NGOs better target the changing nature of host-refugee interactions and time specific policy interventions so that project impacts are more robust.

Second, the research shows that hosts and refugees share similar characteristics of insecurity, unwillingness, vulnerability and inability to influence players above them in the refugee regime power hierarchy. For refugees, insecurities come from relocation and residual tensions that result from the conflicts they escaped from. For hosts, insecurities result from the sudden arrival of city-sized populations who bring arms and potentially violent tendencies from their home countries. Both populations are forced and unwilling to be in their respective situations. Refugees are defined as individuals unwillingly forced to live away from home, just as hosts can be likewise defined as individuals unwillingly forced to *live near* a refugee camp. Lastly, both populations are rendered increasingly vulnerable as protraction continues. As the host government reacts with restrictive policies, refugees in protracted situations are lose social and legal rights and rely more heavily on dwindling INGO handouts. Refugee restrictions rob local host communities of potential economic opportunities with refugees. For refugees, lack of income-generating opportunities and rising negative perception from their hosts makes them

more susceptible to expensive fines for leaving camps and retaliatory violence and poverty from their hosts.⁴³

Third, the dynamic analysis revealed linkages among tension, crime and market activity. Local market interaction was highest after the initial (1-2 year) period of refugee protraction and lasted until crime and government restrictions decreased interaction opportunities (11-12 years). Reported cases of crime were high in the initial (1-2 years) and long-term (9-11 years) years of Kanembwa camp presence shortly before market activities fell. Crime decreased trading and local market participation in bigger markets such as Kibondo town and camps because local villagers feared robberies. Actual cited instances were not extremely high, but the perceived danger and potential consequences made Kilemba residents more wary of traveling to distant markets. Crime increased local vulnerability and insecurity and likely played a factor in provoking stricter District government refugee policies. Some of these attitudinal shifts were likely lubricated by a lack of mutual understanding. Surveyed households emphasized low social interactions with refugees within villages and some said they were suspicious of refugees after the initial damages they levied on village land and water resources. As time passed it was likely easy for villagers to associate negative qualities with refugee populations they regarded as foreigners.


Lasting Impacts of Camp Presence on Village Wealth

To better quantify the size, scope and sustainability of refugee-related development impacts on local hosts after camp disbandment, household wealth was calculated across villages.

⁴³ See Theory and Practice section for past research on the impacts of camp protraction on refugee populations.

According to the findings, the average household wealth was highest in Kazilamihunda and lowest in Kilemba, which was consistent with observations made from village observations.⁴⁴


Figure 1. Average Households Wealth by Village



To explore further test the accuracy of this wealth calculation and develop a more general indicator of socioeconomic development level, surveyed households in each village were asked to give a list of the items they purchased over the past week. Several results are highlighted in the figure below, and show greater variety and frequency of high value purchases by villagers in Kasuga and Kazilamihunda. For example, both villagers purchased significantly more meat and kerosene than Kilemba. Purchasing meat at the market is considered a luxury and the majority of poorer households typically eat only maize and beans as a part of their daily diet. Similarly, soap that was of higher quality was more commonly purchased in both Kazilamihunda and Kasuga. This provides some indication of higher sanitation levels in the latter two villages.

⁴⁴ Wealth differences amongst villages were not significantly affected by excluding outliers.

Figure 2. Bar Graph Items Purchased in the Past Week by Villages



This cross-section of household items purchased in the past week provides additional evidence that Kasuga and Kazilamihunda villages are more developed than Kilemba village.

To link each village's current wealth and socioeconomic level to refugee presence, the impacts of refugee presence gathered from focus groups and surveys was broken down by category for each village. Focus group discussions and surveyed households in the three villages implied that over the course of camp presence, the benefits and negatives of refugees affected Kilemba and Kazilamihunda more than they did Kasuga.

Table 5. Refugee Presence in each Village by Impact


Village	Kilemba	Kazila	Kasuga
Local Market Interaction (Common markets in village/ camp)	HIGH	HIGH	MEDIUM
Income-Generating Activities (Casual labor, village services)	HIGH	HIGH	MEDIUM
Health (Negative) (Water pollution, HIV)	HIGH	HIGH	LOW
Health (Positive) (Access to camp hospitals)	HIGH	HIGH	HIGH
Crime and Theft (Robberies, murders)	MEDIUM	HIGH	MEDIUM
Negative Perception of Refugees (Resentment, general dislike)	HIGH	MEDIUM	MEDIUM

From the table above, Kilemba and Kazilamihunda experienced similar positive and negative effects from refugee presence in nearby Kanembwa camp. However, Kazilamihunda total and average village wealth was higher than Kilemba's village wealth. Since Kilemba and Kazilamihunda received proportionate contact from refugee-affiliated NGOs and Kasuga received less contact, the data does not support a trend that correlates higher or lower village wealth with impacts from refugee presence.

Rather, the results more likely indicate that-existing conditions such as village history and geographic factors likely affected village wealth levels more than refugee presence. Importantly however, pre-existing conditions were not uniformly negative for one village over another. For example, Kilemba's low soil fertility and low water access made it more difficult for villagers to grow crops than villagers in Kazilamihunda. On the other hand, Kilemba's high proximity to Kibondo town with jobs, markets and social networks was an advantage that Kazilamihunda did not have. Although Kasuga was not near a main road like Kilemba and Kazilamihunda, the presence of cotton and tobacco cooperatives and good relationships with traders and external markets enhanced its socioeconomic development.

Refugee-affiliated NGO contact was also disaggregated by village.⁴⁵ The six resulting categories of NGO contact accounted for all five types of NGO-affiliated benefits that in populations refugee-affected areas tend to benefit from, as outlined in the theory section. Direct development-related aid, such as infrastructure-related projects for wells or classrooms, was the most popular type of assistance. Kilemba also received more asset-transfers such as maize seeds and school supplies than Kazilamihunda and Kasuga. Skills-transfer projects, such as agriculture seminar and rainwater harvesting, were also popular and more prominent in Kilemba and Kasuga villages. NGOs employed villagers in Kilemba and Kazilamihunda but not in Kasuga. Villagers in Kazilamihunda and Kasuga sold goods to NGOs, but villagers in Kilemba did not.

Figure 3. Refugee-affiliated NGO saturation in three surveyed villages



Despite its distance from the camps, Kasuga appears to receive the second highest amount of skills-transfer and infrastructure projects. These results are surprising because Kilemba and

⁴⁵ Evidence of refugee-affiliated NGO was introduced during focus groups and cross-checked with surveyed households and villagers throughout each village visit. Non-refugee-affiliated contact, such as employment at a church in Kibondo by one Kilemba household head, was not included in the graph. See Appendix for full list of NGO-related contact in each village categorized by organization.


