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
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Institutions, information, and faction: an experimental test of Riker's federalism thesis for political parties

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As nearly all observers have pointed out, political parties are highly decentralized in the United States. They lack unity on a national level with respect to both platforms and leaders. . . The consequence is, not that states control national decisions—it would take more than local control of nominations to bring about that effect—but that the nation cannot control state decisions. The result is a standoff, which is what, I suppose, is intended in the federal bargain. (Riker 1964: 91)

1 Introduction

This year marks the thirtieth anniversary of the publication of William Riker's landmark *Liberalism Against Populism (LAP)*. One of the authors (Aldrich) of the current paper was a Rochester graduate student in the early 1970s. He had seen William Riker pursue the insights and background for the book over the previous decade. Among Rochester graduate students, many of the theoretical claims that underpinned Riker's argument had been developed, refined, and tested in seminars and discussions. In a way, by the time Riker wrote it all down, he was simply recording a set of claims that many people at Rochester took almost for granted.

But for another of the coauthors of the present paper, the argument, the book, and William Riker himself were all new and being encountered for the first time. Munger was fortunate enough to be taking a class from Prof. William Riker, who was visiting the economics graduate program at Washington University in fall of 1982. Riker's then new book, *LAP*, had

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just been published, and was used as a text in the class. The experience of that class, and that book, redirected Munger's interests and research in a way turned him away from "mainstream" economics, and toward institutional, "Rochester" style public choice.

In this thirtieth anniversary year of the publication of *LAP*, we are pleased to be able to look back at some of the questions and insights that had shaped Prof. Riker's interests in institutions. In particular, we will examine some of Riker's earlier work on federalism, and the political bargaining that resulted in a federal system for the United States. This bargain still has important implications today, especially for party organizations, which operate at the national, state, and local levels with goals that sometimes coincide and sometimes conflict.

We then test a Rikerian thesis about an implication of the "federal bargain". Having power shared by states and federal governments also means that party organizations are obliged to serve multiple masters with conflicting goals. To put it differently, federalism is a bargain between national and local interests. Any party system must likewise continually negotiate conflicts between national and local interests. In a number of his early writings (Riker 1955, 1964; Riker and Schaps 1957), William Riker explored the stresses and cracks in partisan institutional structures. Focusing on the American system, and to a greater extent under the Constitution than under the Articles of Confederation it replaced, Riker concluded that the decentralization of the party system effectively blocks presidents from being able to control partisans, using either ideological or organizational tools.

This theory harkens back to Woodrow Wilson's theory of progressivism in government, a theory in which partisan control was not just a variable, but an obstacle to good governance. Both in *Congressional Government* (1885) and other writings, Wilson noted that the partisanship of the process of selecting a president was a radical departure from that envisioned in the Constitution. The framers had sought to have trustworthy, nonpartisan citizens elect the U.S. president. The creation of parties and the consequent party conventions (see Aldrich 2011) took choice away twice. First, the conventions became contests of delegates, not a forum for aggregating the independent and considered judgment of elites. Second, the elections themselves were decided by direct votes of the public, rather than indirect votes of members of the Electoral College. Wilson approved of the more direct form of democratic choice, but recognized that partisan control of this process fundamentally changed the reasoned dynamic, and potential for control of the process by that application of reason. Elections by partisan convention suppresses unpopular but useful political tenants, and rewards demagogues with short political records.

Riker is less sanguine than Wilson on democratic control, but is likewise interested in problems of partisan direction of the process. He identified two central problems of partisan politics in a federal system. The first is that, given the need for the legislator to answer to a specific geographic constituency that may bear little resemblance to the national constituency, parties often have great difficulty in controlling the voting behavior of "their" legislators in the Congress. Second, Riker considered a measure of partisan "harmony" to be the frequency with which one party controls both the federal and state governments. He saw hierarchically divided partisan control (one party controls the national legislature, the other party controls state legislatures) as a fundamental conflict, a strain on the capacity of institutions to act as effective intermediaries between voter desires and policy actions.

