

The Consequences of Conditional Cash Transfers for Political Behavior and Human Development

by

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Dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of
the requirements for the degree of Doctor
of Philosophy in the Department of
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ABSTRACT

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Abstract

The Global South, and particularly Latin America, experienced a remarkable expansion in conditional cash transfer (CCT) programs in the last fifteen years.

Although a large literature examines the effects of CCTs on human development, the political behavioral consequences remain underexplored. In the dissertation, I address this gap by analyzing the effects of CCTs on political participation and policy. I also explore the implications of these effects for human development.

My central argument is that CCTs increase political participation among beneficiaries, and both program transfers and conditionalities contribute to these positive effects. More specifically, CCTs provide beneficiaries with politically relevant resources, including civic skills and access to state officials and community leaders. These resources reduce the costs of political participation and facilitate more involvement in political activities, particularly in more demanding forms of participation. In addition, I argue that CCTs increase the private provision of local services and influence the outcomes of some non-national elections.

To test this argument, I use four main sources of data: (1) existing survey data from Latin America in 2012; (2) original survey data from Mexico in 2014; (3) experimental data from Mexico in 1998-2000; and (4) in-depth interviews and focus groups from Mexico in 2012. Multilevel models and linear regression models are used to estimate the effects of CCTs on political behavior and service provision. The in-depth

interviews and focus groups help to unravel more of the causal mechanism that connects CCTs to political participation.

The evidence largely supports my argument. I find that CCTs increase participation in a wide variety of political activities, including electoral and non-electoral activities. In addition, the pathways to increased participation include improved civic skills and increased access to state officials and local leaders. Moreover, CCTs increase the private provision of sewerage services.

I conclude that CCTs have both desirable and undesirable consequences. On the one hand, CCTs increase democratic political participation, improve civic skills, reduce the distance between beneficiaries and government officials, and increase access to local services. The increased access to sewerage services creates an indirect pathway to improved human development outcomes. On the other hand, CCTs reduce the pressure on local officials to provide local services, and in some contexts contribute to electoral rewards for undeserving incumbent parties.

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List of Abbreviations

CCT	Conditional Cash Transfer
INEGI	Instituto Nacional Estadística y Geografía
IFE	Instituto Federal Electoral
LAPOP	Latin American Public Opinion Project
PAL	Programa de Apoyo Alimentario
PAN	Partido Acción Nacional
PRI	Partido Revolucionario Institucional
PRD	Partido de la Revolución Democrática
UCT	Unconditional Cash Transfer

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Introduction

The Global South, and particularly Latin America, experienced a stunning shift in social policy in the last fifteen years. Whereas earlier forms of social policy focused on the protection of the formal sector and often failed to reach the poor, the introduction of means-tested programs has provided assistance to those in need (Díaz-Cayeros and Magaloni 2009). This transformation in social assistance programs coincides with an impressive reduction in poverty and inequality in the region (World Bank 2014).

The conditional cash transfer (CCT) program is the primary example of this shift in social policy. In CCT programs, poor households receive a monetary transfer in exchange for fulfilling certain conditions, such as attending health checkups and health education workshops and having the children attend a certain percentage of school days (Fiszbein and Schady 2009; de la Briere and Rawlings 2006; Cecchini and Madariaga 2011). The overarching aims of the program are to reduce poverty in the short term and break the cycle of poverty in the long term by incentivizing poor families to invest in the human capital of their children.

The number of countries with a CCT program has greatly expanded in recent years. Almost all Latin American countries now have a CCT program, and CCTs benefit over 100 million individuals, around 15 percent of the total population, in the region (ECLAC 2009). The spread of CCTs is not confined to Latin America, however; the programs also operate in several African and Asian countries (Fiszbein and Schady 2009), and even surfaced in the form of a pilot program in the United States (Riccio et al. 2013). As a result of this impressive growth, CCTs now are recognized as the largest conditional social assistance program in the Global South.¹

CCTs receive a large amount of praise for their effective targeting procedures and positive human development outcomes. In contrast to the political manipulation of beneficiary selection in many other antipoverty programs, CCT benefits are generally recognized as being distributed according to objective criteria based on need (Fiszbein and Schady 2009; Díaz-Cayeros and Magaloni 2009; Fried 2012; Lindert et al. 2006). Certainly, there is variation in targeting effectiveness across CCT programs, and even across a single program over time, with some studies uncovering evidence of political interference in certain countries (De La O 2015; Rocha Menocal 2001). These negative findings are exceptions though, as most evidence indicates that CCTs are well targeted according to need.

Also, a large body of research finds positive CCT effects on service utilization and some human development outcomes. In terms of the utilization of services, CCTs have

¹ See Azevedo and Robles (2013) and Fiszbein and Schady (2009).

a positive impact on school enrollment and/or attendance (Maluccio and Flores 2005; Galasso 2006; Schady and Araujo 2008; Attanasio et al. 2005a) as well as immunization and/or attendance at health checkups (Morris et al. 2004; Skoufias 2005; Barham and Maluccio 2009; Attanasio et al. 2005b). The available evidence also suggests that CCTs have a positive effect on some child health outcomes (Behrman and Hoddinott 2001; Rasella et al. 2013; Paxson and Schady 2010) and lead to reductions in poverty and inequality (Fiszbein and Schady 2009; Cury et al 2007; Naranjo 2008).

Despite the success of CCTs, only recently have researchers started to consider the political consequences of these programs. The available evidence mainly focuses on the relationship between CCTs and political behavior in national elections, and it generally finds that CCTs have a positive effect on incumbent support (Hunter and Power 2008; Zucco 2013; Baez et al. 2012; Díaz-Cayeros et al. 2012; De La O 2013; Manacorda et al. 2011).² In terms of political participation, the evidence also suggests that CCTs increase voter turnout in these elections (Baez et al. 2012; De La O 2013).

Interestingly, the positive effects of CCTs challenge our understanding of the relationship between social programs and political participation. Prior research on means-tested programs in the United States suggests that these programs reduce political participation among beneficiaries (Soss 1999; Mettler and Stonecash 2008; Sharp 2009), as negative program experiences send signals to beneficiaries that it is not worthwhile to participate in politics and lower their external political efficacy (Soss

² There are some exceptions (Bohn 2011; Green 2006) that find no relationship between CCTs and incumbent support in national elections.

1999). In Sweden, means-tested programs are found to reduce social capital and trust in politicians (Kumlin 2004; Kumlin and Rothstein 2005), creating additional obstacles for political participation among beneficiaries. When considering data from Europe and the United States, there is some evidence that the inclusiveness of the welfare state shapes levels of political participation, with targeted programs producing less participation among the disadvantaged (Alber and Kohler 2009). Beyond this research, means-tested programs with paternalistic authority relations are found to be particularly discouraging for political participation, because beneficiaries learn to accept that decision-making processes are beyond their control (Bruch et al. 2010; Soss 2000). The logic connecting paternalistic means-tested programs and reduced political participation is further explained by Holzner (2010, 92-93), who – speaking from the Mexican context – argues that poor beneficiaries have little reason to become involved in politics when they cannot influence program decisions. CCTs are clear examples of means-tested programs with almost no room for citizen involvement in decision-making processes (Fiszbein and Schady 2009; Holzner 2010, 92-93), but the available evidence indicates that these programs lead to *more* political activity among beneficiaries.

Although the emerging research on CCTs challenges our understanding of the political behavioral consequences of social programs, the extent of this challenge remains an open question. Indeed, much of the existing research on CCTs and political participation only considers one form of political activity (voting in a national election). Moreover, it remains unclear whether political participation by CCT beneficiaries feeds

back into the political system and alters the actions of government. These gaps create three important research questions: (1) Does participation in CCT programs increase involvement in multiple electoral and non-electoral political activities, or is the positive effect of CCTs confined to a select form of political participation? (2) If CCTs spur broad political participation,³ how do these programs lead to increased political involvement? (3) What, if any, are the feedback effects of CCTs on policy?

1.1 Literature: Theoretical Expectations

I now consider insight offered by the literature regarding the potential political behavioral consequences of CCTs. The first sub-section explores expectations regarding CCTs and political participation, while the second considers the potential for feedback effects on policy.

1.1.1 CCTs and Political Participation

The literature generates the following expectations regarding CCTs and political participation. Interpretive arguments (Schneider and Ingram 1993, 1997; Pierson 1993; Soss 1999) emphasize that program effects depend on policy design, as different program features influence the experiences of beneficiaries, lead to political learning, and ultimately shape future decisions to participate in politics. The key mechanism for

³ Broad political participation is defined here as participation in multiple electoral and non-electoral political activities.

program effects is through changes in political attitudes, as the lessons acquired through negative (or positive) program experiences influence the beneficiaries' more general views towards government and politics. Given that means-tested programs, and particularly those with paternalistic authority relations, generally lead to negative program experiences and reduced psychological engagement with politics among beneficiaries (Soss 1999, 2000; Bruch et al. 2010; Kumlin 2004; Kumlin and Rothstein 2005), interpretive arguments suggest that the design of CCTs will discourage political participation.

Holzner (2010), using a cost-benefit framework while considering political participation among the poor in Mexico, arrives at the same negative conclusion regarding CCTs and political participation, especially activities directed at the government. He argues that the top-down design of the CCT program is harmful for political participation among poor beneficiaries, because "it insulates policymakers from political pressures and... makes political activity irrelevant if not irrational. There is simply no chance that political activity by individuals or groups will change who receives funding or how much they receive (93)." According to this view, poor program beneficiaries will be unwilling to pay the costs of political participation when they do not expect a benefit.

Other arguments imply that CCTs will spur increased political participation among beneficiaries. Within the social program and policy feedback literature, material resource arguments (Pierson 1993; Campbell 2003) contend that transferred resources

encourage political participation through two mechanisms: an increased incentive to defend or expand the desirable benefits, or an increased capacity to participate in political activities. In the case of CCTs, the cash transfers serve as obvious desirable benefits, and lead to the expectation that CCTs will spur increased political participation, at least in the particular forms of political activity that are directly related to the defense (or expansion) of program benefits. The increased capacity mechanism appears less likely in the Global South context, and Latin America in particular, given the non-positive relationship between wealth and political participation (Bratton 2008; Krishna 2008b; Booth and Seligson 2008).

Clientelism perspectives (Scott 1972; Kitschelt 2000; Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007) also suggest that CCTs will encourage increased political participation among beneficiaries. If the selection and/or termination of program beneficiaries is up to the discretion of politicians and/or intermediaries rather than determined through a needs-based formula, then this category of arguments suggests that CCTs will spur increased electoral participation. In other words, the CCT beneficiaries will be more likely to turn out to vote and/or campaign for the incumbent in order to ensure the continuation of benefits. Because the logic to participate in non-electoral forms of participation is less clear, clientelism arguments only suggest positive CCT effects in the realm of electoral political participation. Indeed, prominent definitions of political clientelism emphasize the exchange of benefits for electoral support (Stokes 2007; Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007), and the empirical evidence linking clientelism and political participation in the

Global South focuses on electoral participation effects (Nichter 2008; Weghorst and Lindberg 2013; Larreguy et al. 2014).

Even if CCT programs are not clientelistic, mobilization still may contribute to increased political participation among CCT beneficiaries. Mobilization explanations (e.g., Rosenstone and Hansen 1993) argue that requests to participate in politics also matter for whether a citizen decides to participate in political activities. If CCT beneficiaries become more attractive targets to mobilize, whether due to their increased incentive to defend their benefits or improved capacity to participate in politics, then this argument suggests that CCT beneficiaries will receive more mobilization requests and ultimately participate more in politics.

1.1.2 Consequences for Government Responsiveness

If CCTs affect the political involvement of beneficiaries, will these programs also have policy consequences? Two major theoretical traditions argue that increased political participation will lead to increased government responsiveness.⁴ The first on democratic elections (e.g., Campbell et al. 1960; Key 1966; Fenno 1978; Fiorina 1981) suggests that increased voter turnout among CCT beneficiaries will provide proper incentives for politicians to respond to these voters. Through the act of participating in elections, the beneficiaries have a clear pathway to securing improved government responsiveness.

⁴ For a detailed review of these traditions, please see Cleary (2007, 2010). I follow Cleary (2007) by viewing government responsiveness as an issue of performance (286).

A separate theoretical tradition (e.g., Putnam 1993; Verba et al. 1995; Hirschman 1970; Cleary 2010) suggests that other forms of political participation will lead to increased government responsiveness to the needs of CCT beneficiaries. When beneficiaries engage in non-electoral political activities, this participation directs social pressure towards politicians to respond to their needs (Putnam 1993) and even inflicts various psychological strains on politicians (Cleary 2010).⁵ In order to avoid these negative outcomes, politicians will be more responsive to the needs of the beneficiaries who are politically active.

The work of Cleary (2010) on government responsiveness is particularly relevant in developing democracies, the contexts in which CCTs operate. Rather than viewing electoral competition and political participation as separate and static causal factors, it may be that these factors influence one another over time. In the case of Mexico, Cleary argues that non-electoral participation efforts ultimately increased both electoral competition and government responsiveness. This argument suggests that CCTs, by way of increased political participation, will encourage more government responsiveness, even in contexts which lack fully competitive elections.

Of course, we can think of reasons why increased political participation by CCT beneficiaries may not result in increased government responsiveness to their needs, especially in developing democracies. Beer (2011), when reviewing the findings of Holzner (2010) and Cleary (2010), highlights the importance of citizen expectations of

⁵ For empirical examples of this strain, see Cornelius (1974) and Stokes (1995).

responsiveness. If initial surges in political participation are not met with rapid results, then citizens may disengage from the process and government responsiveness is unlikely to be achieved. More obvious factors also may contribute to poor government responsiveness, including corruption, a lack of resources and competence, or competing political pressures. For these reasons, I analyze the conditions under which increased participation by CCT beneficiaries results in increased government responsiveness to their needs, with a central emphasis on the provision of public services.

1.2 My Argument

This dissertation offers comprehensive responses to the first two research questions while also providing a partial response with regard to the third. In doing so, I develop a new policy-based argument of political participation that considers the consequences of government assistance programs.⁶ More specifically, I argue that government assistance transfers *and* conditionalities – the requirements that must be met in order to continue receiving transfers – affect the politically relevant resources of program beneficiaries, which in turn influence levels of political participation. The

⁶ The terms “government assistance programs” and “social assistance programs” are used interchangeably throughout the dissertation. For a review of earlier policy-based arguments of political behavior, see Mettler and Soss (2004) and Campbell (2012).

overall effect of a government assistance program thus will depend on the design of the program.⁷

I refer to this argument throughout the dissertation as the Policy Push Argument, and I utilize it to explain the effects of CCTs. Before proceeding, it is helpful to distinguish the new concept of the policy push from the existing concept of the policy nudge. Whereas a nudge “alters people’s behavior in a predictable way without forbidding any options or significantly changing their economic incentives” (Thaler and Sunstein 2008, 6), a push alters behavior by requiring that certain actions be taken in order to receive *substantial benefits*. Thus, the key difference between the two concepts involves the use of incentives: nudges attempt to influence behavior without the use of carrots, while pushes readily incorporate large carrots to influence behavior. I argue that policy pushes, by incentivizing individuals to meet a set of conditions, also affect the future decisions of these individuals regarding political participation. Indeed, the effects of meeting the assigned conditions are the defining feature of the Policy Push Argument.

Do CCTs have other policy feedback effects? I argue that the cash transfers used to push CCT beneficiaries to meet the conditions also have important consequences for the provision of local public services. The increased amount of disposable income makes private services more affordable for CCT beneficiaries, thus increasing the

⁷ This recognition of the importance of policy design joins previous research (Schneider and Ingram 1993, 1997; Pierson 1993; Soss 1999; Campbell 2003), but is unique for two reasons. First, my argument highlights the effects of program conditionalities. Second, the predicted causal pathway only involves changes in resources, not interpretive effects.

likelihood that CCT beneficiaries will purchase private services, all else equal. The competition from the private sector therefore can *reduce* pressures on government officials to provide these services. In addition, I argue that local party control of government influences the effects of CCTs on election outcomes. When a party does not control each level of government in an area, this governing environment creates more confusion in the minds of citizens regarding responsibility attribution for the CCT program. The resulting confusion opens a window of opportunity for all levels of government to receive credit for the program and electoral rewards, even when one level is completely responsible for the administration of the CCT program. I discuss the contributions of the dissertation in the final section of this chapter, and turn now to an overview of the empirical analysis.

1.3 Empirical Analysis

To analyze the consequences of CCTs for political participation and local policy, I consider several sources of original and existing data, both at the individual and subnational levels. Before reviewing this data, I first provide a more detailed description of CCTs, including the origins, development, characteristics, goals, and administration of these social assistance programs. This description also contains information about the Mexican CCT program, an important case in my empirical analysis.

1.3.1 *Conditional Cash Transfers*

CCTs originated in the mid-1990s and quickly expanded throughout Latin America and other regions in the Global South. In 1997, only three countries operated CCT programs, whereas by 2008 these programs were operating in nearly 30 countries (Fiszbein and Schady 2009). Today, almost all Latin American countries have a CCT program (ECLAC 2014), and the programs have been adopted in many Asian (Gabel and Kamerman 2013) and African countries (Garcia and Moore 2012). In terms of coverage, CCTs are the largest government assistance program in several participating countries (Fiszbein and Schady 2009).

There is some variation in CCT programs across countries, and even across time in the same country, as these programs expand to new contexts and develop over time. Despite these differences, it is striking to consider the similarities across CCT programs, particularly given the varied contexts of operation.⁸ Below I discuss general program characteristics, but readily acknowledge that not all programs (at all times) are identical.

CCTs are characterized by a set of three core program components: a targeted beneficiary selection process, cash transfers, and conditionalities. First, a needs-based targeting process selects beneficiaries for the program, using household and/or community characteristics to determine need (Cecchini and Madariaga 2011; Fiszbein and Schady 2009). Pre-established formulas calculate a poverty score for each potential household, and an eligibility cutoff line dictates which households are allowed to enter

⁸ For an overview of CCT program characteristics in different countries, see Fiszbein and Schady (2009, 206-15).

the program. In practice, there is variation in the amount of opportunities for political interference across CCT programs, and some studies find evidence of political manipulation in specific programs.⁹ Still, this selection process has received a large amount of praise for its effectiveness at reaching the poor, and generally is considered to be outside the reach of clientelism (Fiszbein and Schady 2009; Díaz-Cayeros and Magaloni 2009; Cecchini and Madariaga 2011; Programa Estado de la Nación y Transparencia Internacional 2011).

Second, CCT beneficiary families receive regular cash transfers through the program. According to Fiszbein and Schady, the average cash transfer amount in a given country accounts for up to 20 percent of household consumption. Within each program, the size of the transfer depends on factors such as the household structure, the grade of children, and/or the previous amount of time in the program. An adult female is sometimes required to be the head participant in the program, and thus receive the regular cash transfers (2009).

Third, CCT beneficiaries must complete a set of requirements, or conditionalities, in order to continue receiving benefits. These conditionalities are civic-based, meaning that they require public interaction with other community members, and generally include attendance at health education workshops, health clinic checkups, and/or school (Cecchini and Madariaga 2011; Fiszbein and Schady 2009). The conditionalities focus on

⁹ For specific examples of opportunities for, or evidence of, political manipulation and clientelism, see De La O (2015); Rocha Menocal (2001); Lo Vuolo (2012); Hevia de la Jara (2010).

health and education, in an attempt to increase investment in the human capital of children and break the cycle of poverty.

Among the many CCT programs, the Oportunidades program in Mexico deserves special attention.¹⁰ It started in 1997 in select municipalities and has grown tremendously over time, currently covering over 25 percent of the Mexican population (ECLAC 2014). This CCT program has a highly technical and needs-based beneficiary selection process, involving both household and community targeting mechanisms, and a strict enforcement process of the program conditionalities (Fiszbein and Schady 2009; Cecchini and Madariaga 2011). The money is transferred to beneficiaries every two months, with the exact amount of the transfers depending on factors such as the education level and number of children and the number of elderly household members.¹¹ The program is administered exclusively by the federal government, and leaves almost no room for citizen involvement in important decision-making processes. Local political officials are excluded from the program in order to protect against political manipulation (Levy and Rodríguez 2005; Levy 2006).

¹⁰ Please note that the CCT program name in Mexico has changed over time. It used to be named Progresá, and now is called Prospera (<https://www.prospera.gob.mx/Portal/>).

¹¹ See https://www.prospera.gob.mx/Portal/wb/Web/reglas_de_operacion as well as Fiszbein and Schady (2009)

1.3.2 Data

I utilize multiple sources of data in the dissertation, including Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) survey data,¹² original survey data, field experiment data, focus groups, and in-depth interviews. The LAPOP survey was conducted in 18 Latin American countries in 2012, and it includes a nationally representative sample of adults (18+) in each country. The LAPOP surveys in nine countries¹³ contain questions on CCT participation and participation in a wide variety of political activities, allowing for extensive analysis of the relationship between CCTs and political participation. To my knowledge, this is the only multi-country survey that includes questions on CCT participation and political participation.

The original survey is from June of 2014 and it contains a representative sample of adults (18+) in three Mexican municipalities, including two in the state of Puebla (Oriental and San Felipe Teotlalcingo) and one in the state of Mexico (Ixtlahuaca).¹⁴ The original survey includes questions on CCTs, political participation, and potential pathways to political participation, allowing for extensive analysis of CCT effects on political participation as well as the causal mechanism. Additionally, the survey contains a question on participation in an unconditional cash transfer program (UCT),

¹² Source: The AmericasBarometer by LAPOP, www.LapopSurveys.org.

¹³ The nine countries are Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Chile, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Mexico, and Peru.

¹⁴ The survey was collected by Parametría, a research firm in Mexico. Face-to-face interviews were carried out by trained interviewers. The sampling frame consisted of an area frame based on electoral sections. The sample size for each municipality is 380 respondents (1140 respondents in total). The sampling error is +/- 5 percent.

permitting a comparative analysis that isolates the effect of the conditionality component.

In addition, I utilize data from a randomized field experiment in Mexico and perform “downstream” experimental analysis (Green and Gerber 2002) on electoral behavior and service provision. The Mexican government implemented a randomized rollout of the CCT program in selected rural localities of seven Mexican states from 1998-2000 (Gertler 2000; Schultz 2001). The experimental data allows me to analyze the effects of CCTs on political participation, vote choice, and service provision while avoiding the standard concerns with observational survey data.

The final source of data comes from in-depth interviews and focus groups with CCT beneficiaries and government officials in four Mexican municipalities: Chignahuapan (state of Puebla), Teziutlán (state of Puebla), San Andrés Cholula (state of Puebla), and Tula de Allende (state of Hidalgo). The interviews¹⁵ were conducted in October and November of 2012, and they included a total of sixteen CCT beneficiaries, seven CCT program officials, and four municipal officials. This data helps to unravel the causal mechanism connecting program participation and political participation.

Whenever possible, multiple methods are used to analyze each observable implication of my argument, so as to acknowledge the shortcomings of each individual method and to increase our confidence in the overall findings. A series of robustness

¹⁵ Throughout the dissertation, I use the term “interview” to refer to an in-depth interview or a small focus group.

checks are also performed throughout the dissertation, in order to address more specific concerns.

1.4 Plan of the Dissertation

My dissertation has important implications for research in political behavior, political economy, and human development. For example, the project identifies a significant determinant of political participation and helps to explain variation in political activity among the poor in the Global South. These results improve our understanding of why some poor citizens participate in a wide variety of political activities, while others remain politically inactive. In addition, the article uncovers how targeted transfers serve to mobilize beneficiaries to participate more in politics. Recent theoretical and empirical work in distributive politics emphasizes the importance of targeted transfers as tools of mobilization (Cox 2010; Nichter 2008; De La O 2013), but we know little about the causal mechanism that leads to increased participation. The findings from my study suggest that material transfers alone are not enough to mobilize recipients to participate more in politics, except for low-cost forms of participation. Furthermore, the findings on local service provision have important implications for human development and the debate over demand-side and supply-side policies. Even when demand-side policy interventions spur increased political participation among program beneficiaries, they do not automatically lead to increased government

responsiveness. Instead, program beneficiaries may turn to private providers for vital services that shape human development outcomes.

The second chapter provides a detailed explanation of my Policy Push Argument, including the predicted effects of CCTs on political participation, service provision, and election outcomes. Building on a previous argument that emphasizes the importance of personal resources and experiences (Verba et al. 1995), I introduce a new policy-based argument of political participation that focuses on social assistance conditionalities. When governments require or “push” poor beneficiaries to fulfill certain conditions in order to continue receiving social assistance, they alter the beneficiaries’ stock of politically relevant resources in the process and affect future decisions about political participation. In the case of CCTs, the civic-based requirements encourage increased political participation among beneficiaries by contributing to improved civic skills and increasing access to political officials and community leaders.¹⁶ The consequences of CCTs for policy are also considered, and I argue that CCTs affect the provision of public services and certain election outcomes. The policy feedback effects depend on private competition and local party control, respectively.

¹⁶ This argument falls under the umbrella of an institutional theory of political participation, which emphasizes the importance of the state in the distribution of resources and creation of opportunities for political involvement (Holzner 2010). In particular, Holzner highlights that government programs can distribute resources which facilitate political participation and increase access to government officials, thus increasing opportunities for political participation. He is critical of CCTs, however, and argues that CCTs will lead to less political participation (43-45, 92-93, 102).

The third chapter examines the relationship between CCTs and multiple modes of political participation in Latin America, with a focus on Mexico. Using existing survey data, original survey data, and experimental data, I test whether CCTs and unconditional cash transfers (UCTs) encourage political participation. The evidence suggests that only CCTs lead to broad political participation among beneficiaries, including increased involvement in electoral and non-electoral political activities. This chapter makes an important theoretical contribution by improving our understanding of why some social assistance programs increase political participation, while others have no effect or even a negative effect on participation. The design of program conditionalities has an important influence on political participation, and this influence contributes to the overall effect of the program. Moreover, by utilizing both observational and experimental data, the chapter aims to provide a more comprehensive examination of the relationship between CCTs and political participation. This examination contributes to the growing literature on the political behavioral consequences of CCTs (Hunter and Power 2008; Zucco 2013; Baez et al. 2012; Díaz-Cayeros et al. 2012; De La O 2013; Manacorda et al. 2011; Bohn 2011; Green 2006; Linos 2013; Labonne 2013; Rodríguez-Chamussy 2015).

In the fourth chapter, I examine the causal mechanism that connects CCTs to increased political participation. The analysis draws on original survey data, focus groups, and in-depth interviews in Mexico, and it finds that CCTs lead to more opportunities to exercise civic skills and more access to political officials and local

community leaders. These politically relevant resources facilitate increased involvement in political activities by reducing the costs of participation, particularly more demanding forms of participation. This chapter makes an important theoretical contribution by identifying that the *state*, through the implementation of conditional social assistance programs, can play a key role in the creation of civic skills, which in turn reduce the costs of participation for citizens. Previous work in the Global South focuses on how civic education programs affect skills and/or behaviors (e.g., Finkel 2002; Riutta 2007), but this research does not consider the effects of other types of programs. Moreover, the chapter contributes to the distributive politics literature by uncovering *how* targeted transfers serve to mobilize beneficiaries.

The fifth chapter considers the consequences of CCTs for government responsiveness, with a focus on local service provision. Building on evidence that organizations and companies regularly compete with governments to provide local services in the Global South,¹⁷ I develop a new policy-based argument of service provision that recognizes the importance of transfer effects and private competition. More specifically, conditional transfer programs that encourage political participation may not lead to positive feedback effects in the provision of government services, because the beneficiaries may use the transferred resources to purchase private services. Available experimental data from Mexico supports this argument: CCTs have a positive effect on the private provision of services, but no effect on the provision of government

¹⁷ See, for example, Batley (2006); MacLean (2011); www.un-ngls.org/orf/cso/NGOWater.doc

services. This chapter adds to the literature on government responsiveness by identifying that policies can affect service provision through feedback effects. It also contributes to the extensive literature on CCTs in development economics and global health (Morris et al. 2004; Skoufias 2005; Barham and Maluccio 2009; Attanasio et al. 2005b; Behrman and Hoddinott 2001; Rasella et al. 2013; Paxson and Schady 2010; Fiszbein and Schady 2009; Cury et al 2007; Naranjo 2008) by identifying an alternative pathway to improved human development, and especially health, outcomes.

In the sixth chapter, I attempt to explain within-country variation in CCT effects on incumbent party support in non-benefactor elections, which are elections where the level of government plays no role in the creation, funding, or implementation of a program. My argument is that there will be more confusion over responsibility attribution for the program in non-matched districts, which are districts with elected politicians that are not of the same party as the benefactor party. In these districts, citizens likely receive multiple signals regarding which party and/or level of government is responsible for providing the program, and the multiple signals create confusion in the minds of citizens. The resulting confusion opens a window of opportunity for citizens to attribute responsibility to the wrong level of government. I test this argument using new survey data on responsibility attribution and experimental data on incumbent party support in non-benefactor elections in Mexico, and I find that party control influences responsibility attribution and shapes electoral rewards for CCTs in non-benefactor elections. This argument explains the puzzle of why incumbent

parties in non-matched districts secure more electoral rewards from CCTs in non-benefactor elections, and it contributes to the growing literature on CCTs and vote choice in local and state elections (Linos 2013; Labonne 2013; Rodríguez-Chamussy 2015).

Policy Push Argument

2.1 Introduction

The recent emergence of conditional social assistance programs marks an impressive transformation in social policy in the Global South, and CCTs are at the forefront of this monumental overhaul in antipoverty programs. The cash benefits from CCTs are well targeted, with strong evidence that the transfers are truly reaching the poor (Fiszbein and Schady 2009; Lindert et al. 2006). These innovative programs lead to reductions in poverty in the short term (Fiszbein and Schady 2009; Cury et al 2007; Naranjo 2008). CCTs also increase the utilization of some health and education services (Maluccio and Flores 2005; Galasso 2006; Schady and Araujo 2008; Attanasio et al. 2005a; Morris et al. 2004; Skoufias 2005; Barham and Maluccio 2009; Attanasio et al. 2005b), resulting in more investment in the human capital of poor children. This investment aims to reduce poverty in the long term as well.

While most reaction to CCTs is positive, there is a growing amount of criticism towards these programs. For example, some criticize the paternalistic features of CCTs (Holzner 2010; Standing 2011; Freeland 2007; Veit-Wilson 2009), with program

beneficiaries playing a passive or non-existent role in the decision-making processes, being given financial incentives to invest in their children, and being monitored by the state. Another challenge to CCTs is whether conditionalities are needed, due to the mixed evidence on the consequences of conditionalities for human development,¹ increased opportunities for clientelism, and/or the existence of sizeable compliance costs (Freeland 2007; Standing 2011; Lo Vuolo 2012; Barrientos 2009, 2011). Still others question whether the programs truly help poor women, or merely add more responsibilities and challenges to their lives (Molyneux 2006; Martinez Franzoni and Voorend 2008; Smith-Oka 2013).