Kazilamihunda received much more impact from refugee presence, but not significantly more refugee-affiliated NGO assistance to buffer them.

The two types of non-direct NGO assistance—employment and local purchase—were both present in Kazilamihunda. Kasuga and Kilemba only participated in one or the other. NGOs likely did not purchase items from Kilemba because it was too poor to supply them, and Kasuga did not receive NGO employment opportunities because it was geographically far away from NGO compounds in Kibondo town and refugee camps. From Figure 3, it appears that Kilemba and Kasuga tended to receive more total overall NGO assistance than Kazilamihunda. As the poorest community, the higher concentration of NGO assistance in Kilemba implies that NGOs could have been more effective in protecting or shielding local populations from poverty. From the data, little evidence contributes to a noticeable relationship between the amount of refugee-affiliated NGO-assistance and overall village wealth. Therefore, on the village level, little data supports a consistent relationship between the impacts of refugee camp presence, through refugees and refugee-affiliated NGOs, and average household wealth.

Lasting Impacts of Camp Presence on Household Wealth

Very few households were unable to cite specific and direct evidence of acute negative refugee impact. Refugee-related impacts on specific households were likely diffuse, which made it difficult to draw a relationship between refugee presence and specific household wealth level. NGO assistance was more likely to benefit specific households, so potential NGO-related effects were examined in relation to household wealth within villages. The simple box plot below provides a breakdown of wealth in Kilemba (1), Kazilamihunda (2) and Kasuga (3) villages, respectively. In the 25-75 wealth percentile, the three villages look similar in wealth.

Figure 4. Box Plot of Basic Wealth Comparisons by Village



Although the wealth discrepancy amongst the 25-75 percentile in Kazilamihunda is smallest, it also has the largest number of outliers. Kilemba appears to have the greatest spread of wealth in the 25-75 percentile range, but outliers tended to be lower than those exhibited in the two other villages.

Some evidence also indicates that households that received refugee assistance tended to be wealthier than households that did not. Out of 137 sampled households, 36 households (26%) cited specific instances of refugee-related help. The average wealth of an NGO-affected household was 1.13 times larger than the average wealth of a non-NGO affected household. The following table shows the breakdown of refugee-affiliated NGO contact by village.

Table 6. NGO Contact in Wealthiest and Poorest Households

Village Wealth	Kilemba	Kazila	Kasuga	Total
Top 5%	100%	20%	0	38%
Top 10%	75%	33%	0	27%
Top 20%	50%	20%	11%	30%
Bottom 10%	20%	0	0	6.7%
Village Average NGO Contact	31%	30%	11%	26%
Village Average Wealth	599,112	767,712	702,411	694,575
Average Wealth of NGO-Affected Households	1,000,477	728,867	510,800	786,839
Ratio AVG NGO HH Wealth to Total Avg HH	1.67:1	0.95: 1	0.73:1	1.13:1
Total NGO Impact	18	17	6	41

All four of the households that make up Kilemba’s top 5% village wealth received some form of NGO assistance. 50% of its top 20% wealthiest households also received NGO assistance, which is significantly higher than the 31% average village NGO contact. Kazilamihunda’s wealthiest households also tended to have NGO contact, but the ratio of average wealth in NGO-affected households to the average wealth of all village households was lower, indicating that NGO-affected households on average were not better off than the average household.

Although high NGO assistance in Kilemba was not correlated with greater overall village wealth, NGO contact was correlated with high wealth household outliers. This relationship was not predominant for high wealth outliers in Kazilamihunda and Kasuga villages. These results imply that NGO assistance have a larger impact on specific households in poorer villages. In wealthier villages, NGO assistance was not related to high wealth in specific households, perhaps because wealthy households were able to build wealth in other ways or already had access to benefits NGOs provided. The cross-sectional nature of data collection does not provide sufficient information to assume NGO assistance enabled households to grow wealthier.

Although the average wealth in Kazilamihunda was higher than that in Kilemba, the 25-75 percentile range showed that the majority of households in both villages remained poor. Indeed, the majority of surveyed households across all villages did not have access to Bank services, did not understand the concept of savings or expressed high optimism about future development gains.⁴⁶ Endemic poverty, hunger and food insecurity may have discouraged villagers from wanting to take risks and potentially reap rewards from refugee-related opportunities.

These results provide some interesting considerations for NGO projects for villages in refugee-affected areas. If the primary goal of refugee-affiliated NGO projects is to compensate host communities and provide a safety net for households made most vulnerable from refugee presence, the above data results do not provide evidence to support the successful attainment of that goal. The poorest 10% of households across all three communities were subsistence farmers who were older and often sick, and received little to no support from refugee-affiliated organizations. Those in the next highest poverty bracket also cited lower than average NGO contact. It appears instead, that the lasting impact of NGO projects in surrounding villages maybe contributing to rising income disparities within villages.

High Impact NGOs and Projects

In Kilemba, employment and skills-transfer seminars tended to be affiliated with the wealthiest households. Wealthy households thanked TCRS for its modern agriculture seminars that taught them how to use irrigation to harvest beans twice a year rather than only once. There

⁴⁶ Kazilamihunda was arguably the exception to attitudes of optimism. Younger villagers living closer to the valley tended to be enthusiastic and optimistic about their future prospects in the next five years.

was no significant pattern or type of project that was correlated with high wealth or mentioned by villagers in Kazilamihunda and Kasuga. On the whole, NGO projects tended to be more helpful if the implementing organization had a nuanced understanding of the most important needs of a particular community, as well as how to maximize gains from a certain project. For instance, Kilemba and Kasuga would have valued an additional well more than Kazilamihunda, which may benefit more from skill-transfer services that build the capacities of young households to take advantage of income. The type of well constructed also required detailed understanding of the region's climactic conditions; the majority of INGO and NGO-donated well projects dried up in the summer months.

One organization was particularly effective in implementing impactful projects for the three surveyed villages. TCRS⁴⁷ was considered the most respected and most effective NGO by villagers in Kilemba and Kazilamihunda. TCRS earned this title because it had the greatest visibility in both villages as the primary NGO organization providing services. The organization contributed to various dimensions of aid to local hosts as well as purchased its needs from villages and Kibondo town markets. TCRS developed strong relationships with District government. Over forty years of presence has also gradually enabled the organization to understand the nuanced development needs of specific villages better than other refugee-assisting organizations that have operated in the area.