In this paper we review these theoretical claims in light of more recent work on party control and the federal "bargain." The second section considers the particular problems faced by parties in a federal system. Third, we describe a unique dataset, used for the first time in this article, as a setting to test an implication of this theory. Finally, we describe the results of confronting the theory with those data.

2 Riker's theory of federalism as a "bargain"

William H. Riker wrote on a variety of topics, including the fundamentals of political tactics and rhetoric, as well as the philosophical problems of the representation and meaning of democracy. But he had, from the beginning of his career, a substantive interest in the institutional problem of federalism. In this work (Riker 1955, 1957, 1964, 1975, 1987; Riker and Schaps 1957), there was a consistent theme—if the constitution can be sustained, then federalism is a stable agreement between the several sets of actors with partly convergent and partly divergent interests.

The clearest statement of his argument about this credible, stable bargain starts on p. 12 of Riker (1964). It can be summarized as follows:

1. The *offer* of the federal bargain comes from political elites with two goals: (a) Effect an expansion of the territory of the federalized nation. (b) Protect the expanded territory from foreign aggression.
2. The *acceptance* of the federal bargain comes from political elites that would otherwise prefer to remain independent of, or perhaps even opposed to, the coalition that offers federalism. But the accepters of federalism see two advantages: (a) Improved security, in terms of personal protection, because of the economies of scale in the technology of defense and counter-threat. (b) Improved wealth because of trade and participation in the implied territorial expansion captured by the federal bargain.

Later in the same book (Riker 1964: 91) Riker considers the implication of the federal bargain for political parties. It is perhaps an understatement to say that U.S. political parties are decentralized, especially compared to party systems in other nations. As Riker (1964: 91) puts it (and as we quoted at the outset of this paper):

As nearly all observers have pointed out, political parties are highly decentralized in the United States. They lack unity on a national level with respect to both platforms and leaders. . . The consequence is, not that states control national decisions—it would take more than local control of nominations to bring about that effect—but that the nation cannot control state decisions. The result is a standoff, which is what, I suppose, is intended in the federal bargain.

This "standoff" Riker is concerned with occurs not just between national and local officials, but even between the president from a party and congressional officials putatively from the "same" party.

Consider the President's relationship with Congress: If parties were nationally oriented, then the President would be able to count on substantially complete support from his partisans in Congress. But one of the most well-known facts about our system is that he cannot. Instead, to put any measure through he must bargain, even with his own partisans, whom, in the classic (but false) theory of parties, he has already bought with the cheap currency of ideology. (Riker 1964: 93)

The bargain, then, is a means of capturing mutual benefit for parties that have largely, but not completely, opposed interests. Riker had concluded, in earlier work (Riker and Schaps 1957), that this tension or opposition would find itself worked out in the actions and strategies of parties, both as a theoretical matter and in terms of measurable results.

In particular, political parties are manifestation of the tension, or "disharmony" (Riker and Schaps 1957: 277), among different levels of the federal bargain. The institutional rules that govern and restrict candidate selection and election law have powerful effects on the

balance of power between federal and state governments. There are important economies of scale in the promulgation of a reputation for a particular ideological world view, but incentives also exist for state parties to free ride on this reputation.

Worse, it may be possible for one party to specialize in issues that appeal to voters as national issues, and another party to appeal to voters on regional grounds. One such example may be the struggle between the American Party (with its primarily state-level appeals) and the Republican Party (with appeals at both the national and state levels), as they competed to become the second major national political party after the Whigs collapsed. Riker (1955, 1964) was very interested in the tensions in the logic of Madison's "Federalist #10", because the "large republic" solution to faction works only at the national level. To the extent that federalism is a compromise bargain, with some powers and locuses of decision left to the states, factions will be focused in the states, and, in particular, on the state parties.