Despite all of the research on CCTs, we still know little about the political consequences of these programs. My dissertation aims to address this gap by identifying the effects of CCTs, and particularly CCT conditionalities, on political participation; explaining how CCTs spur changes in political participation among program beneficiaries; and analyzing the feedback effects of CCTs on local policy. I also consider how these political consequences shape human development outcomes, with a focus on health.

2.2 Argument

To address the topics listed above, I introduce a Policy Push Argument that emphasizes the importance of social assistance transfers *and* conditionalities in shaping

¹ For a review of this evidence, see Fiszbein and Schady (2009).

political behavior. Adapted from the definition of a policy nudge (Thaler and Sunstein 2008), a policy push is defined here as a policy which alters behavior by requiring that certain actions be taken in order to receive substantial benefits. Of course, a policy push is not merely an abstract concept. The recent spread of conditional social assistance programs, and especially CCTs, highlights the increasing popularity of these programs throughout the Global South (Fiszbein and Schady 2009; ECLAC 2014; Gabel and Kamerman 2013; Garcia and Moore 2012).

Below I outline how policy pushes influence political participation among program beneficiaries and lead to important policy feedback effects.

2.2.1 Policy Push and Political Participation

In line with Verba et al. (1995), the starting point for my argument is that certain resources are critical for political participation. Resources such as civic skills, time, and money provide individuals with the capacity that is needed to participate in political activities. Without these resources, it is difficult for individuals to participate in politics even if they want to become politically engaged.²

The Policy Push Argument diverges from Verba et al. (1995) by emphasizing that the state – rather than a set of non-political social institutions – plays a key a role in

² Although the argument by Verba et al. (1995) was developed and tested in the United States, recent evidence suggests that individual resources matter for political participation in the Global South as well. This argument finds some support when directly tested in the Latin American context (Carreras and Castañeda-Angarita 2014), and education, a likely creator of politically relevant resources, is strongly associated with broad political participation throughout the Global South (Bratton 2008; Krishna 2008b; Booth and Seligson 2008). As in the United States, income is less important than other resources for political participation.

shaping the possession of politically relevant resources across the citizenry in less industrialized democracies. For instance, as argued by Pierson, the state has the ability to transfer resources directly to certain individuals, altering these individuals' stock of politically relevant material resources. The directly-transferred resources can affect decisions to participate in politics through two mechanisms: providing increased capacity and providing increased incentive to defend or expand the resources (1993).³ I refer to this subgroup of program effects as "transfer effects".

The direct transfer of desirable resources is not the only way that the state shapes the distribution of resources through policy, however. The state also may assign conditions that individuals must meet in order to continue receiving the transfers. Through the process of meeting these conditions, individuals may acquire (or expend) politically relevant resources that shape the future costs of participating in politics. The effects of meeting the assigned conditions, or what I call "conditionality effects," are the defining feature of the Policy Push Argument. When individuals are pushed to perform certain actions, it is likely that their stock of politically relevant resources will be altered. The Policy Push Argument recognizes the importance of conditionalities for acquiring (or expending) politically relevant resources, and it emphasizes that both transfer effects *and* conditionality effects can influence future decisions to participate in politics.

Among the actions of the state, conditional social assistance programs are particularly impactful in shaping the distribution of resources. There are two reasons for this. First, the programs transfer material resources directly to program

³ See Holzner (2010) as well.

beneficiaries, thus creating the potential for strong transfer effects.⁴ Second, the conditionalities shape the beneficiaries' stock of politically relevant, non-material resources. For example, all conditionalities reduce the beneficiaries' available time to spend on non-essential activities such as political participation, creating an additional hurdle for political involvement. Importantly though, some conditionalities can provide beneficiaries with non-material resources which reduce the costs of participation and facilitate more political activity. The overall effect of the conditionalities thus depends on the program design.⁵

In the particular case of CCTs, the largest conditional social assistance programs in the Global South,⁶ the Policy Push Argument suggests that these programs will drive increased political participation among beneficiaries, and that both the program transfers and the conditionalities will shape decisions to participate in politics. Indeed, CCT programs give sizeable cash transfers directly to beneficiaries, increasing the incentive for these beneficiaries to participate more in politics in order to defend or expand the desirable transfers. The cash transfers may also contribute to an increased capacity to participate in politics. Increased incentives and/or capacity will therefore spur more political participation among program beneficiaries.

Moreover, the CCT conditionalities – which are civic in nature, meaning that program beneficiaries must regularly leave their private networks and interact with

⁴ For an examination of how specific social program transfers affect resources and political participation among beneficiaries, see Campbell (2003).

⁵ For examples of other policy-based arguments that emphasize the importance of policy design, see Schneider and Ingram (1993, 1997); Pierson (1993); Soss (1999); and Campbell (2003).

⁶ See Azevedo and Robles (2013) and Fiszbein and Schady (2009).

state officials and other community members in order to fulfill program responsibilities – remove obstacles to participation, alter social networks, and facilitate more political activity among program beneficiaries. Although the exact set of conditionalities can vary slightly across CCT programs, CCT beneficiaries typically are required to attend regular checkups at local health facilities, attend regular health education workshops and other group meetings with program officials, and engage with local school officials (Fiszbein and Schady 2009; Cecchini and Madariga 2011).

Drawing from an institutional theory of political participation (Holzner 2010), I hypothesize two potential pathways from civic-based conditionalities in CCT programs to increased political participation. First, the increased social interactions with state officials and community members in an organized setting lead to more opportunities for beneficiaries to practice civic skills. I follow Verba et al. and define civic skills as “organizational and communications abilities that facilitate political life” (1995, p. 4). Because CCT beneficiaries must utilize both communication and organizational skills in order to fulfill the program conditions, beneficiaries gain experiences in building and maintaining these important skills. Civic skills increase an individual’s capacity to participate in political activities and thus reduce the costs of political participation, and they have been shown to be strong determinants of political activity (Verba et al. 1995; Finkel 2002). Civic skills are especially critical for more demanding forms of political participation, which require communicating and/or working with others.

Second, the civic conditionalities push CCT beneficiaries into a new social space that is closer to state officials and the local community, increasing their access to state

and community leaders and facilitating increased political involvement. In order to meet the program conditions, CCT beneficiaries must regularly interact with representatives of the state and the local community, including program officials, local service providers, and other community members and leaders. The frequent interactions alter social networks and reduce the social distance between CCT beneficiaries and these state and community leaders. The resulting social proximity is a politically relevant resource for CCT beneficiaries, particularly when they have a concern or are in need of assistance, as it reduces the costs of reaching out to key decision makers. With increased access to political leaders, we would expect CCT beneficiaries to increase their political activity.

It is useful to categorize each of these pathways by what I refer to as “internal” or “external” politically relevant resources. Internal resources increase an individual’s capacity to perform political activities, thus lowering the costs of political involvement. External resources also facilitate political involvement, not by expanding individual capacity, but by bringing the activity closer to the individual.⁷ A civic skill, as an individual resource that reduces the costs of performing political activities, is an internal politically relevant resource, while the social proximity to state and community leaders is an external resource. Both types of resources facilitate political involvement by reducing the costs of participation.

⁷ For related arguments on the importance of opportunities for political participation, see work on social movement theory (McAdam et al. 1996; Tarrow 1998; McAdam 1999) as well as institutional arguments of political participation (Holzner 2010). Holzner recognizes that government programs shape resources and opportunities for participation, specifically access to government leaders, but does not consider the social pathways to resource acquisition and increased participation.

The Policy Push Argument offers the following predictions regarding CCTs, otherwise similar unconditional cash transfers (UCTs), and political participation. (H1a) CCTs will be positively associated with political participation, and especially with participation in more demanding political activities. (H1b) The positive association between CCTs and political participation will be larger than the positive association between UCTs and political participation. The argument also makes the following predictions regarding the potential pathways that connect CCT conditionalities and political participation. (H2a) CCTs will be positively associated with civic skills, while UCTs will have no relationship with civic skills; and (H2b) CCTs will be positively associated with access to state officials and community leaders, while UCTs will have no relationship with access to these leaders.

2.2.2 Policy Feedback: Direct Effects

If CCTs spur increased political participation among program beneficiaries as hypothesized, do these programs also lead to improved government responsiveness to the needs of CCT beneficiaries? The main theories of democratic governance assume that the *government* is the only game in town when it comes to responding to citizen needs. Citizens communicate their preferences through electoral and/or non-electoral political participation, and governments must decide whether to respond to these preferences (or select which preferences to respond to). As citizens participate more in politics, it is argued, they create incentives for politicians to be more responsive to their

needs (e.g., Campbell et al. 1960; Key 1966; Fenno 1978; Fiorina 1981; Putnam 1993; Verba et al. 1995; Hirschman 1970; Cleary 2010).

But, the government is not necessarily the only game in town when it comes to responding to citizen needs in a democracy, and competitors can sever the link between political participation and government responsiveness. This is especially apparent in less industrialized democracies, where governments may lack the necessary capacity to respond to citizen needs in a timely manner. In these contexts, competitors may emerge to fill the void left by the government. For example, private businesses and nongovernmental organizations often provide public services for citizens in developing countries,⁸ and the existence of these competitors creates options for citizens. They do not have to go to the government to get vital services in these contexts.

How might CCTs affect competition over service provision in developing democracies? I argue that the cash transfers make private alternatives more viable for CCT beneficiaries. The reason for this is straightforward. Many poor households in developing democracies have little disposable income, and as a result these households often cannot afford services provided by private entities. The cash transfers from CCTs lead to higher levels of disposable income for program beneficiaries, and this income can be used to purchase vital, and previously unaffordable, services from the private sector.

If CCT beneficiaries do indeed opt to use the cash transfers to purchase services from private entities, then the government no longer is needed to address these needs. Importantly for our purposes, the inability of the government to address these needs

⁸ See, for example, Batley (2006); MacLean 2011; www.un-ngls.org/orf/cso/NGOWater.doc

occurs *even when the program beneficiaries are choosing to participate more in politics*. CCTs therefore limit the incentives for the government to address CCT beneficiary needs and alleviate responsibility for effective service delivery.

This argument leads to the following two testable implications regarding CCTs and service provision. (H3) CCTs will be positively associated with the private provision of services. (H4) CCTs will have no relationship with the government's provision of services.

It is important to highlight that these predictions run counter not only to the main theories of democratic governance, but also to a leading argument in development policy. A key justification for demand-side antipoverty policies – policies that transfer resources directly to poor citizens rather than provide subsidies for public services – is that they provide increased leverage for poor citizens to demand superior government services.⁹ But if demand-side programs are pushing beneficiaries away from government services, then it does not automatically follow that the government services will improve. Rather than compete with private entities over the quality of service provision, government leaders may simply make it more difficult for these competitors to operate. Alternatively, some government leaders may attempt to gain from the success of the private services by emphasizing an ideological stance in support of small government. Either way, the particular pathway to development may not run through improved government services.

⁹ See World Bank (2003; Chapter 4) and Devarajan (2013) for an overview of this argument.

2.2.3 Policy Feedback: Indirect Effects

In addition to the hypothesized direct effects on public service provision, CCTs also may have indirect effects on policy through election outcomes. If we assume that party control of government ultimately leads to different policies, then CCT effects on election outcomes also create indirect policy feedback effects.

The literature on CCTs and vote choice mainly focuses on program effects in national elections in Latin America (Hunter and Power 2008; Zucco 2013; Díaz-Cayeros et al. 2012; De La O 2013; Manacorda et al. 2011; Baez et al. 2012). The central finding from this literature is that CCTs increase support for the incumbent party in national elections, regardless of the incumbent party's ideology. Because the national governments in these countries operate and fund the CCT programs, the key implication is that voters are informed: they correctly attribute responsibility for the program and reward the incumbent party at the correct level of government.

More recently, some literature challenges the notion of fully informed CCT beneficiaries. Researchers examine the relationship between CCTs and incumbent support in non-benefactor elections, where governments play no role in the creation, operation, or funding of the CCT programs, and the researchers find that CCTs lead to increased incumbent support in some of these elections (Linos 2013; Labonne 2013; Rodríguez-Chamussy 2015). These findings suggest that CCT beneficiaries are subject to improper responsibility attribution and lack complete information with respect to their vote choice.

We currently lack an explanation for the conditions under which citizens will improperly reward incumbent parties for CCTs. According to the available evidence, CCT beneficiaries reward incumbent parties in some non-benefactor elections but not others, with some variation occurring even within the same country (Linos 2013; Labonne 2013; Rodríguez-Chamussy 2015). In an attempt to fill this gap and advance our understanding of the electoral consequences of CCTs, I develop a new argument on the relationship between CCTs and incumbent support in non-benefactor elections. I argue that citizens will become more confused about responsibility attribution for CCTs in non-matched districts, which are districts that have an elected official from a party that is not the same as the benefactor party. This reason for this is because citizens in non-matched districts may receive signals from *multiple* incumbent parties regarding which level of government is responsible for the program, and the multiple signals are likely to create confusion in the minds of citizens. This confusion opens a window of opportunity for the incumbent party in non-matched districts to receive credit for the program and secure more electoral rewards in non-benefactor elections.

If this argument is correct, we should see the following observable implications. (H5) Citizens in non-matched districts will be more likely to attribute responsibility for CCTs to the wrong level of government. (H6) In non-benefactor elections, CCTs will lead to more electoral rewards for incumbent parties in non-matched districts.

2.3 Plan for the Empirical Analysis

To test the hypotheses listed above, I utilize original survey data, existing survey data, field experiment data, focus groups, and in-depth interviews. Whenever possible, multiple methods are used to analyze each hypothesis, so as to acknowledge the shortcomings of each individual method and to increase our confidence in the findings. A series of robustness checks are also performed throughout the dissertation.

2.3.1 CCTs, Conditionalities, and Political Participation

I collected and/or created data based upon what was needed to test each particular hypothesis. In order to analyze the relationship between CCTs and political participation (H1a), I obtained existing survey data from Latin America, implemented an original survey in Mexico, and collected data from a randomized field experiment in Mexico. To my knowledge, LAPOP is the only existing multi-country survey that includes questions on both CCT participation and participation in a wide variety of political activities. The 2012 LAPOP survey asks respondents about CCT participation and involvement in 21 political activities in nine countries: Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Chile, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Mexico, and Peru. I added aggregate data to this existing survey data and used multilevel models with random intercepts (Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal 2008) to analyze the relationship between CCTs and broad political participation.

Also, in June of 2014, I implemented an original and representative survey of adults (18+) in three Mexican municipalities, including two in the state of Puebla

(Oriental and San Felipe Teotlalcingo) and one in the state of Mexico (Ixtlahuaca). This survey includes questions on CCT participation and involvement in 23 forms of political participation, as well as a standard battery of control variables. The municipalities were selected for their high breadth and low depth of poverty, thus reducing the differences between CCT beneficiaries and poor non-beneficiaries in the sample and creating natural controls for my analysis. Subnational-level data was added to the original survey data and multilevel models with random intercepts were utilized for this part of the analysis.

The randomized field experiment, which took place in Mexico between 1998 and 2000, supplies experimental data to analyze the relationship between CCTs and voter turnout in non-benefactor elections. The electoral data was obtained through formal requests to each state electoral office. Linear regression models were used to assess the relationship between CCT treatment and voter turnout in municipal and state elections.

To test whether CCT conditionalities are positively associated with political participation (H1b), I use the original survey data from Mexico. Mexico is ideally suited for this part of the analysis, because it has a CCT program (*Oportunidades*)¹⁰ and a UCT program (*Programa de Apoyo Alimentario*) that provide a similar amount of cash to program beneficiaries; serve almost identical beneficiary populations; and have the same administrative agency and structure.¹¹ These similarities across programs allow for important natural controls and increased leverage when trying to isolate the effect of

¹⁰ The name of the program has since changed to *Prospera*.

¹¹ For an overview of these programs, please see <https://www.prospera.gob.mx/Portal/wb/Web/2014>

CCT conditionalities. Once again, I use multilevel models with random intercepts to analyze the relationship between program participation and political participation in Mexico.

2.3.2 Pathways to Increased Political Participation

Multiple sources of data are utilized to assess the causal mechanism that connects program participation and political participation (H2a and H2b), including the original survey data, in-depth interviews, and focus groups. The original survey data contains measures of civic skills and access to political officials, allowing for analysis of the relationship between program participation and these proposed pathways. Multilevel models with random intercepts are used in this analysis. In addition, I conducted in-depth interviews and focus groups with CCT beneficiaries and program officials in four Mexican municipalities. The interviews were conducted in October and November of 2012, and the resulting data helps to uncover more of the causal mechanism that contributes to increased political participation.

2.3.3 CCTs and Policy Feedback Effects

I also evaluate the consequences of CCTs for local service provision and incumbent party support in non-benefactor elections. The relationship between CCTs and service provision (H3 and H4) is analyzed using the experimental data from Mexico and census data on private and governmental provision of services. Both the CCT treatment data and the census data is available at the locality level, allowing for a clean

“downstream” experimental analysis (Green and Gerber 2002) of this relationship. The dependent variables are the change in the coverage of the provision of potable water and sanitary sewerage between 1995 and 2000, which are before and after the start of the field experiment. Service provision coverage is defined here as the percentage of households with access to the service. Basic linear regression models are used to analyze the effect of CCT treatment on private and governmental service provision.

Finally, I use nationally representative survey data and the experimental data from Mexico to assess the relationship between CCTs, responsibility attribution, and electoral rewards in non-benefactor elections (H5 and H6). The Presidency implemented a national survey of voting-age adults in October 2007 with several questions about the Mexican CCT program (*Oportunidades*).¹² Regarding responsibility attribution, the survey included an open-ended question about which level of government provides the CCT program. Data on non-benefactor party control is added to the survey data, and multilevel models are used to assess the relationship between matched districts and responsibility attribution for CCTs (H5). In addition, I use the experimental data from Mexico to assess the relationship between CCT treatment and incumbent party support in non-benefactor elections (H6). Linear regression models are utilized to analyze the effect of CCT treatment on incumbent party vote share in these elections.

¹² The data was obtained through a formal information request (see <https://www.infomex.org.mx/gobiernofederal/home.action>).

2.4 Discussion

The arguments outlined above attempt to explain the consequences of CCTs for political behavior and local policy. The central argument of the dissertation is that CCTs matter for political behavior, because they shape the acquisition of politically relevant resources for program beneficiaries. More specifically, the conditionality component of these programs influences civic skills and access to political officials and local leaders, reducing the costs of political participation. This argument challenges the generalizability of previous policy-based explanations of political participation that emphasize the importance of interpretive effects (Soss 1999; Bruch et al. 2010). It also challenges recent work which argues that CCT conditionalities have no effect on political behavior (Layton and Smith 2015).

I also argue that CCTs have important direct and indirect policy feedback effects. CCT beneficiaries can use the cash transfers to purchase private services, thus creating competition for governments and imposing important time constraints on government responsiveness. Cash transfers, by way of private services, can sever the positive link between political participation and government responsiveness.

It is important to clarify that I am *not* arguing that cash transfers will always interrupt the link between political participation and government responsiveness. The availability of private service providers, the affordability and quality of the private services, and the quality of the government services are all factors which influence competition over service provision. Instead, I am simply arguing that private providers can serve as complements to the government when it comes to service provision, and,

when utilized, this alternative option reduces the pressures on government to respond to citizen needs. CCTs therefore have perverse consequences as well.

My argument on CCTs and service provision challenges the proposed mechanism that connects demand-side antipoverty programs and human development. Recent arguments in favor of demand-side policies emphasize that cash transfers provide increased leverage for beneficiaries to demand better government services.¹³ Rather than subsidize government services, it is argued, poverty is best addressed by transferring cash payments to the poor, because poor citizens can use these cash transfers to demand better government services. The key problem with this argument is that it assumes the poor will ultimately demand better services from the government, or at least that the government will attempt to compete (in a fair manner) with the superior quality of the private services. Poor program beneficiaries simply may decide to stick with private service providers, and/or the government may be unable or unwilling to compete with the private providers. In either instance, the pathway from demand-side antipoverty programs to human development goes through the private providers of services.

Direct effects on service provision are not the only avenues through which CCTs can influence policy. If we believe that party control shapes policy outcomes, then CCTs also will indirectly affect policy outcomes through feedback effects on non-benefactor elections. The size of the CCT effect on incumbent support in these elections depends on party control: CCTs will lead to larger electoral rewards for incumbent parties in non-

¹³ See World Bank (2003; Chapter 4) and Devarajan (2013).

matched districts, because the multiple signals will create more confusion over which party and level of government is responsible for the program. CCT beneficiaries are not immune to confusion over responsibility attribution for the CCT program, and this confusion affects election outcomes.

In total, CCTs can help beneficiaries overcome key obstacles to political participation, and in turn can lead to direct and indirect policy feedback effects. When governments attach civic-based requirements to receiving transfers, program beneficiaries gain politically relevant resources that facilitate more involvement in politics. The increased political participation among program beneficiaries also feeds back into the political system, influencing the provision of vital local services and outcomes in local elections. National antipoverty programs matter for local politics.

CCTs and Broad Political Participation

3.1 Introduction

Latin America experienced a remarkable reduction in poverty and inequality in the past fifteen years, especially when considering the region's poor performance in these areas in previous decades. According to the World Bank, economic growth is responsible for a large portion of these effects, but the available evidence suggests that redistributive social policy, and particularly CCTs, also played an important role. It is estimated that redistribution was responsible for 32 percent of the reduction in poverty in the region between 2003 and 2012 (2014). Latin American governments, by overhauling their social policy and turning to these conditional social assistance programs, thus contributed to positive human development outcomes. These findings offer a refreshing challenge to deeply held skepticisms and frustrations with governments in the region.

While the effects of CCTs on poverty and other human development outcomes are well established,¹ the political consequences are less clear. We have some evidence demonstrating positive CCT effects on incumbent party support in national elections

¹ See Chapter 1 of this dissertation for a discussion of the literature.

(Hunter and Power 2008; Zucco 2013; Baez et al. 2012; Díaz-Cayeros et al. 2012; De La O 2013)² and some evidence showing that CCTs encourage voter turnout in these elections (Baez et al. 2012; De La O 2013). But we lack a more comprehensive examination of the relationship between CCTs and participation in other modes of political activity. This omission is surprising, given the immense importance of CCTs in Latin America and the recognition that other forms of political participation have meaningful consequences in the region.³

The following chapter aims to address this gap by analyzing two important research questions: Do CCTs lead to increased participation in multiple political activities, or is the positive effect of CCTs confined to a select form of political participation (voting in national elections)? If CCTs contribute to broad political participation, which program component leads to more participation in a wide variety of political activities?

Following the definition of political participation introduced by Booth and Seligson (1978), political participation is defined here as *“behavior influencing or attempting to influence the distribution of public goods”* (6; emphasis in the original). This definition recognizes that political participation encompasses a wide range of electoral and non-electoral activities. I define broad political participation as involvement in multiple modes of political activities.

² There are some exceptions (Bohn 2011; Green 2006) that find no relationship between CCTs and incumbent support in national elections.

³ For examples of work demonstrating that other forms of political participation have meaningful consequences in Latin America, see Biles (1978); Booth and Seligson (1979); Smulovitz and Peruzzotti (2000); Eckstein (2001); and Trejo (2012).

This chapter attempts to make two major contributions to the literature. First, it improves our theoretical understanding of why some social programs increase political participation, while others have no effect or even a negative effect on participation. The design of conditionalities has an overlooked but yet important influence on political participation, and this influence contributes to the overall effect of the program. Second, the chapter uncovers how targeted transfers serve to mobilize beneficiaries to participate more in politics. Recent theoretical and empirical work in distributive politics emphasizes the importance of targeted transfers as tools of mobilization (Cox 2010; Nichter 2008; De La O 2013), but we know little about the causal mechanism that leads to increased participation. The findings from this chapter suggest that material transfers alone are not enough to mobilize recipients to participate more in politics, except for low-cost forms of participation.

In the following chapter, I first review the literature on the political behavioral consequences of social programs. Section 3.3 discusses the Policy Push Argument and outlines my theoretical expectations regarding CCT participation and political participation. In Section 3.4, I analyze the effects of CCTs on broad political participation and evaluate the hypotheses. Finally, I conclude by discussing the implications of the findings.

3.2 Literature

There is a growing literature in political science that considers the effects of social policies on political participation.⁴ The bulk of the evidence comes from the United States and suggests that participation in universal programs increases political activity, whereas participation in means-tested programs decreases political participation (Campbell 2003; Soss 1999; Mettler and Stonecash 2008; Sharp 2009). Evidence from outside of the United States reinforces these findings, as means-tested programs produce more obstacles to political participation and lead to less political involvement (Kumlin 2004; Kumlin and Rothstein 2005; Alber and Kohler 2009). In terms of the mechanism for the means-tested program effects, Soss (1999) finds that negative program experiences influence overall views of the government and decrease external political efficacy, which in turn reduces political activity. Among means-tested programs, some evidence suggests that authority structures play an important role in shaping the effects on participation. Bruch et al. (2010), for example, find that paternalistic authority relations – those which prohibit beneficiaries from taking part in decision-making processes – reduce political participation among program beneficiaries. Holzner (2010) also argues that programs with this type of authority relations discourage political participation, because beneficiaries learn that it is not worthwhile to participate in politics when their involvement has little chance of producing desirable change.

The relationship between social programs and political participation also has been considered in Latin America, and the results are mixed. For example, Garay (2007)

⁴ For a review of some relevant literature, see Mettler and Soss (2004) and Campbell (2012).

analyzes the effects of a workfare program in Argentina, and she argues that this program contributed to an increase in protest. Schady (2001), on the other hand, does not find a relationship between government infrastructure projects and volunteering in the community in Peru. Nishikawa (2012) finds a positive relationship between participation in a government development program and political participation in Baja California, Mexico, but only considers effects on voter turnout. Also, Holzner (2010) finds that transfers from government programs are associated with increased external political efficacy and political participation in Mexico, but he is unable to test whether different types of programs lead to different effects.

More recently, researchers started to examine the consequences of CCTs for political behavior in Latin America. Although there are exceptions (Bohn 2011; Green 2006), most research finds that CCTs increase incumbent support and/or voter turnout in national elections.⁵ For example, Díaz-Cayeros et al. (2012) use both survey data and municipal-level data to show that CCTs had a positive effect on incumbent support in the 2000 and 2006 presidential elections in Mexico. Also, Hunter and Power (2008) argue that CCTs played an important role in the reelection of President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva in the 2006 elections in Brazil. Furthermore, Zucco (2013) finds that CCTs increased incumbent support in multiple presidential elections in Brazil.

Researchers also utilize quasi-experimental and experimental research designs to analyze the effects of CCTs on electoral behavior in national elections. Manacorda et al.

⁵ For a debate on whether CCTs contributed to increased incumbent support in the 2006 presidential elections in Brazil, see Bohn (2013) and Zucco and Power (2013).

(2011) use a regression discontinuity design and find that CCTs have a positive effect on incumbent party support in Uruguay. Baez et al. (2012) also use a regression discontinuity design and find that CCTs are positively associated with incumbent support and voter turnout in the 2010 presidential election in Colombia. De La O (2013) uses data from a field experiment in Mexico to examine the effects of CCTs on voter turnout and party vote share in the 2000 presidential election. When comparing precincts with longer CCT exposure to precincts with shorter CCT exposure, she finds that more exposure to CCTs has a positive effect on both voter turnout and incumbent party support.

Interestingly, the findings from Baez et al. (2012) and De La O (2013) run counter to earlier claims in the literature that means-tested programs, and particularly those with paternalistic authority relations, lead to a decrease in political activity (Bruch et al 2010; Soss 1999; Alber and Kohler 2009). These two studies on CCTs only consider one act of political participation though, so the extent of this challenge remains unclear. Some recent research analyzes the effects of CCTs on other forms of political participation (Perova 2010; Rodríguez-Chamussy 2011), but this research produces mixed findings and still only considers a limited range of political activities. By introducing new survey data and analyzing a full range of political activities, my chapter attempts to clarify the extent to which CCTs challenge existing arguments on means-tested programs and political participation.

3.3 Theoretical Expectations

The Policy Push Argument, described in full detail in the previous chapter, predicts that CCTs will be positively associated with political participation, particularly more demanding forms of political activity. In addition, the program conditionality component will contribute to the positive effects on political involvement. If this argument is correct, we would expect the size of the positive relationship between CCTs and political participation to be larger than the size of the positive relationship between otherwise similar UCTs and political participation. Furthermore, among CCT programs, CCTs with more extensive civic conditionalities will have a larger positive association with political activity.

Competing arguments in the literature lead to the following predictions regarding CCTs and political participation. Interpretive arguments suggest that CCTs, and the conditionalities in particular, will be negatively associated with political involvement. Material resource arguments predict that both CCTs and UCTs will have a positive effect on political participation, but there will be little difference in the size of the positive effect across programs. Clientelism arguments suggest that CCTs will be positively associated with electoral forms of political participation, but have no relationship with other forms of political activity. Finally, mobilization arguments imply that CCTs will be positively associated with political participation, but make no prediction regarding the type of political activity.

3.4 Research Design and Results

I test the hypotheses using three sources of data: (1) LAPOP survey data,⁶ (2) original survey data from Mexico, and (3) experimental data from Mexico. The LAPOP survey was conducted in 18 Latin American countries in 2012, and it includes a nationally representative sample of adults (18+) in each country. The LAPOP surveys in nine countries⁷ contain questions on CCT participation and participation in a wide variety of political activities, allowing for extensive analysis of the relationship between CCTs and political participation (H1a). In addition, the CCT programs in these countries vary in terms of the extensiveness of their civic conditionalities, permitting analysis on whether conditionality design influences political participation (H1c). Unfortunately, the LAPOP surveys do not contain questions on UCTs, so the remaining hypothesis (H1b) cannot be analyzed with this data.

To test the remaining hypothesis (H1b), I use original survey data from Mexico. Mexico is an ideal country for this analysis, because it has a CCT program (Oportunidades)⁸ and a UCT program (Programa de Apoyo Alimentario, or PAL) that provide a similar amount of cash to program beneficiaries; serve almost identical beneficiary populations; and have the same administrative agency and structure.⁹

⁶ Source: The AmericasBarometer by LAPOP, www.LapopSurveys.org.

⁷ The nine countries are Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Chile, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Mexico, and Peru. Note that I decide to include data from Argentina in the analysis, despite concerns regarding clientelism (e.g., Lo Vuolo 2012). The reason for this decision is because I am interested in testing the effects of CCTs, not simply the effects of CCTs which are (almost entirely) free from clientelism.

⁸ The program was called Oportunidades at the time of the survey, but now is called Prospera.

⁹ For an overview of these programs, please see <https://www.prospera.gob.mx/Portal/wb/Web/2014>.

Indeed, PAL is a means-tested, unconditional cash transfer program that uses nearly the same beneficiary selection criteria as Oportunidades, but it targets rural areas where poor citizens may have more difficulty accessing local health and education services.¹⁰ PAL, with only 3.7 million beneficiaries in total, is a much smaller program than Oportunidades, which has nearly 26 million beneficiaries.¹¹ Both programs are administered through the national Oportunidades agency.