Importantly, two types of NGO involvement that were not service or aid related but nevertheless highly impactful included employment and local purchase agreements. NGO employment, even at the security guard, cook or cleaning level, provided villagers with a lucrative salary consistent enough to help them clear all debts and invest in long-term rewards

⁴⁷ A former Lutheran World Federation-supported INGO, TCRS recently gained legal status as a national NGO and has operated in Kigoma Region since 1964.

such as grinding mills and cattle.⁴⁸ In addition to high payment, NGOs frequently included training sessions and workshops for employees. NGO-employment also enables farmers to build networks beyond the village setting, which also increases the chances they can find other jobs to access after NGO employment, find middlemen to sell their crops, and new information about opportunities they would not have encountered in their communities. Some NGOs also provided pensions programs after employees were no longer necessary.

NGO organizations also supported cottage industries such as brick-making and stone slab collection in villages. Kazilamihunda took advantage of TCRS and IRC needs for bricks to build their compounds and continued to supply both organizations until 2007. Today, the village still devotes land entirely for brick-making and firing. All three villages made bricks and some homesteads have visible brick-burning ovens on their grounds, but only Kazilamihunda scaled up brick production to accommodate mass purchasing needs of NGOs. By reliably producing thousands of burnt bricks weekly, villagers and regional NGOs have continued to rely on Kazilamihunda's brick production for their construction needs. As Kazilamihunda and surrounding villages develop, bricks are likely to remain in high demand for households eager to exchange mud dwellings for a more durable and weather resistant material. Despite being further away from camps, Kasuga households also took advantage of NGO needs by selling stone slabs to compounds such as TCRS and an Anglican Church in Kakonko town. Households as of 2009 continue to integrate stone slabs when building new extensions onto their homesteads.

Local Capacity Affects the Impact of Refugee Camp Presence on Hosts

⁴⁸ In maintenance jobs, it was not uncommon for employees to receive between 30-60,000Tsh per month (22-45USD). A one-month NGO salary could be comparable to one acre (300 kilograms) of maize sold to the market at (at 4000Tsh per tin where 1 tin= 18 kilograms).

Kazilamihunda and Kasuga's ability to take advantage of NGO needs through brick making and slab collection is illustrative of a larger trend where economic advantage was dependent on the household or village's capacity and initiative. Diverging wealth patterns in Kazilamihunda and Kasuga showed that time and frequency of refugee and NGO contact were not significant causes of wealth or poverty. Rather, focus groups and surveys showed that willingness, ability, attitude and initiative were more likely to determine wealth levels. Thus, the data provides some evidence that the size, scope and long-term impacts of camp presence on local hosts depended on the household or village's ability to absorb or shield itself from refugee presence. Furthermore, a household's ability to take advantage of refugee and NGO-related benefits stems from its absorption capacity. In this context, absorption capacity may be characterized as the ability to incorporate gains from economic benefits into lasting wealth gains.

Several specific examples from the three villages build evidence to support the absorption argument. For example, one 42-year-old household head in Kilemba cited his desire to provide for his seven young children and TCRS's seminars on improving agricultural practices to be the two primary reasons for his present success. After learning new mixed farming strategies for instance, he planted groundnut with cassava and millet with maize to bolster yield. From crop profits, he invested in a generator, virtually nonexistent in the three villages except for use with grinding mills, to power a water pump to irrigate his 23-acres of land. In Kasuga village, a group of farmers self-organized to plant seedlings after the national NGO REDESOS stopped its environmental project in the area. After learning about the farmers' initiative, REDESOS returned with water cans, seed germination tools, machetes and hoes to help their efforts. In Kazilamihunda, household surveys interrupted one farmer holding a meeting with other residents of his Kitongoji to start a chicken sharing project.

The ability of action to induce positive wealth gains was not confined to villagers. Local and District government in the Kibondo context also play a large role in assisting or constricting village wealth and development. Responsible for land allocation and administration of socioeconomic benefits such as education, health and agriculture, government-appointed village authorities were powerful community members. Village Executive Officers (VEO) that were often appointed to villages by the government did not have incentives to push for development in their assigned villages. For example, the VEO in Kilemba spent weekends at his second house in another village, and did not have village population statistics from previous years even though such records were supposed to be readily available. Public funding facilities such as the Tanzania Social Action Fund (TASAF) provide resources for villages that demonstrate need for specific projects for which Village Councils must create convincing proposals. Kazilamihunda and Kasuga have both received infrastructure grants from TASAF for wells, classroom and dispensary construction. Kilemba has not received any funding support from TASAF, which was perhaps reflective of poor VEO and Village Council initiative perceived in focus groups.

Corruption and political mismanagement of resources could affect local capacity to take advantage of opportunities driven by refugee presence. For example, the Kazilamihunda village Health Officer sold monthly drug rations from the village dispensary to local kiosk owners. This forced households who paid 5,000Tsh for annual health insurance that covered free dispensary medicine were forced to pay twice for drugs. Since poor households were often also sick, the additional monetary burden for medicine was particularly taxing. In another instance, UNHCR funded the construction of a Kibondo Youth Center Library in Kibondo town. After the library was finished, operations were transferred to the local government. Within two years, however, mismanagement and unenforced loans led to lost books and premature facility deterioration.

Today, the former library stands as an abandoned meeting hall. According to focus groups, poverty, apathy, cultural motivations and fear of conflict held villagers back from complaining to District offices.

On the village level, the absorption argument may also explain differences in household wealth trajectories. For instance, Kilemba's poverty compared to Kazilamihunda's relative wealth could be explained by poor absorptive capacity to leverage refugee-induced opportunities and deflect refugee-induced burdens. During surveys in August 2009, Kazilamihunda's local market was about twice the size of Kilemba's local market. This implies that Kazilamihunda may have had twice the market participation as Kilemba and come in contact with refugees on a more frequent basis. High refugee contact and high refugee-affiliated contact in free market-oriented areas such as employment and local purchases could also provide evidence of greater absorption capacity in Kazilamihunda and help explain its current wealth. In other words, camp presence could positively affect wealth in households and communities that are willing and able to take advantage of refugee presence.

Three major points about the impact refugees have on local hosts can be induced from the research conclusions. First, households and villages can potentially generate large and lasting wealth impacts if they have the capacity and initiative to take advantage of opportunities around protracted refugee camps. Second, crime, negative perceptions and lack of absorptive capacity are large barriers that hinder host communities from taking advantage of refugee-related opportunities. Finally, protracted camps can leave certain households or villages more insecure and vulnerable after disbandment because camp presence depletes productive resources and increases cost of living.