Bringing our review full circle, Riker (1982: 233–234) returns to the theme of majoritarianism, party control, and the federal bargain. Riker (1982: 233) claimed that Madison and others argued that "majorities are temporary". In *LAP*, this "majorities are temporary" argument is buttressed by the full array of Rikerian arguments, ranging from cycling through heresthetics to the problem of coalition formation.¹ As applied to federalism, Riker knew that the balance struck in the American federal bargain, like all political equilibriums, might well be temporary. Indeed, many federal systems have proven to be transient, either collapsing into the component individual nation states (Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia) or concentrating power in the central government at the expense of regional autonomy, not unlike the pressures felt in the European Union today. It was the genius of the American parties to be able to strike an enduring solution, by keeping usually parties autonomous at the state level.

The relative balance of politics has changed since Riker wrote, and parties have become more centralized. Yet more centralized does not mean *highly* centralized. Disharmony persists, and the political consequences of the federal bargain can cut both ways. On the one hand, we may see more local control produce electoral winners that are out of step with the national party (e.g., relatively conservative Democrats holding governorships in states such as Montana and North Carolina, or the relatively liberal Republicans, including Mitt Romney, who have governed Massachusetts in recent decades). On the other hand, decentralized authority may produce electoral losers, given that it is possible to nominate candidates who may be supported enthusiastically by local activists but who cannot garner the support of a broader local population (as seen with Republican Senate candidates in Delaware and Nevada in 2010). The federal bargain appears to be uncommonly resilient in the American system. As our empirical analyses that follow demonstrate, one reason for this resiliency is that partisans are not especially supportive of electoral reforms that may weaken local partisan power.

3 Parties in a federal system

A number of scholars have taken up Riker's claims about parties and federalism. Schwartz (1989) asserted that parties should be thought of as "long coalitions", a means of preventing devolution into a divide-the-dollar bargaining game. So, while parties in this view provide stability, they are also likely to thwart some of the dynamic trends for which Riker argues, and attributes to Madison and other founders.

¹For an extensive reviews of Riker's work on heresthetics and politics, see McLean (2002), Volden (2004), and Weale (1984). For a broader context on theories of federalism, see Feeley and Rubin (2008).

Aldrich (2011) argued that parties served two important functions, solving problems of collective action and collective choice. This was not a correction of Riker's insights, but an extension, and it suggested some problems of "brand name" and "franchising" at the state level. What this meant is that state party units would try to cheat on the franchise agreement while at the same time free-riding on the reputation in which the national parties had invested. Grynaviski (2010) showed that this neo-Rikerian approach could unify the original Riker and later Aldrich arguments in the same theoretical framework.

Aspects of Riker's theory have been tested, but existing work has focused solely on the empirical disharmony measure (i.e., divided partisan control within the federal structure; see, for example, Alexander 1973/1987; Gordin 2004) or its extensions. McKay (2004) reviews the empirical literature, but he looks only at the work on federalism and not at its implications for parties.

There are two key bases for the empirical tests of our hypotheses about parties, federalism, and disharmony. The first is how much the parties are able to control the selection and behavior of their candidates at the state and local levels. We exploit recent attempts to impose a "blanket primary" as the basis for real-world attempts to extract power from the political parties by reducing their control over their own nominations. When or if enacted, it is in this way that the potential for federalism to induce disharmony through the political parties is reduced.² The second key empirical consideration is partisan identification within the electorate. Those who are partisans, regardless of their particular affiliation, favor stronger parties and, at least indirectly, the disharmony they can induce. Those who are more independent of parties don't favor either choice.

Our goal is to state and test some predictions of the combined theory proposed by Riker and extended by Aldrich (2011) and Grynaviski (2010). We will test it in the context of a regularly (and recently) proposed reform about primary elections, the blanket primary. The predictions of this combined theory are as follows:

- H1: There should be no difference between the preferences of majority and minority party identifiers over the blanket primary, because the chances of cycles or heresthetic dynamics in the electorate make partisanship itself, not majority party status, the key variable in such choices.
- H2: Partisan identifiers should exhibit weaker support for blanket primaries if they understand that blanket primaries weaken state party control over candidates.
- H3: Voters with no partisan identification should prefer the blanket primary, because it would allow non-partisan identifiers to have the widest freedom of choice among candidates, precisely because it weakens party control.
- H4: For non-partisans, receiving (neutral) explanation of the effects of blanket primaries should add to their attractiveness.

