

Democratic Citizenship as Uruguayan Cultural Heritage

Robin Rodd

► **Abstract:** Amidst a global turn towards authoritarianism and populism, there are few contemporary examples of state-led democratization. This article discusses how Uruguay's Frente Amplio (FA) party has drawn on a unique national democratic cultural heritage to encourage a coupling of participatory and representative institutions in "a politics of closeness." The FA has reinvigorated Batllismo, a discourse associated with social justice, civic republicanism, and the rise of Uruguayan social democracy in the early twentieth century. At the same time, the FA's emphasis on egalitarian participation is inspired by the thought of Uruguay's independence hero José Artigas. I argue that the cross-weave of party and movement, and of democratic citizenship and national heritage, encourages the emergence of new figures of the citizen and new permutations for connecting citizens with representative institutions. The FA's "politics of closeness" is an example of how state-driven democratization remains possible in an age described by some as "post-democratic."

► **Keywords:** civic republicanism, democratic citizenship, democratization, Frente Amplio, participatory democracy, pink tide, Uruguay

The third wave of democratization crashed early this century and has been receding since. By any number of metrics, qualitative or comparative analysis, leftist or establishment perspectives, democracy appears to be in retreat (Brown 2015; Diamond and Plattner 2015; Rancière 1999). Latinobarómetro's latest report on the state of democracy in Latin America notes that support for democracy as a form of government is lower now than at any time in the 21 years the organization has conducted regional political surveys (Latinobarómetro 2016). The 2017 Economist Intelligence Unit Democracy Index (Economist Intelligence Unit 2018) presents a bleak picture of a world trending towards the solidification of new authoritarianisms, and declining conditions for the practice of civil and political rights. Similarly, Freedom House's 2018 "Freedom in the World Report" noted that "democracy faced its most serious crisis in decades" amidst a "12th consecutive year of decline in global freedom"



(Freedom House 2018). Indeed, metrics-based analyses of democratic government indicate that no region on earth is becoming freer, more democratic, or more equitable.

A recent proliferation of populist (Müller 2016) and despotic (Keane 2016) regimes speaks to diminishing faith in representative institutions, including political parties and elections. Declining membership in formal political parties has been accompanied by growing participation in a range of informal political forums where it is possible to make voices heard, for example by boycotting products, participating in petitions and protests, urban interventions, and crowd-funded political causes. However, few of these forums offer possibilities for power-sharing or direct engagement with political parties and decision-making in legislative forums. A series of mass protest movements (Occupy in the US, 2011–2012; anti-dictatorship movements in Tunisia and Egypt, 2010–2012; student protests in Québec, 2012, and Chile, 2011–2013; and the *indignado* movements of Spain and Greece, 2011) failed to significantly shape representative government in their respective polities. Instead, Occupy and *indignado* were dubbed “exodus movements” for their total rejection of liberal democratic institutions, including parties and elections (Lorey 2013; Mouffe 2013; Sitrin 2012).

Global malaise in democratic institutions has inspired the term “post-democracy” (e.g. Crouch 2004). Jacques Rancière uses “post-democracy” to describe the peculiar political order whereby “democracy has given up posing as the power of the people” (Rancière 1999: 96). The collapse of the myth of “real democracy” has not led to the rehabilitation of formal (theoretical) democracy – mechanisms of popular sovereignty or citizen agency. Instead, it has led to the extension of political powers to non-accountable authorities across all domains of social life, and to the sense that the institutions of liberal democracy serve the interests of capital rather than those of a *demos* (Brown 2015). Brian Turner (2017) sees the spaces for citizen participation in democratic institutions dimmed by the depoliticizing financialization and (social) mediatization of everything, and Eugenia Siapera (2017) argues that neoliberal globalization has rendered citizenship meaningless by negating the legitimacy of social and political rights, and redefining civil rights in terms of consumers and entrepreneurs. Siapera writes:

Citizenship under post-democracy is apathetic, responding to signals in the (mass) media, connected to a well-documented shift in political communication from argument-based communication towards political marketing and spin as well as a clear dumbing down of complex issues. At the same time, citizens may also be over concerned with micro-issues that do not belong to the field of politics proper: precisely because there

is no real difference between political parties, the focus then shifts to issues ranging from morality to technical implementation of policy, but which really have little to do with politics, understood as addressing questions of power distribution and contestation. (Siapera 2017: 29)

Citizenship in the post-democratic age is reduced to spectatorship, arguments are reduced to advertising. Questions about the distribution of power are disappeared amidst pseudo-debates over technical banalities. Popular disaffection with the status quo, however, does not necessarily imply acceptance of post-democratic or authoritarian forms of governance (although in some cases it might; cf. Danemark et al. 2016). Michael Neblo et al (2010), for instance, studied online engagements between US citizens and their members of congress, and found that citizens were interested in becoming involved if they felt they had meaningful opportunities to participate. As the idea of participation has become universally accepted as a political good, however, its meaning has been stripped of the emancipatory or radical associations it once had. As Ernesto Ganuza, Gianpaolo Baiocchi, and Nicole Summers put it:

If once activists expected participation to bring about emancipation for citizens in a world otherwise dominated by political and economic elites, today participation is understood as complementary to the social order. Participation in this age is no longer a counter-power; it has become part of the planning of how power functions. (Ganuza et al. 2016: 329)

Nonetheless, a central challenge faced by governments and citizens around the world is how to reconnect citizens to the formal world of representative democracy. How can meaningful possibilities for participatory engagement be connected to representative institutions such as parties, elections, and parliament? For Sheldon Wolin, the reinvigoration of citizenship in an age he refers to as “inverted totalitarianism” amounts to “a reordering of basic power arrangements and a different understanding of civic commitments from that of the spectator” (Wolin 2008: 43). Transforming spectatorship back to citizenship demands more than spaces for voice or choice but possibilities for sharing in power. Carolyn Hendriks, meanwhile, argues that the path to “reconnecting citizens to their democratic systems may not lie in specific institutional designs but in citizens themselves” (Hendriks 2017: 482). “Citizen-led” democratic reform involves creating or activating informal spaces for citizens to engage each other in political dialogue, and to reduce the space between representative and represented. Hendriks (2017: 492–493) uses the terms “thickening formal political participation and representation” and “democratic coupling” to refer to efforts to decrease the distance between the representatives and