POLICY IMPLICATIONS

Given the high rate of failure of host-related development initiatives in the past, policy recommendations on behalf of hosts need to be constructed with past projects in mind. Earlier in the paper, several development projects aimed at refugee-affected areas failed because the programs created opportunities for government power hoarding or triggered negative national government perceptions of the aid regime as harborers of a “hidden agenda” to locally integrate refugees. Furthermore, as was most often the case, INGO mandates, donor motivations and funding limitations prevented projects designed to bring host considerations on par with refugee considerations from materializing. There is no question that refugee needs supersede those of hosts in the refugee studies field. Therefore, the design of any host-related development policy or project will require a liberal degree of caution, strategy and care.


To tie host interests to refugee situations and continue to satisfy donor preferences,⁴⁹ policies need to include refugees and contribute to building self-reliance opportunities for camp-bound populations.⁵⁰ Successes in Zambian self-reliance based programs have provided some evidence that strategies expanding refugee autonomy do not necessarily increase their desire to remain in the host country (Lin, 2001). Self-reliance options such as education, skills and training services originally intended for refugees are also important for local host communities as well, because they can help reduce dependency and antagonistic coping mechanisms frustrated refugees may take out on their surroundings. More importantly, development projects in refugee-affected areas that include refugees are more likely to receive donor attention and funding.

⁴⁹ Donors prefer initiatives that include widespread community participation, are small in scale and fast to implement, use local resources involving bullet donations, promote gender equality and bridge development and institutional linkages within larger UN funding bodies (Crisp, 2001).

⁵⁰ See *The Host-Refugee Relationship in Theory and Practice* section.

The figure below demonstrates where NGOs might best intervene to support both vulnerable populations in the host-refugee framework. As protraction continues, hosts are vulnerable to poverty while refugees are susceptible to dependency on the refugee aid regime.

Figure 5. Policy Interventions in the Host-Refugee Framework



By creating policies and projects that link hosts to refugees, NGOs may be able to help decrease vulnerable tendencies in both populations. Policy recommendations that target the three major host needs identified in the findings section and integrate refugees are explored below.

First, lasting impacts of refugee presence on local economics can be affected by augmenting local absorption capacity. Participatory seminars in leadership, saving, cash flow planning, project management and public speaking can empower and build capacity for villagers from refugee-affected areas. To alleviate this tension, NGOs may consider hiring both locals and refugees as local security guards to both increase overlapping sense of responsibility as well as provide larger money transfers for locals and refugees. Local government can also encourage

Vitongoji Chairmen to integrate neighborhood watch programs into village daily life as a way of self-protection, household empowerment and community building.

Second according to the research findings, productive interactions between the host and refugee populations in the first “stage” of camp protraction can be helpful to decrease the onset of dependency and violent outbursts if/ when external factors such as food ration cuts provoke reactions from refugees and retaliating responses from hosts. In this way, interactions with hosts can serve as a safety valve that reduces dependency tendencies that long-term refugees adopt, which later on devolve into crime and theft. To increase positive interaction between hosts and refugees, community governance structures and sport programs established early on in refugee presence can reap long-term benefits.

Specifically, NGOs could facilitate the creation of community-level refugee camp council structures that include local host and refugee participants. Representatives from both parties could meet to discuss issues and grievances from their respective communities as well as build steps towards managing mutual concerns. Similarly, social societies and organizations should be encouraged between host and refugee communities. Such organizations may meet several times a year in camps for social events, mock debates, discussions or specific activities. Sports programs provide another healthy outlet for what Simon Turner calls “angry young men” syndrome, which drives idle, frustrated young men on camps to engage in violence and petty disturbances (Turner, 1999). Evidence of these types of interactions already exist: Kazilamihunda residents recall refugees who visited the village to play football.

Some policy interventions achieve several positive goals that help both hosts and refugees and simultaneously appease donors and regional governments. For example, NGOs could coordinate host-refugee skills-sharing workshops between hosts and refugees on camps or

in surrounding villages. In the early 2000s, TCRS created a woman's income generation group in Minyinya village to receive training in basket weaving from refugee women at Mtendeli camp. One woman in the beneficiary village said this skills transfer project was "very successful" and "one of the examples of the positive benefits of the presence of refugees" (Rutinwa, 2003). These types of interactions 1) reduces tensions by building relationships and encouraging safe interaction between the two populations, 2) empowers both parties by having them serve as teachers instead of students, which builds leadership skills and 3) fosters potentially sustainable and scalable skills-acquisition after refugees repatriate. They also do not require NGOs to hire specialty staff to lead seminars, and do not violate local government restrictions on refugee movement.

Third, the research findings conclude that NGOs should provide safeguards to reduce negative impacts to host populations made more vulnerable from camp presence. To mitigate vulnerabilities, refugee-affiliated NGOs implementing development projects in refugee-affected areas should consider consulting Kitongoji chairmen instead of village-level leadership. Surveyed villagers tended to rely on Kitongoji chairmen who were elected, took their jobs seriously and were typically well-respected, to solve conflicts and represent their needs. NGOs may also consider direct solicitation of needs from a sample of villagers. This includes them in the decision-making process and helps build a greater sense of solidarity with other actors involved in refugee camps. Another vulnerability mitigation tactic stems from research findings. Households tended to benefit more sustainably from free-market opportunities that arise from refugee presence, so NGOs may consider saving a portion of local purchase agreements for the poorest host villages because these villages tend to be overlooked in local purchase agreements.

NGOs should also consider hiring villagers in development projects such as planting trees that help compensate hosts for the environmental damage refugee presence has created.

FUTURE RESEARCH AND APPLICATION

In the western Tanzanian refugee-host context, a dynamic analysis revealed a shift in host-refugee interactions and impacts at the 9-11 year mark, with high socioeconomic benefits and interaction in the first period and increased crime and negative perception in the second. This single case study may not be sufficient to argue for a revision to the definition and conception of refugee protraction, but it does provide evidence that the present conception of protraction may not be a wholly accurate reflection of the relationships and impacts experienced by refugees and host populations. Research that investigates how refugees and hosts can influence their relationships with each other will be helpful to elucidate policies that can take advantage of positive interactions for the benefit of both populations. For example, the changing composition, or the stock and flow of refugees populations on camps, could affect the nature and timing of tensions between refugees and hosts. Understanding how new populations of refugees to an old camp could trigger or relieve violence between refugees and hosts could enable policymakers to better plan interventions.

Despite attempted peace accords and ceasefires, conflict continues to undermine development efforts in many sub-Saharan African countries. Dadaab camps in Kenya have been operating for more than eighteen years, and over 60,000 new Somali refugees from Mogadishu recently arrived in 2008. Liberians in Ghana, Sahrawis in Algeria, Sudanese in Uganda, Angolans in the Congo, and Liberians in Cote d'Ivoire reflect only a small percentage of refugees who have or continue to deal with unresolved situations over the past two decades.