Importantly for our purposes, the one crucial difference between these programs is that the CCT program has a conditionalities component, while the UCT program does not. The similarities across these programs allow for important natural controls when comparing program effects, which in turn provide increased leverage when trying to isolate the effect of CCT conditionalities on political participation. In addition, the well-defined selection criteria for these programs in Mexico reduce the risk of bias. Furthermore, the estimated CCT drop-out rate is only 3-8 percent on average in Mexico (Álvarez et al. 2008; González-Flores et al. 2012), so there are fewer concerns regarding self-selection (or in this case self-removal) bias due to the CCT beneficiaries not meeting the conditions.

The original survey is from June of 2014 and it contains a representative sample of adults (18+) in three Mexican municipalities, including two in the state of Puebla

¹⁰ For information about the operation rules for each program, see https://www.prospera.gob.mx/Portal/wb/Web/reglas_de_operacion.

¹¹ For this data, see: http://www.sedesol.gob.mx/es/SEDESOL/Padron_de_Beneficiarios

(Oriental and San Felipe Teotlalcingo) and one in the state of Mexico (Ixtlahuaca).¹²

These municipalities offer several advantages with regard to the analysis of hypothesis (H1b). First, they each contain a sizeable percentage of CCT beneficiaries and UCT beneficiaries, allowing for a comparative analysis of program effects. Second, because the beneficiaries in both programs are located in the same municipalities, and even localities, the case selection limits the potential differences in rurality and local services across the two groups of beneficiaries. Third, the CCT and UCT beneficiaries in these municipalities receive similar amounts of cash transfers through the programs, with CCT beneficiaries receiving an average of 660 pesos (about US\$51) per month and UCT beneficiaries receiving an average of 540 pesos (about US\$42) per month.¹³ Given the other similarities across the programs, including the beneficiary selection criteria and the administrative agency and structure, the similar transfer amounts allow us to isolate the impact of the CCT conditionalities. Fourth, the municipalities have a very high rate of poverty (nearly 80 percent of residents are below the poverty line¹⁴), including a large percentage of poor residents who are *not* program beneficiaries. This creates an extensive set of natural controls that resembles a regression discontinuity design, where the differences between program beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries are minimized and

¹² The survey was implemented by Parametría, a research firm in Mexico. The sample size for each municipality is 380 respondents (1140 respondents in total). The sampling error is +/- 5 percent.

¹³ The source of this data is the original survey, where program beneficiaries were asked to indicate the amount of money that they receive through the program.

¹⁴ The source of the poverty data is the 2010 Análisis y Medición de la Pobreza study by the Consejo Nacional de Evaluación de la Política de Desarrollo Social (<http://www.coneval.gob.mx/Medicion/Paginas/Medici%C3%B3n/Medicion-de-la-pobreza-municipal-2010.aspx>).

any resulting differences in outcomes can reasonably be attributed to the program treatment. Fifth, there is variation in the municipal and state incumbent parties across the municipalities, as well as variation in whether the state holds concurrent elections. This variation improves our confidence that the results hold in contexts outside of the selected municipalities.

The final source of data comes from a randomized field experiment in Mexico. The Mexican government implemented a randomized rollout of the CCT program in selected rural localities of seven Mexican states from 1998-2000 (Gertler 2000; Schultz 2001). The seven states involved in the experiment were Guerrero, Hidalgo, Michoacán, Puebla, Querétaro, San Luis Potosí, and Veracruz. CCT treatment was randomized at the locality level, with a total of 506 localities included in the sample. Out of these 506 localities, 320 localities were randomly assigned to receive CCT treatment in September of 1998. The remaining 186 localities were assigned to be in the control group, and the control localities were later given treatment starting in 2000 (Gertler 2000; Schultz 2001).

I utilize data from this randomized field experiment in Mexico and perform “downstream” experimental analysis (Green and Gerber 2002) on electoral political participation in municipal and state elections. This analysis adds to previous downstream work that only considered voter turnout in presidential elections (De La O 2013), thus providing a more comprehensive view of the relationship between CCTs and electoral political participation. Furthermore, given that the execution of the CCT field experiment in Mexico was tested extensively by a team of researchers and is widely accepted in the literature as a randomized treatment (e.g., Behrman and Todd 1999;

Gertler 2000; Schultz 2001; De La O 2013), the downstream analysis avoids some of the common concerns with observational survey data, such as omitted variable bias and social desirability bias. Indeed, the pre-treatment values for the treatment and control groups were found to be well-balanced on a multitude of socioeconomic and political indicators at both the locality and precinct levels (Behrman and Todd 1999; De La O 2013), making it reasonable to conclude that CCT treatment is exogenous for this experimental sample at both levels of analysis.

The following empirical analysis is divided into two parts. In part one, I analyze the relationship between CCTs and participation in a wide range of political activities. This analysis draws from the LAPOP survey data and the experimental data from Mexico. In part two, I consider the relationship between CCTs, UCTs, and political participation. This part of the analysis utilizes my original survey data from Mexico.

3.4.1 CCTs and Political Participation

To test the relationship between CCTs and political participation (H1a), data is needed on participation in the CCT program as well as participation in a wide variety of political activities. Although there are many existing surveys that include questions on CCT participation *or* political activity, few of these surveys include questions on both topics. Fortunately, the 2012 LAPOP survey is an exception, as it contains questions on CCT participation and 21 forms of political participation in nine countries.

The dependent variables in this analysis are a set of indices for the different modes of political participation. Through the use of factor analysis, prior research on

the dimensions of political participation in Latin America identifies six distinct modes of political participation: voting, campaign activism, contacting public officials, community activism, civil society engagement, and protest (Booth and Seligson 2009; Klesner 2009).¹⁵ I follow this work and construct a separate index for each of these six modes. The additive index for each mode is made up of between two to five survey questions, with each survey question rescaled to have equal weight in the index and a maximum value of one. The advantage to constructing the indices in this way is that the index values can be easily interpreted: they simply represent the number of political acts performed by the respondent. More details on the construction of these indices as well as the summary statistics are included in Appendix A.

I use confirmatory factor analysis to test whether the six indices correspond to underlying dimensions of political participation in the 2012 LAPOP survey data, and the results are reported in Appendix B (Table B3.1). As expected, the results provide strong support that each index represents a separate dimension of political participation in Latin America.¹⁶ The root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA) values are less than .06 and the comparative fit index (CFI) values are at least .90 for nearly all of the indices, providing no cause for concern (Hu and Bentler 1999). The one exception is the civil society engagement index, which has an acceptable RMSEA value but a low CFI

¹⁵ There is some disagreement over whether civil society engagement is a form of political participation. I follow Booth and Seligson (2008; 2009) and include civil society engagement as a mode of political participation.

¹⁶ The two variables in the protest index (participation in a protest and participation in a blockade) are not able to be assessed using confirmatory factor analysis, because all respondents who participated in a blockade also participated in a protest. The two variables are combined into a single protest scale for the remainder of the analysis.

value. Due to this mixed support, I choose to measure the four civil society engagement variables both as an index and as separate political activities, with the results of the latter being reported in Appendix B (Table B3.2).

The independent variables in this analysis are participation in the CCT program and a standard set of control variables. CCT program participation is a dichotomous variable, in which a value of one indicates CCT program participation in the household and a value of zero indicates non-participation. The control variables include income,¹⁷ whether the respondent is currently employed, education level, the natural log of age, a gender variable, whether the respondent has children, religiosity, and rurality. Several of the control variables approximate the criteria that generally are used to select CCT program beneficiaries in these countries, including education level, income, and whether the respondent has children.¹⁸ A description of these variables and their summary statistics are included in Appendix A.

Using the variables from the 2012 LAPOP data, I employ multilevel linear models¹⁹ with random intercepts (Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal 2008) to analyze whether

¹⁷ I decide to use income instead of an index of household items in these models, because, due to the question wording in the survey, the income measure is less likely to be influenced by CCTs and therefore less likely to introduce bias. The reason for this is because survey respondents are only asked to report income from work or remittances, not social programs. As a robustness check, and following Booth and Seligson (2008), I use an index of household items (*Wealth Index*) instead of income, and report the results in Appendix B (Table B3.5). I also include yet another robustness check where I remove both income and the index of household items, and also report these results in Appendix B (Table B3.6). The main results hold when using these alternative model specifications.

¹⁸ See Fiszbein and Schady (2009) for more details about the criteria to select CCT beneficiaries.

¹⁹ For the two indices with under five response categories (Voting and Protest), the results are robust to using multilevel generalized linear models. I report the multilevel linear model results for ease of interpretation.

CCTs are positively associated with political participation (H1a). Each multilevel model has three levels – the individual level, the municipal level, and the country level – and includes the standard set of control variables described above. The results are listed in Table 3.1.

Table 3.1: Multilevel Models of Political Participation (2012 LAPOP Survey Data)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Voting	Campaign Activism	Contacting Public Officials	Community Activism	Civil Society Engage	Protest
CCT	0.025 (0.023)	0.126*** (0.018)	0.161*** (0.029)	0.033 (0.024)	0.072*** (0.020)	0.037*** (0.011)
Income	0.002 (0.003)	-0.000 (0.002)	-0.007** (0.003)	-0.004 (0.003)	0.005** (0.002)	-0.000 (0.001)
Employed	0.105*** (0.019)	0.060*** (0.014)	0.013 (0.023)	0.071*** (0.019)	0.048*** (0.016)	-0.003 (0.009)
Education	0.014*** (0.002)	0.014*** (0.002)	0.021*** (0.003)	0.019*** (0.003)	0.021*** (0.002)	0.009*** (0.001)
Age	0.442*** (0.025)	0.108*** (0.020)	0.172*** (0.032)	0.220*** (0.026)	-0.084*** (0.022)	-0.007 (0.013)
Female	0.039** (0.018)	-0.091*** (0.014)	-0.036 (0.022)	-0.080*** (0.019)	-0.003 (0.016)	-0.017* (0.009)
Children	0.054** (0.022)	0.026 (0.017)	0.084*** (0.027)	0.082*** (0.022)	0.228*** (0.019)	-0.015 (0.011)
Religiosity	0.054*** (0.010)	0.023*** (0.008)	0.032*** (0.012)	0.065*** (0.010)	0.201*** (0.009)	-0.017*** (0.005)
Rurality	0.033 (0.023)	0.003 (0.019)	0.083*** (0.031)	0.151*** (0.025)	0.094*** (0.022)	-0.009 (0.012)
Constant	0.487*** (0.130)	-0.297*** (0.091)	-0.449*** (0.127)	-0.673*** (0.121)	0.004 (0.101)	0.113** (0.052)
N (ind)	6804	7756	7804	7732	7792	7857
N (mun)	636	637	637	636	637	637
N (ctry)	9	9	9	9	9	9

Standard errors are in parentheses. * $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$

Notes: The dependent variables are the voting index, the campaign activism index, the contacting public officials index, the community activism index, the civil society engagement index, and the protest index. Random-intercept multilevel linear models are used in this analysis.

As predicted in (H1a), the results indicate that CCT participation is positively and significantly associated with several modes of political participation, including

campaign activism, contacting public officials, civil society engagement, and protest. The Policy Push Argument also predicts that CCTs will have a larger effect on more demanding political activities, and this too finds support in the results. CCTs have no relationship with voting, which is considered a low-cost activity (Niemi 1976; Aldrich 1993), but have a positive effect on high-cost activities such as campaigning and participating in civic organizations.

In terms of the substantive significance, CCTs have a sizeable impact on several modes of political participation. For example, the estimated effect of CCTs on campaign activism is .126 campaign acts. Although at first glance this may appear to be small, it is important to put this number into perspective. The mean number of campaign acts by respondents in this survey is only .318, so an increase of .126 acts represents a 40 percent jump in campaign activism for the average respondent. The results indicate similar substantive effects for contacting public officials and protest, with the percentage gains for the average respondent ranging from 34 percent (contacting public officials) to 41 percent (protest). The substantive effect of CCTs on civil society engagement is smaller, but still represents a 9 percent increase for the average respondent.

Furthermore, when the size of the CCT effect is compared to other variables in Table 3.1, it becomes even more apparent that the CCT effect is meaningful. For example, research has shown that education is a very important determinant of political participation in Latin America (Booth and Seligson 2008). When comparing the estimated effects of CCTs and education, the results indicate that the effect of participating in the CCT program is three to eight times greater than the effect of an

additional year of education, depending on the mode of participation. Clearly, the relative size of the CCT impact is large.

3.4.1.1 Experimental Data

Due to the limitations of observational data, the estimated CCT effects in the analysis above may be biased. To address this concern, I now turn to the data from the randomized field experiment in Mexico and analyze the effects of CCT treatment on voter turnout in non-national elections. Because of our expectations that CCT effects will not be as large for low-cost political activities, of which voting is an example, it is likely that the analysis will underestimate the effects of CCTs on political participation. Indeed, we would expect the effects to be even larger for other modes of political participation.

For the dependent variables in my experimental analysis, data on the first post-treatment municipal and state legislative elections was collected at the precinct level from the state electoral office in each of the seven experimental states.²⁰ Mexican municipal and state elections are organized by the independent electoral office in each state, and the dates of these elections can (and do) vary by state. For the seven states in question, Michoacán and Puebla had their first post-treatment state and municipal elections two months after the start of the experiment, Guerrero had elections within thirteen months, Hidalgo had elections within fourteen months, Querétaro and San Luis

²⁰ Information requests to the respective state electoral offices were made by the author to obtain this data. As with the national elections, the precinct level is the most disaggregated unit of electoral data that is available for non-national elections in Mexico.

Potosí had elections within twenty-two months, and Veracruz had elections within twenty-four months. As a result of the timing of these elections, four states had their state and municipal elections prior to the treatment of the control group in 2000, and the remaining three states had their elections after the control group started to receive treatment.

The dependent variables are measured as the number of total votes in the precinct for the first post-treatment municipal or state legislative election divided by the number of potential voters (eighteen years or above) in the precinct.²¹ Following De La O, the number of registered voters is not used here, because it is likely that this number was automatically affected by the program in Mexico. Indeed, the Mexican CCT program required participants to obtain an identification card and the voter registration card has been the most popular way to fulfill this requirement (2013).

A dichotomous variable is used for the main explanatory variable of CCT treatment (*Treatment*), with a value of one indicating that a precinct received early CCT treatment and a value of zero indicating that a precinct did not receive treatment or only received late treatment.²² Although the experiment was randomized at the locality level, the CCT treatment variable is measured at the larger precinct level in order to match the

²¹ The data on the number of potential voters (eighteen years or above) by precinct is available on De La O's website (<http://anadelao.common.yale.edu>)

²² The data for this variable is available on De La O's website (<http://anadelao.common.yale.edu>). Although the data identifies the precinct for each experimental locality in the 2000 national elections, the seven state electoral offices have confirmed that they each used the same precincts for their non-national elections from 1998-2000 (information requests made by the author, April 2013). The historical archive of redistricting changes from the Instituto Federal Electoral also confirms that these particular localities and precincts did not experience any redistricting changes in these years (information request made by the author, March 2013).

most disaggregated unit of data that is available for turnout in Mexican elections (the dependent variable). Despite the need to aggregate localities into precincts for this analysis, a very large percentage of precincts in the sample (about 91 percent) end up having just one experimental locality. The main results are robust to using both the full sample of precincts and the restricted sample of precincts with only one experimental locality.

In Table 3.2, linear regression models are used to estimate the effect of CCT treatment on voter turnout in municipal and state legislative elections.²³ The *Treatment* coefficients in this table are intent-to-treat estimates (Gupta 2011), with models 1-2 reporting the effects in municipal elections and models 3-4 reporting the effects in state legislative elections. Two different types of models are presented in this table: the base model which follows the exact analysis of De La O (2013) but with new dependent variables (Models 1 and 3), and the full model which adds state fixed effects to account for differences in the timing of elections and other potential differences across states (Models 2 and 4). To account for the aggregation of localities into precincts, all four models include fixed effects for the number of localities in the precinct. All of the models also include a standard set of controls at the precinct level, including population, poverty, total votes in the previous election, and total votes for each of the three major

²³ Table 3.2 shows the results for the sample of precincts with one experimental locality, but the main results do not change if all precincts are included in the sample. Also, according to the official data results provided by the state electoral offices, thirty-nine precincts (8 percent of the sample) are missing data for the municipal elections and ten precincts (2 percent of the sample) are missing data for the state legislative elections. The missing data for these variables account for differences in the sample size in the municipal models and the state legislative models.

parties in the previous election.²⁴ Importantly, and as expected given the experimental research design, the main results are robust to whether these controls are removed. A detailed description of the variables and the summary statistics are listed in Appendix A.

²⁴ According to several state electoral offices, the data on the previous municipal and state elections is not available at the precinct level (information requests made by the author, April 2013). I therefore had to use previous national election data for these control variables. The data for all of the precinct-level controls and for number of localities in each precinct is available on De La O's website (<http://anadelao.common.yale.edu>).

Table 3.2: The Effect of CCTs on Voter Turnout in Non-national Elections

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Turnout in Municipal Election	Turnout in Municipal Election	Turnout in State Election	Turnout in State Election
Treatment	0.042 (0.031)	0.049 (0.031)	0.061** (0.028)	0.070** (0.028)
Constant	0.629*** (0.021)	0.606*** (0.069)	0.600*** (0.017)	0.572*** (0.062)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
# of Localities fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
State fixed effects	No	Yes	No	Yes
N	381	381	408	408
R-squared	0.13	0.19	0.13	0.20

Robust standard errors are in parentheses. * $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$.

Notes: The sample consists of all precincts with only one experimental locality. The dependent variables are voter turnout in municipal elections and voter turnout in state legislative elections at the precinct level from 1998-2000 in Mexico. The control variables are at the precinct level and include population, poverty, total votes in the previous election, and total votes for each of the three major parties in the previous election. Linear regression models are used for this analysis, and the intent-to-treat estimates of the treatment coefficients are reported.

The results from Table 3.2 reveal that *Treatment* has a positive and statistically significant relationship with voter turnout in state legislative elections, and that these findings are robust to including state fixed effects in the model. In substantive terms, CCT exposure increases voter turnout in state legislative elections by over six percentage points, a sizeable increase that has the potential to shift election outcomes in close contests. As for the municipal elections, the *Treatment* coefficient is positive but not

statistically significant. The results therefore indicate that CCT exposure has no relationship with voter turnout in municipal elections.

There are two potential explanations for the mixed results across election type in the experimental data. The first explanation is that the costs already are so low for voting that CCT programs are unable to universally tip the scales in favor of electoral participation. In other words, if the costs are low to begin with, then the program can only lower the costs so much more. The second explanation, which fits with a recurring theme in my policy-based argument and throughout the empirical analysis of the dissertation, is that human agency matters. Policies can equip citizens to participate in politics and thus lower the costs of political involvement, but citizens still have the choice of which activities to engage in. These decisions may affect involvement across and even within modes of political participation.

Given my research question of whether CCTs contribute to broad political participation beyond voter turnout in national elections, one potential concern that must be addressed is whether the states with concurrent national elections are driving the results. In other words, it needs to be considered whether the CCT program only increases turnout in non-national elections when they happen to be held on the same day as the national elections. To test this, the two states in the experiment that had elections which were concurrent with national elections (Querétaro and San Luis Potosí) were removed from the sample, and then the analysis from Table 3.2 is repeated. The new results are shown in Table 3.3.

Table 3.3: The Effect of CCTs on Voter Turnout in Non-national Elections

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Turnout in Municipal Election	Turnout in Municipal Election	Turnout in State Election	Turnout in State Election
Treatment	0.043 (0.035)	0.049 (0.035)	0.064** (0.030)	0.071** (0.030)
Constant	0.603*** (0.024)	0.610*** (0.065)	0.569*** (0.019)	0.567*** (0.058)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
# of Localities fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
State fixed effects	No	Yes	No	Yes
N	293	293	320	320
R-squared	0.17	0.22	0.16	0.21

Robust standard errors are in parentheses. * $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$

Notes: The sample consists of all precincts with only one experimental locality, but only from states with elections that were not concurrent with national elections. The dependent variables are voter turnout in municipal elections and voter turnout in state legislative elections at the precinct level from 1998-2000 in Mexico. The control variables are at the precinct level and include population, poverty, total votes in the previous election, and total votes for each of the three major parties in the previous election. Linear regression models are used for this analysis, and the intent-to-treat estimates of the treatment coefficients are reported.

Even when the precincts from these two states are removed from the sample, CCT treatment still has a positive and statistically significant relationship with voter turnout in state legislative elections. This confirms that the positive CCT effect on voter turnout in state elections is not simply due to the fact that some of these elections were held on the same day as the national elections. There also remains no statistically significant relationship between CCT treatment and turnout in municipal elections,

although once again the sign of the coefficient is positive. Overall, this evidence provides some additional support for the argument that CCTs lead to increased political participation, even beyond turnout in national elections.

3.4.1.2 Observational Data: CCT Policy Design

The Policy Push Argument not only predicts that CCTs will be positively associated with political participation (H1a), but it also suggests that variation in the design of program conditionalities will influence the size of CCT effects on political participation. More specifically, the argument predicts that CCT programs with more extensive civic conditionalities will have a larger positive effect on political participation (H1c).

To test this hypothesis, I return to the 2012 LAPOP data and compare the effects of CCTs by the extensiveness of the civic conditionalities. Of the nine countries with CCT programs in the LAPOP survey data, four (Argentina, Costa Rica, Ecuador, and Peru) have fewer civic conditionalities: the CCT beneficiaries only must attend health checkups and/or ensure that their children are attending school (Cecchini and Madariga 2011). The remaining five countries (Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and the Dominican Republic) require that CCT beneficiaries regularly attend health education workshops and/or other meetings, in addition to attending health checkups and ensuring that their children attend school (Cecchini and Madariga 2011). Due to these additional civic requirements, these five CCT programs are assessed as having more extensive civic conditionalities.

I repeat the analysis of the relationship between CCTs and the six modes of political participation from Table 3.1, but this time divide the sample according to the extensiveness of the CCT civic conditionalities. Table 3.4 reports the results when restricting the sample to countries with less extensive civic conditionalities, while Table 3.5 reports the results when restricting the sample to countries with more extensive civic conditionalities. A separate table for each country also is included in Appendix B (Tables B3.8 to B3.16).

The results from Tables 3.4 and 3.5 are striking and provide strong support for hypothesis (H1c). CCTs with less extensive civic conditionalities are positively and significantly associated with only two indices of political participation (campaign activism and contacting public officials), while CCTs with more extensive civic conditionalities are positively and significantly associated with five of the six political participation indices. Voting, the only participation index not significantly associated with CCTs with more extensive civic conditionalities, is a less demanding political activity and therefore in line with our expectations. Moreover, for the indices of political participation that are positively associated with both types of CCT programs, the estimated size of the CCT effect is larger for programs with more extensive civic conditionalities. In the case of campaign activism, CCTs with more extensive civic conditionalities have two times the estimated effect of CCTs with less extensive civic conditionalities. Clearly, the results suggest that the effects of CCTs vary depending on the design of the civic conditionalities, as CCTs with more extensive civic conditionalities lead to larger and broader effects on political participation.

Table 3.4: Multilevel Models of Political Participation (2012 LAPOP Survey Data; Countries with CCTs that have less extensive civic conditionalities)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Voting	Campaign Activism	Contact Public Officials	Comm Activism	Civil Society Engage	Protest
CCT	0.014 (0.032)	0.077*** (0.027)	0.141*** (0.048)	-0.049 (0.042)	0.025 (0.035)	0.020 (0.021)
Income	0.001 (0.003)	-0.000 (0.003)	-0.006 (0.005)	-0.005 (0.004)	0.006 (0.004)	-0.002 (0.002)
Employed	0.102*** (0.023)	0.029 (0.019)	-0.009 (0.034)	0.052* (0.029)	0.022 (0.025)	0.013 (0.015)
Education	0.010*** (0.003)	0.010*** (0.002)	0.025*** (0.004)	0.015*** (0.004)	0.016*** (0.003)	0.010*** (0.002)
Age	0.087*** (0.031)	0.048* (0.025)	0.095** (0.045)	0.187*** (0.038)	-0.129*** (0.033)	0.021 (0.020)
Female	0.038* (0.023)	-0.066*** (0.018)	-0.062* (0.033)	-0.065** (0.028)	-0.011 (0.024)	-0.021 (0.014)
Children	0.082*** (0.028)	0.012 (0.022)	0.121*** (0.041)	0.116*** (0.035)	0.275*** (0.030)	0.008 (0.018)
Religiosity	0.016 (0.012)	0.022** (0.010)	0.024 (0.018)	0.047*** (0.015)	0.189*** (0.013)	-0.007 (0.008)
Rurality	-0.021 (0.027)	0.006 (0.026)	0.054 (0.049)	0.128*** (0.040)	0.122*** (0.035)	0.009 (0.020)
N (ind)	2913	3347	3366	3316	3382	3425
N (mun)	231	231	231	231	231	231
N (ctry)	4	4	4	4	4	4

Standard errors are in parentheses. * p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01

Notes: The sample is restricted to countries with CCTs that have less extensive civic conditionalities (Argentina, Costa Rica, Ecuador, and Peru). The dependent variables are the voting index, the campaign activism index, the contacting public officials index, the community activism index, the civil society engagement index, and the protest index. Random-intercept multilevel linear models are used in this analysis.

Table 3.5: Multilevel Models of Political Participation (2012 LAPOP Survey Data; Countries with CCTs that have more extensive civic conditionalities)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Voting	Campaign Activism	Contact Public Officials	Comm Activism	Civil Society Engage	Protest
CCT	0.032 (0.031)	0.155*** (0.024)	0.165*** (0.036)	0.075** (0.030)	0.100*** (0.025)	0.048*** (0.013)
Income	0.001 (0.004)	-0.001 (0.003)	-0.008* (0.004)	-0.004 (0.004)	0.004 (0.003)	0.001 (0.002)
Employed	0.106*** (0.027)	0.082*** (0.021)	0.032 (0.031)	0.088*** (0.026)	0.068*** (0.021)	-0.016 (0.012)
Education	0.023*** (0.004)	0.019*** (0.003)	0.019*** (0.004)	0.022*** (0.003)	0.026*** (0.003)	0.007*** (0.002)
Age	0.749*** (0.038)	0.164*** (0.030)	0.227*** (0.044)	0.248*** (0.036)	-0.041 (0.030)	-0.036** (0.016)
Female	0.035 (0.026)	-0.108*** (0.021)	-0.016 (0.030)	-0.090*** (0.025)	0.004 (0.021)	-0.014 (0.011)
Children	0.028 (0.031)	0.038 (0.024)	0.060* (0.036)	0.060** (0.029)	0.193*** (0.025)	-0.030** (0.013)
Religiosity	0.087*** (0.015)	0.023** (0.012)	0.042** (0.017)	0.082*** (0.014)	0.212*** (0.012)	-0.026*** (0.006)
Rurality	0.083** (0.033)	0.003 (0.026)	0.106*** (0.040)	0.168*** (0.033)	0.077*** (0.029)	-0.026* (0.014)
N (ind)	3891	4409	4438	4416	4410	4432
N (mun)	405	406	406	405	406	406
N (ctry)	5	5	5	5	5	5

Standard errors are in parentheses. * p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01

Notes: The sample is restricted to countries with CCTs that have more extensive civic conditionalities (Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and the Dominican Republic). The dependent variables are the voting index, the campaign activism index, the contacting public officials index, the community activism index, the civil society engagement index, and the protest index. Random-intercept multilevel linear models are used in this analysis.

The results from this subsection do not provide support for two of the competing arguments in the literature: interpretive arguments and clientelism arguments. CCTs are positively associated with political participation, contrary to what is expected by the interpretive arguments. Also, CCTs have a positive relationship with several nonelectoral modes of participation and only a mixed relationship with electoral participation, which goes against the predictions from the clientelism arguments.

The results provide mixed support for the material resource and mobilization arguments. CCTs are positively associated with political participation, as both of these sets of arguments would expect. The material resource arguments would not predict a difference in effects across CCT programs though, unless there was also a difference in the amount of cash transfers. Also, the mobilization arguments are unable to explain why CCTs spur more involvement in high-cost activities. The next subsection provides additional tests of my argument as well as the competing arguments from the literature.

3.4.2 CCTs, UCTs, and Political Participation

We now turn to analyzing the relationship between participation in social assistance programs (conditional vs. unconditional) and political participation. If conditionalities spur increased political participation among program beneficiaries as predicted, then we would expect the positive relationship between CCTs and political participation to be larger than the positive relationship between UCTs and political participation (H1b).

3.4.2.1 Original Survey Data: Full Sample

To compare the effects of CCTs and otherwise similar UCTs, I utilize the original survey data from Mexico. The dependent variables – the six indices of political participation from the analysis of LAPOP survey data above - are measured using the same group of political activities for each index, with some minor changes for the local context. The additive index for each mode is made up of between two to six survey questions, with each survey question rescaled to have equal weight in the index and a maximum value of one. More details on the construction of these indices as well as the summary statistics are included in Appendix A.

Confirmatory factor analysis is used to test whether the indices correspond to different dimensions of political participation in these Mexican municipalities, and the results are reported in Appendix B (Table B3.3). The results provide strong support that each index represents a separate dimension of political participation in the Mexican survey data.²⁵ The RMSEA values are all below or close to .06 and the CFI values are all above or close to .95.

The independent variables in this analysis are CCT participation, UCT participation, and a standard set of control variables. CCT participation and UCT participation are each dichotomous variables for whether someone in the household is a beneficiary of these programs. The same individual-level control variables are included

²⁵ The two variables in the protest index (participation in a protest and participation in a blockade) are not able to be assessed using confirmatory factor analysis, because all respondents who participated in a blockade also participated in a protest. The two variables are combined into a single protest scale for the remainder of the analysis.

as in the analysis of the LAPOP survey data above.²⁶ The locality-level control variables of population, poverty, rurality, and education are also included in the models,²⁷ in order to account for potential differences across localities in the program selection processes. More details on the creation of these variables as well as the summary statistics are included in Appendix A.

Using the Mexican survey data, I employ multilevel linear models with random intercepts to assess the relationship between program participation and political participation.²⁸ The primary purpose of the analysis is to compare CCT and UCT program effects on political participation (H1b), but of course the analysis also provides an additional test of the relationship between CCTs and political participation (H1a). Each multilevel model has three levels: the individual level, the locality level, and the municipality level. The results are listed in Table 3.6.

²⁶ Once again, the income variable is used instead of an index of household items, because the wording for the income survey question excludes money received through social programs and therefore is less likely to introduce bias. As a robustness check, I remove income and add an index of household items (*Wealth Index*), and report the results in Appendix B (Table B3.7). The main results are robust to these changes.

²⁷ The source of the locality-level data is the 2010 Mexican census by the Instituto Nacional Estadística y Geografía (INEGI). Please see http://www.inegi.org.mx/sistemas/consulta_resultados/iter2010.aspx

²⁸ For the one index with under five response categories (protest), the results are robust to using multilevel generalized linear models. I report the multilevel linear model results for ease of interpretation.