the represented, formal and informal spaces of political participation. “Thickening representation” involves efforts to connect a community to the legislative process. “Coupling” should allow for public concerns to be effectively channeled into spaces of democratic deliberation and decision-making. Crucially, these involve a collapsing or integration of “the public sphere and formal worlds of electoral politics” (Hendriks 2017: 493). Hendriks’s use of “thickening” and “coupling” echoes a history of Latin American efforts at “deepening democracy.” “Deepening” equates to intensifying the participatory aspects of existing political institutions to expand citizen agency (De Sousa Santos and Avritzer 2007; Roberts 1998). Over the last 20 years, a “pink tide” of left-leaning administrations came to power in several South American countries, and appeared to offer models for state-driven democratization based around progressive social policy, a flowering of grassroots political projects, and experiments in participatory democracy (Arditi 2008; Motta 2011). Unfortunately, the participatory democratic promise of these projects has largely outstripped their realities (Escobar 2010; Tockman 2017). Cladio Balderocchi (2016) reviews contradictions within participatory democratic systems, drawing recent examples from Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela. He argues that participatory democracy is less viable in unequal societies with poorly functioning liberal democratic institutions. However, according to Chantal Mouffe:

The experience of progressive governments in South America in the last decade proves it is possible to challenge neoliberalism and to re-establish the priority of democratic values without relinquishing liberal representative institutions. It also shows that the state, far from being an obstacle to democratic advances, can in fact be an important vehicle for fostering popular demands. (Mouffe 2013: 124)

In this article I explore how the Uruguayan state has drawn on a unique heritage of democratic national identity to encourage a coupling of participatory citizens and representative institutions in “a politics of closeness.” While the “left turns” of the much larger Brazil, Venezuela, Bolivia, and Ecuador have all garnered significant interest, the model of democracy espoused by Uruguay’s ruling Frente Amplio (FA) has received less scholarly attention than it deserves. I examine ways in which the FA, a coalition of parties that has won the last three presidential elections (2004, 2009, 2014), has fostered a social democracy with participatory elements by drawing on a rich tradition of symbols, myths, and discourses that link civic republicanism, egalitarianism, secularism, militant citizenship, and participatory democracy with national identity.

This article explores three questions. What model of democratic citizenship is espoused by the FA? What cultural traditions and historical

inspirations does it draw on? What light if any can the FA's "politics of closeness" and Uruguay's tradition of democratic citizenship and civic republicanism shed on the global challenge of connecting citizens to formal political institutions? Analysis is informed by an ethnographic sensibility but draws primarily on recent and historical Uruguayan political texts and media commentary. Firstly, I situate the FA as a party and movement committed to democratic liberation, dissensus, and characterized by a history of diverse political struggles. Secondly, I show how the FA has drawn on elements of Batllismo, a discourse associated with the rise of Uruguayan social democracy in the early twentieth century, to reinvoke a historical commitment to civic republicanism and redistributive social justice. Thirdly, I trace the FA's commitment to an egalitarian, participatory "politics of closeness" to the thought of Uruguay's independence hero José Artigas. I argue that this cross-weave of party and movement and of democratic citizenship and national heritage encourages the emergence of new figures of the citizen and new permutations for connecting citizens with representative institutions. The FA model of democracy emerges out of distinctly Uruguayan political and cultural traditions. However, it indicates one way in which nineteenth- and twentieth-century culture heroes can be mobilized to foster democratic citizenship in a twenty-first century that some have described as post-democratic.

The FA as Party and Movement

Uruguay has had universal suffrage and a competitive party system since 1918. There have been two dictatorship "interruptions" since then, between 1933 and 1938 and between 1973 and 1984. Among the "democracies with adjectives" (Collier and Levitsky 1996) or "third wave democracies" (Huntington 1991), Uruguay has been regarded in the literature as among the most "consolidated." Uruguay ranks third in human development indicators for Latin America (UNDP 2016). A 2014 United Nations Human Development Program report on Uruguay showed reductions in all dimensions of inequality (including health, education, housing, income, and gender) in the period 2006–2011 (UNDP 2013). Uruguay is ranked first in Latin America for civil and political liberties by Freedom House, and first in the region by the Economist's democracy index (Economist Intelligence Unit 2018; Freedom House 2018). In both cases Uruguay ranks higher than a range of European countries as well as the US. Uruguay has regularly ranked first in Latin American surveys of satisfaction with and preference for democracy as a form of government (Latinobarómetro

2016). One explanation for this is the centrality of parties in the political culture and the high degree of institutionalization of political parties in Uruguayan politics (Mainwaring and Scully 1995). However, as Constanza Moreira (2004) points out, the Uruguayan democratic experience includes a significant history of direct action that extends beyond the role of parties in maintaining and supplanting democratic forms of government.

The FA is a movement and a party of the political, not simply a political party. It emerged in 1971 in the context of an established and pluralist party system and an autonomous labor movement, two years before a coup that marked the beginning of a 12-year “civico-military” dictatorship. At this time, the FA was an alliance of 12 parties and movements that included communists, socialists, Christian democrats, Tupamaro revolutionaries (Movimiento de Liberación Nacional-Tupamaros, MLN-T), independents, and splinters from other parties (Stolovich 1992: 143). Even the MLN-T originated as a “wide front” of sorts from meetings held between 1963 and 1965 by socialists, anarchists, former communists, and independents dissatisfied with the traditional left. These factions united around a program of democratic liberation, while maintaining their distinct political positions. The influence of the Communist Party within the FA led to Marxist-Leninist labor strategies, while the socialist presence retained a historical influence among students and intellectuals. The symbolic significance of the MLN-T’s history of radicalism, meanwhile, has continued to attract young voters to the FA who did not live through the dictatorship and guerrilla warfare of the 1970s (Moreira 2004).