Professor and researcher Karen Jacobsen provides encouragement however, by arguing that “the economic and social benefits to host communities of hosting refugees can outweigh the costs, particularly if policies are set up as to take advantage of the refugees’ presence” (Jacobsen, 2005). As the length of time UNHCR requires to find durable solutions for refugees grows, so does the need for well-timed strategies that mitigate protraction’s consequences for refugees and populations in refugee-affected areas. Hosts may be forced to remain supplementary to refugee needs because of organizational mandates, but including them in the spheres of research and refugee care and maintenance strategies could make protraction more bearable—and even beneficial—for both vulnerable populations.

APPENDIX

A. Constructing Household Wealth

Household wealth was calculated by taking the sum of physical and financial capital for households in each village. Physical capital included livestock, household items such as bicycles, hoes and radios, as well as larger productive assets. All were valued by the item's average sale price in the August 2009 market. Financial capital included savings, additional income, and total agricultural sales. Land acreage and homestead were not used in calculating physical capital because appraisals were notoriously difficult to determine and all land is publically owned by the government. With rare exception, owned land is only as valuable as the productive value of the land, which was measured by total agricultural sales. To estimate village wealth, total sampled wealth was summed and multiplied by its percentage of total village population, a statistic provided by the Village Census. Survey composition borrowed heavily from previous frameworks used and adapted by Karen Jacobsen and the UK DFID Sustainable Guidance Model. Both measured the wealth of vulnerable households in insecure environments.⁵¹

Limitations

Village-level idiosyncrasies that disrupted data accuracy would have fallen if more villages were sampled, but constraints on resources and time prevented this option. The accuracy of surveys depended on respondents who were sometimes reluctant to part with personal information or simply did not know. When the husband was not home, many wives had difficulty estimating the financial stock of the household. In such cases, every attempt was made

⁵¹ The five areas of capital development include 1) Natural capital, 2) Physical capital 3) Human capital), 4) Social capital and 5) Financial capital (Jacobsen, 2005).

to revisit the household after the husband returned, or to make best estimates based on other information. Although hiring expenses for day labor is important to include in the overall wealth calculations for the village, some respondents gave daily payment estimates instead of an annual total. Therefore, this value could not be estimated and detracts from the accuracy of the wealth measurement. Translator discrepancies also affected the accuracy of the wealth measurement. For example, one translator tended to record higher savings than the other, which was most likely caused by the different ways each asked questions and follow-up questions.

B. Village Wealth Comparison

		Kilemba			Kazilamihunda			Kasuga	
ID	AVG/ HH	Vil SUM EXTRAPOL	STDEV	AVG/ HH	Vil SUM EXTRAPOL	STDEV	AVG/ HH	Vil SUM EXTRAPOL	STDEV
Observations		42			50			46	
HH_Head_Age	45.17		18.20	38.20		13.58	47.71		17.30
Wife	1.07		0.26	1.16		0.37	1.12		0.50
W-Age	37.98		12.81	33.03		12.39	39.44		15.03
DepElders>65	68.33		5.77	1.74		11.80	1.59		10.55
C< 18	5.14	2973.40	2.84	4.54	3420.62	2.78	5.31	3898.86	2.82
AVGAdAge	41		14.2	37.8		11.7	43.6		17.2
HH	6.98	4585.29	3.31	6.98	5253.68	3.59	7.56	5546.49	3.12
Koloboi	1.19	782.47	0.63	1.00	818.33	0.49	1.02	750.41	0.40
K_Value	7142.86	4694835.68	3803.54	6000.00	4909983.63	2969.23	6133.33	4502446.98	2389.37
CellPhone	0.24	156.49	0.43	0.22	180.03	0.46	0.18	130.51	0.39
C_Value	4761.90	3129890.45	8621.61	4400.00	3600654.66	9293.40	3555.56	2610114.19	7732.92
Radio	0.45	297.34	0.55	0.73	589.20	0.53	0.60	440.46	0.50
R_Value	5428.57	3568075.12	6600.60	8640.00	7070376.43	6432.57	7200.00	5285481.24	5945.20
Hoes	3.48	2284.82	1.85	3.04	2487.73	1.70	3.24	2381.73	1.90
H_Value	10428.57	6854460.09	5553.04	9120.00	7463175.12	5105.58	9733.33	7145187.60	5690.50
Bike	0.74	485.13	0.66	0.58	474.63	0.57	0.51	375.20	0.55
V_Value	36904.76	24256651.02	33238.83	29000.00	23731587.56	28731.69	25555.56	18760195.76	27432.19
Add_Assets	86428.57	56807511.74	341216.06	34782.61	26186579.38	135347.11	68372.09	47960848.29	169950.00
Goats	1.86	1220.66	2.30	2.84	2324.06	3.81	3.13	2300.16	3.05
G_Value	37142.86	24413145.54	46026.81	56800.00	46481178.40	76169.52	62666.67	46003262.64	60991.80
Cows	0.10	62.60	0.48	0.22	180.03	1.20	2.54	1076.67	5.39
Exotic	2380.95	1564945.23	15430.33	0.00	0.00	0.00	9523.81	3262642.74	43643.58
Local	5357.14	3521126.76	34718.25	16500.00	13502454.99	90012.75	106666.67	78303425.77	319596.69
Chicken	0.93	610.33	2.65	2.16	1767.59	3.38	5.96	2626.43	4.32