4 The data and the experimental sample

The data are taken from the 2010 version of the Cooperative Congressional Election Survey (CCES) in an original module of questions designed by scholars (including the authors) at

²The blanket primary is an alternative to the current U.S. primary system, in which an election is run for candidates from each party separately. The winner from each party, so chosen, then compete in the general election. In the blanket primary, all candidates run in one election, regardless of party affiliation. The two candidates with the most votes advance to face each other in the general election, independent of whether they affiliate with the same party, two different parties, or even no party at all. In this way the blanket primary is a direct challenge to party control of candidate selection.

Duke University.³ Details of the survey are reported below.⁴ Basically, it is a national representative Internet survey, of which 1,000 of its respondents were asked our questions. The questions were designed by the authors, and they included a survey-embedded experiment based on an experimental, randomized treatment consisting of variable question wording.

The experiment was designed to test for the effect of including more information about the proposed electoral system. In particular, each respondent was asked the same question stem:

Some states are considering changing how they nominate candidates for each elected office in the November elections. Currently, states use party primaries where each party selects one person to be their nominee for the November election. The new system is one where for each office all candidates run in a single primary, with the two candidates receiving the most votes running against each other in the fall. How about you, which do you prefer?

The experiment took the form of random assignment of each respondent into one of two conditions. A randomly selected half of the sample was asked to choose between the two following alternatives, what we refer to as the “low information” condition about a blanket primary:

- (a) Party primaries or caucuses in which the winners of each party’s primary or caucus run against each other in the November election.
- (b) A primary in which all voters vote for any candidate running.

The remaining half-sample was asked to choose between the same first half (or “a” alternative) and the “high information” (c) version of the blanket primary method:

- (a) Party primaries or caucuses in which the winners of each party’s primary or caucus run against each other in the November election.
- (c) A primary in which all voters vote for any candidate running. The two candidates receiving the most votes run in the November elections, whether they are members of the same party or different parties.

In both cases, the “a” alternative is the same. But half of the sample was asked to compare (a) to (b), a very simple description of a blanket primary, and half the sample was asked to compare (a) to (c), a more detailed description of the specific partisan implications of a blanket primary.⁵

All respondents were also asked to indicate their party identification, using the disciplinary standard measure tapped by two questions. We employ the first question that asks, “Generally speaking, do you consider yourself to be a Democrat, a Republican, an independent, or what?” Our hypotheses concern not which party, per se, but whether one identifies with the majority party in the state or the minority party. The CCES reports the actual election results from the 2008 election in their aggregate data, which we use to identify the

³The module is also paid for by Duke University, support from which we gratefully acknowledge.

⁴The CCES is a 30,000+ person national stratified sample survey administered by YouGov. Half of the questionnaire consists of a common contents asked of all 30,000+ people, and half of the questionnaire consists of team content designed by each participating group and asked of a subset of 1,000 people (additional details available at <http://projects.iq.harvard.edu/cces/book/study-design>).

⁵YouGov, which administered the CCES, has a great deal of experience in survey-embedded experiments, such as these. The treatment, therefore, was empirically random with respect to relevant variables. Details available upon request.

majority and minority parties in each state. Finally, those who responded “independent” or some other party were classified as “unaffiliated” with either the majority or the minority party.