A historical commitment to democracy and dissensus accounts for the originality of the Uruguayan left’s theoretical responses to national social reality. Under the leadership of Rodney Arismendi, the Uruguayan Communist Party of the 1950s broke relations with Stalinism and developed “original positions that were deeply rooted in national reality” to create a “true theory of the Uruguayan revolution” (Stolovich 1992: 140). Similarly, the MLN-T developed their own model of urban guerrilla warfare they believed would be more suited to the Uruguayan cultural and geographic conditions than the rural project outlined by Régis Debray and enacted by Che Guevara in Cuba (Marchesi 2014). The FA’s twin pillars of liberation and democracy have become, for some, the definition of the left in Uruguay. In a recent news editorial, Alberto Couriel (2016) writes that “left” in Uruguay involves uniting the pursuit of reducing all forms of inequality with a commitment to democracy as an open-ended process. Couriel writes:

To be left . . . means to accept that there are issues that do not have any specific resolution. This involves discussion of different notions of

property, models of social participation, issues of social transformation, the basis and mechanisms of democratizing social relations and structures of power. (Couriel 2016, translated by the author)

There has never been one “left” in Uruguay, but as Luis Stolovich (1992) argues, “left” is more informed by horizontal citizen movements and internal democratic organization, and less beholden to classical syndicalist, Marxist, or revolutionary traditions than elsewhere on the continent. The FA is both a coalition of parties and a movement (of independent people), and its strength comes from being able to flex across a plurality of forms of political expression and organization. According to Stolovich:

The FA has become a political space that allows for the maintenance of basic loyalties (“to be left”), without being tied to party formulas; one can cease to be a communist, socialist or Tupamaro, or change one’s party, or have no party, yet retain a lasting identity of belonging to the Frente. The FA is the basic common framework for a diversity of ideological expressions and political sensibilities. (Stolovich 1992: 145)

The FA’s identity has evolved significantly from its origins as an illegal organization that opposed the dictatorship (1971–1984), to a party that has won municipal elections in the capital city of Montevideo since 1990, to an electoral coalition that has won three successive national elections (2004, 2009, 2014). However, the spirit of a militant, democratic left continues. The 2003 referendum to renationalize the state oil company (ANCAP), which had been privatized in 2001, was a particularly important victory for the FA’s grassroots movements, and continues to be a symbolically potent act of democratic defiance to neoliberal dogma. Since then, there have been many other struggles and campaigns driven by grassroots affiliates of the FA that have led to socially progressive legislation, such as opposition to mandatory detention for repeat young offenders and legalization of drugs and same sex marriage. Different ephemeral movements or factions of the FA have fought, at various times over the past 45 years, against dictatorship, imperialism, and neoliberalism, and for labor rights, education reforms, rights for the retired, housing, memory and transitional justice, and public space.

Since its inception, the FA has fostered the legitimacy of political struggle for social justice as the framework of citizenship. The legitimacy of struggles for equality and liberty is sustained by important symbols, myths, and ideas threaded through Uruguayan history, which the FA has integrated into its policy and identity. Beyond the symbolic importance of the MLN-T’s radicalism, the FA has managed to absorb symbols, myths, and ideas previously associated with the two traditional parties. From

the Blanco party the FA has integrated a commitment to participatory and radical democracy that traces back to Artigas, Uruguay's nineteenth-century independence hero. From the Colorado party the FA has reincarnated Batllismo, an early twentieth-century discourse associated with Uruguayan social democracy and civic republicanism. The FA platform spans Artigist democratic discourse, Batllista social justice reformism, Tupamaro anti-imperialism, and a national history of secular humanism and civic republicanism. As a member of the FA explained:

We reach the Blancos with a ruralist and "Artigist" discourse. And they also like our rebellious past as "Tupamaros," because that is the root of Blanco identity. Meanwhile, we reach the Colorados talking about the old Batlle. However, if you tell them about Marx and Lenin, forget it. But we have the common heritage of a republican and atheist society in which public education and civil and social rights are sacred, and that's set in stone. That's *Batllismo*. And today's FA platform is *Batllista*, so they approach us without major prejudices. (Topolansky 2002, cited in Luna 2007: 23)

Batllismo, Social Justice, and Civic Republicanism

Batllismo is a reformist social democracy discourse associated with José Batlle y Ordoñez, who was president from 1903 to 1907 and from 1911 to 1915, and whose presence dominated Uruguayan politics until his death in 1929. Batllismo as political discourse, however, continued after Batlle y Ordoñez's death and into the 1950s when Batlle Berres, Batlle y Ordoñez's nephew, became president and advocated what he called "neo-Batllismo." Carlos Gadea (2013) sees the FA as a re-embodiment of Batllismo, which is associated with a golden era of Uruguayan history, and the creation of an original form of secular, social democracy premised on the protection of individual liberties, civic republicanism, and state-guided social justice reforms.

The Batlle y Ordoñez administrations created a vanguard state structure that expanded social and civil rights, while deepening commitment to civic republicanism as the basis of democratic life (Caetano 2011). Education, health care, and dignified working and living conditions were all conceived of as social rights. The eight-hour work day was instituted in 1915. Subsidized public housing and state-managed pension funds were introduced. Batlle understood that rights can only be enjoyed if there is adequate social equality, and one of the state's major responsibilities was implementing redistributive policies so that each citizen could pursue their own freedom and participate in public life. Batlle studied Swiss

democracy, and in 1913 proposed the replacement of the president with a nine-member council. While his proposal was defeated in a 1916 referendum, he established a model of splitting executive powers between the president and a National Administrative Council that was accepted in the Constitution of 1918. The result was the world's first welfare state, and a unique model of social democracy. Batllista citizenship required both favorable structural conditions, achievable through redistributive policy, and cultural diversification and development, achievable through education and immigration. In the 1920s and 1930s, Uruguay became home to Europeans of very different political, religious, and social backgrounds, including anarchists, Jews, and Nazi sympathizers. In the case of anarchists, Batlle publicly disagreed with their politics but believed they would contribute to diversifying Uruguayan political thought and stimulate civic republicanism.

Batlle was a secular humanist who regarded education as the primary means of cultivating citizenship and social progress. Although universal access to education was enshrined in the Constitution of 1830, the early twentieth century saw access to education increase. Financial support was given to working families so children could complete high school. Women were encouraged to pursue university education and gained the vote in 1932. Divorce was legalized in 1913. Amidst claims of “secular Jacobinism” (e.g. Rodó 1964), Batlle was adamant that the Church, an authoritarian institution, was incompatible with democracy. Crucifixes were banned from hospitals in 1907, and religious symbols were kept out of public spaces.