Chick_Value	2785.71	1830985.92	7961.91	6480.00	5302782.32	10148.37	10733.33	7879282.22	13332.12
Ducks	0.00	0.00		4.00	65.47		0.56	391.52	1.91
D_Value	0.00	0.00	0.00	400.00	327332.24	2828.43	2666.67	1957585.64	9329.82
AnimalSales	5309.52	3489827.86	11149.73		0.00		74857.14	17096247.96	128558.79
Acres	5.32	3497.65	3.68	4.91	3936.17	3.46	4.31	3164.60	2.20
Sales_Beans	0.71	463.88	1.19	4.45	3640.77	9.23	1.27	914.98	2.59
ValueperTinBeans	6357.52	4178650.39	12128.65	6722.00	5500818.33	5564.73	2766.67	2030995.11	4776.36
TotalBeansSale	15317.07	9827856.03	45072.41	47738.46	39065842.23	108455.96	11819.56	8676672.10	22107.17
Sales_Maize	8.43	5539.91	15.89	9.26	7573.65	14.19	10.67	7830.34	27.85
ValuepertinMaize	3087.30	2029212.36	2151.52	2836.00	2320785.60	1979.46	2533.33	1859706.36	1905.14
TotalMaizeSold	39440.48	25923318.31	87940.27	36434.00	29815057.28	54161.30	41266.67	30293637.85	111540.33
Sales_Millet	1.75	1151.35	3.58	0.63	515.55	2.03	0.29	212.07	1.10
ValuepertinMillet	1186.51	779864.32	1920.58	536.00	438625.20	1363.33	355.56	261011.42	1170.77
TotalMilletSold	7380.95	4851328.33	17994.52	2444.00	2000000.00	8027.23	1111.11	815660.69	4124.33
Sales_GN	0.81	532.08	3.20	1.48	1211.13	6.92	0.31	228.38	1.08
ValuepertinGN	2500.00	1643192.49	5790.03	520.00	425531.91	1554.98	977.78	717781.40	2965.63
TotalGNSold	12476.19	8200312.99	48719.83	6680.00	5466448.45	34174.49	2355.56	1729200.65	8023.14
Sales_Garden	476.19	312989.05	3086.07	5140.00	4206219.31	19828.87	1688.89	1239804.24	7771.81
Sales_MiscCrop	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		10500.00	342577.49	6363.96
Tobacco/Cotton	27500.00	860719.87	17677.67		0.00		135521.78	99485807.50	401282.18
TotalAgrSales	81011.90	53247261.35	143264.32	158702.00	129870703.76	449696.16	196144.00	143988254.49	428394.38
Add_Income	160028.57	105183098.59	288829.56	233620.00	191178396.07	442881.42	163666.67	120146818.92	486828.75
Payment	174256.25	43632237.87	390567.09	74750.00	14680851.06	63599.78	104490.91	18750407.83	161616.49
Savingsq3	154000.00	101220657.28	445233.78	206050.00	168617021.28	888388.44	14622.22	10734094.62	52905.27
Total_Wealth	599111.90	393782472.61	869804.91	767712.00	628242225.86	1319387.2	702410.67	515635889.07	1201232.4

C: Village NGO Contact by Organization

Organization	Village	1: Employment	2: Income-generating	3: Asset-Transfer	4: Education Seminars	5: Infrastructure	6: Local Goods Purchase	Refugee-Related
Anglican Church (Kibondo)	1	Employment						N
Anglican Church (Kibondo)	1			Blankets, mosquito nets				N
Anglican Church (Kibondo)	2						Bricks for Compounds	N
Anglican Church (Kibondo)	3			Clothing				N
DANIDA	1					Wells (1)		N
DANIDA	1			4 milk cows				N
DANIDA/UNHCR	1					Former CCM party office (1)		N
Mayawasi Game Reserve	2					Contributed money to build district headquarters		N
TASAF	2					Wells		N
TASAF	3					Dispensary		N
TASAF	3					Secondary School Rooms (3)		N
TWESA	2					1 well and 3 springs in 1999		N
CARITAS	1		Education					Y
CARITAS	3		Disease Prevention					Y
CARITAS	3			Maize Seeds				Y
CARITAS	3			Mosquito Nets				Y
CARITAS	3					Gravitational Water		Y
CONCERN	2					Built wells		Y
CONCERN	2					Built 3 classrooms(1998)		Y
IRC	3						Stone Slabs for Hospitals	Y
IRC	2					Transport to Camp Hospitals		Y
IRC	2						Bricks for Compounds	Y
IRC, EU	1					Village Dispensary (1)		Y

KDC/TCRS	1					VEO office (1)		Y
REDESO	1				Environ protect			Y
REDESO	1			Tree Seedlings				Y
REDESO	1					Pump well (1)		Y
REDESO	2			Tree Seedlings				Y
REDESO	2		Seminar on cultivation					Y
REDESO	2				Deforestation (2004)			Y
REDESO	2		Water conservation and usage					Y
REDESO	3				Environ Protect			Y
SAEU	1			School supplies				Y
TCRS	2						Bricks for Compounds	Y
TCRS	3						Stone Slabs for Compounds	Y
TCRS	2			Mango, Guava Trees				Y
TCRS	2	Employee						Y
TCRS	2	Employee						Y
TCRS	2	Employee						Y
TCRS	1					Primary Classrooms (2)		Y
TCRS	1					Deep well (1)		Y
TCRS	1		Mechanic Training					Y
TCRS	1	Sec Guard						Y
TCRS	1	Employee						Y
TCRS	1		Building Construction					Y
TCRS	1	Pension						Y
TCRS	1		Fishing Pond Training	Fish, gear, supplies				Y
TCRS	1					Com Develop Office (1)		Y
TCRS	1		Agricultural Methods					Y
TCRS	2					Gravitational Tank for village		Y

TCRS	2			Seedlings for lumbering trees				Y
TCRS	3					Built, Repaired classrooms		Y
TCRS	3					Deep Wells (3)		Y
TCRS	3					Head Teacher House		Y
TCRS	3					Head Officer House		Y
TCRS	3				Environ Protect			Y
TWESA	1					Latrines for school		Y
TWESA	1		Rainwater harvesting					Y
TWESA	3					Shallow wells (3) 2006		Y
UNICEF	3		Child health, Family planning					Y
UNICEF-CSPD	3		Child Survival Protection Program					Y
Ref-Related		6	11	7	4	17	4	49
Non-Ref		1	0	3	0	7	1	12
Total		7	11	10	4	24	5	61

D. Focus Group Guiding Questions

Focus groups consisted of 12-14 members and consisted of 1) Village Executive Officer, 2) Village Agricultural Officer, 3) Village Chairman, 4) Health Officer, 5) Head Teacher, 6) Village Elders, 7) members of the Village District Council, 9) additional voluntary informants. Guided by the Participatory Rural Appraisal Method (PRA), discussions had four major purposes; 1) introduce the research project and intentions to the village in a formal way, 2) establish basic macroeconomic conditions such as roads, schools, health clinics and water wells per capita, village demographics and case-specific context for the village, 3) collect qualitative information about how refugees and NGOs have impacted the village over time, 4) solicit the aid of community leaders on creating a village map and setting the ideal random sampling methodology.