5 Experimental results

5.1 Overview

As we discussed above, the implication of Riker’s “bargain” thesis is that state-level partisans will seek local control over the choice of the candidates who will represent the party. To make the implications of the theory clearer in the context of our experiment, the following sign predictions should be highlighted:

- H1: No significant difference between majority and minority party identifiers.
- H2: Party identifiers in the (a) versus (c) condition should be less favorable to blanket primaries than party identifiers in the (a) versus (b) condition.
- H3: A higher proportion of unaffiliated voters should prefer blanket primaries, compared to party identifiers.
- H4: Unaffiliated voters in the (a) versus (c) condition should be more favorable to blanket primaries than party identifiers in the (a) versus (b) condition.

5.2 Simplified tabular analysis

The hypotheses are complex, and cannot be addressed fully by contingency tables and simple independence tests. It is useful to make such comparisons, however, because the visual explanatory power is significant, and we want to give the reader a feel for the distribution of responses across conditions. So, as a first pass, we present the data so that the implications of the hypotheses can be evaluated, as in Table 1, with three sub-tables.

Table 1A presents the comparison for majority party voters (a) versus (b) condition (top row) and the (a) versus (c) condition (bottom row). Tables 1B and 1C give the same comparison for minority party identifiers and unaffiliated voters, respectively.

Hypothesis 1 is supported by the results. There is no substantive difference in the effects of the treatment between majority and minority partisans. Under the “low information” condition, 55 % of majority partisans choose ‘b’ and 54 % of minority partisans did the same. Under the “high information” condition, the proportions reverse in the same way: 56 % of majority partisans choose ‘a’ and 55 % of minority partisans choose ‘a’. Hypothesis 2 is likewise supported by the results. Using either standard chi-square or Fisher’s Exact Test to calculate the two-tailed probability of finding a difference this large, assuming that the null hypothesis of nonassociation is correct, we find that both majority and minority partisans react in the predicted direction: with more information, partisans choose partisan primaries, which focus control at the level of the local party electorate, not the larger nonpartisan electorate. The majority partisan effect (a difference of nearly 11 points) is significant at the 5 % level, and the minority partisan effect (nine points) is significant at the 6 % level. In other words, being told that a party may not have a candidate in the general election lessens support among partisans. The difference between majority and minority status for this partisan difference is minimal.

Hypothesis 3 too is supported by the results also, considering only the simplest comparison of proportions: 75 % of unaffiliated voters prefer blanket primaries, across both conditions, compared with just 50 % of partisan voters.

Table 1 Partisans (majority and minority) and unaffiliated voters reactions to information about the effects of “blanket” primaries

	Current system	Blanket primary	Total
<i>A: Majority partisans</i>			
Low info	102 (a)	125 (b)	227
	44.93 %	55.07 %	100 %
High info	102 (a)	81 (c)	183
	55.74 %	44.26 %	100 %
2-tailed chi-square: 4.31. P = 0.038, FET P = 0.036			
<i>B: Minority partisans</i>			
Low info	108 (a)	125 (b)	233
	46.35 %	53.65 %	100 %
High info	117 (a)	94 (c)	211
	55.45 %	44.55 %	100 %
2-tailed chi-square: 3.31. P = 0.069, FET P = 0.058			
<i>C: Unaffiliated/no party</i>			
Low info	9 (a)	38 (b)	47
	19.15 %	80.85 %	100 %
High info	21 (a)	51 (c)	72
	29.17 %	70.83 %	100 %
2-tailed chi-square: 1.029. P = 0.310, FET P = 0.281			

Hypothesis 4 is not supported by the results. The “treatment” produces no significant effect on unaffiliated voters, but the effect that is observed has the wrong sign. It may be that the extremely high backing (80 % in the uninformed condition) among unaffiliated voters is constant, because they already understand the blanket primary, and so the treatment could not produce much of an increase in that percentage. But in any case there is no evidence that this hypothesis is supported in the experimental results.

5.3 Logit regression analysis

The results of the experimental survey are presented in Table 2. Table 2A presents the comparison for testing H1, and Table 2B, 2C, and 2D do the same for H2, H3, and H4, showing majority party voters (a) versus (b) condition (top row) and the (a) versus (c) condition (bottom row). Tables 2B and 2C give the same comparison for minority party identifiers and unaffiliated voters, respectively. There we report the tabular analyses, a chi-square test of significance of that cross-tab, and a simple logit regression.