Batllismo benefited from a supportive cultural context in early twentieth-century Uruguay. Literary and political figures linked secularism, pragmatism, and democracy with notions of social progress and national harmony. José Enrique Rodó's book *Ariel*, published in 1900, is an exploration of the potential of South American secularism, in which he argues that the purpose of the democratic state is to provide the means to manifest human qualities, including intelligence and civic virtue, wherever they exist (Rodó [1900] 2009: 48–49). At the same time, Rodó's concept of *nordomanía* spoke to his conviction in maintaining unique regional identities in the face of cultural imperialism and what he saw as inane utilitarianism and materialism. Carlos Vaz Ferreira, who among other things headed the National University during the Batlle y Ordoñez administrations and wrote what is considered the first essay on feminism in South America, carried through a commitment to pragmatism, secularism, and liberal pluralism. Vaz Ferreira's *Conocimiento y acción* and *Moral para intelectuales* asserted that ideas can only be understood in terms of their historical context and enacted practically in the social world (Vaz Ferreira

1908, [1909] 1962). At the time of Batlle's first administration, the politician, entrepreneur, urban planner, and alchemist Francisco Piria wrote the sci-fi novel *El Socialismo Triunfante* ([1900] 2011). This book imagined Uruguay two hundred years in the future after it had carried its secular, humanist project through to become a communist utopia. The optimism of Batllismo comes through in the "model small nation" in Fernán Silva Valdés's book of poetry *Libro de centenario* (1926). Likewise, the writing and painting of Pedro Figari emphasizes a racially harmonious, inclusive society that speaks to the social reforms involved in Batllismo's social imaginary of progressive harmony. Figari's paintings of everyday social encounters chided bourgeois sensibilities and constructed an egalitarian national identity. Like Rodó and Vaz Ferreira, Figari, who was the director of the Escuela Nacional de Artes y Oficios as well as a member of parliament, believed that social progress and the alleviation of poverty were contingent on developing original solutions to local cultural conditions.

Batlle's 1920s discourse connected civilization to social justice, tolerance, and democracy. Batlle's notion of the state related to a "philosophical position on human beings and their rights that emphasized social solidarity and equality among citizens irrespective of their origins (social, national, ethnic)" (Nahum 1993: 67, translated by the author). As Batlle Berres put it: "Because this is Batllismo: Batllismo is not against anyone, protects everyone, including conservatives" (Berres 1958, cited in Arias and Rodriguez 2013: 48, translated by the author). Citizens were to be cultivated through education to be tolerant of racial and class difference, and to respect all Uruguayans. According to Carla Gaudrone, the ideal of tolerance "figures to this day as one of the principle civic virtues in Batllista discourse" (Gaudrone 2014: 27, translated by the author). Francisco Panizza (1999: 44), meanwhile, argues that in Batlle's discourse the term civilization lost its colonial ties to racial and class exclusion, and came to be related to the struggle for social justice and equality.

In Batllismo the state was to be responsible for cultivating the participation of a capable citizenry. Individual liberty and organic solidarity were conceived of as complementary aspects of the same secular humanist project. Batllismo combined apparently contradictory elements, including the protection of private property and rights to inheritance, with a discourse surrounding the need to "desacralize private property" and the nationalization of some banks and utilities (García Bouzas 2001: 67). The dual emphasis on social justice and individual liberties has led scholars to situate Batllismo as a peculiar amalgam of French Jacobinism and American Calvinism (Tani 2012), or as a type of "solidary republicanism," more in line with notions of active citizenship (freedom for and with) and collective goals than Anglo-liberal traditions oriented around negative

freedom and individual rights (Caetano 2011: 69). Batllismo speaks to contradictions within liberalism and between liberalism and democracy. Liberalism and democracy are philosophical principles with contradictory tendencies, so any resulting fusion will have to resolve the contradiction by favoring either liberty or equality (Bobbio 2005; Mouffe [2000] 2009). On one side there are democracies in name only, where formal equality becomes a means of legitimizing the reproduction of structural inequality, leading Wolin to ask “What kind of democracy is it where equal rights are formally guaranteed but where wealth and power are no less concentrated than poverty and powerlessness?” (Wolin 2016: 55). On the other hand, there is the notion of liberal democracy, as advocated by the FA, that evokes the “ethical liberal-democrats” of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries who took liberal democracy to mean a society striving to ensure that all its members are equally free to realize their capabilities (MacPherson 1975).

Batllismo is a civic republican, social justice tradition that challenges the contemporary hegemony of market freedom by emphasizing the importance of effective freedom. At the same time, individual freedom is conceived of *through* rather than *against* community in a way that challenges immunitarian principles of liberal thought and reinvigorates new modes of civic republicanism (Esposito 2013). The FA has replaced its anti-imperialist stance with a more moderate position centered on opposition to neoliberal reforms and a reinterpretation and renovation of Batllismo. In practice, this has meant introducing policies that have continued to liberalize international trade and finance while maintaining a strong state capable of providing social services and guiding the shape of development.

The Politics of Closeness from Artigas to the MPP

The entwining of national identity with social justice and civic republicanism continued in Batllismo but originated with Uruguay’s myths of independence. Artigas’s historical legacy as a staunch democrat, and not just a liberal or a liberator, furnishes Uruguay with a cultural heritage of democracy appealing across social classes, which is unique to Latin America (Stolovich 1992: 146). Artigas’s identity as military hero is linked to his criticism that military authority can be transformed into tyranny, and his preference for the responsibilities of citizenship over those of military subordination (his status as general was affirmed by popular vote rather than bureaucratic authority). According to Eugenio Petit Muñoz (2000: 306), Artigas is the germinator of democracy in the Americas, and

Uruguay is democracy's "most loyal and authentic heir." Artigas's *Instructions of 1813* was a declaration of independence that dissolved any political obligation to the Spanish Crown, and established the basic institutional arrangements of what is today the República Oriental de Uruguay. The principle articles defended individual liberty and equality, and outlined the government's responsibility to facilitate these (e.g. Freitas 2013: 48). If the government became unable to guarantee the "natural rights" of life, liberty, and property, people retained the right to replace the government. Ariosto González argues that the *Instructions* copied much from the constitutions of Virginia and Massachusetts, while Freitas sees them as "distinctly Uruguayan [oriental], distinctly Artiguista" (Freitas 2013: 48; González 1962). In 1815, Artigas expropriated large landed estates under the premise that "the most unhappy will become the most privileged" (Artigas, cited in Rabuffetti 2014: 131). Artigas was critical of the way that a dogmatic commitment to the US Constitution became a mechanism for effectively excluding the poor, the illiterate, black and indigenous peoples from citizenship. He recognized that upholding formal equality without adequate social equality allowed democracy to revert to plutocracy.