Table 3.6: Multilevel Models of Political Participation (2014 Mexican Survey Data)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Voting	Camp Activism	Cont Publ Officials	Comm Activism	Civ Soc Engage	Protest
<i>Ind Variables</i>						
CCT	0.154*	-0.005	0.255**	0.124***	0.187***	0.036
UCT	0.255*	-0.002	0.155	-0.002	-0.019	-0.032
Income	0.055	0.065***	0.060	0.020	-0.016	0.004
Employed	0.316***	-0.051	0.026	-0.094*	-0.073	-0.021
Education	0.020	0.009	-0.003	-0.001	-0.001	-0.005
Age	1.093***	0.144***	0.187	0.063	0.035	0.048
Female	0.243**	-0.026	0.186	-0.056	0.059	0.009
Children	0.076	0.044	0.183*	0.111**	0.270***	-0.013
Religiosity	0.073	-0.058***	-0.222***	-0.051**	0.030	-0.098***
<i>Loc Variables</i>						
Population	-0.041	0.034	-0.083	-0.084	0.001	0.004
Poverty	-0.469***	0.083	-0.306	0.348*	-0.033	-0.153
Rurality	-0.010	-0.066	-0.319	-0.179	0.014	-0.068
Education	-0.007	-0.089*	-0.220	-0.007	-0.065	-0.064
N (ind)	951	982	984	979	980	990
N (loc)	20	20	20	20	20	20
N (mun)	3	3	3	3	3	3

* p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01

Notes: The dependent variables are the voting index, the campaign activism index, the contacting public officials index, the community activism index, the civil society engagement index, and the protest index. Random-intercept multilevel linear models are used in this analysis.

Table 3.6 provides considerable support for hypothesis (H1b), and it also reinforces the findings from the previous subsection regarding hypothesis (H1a). CCTs are positively and significantly associated with four modes of political participation (contacting public officials, community activism, voting, and civil society engagement), whereas UCTs only have a statistically significant relationship with one mode (voting).

Clearly, the CCT conditionalities matter for political participation, because the individuals who only receive the cash transfers – the UCT beneficiaries – increase their participation in only one mode of political activity. It also is not surprising, at least when viewed from the lens of the Policy Push Argument, that this one mode of participation is voting, given the low-cost nature of this activity.

3.4.2.2 Original Survey Data: Restricted Sample

One potential concern regarding the Mexican survey data results is omitted variable bias, given the observational nature of the data. The sample of poor municipalities at least partly addresses this concern, because many of the residents are poor and the potential differences between program beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries are minimized. Still, it is unlikely that the models control for all relevant variables.

To further protect against omitted variable bias when estimating program effects on political participation, I construct program eligibility scores using the original survey data from Mexico, restrict the sample to respondents who are directly above or below the eligibility line, and repeat the analysis from Table 3.6. Program eligibility scores are created using a two-step process. First, I construct a comprehensive poverty index using nineteen variables from the CCT and UCT program eligibility formulas in Mexico.²⁹ Each variable is given equal weight in the poverty index, because the official formula weights are not shared with the public. Second, I adjust the scores for CCT and UCT

²⁹ For more information on the formula utilized for selecting CCT and UCT beneficiaries in Mexico, please see https://www.prospera.gob.mx/Portal/wb/Web/metodo_de_identificacion_de_hogares_en_situacion_d

beneficiaries according to the specific amounts of benefits obtained through the program. These adjustments allow me to account for program effects on poverty and identify the beneficiaries that were closest to the eligibility line when initially selected for the program. A detailed description of the adjusted poverty index and the corresponding summary statistics are included in Appendix A.

Next, I restrict the sample to CCT and UCT beneficiaries just above, and non-beneficiaries just below, the program eligibility line. Program beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries within .25 units of the eligibility line are selected, the most restrictive cutoff point that allows a large enough sample size for the models to be meaningful.³⁰ As a result of the restrictions, the differences between the program beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries are even further reduced, providing an additional layer of natural controls when estimating the effects of program participation on political participation. This setup resembles a regression discontinuity design and aims to achieve many of the same desirable qualities.

I repeat the analysis from Table 3.6 using only the restricted sample of respondents, and the results are listed in Table 3.7. CCTs remain positively and significantly associated with three modes of participation, including contacting public officials, community activism, and civil society engagement. UCTs, on the other hand, are not significantly related to any participation index. These results reinforce the notion that conditionalities spur political participation, especially more involvement in

³⁰ The resulting sample size is 801 respondents, including 134 CCT beneficiaries and 51 UCT beneficiaries.

demanding political activities. Overall, the improved models provide moderate support for the hypotheses that CCTs drive broad political participation (H1a), and do so more than UCTs (H1b).

Table 3.7: Multilevel Models of Political Participation (2014 Mexican Survey Data; Sample of poor individuals right above or right below program eligibility line)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Voting	Camp Activism	Contact Public Officials	Comm Activism	Civil Society Engage	Protest
Ind Variables						
CCT	0.154	-0.070	0.268*	0.161**	0.177***	0.066
UCT	0.251	-0.053	0.182	0.038	0.096	0.020
Income	0.066*	0.060***	0.085*	0.019	-0.022	0.014
Employed	0.278**	-0.036	0.039	-0.052	-0.075	-0.022
Education	0.041	0.008	0.005	-0.011	-0.002	-0.005
Age	1.091***	0.118**	0.184	0.064	-0.003	0.037
Female	0.218*	-0.007	0.131	-0.016	0.009	0.011
Children	0.021	0.057	0.148	0.122**	0.303***	-0.026
Religiosity	0.137**	-0.042**	-0.257***	-0.055*	0.037	-0.093***
Loc Variables						
Population	-0.040	0.033	0.025	-0.047	-0.002	0.034
Poverty	-0.452**	0.038	-0.346	0.251	0.099	-0.157
Rurality	0.025	-0.044	-0.157	-0.128	0.041	-0.074
Education	-0.030	-0.093**	-0.206	-0.003	-0.055	-0.082**
N (ind)	692	710	712	708	711	716
N (loc)	20	20	20	20	20	20
N (mun)	3	3	3	3	3	3

* p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01

Notes: Sample is of poor individuals who are right above or right below program eligibility line. The dependent variables are the voting index, the campaign activism index, the contacting public officials index, the community activism index, the civil society engagement index, and the protest index. Random-intercept multilevel linear models are used in this analysis.

3.4.2.3 Original Survey Data: Alternative CCT Measure

Another potential threat to the results from Table 3.6 is that some CCT beneficiaries may have been removed from the program due to not meeting the

conditions, and these former beneficiaries may be systematically different from the remaining CCT beneficiaries. If the remaining CCT beneficiaries are more likely to participate in politics than the former beneficiaries, then this would inflate the estimated effects of CCTs on political participation. To test this, I include former CCT beneficiaries in my measure of CCT participation, and repeat the analyses of political participation using the Mexican survey data.

The results are listed in Appendix B (Table B3.4), and they indicate that this concern of self-selection (or self-removal) bias is not warranted. Even when including former CCT beneficiaries in the measure of CCT participation, there still is a positive relationship between CCTs and several modes of participation. This finding is not surprising, given that only a small percentage of CCT beneficiaries are removed from the program due to not meeting the conditionalities.

The competing arguments find little support from the results in this subsection. The positive relationship between CCT conditionalities and political participation goes against all of the competing arguments, except perhaps the mobilization arguments. If political elites are recruiting CCT beneficiaries to participate in some political activities due to their increased capacity from the conditionalities, then the results are consistent with the predictions from the mobilization arguments. The next chapter on the causal pathways to increased political participation offers more analysis to test between these competing arguments.

3.5 Discussion

Overall, the available evidence on political participation strongly supports the Policy Push Argument, with each of the three hypotheses mostly finding support in the data. CCTs lead to increased political participation, particularly in more demanding political activities. The size of the CCT effect on political participation is larger than the size of the UCT effect. CCTs with more extensive civic conditionalities lead to even more political participation.

Although CCTs lead to an increase in broad political participation, these social assistance programs do not uniformly increase political involvement across all modes of participation. Indeed, the evidence suggests that CCTs have no (or little) relationship with some modes of participation. These findings point to the importance of human agency in policy-based arguments of political participation. The state may provide individuals with politically relevant resources, but the individuals still have a choice about which activities to participate in. The existence of agency creates opportunities for varied program effects.

The findings also help to explain the puzzle of why some means-tested programs lead to negative effects on political participation, while others have no effect (or even a positive effect). Conditionalities affect political participation, and may counteract the effects of other program components. Future studies of social programs need to consider the effects of different program components, including conditionalities, when analyzing the relationship with political participation.

An unexpected finding that further reinforces the importance of conditionalities is that UCTs have little relationship with political activity. This has important implications for the study of distributive politics, which recently has emphasized the role of targeted benefits in mobilizing citizens to participate in politics (Cox 2010; Nichter 2008; De La O 2013). After considering my more comprehensive evidence, it appears that targeted benefits are insufficient mobilizers for almost all modes of participation, suggesting that the theories of distributive politics are oversimplified and ought to be expanded to consider other program components.

Moreover, the findings improve our understanding of the relationship between CCTs and political behavior, a growing literature in comparative and Latin American politics (Hunter and Power 2008; Zucco 2013; Baez et al. 2012; Díaz-Cayeros et al. 2012; De La O 2013; Manacorda et al. 2011; Bohn 2011; Green 2006; Perova 2010; Rodríguez-Chamussy 2011, 2015; Linos 2013; Labonne 2013). Studies which exclusively focus on the effects of CCTs on voter turnout are too narrow and, according to the evidence presented here, will underestimate the importance of CCTs. Instead, because of the choices available to beneficiaries, scholars must consider the effects of CCTs on all modes of political participation.

Finally, in the context of Latin America, it must be highlighted that CCTs offer much promise for the strengthening of democratic citizenship in the region. Previous work on democracy in Latin America (e.g., UNDP 2004) stresses that high levels of poverty, and the disadvantaged who are disengaged from the democratic process, present challenges for the consolidation of democracy in the region. CCTs, by reducing

poverty and spurring more democratic political participation among beneficiaries, help to address these concerns.

Pathways to Increased Political Participation

4.1 Introduction

CCTs increase political participation among program beneficiaries, particularly in more demanding political activities. Moreover, CCT conditionalities play an important role in spurring more involvement in politics. This next chapter considers the pathways to increased political participation.

The growing CCT literature does not analyze the causal mechanism that connects CCTs to increased political involvement. This literature views CCT effects on political participation merely as an explanation for changes in incumbent support (De La O 2013; Baez et al. 2012), rather than an interesting and worthwhile outcome to explain in and of itself. As a result, we lack an explanation of how CCTs create more involvement in political activities. What is the causal mechanism that connects CCTs to increased political participation?

In addressing this question, the following chapter aims to contribute to several areas of research. First, it contributes to the literature on social policy and policy feedback by identifying a new source of resource effects. Not only do means-tested social assistance programs transfer desirable resources to citizens, but they can also

impose conditionalities which alter citizens' stock of politically relevant resources.

Conditionality effects matter for both internal and external resources.

Second, the chapter contributes to the political participation literature by identifying a new political determinant of civic skills. Previous research establishes that civic skills are critical for political participation (Verba et al. 1995; Finkel 2002), but we lack a full explanation of how the *state* provides opportunities for the development and/or maintenance of these important skills. Governments do not just influence civic skills through public education and civic programs;¹ CCTs provide new civic vehicles for beneficiaries to practice key organizational and communications skills.

Third, the chapter contributes to the distributive politics literature by explaining how targeted transfers mobilize recipients. Recent theoretical and empirical work in this literature argues that targeted transfers mobilize citizens to participate more in politics (Cox 2010; Nichter 2008; De La O 2013). In contrast to this work, my evidence suggests that targeted transfers alone typically are not sufficient to mobilize citizens. Instead, the combination of targeted benefits and civic conditionalities serve as a more potent mobilizing force, creating higher levels of politically relevant resources which in turn facilitate more involvement in politics.

4.2 Theoretical Expectations

The Policy Push Argument, as outlined in subsection 2.2.1, predicts that CCTs will increase civic skills and access to state officials and community leaders. Also,

¹ For relevant information on these effects, see Torney-Purta (2002) and Conway et al. (2009).

because I expect only the conditionalities component to be responsible for creating opportunities to obtain these resources, my argument suggests that UCTs will have no relationship with these outcomes.

The literature generates some competing expectations regarding the pathway to increased political participation.² Interpretive arguments (Schneider and Ingram 1993, 1997; Pierson 1993; Soss 1999) suggest that CCTs will affect beneficiaries' psychological engagement with politics, especially external political efficacy. Mobilization arguments (e.g., Rosenstone and Hansen 1993) suggest that CCT beneficiaries will receive more invitations to participate in politics. Clientelism perspectives (Scott 1972; Kitschelt 2000; Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007) suggest that beneficiaries will participate more in politics out of fear of losing program benefits.

I turn now to the evaluation of the predictions.

4.3 Research Design

I test the hypotheses using original survey data, in-depth interviews, and focus groups from Mexico. Once again, given the similarities between CCTs and UCTs in Mexico, the original survey data from selected Mexican municipalities in 2014 allows me to cleanly estimate the effects of conditionalities. The in-depth interviews and focus groups with program beneficiaries and officials in Mexico provide another important source of data, allowing me to further unravel the causal mechanism that connects program participation and political participation. These interviews were conducted in

² For a more detailed explanation of these expectations, please see subsection 1.1.1.

October and November 2012, and they took place in four Mexican municipalities: Chignahuapan (state of Puebla), Teziutlán (state of Puebla), San Andrés Cholula (state of Puebla), and Tula de Allende (state of Hidalgo).

4.3.1 Survey Data: Testing My Argument

I first consider the original survey data from Mexico. The dependent variables for this analysis are civic skills and access to state officials and community leaders. Rather than relying on subjective assessments of civic skills, I follow Verba et al. (1995) and ask respondents about their recent experiences exercising specific civic skills at work, through a social program, or in other non-political activities. The idea behind the measure is that if adults practice these types of skills outside of their political activities, then they are able to develop or maintain the skills for future political participation. This type of measure also has the added benefit of being more objective – and thus leading to less measurement error – than self-assessments of civic skills.³ In the survey, respondents were asked how often they performed each of the following organizational and communications activities in the past year: attended a meeting and participated in the discussion; organized a meeting or set up an appointment; wrote a letter or filled out forms; and asked someone to clarify information. The respondents then selected one of the following options: never, one or two times a year, one or two times a month, or once a week. These survey questions are used to create four separate civic skill variables as

³ For a discussion, see Verba et al. (1995).

well as an additive index of civic skills, with each civic skill rescaled to have equal weight in the index and a maximum value of one.

To measure access to state officials and community leaders, I used a survey question that identifies members of the social support network for each respondent.⁴ More specifically, I asked respondents the following battery of questions: “If you needed help with a difficult problem, would you ask (leader type)?” Respondents were asked this question about the following six types of officials or leaders: a politician or a leader from a political party; a public program official; a program beneficiary leader; a leader of a civic association or community group; a medical professional, teacher, or professor; and any other community leader. Respondents then had the option to respond yes or no for each question. In addition to creating a separate variable for each type of leader, I also construct an additive index of access to state officials and community leaders, with each survey question given equal weight in the index. The summary statistics for all of the dependent variables are included in Appendix A.

The summary statistics provide insight into the stock of politically relevant resources that are available to residents in these areas. Residents have very few experiences with practicing civic skills through non-political activities, but they do have some access to state officials and community leaders in their social support network. The mean value for the civic skills index is only .42. In substantive terms, this value corresponds to the average respondent exercising one of the four civic skills only one or

⁴ For a typology of social support, please see Cohen and Wills (1985). The support network question used in my survey captures both informational support and instrumental support.

two times in the past year. In other words, the average respondent had no experience with three of these activities in the past year, and only participated one or two times in one of the activities. Residents in these municipalities enjoy a moderate amount of access to state officials and local leaders, however. The mean value for the access index is 2.59. This value indicates that the average respondent would ask between two and three leaders for help if she or he faced a difficult problem.

In the following analysis, I use the same set of independent variables as in the previous chapter, including CCT participation, UCT participation, the individual-level control variables, and the locality-level control variables. Multilevel models with random intercepts⁵ are utilized to assess the relationship between participation in the CCT and UCT programs, civic skills, and access to state officials and community leaders. Table 4.1 reports the results for civic skills, and Table 4.2 reports the results for access to state officials and community leaders.

⁵ For the individual civic skills, the results are robust to using multilevel generalized linear models. I report the multilevel linear model results for ease of interpretation. For the individual access variables, I report the multilevel generalized linear model results. Multilevel linear models are used for the civic skills index and the access index.

Table 4.1: Multilevel Models of Civic Skills (2014 Mexican Survey Data)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	Attended a Meeting and Participated in the Discussion	Organized a Meeting or Set Up an Appointment	Wrote a Letter or Filled Out Forms	Asked Someone to Clarify Information	Civic Skills Index
Ind Variables					
CCT	0.337***	0.125***	0.143***	0.146***	0.252***
UCT	0.219***	0.072	0.021	0.012	0.119*
Income	0.011	0.039**	0.039***	0.046***	0.045***
Employed	-0.024	-0.081*	-0.014	0.033	-0.023
Education	-0.004	0.010	-0.001	0.010	0.004
Age	0.071	0.032	-0.002	0.001	0.034
Female	0.117**	0.039	0.008	0.023	0.052
Children	-0.030	0.046	0.033	-0.035	0.008
Religiosity	-0.039	-0.047**	-0.092***	-0.067***	-0.084***
Loc Variables					
Population	0.040	-0.015	-0.004	0.021	0.014
Poverty	0.323***	0.137	0.054	0.006	0.159
Rurality	-0.033	-0.008	-0.000	0.008	-0.020
Education	-0.037	-0.017	-0.057	-0.043	-0.052
N (ind)	984	984	982	982	971
N (loc)	20	20	20	20	20
N (mun)	3	3	3	3	3

* p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01

Notes: The dependent variables are how often the respondent exercised each of the four civic skills, along with the civic skills index. Random-intercept multilevel linear models are used in this analysis.

As predicted by the Policy Push Argument, Table 4.1 indicates that the relationship between CCTs and each measure of civic skills is positive and statistically significant. The CCT program creates opportunities for beneficiaries to attend meetings and participate in the discussions; organize meetings or set up appointments; write

letters or fill out forms; and ask other people to clarify information. These experiences allow CCT beneficiaries to develop and/or maintain important organizational and communications skills, which in turn reduce the costs of political participation and thus facilitate more political activity.

The estimated effects of UCTs are moderately in line with our expectations. As predicted, UCTs have no relationship with three of the civic skills. However, UCTs are positively associated with exercising one civic skill (attending meetings and participating in discussions), and also are positively associated with the overall index of civic skills. In both instances, the size of the estimated UCT coefficient is much smaller than the estimated CCT coefficient, indicating that CCTs lead to more experiences practicing civic skills. These findings suggest that the cash transfers and the conditionalities each lead to more opportunities for program beneficiaries to practice civic skills, but that the conditionalities have a much larger and broader impact. In terms of the substantive effect, CCTs lead to a 60 percent increase in the exercising of civic skills for the average respondent, while UCTs only lead to an increase of 28 percent.

Some other results from Table 4.1 deserve our attention. For example, education and being employed do *not* lead to more experiences with exercising civic skills in these poor municipalities. Although these two variables are important determinants of exercising civic skills in an advanced industrialized democracy (Verba et al. 1995), the results above indicate that the effects of education and having a job depend on the particular context. In poor areas with lower quality schools and more menial jobs,

education and having a job can have no effect on whether an individual exercises civic skills. Another interesting finding is that income is positively and significantly associated with three civic skills. Among the poor in these municipalities, income leads to more opportunities to participate in organizational and communications activities.

Moving on to Table 4.2, the results indicate that CCTs increase access to both public program officials and program beneficiary leaders, while UCTs have no relationship with the access variables. These findings suggest that CCT conditionalities play an important role in expanding the social support network of CCT beneficiaries and providing them with more access to state officials and community leaders. The increased access to these officials and leaders lowers the cost of political participation for CCT beneficiaries and identifies a second pathway to increased political activity.

Curiously, CCTs are not positively associated with access to medical professionals and teachers, despite the frequent interaction between CCT beneficiaries and these service providers. We would expect the frequent interaction to contribute to a reduction in social distance, as predicted by the Policy Push Argument, but CCTs beneficiaries are not more likely to approach these professionals in the event of an important problem, all else equal. This finding is surprising, and it will be discussed in more detail in the next section.

Table 4.2: Multilevel Models of Access to State Officials and Community Leaders (2014 Mexican Survey Data)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
	Pol or Party Leader	Public Prog Off	Prog Benif Leader	Civic Assoc Leader	Med Prof or Teacher	Other Comm Leader	Access Index
Ind Var							
CCT	0.193	0.499***	0.544***	0.184	-0.242	-0.006	0.268*
UCT	0.168	0.342	0.188	0.279	0.148	0.304	0.289
Income	0.013	-0.157**	-0.265***	0.012	-0.007	-0.109*	-0.103*
Employed	-0.134	0.157	0.152	0.152	-0.191	-0.030	0.028
Education	-0.086*	-0.094*	0.030	-0.032	-0.020	0.023	-0.050
Age	0.074	-0.299	0.145	-0.047	-0.126	-0.089	-0.197
Female	-0.160	0.375**	0.301	0.191	0.081	0.257	0.203
Children	0.437**	0.221	0.423**	0.068	0.254	0.194	0.292*
Religiosity	0.380***	-0.001	-0.028	0.019	0.172**	0.247***	0.165**
Loc Var							
Pop	-0.185	-0.203	-0.052	-0.285**	-0.594**	-0.406**	-0.404*
Poverty	-0.597	-1.236**	-1.053**	-0.506*	-0.637	0.376	-0.863
Rurality	-0.604***	-0.464	-0.417	-0.258*	-0.345	-0.544**	-0.563*
Education	-0.334*	-0.193	-0.227	-0.002	0.008	0.143	-0.129
N(ind)	983	973	968	975	962	960	927
N(loc)	20	20	20	20	20	20	20
N(mun)	3	3	3	3	3	3	3

* p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01

Notes: The dependent variables are whether the respondent would ask each of these types of officials and leaders for help with a difficult problem. Multilevel generalized linear models with random intercepts are used for each type of leader, and a multilevel linear model with random intercepts is used for the index.

As far as the substantive effect of CCTs, the estimated size of the CCT effect is .268 for the access index. Given that the mean value for this index is 2.59, CCTs are associated with an increase of ten percent in access to officials and leaders for the average respondent. Few other variables affect access to officials and leaders, but both religiosity and having children are positively and significantly associated with several access variables and the access index. Along with CCTs, having children and religious involvement each alter social support networks in ways that increase access to state officials and community leaders.

Overall, Tables 4.1 and 4.2 provide considerable support for the hypothesized causal mechanisms connecting CCTs and increased political participation. CCTs, and particularly the conditionalities, produce important non-material resources for beneficiaries, including opportunities to exercise civic skills and increased access to state officials and community leaders. These non-material resources lower the costs of political activity for beneficiaries and create two pathways to increased political participation, particularly for more demanding activities.

As with the analysis of observational survey data from the last chapter, one potential concern regarding the Mexican survey data results is omitted variable bias. To further protect against omitted variable bias when estimating program effects on the causal pathway variables, I once again restrict the sample to CCT and UCT beneficiaries just above, and non-beneficiaries just below, the program eligibility line. Program beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries within .35 units of the eligibility line are selected,

allowing a large enough sample size for the models to be meaningful.⁶ As a result of the restrictions, the differences between the program beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries are even further reduced, providing an additional layer of natural controls when estimating the effects of program participation on civic skills and access to officials and leaders. I repeat the analysis from Tables 4.1 and 4.2 using only the restricted sample of respondents, and the results are listed in Appendix B (Tables B4.1 and B4.2).

The improved models with the restricted sample mostly reinforce the findings from Tables 4.1 and 4.2, with CCTs contributing to more opportunities to exercise civic skills and more access to state officials and community leaders. Once again, UCTs have little effect on these causal pathway variables, only contributing to the exercise of one civic skill (along with the civic skills index) and increasing access to one community leader. As expected, the results suggest that civic-based conditionalities contribute to the acquisition of politically relevant resources, thus creating two pathways to increased political participation.

4.3.2 Survey Data: Testing Competing Arguments

Although the results above support the predictions of the Policy Push Argument, they do not rule out the possibility of other potential pathways from CCTs to increased political participation. For example, the main alternative explanation offered by the social program and policy feedback literature is that programs lead to political learning

⁶ The size of the restricted sample is 974 respondents, including 233 CCT beneficiaries and 69 UCT beneficiaries.

and affect beneficiaries' psychological engagement with politics, particularly external political efficacy (Soss 1999). To test whether interpretive effects represent an additional pathway from CCTs to increased participation in political activities, I use the original survey data from Mexico and analyze the relationship between program participation and multiple measures of psychological engagement with politics, including two measures of external political efficacy (*Govt Interested in You; Vote Matters*), three measures of internal political efficacy (*Understand Political Issues; Informed about Loc Govt; Ability to Help Com Group*), and one measure of interest in politics (*Interest in Politics*).⁷ More details on these variables as well as their summary statistics are available in Appendix A.

Multilevel linear models with random intercepts are utilized to estimate the effects of CCTs and UCTs on psychological engagement with politics, and the results are reported in Table 4.3. The evidence does not provide any support for interpretive arguments. CCTs and UCTs have no relationship with psychological engagement with politics, as each program variable fails to achieve statistical significance in the models. In Appendix B (Table B4.3), I report the results for the reduced sample of respondents who are just above or below the program eligibility line,⁸ which further reduces the differences between program beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries. Once again, I find no evidence in favor of the interpretive arguments. Overall, the results suggest that the

⁷ For more on the distinction between external and internal political efficacy, see Niemi et al. (1991).

⁸ Respondents within .25 units of the program eligibility line are included in the sample.

pathway from CCTs to increased political participation does not involve interpretive effects.

Table 4.3: Multilevel Models of Psychological Engagement with Politics (2014 Mexican Survey Data)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Govt Interested in You	Vote Matters	Understand Political Issues	Informed about Loc Govt	Ability to Help Com Group	Interest in Politics
Ind Variables						
CCT	0.085	0.066	-0.042	0.025	0.009	0.038
UCT	-0.018	-0.155	0.004	0.027	-0.004	0.026
Income	-0.052	0.007	0.009	-0.007	0.039	-0.013
Employed	0.059	-0.064	-0.038	-0.119	0.028	-0.084
Education	-0.052**	0.011	0.012	0.031	0.061***	0.049***
Age	-0.057	-0.048	0.085	0.095	0.259**	0.144*
Female	-0.053	-0.006	-0.222***	-0.245***	-0.100	-0.292***
Children	0.221**	-0.043	0.229***	0.260***	-0.118	-0.034
Religiosity	0.017	-0.125***	0.069*	0.048	-0.018	0.094***
Loc Variables						
Population	0.020	-0.004	-0.080	-0.065	0.176***	-0.054
Poverty	-0.187	0.136	0.165	0.303**	-0.138	0.058
Rurality	0.079	-0.067	0.014	0.014	0.095	-0.008
Education	-0.038	-0.068	0.136**	0.098*	-0.138**	0.019
N (ind)	974	973	969	967	979	989
N (loc)	20	20	20	20	20	20
N (mun)	3	3	3	3	3	3

* p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01

Notes: The dependent variables are six measures of psychological engagement with politics. Random-intercept multilevel linear models are used in this analysis.

Next, I consider the relationship between program participation and mobilization in order to test whether mobilization attempts represent an alternative pathway to increased political participation. I measure mobilization attempts as whether the respondent personally was asked to participate in each of the following political activities in the past twelve months (or in the most recent election, if outside of the past twelve months): vote in the national election; vote in the state or municipal election; campaign on behalf of a candidate or party; attend meetings for an association or civic organization; attend meetings for a group or committee that aims to improve the community; help resolve a problem in the community or neighborhood; attend a town council meeting or municipal session; contact a politician, government employee, or municipal government office; sign a petition; and participate in a demonstration or protest. These political activities represent a wide range of political participation and include an example of each mode of political involvement.

Using the same set of independent variables as Table 4.3, I estimate the effects of CCTs on mobilization attempts. Generalized linear multilevel models are used for each political activity, while a linear multilevel model is used for the mobilization index. The results are reported in Table 4.4. Contrary to the expectations of the mobilization arguments, the evidence indicates that there is no relationship between CCTs and mobilization attempts. It appears that CCTs do not contribute to an increase in the amount of mobilization efforts towards beneficiaries.

Once again, I repeat the analysis using the restricted sample of respondents right above or below the program eligibility line,⁹ and I report the results in Appendix B (Table B4.4). The evidence offers a small amount of support for the mobilization pathway, as CCTs are positively and significantly associated with one of the political activities (attend meetings for a group or committee that aims to improve the community). The results therefore suggest that participating in a CCT program makes individuals more attractive targets for mobilization, at least for community improvement groups. It may be the case that CCT beneficiaries are more in demand due to their improved civic skills. Regardless of the reason, CCT beneficiaries are being both pushed and pulled to participate more in community improvement groups.

Unfortunately, the survey data is not suitable to test whether clientelism is contributing to an increase in political participation among beneficiaries. Instead, I rely on interviews with CCT beneficiaries in order to assess whether they feel pressure to support a particular candidate or party. I return to the analysis of this potential pathway in the next subsection.

⁹ Respondents within .35 units of the program eligibility line are included in the sample.

Table 4.4: Multilevel Models of Mobilization Attempts (2014 Mexican Survey Data)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Vote in Nat Elect	Camp	Attend Civ Org	Attend Comm Impr Group	Cont Govt Official	Sign a Petition	Protest	Mobil Index
Ind Var								
CCT	0.094	-0.123	-0.102	0.276	0.007	-0.216	-0.044	-0.001
UCT	0.580	-0.355	0.299	0.046	0.005	-0.579	-0.301	-0.011
Income	0.092	0.255***	-0.041	0.019	0.196*	0.363***	0.226*	0.010**
Employed	0.376	-0.065	-0.235	-0.370*	0.001	-0.011	-0.407	-0.014
Education	0.005	0.038	0.164**	0.064	0.108	0.051	0.051	0.008**
Age	1.077***	0.192	0.236	0.396	0.250	0.482	0.142	0.042**
Female	0.902***	-0.127	-0.197	-0.230	-0.106	0.188	0.019	0.002
Children	0.353	0.087	0.334	0.662***	0.177	0.526**	0.360	0.025*
Religiosity	-0.418***	-0.192	-0.302***	-0.391***	-0.482***	-0.501***	-0.497***	-0.039***
Loc Var								
Pop	-0.162	0.601	0.308	-0.024	0.608	0.032	1.063	-0.016
Poverty	2.250***	-0.417	-1.088	0.006	-1.668*	-0.463	-1.096	0.042
Rurality	-1.243**	-0.521**	-0.495	-0.614**	-0.045	-0.161	-0.109	-0.052
Education	-0.174	-1.124**	-0.908*	-0.399*	-1.193	-0.437	-1.408	-0.032
N(ind)	988	989	991	993	991	993	992	974
N(loc)	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20
N(mun)	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3

* p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01

Notes: The dependent variables are whether the respondent was asked to participate in each of the political activities (only selected models are included in the table). Multilevel generalized linear models with random intercepts are used for each type of activity, and a multilevel linear model with random intercepts is used for the index.