- I. Introductions
 - a. Short Explanation of Project
 - b. Questions/ Answers about project
- II. Establish context for survey administration
 - a. Develop a village map
 - b. Gain estimations of seasonal calendars, timelines and wealth and social group definitions, i.e. how many catamarans, oil palm plots, cultivable land, permanent/ iron roofed houses, shops (duka) constitute wealthy, medium-wealth, etc.
- III. Village Context, Background and Statistics
 - a. Communal buildings including who built them, who inhabit them, who operates them, estimation of use.
 - b. Community population and growth rate
 - c. Local businesses per capita
 - d. Under five mortality rate
- IV. Physical Capital (includes infrastructure and natural resources)
- V. Financial Capital opportunities
- VI. Livelihoods and crop productivity (trends)
- VII. Human Capital (health and education)
 - a. Number of healthcare facilities per capita

- b. Number of wells per capita
 - c. Literacy rate estimation
- VIII. Local-markets, size, composition and prices
 - a. List of local markets and roads to reach them
 - b. Using the information provided by the village-level focus groups, I will attempt to construct an estimate of the size of the local market
 - c. How have prices, quantity of food demanded and produced, sales and availability of products changed over the past twenty years? Past fifteen years? Past three years? Predictions for the next three years?
- IX. Perceptions and Interactions with Refugees
 - a. Village-level interaction with refugees: first refugee encounter, frequency of refugee visits and the nature of refugee visits.
- X. NGO & Government involvement
 - a. Interaction with local NGOs, development organizations and/or refugee organizations
 - b. Number of, names, exact distance, duration of stay and any involvement for external organizations operating in the vicinity
 - c. Explicit dialogue with government with refugee protocol
- XI. Quality of life/ perception questions
 - a. Crime rate and how it has changed in the past ten years
- X. Q & A

E: Household Survey

Survey # _____

Date _____

START TIME: _____

Surveyer _____

Village _____

Kitongoji _____

Basic Identification: Very Poor Poor Medium Wealth Wealthy

SECTION I: HOUSEHOLD BACKGROUND

1. How many dependents live in your household?

Individual (Number)	Relationship to Household Head	Sex (M/F)	Age	Ethnicity
	Head of Household			
	Wife (1)			
	Wife (2)			
	Wife (3)			
	Children <18			
	Non-Head Elders > 65			
	Non-Dependents			
	Total Members			

2. Household members who have spent time outside the village in the past ten years

Individual	Age	Sex	Depart Year	Duration of Move	Reasons for Move	Destination Village	Destination District

3. Does your household own or rent your dwellings? Own / Rent / Other

If Other, Explain: _____

4. Dwellings (Check appropriate)

Type	D1	Year Built	Use	D2	Year Built	Uses	D3	Year Built	Uses
1. Mud, Thatched, Small									
2. Mud, Thatched, Large									

3. Mud, Iron Roof, Small									
4. Mud, Iron Roof, Large									
5. Unbaked Brick, Iron, Small									
6. Unbaked Brick, Iron, Large									
7. Baked Brick, Iron, Small									
8. Baked Brick, Iron, Large									
9. Compound (# rooms: _____)									
10. Brick, Thatched, Small									
11. Brick, Thatched, Large									

SECTION II: PHYSICAL CAPITAL

A. LAND

1. Does your household own or rent land? Own / Rent / Other: _____
2. If yes, how many acres of land does your household own? _____
3. Please list dates of land acquisition as well as reasons for the acquisition:

Year	# Acres	Reasons for Acquisition

--	--	--

4. If no, how many acres of land do you rent? _____

5. Please list dates of land rental as well as reasons for land rental:

Year	# Acres	Reasons for Acquisition

6. Who do you rent out your land to, since when and why?

Renters	Start Date	End Date	Rent/ month	Reasons for Renting

7. Please estimate the CURRENT total value of the land you own.

# Acres	Primary Use	Estimated Value/Acre	Total Estimated Value

8. What are the top three reasons for land acquisition over the past TEN YEARS? (rank)

- () Members of household increased/ decreased
- () Land taken forcefully (If yes, by whom? _____)
- () Needed money
- () Opportunity for sale/ purchase arose
- () Inheritance
- () Other: _____

- Other: _____
- No change in land acquisition/ use

9. Has your property ever been taken away or used without compensation? Y / N

Trespasser	Trespass Dates	Duration	# of acres	Usage

10. If yes, what action did you take?

- Contacted local government, and successfully removed trespasser
- Contacted local government, and was unsuccessful in removing trespasser
- Personally confronted trespasser and successfully removed them from the property
- Personally confronted trespasser and was unsuccessful in removing them
- Took no action to remove trespasser
- Other (specify): _____

B. PHYSICAL ASSETS

11. Please indicate the quantity, acquisition date and values of the following assets:

Assets	Quantity	Acquisition Year	Estimated Present Value	Currently Used by Household?
Electric Generator				
Koroboi Lamp				
Phone				
Working Radio				
Hoe				
Motorcycle				
Bicycle				
Cart				
Lorry				
Boat				
Tractor				
Fishing Gear				
Plow				
Kiosk				
Shop				
Bar				

Restaurant				
Hotel				
Grinding Mill				
Sewing Machine				
Other:				

12. Please list what you believe are the three major reasons for changes to your overall household physical assets in the past ten years.

1. _____
2. _____
3. _____

C. AGRICULTURE

17. Please check type and acreage of crops grown IN THE PAST YEAR

Crop	Acres Cultivated	Production Change in Past 10 Years (Increase/ Decrease)	Fertilizer (Y/N)
Cassava			
Beans			
Maize			
Millet			
Groundnut			
Sweet Potato			
Garden (ie. onion, tomato, spinach, cabbage)			
Tobacco			
Cotton			
Other			

18. What crop composition changes do you perceive for THE NEXT THREE YEARS?

19. Please provide major reasons for anticipated changes

- Household consumption patterns changed
- Demand in local markets for certain crops rose
- Yields for certain crops were consistently below target
- Seed Price or ease of access
- External promotion
- Fertilizer access
- Other: _____

20. Please list crop yields in the PAST YEAR

Crop	Months of Harvest	Quantity Harvested	Total quantity consumed

21. Please list crop sales in the PAST TWELVE MONTHS.

Crop	Quantity sold	Price/ unit	Total Value

22. Where did you sell and who did you sell to in the PAST TWELVE MONTHS?

Crop	Market sold to	Frequency	Buyers

23. Did you hire day laborers in the past year? Y / N

24. How much did you pay them? Per Yard _____ Total Payment _____

25. Were there differences in compensation? Please list reasons:

- () Individual's productivity
- () Refugee Status
- () Willingness to work for less pay
- () Cultural Reasons
- () Age
- () Individual requested additional compensation
- () Individual compensated in other ways such as food, shelter (list)

SECTION III: FINANCIAL CAPITAL

A. SAVINGS

1. How do you and members in your household acquire money?

- Savings
- Borrow from friends
- Borrow from bank
- Do not acquire
- Other: _____