Artigas equated citizenship with participation in democratic government, and he imagined a plurality of public spaces in which this could occur within a federal system. Although these spaces were never fully realized or entirely adopted in the Constitution of 1830, they evidence an original Uruguayan lineage of thought for deepening democracy beyond periodic elections, which continues to shape policy debate. Firstly, Artigas envisaged adapting the colonial municipal (*cabildo*) system and city-level congresses as "genuine organs of the people" and the base of democratic organization. The *cabildo* was to be a municipal council open to all, organized around democratic process and responsive to local issues. From this base, representatives would be elected to sit in parliament. Alongside the municipal and federal council system was to be a Chamber of Representatives as the popular branch of legislative power. Artigas also proposed the creation of a third chamber of parliament that would meet irregularly, overlapping with the municipal and federal chambers for the election of governor and to deliberate over "exceptional, unforeseen, business of the Province." Petit Muñoz writes that Artigas's vision of a third chamber of parliament was fraught with imperfections:

But the clarity of the democratic idea that it conveys is incontestable. It is there as the institutionalization of public opinion enacted through a mixture of referendum and representative government that deserves, because of its absolute novelty and democratic success, the honor of being examined in further detail. (Petit Muñoz 2000: 297, translated by the author)

Indeed, the goal of combining regular and temporary mechanisms of democratic participation and representation, of fusing representative chambers and popular referendums, of conceiving of ways of engaging local people and issues in national forums, and vice versa, continues to perplex theorists of democracy, even as it is recognized as the basis for democratization (e.g. Barber 2003; MacPherson 1975; Pateman 2012). It is perhaps a legacy of Artigas that Uruguay has a historically high frequency of referendums and plebiscites (Moreira 2004), and that Uruguayan popular culture is permeated by the notion that politics is the business of everyone (Rabuffetti 2014). One can also see how elements of Artigas's democratic order have been reconceptualized in contemporary experiments aimed at deepening democracy, such as Brazil's participatory budgeting and Venezuela's communal councils (Baiochi 2005; Motta 2011).

Artigas's efforts to expand democratic possibility are presented as the inspiration of the FA's model of "the politics of closeness," and the FA has increasingly moved towards finding ways of blending parliamentary and local participatory democracy. Moreira argues that what now distinguishes the left in Uruguay is a commitment to participatory mechanisms of democracy, or what he calls a "new republicanism" of expanded participation. Moreira uses a series of survey data to argue that the FA "evidences values more in line with an Aristotelian vision of politics" defined by the actions of citizens, while supporters of the traditional parties emphasize "technical approaches to politics" and institutions over citizen agency (Moreira 2014: 26).

The Movimiento de Participación Popular (MPP), which has become the largest section of the FA by vote (Luna 2007), is organized around a bottom-up conception of popular participation as the basis of political power. It is inspired by the radical democracy of the MLN-T, and defines itself as a movement without a fixed organizational structure. Different organizations – from the traditional parties, to NGOs, rural coops, and the Tupamaros – converge and interact in this heterogeneous fraction. The MPP pursues a pragmatic cross-class electoral strategy, and has a large territorial presence where popular ex-president Pepe Mujica and others travel to hold public meetings – *mateadas* – to share *mate* (the national herbal beverage) and talk about local issues. As Sebastián Sabini, a history teacher and MPP member of parliament puts it, an MPP militant must be "ready to work on the street, in festivals, in houses, in plazas for their organization, for an objective that transcends the individual, that aims to generate collective goals beyond the organization itself" (Sabini, cited in Rabuffetti 2014: 100, translated by the author). Sabini explains that the MPP is made up of:

workers or the children of workers. We don't have wealth, we don't have a surname or business. We are normal people who like politics. This is something very important today that Pepe has communicated. People in politics must be there to serve, to be at the service of politics, and not for individual interests. (Sabini, cited in Rabuffetti 2014: 100–101, translated by the author)

At the behest of Mujica, the MPP has promoted meetings on the streets in which members and anyone wishing to be involved can explain their ideas or vent their criticisms of the government. These meetings are premised on the assumption that the basis of being a politician is being a citizen, and the basis of citizenship is political participation. Tabaré Vázquez, Mujica's successor as president of Uruguay, and Javier Miranda, the president of the Frente Amplio, have continued this new tradition of "the politics of closeness." In his regular movements around the country to appeal to people to become involved in the political process, Miranda emphasizes that the politics of closeness is a means of making the institutional structures of constitutional democracy – parliament and the executive – more responsive to people living in a diversity of places and situations. Speaking at the final ministerial council meeting of 2016, held in a town with 97 residents, Vázquez reiterated that the FA's political vision is underpinned by the idea that "no one is more than any other," which also has the colloquial significance of no one is more valuable than a nobody (*nadie es mas que nadie*), and that the voices that needed to be heard are not professional politicians or experts but people speaking of their everyday experiences. According to Vázquez:

The media ask me why we have chosen [to hold the meeting] in this community. We chose it because here in Uruguay *nadie es más que nadie*, and a small town is just as important as a big city. Governments need to attend to all citizens within and beyond national territorial boundaries. That is the task of governments, to be with the people. That is how we are going to continue to do things, covering the entire country, talking with people, learning from you all, with a great deal of respect. Because what matters is not what we the government or politicians say, or political scientists or the media, the reality is what you live every day. (Vázquez, cited in *La República*, 13 December 2016, translated by the author)¹

Despite the FA's commitment to an egalitarian, participatory politics of closeness, tensions within the FA and the regional turn to the right have given rise to a sense of "crisis of the left" in Uruguay. One narrative that emerges in recent media analysis is of a party no longer able to provide the space and flexibility for the demands of diverse movements. The FA's commitment to the democratic process and constitutional arrangements

are challenged by claims for more direct forms of political action, particularly by young people for whom the FA's ties to the political past no longer provide the same resonance they did during the anti-neoliberal protests of the early 2000s. During a wave of 2015 protests and occupations of government buildings by teachers and students, *La República* (25 September 2015)² writes that “the challenge of the left” is to continue to provide a space for inclusive understanding and democratic participation against rising dissatisfaction among young people. In an editorial six months later, entitled “The Challenges of Frente Amplio in the Left's Hour of Crisis,” the editors write that the delicate balance between movement and party that used to define the democratic space of the Frente Amplio has swung in favor of movement, but the movements are not finding adequate spaces for democratic deliberation.