Finally, I consider the possibility that CCTs affect political participation due to changes in social capital. Social capital arguments (Putnam 1993, 1995; Krishna 2002; Klesner 2007) suggest that the increased social interactions between CCT beneficiaries and other community members may be contributing to more interpersonal trust, which in turn facilitates political involvement. Previous research finds mixed evidence regarding the consequences of CCTs for social capital in other contexts (Chong et al.

2009; Attanasio et al. 2009), so it remains unclear whether social capital plays an important role in spurring political participation among CCT beneficiaries.

To test this alternative explanation, I analyze the relationship between CCTs and social capital using the original survey data from Mexico. The dependent variables for this analysis are measures of the respondent's trust in other community members, trust in CCT beneficiaries in the community, and trust in beneficiaries from other government programs in the community. More details on these variables are included in Appendix A. Once again, I include the same set of independent variables and estimate the effects of CCTs using multilevel models.¹⁰ The results are reported in Table 4.5. I also repeat the analysis with the restricted sample of respondents who are right above or below the program eligibility line,¹¹ and I report these results in Appendix B (Table B4.5).

¹⁰ Multilevel linear models are utilized in this analysis, but the main results are robust to using generalized linear multilevel models.

¹¹ Respondents within .35 units of the program eligibility line are included in the sample.

Table 4.5: Multilevel Models of Social Capital (2014 Mexican Survey Data)

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Trust in Other Community Members	Trust in CCT Beneficiaries in the Community	Trust in Beneficiaries of Other Programs in the Community
Ind Variables			
CCT	-0.009	0.187***	0.111*
UCT	0.013	0.221**	0.100
Income	-0.021	-0.033	-0.008
Employed	0.000	0.045	0.047
Education	0.020	0.015	0.035*
Age	0.068	-0.002	0.139
Female	-0.152**	-0.067	-0.053
Children	-0.046	-0.142**	-0.054
Religiosity	0.053*	0.028	-0.008
Loc Variables			
Population	0.039	0.012	0.068
Poverty	0.086	-0.037	0.071
Rurality	0.001	0.055	0.148**
Education	-0.026	0.032	0.011
N (ind)	985	878	856
N (loc)	20	20	20
N (mun)	3	3	3

* p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01

Notes: The dependent variables are measures of social capital, including trust in other community members in general, trust in CCT beneficiaries, and trust in beneficiaries of other programs. Random-intercept multilevel linear models are used in this analysis.

The results provide mixed support for the social capital pathway. On the one hand, CCTs do not have a relationship with trust in other community members in general, despite the increased social interactions between CCT beneficiaries and other community members. CCTs therefore are not breaking down barriers of mistrust across

groups in the community. On the other hand, CCTs are positively and significantly associated with trust in CCT beneficiaries in both tables, indicating an increased level of trust among fellow CCT beneficiaries. The increase in social capital facilitates political activity among members of this particular group. CCTs also are positively associated with trust in beneficiaries of other programs in Table 4.5, but this finding does not hold when considering the improved models in Table B4.5.

Overall, the evidence from the original survey data demonstrates that the two hypothesized pathways – civic skills and access to government officials and community leaders – are important, but not exhaustive, pathways from CCTs to increased political participation. There also is limited support for both the mobilization and social capital pathways. CCT beneficiaries certainly are pushed to secure politically relevant resources which reduce the costs of political participation, but they also are pulled by other forces to participate in politics. The existence of multiple causal pathways helps to explain the large CCT effects on participation in a wide variety of political activities.

4.3.3 *Interviews*

The interviews with CCT beneficiaries and program officials shed additional light on the causal mechanism that connects CCTs with increased political participation.¹² Six key themes emerge from these interviews. First, the CCT beneficiaries unanimously recognize that the program develops their communications skills. For example, one CCT beneficiary proudly states that the program has taught her

¹² For a list of the guiding interview questions, please see Appendix C.

“how to speak to, and how to be with, others.”¹³ Another beneficiary mentions: “before, it scared us to talk with others, but now we feel more confident [in our ability] to *speak in public* and express what we feel” (emphasis added).¹⁴

Second, the CCT beneficiaries point to the conditionalities – and particularly the educational workshops – as the reason for the improved communications skills. One beneficiary summarizes this view: “More than anything, the workshops teach us how to communicate better with our children, spouses, and *everybody else*. They teach us a new alternative to improve our well-being” (emphasis added).¹⁵ Some CCT beneficiaries point to the importance of the information that is supplied through the workshops, especially in health and nutrition. This information allows the beneficiaries to approach others, both inside and outside the program, and discuss these matters. The responses demonstrate that the opportunities to exercise civic skills through the workshops provide meaningful experiences for CCT beneficiaries.

Interestingly, the improved civic skills and increased willingness to approach non-beneficiaries does not create more trust in other community members, as evidenced by the lack of relationship between CCTs and trust in other community members in the previous section. These findings suggest that the social interactions between CCT beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries, although more frequent and likely more effective in communicating information, are not producing social capital.

¹³ Source: focus group with CCT beneficiaries in San Andrés Cholula on October 23, 2012.

¹⁴ Source: focus group with CCT beneficiaries in Chignahuapan on October 30, 2012.

¹⁵ Source: focus group with CCT beneficiaries in San Andrés Cholula on October 23, 2012.

Third, CCT beneficiaries utilize their program contacts to ask for help with problems. When asked in the interviews, CCT program officials consistently report that they are approached by CCT beneficiaries to help with all types of problems. One program official states, “Yes, of course, because we have direct contact with all [the program participants], and we are responsible for all the communication with them directly.”¹⁶ In terms of the scope of the problems, some CCT program officials report that they only get asked about program-related problems, while others indicate that they are regularly asked questions about problems which are outside the scope of the program. “Sometimes there are matters that correspond to other areas [of the government], so we link them to the institution that can help them,” an official mentions.¹⁷ Another official replies, “Yes, we are advisors too, we link them to other government authorities. For example, if there are problems with education, we need to connect them with those that are in charge of public education.”¹⁸ CCT officials thus serve as intermediaries between CCT beneficiaries and other government authorities and institutions.

The interviews reveal that the reduction in distance between CCT beneficiaries and government officials is an intended consequence of the program. One CCT program official states, “one objective of the program is [for program beneficiaries] to search for and defend their rights, to get closer to government authorities to make sure that their rights are respected, and that is what the program offers...a link with

¹⁶ Source: focus group with CCT program officials in Chignahuapan on October 29, 2012.

¹⁷ Source: focus group with CCT program officials in Chignahuapan on October 29, 2012.

¹⁸ Source: focus group with CCT program officials in Chignahuapan on October 29, 2012.

government authorities [and] institutions.”¹⁹ Another mentions, “Yes, [the CCT program] promotes communication, brings [beneficiaries] closer to information that is given to them, to investigate more what is politics, which benefits their family and community can obtain.”²⁰

Fourth, the CCT beneficiaries are pleased with the responsiveness of the CCT program officials, but this satisfaction often does not extend to the government in general. When asked to evaluate the CCT program officials’ responsiveness, the CCT beneficiaries unanimously give high marks. One beneficiary explains, “We always get a response from them.”²¹ Another states, “I want to believe yes, but there hasn’t been a problem yet. But I think and believe that they would resolve my problem.”²²

Importantly, the CCT beneficiaries differentiate between the CCT program offices and other areas of government, and most believe that the government in general is less responsive to their needs. Some beneficiaries are very critical of the responsiveness of the government in general, reporting that the government is not at all responsive to their problems and needs. One CCT beneficiary states, “I feel no...for example, look at how the street is.”²³ Other beneficiaries offer a more moderate response, replying that the responsiveness of the government in general depends on the problem.

The beneficiaries’ views regarding government responsiveness help to explain the null survey results for CCTs and external political efficacy. The CCT beneficiaries

¹⁹ Source: focus group with CCT program officials in Chignahuapan on October 29, 2012.

²⁰ Source: focus group with CCT program officials in Chignahuapan on October 29, 2012.

²¹ Source: focus group with CCT beneficiaries in Chignahuapan on October 30, 2012.

²² Source: in-depth interview with a CCT beneficiary in San Andrés Cholula on October 23, 2012.

²³ Source: in-depth interview with a CCT beneficiary in Teziutlán on November 1, 2012.

distinguish between the CCT program offices and the government in general, so their positive views towards the program officials do not seep into their feelings towards government in general. This finding, when considered alongside other research on means-tested programs (Soss 1999), suggests that views towards the government are more stable when confronted with positive program experiences than negative ones. In other words, the impact of program experiences on political attitudes may depend, at least in part, on whether the experiences are positive or negative.

Fifth, the interviews with CCT beneficiaries reveal no evidence of clientelism in the program. Instead, the responses suggest that beneficiaries possess a strong sense of ownership of their involvement in the program. For example, when asked about whether the CCT program increases their understanding of politics, some beneficiaries quickly point out that the program is separate from politics, and one participant even went on to describe the program conditionalities. It was evident from their responses that they were proud to explain to me how the program works. Moreover, most of the beneficiaries indicate that they now follow the actions of governments and politicians more, suggesting proper accountability relationships between citizens and government. As one beneficiary states, after starting in the program she now tries to "...know and become more familiar with the candidates, so they don't fool us...[make sure] that they are good for us."²⁴ This increased willingness to monitor politicians hasn't translated into increased political interest in general, at least as evidenced by the survey data in the previous section, but it nonetheless is a noteworthy development. The beneficiaries'

²⁴ Source: focus group with CCT beneficiaries in Chignahuapan on October 30, 2012.

ownership and awareness of the program likely create additional barriers to political interference by local elites, further protecting the program from clientelism.

Sixth, an expressed concern with the program is the amount of time that is required to fulfill all of the responsibilities. It was common to hear CCT beneficiaries express gratitude for the cash transfers, but several make sure to point out the extensive time commitments that are involved. I would not describe these communications as complaints, but rather attempts to receive acknowledgement for their efforts. A few beneficiaries indicate that they are happy to meet the conditions, but do so in an unenthusiastic manner which contradicts their stated words. These reactions demonstrate that conditionalities limit the amount of time beneficiaries can spend on outside activities, including political participation.

Overall, the interview results support the predictions of the Policy Push Argument and reinforce the survey findings, but with two caveats. The first caveat is that the two predicted pathways may be connected, or at least complementary. For example, it is easy to see how the combination of improved civic skills and increased access to public program officials contributes to more contacting of public officials. This finding challenges whether each pathway is separate, at least for some modes of participation. The second caveat is that some respondents indicate that the program increases their confidence in participating in politics. Although these responses are not supported by the survey evidence and may be outliers, it also may be the case that CCTs increase feelings of political engagement for a small subset of beneficiaries.

The data from this chapter comes from Mexico, but there are reasons to believe that the results will hold in other Latin American countries and throughout the Global South. The Mexican CCT program has been emulated in other countries, with many other CCT programs including similar civic-based conditionalities (Cecchini and Madariaga 2011; Fiszbein and Schady 2009). As a result, we would expect these same causal pathways to emerge outside of Mexico as well. Moreover, given that the program recipients will share some socioeconomic similarities across contexts, it is at least reasonable to think that the program effects will also be similar. Perhaps the primary factor that may limit the generalizability of the results is the variation in the amount of political interference across programs. Clientelism, for example, is likely to produce a new pathway to increased electoral participation. It is important to emphasize that the existence of clientelism in the program does not preclude the existence of other pathways to increased political participation. It may be the case that clientelistic and non-clientelistic pathways are operating in a single program.

4.4 Discussion

This chapter provides strong support for the predicted pathways of the Policy Push Argument. CCTs, and the conditionalities in particular, push beneficiaries to perform certain actions, and in the process the beneficiaries acquire politically relevant, non-material resources. These resources reduce the costs of participation and spur more involvement in politics among beneficiaries, although there is some evidence that mobilization and social capital also play a limited role.

The results from this chapter reveal some key limitations of the CCT program, and these limitations have important policy consequences. For example, although CCT beneficiaries are required to interact regularly with service providers such as health professionals and teachers, it is striking that CCTs do not reduce the social distance between program beneficiaries and these particular service providers. Indeed, CCTs are positively associated with access to program officials and other program beneficiary leaders, but yet have no relationship with access to healthcare workers and teachers who play such a critical role in the program. In more specific terms, this finding indicates that CCT participation does not make it more likely for beneficiaries to approach service providers when faced with a difficult problem. This outcome is a startling missed opportunity for the CCT program, and it joins previous research which is critical of the actions of these service providers when interacting with CCT beneficiaries (Hevia de la Jara 2010). Funders and policymakers must address this missed opportunity, and they should consider creating additional incentives for service providers to invest more time in the human development of beneficiaries.

Another limitation of the program which is exposed through the interviews is that there is a disconnect between the CCT program offices and other areas of government. Currently, CCT program officials are linking beneficiaries to other areas of government in the event of a problem not related to the program, and other areas of government are not as responsive to the needs of beneficiaries. Rather than simply acting as connectors though, it would be useful to explore ways for CCT program officials to serve as advocates. If some CCT advocates were placed in other areas of the

government, for example, then they may serve as additional accountability checks when beneficiaries have problems outside of the program. Some CCT programs are exploring new ways to link beneficiaries to other areas of government,²⁵ but more efforts need to be made. The successful communication mechanisms developed through the CCT program may also be emulated in these other areas of government as well. With these changes, inter-office communication should improve and beneficiaries will likely receive a higher quality of service.

²⁵ See, for example, recent changes to the Mexican CCT program (<https://www.prospera.gob.mx/Portal/wb/Web/inicio>) as well as the Chilean CCT program (http://www.chilesolidario.gob.cl/en/chs_en.php).

Policy Feedback: Local Service Provision

5.1 Introduction

Starting with the seminal work by Schattschneider (1935), a large policy feedback literature has emerged to study the effects of policies on the behaviors of political elites and on the creation of subsequent policies (Skocpol 1992; Ikenberry 1988; Vogel 1989; Rothstein 1992; Pierson 1994; Hacker 2002; Wilson 1973). More recently, and following the lead of Pierson (1993) and Schneider and Ingram (1993), scholars have considered the effects of social programs on individual political behavior in the mass public (Soss 1999; Campbell 2003; Mettler 2005; Bruch et al. 2010; Mettler and Stonecash 2008; Sharp 2009; Alber and Kohler 2009; Garay 2007; Schady 2001; Nishikawa 2012; Holzner 2010; MacLean 2011). Despite impressive gains in our understanding of the consequences of social programs for political participation, there is little research on how these programs feed back into the political system. As Campbell (2012, 347) summarizes, “Many existing feedback studies show the feed but not the back (or they just assume the back).”

The following two chapters aim to address this gap in the literature and analyze whether CCT effects on individual political behavior feed back into the political system.

I consider two potential feedback areas. In this chapter (chapter 5), I explore whether CCTs have feedback effects on government responsiveness to the needs of CCT beneficiaries, particularly in local service provision. In the next chapter (chapter 6), I examine whether CCTs have feedback effects on election outcomes in non-benefactor elections. As long as we assume that party control of government matters for policy outcomes, then effects on election outcomes certainly can be considered policy feedback effects, albeit of the indirect variety. The analysis from chapter 6 extends existing research that establishes the existence of CCT effects on incumbent party support in benefactor elections (Hunter and Power 2008; Zucco 2013; Baez et al. 2012; Díaz-Cayeros et al. 2012; De La O 2013).

5.2 Theoretical Expectations

What are the consequences of CCTs for local service provision? My argument, as outlined in chapter 2 (subsection 2.2.2), predicts that CCTs will be positively associated with the private provision of services, but have no relationship with the government's provision of services.

The work of Holzner (2010) also suggests that CCTs will have no relationship with the government's provision of local services, but for a different reason. If CCT beneficiaries become frustrated with the local government's lack of responsiveness and decide to disengage from the political system, then we would not expect an increase in the government's provision of local services. This argument also implies that CCTs will have no relationship with the private provision of local services.

Electoral and non-electoral participatory theories¹ generate an alternative set of expectations. Because CCTs spur increased involvement in electoral and non-electoral political activities, these theories suggest that CCTs will contribute to an increase in government responsiveness to the needs of CCT beneficiaries. When applied to local service provision, these theories would expect for CCTs to have positive feedback effects on the actions of local government and contribute to an increase in the government's provision of local services.

A leading argument in development policy² also suggests that CCTs will have positive feedback effects on local service provision. Because CCTs are a demand-side policy that transfers cash directly to poor citizens instead of subsidizing public services, this argument predicts that the transferred resources will provide increased leverage for poor citizens to demand better government services. CCTs, according to this argument, will be positively associated with the government's provision of local services.

This chapter makes several important contributions to the literature. First, it contributes to the literature on government responsiveness by identifying that government policies can affect service provision through feedback effects. Previous work establishes that citizen political participation increases government responsiveness (Cleary 2007, 2010), but does not consider less proximate influences. Second, it reinforces an earlier call in the literature for improved measures of government

¹ For examples of electoral theories of government responsiveness, see Campbell et al. (1960); Key (1966); Fenno (1978); and Fiorina (1981). For examples of non-electoral participatory theories of government responsiveness, see Putnam (1993); Verba et al. (1995); Hirschman (1970); and Cleary (2010).

² See World Bank (2003; Chapter 4) and Devarajan (2013) for an overview of this argument.

responsiveness in the Global South (Adida and Girod 2011). It is common for researchers in Mexico, for example, to measure government responsiveness or performance as access to basic local services (Cleary 2007, 2010; Hiskey 2003; Díaz-Cayeros et al. 2012). Studies of government responsiveness must recognize the existence of private competition and separate these measures of local service provision (Adida and Girod 2011). Third, the chapter also contributes to the extensive literature on CCTs in development economics and global health³ by identifying an alternative pathway to improved human development, and especially health, outcomes.

5.3 Research Design

I test the hypotheses by analyzing the effects of CCTs on local service provision in Mexico. Mexico is selected for two main reasons. First, I am able to utilize data from the randomized field experiment in Mexico in the late 1990s, thus avoiding common problems with observational data. Indeed, the CCT field experiment in Mexico was tested extensively by a team of researchers, and the pre-treatment values for the treatment and control groups were found to be well-balanced on a multitude of socioeconomic and political indicators (Behrman and Todd 1999; De La O 2013). As a result, it is reasonable to conclude that CCT treatment is exogenous for this experimental sample. Second, in Mexico there are clear distinctions between local public services that are offered by private companies and the government, and local service data is available

³ See, for example, Morris et al. (2004); Skoufias (2005); Barham and Maluccio (2009); Attanasio et al. (2005b); Behrman and Hoddinott (2001); Rasella et al. (2013); Paxson and Schady (2010); Fiszbein and Schady (2009); Cury et al (2007); and Naranjo (2008).

according to the type of provider (Adida and Girod 2011). More specifically, sewerage services can be provided by the private sector (i.e., septic tanks) or the government, while potable water services are available only through the government.⁴

The dependent variables for this analysis are the changes in the provision of local public services, measured as the changes in the private provision of sewerage services, the governmental provision of sewerage services, and the governmental provision of water services. Local public service coverage is measured at the locality level both before (1995) and after (2000) the start of the experiment, allowing for a difference-in-difference analysis of the change in service coverage over time. Aggregate-level data is suitable for this analysis, because CCT feedback effects on service provision may surface inside or outside of CCT households. Indeed, there is evidence that some CCT beneficiaries shared benefits with non-beneficiary households in their local area during this time period (Adato and Hoddinott 2010), thus creating a downward bias on any estimates obtained with individual-level data. I use data at the locality level in order to match the level of treatment in the randomized field experiment.

There are several advantages to considering local public services for this analysis. First, access to sewerage and water services are of critical importance for poor people in Mexico (Mizrahi 1999, 2000), including CCT beneficiaries. Because we are interested in analyzing whether CCTs have feedback effects on government responsiveness to the needs of CCT beneficiaries, it is essential to select services that are desired by these

⁴ This classification of local service provision in Mexico follows Adida and Girod (2011), but categorizes all services requiring at least some government involvement as government services. Also, as noted by these authors, the private provision of water services (i.e., wells) is not common in Mexico, so it is not considered here.

beneficiaries. Second, there is rich variation in the provision of sewerage and water services at the locality level in Mexico, particularly during this time period.⁵ Third, as mentioned above, local public services in Mexico have both private and governmental providers, thus allowing for a clean analysis of the hypotheses. My work joins previous research that utilizes these local services to analyze government responsiveness or performance in Mexico (Cleary 2007, 2010; Hiskey 2003; Díaz-Cayeros et al. 2012).

The main independent variable in this analysis is CCT treatment (*Treatment*), a dichotomous variable that is measured at the locality level.⁶ The original field experiment randomized CCT treatment in a sample of 506 localities in seven Mexican states, with 320 localities receiving CCT treatment in September 1998 and the remaining 186 localities not receiving treatment until 2000 (Gertler 2000; Schultz 2001). For this variable, a value of one indicates that a locality received CCT treatment and a value of zero indicates that a locality did not receive treatment.⁷ On average, 78 percent of households in an experimental locality were eligible to participate in the CCT program, and 97 percent of all eligible households enrolled in the program (Gertler 2000).

I include a standard set of pre-treatment control variables in the models, such as population in 1995, poverty in 1995, and whether the national government party (PRI)

⁵ See data from the Mexican census (http://www.inegi.org.mx/sistemas/consulta_resultados/iter2010.aspx).

⁶ This data was obtained from the Oportunidades program office in January 2013, and also is available online at <https://www.prospera.gob.mx/EVALUACION/index1.php>.

⁷ Because the dependent variables are last measured in early 2000, it is possible that some control localities received a few months of CCT treatment at the end of the experiment. However, it seems unlikely that feedback effects on public service coverage could materialize in this short period of time.

controls the municipal presidency at the start of the experiment.⁸ The variables are measured before the start of the experiment in order to avoid introducing bias. I choose to include a variable for whether the PRI controls the municipal government, because this is the level of government in Mexico that is solely responsible for providing sewerage and water services (Cleary 2007; Adida and Girod 2011). Importantly, and as expected given the experimental research design, the main results are robust to removing these control variables. More detailed information on the construction of these variables as well as their summary statistics is included in Appendix A.

In Table 5.1, I use linear regression models to estimate the effect of CCT treatment on changes in private and governmental service coverage at the locality level between 1995 and 2000, with models 1-2 reporting the results for private sewerage services, models 3-4 reporting the results for governmental sewerage services, and models 5-6 reporting the results for governmental water services. The *Treatment* coefficients in this table are intent-to-treat estimates (Gupta 2011). Models 1, 3, and 5 include municipality fixed effects, while the remaining models include both municipality and state fixed effects. All models include the control variables described above.

As predicted in (H3), the results indicate that CCTs have a positive effect on the private provision of sewerage services. The relationship between CCTs and the private provision of sewerage services is positive and statistically significant in both of the

⁸ The locality-level measures of poverty and population are obtained from the 1995 Mexican census (http://www.inegi.org.mx/est/contenidos/proyectos/ccpv/cpv1995/iter_1995.aspx). The PRI municipal president control variable is created using data from the Sistema Nacional de Información Municipal website (<http://www.snim.rami.gob.mx/>).

models (1-2), indicating that this finding is robust to adding state fixed effects. In substantive terms, CCTs lead to an increase in the coverage of private sewerage services by four percentage points, an impressive gain given the importance of these critical services and the short treatment period. To put the size of this CCT effect into perspective, the mean coverage of sewerage services (private or governmental) was only 15 percent in these localities by the year 2000, meaning that only 15 percent of households had access to any type of sewerage service. Clearly, CCTs have a sizeable impact on access to private sewerage services, and this impact represents a meaningful amount of overall access to sewerage services in the treated localities.

The results indicate that CCTs affect the private provision of sewerage services, but are CCT beneficiaries the ones who are purchasing the private services? Unfortunately, the data is unable to determine which exact individuals are purchasing the services, but it seems very likely that the purchasers are CCT beneficiaries. As noted earlier, CCT beneficiaries make up approximately 75 percent of the population in treated localities, leaving a much smaller number of non-beneficiaries. More importantly, there is not a reasonable argument to explain why poor non-beneficiaries would suddenly be able and willing to purchase septic tanks after being exposed to CCTs in their locality, even if CCT beneficiaries did share some benefits with them. It is much more likely that CCT beneficiaries used their cash transfers to purchase private sewerage services.

I now consider the results regarding CCTs and changes in governmental provision of local services. Models 3-6 demonstrate that CCTs have no effect on the government's provision of local services, regardless of whether state fixed effects are

included. The estimated effect of CCTs on governmental sewerage provision is positive but not statistically significant, while the estimated CCT effect on governmental water provision is negative (and does not achieve statistical significance). According to these results, CCTs do not have a positive feedback effect on the provision of local governmental services.

Also, because the relationship between CCTs and governmental provision of sewerage services does not reach statistical significance, we can conclude that households with newly accessed private services did not formerly have access to governmental services. In other words, private providers are not convincing households to switch sewerage providers, but instead are connecting households which formerly did not have access to any sewerage service. This distinction has important policy implications that will be addressed in the discussion section.

Table 5.1: The Effect of CCTs on Local Service Provision

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Private Prov of Sewerage Services	Private Prov of Sewerage Services	Gov Prov of Sewerage Services	Gov Prov of Sewerage Services	Gov Prov of Water Services	Gov Prov of Water Services
Treatment	0.040** (0.019)	0.040** (0.019)	0.001 (0.014)	0.001 (0.014)	-0.010 (0.041)	-0.010 (0.041)
Constant	-0.004 (0.019)	-0.004 (0.019)	-0.006 (0.015)	-0.006 (0.015)	-0.011 (0.042)	-0.011 (0.042)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Mun Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
State Fixed Effects	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
N	506	506	506	506	506	506
R-squared	0.49	0.49	0.41	0.41	0.41	0.41

Robust standard errors are in parentheses. * $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$.

Notes: The sample consists of all experimental localities. The dependent variables are the changes in the private provision of sewerage services, the governmental provision of sewerage services, and the governmental provision of water services at the locality level from 1995-2000 in Mexico. The control variables are at the locality level and include population, poverty, and whether the PRI controls the municipal presidency. Linear regression models are used for this analysis, and the intent-to-treat estimates of the treatment coefficients are reported.

Still, it may be the case that positive feedback effects on the government's provision of local services will only materialize when there are elections, as stressed by electoral theories of democratic governance (e.g., Campbell et al. 1960; Key 1966; Fenno 1978; Fiorina 1981). Fortunately, because local election dates vary across states in Mexico and only some of the experimental localities end up having elections during the treatment period, the experimental data allows us to test whether CCT effects on

governmental service provision are conditional on having local elections. I create a dichotomous variable for whether there is a municipal election – the level of government that is responsible for the sewerage and water services – between the start of the experiment and the local service measures in 2000, and then I multiply this variable with the CCT treatment variable to create an interaction variable. I add both of these variables to the models of governmental service provision from Table 5.1, repeat the analysis using the new linear regression models, and then report the new results in Table 5.2.

Table 5.2: The Effect of CCTs on Local Service Provision (with election interaction variable)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Governmental Provision of Sewerage Services	Governmental Provision of Sewerage Services	Governmental Provision of Water Services	Governmental Provision of Water Services
Treatment	0.000 (0.019)	0.000 (0.019)	-0.010 (0.058)	-0.010 (0.058)
Election	-0.046 (0.146)	-0.021 (0.023)	-0.258 (0.326)	-0.110 (0.079)
Treatment*Election	0.003 (0.029)	0.003 (0.029)	-0.000 (0.081)	-0.000 (0.081)
Constant	-0.004 (0.019)	-0.004 (0.019)	-0.011 (0.059)	-0.011 (0.059)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Mun Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
State Fixed Effects	No	Yes	No	Yes
N	506	506	506	506
R-squared	0.41	0.41	0.41	0.41

Robust standard errors are in parentheses. * $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$.

Notes: The sample consists of all experimental localities. The dependent variables are the changes in the governmental provision of sewerage services and the governmental provision of water services at the locality level from 1995-2000 in Mexico. Election is a dichotomous variable for whether the locality had a municipal election during the treatment period, and Treatment*Election is an interaction variable between Treatment and Election. The control variables are at the locality level and include population, poverty, and whether the PRI controls the municipal presidency. Linear regression models are used for this analysis, and the intent-to-treat estimates of the treatment coefficients are reported.

The results from this table do not support the notion that elections facilitate positive feedback effects on local governmental service provision. The interaction variable *Treatment*Election* does not achieve statistical significance in any model, indicating that there is not a difference in the effect of CCTs across election and non-

election localities. Because *Treatment* also is not statistically significant, the table suggests that CCTs have no effect on local governmental service provision in either type of locality. Elections therefore do not spur positive CCT feedback effects in the form of increased local governmental service provision.

One may argue that the quality of elections in Mexico during the period of study is not high, so the above analysis does not properly test whether elections matter for government responsiveness. I do not disagree with this point, but I emphasize that my goal for this analysis is to test whether CCTs have positive feedback effects on local service provision in developing democracies, not to test whether elections matter. By most measures, Mexico in the late 1990s is considered a developing democracy.⁹

This last point on the quality of elections in Mexico during the late 1990s calls to our attention the more important matter of external validity. Would we expect the feedback effects of CCTs on local service provision to hold in other developing democracies in the Global South? Certainly, my argument assumes the existence of private competitors in the provision of public services, and that the quality of private services (real or perceived) is high enough to make these services at least somewhat desirable by poor households. The relative size of the CCT cash transfer amount to the cost of the private services represents an additional limiting factor. In contexts that meet these conditions though, I expect for CCTs to have similar effects on local public service provision.

⁹ For an example, see measures from the Polity IV Project (<http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm>).

5.4 Discussion

The findings presented above illustrate that CCTs have perverse consequences for local government responsiveness. Instead of contributing to an expansion in the government's provision of local services, CCTs increase the private provision of local services. This outcome reduces the pressure on local government officials to provide services in the future, as these critical needs no longer have to be satisfied. CCTs do not increase competition among local service providers; the programs simply allow the private sector to fill the void left by the government.

Once again, a key theme that surfaces in the results is the importance of choice. When policies provide beneficiaries with resources, both material and non-material, they facilitate certain actions. Still, even though certain actions become less costly or more affordable, citizens have a choice about whether to carry out these actions. In the case of CCTs, citizens are pushed to participate in politics, but they do not secure improved government services. There is not a positive feedback effect on government responsiveness, at least in part because beneficiaries pursue private services instead.

These findings have important implications for policy and human development, particularly in the areas of poverty alleviation and health. Contrary to existing arguments,¹⁰ demand-side antipoverty programs do not necessarily lead to improvements in government services for the poor. The improved leverage afforded by the transferred resources may simply be used to purchase services from private competitors, at least in contexts that have desirable private alternatives. These results

¹⁰ See World Bank (2003; Chapter 4) and Devarajan (2013).

need to be taken into account in both policy and academic debates over demand-side vs. supply-side programs, particularly in countries which are considering the creation or expansion of antipoverty programs. The assumed positive consequences of demand-side programs for government services are not always achieved in practice.