2. What has affected changes in financial capital over the past ten years?

- New asset acquisition _____
- Changes to land acreage
- Weather
- Changes in demand for crops
- Other _____

3. Please list your main household expenses in the past week and estimate the amount you spend on each item.

Item	Quantity	Amount Spent	Location of Purchase	Difficulty meeting need? Y / N

4. In the past TEN YEARS, where there any 2+ year periods where you were able to save money? Y / N

5. Please specific main reasons for improved ability to save.

- A. _____
- B. _____
- C. _____

6. Please estimate the current TOTAL SAVINGS of your household.

7. Do you have a bank account? Y / N / Previously had one

8. Please estimate savings distribution:

Savings in Bank:

Savings at Home:

9. Please estimate when the majority of savings were made.

Years	Reasons

B: ADDITIONAL INCOME-GENERATION SOURCES

10. How much income did you generate in the PAST TWELVE MONTHS from the following sources?

Activity	Engaged Members	Explanation	Amount / Month	Amount / Year	Receive 3 years from today? Y / N
Pensions					Y / N
State Transfers					
Remittances					
Jewelry					
Land Rental					
Equipment Rental					
NGO Employment					
Government Employment					
Other Formal Employment					
Business Ownership					
Kiosk Ownership					
Crafts					
Sisal Rope					
Lumbering					
Beekeeping					
Brickmaking					
Slab-collection					

Trading					
Animal Sales					
Day Labor					
Domestic Servant					
Repairs					
Transport Services					
Other					

C. ANIMAL HUSBANDRY

What income-generating animals do you currently own?

Animal	Quantity	Value/ unit	Additional Inc-Gen Opportunities	Total Value
Cattle: (Exotic = E, Local = L)				
Sheep				
Goats				
Pigs				
Ducks				
Chickens				
Other				

11. Has the composition of animals changed in the past TEN YEARS? Y/N

12. Provide main reasons for these changes.

SECTION IV: HOUSEHOLD CONDITIONS

A. NATURAL RESOURCES

1. What does your household use for cooking?

- () Firewood
- () Charcoal
- () Gas

2. How does your family acquire cooking materials?
 - Purchase in local market
 - Purchase from friends and/or family
 - Private collection
 - Other: _____

3. How long does a one-way firewood collection trip take?
 - 0 -1 hours
 - 1 -2 hours
 - 2 -3 hours
 - 3 -4 hours
 - Over 4 hours

4. How long does firewood from each trip typically last? _____

B. MARKET CONDITIONS AND ACCESS

5. How often do you and/or members of your household travel to buy goods at the market per month in the past twelve months? (Total)
 - 0 times
 - 1-3 times per month
 - 3-6 times per month
 - more than 6 times per month

6. Generally, in the PAST TWELVE MONTHS, where do you go to sell goods that your family does not consume?
 - Roadside stand
 - To family and friends
 - Local market
 - Refugee Camp
 - No sales, opted to store
 - No sales, no buyers
 - No sales, no opportunities to reach buyers
 - Other (specify)

7. In the past twelve months, were you able to sell everything you wanted to sell?
 Y / N
 If not, why? _____

8. What would you say is the biggest dissatisfaction you have with sales?

C. EDUCATION

1. Please provide literacy and education information on all members of your household.

Individual (relation to HoH)	Highest Level Education Completed	Education location	Reasons for Discontinuing Education	Reading and Writing ability in Kiswahili	Reading and Writing ability in English

D. HEALTH

1. In the past TWELVE MONTHS, how many times have members of your household visited a local health clinic (total)? _____
2. How long was the average waiting period?
3. From where does your household access drinking water?
 - () rainwater, dam, pond, lake or river
 - () public well (type)
 - () private well
 - () Other
4. What type of waste disposal facilities does your household use?
 - () no facility
 - () communal pit latrine
 - () private pit latrine
 - () private toilet
 - () Other: _____
5. Who is responsible for maintaining the latrine? How often is it maintained?

6. What happens to garbage? Who maintains it? How often?

SECTION V: REFUGEE INTERACTION

1. How do you receive your news?

- Word of mouth
- Local village updates
- Radio
- Reading materials
- Other _____

2. When were you first aware that refugees had arrived nearby?

3. What was your reaction?

- Hostile
- Troubled
- Sympathetic
- Welcoming
- Undecided

4. What motivated your reaction? (Check all that apply)

- Village sentiment towards refugees
- Previous first-hand experience with refugees
- Previous non-experiential relationship with refugees
- News stories about refugees
- Government reports about refugees
- Fear of the unknown
- Undecided
- Prefer not to answer

5. Have you had previous first-hand experience with refugees before the camp? Y / N

6. Have refugees settled in your village? Y / N

7. Have you interacted personally with refugees within your village? Y / N

8. If so, when was the first experience?

9. What perception of the refugee did you have after the first encounter?

- Positive
- Somewhat positive
- Unaffected
- Somewhat negative
- Negative

10. How frequently do you interact with refugees within your village?

- On a daily basis
- Several times per week
- Several times per month
- Several times per year
- Once or twice
- Never

11. Where do you interact most with refugees?

- At home
- In the local market
- On the street
- In education or health centers
- Random
- Other _____

12. Have you ever invited refugee(s) into your home? Y / N

13. If yes, on how many occasions?

14. How has your interaction with refugees impacted your attitude towards refugees?

- More negative
- Slightly more negative
- No change
- Slightly more positive
- More positive
- Undecided

15. When you are at the market TODAY, how frequently do you encounter refugees?

- Never
- Less than half of trips
- About half the time
- More than half of trips
- On every trip

16. What years did you encounter the MOST refugees on your trips?

17. When you were at the market during highest refugee interaction, how frequently do you encounter refugees?

- Never
- Less than half of trips
- About half the time
- More than half of trips
- On every trip

18. To the best of your knowledge, were refugees buying, selling, or both?

SECTION VI: NGO ASSISTANCE AND INTERACTION

1. Have you received assistance from government in the PAST TEN YEARS? Y / N

2. What assistance has the government provided you in the PAST TEN YEARS?

Level of Government	Service	Years of Assistance	Anticipated in 3 yrs?

3. Have you received assistance from government in the PAST TEN YEARS? Y / N

4. What assistance have NGOs provided for you in the PAST TEN YEARS?

NGO (name)	Service	Years of Assistance	Anticipated Help in 3 years?

5. What assistance did you value the most?

6. What type of assistance do you wish you had more of?

7. Were you given opportunities to vocalize your desires? Y / N

8. If so, were they recognized?

QUESTIONS
PRESENT APPRECIATION TOKEN

END TIME: _____

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