The Frente Amplio originated as a “coalition” and “movement.” And we write in the past tense. Today it takes a different form. The “coalition” aspect has been overshadowed by the “movement” elements. Unusually, the political sectors have become numerically weakened vis-à-vis the “movement.” (*La República*, 15 May 2016, translated by the author)³

If there is a “crisis of the left” in Uruguay, it concerns the unraveling of the delicate balance between movement and party, formal and informal spaces, constitutive of the FA and the politics of closeness it has espoused. Whereas some democracies suffer from parties ossified for lack of social movement linkages, the FA finds itself potentially consumed by the diversity and intensity of its base movements, which cannot be contained within institutional structures. This amounts either to a democratic surplus, in Wolin's (2016) terms, that transcends the existing constitutional structures, or to social movements incapable of gaining sufficient traction in formal democratic forums, in Mouffe's terms (2013). Accordingly, Miranda champions popular debate about constitutional reform that speaks to the ideological concerns of the base movements (*La República*, December 2016).⁴ Echoing the pragmatism of Batllismo and Arismendi's adaptation of Marxism to Uruguayan conditions, the FA enters a new phase of its evolution as a party and movement tasked with recreating democratic constitutionalism according to the demands of the day.

Conclusions: Democratic Citizenship as Living Heritage in the Post-Democratic Age

The FA has fused Batllismo's emphasis on redistributive social justice and civic republicanism with its own history of militancy and an Artigist

commitment to participatory spaces to create a unique figure of the citizen. This figure has coevolved with state and non-state institutions, movements, and parties, and is premised on the assumption that being political is everyone's business. Uruguayan citizenship is "active" in the sense defined by Étienne Balibar, for whom the "essence of democracy is the maximization of the capacity of its citizens for political action" (Balibar 2015: 86). The figure of the citizen and model of democracy espoused by the FA also echoes Jean-Louis Laville's (2016) challenge for redefining a twenty-first century left by combining a democratized civil society with a state capable of overseeing redistributive justice. The FA espouses a substantive model of democracy insofar as citizen agency and social justice, rather than their proxies in formal rights and elections, are at the center of the project. Gadea (2013: 391) and Adriana Gallo and Julieta Bartoletti (2012) are critical of the Uruguayan left as an empty referent because in their estimation it no longer poses a challenge to the existing structures of power. I argue, however, that the identification of left with participatory democracy, and the equation of citizen with politician, poses an open-ended alternative to a depoliticizing hegemonic order favoring rituals of legitimization and institutional definitions of democracy over participation and citizen agency.

Batllismo and the ghost of Artigas offer members of the FA two notions of social justice emphasized and legitimized at different times: social justice from above through legislation; and from below through popular mobilization. The dual status of the FA as party and movement, indeed as a plurality of parties and movements not contained by the party, creates an unusual complementarity of state and civil society that problematizes the idea that civil society must be independent of the state to support democracy. This dual identity, and the wide range of political visions housed under the FA banner, makes the FA an inherently unstable entity. At the same time, this volatility has allowed it to act as a mechanism for coupling a diverse array of grassroots elements with formal political processes.

In Uruguay, democracy is not only a mode of government, but a practice of cultural heritage. This creates a unique legitimizing framework for demotic action. Uruguayan history contains the seeds of a generative capacity to reinvent new forms of democracy because Uruguayan political mythology celebrates democracy as an open-ended process tied to ongoing efforts towards achieving greater social justice and participation, liberty and equality. The FA has mobilized a selection of national mythologies to equate equality, social justice, democracy, and civic republicanism with national identity. They have done so not by claiming culture heroes as party institutions, but by drawing out the significance

of a dialectic between demotic action and institutions as the basis of democracy. From Artigas to Batlle to the FA, Uruguayan political culture is marked by faith in the citizen as the agent of democracy rather than institutions as proxies for citizenship. Universal rights claims are supported by multiple moments of national Uruguayan history, which have been bound together by the FA to create an open-ended image of social citizenship. In this sense, the citizenship dialectic continues to move in an open-ended manner. This is not to say that it will necessarily go in any particular direction, or will be successful in democratizing the social order, but that the historical and cultural terrain for continuing a citizenship dialectic, and therefore the possibility of democratization, appears robust relative to many other places in the world today.

This article has positioned the FA model of democracy in a global context of democratic decline and citizen disaffect with and disconnection from representative political parties and the legislative process. The notion of post-democracy has been invoked to describe what remains of democratic government after it has been colonized by neoliberal ideology that replaces political debate with banal technical drivel, rights with administrative processes, and power-sharing with the voicing of opinion. Citizenship in the post-political age is reduced to spectatorship. One of the primary challenges that democracies now face is creating opportunities for citizens to meaningfully participate in ways that reconnect citizenship with the sharing of power. This involves closing the space between formal and informal, representative and participatory political forums, and has been referred to as “thickening” or “deepening” democracy.

The unique significance of democratic thought and civic republicanism in Uruguayan national history creates a cultural context amenable to the reinvention of democracy and the citizen according to the social conditions of the day. I have explored how the FA mobilized ideas associated with nineteenth- and twentieth-century culture heroes to foster democratic citizenship in the twenty-first century. The Frente Amplio has combined two rich veins of Uruguayan national heritage, one relating to the radical democracy of Uruguay’s nineteenth-century independence hero José Artigas, and one relating to the early twentieth-century social democracy and civic republicanism of José Batlle. The FA’s experiments in participatory democracy resonate with cultural traditions that reproduce an appreciation of liberty, equality, social justice, and democratic participation. The “politics of closeness” is how the FA has attempted to draw on a cultural heritage of egalitarian radical democracy to couple formal and informal forums of political deliberation. The model of citizenship fostered by the FA does not oppose the free individual and the socially just community, but builds on a national heritage of recognizing

that formal equality can only exist by way of social justice reform. This citizen-driven model is neither reducible to formal institutions (e.g. laws, rights, parliament, parties, elections) nor to molecular activism, but has been able to flex according to both. The FA has maintained a commitment to dissensus, struggles for justice, and participation that fosters a space for citizens to emerge without being contained by institutions. At the same time, the dissenting parts that constitute the FA can threaten to devour the whole. This is a delicate balance.

The FA proposes a unique model of citizen-driven democracy that demonstrates how the state can cultivate citizenship without domesticating it. The FA's state-guided "politics of closeness" may be an antidote to the waning currency of liberal democracy, and the growing illegitimacy of claims for equality or liberty in an age described as "post-democratic." However, while the FA's citizen-driven mode of democracy is an unusual outlier in a contemporary context bereft of national-level models of democratization, the potency of this model owes in large part to its cultural specificity. The FA's politics of closeness may not be translatable elsewhere because it is sustained and derived from an amenable national history where democratic citizenship has become enmeshed with cultural heritage and national identity.