In the case of CCTs, the findings identify a new indirect pathway to improvements in human development. A large literature establishes that CCTs have positive human development consequences (Morris et al. 2004; Skoufias 2005; Barham and Maluccio 2009; Attanasio et al. 2005b; Behrman and Hoddinott 2001; Rasella et al. 2013; Paxson and Schady 2010; Fiszbein and Schady 2009; Cury et al 2007; and Naranjo 2008), but it remains unclear how CCTs create these positive effects. This chapter argues that CCTs contribute to an increase in the private provision of sewerage services, a vital local service that leads to improvements in health and reductions in poverty. Indeed, sewerage services are critical in the prevention of disease and illness, reducing the number of episodes of diarrhea that can cause severe illness and even death.¹¹ Clearly, the positive effects of CCTs on the private provision of sewerage account for at least part of the positive CCT effects on health, and more research is needed to parse out the importance of this pathway vs. other potential pathways.

Moreover, the effects of CCTs on sewerage services are likely to (partly) explain another positive human development consequence of CCTs: poverty alleviation. Healthier citizens have more time and energy to devote to work, and also have fewer health-related needs and expenses. Improvements in health thus help beneficiaries to

¹¹ For an overview of this research, see Hutton and Haller (2004).

rise (and stay) out of poverty. Existing research supports the notion that sewerage services matter for poverty, with sewerage services contributing to poverty alleviation.¹² Once again, this indirect pathway explains at least some of the reductions in poverty caused by CCTs, but more research is needed to assess its relative impact vs. other potential pathways.

The failure of CCTs to create positive feedback effects on the provision of local government services illuminates a key shortcoming of these programs in Mexico and many other developing democracies. Local politicians are often bypassed by CCTs (Fiszbein and Schady 2009), sometimes in an attempt to avoid clientelism (Levy and Rodríguez 2005; Levy 2006). Yet, this policy feature has important unintended consequences, namely to push beneficiaries towards private providers of services rather than directing their efforts towards demanding improved government services. CCT programs should address this shortcoming by expanding beneficiary trainings on how to approach local officials and secure improved government services; by creating new or additional employee positions within the program that focus on relations with local officials; and by carving out more space in the program for local officials and community leaders. In contexts where the perceived risk is too great to involve local officials in the CCT program, program officials may consider incorporating this component after a few successful years.

It is important to clarify that these changes should not be used to push CCT beneficiaries away from the private provision of local services. Private services play an

¹² For an example of this research, see Hotez (2008).

important role in human development in many areas of the Global South, and this role ought not to be eliminated. Rather, the proposed changes are intended to provide beneficiaries, and particularly those who are unable to afford private services, with more resources to demand *and* secure access to improved public services. CCT programs currently spur voice in the form of increased political participation, but fall short of achieving positive feedback effects in government responsiveness. This current failure represents a clear opportunity for improvement in the future.

Policy Feedback: Non-benefactor Elections

6.1 Introduction

Do CCTs influence the outcomes of non-benefactor elections?¹ The literature offers a large amount of evidence indicating that CCTs increase incumbent party support in benefactor elections (Hunter and Power 2008; Zucco 2013; Baez et al. 2012; Díaz-Cayeros et al. 2012; De La O 2013), but our understanding of CCT effects outside of these elections is limited. Recent research on this topic produces mixed results, with CCT effects varying across and even within countries. CCTs lead to electoral rewards in mayoral elections in Honduras and Mexico, but the type of effect – incumbent party vs. party – is unclear in Honduras and the size of the effect varies across the local context in Mexico (Linos 2013; Rodríguez-Chamussy 2015). Moreover, some evidence suggests that CCTs increase incumbent party support in municipal elections in the Philippines, but only under certain conditions (Labonne 2013). The explanations offered by these researchers, such as pocketbook and credit-claiming arguments, are unable to account

¹ In this dissertation, non-benefactor elections are defined as elections where the level of government plays no role in the creation, funding, or implementation of a program.

for within-country variation in CCT effects. What explains the variation in CCT effects in non-benefactor elections?

My argument emphasizes the importance of responsibility attribution and confusion among citizens, and it predicts that citizens in non-matched districts² will be more likely to attribute responsibility for CCTs to the wrong level of government. Consequently, in non-benefactor elections, CCTs will lead to more electoral rewards for incumbent parties in non-matched districts.

This chapter attempts to make several contributions. It tests whether citizens are rewarding non-benefactors for a beneficial policy and thus threatening the proper functioning of electoral accountability. To my knowledge, this study represents the first examination into whether electoral rewards for a specific beneficial policy extend into multiple non-benefactor elections. Indeed, the sizable literature on responsibility attribution and election outcomes across levels of government focuses on economic performance rather than specific policies (Atkeson and Partin 1995; Carsey and Wright 1998; Chubb 1988; Gélinau and Remmer 2006), while studies on specific beneficial policies tend to consider pro-incumbent effects solely in benefactor elections (e.g., Bechtel and Hainmueller 2011; De La O 2013; Zucco 2013; Díaz-Cayeros et al. 2012; Hunter and Power 2008). In addition, the chapter contributes new evidence on the electoral consequences of CCTs, and it also analyzes the determinants of proper responsibility attribution for the program. The analysis on responsibility attribution

² Non-matched districts are districts with elected politicians that are not of the same party as the benefactor party.

helps to identify the causal mechanism that leads to variation in CCT effects across local contexts. Furthermore, the chapter adds to the policy feedback literature by showing that CCTs have important consequences for the outcomes in non-benefactor elections.

I turn now to the analysis of the hypotheses.

6.2 Research Design and Findings

In this section, I assess to what extent citizens attribute responsibility for CCTs to the correct level of government, analyze the determinants of incorrect responsibility attribution for CCTs, and identify the effects of CCTs on incumbent party support in non-benefactor elections. Mexico is selected for this analysis, because it offers several key advantages. First, one level of government (the national government) is fully responsible for providing the program (Levy and Rodríguez 2005; Levy 2006). Second, nationally-representative survey data is available on attitudes towards which level of government is responsible for CCTs in Mexico, allowing for an analysis of responsibility attribution. Third, I am able to utilize the randomized field experiment from Mexico, allowing for the use of experimental data to test the effects of CCTs on electoral behavior.

6.2.1 *Responsibility Attribution for CCTs in Mexico*

Do Mexican citizens correctly attribute responsibility for CCTs to the national government? The Presidency implemented a national survey of voting-age adults in

October 2007 with several questions about the Mexican CCT program (Oportunidades). Regarding responsibility attribution, the survey included an open-ended question about which level of government provides the CCT program. The survey question states: “From what you know, who provides the Oportunidades program?” The CCT program had been in existence for ten years at the time of the survey.

Table 6.1 shows the results of this survey question on responsibility attribution for the CCT program.³ The results indicate that over 27 percent of respondents were unable to identify the national government as the benefactor of CCTs, even though the program is large and the national government is the sole provider of the program in Mexico. Interestingly, almost 11 percent of respondents believed that the state government provided the CCT program. Even after ten years of the program, there exists confusion in the minds of a sizeable number of Mexican citizens about which level of government is responsible for providing CCTs.

³ The survey data was obtained through a public information request to the Mexican Presidency.

Table 6.1: Responsibility Attribution for the Mexican CCT Program (Full Sample)

From what you know, who provides the Oportunidades program?	Frequency	Percentage
Federal Government or President	12,643	72.82
State Government or Governor	1,829	10.53
Municipal Government or Municipal President	326	1.88
Other	104	.6
Don't Know	2,460	14.17
Total	17,362	100

Notes: Survey data is from the national survey of adults (18+) in Mexico by the Presidency in October 2007.

Of course, it may be the case that non-beneficiaries are uninformed about the CCT program, but that CCT beneficiaries are able to correctly identify the benefactor. To test this possibility, I consider the results of the same survey question but with a restricted sample of CCT beneficiaries. The results are listed in Table 6.2, and the attribution percentages are similar to Table 6.1. Once again, a large percentage of respondents (around 22 percent) are unable to identify the national government as the benefactor for CCTs, and nearly 10 percent of respondents believe that the state government provides CCTs. This survey data illustrates that there exists similar

amounts of confusion over responsibility attribution even in the minds of individuals who receive CCT benefits.

Table 6.2: Responsibility Attribution for the Mexican CCT Program (Restricted Sample of CCT beneficiaries)

From what you know, who provides the Oportunidades program?	Frequency	Percentage
Federal Government or President	2,932	78.33
State Government or Governor	349	9.32
Municipal Government or Municipal President	52	1.39
Other	23	.61
Don't Know	387	10.34
Total	3,743	100

Notes: Survey data is from the national survey of adults (18+) in Mexico by the Presidency in October 2007.

Overall, and in line with my expectations, the evidence suggests that a considerable percentage of citizens are unable to correctly identify which level of government is responsible for the CCT program in Mexico. But are citizens in non-matched districts more likely to attribute responsibility for CCTs to the wrong level of government, as predicted? To evaluate this hypothesis, I first constructed dummy variables that measured whether party control of each municipal government and state

government was the same as the national government in Mexico in 2007. Each municipality (or state) is given a value of one if the mayor (or governor) is from the same party as the president in 2007. More details on the construction of these variables are included in Appendix A.

Next, I used chi-square tests to assess the relationship between incorrect responsibility attribution for CCTs and non-benefactor party control, and the results are reported in Table 6.3. At the state level, citizens are more likely to attribute responsibility for the CCT program to the wrong level of government in non-matched districts, as predicted. The gap is four percentage points and, not surprisingly, is statistically significant. However, at the municipal level, there is not a statistically significant difference in attributing responsibility to the municipal government by party control. This finding, while contrary to my expectations, reveals a common theme throughout the rest of the chapter: non-benefactor party control does not matter at the municipal level. I return to this interesting finding in the discussion section.

Table 6.3: Responsibility Attribution for CCTs by Non-benefactor Party Control (Means)

Attribute	Party Control of Municipal Government (Mayor)		Difference
	Matched district	Non-matched district	
Responsibility for CCTs to Municipal Level	0.02	0.02	0
Attribute	Party Control of State Government (Governor)		Difference
	Matched district	Non-matched district	
Responsibility for CCTs to State Level	0.08	0.12	(-) 0.04***

* p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01. Chi-square tests are used in this analysis.

The results from Table 6.3 establish that citizens are more likely to attribute responsibility for CCTs to the wrong level of government (the state government) in non-matched districts, but it is unclear what factors are driving this difference across districts. For example, instead of non-matched districts creating more confusion in the minds of citizens, it may be the case that the composition of citizens in non-matched districts is different and driving this result. To control for this competing explanation, I use multilevel models to estimate the determinants of incorrect responsibility attribution for CCTs. My expectation is that, even when controlling for individual- and subnational-level factors that may conceivably influence responsibility attribution for

CCTs, non-matched districts still will be positively associated with attributing responsibility to the wrong levels of government.

For the variables in this analysis, I use the same 2007 Mexican survey data to measure incorrect responsibility attribution for CCTs. The dependent variables are attributing responsibility to the municipal government and the state government. The survey also includes questions on several individual-level factors that may influence responsibility attribution for CCTs, including CCT participation, income, education, age, gender, and religiosity. These questions are used to create individual-level control variables for the analysis.

My two main explanatory variables are the party control variables used in the previous analysis: separate dummy variables for whether the mayor or governor is of the same party as the president at the time of the survey. In addition, Mexican census data from 2005 allows for the creation of municipal- and state-level control variables that may influence responsibility attribution for CCTs, including measures for population, education, poverty, and the number of indigenous individuals living in the municipality or state.⁴ More details on the construction of these variables are included in the appendix.

Random-intercept multilevel logistic regression models (Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal 2008) are used in this analysis, and each model includes three levels: individual (level 1), municipality (level 2), and state (level 3). The results are reported in

⁴ This data is available at <http://www.inegi.org.mx/est/contenidos/proyectos/ccpv/cpv2005/Default.aspx>

Table 6.4. Even after controlling for individual- and subnational-level factors that likely influence responsibility attribution for CCTs, non-matched districts still have a positive and statistically significant relationship with attributing responsibility for CCTs to the state level of government. As for attributing responsibility to the municipal level, non-matched districts have the expected positive sign, but once again, this variable fails to reach statistical significance. The evidence supports the argument that the confusion caused by multiple signals in non-matched districts, rather than the composition of citizens in these districts, explains variation in attributing responsibility for CCTs to the state government.

Table 6.4: Models of Responsibility Attribution for CCTs

	(1) Attributing Responsibility for CCTs to Municipal Level	(2) Attributing Responsibility for CCTs to State Level
Ind Variables		
CCT	-0.366* (0.206)	-0.297*** (0.084)
Income	-0.203** (0.103)	-0.090** (0.045)
Education	-0.113 (0.107)	-0.097** (0.046)
Age	-0.231 (0.240)	-0.149 (0.107)
Female	-0.213 (0.168)	-0.002 (0.074)
Religiosity	0.042 (0.055)	0.089*** (0.023)
Subnat Variables		
Non-matched district (Mayor)	0.067 (0.298)	
Non-matched district (Governor)		0.517** (0.261)
Population	0.501 (0.805)	0.201 (0.160)
Education	0.090 (0.143)	0.185 (0.224)
Poverty	-0.076 (0.298)	-0.270 (0.247)
Indigenous	-0.263 (0.262)	0.197 (0.187)
Observations (ind)	8288	8803
Observations (mun)	738	815
Observations (states)	31	31

* p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01. Standard errors are in parentheses. The dependent variables are dichotomous variables for attributing responsibility for CCTs to the municipal level of government (Model 1) and the state level of government (Model 2). Model 1 includes subnational-level control variables at the municipal level and Model 2 includes subnational-level control variables at the state level. Random-intercept multilevel logistic regression models are used in this analysis.

6.2.2 CCTs and Incumbent Party Support in Non-benefactor Elections

There are three main challenges to estimating the effects of targeted transfers on electoral behavior in non-benefactor elections. First, governments may apply a political logic when deciding where to target the transfers (Cox and McCubbins 1986; Lindbeck and Weibull 1987; Dixit and Londregan 1995), and it will not be clear to the researcher which exact logic was followed. Without this information, we are unable to control for the targeting process and the estimated results will suffer from omitted variable bias. Second, even if there is no political logic driving the selection of beneficiaries, the reception of transfers may not be the only difference that exists between beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries. Unless we control for all of the differences that will affect electoral behavior, the results will still suffer from omitted variable bias. Third, if surveys are used for this analysis, the survey data may suffer from social desirability bias. For example, individuals may lie about their vote choice, because they want to be associated with the winning candidate or party (e.g., Atkeson 1999). If this is the case, then the estimates will be biased.

To overcome these problems, I once again utilize data from the randomized field experiment in Mexico and perform “downstream” experimental analysis (Green and Gerber 2002) on incumbent party support in non-benefactor elections. The use of experimental data is an improvement over previous analysis on this topic in Mexico. For the dependent variables of incumbent party vote share in non-benefactor elections, electoral data on the first post-treatment municipal and state legislative elections was collected at the precinct level from the independent state electoral office in each of the

seven experimental states.⁵ Incumbent party vote share is measured as the number of votes for the incumbent party in the first post-treatment municipal or state legislative election divided by the total number of votes in the precinct. The data is collected at the precinct level, because this is the most disaggregated unit of electoral data that is available in Mexico.

A dichotomous variable is used for the main explanatory variable of CCT treatment (*CCT Treatment*), with a value of one indicating that a precinct received CCT treatment and a value of zero indicating that a precinct did not receive treatment or only received late treatment.⁶ Although the experiment was randomized at the locality level, the CCT treatment variable is measured at the larger precinct level in order to match the most disaggregated unit of data that is available for electoral behavior in Mexican elections. On average, an experimental locality represents approximately 17 percent of the total population in its electoral precinct. Also, I use a dichotomous measure of CCT treatment in this analysis, because it is CCT treatment that is randomized in the field experiment (not the CCT treatment share).

To identify the exact electoral precinct for each experimental locality during the experimental period, I utilized ArcGIS and simultaneously analyzed shape files for electoral precincts and localities in the seven experimental states.⁷ The results from this procedure were confirmed by the independent electoral office in each state, and also

⁵ The author obtained this data through public information requests to the respective state electoral offices.

⁶ The name of the CCT program was Progresá during the experimental period.

⁷ The shapefiles were obtained through public information requests to the Instituto Federal Electoral (IFE) and the Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografía (INEGI).

match the assessments that were made in previous research by De La O (2013).⁸ Despite the need to aggregate localities into precincts for this analysis, a very large percentage of precincts in the sample (about 90 percent) end up having exactly one experimental locality. The main results for the analysis are robust to using both the full sample of precincts and the restricted sample of precincts with exactly one experimental locality.

To assess whether electoral gains from CCTs in non-benefactor elections depend on whether the district is matched, two additional variables also are created for each election. The first variable is dichotomous and it measures whether the PRI party, which is the party that controls the national government and provides the CCT program during the entire experimental period, is the incumbent party (*Matched District*). The second variable multiplies CCT treatment and the matched district dummy variable and creates a new interaction variable (*CCT Treatment*Matched District*).

A standard set of control variables at the precinct level also are added to the models presented below, including population in 1995, poverty in 1995, total votes in the previous election, and total votes for each of the three major parties in the previous election.⁹ A control variable is not included for whether the incumbent politician is seeking reelection, because consecutive reelection is prohibited in Mexico. The control

⁸ The data for this variable is available on De La O's website (<http://anadelao.commons.yale.edu>). The historical archive of redistricting changes from IFE confirms that these particular localities and precincts did not experience any redistricting changes in these years (public information request made by the author).

⁹ According to several state electoral offices, the data on the previous municipal and state elections is not available at the precinct level (public information requests made by the author). I therefore had to use previous national election data for these control variables. The data for all of the precinct-level controls and for the number of localities in each precinct is available on De La O's website (<http://anadelao.commons.yale.edu>).

variables are measured before the start of the experiment, so as to not introduce bias into the results. Importantly, and as expected given the experimental research design, the main results are robust to whether these controls are removed.

In Table 6.5, linear regression models are used to estimate the effect of CCTs on incumbent party vote share in municipal and state legislative elections.¹⁰ The *CCT Treatment* coefficients in this table are intent-to-treat estimates,¹¹ with models 1-2 reporting the effects in municipal elections and models 3-4 reporting the effects in state legislative elections. To account for the aggregation of localities into precincts, all models include fixed effects for the number of localities in the precinct. Also, to account for differences in the timing of elections as well as other potential differences across states, state fixed effects are included in each model. The *Matched District* dummy variable as well as the *CCT Treatment*Matched District* interaction variable are added to models 2 and 4. All models include precinct-level control variables, but as previously mentioned the main findings hold if these controls are removed.

¹⁰ According to the official data results provided by the state electoral offices, thirty-nine precincts (8 percent of the sample) are missing data for the municipal elections and ten precincts (2 percent of the sample) are missing data for the state legislative elections. The missing data for these variables account for differences in the sample size in the municipal models and the state legislative models.

¹¹ See Gupta (2011) for a review of intent-to-treat estimates.

Table 6.5: Effect of CCTs on Incumbent Party Vote Share in Non-benefactor Elections

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Municipal Elections	Municipal Elections	State Legislative Elections	State Legislative Elections
CCT Treatment	-0.010 (0.022)	-0.024 (0.035)	0.002 (0.017)	0.117* (0.066)
Matched District (Mayor)		0.244*** (0.036)		
CCT Treatment*Matched District (Mayor)		0.027 (0.042)		
Matched District (State Legislator)				0.213*** (0.060)
CCT Treatment*Matched District (State Legislator)				-0.125* (0.069)
Observations	381	381	408	408
R-squared	0.37	0.53	0.45	0.48

*p<.10, **p<.05, ***P<.01. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Linear regression models are used for this analysis, and the intent-to-treat estimates are reported. The dependent variables are incumbent party vote share for the first municipal and state legislative election after the start of the randomized experiment in Mexico (1998-2000). All models include number of localities fixed effects and state fixed effects. All models also contain a set of precinct-level control variables measured before the start of the experiment, including population, poverty, total votes in the previous election, and total votes for each of the three major parties in the previous election. The sample consists of all precincts with one experimental locality.

The results for the municipal elections in Table 6.5 indicate that CCTs have no effect on incumbent party vote share in these elections. Whether considering a single effect across all incumbent parties (Model 1) or a different effect depending on whether

the district is matched (Model 2), CCTs do not have a statistically significant relationship with incumbent party support in municipal elections.

As for the state legislative elections, the results from Table 6.5 indicate that the effect of CCTs on incumbent party vote share depends on whether the district is matched. When the district is *not* matched, CCTs increase incumbent party vote share by almost 12 percentage points in state legislative elections. Non-matched incumbents are able to secure immense electoral gains from CCTs, even though they play no role in providing the program. In substantive terms, CCTs have a sizable influence on election outcomes in state legislative elections when the district is not matched. Interestingly, the estimated CCT effect on incumbent party vote share for matched districts in state legislative elections is $- .8$ percentage points ($11.7 + -12.5 = - .8$). While statistically significant, the effect is small in substantive terms. In other words, CCTs only have the potential to influence election outcomes in matched districts in very close state legislative elections. The evidence from the state elections supports my prediction: CCTs lead to more electoral rewards for the incumbent party in non-matched districts.

The results are robust to a variety of alternative specifications, and the tables with these results are included in Appendix B. In Table B6.1, I present the results for the same models but with the precinct-level control variables removed. As expected given the experimental design, the main findings do not change. In Table B6.2, I present the results for the full set of experimental precincts. Once again, the results hold when considering the full sample. These main findings also are robust to removing the state

fixed effects, removing the number of localities fixed effects, and removing both sets of fixed effects.

Overall, the evidence from Mexico suggests that electoral rewards from CCTs extend into state legislative elections but not municipal elections. Within state legislative elections, the effect of CCTs on incumbent party vote share depends on party control: incumbent parties gain sizeable vote share in non-matched districts, but lose a small amount of vote share in matched districts. The results for the municipal elections run counter to earlier research on Mexico (Rodríguez-Chamussy 2015). These findings create a new set of questions. First, why does non-benefactor party control condition the effect of CCTs on incumbent party support in state legislative elections in Mexico, as predicted, but not municipal elections? Second, will non-benefactor party control influence the effect of CCTs in other countries?

In response to the first question, it appears that government resources, not just whether the district is matched, play a role in creating confusion in the minds of citizens, and in turn, electoral rewards. The state government controls more resources than the municipal government in Mexico, and it is more likely to be able to support a large CCT program. The resources of the state government therefore make it a more plausible provider of CCTs. The survey data on responsibility attribution reinforce this idea. According to the 2007 national survey, approximately 27 percent of Mexican respondents are unable to identify the national government as the provider of CCTs. Importantly for our purposes, the incorrect responses are not evenly distributed. While less than two percent of respondents identify the municipal government as the provider

of CCTs, nearly eleven percent indicate the state government. More research is needed to unpack whether confusion, credit-claiming¹² or a combination of both is responsible for the differences in CCT effects across election levels.

Moving on to the second question, will party control condition CCT effects on incumbent party support in non-benefactor elections outside of Mexico? I argue that it will, but only in contexts where it is plausible for the level of government in question to provide the program. Previous research on CCTs does not find these effects because it only considers local elections. As we have seen in Mexico, nearly all citizens are able to conclude that local level governments are unable to provide expensive cash transfer programs. In other words, only plausible signals are able to confuse citizens and lead to differences in CCT effects.

Another limiting condition is if the CCT program is clientelistic. If benefactors are able to trade benefits for electoral support, then we would not expect many errors in responsibility attribution. Consequently, it is less likely in these contexts that CCT effects on incumbent party support will depend on whether the district is matched.

6.3 Discussion

Democratic elections will incentivize elected officials to offer beneficial policy, as long as citizens properly attribute responsibility for past policy and reward (or punish) the correct policy makers.¹³ If we want to understand the consequences of beneficial

¹² For an argument on CCTs and credit-claiming in Mexico, see Rodríguez-Chamussy (2015).

¹³ For more on this mechanism, see the seminal work of Key (1966).

policies for electoral accountability, we must examine the potential consequences of these policies in both benefactor and non-benefactor elections. An exclusive examination of benefactor elections is too narrow and misses the possibility of perverse incentives for non-benefactor incumbents.

In the particular case of CCTs, the findings from this chapter illuminate another negative consequence of these programs: undeserving incumbent parties are being rewarded in non-benefactor elections. Although the electoral rewards are not as widespread as previously imagined, they still create perverse incentives for non-benefactors and present a threat to electoral accountability. When combined with the results from the last chapter (chapter 5), which show a reduced pressure on local politicians to provide vital services, it becomes even more clear that effective policy from one level of government can create undesirable outcomes at another.

These findings have important policy implications, not just in Mexico but also more broadly. CCT benefactors, including governments and international funders, need to make a larger investment in credit-claiming efforts, especially in non-matched districts. Although these efforts will not directly help the poor, they will help make the cash transfers more effective by removing obstacles to electoral accountability at other levels of government. The need for increased investment in credit-claiming efforts is even greater in programs which allow space for the involvement of non-benefactors. Benefactors might also explore the creation or expansion of penalties for false credit-claiming efforts by non-benefactors, as these are examples of signals that may cause confusion in the minds of citizens.

In addition, the strict limitations on official CCT program communications during electoral campaigns needs to be reexamined. These limitations that are in place in countries such as Mexico are seen as hallmarks of clean CCT programs (De La O 2015), and they certainly create obstacles for some forms of political interference. But they also might limit the transfer of accurate information and create threats to electoral accountability at other levels of government. The removal of accurate signals leaves more space for flawed ones.

Conclusion

7.1 Argument and Main Results

In this dissertation, I find that CCTs have important consequences for political behavior and human development. CCTs increase participation in multiple modes of political activity, particularly more demanding activities. These antipoverty programs also feed back into the political system and affect some non-benefactor election outcomes. In addition, CCTs increase access to private local services. The positive CCT effect on the private provision of sewerage illuminates a new indirect pathway to improved human development outcomes, especially in the areas of health and poverty alleviation.

How do CCTs produce these outcomes? I present a Policy Push Argument that emphasizes the importance of both cash transfers and conditionalities. When CCT beneficiaries are pushed to meet civic-based conditionalities, they acquire politically relevant resources. In particular, the conditionalities create more opportunities to exercise civic skills and more access to government officials and community leaders, thus reducing the costs of political participation for beneficiaries. The cash transfers increase disposable income and allow beneficiaries to purchase private local services.

Rather than wait for access to the government's public system, CCT beneficiaries find alternative options.

A recurring theme of this dissertation is the importance of human agency. Programs can provide material and non-material resources which alter the costs of performing certain actions, but beneficiaries still have a choice over whether to carry out these actions. In the case of CCTs, the program beneficiaries receive politically relevant resources, but these resources do not translate into increased involvement in all modes of political participation. In addition, the cash transfers open up a set of new local service options to consider, as CCT beneficiaries gain the necessary financial security to afford private alternatives. Lastly, CCT beneficiaries have the option to attribute responsibility for the program to a level of government and/or a political party and to reward (or punish) the perceived benefactors during elections.

7.2 Contributions

This dissertation makes several key theoretical and empirical contributions. On the theoretical side, it highlights that social assistance programs can have multiple components, and it recognizes the potential for each component to have a separate effect on political participation. Program component effects not only help to explain variation in political participation, but they also may help clarify mixed findings on the consequences of certain types of social programs. Future policy-based theories of political participation must take into account the potential effects of specific program components, especially conditionalities. In addition, the dissertation underscores how

government programs can create *social* pathways to increased political participation. When programs push beneficiaries into new social interactions, they alter their social networks and create opportunities for exercising communications skills. The new social space thus influences the acquisition of key resources which can facilitate political involvement. Moreover, my project emphasizes that CCTs also have some undesirable political consequences. In particular, CCTs reduce the amount of pressure on local officials to provide local services, and, at least in some contexts, increase electoral rewards for undeserving incumbent parties. The unwarranted electoral rewards create even less motivation for incumbents to improve responsiveness to citizen needs.

The dissertation also introduces a new challenger to the political clientelism tradition in the study of the poor's political participation in the Global South. CCTs, which in many cases are beyond the grasp of clientelism, constitute an emerging force in explaining broad political participation among the poor. An examination of the relative importance of clientelism and CCTs is outside the scope of this dissertation, but, at the very least, it is reasonable to think that CCT-based explanations will outperform clientelism arguments when it comes to explaining non-electoral political participation.

On the empirical side, the dissertation isolates the effects of the conditionality component by comparing the impacts of CCTs and otherwise similar UCTs in a single context. This empirical strategy is superior to assessing the effects of conditionalities across countries, because it produces natural controls for any country-level differences. In addition, by focusing my analysis on municipalities with a wide breadth – but low depth – of poverty, I am able minimize the number of differences between CCT

beneficiaries, UCT beneficiaries, and non-beneficiaries and produce improved estimates of program effects. The follow-up analysis with a restricted sample, which only considers the beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries who are right above or below the program eligibility line, create an additional layer of natural controls. This analysis resembles a regression discontinuity design and reduces concerns that are common with observational data. Furthermore, by utilizing data from a randomized field experiment to test the effects of CCTs on incumbent party support in non-benefactor elections, the dissertation improves upon existing empirical analysis on this topic in Mexico.

7.3 Policy Implications

The findings have three important implications for policy. First, the results need to be taken into account in debates over whether to adopt (or expand) CCTs vs. UCTs. A narrow examination of the human development consequences of these programs does not capture the full range of important effects.

Second, in contexts that have civic education programs, policymakers ought to consider consolidating antipoverty and civic education efforts. CCTs may turn out to be a more effective producer of civic skills and democratic engagement than programs which are specifically designed for these purposes. The CCT workshops may incorporate more formal civic education trainings and/or continue to serve as venues for experiential civic learning. Indeed, some of the program conditionalities already create environments which are similar to civic organization meetings, even though they are state-directed activities.

Third, policymakers and international funders need to address the negative political consequences of CCTs. More investment in credit-claiming efforts should help improve democratic accountability at other levels of government. The removal of some of the restrictions on official CCT communications during electoral campaigns also should be considered, although I recognize that this decision carries some risks. Policymakers and interested groups also should explore different ways to incentivize local officials to become more responsive to the needs of CCT beneficiaries. For example, the introduction of rewards for expanding high quality local services would appear to align the interests of both local officials and poor citizens. Another option would be to reimburse CCT beneficiaries for some of the expenses involved with connecting to the government's network of services, as well as maintaining this connection over time.

7.4 Future Research

I conclude by identifying some promising avenues for future research. Given that CCTs encourage democratic political participation, they also may influence attitudes towards democracy. More research is needed to test the effects of CCTs on democratic attitudes, with an emphasis on identifying whether, or under what conditions, beneficiaries believe democracy is responsible for instituting the program. In addition to considering existing sources of data on this topic, researchers should pursue opportunities to produce original survey data with more refined measures of democratic attitudes.

A comparative social policy analysis, with CCTs as one of the highlighted policies, would also improve our understanding of the consequences of social policy for political attitudes and behavior in the Global South. Latin America would appear to be a promising location for this study, given the expansion of CCTs and the recent changes in health policy in some countries. This work would help identify the relative importance of CCTs.