►► **Robin Rodd** teaches anthropology and critical theory at James Cook University in Townsville, Australia. He has worked with the Piaroa ethnic group in Venezuela on shamanism and drug use, and in Uruguay and Argentina on questions of memory and democracy. He is currently researching the banality of evil in Australia and the southern cone. E-mail: robin.rodd@jcu.edu.au

►► NOTES

1. <http://www.republica.com.uy/vazquez-la-participacion-social-es-esencial-en-un-gobierno-de-cercania/>.
2. <http://www.republica.com.uy/desafio-de-la-izquierda/>.
3. <http://www.republica.com.uy/frente-amplio-necesita-tornado/>.
4. <http://www.republica.com.uy/miranda-si-no-discutimos-ideologicamente-nos-estamos-empobreciendo/>; <http://www.republica.com.uy/volver-la-politica-cercania-una-respuesta-la-no-politica/>.

►► REFERENCES

- Arditi, Benjamin. 2008. "Arguments about the Left Turns in Latin America: A Post-Liberal Politics?" *Latin American Research Review* 43 (3): 59–81.
- Arias, Cecilia, and Sylvia Rodríguez. 2013. "El concepto de justicia social en el discurso de Luis Batlle Berres: Justicia social y profundización de la democracia

- en la sociedad uruguaya de mediados del siglo XX.” [The concept of social justice in the discourse of Batlle Berres: Social justice and the deepening of democracy in mid-twentieth century Uruguayan society]. *Revista de la facultad de derecho* 35 (July–December): 39–54.
- Baiocchi, Gianpaolo. 2005. *Militants and Citizens: The Politics of Participatory Democracy in Porto Alegre*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Balderocchi, Claudio. 2016. “Problems and Contradictions of Participatory Democracy: Lessons from Latin America.” *Contemporary Politics* 22 (2):164–177.
- Balibar, Étienne. 2015. *Citizenship*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Barber, Benjamin. 2003. *Strong Democracy: Participatory Politics for a New Age*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Bobbio, Norberto. 2005. *Liberalism and Democracy*. London: Verso.
- Brown, Wendy. 2015. *Undoing the Demos: Neoliberalism’s Stealth Revolution*. New York: Zone Books.
- Caetano, Gerardo. 2011. *La república Batllista*. Montevideo: EBO.
- Collier, David, and Steven Levitsky. 1996. *Democracy with Adjectives: Conceptual Innovation in Comparative Research*. Working paper 230, Berkeley University.
- Crouch, Colin. 2004. *Post-democracy*. London: Polity Press.
- Couriel, Alberto. 2016. “Que es ser izquierda?” [What is it to be left?] *República*, 31 August. <http://www.republica.com.uy/que-es-ser-de-izquierda>
- Danemark, David, Robert Mattes, and Richard Niemi, eds. 2016. *Growing Up Democratic: Does It Make a Difference?* Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.
- De Sousa Santos, Boaventura, and Leonardo Avritzer. 2007. “Introduction: Opening Up the Canon of Democracy.” In *Democratizing Democracy: Beyond the Liberal Democratic Canon*, ed. B. de Sousa Santos, xxxiv–lxxiv. London: Verso.
- Diamond, Larry, and Marc Plattner. 2015. *Democracy in decline?* Baltimore, MD: John Hopkins University Press.
- Economist Intelligence Unit. 2018. *Democracy Index 2017*. <https://www.eiu.com/topic/democracy-index>.
- Escobar, Arturo. 2010. “Latin America at a Crossroads.” *Cultural Studies* 24 (1): 1–65.
- Esposito, Roberto. 2013. *Terms of the Political: Community, Immunity, Biopolitics*. Trans. N. Welch. New York: Fordham University Press.
- FreedomHouse. 2018. “Freedom in the World 2018: Democracy in Crisis.” <https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/freedom-world-2018#fiw-key-findings>.
- Freitas, Ruben Correa. 2013. “El ideario Artiguista en la formación constitucional Uruguaya.” [Artigist thought in the formation of the Uruguayan constitution]. *Revista de derecho público* 22 (44): 43–57.
- Gadea, Carlos. 2013. “La ‘izquierda política’ en América Latina: El ‘Lulismo’ en Brasil y la ‘izquierda’ en el Uruguay.” [The ‘political left’ in Latin America: ‘Lulism’ in Brazil and the ‘left’ in Uruguay]. *Espacio abierto* 22 (3): 377–392.
- Gallo, Adriana, and Julieta Bartoletti, J. 2012. “Partidos de gobierno en la era post-neoliberal: Paradigmas antagónicas y límites para una agenda de izquierda en América del Sur. Los casos del Frente Amplio, Alianza País y el Frente para la victoria.” [Political parties in the post-neoliberal age: Conflicting paradigms and the limits of a left agenda in South America]. *Elecciones* 11 (12): 35–69.