In addition, in order to contribute more to the debate over CCTs vs. UCTs, more research is needed on the feedback effects of these programs. My dissertation exposes some negative political consequences of CCTs, but it is unclear if UCTs also lead to these undesirable outcomes. Moreover, it remains to be seen if there are other feedback effects – positive or negative – on the behavior of elites and citizens. A comprehensive examination of the policy feedback effects of CCTs and UCTs would allow policymakers and international funders to make a more informed choice over future investments in social assistance programs.

Finally, I believe that there are exciting opportunities to explore the long-term effects of CCTs. As the programs mature, and the child beneficiaries become adults, it may be the case that their past experiences in the program continue to shape attitudes and behavior over time. Given the immense size of some of the programs, it seems very likely that the programs will have long-term policy feedback effects as well. In the current time period, we may be only scratching the surface of the effects of CCTs on political behavior and policy. The long-term effects likely will shape human development consequences as well.

Appendix A

Variables from the 2012 LAPOP Survey Data

Voting: An additive index of whether the respondent has registered to vote, voted in the last presidential election, and would vote in the current presidential election. When necessary, survey question responses are rescaled so that larger values indicate more political participation. Also, if a survey question has multiple response categories, then it is rescaled to have a maximum value of one (Mean: 2.55; SD: .80)

Campaign Activism: An additive index of whether the respondent has tried to convince others to vote, participated in an electoral campaign in the last presidential election, and attended meetings for a political party or movement. When necessary, survey question responses are rescaled so that larger values indicate more political participation. Also, if a survey question has multiple response categories, then it is rescaled to have a maximum value of one (Mean: .32; SD: .55)

Contacting Public Officials: An additive index of whether the respondent has contacted a member of the legislature, contacted a local politician, contacted a state official or agency, asked for help from or presented a petition to a government official in the last twelve months, and signed a petition. When necessary, survey question responses are rescaled so that larger values indicate more political participation. Also, if a survey question has multiple response categories, then it is rescaled to have a maximum value of one (Mean: .48; SD: .91)

Community Activism: An additive index of whether the respondent has attended a municipal meeting or session in the past twelve months, contributed to help resolve a community problem in the past twelve months, attended meetings for a community improvement group, and organized with neighbors against violence. When necessary, survey question responses are rescaled so that larger values indicate more political participation. Also, if a survey question has multiple response categories, then it is rescaled to have a maximum value of one (Mean: .56; SD: .77)

Civil Society Engagement: An additive index of how often the respondent has attended meetings for a religious organization, a school organization, a professional organization, and a sports group. When necessary, survey question responses are rescaled so that larger values indicate more political participation. Also, if a survey question has multiple response categories, then it is rescaled to have a maximum value of one (Mean: .82; SD: .71)

Protest: An additive index of whether the respondent has participated in a protest or demonstration in the past twelve months, and whether the respondent has participated in a blockade in the past twelve months. When necessary, survey question responses are rescaled so that larger values indicate more political participation. Also, if a survey question has multiple response categories, then it is rescaled to have a maximum value of one (Mean: .09; SD: .36).

Religious Organization: how often the respondent has attended meetings for a religious organization. 0= never; 1= one or two times a year; 2= one or two times a month; and 3= once a week (Mean: 1.22; SD: 1.28).

School Organization: how often the respondent has attended meetings for a school organization. 0= never; 1= one or two times a year; 2= one or two times a month; and 3= once a week (Mean: .61; SD: .90).

Professional Organization: how often the respondent has attended meetings for a professional organization. 0= never; 1= one or two times a year; 2= one or two times a month; and 3= once a week (Mean: .18; SD: .57).

Sports Group: how often the respondent has attended meetings for a sports group. 0= never; 1= one or two times a year; 2= one or two times a month; and 3= once a week (Mean: .44; SD: .94).

CCT: a dichotomous variable for whether someone in the household participates in the CCT program: 1=CCT participant, 0= Not a CCT participant (Mean: .18; SD: .38)

Income: the range of monthly household income for the respondent, including income from remittances and all adults and children in the house that work, out of 16 possible categories (Mean: 7.80; SD: 4.07)

Wealth Index: this variable is measured using a household living standard index. Out of a total of fifteen household items, the additive index counts the number of items in the respondent's house. The household items include a TV, refrigerator, land telephone, cellphone, car, washer, microwave, motorcycle, potable water, bathroom, computer, internet, flat screen TV, and sewerage (Mean: 8.69; SD: 3.15).

Employed: a dichotomous variable for whether the respondent is currently employed. 1=employed, 0=not employed (Mean: .56; SD: .50)

Education: the number of years of schooling for the respondent (Mean: 9.76; SD: 4.26).

Age: the natural log of the respondent's age in years (Mean: 3.64; SD: .40)

Female: a dichotomous variable for whether the respondent is female. 1=female, 0=male (Mean: .52; SD: .50).

Children: a dichotomous variable for whether the respondent has children. 1=yes, 0=no (Mean .73; SD: .44)

Religiosity: how important religion is to the respondent: 0=not at all important, 1=a little important, 2=somewhat important, 3=very important (Mean: 3.30; SD=.90)

Rurality: a dichotomous variable for whether the respondent lives in a rural area, using the census definition in each country. 1=rural, 0=not rural (Mean: .24; SD: .42).

Variables from the 2014 Mexican Survey Data

Voting: An additive index of whether the respondent has registered to vote, voted in the last presidential election, voted in the last state legislative election, and voted in the last municipal election. When necessary, survey question responses are rescaled so that larger values indicate more political participation. Also, if a survey question has multiple response categories, then it is rescaled to have a maximum value of one (Mean: 3.14; SD: 1.29)

Campaign Activism: An additive index of whether the respondent has tried to convince others to vote, participated in an electoral campaign in the last presidential election, and attended meetings for a political party or movement. When necessary, survey question responses are rescaled so that larger values indicate more political participation. Also, if a survey question has multiple response categories, then it is rescaled to have a maximum value of one (Mean: .29; SD: .45)

Contacting Public Officials: An additive index of whether the respondent has contacted a member of the legislature, contacted a local politician, contacted a state official or agency, contacted a public program official, asked for help from or presented a petition to a government official in the last twelve months, and signed a petition. When necessary, survey question responses are rescaled so that larger values indicate more political participation. Also, if a survey question has multiple response categories, then it is rescaled to have a maximum value of one (Mean: 1.03; SD: 1.43)

Community Activism: An additive index of whether the respondent has attended a municipal meeting or session in the past twelve months, contributed to help resolve a community problem in the past twelve months, attended meetings for a community improvement group, and attended neighborhood committee meetings. When necessary, survey question responses are rescaled so that larger values indicate more political participation. Also, if a survey question has multiple response categories, then it is rescaled to have a maximum value of one (Mean: .47; SD: .63)

Civil Society Engagement: An additive index of how often the respondent has attended meetings for a religious organization, a school organization, a health organization, and any other organization. When necessary, survey question responses are rescaled so that larger values indicate more political participation. Also, if a survey question has multiple response categories, then it is rescaled to have a maximum value of one (Mean: .88; SD: .70)

Protest: An additive index of whether the respondent has participated in a protest or demonstration in the past twelve months, and whether the respondent has participated

in a blockade in the past twelve months. When necessary, survey question responses are rescaled so that larger values indicate more political participation. Also, if a survey question has multiple response categories, then it is rescaled to have a maximum value of one (Mean: .12; SD: .41).

Religious Organization: how often the respondent has attended meetings for a religious organization. 0= never; 1= one or two times a year; 2= one or two times a month; and 3= once a week (Mean: 1.28; SD: 1.20).

School Organization: how often the respondent has attended meetings for a school organization. 0= never; 1= one or two times a year; 2= one or two times a month; and 3= once a week (Mean: .75; SD: .89).

Health Organization: how often the respondent has attended meetings for a professional organization. 0= never; 1= one or two times a year; 2= one or two times a month; and 3= once a week (Mean: .44; SD: .74).

Other Organization: how often the respondent has attended meetings for a sports group. 0= never; 1= one or two times a year; 2= one or two times a month; and 3= once a week (Mean: .17; SD: .45).

CCT: a dichotomous variable for whether someone in the household participates in the *Oportunidades* program: 1=CCT participant, 0= Not a CCT participant (Mean: .30; SD: .46)

UCT: a dichotomous variable for whether someone in the household participates in the *Programa de Apoyo Alimentario (PAL)* program: 1=UCT participant, 0= Not a UCT participant (Mean: .10; SD: .30)

Income: Adding up the income from all household members that work, the range of monthly household income out of 8 categories (Mean: 3.35; SD: 1.16)

Wealth Index: this variable is measured using a household living standard index. Out of a total of twelve household items, the additive index counts the number of items in the respondent's house. The household items include cooking materials, refrigerator, land telephone, cellphone, car, washing machine, microwave, video cassette or DVD player, 3 or more rooms in the house, bathroom, computer, and internet (Mean: 4.28; SD: 2.40).

Employed: a dichotomous variable for whether the respondent is currently employed. 1=employed, 0=not employed (Mean: .51; SD: .50)

Education: highest level of education completed (Mean: 4.13; SD: 1.85).

Age: the natural log of the respondent's age in years (Mean: 3.66; SD: .38)

Female: a dichotomous variable for whether the respondent is female. 1=female, 0=male (Mean: .51; SD: .50).

Children: a dichotomous variable for whether the respondent has children. 1=yes, 0=no (Mean: .73; SD: .44)

Religiosity: how important religion is to the respondent: 0=not at all important, 1=a little important, 2=somewhat important, 3=very important (Mean: 3.22; SD: .84)

Population: the total population in the respondent's locality in 2010. This variable is standardized in the models (Mean: 7405; SD: 2955)

Poverty: the number of households without potable water, sewerage, or electricity in the respondent's locality divided by the total number of households in the respondent's locality in 2010 (Mean: .27; SD: .29)

Rurality: whether the respondent's locality is rural, semi-rural or urban. 2=population under 2500, 1=population above 2500, but not an administrative headquarters for the municipality; 0=the administrative headquarters for the municipality (Mean: .45; SD: .62).

Education: the total number of people with education beyond secondary school in the respondent's locality in 2010. This variable is standardized in the models (Mean: 1067; SD: 600)

Attended a Meeting and Participated in the Discussion: How often the respondent has attended meetings and participated in the discussions in the past year, thinking only of their experiences at work, in social programs, or in other non-political activities. 0= never, 1= one or two times a year, 2= one or two times a month, and 3= once a week (Mean: .43; SD: .72).

Organized a Meeting or Set Up an Appointment: How often the respondent has organized a meeting or set up an appointment in the past year, thinking only of their experiences at work, in social programs, or in other non-political activities. 0= never, 1= one or two times a year, 2= one or two times a month, and 3= once a week (Mean: .30; SD: .58).

Wrote a Letter or Filled Out Forms: How often the respondent has wrote a letter or filled out forms in the past year, thinking only of their experiences at work, in social programs, or in other non-political activities. 0= never, 1= one or two times a year, 2= one or two times a month, and 3= once a week (Mean: .26; SD: .55).

Asked Someone to Clarify Information: How often the respondent has asked someone questions or for clarifications regarding some information in the past year, thinking only

of their experiences at work, in social programs, or in other non-political activities. 0= never, 1= one or two times a year, 2= one or two times a month, and 3= once a week (Mean: .28; SD: .55).

Civic Skills Index: An additive index of the four survey questions on civic skills, with each question rescaled to have a maximum value of one and equal weight in the index (Mean: .42; SD: .58).

Politician or Party Leader: Whether the respondent would ask a politician or someone from a political party for help, if she needed help with a difficult problem. 1= yes, 0= no (Mean: .50; SD: .50)

Public Program Official: Whether the respondent would ask a government program official for help, if she needed help with a difficult problem. 1= yes, 0= no (Mean: .45; SD: .50)

Program Beneficiary Leader: Whether the respondent would ask a program beneficiary for help, if she needed help with a difficult problem. 1= yes, 0= no (Mean: .38; SD: .49)

Civic Association Leader: Whether the respondent would ask a civic association or community group for help, if she needed help with a difficult problem. 1= yes, 0= no (Mean: .44; SD: .50)

Medical Professional or Teacher: Whether the respondent would ask medical professional, teacher, or professor for help, if she needed help with a difficult problem. 1= yes, 0= no (Mean: .52; SD: .50)

Other Community Leader: Whether the respondent would ask a different community leader for help, if she needed help with a difficult problem. 1= yes, 0= no (Mean: .35; SD: .48)

Access Index: An additive index of the six survey questions on access to state officials and community leaders, with each question given equal weight in the index (Mean: 2.59; SD: 2.12).

Adjusted Poverty Index: An index of nineteen variables measuring poverty, with each variable given equal weight in the index. The index is rescaled to range from 0 to 1, and adjusted to account for benefits obtained through participating in the CCT or UCT program. Adjustments are based on the amount of program benefits received by the household, with higher levels of program benefits requiring a larger adjustment. The variables include a kids to adults household ratio, the number of adult females in the household, the total number of household members, two separate measures of education, current employment, health insurance, number of rooms, indoor bathroom, cooking source, refrigerator, car, computer, DVD player, phone, oven, two separate measures of rurality, and a measure of social vulnerability in the locality (Mean: .45; SD: .20).

Govt Interested in You: Respondent's assessment of whether those who govern the country are interested in what people like her think. 0=strongly disagree, 1= somewhat disagree, 2=neither agree nor disagree, 3=somewhat agree, and 4=strongly agree. (Mean: 1.66; SD: 1.19)

Vote Matters: Respondent's assessment of whether the vote influences what happens in the country. 0=strongly disagree, 1= somewhat disagree, 2=neither agree nor disagree, 3=somewhat agree, and 4=strongly agree. (Mean: 1.98; SD: 1.12)

Understand Political Issues: Respondent's assessment of whether she understands important political issues well. 0=strongly disagree, 1= somewhat disagree, 2=neither agree nor disagree, 3=somewhat agree, and 4=strongly agree. (Mean: 1.78; SD: .99)

Informed about Loc Govt: Respondent's assessment of whether she is better informed about local government than the majority of other people in her community. 0=strongly disagree, 1= somewhat disagree, 2=neither agree nor disagree, 3=somewhat agree, and 4=strongly agree. (Mean: 1.65; SD: .97)

Ability to Help Com Group: Respondent's assessment about whether she lacks the ability to help a community improvement group. 0=strongly disagree, 1= somewhat disagree, 2=neither agree nor disagree, 3=somewhat agree, and 4=strongly agree. Rescaled so that larger values indicate more ability. (Mean: 2.43; SD: 1.00)

Interest in Politics: Respondent's assessment of her level of interest in politics. 0=none, 1=a little, 2=some, 3=a lot. (Mean: 1.21; SD: .80)

Vote in Nat Election: Whether the respondent personally was asked to vote in the most recent presidential election; 1=Yes, 0=No (Mean: .09; SD: .28)

Vote in State or Mun Election: Whether the respondent personally was asked to vote in the most recent state or municipal elections; 1=Yes, 0=No (Mean: .07; SD: .25)

Camp: Whether the respondent personally was asked to work on behalf of some candidate or party in the campaign of the most recent elections; 1=Yes, 0=No (Mean: .09; SD: .29)

Attend Civ Org: Whether the respondent personally was asked to attend meetings of an association or civic organization in the past twelve months; 1=Yes, 0=No (Mean: .14; SD: .35)

Attend Comm Impr Group: Whether the respondent personally was asked to attend meetings for a group or committee aimed at improving the community in the past twelve months; 1=Yes, 0=No (Mean: .19; SD: .39)

Solve Comm Prob: Whether the respondent personally was asked to help resolve a problem in the community or neighborhood in the past twelve months; 1=Yes, 0=No (Mean: .22; SD: .42)

Attend Mun Session: Whether the respondent personally was asked to attend a town hall meeting or municipal session in the past twelve months; 1=Yes, 0=No (Mean: .11; SD: .32)

Cont Govt Official: Whether the respondent personally was asked to contact a politician, government employee, or municipal government office in the past twelve months; 1=Yes, 0=No (Mean: .08; SD: .27)

Sign a Petition: Whether the respondent personally was asked to sign a petition in the past twelve months; 1=Yes, 0=No (Mean: .13; SD: .34)

Protest: Whether the respondent personally was asked to participate in a demonstration or protest in the past twelve months; 1=Yes, 0=No (Mean: .05; SD: .22)

Mobil Index: An additive index of the ten mobilization variables, rescaled so that values range between 0 and 1 (Mean: .12; SD: .17)

Trust in Other Community Members: The respondent's opinion of how trustworthy are the other members of the community; 3=Very trustworthy, 2=somewhat trustworthy, 1=A little trustworthy, 0=Not at all trustworthy (Mean: 1.94; SD: .81)

Trust in CCT Beneficiaries in the Community: The respondent's opinion of how trustworthy are the CCT beneficiaries in the community; 3=Very trustworthy, 2=somewhat trustworthy, 1=A little trustworthy, 0=Not at all trustworthy (Mean: 1.70; SD: .82)

Trust in Beneficiaries of Other Programs in the Community: The respondent's opinion of how trustworthy are the beneficiaries of other programs in the community; 3=Very trustworthy, 2=somewhat trustworthy, 1=A little trustworthy, 0=Not at all trustworthy (Mean: 1.60; SD: .80)

Variables from the 2007 Mexican Survey Data

Attributing Responsibility for CCTs to Municipal Level: dichotomous variable for whether the respondent attributed responsibility for CCTs to the municipal government or the mayor, with a value of one indicating yes (Mean: .02; SD: .14).

Attributing Responsibility for CCTs to State Level: dichotomous variable for whether the respondent attributed responsibility for CCTs to the state government or the governor, with a value of one indicating yes (Mean: .11; SD: .31).

CCT: dichotomous variable for whether respondent or someone in the respondent's household participates in the Oportunidades program (Mean: .33; SD: .47)

Income: Respondent's monthly household income according to categories of income ranges (Mean: 1.49; SD: 1.06)

Education: highest level of education achieved by the respondent according to education categories (Mean: 1.86; SD: 1.06)

Age: the natural log of the respondent's age (Mean: 3.61; SD: .40)

Female: dichotomous variable for whether the respondent is female (Mean: .51; SD: .40)

Religiosity: How often the respondent attends religious services according to attendance categories (Mean: 2.60; SD: 1.78)

Matched District (mayor): dichotomous variable for whether the mayor in 2007 is of the same party as the president (Mean: .35; SD: .48)

Matched District (governor): dichotomous variable for whether the governor in 2007 is of the same party as the president (Mean: .28; SD: .45)

Population (municipal): total population in the municipality; standardized in the model (Mean: 131,231.30; SD: 256,862.90)

Education (municipal): average highest grade level achieved in the municipality (Mean: 6.92; SD: 1.61)

Poverty (municipal): number of households in the municipality that have a dirt floor; standardized in the model (Mean: 1854.63; SD: 3005.72)

Indigenous (municipal): number of individuals in the municipality that speak an indigenous language; standardized in the model (Mean: 3774.64; SD: 10,887.87)

Population (state): total population in the state; standardized in the model (Mean: 3,235,927; SD: 2,757,989)

Education (state): average highest grade level achieved in the state (Mean: 8.07; SD: .88)

Poverty (state): number of households in the state that have a dirt floor; standardized in the model (Mean: 77,060.31; SD: 88,591.30)

Indigenous (state): number of individuals in the state that speak an indigenous language; standardized in the model (Mean: 189,370.40; SD: 276,657.10)

Variables from the Mexican Experimental Data (precinct level)

Voter Turnout in the Municipal Election: The total number of votes in a precinct for the municipal election divided by the number of potential voters (eighteen years or older) in that precinct (Mean: .66; SD: .31).

Voter Turnout in the State Legislative Election: The total number of votes in a precinct for the relative majority state legislative election divided by the number of potential voters (eighteen years or older) in that precinct (Mean: .64; SD: .30).

CCT Treatment: Dichotomous variable for whether the precinct received early CCT treatment in September of 1998, with a value of one indicating yes (Mean: .67; SD: .47)

Population: The total population in the precinct in 1995 (Mean: 1977.41; SD: 6603.17)

Poverty: The average level of poverty in the precinct in 1995 (Mean: 4.58; SD: .49)

Total Votes: The total number of votes in the precinct in the 1994 presidential election (Mean: 395.93; SD: 225.16)

PRI Votes: The total number of votes for the PRI in the precinct in the 1994 presidential election (Mean: 248.54; SD: 151.45)

PAN Votes: The total number of votes for the PAN in the precinct in the 1994 presidential election (Mean: 36.26; SD: 47.12)

PRD Votes: The total number of votes for the PRD in the precinct in the 1994 presidential election (Mean: 62.61; SD: 76.67)

Number of Localities: The total number of localities in the precinct (Mean: 6.18; SD: 3.82)

Incumbent Party Vote Share (Municipal Elections): The number of votes for the incumbent party in the first post-treatment municipal election divided by the total number of votes in the precinct (Mean: .46; SD: .24).

Incumbent Party Vote Share (State Legislative Elections): The number of votes for the incumbent party in the first post-treatment state legislative election divided by the total number of votes in the precinct (Mean: .52; SD: .20).

Matched District (Mayor): Dichotomous variable for whether the incumbent party in the first post-treatment municipal election is the PRI (Mean: .67; SD: .47)

Matched District (State Legislator): Dichotomous variable for whether the incumbent party in the first post-treatment state legislative election is the PRI (Mean: .91; SD: .28)

*CCT Treatment*Matched District (Mayor):* The variable for CCT Treatment multiplied by the variable for PRI Incumbent in the municipal election (Mean: .45; SD: .50)

*CCT Treatment*Matched District (State Legislator):* The variable for CCT Treatment multiplied by the variable for PRI Incumbent in the state legislative election (Mean: .60; SD: .49)

Variables from the Mexican Experimental Data (locality level)

Private Provision of Sewerage Services: The change in the share of the locality with household access to the private provision of sewerage services (septic tanks) between 1995 and 2000 (Mean: .07; SD: .17)

Governmental Provision of Sewerage Services: The change in the share of the locality with household access to governmental provision of sewerage services between 1995 and 2000 (Mean: .01; SD: .11)

Governmental Provision of Water Services: The change in the share of the locality with household access to governmental provision of water services between 1995 and 2000 (Mean: .03; SD: .32)

Treatment: Dichotomous variable for whether the locality received early CCT treatment in September of 1998; 1=yes, 0=no (Mean: .63; SD: .48)

Population: The total population of the locality in 1995 (Mean: 258.69; SD: 182.01)

Poverty: Number of individuals (aged six or older) who are illiterate in the locality in 1995 (Mean: 63.54; SD: 64.36)

PRI Controls the Municipal Presidency: A dummy variable for whether the locality has a PRI mayor at the start of the experiment in September of 1998; 1=yes, 0=no (Mean: .66; SD: .47)

Election: A dummy variable for whether there is a municipal election between the start of the experiment in September of 1998 and the final measurement of local service coverage in spring of 2000; 1=yes, 0=no (Mean: .54; SD: .50)

*Treatment*Election:* An interaction variable between *Treatment* and *Election* (Mean: .36; SD: .48)

Appendix B

Table B3.1: Confirmatory Factor Analysis Results for the Political Participation Indices (2012 LAPOP Survey Data)

	Voting	Campaign Activism	Contacting Public Officials	Community Activism	Civil Society Engagement
RMSEA	.00	.00	.03	.01	.07
CFI	1.00	1.00	.90	1.00	.70
N	11,446	13,232	13,424	13,287	13,428

Notes: The two variables in the protest index (participation in a protest and participation in a blockade) are not able to be assessed using confirmatory factor analysis, because all respondents who participated in a blockade also participated in a protest.

Table B3.2: Multilevel Models of Civil Society Engagement (2012 LAPOP Data)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Religious Organization	School Organization	Professional Organization	Sports Group
CCT	0.037 (0.035)	0.132*** (0.026)	0.044** (0.018)	0.024 (0.028)
Income	0.000 (0.004)	-0.004 (0.003)	0.008*** (0.002)	0.010*** (0.003)
Employed	-0.064** (0.028)	0.089*** (0.021)	0.117*** (0.014)	-0.007 (0.022)
Education	0.010*** (0.004)	0.016*** (0.003)	0.017*** (0.002)	0.022*** (0.003)
Age	0.267*** (0.038)	-0.311*** (0.029)	0.089*** (0.019)	-0.290*** (0.031)
Female	0.202*** (0.027)	0.274*** (0.021)	-0.058*** (0.014)	-0.440*** (0.022)
Children	-0.004 (0.033)	0.689*** (0.025)	0.047*** (0.017)	-0.048* (0.026)
Religiosity	0.490*** (0.015)	0.059*** (0.011)	0.011 (0.008)	0.039*** (0.012)
Rurality	0.053 (0.039)	0.113*** (0.026)	0.115*** (0.018)	0.032 (0.028)
N (individuals)	7904	7900	7887	7853
N (municipalities)	637	637	637	637
N (countries)	9	9	9	9

Standard errors are in parentheses. * p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01

Notes: The dependent variables are how often the respondent attends meetings for a religious organization, school organization, professional organization, and a sports group. Random-intercept multilevel models are used in this analysis.

Table B3.3: Confirmatory Factor Analysis Results for the Political Participation Indices (2014 Survey Data from Mexico)

	Voting	Campaign Activism	Contacting Public Officials	Community Activism	Civil Society Engagement
RMSEA	.00	.00	.03	.02	.08
CFI	1.00	1.00	.92	.99	.90
N	1093	1126	1128	1125	1126

Notes: The two variables in the protest index (participation in a protest and participation in a blockade) are not able to be assessed using confirmatory factor analysis, because all respondents who participated in a blockade also participated in a protest.

Table B3.4: Multilevel Models of Political Participation (2014 Mexican Survey Data)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Voting	Camp Activism	Cont Publ Officials	Comm Activism	Civ Soc Engage	Protest
Ind Variables						
CCT	0.220**	0.037	0.358***	0.107**	0.144***	0.108***
UCT	0.310**	0.017	0.245	0.009	-0.012	0.010
Income	0.054	0.064***	0.059	0.020	-0.016	0.003
Employed	0.313***	-0.053	0.018	-0.095*	-0.072	-0.024
Education	0.024	0.011	0.002	-0.000	-0.002	-0.002
Age	1.108***	0.150***	0.213	0.067	0.038	0.060
Female	0.243**	-0.028	0.184	-0.055	0.062	0.008
Children	0.072	0.039	0.176	0.117**	0.281***	-0.021
Religiosity	0.078	-0.058***	-0.215***	-0.048*	0.035	-0.097***
Loc Variables						
Population	-0.048	0.034	-0.097	-0.091	-0.008	0.002
Poverty	-0.482***	0.075	-0.315	0.357*	-0.018	-0.165
Rurality	-0.014	-0.068	-0.317	-0.174	0.021	-0.071
Education	0.002	-0.087*	-0.204	-0.001	-0.058	-0.060
N (ind)	951	982	984	979	980	990
N (loc)	20	20	20	20	20	20
N (mun)	3	3	3	3	3	3

* p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01

Notes: The dependent variables are the voting index, the campaign activism index, the contacting public officials index, the community activism index, the civil society engagement index, and the protest index. The CCT participation variable includes current and former CCT beneficiaries. Random-intercept multilevel linear models are used in this analysis.

Table B3.5: Multilevel Models of Political Participation (2012 LAPOP Survey Data)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Voting	Camp Activism	Cont Public Officials	Comm Activism	Civil Society Engage	Protest
CCT	0.032 (0.024)	0.117*** (0.017)	0.148*** (0.029)	0.034 (0.024)	0.058*** (0.021)	0.036*** (0.012)
Wealth Index	0.014*** (0.003)	-0.000 (0.002)	-0.009** (0.004)	0.000 (0.003)	0.012*** (0.003)	-0.001 (0.002)
Employed	0.127*** (0.018)	0.034*** (0.013)	-0.008 (0.022)	0.051*** (0.018)	0.058*** (0.016)	-0.000 (0.009)
Education	0.015*** (0.002)	0.015*** (0.002)	0.026*** (0.003)	0.020*** (0.002)	0.017*** (0.002)	0.008*** (0.001)
Age	0.330*** (0.025)	0.102*** (0.018)	0.147*** (0.030)	0.223*** (0.025)	-0.087*** (0.022)	-0.004 (0.012)
Female	0.044** (0.017)	-0.071*** (0.013)	-0.023 (0.022)	-0.059*** (0.017)	0.014 (0.015)	-0.014 (0.009)
Children	0.083*** (0.021)	0.025 (0.015)	0.093*** (0.026)	0.082*** (0.021)	0.252*** (0.019)	-0.010 (0.011)
Religiosity	0.052*** (0.009)	0.017** (0.007)	0.021* (0.012)	0.044*** (0.010)	0.189*** (0.009)	-0.015*** (0.005)
Rurality	0.041* (0.024)	0.011 (0.019)	0.079** (0.033)	0.130*** (0.027)	0.102*** (0.025)	-0.001 (0.013)
N (ind)	6725	7801	7867	7782	7854	7921
N (mun)	632	630	632	632	633	633
N (ctry)	9	9	9	9	9	9

Standard errors are in parentheses. * p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01

Notes: The dependent variables are the voting index, the campaign activism index, the contacting public officials index, the community activism index, the civil society engagement index, and the protest index. Random-intercept multilevel linear models are used in this analysis.

Table B3.6: Multilevel Models of Political Participation (2012 LAPOP Survey Data)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Voting	Camp Activism	Cont Public Officials	Comm Activism	Civil Society Engage	Protest
CCT	0.022 (0.021)	0.127*** (0.016)	0.170*** (0.026)	0.046** (0.022)	0.073*** (0.019)	0.036*** (0.010)
Employed	0.122*** (0.017)	0.058*** (0.013)	0.003 (0.020)	0.068*** (0.017)	0.060*** (0.015)	0.001 (0.008)
Education	0.015*** (0.002)	0.014*** (0.002)	0.021*** (0.003)	0.018*** (0.002)	0.022*** (0.002)	0.008*** (0.001)
Age	0.441*** (0.024)	0.107*** (0.018)	0.158*** (0.028)	0.217*** (0.024)	-0.087*** (0.020)	-0.008 (0.011)
Female	0.039** (0.017)	-0.087*** (0.013)	-0.023 (0.020)	-0.071*** (0.017)	0.007 (0.014)	-0.018** (0.008)
Children	0.065*** (0.020)	0.035** (0.015)	0.097*** (0.024)	0.087*** (0.020)	0.237*** (0.017)	-0.008 (0.010)
Religiosity	0.051*** (0.009)	0.019*** (0.007)	0.024** (0.011)	0.054*** (0.009)	0.188*** (0.008)	-0.016*** (0.004)
Rurality	0.029 (0.021)	-0.002 (0.017)	0.087*** (0.028)	0.149*** (0.023)	0.075*** (0.021)	-0.007 (0.011)
N (ind)	7897	9127	9198	9104	9185	9261
N (mun)	638	638	638	637	638	638
N (ctry)	9	9	9	9	9	9

Standard errors are in parentheses. * p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01

Notes: The dependent variables are the voting index, the campaign activism index, the contacting public officials index, the community activism index, the civil society engagement index, and the protest index. Random-intercept multilevel linear models are used in this analysis.