- Ganuzza, Ernesto, Gianpaolo Baiocchi, and Nicole Summers. 2016. "Conflicts and Paradoxes in the Rhetoric of Participation." *Journal of Civil Society* 12 (3): 328–343.
- García Bouzas, Raquel. 2001. *La justicia de los doctores*. [The justice of the doctors]. Montevideo: Fundación de Cultura Universitaria.
- Giaudrone, Carla. 2014. "Milonga del asimilado: Batllismo, nativismo y tolerancia en el Centenario." [Milongo of assimilation: Batllismo, nativism and tolerance one hundred year on] In *Más allá de la tolerancia? Ciudadanía y diversidad en el Uruguay contemporáneo*, [Beyond tolerance? Citizenship and diversity in contemporary Uruguay] ed. L. Gioscia, 25–45. Montevideo: Trilce Editores.
- González, Ariosto. 1962. *Las primeras formulas constitucionales en los países del Plata (1810–1814)* [The first constitutional forms in the countries of the River Plate (1810-1814)]. Montevideo: Barreiro y Ramos.
- Hendriks, C. 2017. "Citizen-Led Democratic Reform: Innovations in Indi." *Australian Journal of Political Science* 52 (4): 481–499.
- Huntington, Samuel. 1991. "Democracy's Third Wave." *Journal of Democracy* 2 (2): 12–34.
- Keane, John. 2016. "Los nuevos despotismos: Imaginando el fin de la democracia." [New despotisms: Imagining the end of democracy] *Recerca* 19: 137–154.
- Latinobarómetro. 2016. *Informe 2016*. <http://www.latinobarometro.org/latContents.jsp>.
- Laville, Jean-Louis. 2016. "Defending Democracy, Reinventing the Left." *Opendemocracy.net*. <https://opendemocracy.net/jean-louis-laville/defending-democracy-reinventing-left>.
- Lorey, Isabell. 2013. "On Democracy and Occupation: Horizontality and the Need for New Forms of Verticality." In *Institutional Attitudes: Instituting Art in a Flat World*, ed. Gielen. Amsterdam: Valiz. Pp. 77-99.
- Luna, Juan Pablo. 2007. "Frente Amplio and the Crafting of a Social Democratic Alternative in Uruguay." *Latin American Politics and Society* 49 (4): 1–30.
- MacPherson, C. B. 1975. *The Life and Times of Liberal Democracy*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Mainwaring, Scott, and Timothy Scully. 1995. *Building Democratic Institutions: Party Systems in Latin America*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Marchesi, Aldo. 2014. "Revolution beyond the Sierra Maestra: The Tupamaros and the Development of a Repertoire of Dissent in the Southern Cone." *The Americas* 70 (3): 523–553.
- Moreira, Constanza. 2004. "Resistencia política y ciudadanía: Plebiscitos y referendums en el Uruguay de los 90." [Political resistance and citizenship: Plebiscites and reforms in 1990s Uruguay] *América Latina hoy* 36: 17–45.
- Motta, Sara. 2011. "Populism's Achilles' Heel: Popular Democracy beyond the Liberal State and the Market Economy in Venezuela." *Latin American Perspectives* 38: 28–48.
- Mouffe, Chantal. (2000) 2009. *The Democratic Paradox*. New York: Verso Books.
- Mouffe, Chantal. 2013. *Agonistics: Thinking the World Politically*. New York: Verso.
- Müller, Jan-Werner. 2016. *What Is Populism?* Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.

- Nahum, Benjamin. 1993. *Empresas públicas Uruguayas: Origen y gestión*. [Uruguayan public enterprises: Origen and development]. Montevideo: Ediciones de la Banda Oriental.
- Neblo, Michael, Kevin Esterling, Ryan Kennedy, David Lazer, and Anand Sokhey. 2010. "Who Wants to Deliberate – And Why?" *American Political Science Review* 104 (3): 566–583.
- Panizza, Francisco. 1999. *Uruguay, Batllismo y después: Pacheco, militares y Tupamaros en la crisis de Uruguay Batllista*. [Uruguay, Batllismo and afterwards: Pacheco, the military and Tupamaros in the crisis of Batllista Uruguay] Montevideo: Ediciones de la Banda Oriental.
- Pateman, Carole. 2012. "Participatory Democracy Revisited." *Perspective on Politics* 10 (1): 7–19.
- Petit Muñoz, Eugenio. 2000. "Valoración de Artigas." [Assessing Artigas]. *Revista de la Facultad de Derecho* (Universidad de la República, Uruguay) 18: 283–306.
- Piria, Francisco. (1900) 2011. *El Socialismo Triunfante: Lo que será de mi país dentro de 200 años*. [Socialism triumphant: What will become of my country in 200 years]. Montevideo: Zonalibro.
- Rancière, Jacques. 1999. *Disagreement: Politics and Philosophy*. Trans. J. Rose. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Rabuffetti, Mauricio. 2014. *José Mujica: La revolución tranquila*. [José Mujica: The peaceful revolution]. Montevideo: Aguilar.
- Roberts, Kenneth. M. 1998. *Deepening Democracy? The Modern Left and Social Movement in Chile and Peru*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Rodó, José Enrique. (1900) 2009. *Ariel*. Madrid: Ediciones Catédra.
- Rodó, José Enrique. 1964. *Liberalismo y jacobinismo*. [Liberalism and jacobinism] Montevideo: Ministerio de Instrucción Pública y Previsión Social.
- Siapera, Eugenia. 2017. "Reclaiming Citizenship in the Post-Democratic Condition." *Journal of Citizenship and Globalisation Studies* 1 (1): 24–35.
- Silva Valdés, Fernán. 1926. *Libro de centenario de Uruguay*. [Centenary yearbook, Uruguay]. Montevideo: Capurra & Compañía.
- Sitrin, Marina. 2012. *Everyday Revolutions: Horizontalism and Autonomy in Argentina*. New York: Zed Books.
- Stolovich, L. 1992. "Uruguay: The Paradoxes and Perplexities of an Uncommon Left." *Social Justice* 19 (4): 18–152.
- Tani, Ruben. 2012. *Pensamiento y utopía en Uruguay: Varela, Rodó, Figari, Piria, Vaz Ferreira y Ardao* [Thought and utopia in Uruguay: Varela, Rodó, Figari, Piria, Vaz Ferreira y Ardao]. Montevideo: HUM.
- Tockman, Jason. 2017. "The Hegemony of Representation: Democracy and Indigenous Self-Government in Bolivia." *Journal of Politics in Latin America* 9: 121–138.
- Turner, Bryan. 2017. "Contemporary Citizenship: Four Types." *Journal of Citizenship and Globalisation Studies* 1 (1): 10–23.
- UNDP. 2013. *Uruguay, el futuro en foco: Desigualdad multidimensional y dinámica de la pobreza en Uruguay en los años recientes*. [The future of Uruguay in focus: Multidimensional inequality and the dynamics of recent poverty]. <http://www.uy.undp.org/content/dam/uruguay/docs/cuadernosDH/CUADERNO%20DH02.pdf>.
- UNDP. 2016. "Human Development Report." <http://hdr.undp.org/en/2016-report>.

- Vaz Ferreira, Carlos. 1908. *Conocimiento y acción*. [Thought and action] Montevideo: Cámara de Representantes.
- Vaz Ferreira, Carlos. (1909) 1962. *Moral para intelectuales*. [Morality for intellectuals]. Buenos Aires: Ediciones Losada.
- Wolin, Sheldon. 2008. *Democracy Inc.: Managed Democracy and the Specter of Inverted Totalitarianism*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Wolin, Sheldon. 2016. *Fugitive Democracy and Other Essays*. Ed. N. Xenos. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Copyright of Democratic Theory is the property of Berghahn Books and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use.