Table B3.7: Multilevel Models of Political Participation (2014 Mexican Survey Data)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Voting	Camp Activism	Cont Public Officials	Comm Activism	Civil Soc Engage	Protest
Ind Variables						
CCT	0.120	-0.010	0.261***	0.119***	0.172***	0.033
UCT	0.269**	0.009	0.114	0.009	0.003	-0.027
Wealth Index	0.031*	0.012**	0.001	0.006	0.003	0.002
Employed	0.300***	-0.036	0.041	-0.089*	-0.048	-0.008
Education	0.012	0.019**	0.004	-0.004	-0.004	-0.009
Age	1.061***	0.151***	0.196	0.034	0.032	0.039
Female	0.208**	-0.023	0.163	-0.044	0.077	0.014
Children	0.089	0.052	0.178*	0.122***	0.240***	-0.021
Religiosity	0.070	-0.047***	-0.223***	-0.044*	0.037	-0.098***
Loc Variables						
Population	-0.040	0.022	-0.091	-0.083	0.002	0.004
Poverty	-0.445**	0.090	-0.272	0.363*	-0.042	-0.154
Rurality	-0.026	-0.088	-0.361*	-0.189	0.018	-0.070
Education	-0.021	-0.087**	-0.214	-0.016	-0.075	-0.063
N (ind)	1051	1084	1087	1083	1083	1094
N (loc)	20	20	20	20	20	20
N (mun)	3	3	3	3	3	3

* p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01

Notes: The dependent variables are the voting index, the campaign activism index, the contacting public officials index, the community activism index, the civil society engagement index, and the protest index. Random-intercept multilevel linear models are used in this analysis.

Table B3.8: Multilevel Models of Political Participation in Argentina (2012 LAPOP Survey Data)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Voting	Campaign Activism	Contact Public Officials	Comm Activism	Civil Soc Engage	Protest
CCT	-0.004 (0.054)	0.123*** (0.048)	0.261*** (0.084)	-0.058 (0.055)	0.018 (0.051)	0.022 (0.033)
Income	0.008 (0.007)	0.008 (0.006)	-0.019 (0.012)	0.000 (0.008)	0.017** (0.007)	-0.003 (0.005)
Employed	0.123*** (0.044)	0.047 (0.037)	-0.117* (0.067)	0.028 (0.044)	-0.034 (0.041)	0.012 (0.027)
Education	0.001 (0.006)	0.011* (0.006)	0.022** (0.010)	0.016** (0.007)	0.019*** (0.006)	0.012*** (0.004)
Age	-0.048 (0.059)	0.032 (0.050)	0.034 (0.091)	0.096 (0.059)	-0.150*** (0.054)	-0.001 (0.036)
Female	0.020 (0.042)	-0.065* (0.035)	0.063 (0.064)	0.003 (0.042)	0.041 (0.039)	0.011 (0.026)
Children	0.071 (0.049)	-0.062 (0.042)	0.001 (0.077)	-0.013 (0.050)	0.243*** (0.046)	-0.044 (0.031)
Religiosity	0.004 (0.019)	0.021 (0.017)	-0.011 (0.031)	0.028 (0.020)	0.183*** (0.019)	0.003 (0.012)
Rurality	0.001 (0.065)	-0.026 (0.088)	0.211 (0.154)	0.043 (0.087)	0.143* (0.080)	-0.018 (0.043)
N (ind)	840	999	1012	994	1014	1016
N (mun)	74	74	74	74	74	74

Standard errors are in parentheses. * p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01

Notes: The dependent variables are the voting index, the campaign activism index, the contacting public officials index, the community activism index, the civil society engagement index, and the protest index. Random-intercept multilevel linear models are used in this analysis.

Table B3.9: Multilevel Models of Political Participation in Brazil (2012 LAPOP Survey Data)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Voting	Campaign Activism	Contact Public Officials	Comm Activism	Civil Soc Engage	Protest
CCT	0.061 (0.041)	0.144*** (0.043)	0.069 (0.068)	0.021 (0.044)	0.095** (0.045)	0.055** (0.024)
Income	0.009** (0.005)	-0.005 (0.005)	-0.008 (0.008)	-0.000 (0.005)	-0.001 (0.005)	0.001 (0.003)
Employed	0.118*** (0.033)	0.079** (0.034)	-0.018 (0.055)	0.043 (0.036)	0.102*** (0.036)	-0.024 (0.020)
Education	0.013*** (0.005)	0.017*** (0.005)	0.017** (0.008)	0.015*** (0.005)	0.018*** (0.005)	0.006** (0.003)
Age	0.194*** (0.048)	0.143*** (0.050)	0.193** (0.079)	0.207*** (0.052)	0.059 (0.052)	-0.028 (0.028)
Female	0.041 (0.031)	-0.106*** (0.032)	-0.022 (0.051)	-0.070** (0.034)	0.045 (0.034)	-0.032* (0.018)
Children	0.048 (0.036)	0.070* (0.037)	0.051 (0.059)	0.051 (0.038)	0.151*** (0.039)	-0.038* (0.021)
Religiosity	0.039** (0.018)	0.021 (0.019)	0.022 (0.030)	0.046** (0.019)	0.204*** (0.020)	-0.017 (0.011)
Rurality	0.105* (0.055)	0.042 (0.070)	0.136 (0.106)	0.078 (0.057)	-0.002 (0.076)	-0.033 (0.030)
N (ind)	1205	1354	1365	1358	1339	1372
N (mun)	111	111	111	110	111	111

Standard errors are in parentheses. * p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01

Notes: The dependent variables are the voting index, the campaign activism index, the contacting public officials index, the community activism index, the civil society engagement index, and the protest index. Random-intercept multilevel linear models are used in this analysis.

Table B3.10: Multilevel Models of Political Participation in Chile (2012 LAPOP Survey Data)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Voting	Campaign Activism	Contact Public Officials	Comm Activism	Civil Soc Engage	Protest
CCT	-0.067 (0.146)	0.045 (0.049)	0.475*** (0.114)	0.138 (0.091)	0.008 (0.081)	0.098* (0.054)
Income	0.016 (0.014)	0.003 (0.005)	-0.014 (0.011)	-0.003 (0.009)	-0.005 (0.008)	0.001 (0.005)
Employed	-0.056 (0.099)	0.045 (0.032)	-0.011 (0.076)	0.034 (0.059)	0.077 (0.053)	0.004 (0.035)
Education	0.009 (0.014)	0.002 (0.005)	-0.000 (0.011)	0.020** (0.008)	0.026*** (0.008)	0.002 (0.005)
Age	1.584*** (0.137)	-0.031 (0.045)	0.007 (0.105)	0.253*** (0.082)	-0.188*** (0.072)	-0.089* (0.049)
Female	-0.120 (0.103)	-0.014 (0.033)	0.145* (0.077)	0.079 (0.060)	0.042 (0.054)	0.031 (0.036)
Children	0.134 (0.122)	-0.063 (0.040)	-0.017 (0.093)	0.026 (0.073)	0.328*** (0.065)	-0.009 (0.043)
Religiosity	0.087* (0.050)	-0.013 (0.017)	-0.014 (0.038)	0.101*** (0.030)	0.181*** (0.027)	-0.098*** (0.018)
Rurality	0.127 (0.155)	-0.004 (0.053)	0.033 (0.114)	0.071 (0.104)	0.048 (0.091)	-0.100 (0.061)
N (ind)	526	609	621	623	621	622
N (mun)	100	100	100	100	100	100

Standard errors are in parentheses. * p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01

Notes: The dependent variables are the voting index, the campaign activism index, the contacting public officials index, the community activism index, the civil society engagement index, and the protest index. Random-intercept multilevel linear models are used in this analysis.

Table B3.11: Multilevel Models of Political Participation in Colombia (2012 LAPOP Survey Data)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Voting	Campaign Activism	Contact Public Officials	Comm Activism	Civil Soc Engage	Protest
CCT	0.130 (0.099)	0.148*** (0.056)	0.363*** (0.099)	0.137* (0.080)	0.110* (0.067)	0.014 (0.034)
Income	-0.014 (0.012)	-0.001 (0.007)	-0.017 (0.012)	-0.024** (0.010)	-0.006 (0.008)	-0.000 (0.004)
Employed	0.162* (0.088)	0.031 (0.049)	-0.037 (0.086)	0.149** (0.070)	-0.002 (0.058)	-0.090*** (0.030)
Education	0.057*** (0.012)	0.037*** (0.007)	0.060*** (0.012)	0.049*** (0.009)	0.028*** (0.008)	0.007* (0.004)
Age	0.805*** (0.129)	0.209*** (0.072)	0.203 (0.125)	0.193* (0.102)	0.000 (0.085)	-0.057 (0.044)
Female	0.111 (0.083)	-0.017 (0.047)	-0.126 (0.081)	-0.029 (0.067)	-0.037 (0.055)	0.017 (0.029)
Children	-0.100 (0.095)	-0.073 (0.054)	0.155 (0.095)	-0.109 (0.078)	0.187*** (0.065)	-0.057* (0.033)
Religiosity	0.178*** (0.049)	0.052* (0.028)	0.098** (0.049)	0.084** (0.040)	0.247*** (0.033)	0.000 (0.017)
Rurality	0.270*** (0.101)	0.051 (0.059)	0.123 (0.108)	0.177** (0.084)	0.065 (0.073)	0.009 (0.035)
N (ind)	519	603	604	600	603	581
N (mun)	46	46	46	46	46	46

Standard errors are in parentheses. * p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01

Notes: The dependent variables are the voting index, the campaign activism index, the contacting public officials index, the community activism index, the civil society engagement index, and the protest index. Random-intercept multilevel linear models are used in this analysis.

Table B3.12: Multilevel Models of Political Participation in Costa Rica (2012 LAPOP Survey Data)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Voting	Campaign Activism	Contact Public Officials	Comm Activism	Civil Soc Engage	Protest
CCT	0.176 (0.125)	0.067 (0.073)	0.452*** (0.110)	0.051 (0.100)	0.105 (0.089)	0.006 (0.040)
Income	-0.011 (0.011)	-0.006 (0.007)	-0.001 (0.010)	-0.004 (0.009)	-0.000 (0.008)	0.005 (0.004)
Employed	0.003 (0.090)	0.050 (0.053)	-0.132* (0.079)	-0.035 (0.072)	0.064 (0.064)	-0.003 (0.029)
Education	0.032*** (0.010)	0.011* (0.006)	0.010 (0.009)	0.020** (0.008)	-0.001 (0.007)	0.007** (0.003)
Age	0.315*** (0.112)	0.069 (0.065)	-0.105 (0.097)	0.069 (0.089)	-0.095 (0.079)	-0.059* (0.035)
Female	-0.005 (0.091)	-0.011 (0.054)	-0.042 (0.080)	-0.061 (0.073)	0.085 (0.065)	0.005 (0.029)
Children	-0.095 (0.098)	0.016 (0.057)	0.113 (0.086)	0.103 (0.079)	0.216*** (0.069)	0.032 (0.031)
Religiosity	0.048 (0.044)	0.088*** (0.026)	-0.010 (0.040)	0.064* (0.037)	0.126*** (0.032)	-0.013 (0.015)
Rurality	-0.021 (0.085)	-0.040 (0.049)	0.037 (0.073)	0.066 (0.067)	0.028 (0.064)	-0.059** (0.028)
N (ind)	441	497	504	505	506	510
N (mun)	29	29	29	29	29	29

Standard errors are in parentheses. * p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01

Notes: The dependent variables are the voting index, the campaign activism index, the contacting public officials index, the community activism index, the civil society engagement index, and the protest index. Random-intercept multilevel linear models are used in this analysis.

Table B3.13: Multilevel Models of Political Participation in Ecuador (2012 LAPOP Survey Data)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Voting	Campaign Activism	Contact Public Officials	Comm Activism	Civil Soc Engage	Protest
CCT	0.008 (0.048)	0.061 (0.046)	-0.140 (0.087)	-0.090 (0.087)	0.018 (0.072)	-0.015 (0.037)
Income	0.008 (0.007)	-0.002 (0.006)	0.001 (0.012)	0.019* (0.011)	0.014 (0.010)	-0.003 (0.005)
Employed	0.180*** (0.046)	-0.066 (0.043)	-0.030 (0.081)	-0.023 (0.079)	-0.088 (0.068)	0.006 (0.036)
Education	0.010* (0.005)	0.012** (0.005)	0.029*** (0.010)	0.011 (0.009)	0.022*** (0.008)	0.001 (0.004)
Age	-0.003 (0.060)	0.122** (0.056)	0.164 (0.106)	0.106 (0.103)	-0.116 (0.088)	0.021 (0.046)
Female	0.084** (0.042)	-0.088** (0.040)	-0.087 (0.075)	-0.054 (0.073)	0.034 (0.062)	0.009 (0.033)
Children	0.205*** (0.059)	0.100* (0.057)	0.225** (0.106)	0.226** (0.104)	0.234*** (0.088)	0.082* (0.046)
Religiosity	0.019 (0.026)	-0.063*** (0.024)	0.043 (0.045)	0.049 (0.044)	0.175*** (0.038)	-0.065*** (0.020)
Rurality	-0.007 (0.045)	0.018 (0.043)	0.106 (0.084)	0.306*** (0.078)	0.144** (0.066)	0.033 (0.033)
N (ind)	571	603	595	579	599	619
N (mun)	51	51	51	51	51	51

Standard errors are in parentheses. * p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01

Notes: The dependent variables are the voting index, the campaign activism index, the contacting public officials index, the community activism index, the civil society engagement index, and the protest index. Random-intercept multilevel linear models are used in this analysis.

Table B3.14: Multilevel Models of Political Participation in Mexico (2012 LAPOP Survey Data)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Voting	Campaign Activism	Contact Public Officials	Comm Activism	Civil Soc Engage	Protest
CCT	0.003 (0.077)	-0.023 (0.051)	0.174 (0.118)	0.121 (0.085)	0.047 (0.075)	0.008 (0.024)
Income	0.008 (0.009)	-0.001 (0.006)	-0.006 (0.014)	-0.001 (0.010)	0.013 (0.009)	-0.000 (0.003)
Employed	0.018 (0.063)	0.030 (0.039)	0.174* (0.093)	0.079 (0.066)	0.046 (0.057)	0.004 (0.019)
Education	0.044*** (0.008)	0.012** (0.005)	0.012 (0.012)	0.020** (0.008)	0.023*** (0.007)	0.003 (0.002)
Age	0.788*** (0.090)	0.140** (0.057)	0.395*** (0.134)	0.228** (0.093)	-0.118 (0.082)	0.020 (0.028)
Female	0.104* (0.063)	0.052 (0.039)	0.140 (0.093)	-0.011 (0.065)	0.034 (0.057)	0.007 (0.019)
Children	0.188*** (0.071)	0.015 (0.044)	0.042 (0.104)	0.077 (0.073)	0.270*** (0.064)	0.001 (0.022)
Religiosity	0.077** (0.033)	-0.004 (0.021)	0.015 (0.050)	0.028 (0.035)	0.162*** (0.031)	-0.007 (0.010)
Rurality	0.020 (0.074)	0.016 (0.052)	-0.100 (0.117)	0.241** (0.096)	0.099 (0.086)	-0.020 (0.021)
N (ind)	501	596	601	598	599	604
N (mun)	106	107	107	107	107	107

Standard errors are in parentheses. * p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01

Notes: The dependent variables are the voting index, the campaign activism index, the contacting public officials index, the community activism index, the civil society engagement index, and the protest index. Random-intercept multilevel linear models are used in this analysis.

Table B3.15: Multilevel Models of Political Participation in Peru (2012 LAPOP Survey Data)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Voting	Campaign Activism	Contact Public Officials	Comm Activism	Civil Soc Engage	Protest
CCT	-0.147** (0.074)	0.015 (0.071)	-0.154 (0.136)	-0.044 (0.130)	0.007 (0.108)	0.096 (0.068)
Income	-0.002 (0.005)	0.003 (0.004)	-0.002 (0.008)	-0.022*** (0.008)	-0.001 (0.007)	-0.004 (0.004)
Employed	0.078*** (0.030)	0.044 (0.028)	0.073 (0.054)	0.090* (0.051)	0.084** (0.042)	0.002 (0.027)
Education	0.004 (0.004)	0.004 (0.004)	0.022*** (0.007)	0.010 (0.007)	0.017*** (0.006)	0.013*** (0.004)
Age	0.124*** (0.043)	0.003 (0.039)	0.161** (0.076)	0.302*** (0.071)	-0.176*** (0.058)	0.072* (0.037)
Female	0.032 (0.031)	-0.072*** (0.028)	-0.170*** (0.054)	-0.164*** (0.051)	-0.111*** (0.041)	-0.075*** (0.027)
Children	0.094** (0.039)	0.044 (0.035)	0.172** (0.069)	0.170*** (0.064)	0.358*** (0.052)	0.005 (0.034)
Religiosity	0.015 (0.017)	0.036** (0.016)	0.081*** (0.031)	0.070** (0.029)	0.236*** (0.024)	0.004 (0.015)
Rurality	-0.014 (0.034)	0.050 (0.045)	0.005 (0.081)	0.031 (0.085)	0.155* (0.082)	0.032 (0.048)
N (ind)	1061	1248	1255	1238	1263	1280
N (mun)	77	77	77	77	77	77

Standard errors are in parentheses. * p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01

Notes: The dependent variables are the voting index, the campaign activism index, the contacting public officials index, the community activism index, the civil society engagement index, and the protest index. Random-intercept multilevel linear models are used in this analysis.

Table B3.16: Multilevel Models of Political Participation in the Dominican Republic (2012 LAPOP Survey Data)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Voting	Campaign Activism	Contact Public Officials	Comm Activism	Civil Soc Engage	Protest
CCT	0.046 (0.046)	0.212*** (0.053)	0.109* (0.060)	0.069 (0.060)	0.127*** (0.044)	0.045* (0.025)
Income	0.001 (0.007)	-0.000 (0.008)	-0.007 (0.009)	-0.006 (0.009)	0.016** (0.007)	0.003 (0.004)
Employed	0.192*** (0.047)	0.160*** (0.054)	0.065 (0.062)	0.133** (0.061)	0.066 (0.045)	0.003 (0.025)
Education	0.016*** (0.006)	0.021*** (0.007)	0.021*** (0.007)	0.022*** (0.007)	0.032*** (0.005)	0.010*** (0.003)
Age	0.819*** (0.066)	0.273*** (0.075)	0.368*** (0.086)	0.295*** (0.086)	-0.007 (0.063)	-0.033 (0.035)
Female	0.040 (0.047)	-0.253*** (0.053)	-0.073 (0.061)	-0.239*** (0.061)	-0.054 (0.045)	-0.043* (0.025)
Children	0.005 (0.058)	0.075 (0.066)	0.029 (0.076)	0.151** (0.075)	0.123** (0.055)	-0.022 (0.031)
Religiosity	0.037 (0.029)	0.052 (0.033)	0.093** (0.038)	0.167*** (0.038)	0.254*** (0.028)	-0.009 (0.016)
Rurality	0.048 (0.047)	-0.007 (0.053)	0.216*** (0.061)	0.232*** (0.061)	0.126*** (0.046)	-0.005 (0.024)
N (ind)	1140	1247	1247	1237	1248	1253
N (mun)	42	42	42	42	42	42

Standard errors are in parentheses. * p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01

Notes: The dependent variables are the voting index, the campaign activism index, the contacting public officials index, the community activism index, the civil society engagement index, and the protest index. Random-intercept multilevel linear models are used in this analysis.

Table B4.1: Multilevel Models of Civic Skills (2014 Mexican Survey Data; Sample of poor individuals right above or right below program eligibility line)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	Attended a Meeting and Participated in the Discussion	Organized a Meeting or Set Up an Appointment	Wrote a Letter or Filled Out Forms	Asked Someone to Clarify Information	Civic Skills Index
Ind Variables					
CCT	0.281***	0.144***	0.151***	0.142***	0.242***
UCT	0.276***	0.047	0.080	0.041	0.154**
Income	0.018	0.034**	0.034**	0.034**	0.037**
Employed	-0.036	-0.092*	-0.021	0.035	-0.037
Education	-0.011	0.012	-0.007	0.008	-0.001
Age	0.072	-0.001	-0.034	-0.039	-0.001
Female	0.052	0.008	-0.029	0.016	0.004
Children	0.033	0.039	0.022	-0.055	0.014
Religiosity	-0.052*	-0.031	-0.091***	-0.054**	-0.078***
Loc Variables					
Population	0.056	0.003	0.005	0.035	0.024
Poverty	0.225**	0.086	0.050	-0.055	0.097
Rurality	-0.033	0.001	-0.012	0.012	-0.027
Education	-0.075*	-0.021	-0.058	-0.049	-0.074
N (ind)	867	867	867	866	859
N (loc)	20	20	20	20	20
N (mun)	3	3	3	3	3

* p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01

Notes: The sample is restricted to poor individuals who are right above or right below the program eligibility line. The dependent variables are how often the respondent exercised each of the four civic skills, along with the civic skills index. Random-intercept multilevel linear models are used in this analysis.

Table B4.2: Multilevel Models of Access to State Officials and Community Leaders (2014 Mexican Survey Data; Sample of poor individuals right above or right below the program eligibility line)

	(1) Pol or Party Leader	(2) Public Prog Off	(3) Prog Ben Leader	(4) Civic Assoc Leader	(5) Med Prof or Teacher	(6) Other Comm Leader	(7) Access Index
Ind Var							
CCT	0.296	0.552***	0.603***	0.278	-0.261	-0.123	0.317*
UCT	0.081	0.463	0.023	0.449*	0.309	0.291	0.320
Income	0.047	-0.162**	-0.270***	0.039	0.018	-0.119*	-0.077
Employed	-0.074	0.195	0.125	0.075	-0.135	0.102	0.071
Education	-0.094*	-0.096*	0.029	-0.026	-0.022	0.009	-0.059
Age	0.036	-0.282	0.046	0.024	-0.104	-0.213	-0.241
Female	-0.135	0.382**	0.215	0.166	0.092	0.252	0.178
Children	0.375**	0.209	0.401**	0.045	0.247	0.092	0.248
Religiosity	0.407***	0.046	0.005	0.025	0.188**	0.264***	0.203**
Loc Var							
Pop	-0.139	-0.247	-0.080	-0.367***	-0.590***	-0.398***	-0.417**
Poverty	-1.033**	-1.212**	-0.959*	-0.469	-0.544	0.290	-0.877*
Rurality	-0.578***	-0.512	-0.428	-0.274*	-0.350	-0.530***	-0.561*
Education	-0.381**	-0.190	-0.197	0.033	0.028	0.113	-0.107
N(ind)	865	856	853	860	846	845	817
N(loc)	20	20	20	20	20	20	20
N(mun)	3	3	3	3	3	3	3

* p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01

Notes: The sample is restricted to poor individuals right above or below the program eligibility line. The dependent variables are whether the respondent would ask each of these types of officials and leaders for help with a difficult problem. Multilevel generalized linear models with random intercepts are used for each type of leader, and a multilevel linear model is used for the index.

Table B4.3: Multilevel Models of Psychological Engagement with Politics (2014 Mexican Survey Data; Sample of poor individuals right above or below program eligibility line)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Govt Interested in You	Vote Matters	Understand Political Issues	Informed about Loc Govt	Ability to Help Com Group	Interest in Politics
Ind Variables						
CCT	0.108	0.064	-0.017	-0.087	-0.021	-0.058
UCT	0.156	-0.259	-0.010	0.161	0.016	-0.112
Income	-0.034	-0.016	-0.008	-0.004	0.049	-0.018
Employed	0.088	-0.033	0.046	-0.152*	0.044	-0.050
Education	-0.067**	-0.024	0.027	0.045*	0.053**	0.057***
Age	-0.047	-0.133	0.118	0.177	0.317**	0.158
Female	0.009	0.087	-0.154*	-0.225**	-0.116	-0.263***
Children	0.268***	-0.014	0.307***	0.245***	-0.128	0.008
Religiosity	-0.009	-0.066	0.055	0.023	-0.001	0.102***
Loc Variables						
Population	0.020	-0.080	-0.073	-0.072	0.234***	-0.029
Poverty	-0.248	0.119	0.096	0.352**	-0.470***	-0.030
Rurality	0.138	-0.053	0.040	0.025	0.080	0.031
Education	-0.035	0.001	0.140**	0.078	-0.158**	-0.007
N (ind)	702	705	701	700	710	717
N (loc)	20	20	20	20	20	20
N (mun)	3	3	3	3	3	3

* p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01

Notes: The sample is restricted to poor individuals right above or below the program eligibility line. The dependent variables are six measures of psychological engagement with politics. Random-intercept multilevel linear models are used in this analysis.

Table B4.4: Multilevel Models of Mobilization Attempts (2014 Mexican Survey Data; Restricted Sample)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Vote in Nat Elect	Camp	Att Civ Org	Attend Comm Impr Group	Cont Govt Off	Sign a Petition	Protest	Mobil Index
Ind Var								
CCT	0.280	-0.004	-0.012	0.518**	0.136	-0.128	-0.422	0.009
UCT	0.316	-0.453	0.413	-0.061	0.228	-0.341	0.134	-0.011
Income	0.050	0.262***	-0.024	0.080	0.145	0.351***	0.210	0.011**
Employed	0.401	0.054	-0.276	-0.468**	0.006	-0.006	-0.293	-0.015
Education	-0.017	0.002	0.154**	0.058	0.114	0.074	0.036	0.007*
Age	0.851*	0.222	0.157	0.472	0.276	0.664*	0.174	0.046**
Female	0.794**	-0.099	-0.263	-0.268	-0.171	0.143	-0.081	-0.003
Children	0.197	0.111	0.248	0.779***	0.244	0.681**	0.305	0.028**
Religiosity	-0.344**	-0.239	-0.236*	-0.388***	-0.486***	-0.544***	-0.534***	-0.041***
Loc Var								
Pop	-0.096	0.662	0.453	0.099	0.573	-0.057	0.995	-0.013
Poverty	2.579***	-0.618	-0.978	-0.303	-1.363	-0.397	-0.952	0.036
Rurality	-1.692***	-0.622**	-0.380	-0.519**	-0.072	-0.304	-0.094	-0.055*
Education	-0.232	-1.226**	-0.926*	-0.370*	-1.090	-0.484	-1.408	-0.033
N(ind)	870	871	873	875	873	875	874	857
N(loc)	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20
N(mun)	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3

* p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01

Notes: The sample is restricted to poor individuals right above or below the program eligibility line. The dependent variables are whether the respondent was asked to participate in each of the political activities. Multilevel generalized linear models with random intercepts are used for each type of activity, and a multilevel linear model with random intercepts is used for the index.

Table B4.5: Multilevel Models of Social Capital (2014 Mexican Survey Data; Restricted Sample)

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Trust in Other Community Members	Trust in CCT Beneficiaries in the Community	Trust in Beneficiaries of Other Programs in the Community
Individual Variables			
CCT	0.069	0.181**	0.089
UCT	0.030	0.273**	0.131
Income	-0.025	-0.013	0.014
Employed	-0.069	0.045	0.035
Education	0.006	-0.004	0.015
Age	0.058	-0.005	0.148
Female	-0.144*	-0.046	-0.061
Children	0.042	-0.084	-0.002
Religiosity	0.059	0.003	-0.032
Locality Variables			
Population	0.056	0.065	0.091
Poverty	0.198	-0.118	0.085
Rurality	0.045	0.114*	0.222***
Education	-0.018	-0.006	0.031
N (ind)	711	621	613
N (loc)	20	20	20
N (mun)	3	3	3

Standard errors are in parentheses. * p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01

Notes: The restricted sample consists of poor respondents who are right above or below the program eligibility line. The dependent variables are measures of social capital, including trust in other community members in general, trust in CCT beneficiaries, and trust in beneficiaries of other programs. Random-intercept multilevel linear models are used in this analysis.

Table B6.1: Effect of CCTs on Incumbent Party Vote Share in Non-benefactor Elections

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Municipal Elections	Municipal Elections	State Legislative Elections	State Legislative Elections
CCT Treatment	-0.011 (0.022)	-0.024 (0.035)	0.001 (0.017)	0.099* (0.060)
Matched District (Mayor)		0.254*** (0.037)		
CCT Treatment*Matched District (Mayor)		0.024 (0.042)		
Matched District (State Legislator)				0.215*** (0.057)
CCT Treatment*Matched District (State Legislator)				-0.105* (0.063)
Observations	384	384	411	411
R-squared	0.34	0.52	0.40	0.43

*p<.10, **p<.05, ***P<.01. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Linear regression models are used for this analysis, and the intent-to-treat estimates are reported. The dependent variables are incumbent party vote share for the first municipal and state legislative election after the start of the randomized experiment in Mexico (1998-2000). All models include number of localities fixed effects and state fixed effects. The set of precinct-level control variables are not included in these models. The sample consists of all precincts with one experimental locality.

Table B6.2: Effect of CCTs on Incumbent Party Vote Share in Non-benefactor Elections

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Municipal Elections	Municipal Elections	State Legislative Elections	State Legislative Elections
CCT Treatment	-0.018 (0.021)	-0.036 (0.034)	-0.001 (0.016)	0.127* (0.065)
Matched District (Mayor)		0.246*** (0.034)		
CCT Treatment*Matched District (Mayor)		0.033 (0.040)		
Matched District (State Legislator)				0.211*** (0.059)
CCT Treatment*Matched District (State Legislator)				-0.138** (0.067)
Observations	420	420	449	449
R-squared	0.37	0.55	0.44	0.47

*p<.10, **p<.05, ***P<.01. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Linear regression models are used for this analysis, and the intent-to-treat estimates are reported. The dependent variables are incumbent party vote share for the first municipal and state legislative election after the start of the randomized experiment in Mexico (1998-2000). All models include number of localities fixed effects and state fixed effects. All models also contain a set of precinct-level control variables measured before the start of the experiment, including population, poverty, total votes in the previous election, and total votes for each of the three major parties in the previous election. The sample consists of all precincts in the experiment.

Appendix C

Guiding Questions for the Focus Groups and Interviews with CCT Program Participants

1. Do those who are most in need get to participate in the program? Do some people get selected because of who they know or what party they support?
2. Have you learned anything from participating in the program? If so, what?
3. Are you confident in your ability to participate in politics?
4. Is the government responsive to the needs of people like you?
5. Do you get asked to participate in politics? Who asks you to participate?
6. How would you rate the public services that are provided by your municipality, such as water, electricity, or sewerage?
7. Do you think democracy has been good for people like you? Do you think it is the best form of government?

Guiding Questions for the Focus Groups and Interviews with CCT Program Officials

1. In comparison to other citizens, how demanding are program participants?
2. Do you think program participants are confident in their ability to participate in politics?
3. Do you think the program has empowered participants to be more demanding? Has the program empowered them to be more confident in their ability to participate in politics?

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