Hypothesis 1 is corroborated by the results. There is a slight, seven point, difference in the effects of the treatment between majority and minority partisans. That difference is not statistically significant in either version. This is, of course, a weaker form of hypothesis test, as the “null” or no effects hypothesis is actually our hypothesis of interest. We can say, however, that the magnitude of the effect is slight.

Hypothesis 2 is likewise supported by the results, in this case in the more conventional sense. Using either the standard chi-square from the table or the estimated effect of the coefficient in the logit, we find that both majority and minority partisans react in the predicted direction to a statistically significant degree. More information reduced the support for the proposed reform by a substantial amount, nearly 15 %.

Hypothesis 3 is consistent with the results also, and to about the same degree as is Hypothesis 2. That is, the effect is statistically significant, in the predicted direction, and reasonably substantial. Support for the blanket primary is about 15 % higher among unaffiliated respondents than among those expressing a partisan affiliation. This effect holds regardless of treatment in the experimental manipulation of information.

Hypothesis 4, however, is not supported. This is the sort of “cross-partial” hypothesis. That is, do the more highly informed unaffiliateds favor the blanket primary more than the affiliated respondents who were provided little information? The comparison is not statistically different. It is in the predicted direction, but the magnitude is fairly slight. Hypothesis 4 should not be compared directly to Hypothesis 1, even though the magnitudes involved are approximately the same. The construction of the two hypotheses is fundamentally distinct,

Table 2 Tests of hypotheses using logit regression

A: No significant difference between majority and minority party identifier

		Blanket reform	
		Supports	Opposed
Party identifiers	Majority party	154 (50.0 %)	154 (50.0 %)
	Minority party	113 (43.1 %)	149 (56.9 %)

$$X^2_1 = 2.415, p \leq 0.13$$

Logit regression	Estimate	S.E.	t value	P test
Intercept	0.500	0.028	17.596	0.000
Minority party	-0.69	0.042	-1.639	0.102
AIC:	828.43			

B: Hypothesis 2: Party identifiers in the (a) versus (c) condition should be less favorable to blanket primaries than party identifiers in the (a) versus (b) condition

		Blanket reform	
		Supports	Opposed
All party identifiers	a & b	168 (53.3 %)	147 (46.7 %)
	a & c	99 (38.8 %)	156 (61.2 %)

$$X^2_1 = 11.3, p \leq 0.001$$

Logit regression	Estimate	S.E.	t value	P test
Intercept	0.533	0.028	19.137	0.000
Party identifiers between a & c	-0.145	0.042	-3.482	0.001
AIC:	819.08			

Table 2 (Continued)

C: Hypothesis 3: A higher proportion of unaffiliated voters should prefer blanket primaries, compared to party identifiers

	Blanket reform	
	Supports	Opposed
Unaffiliated voters	247 (61.3 %)	156 (38.7 %)
All party identifiers	267 (46.8 %)	303 (53.2 %)

$$X^2_1 = 19.201, p \leq 0.001$$

Logit regression	Estimate	S.E.	t value	P test
Intercept	0.613	0.025	24.879	0.000
Party identifiers	-0.144	0.032	-4.488	0.000
AIC:	1395.3			

D: Hypothesis 4: Unaffiliated voters in the (a) versus (c) condition should be more favorable to blanket primaries than party identifiers in the (a) versus (b) condition

	Blanket reform	
	Supports	Opposed
Unaffiliated: a & c	127 (60.2 %)	84 (39.8 %)
All party identifiers: a & b	168 (53.3 %)	147 (46.7 %)

$$X^2_1 = 2.141, p \leq 0.150$$

Logit regression	Estimate	S.E.	t value	P test
Intercept	0.602	0.034	17.624	0.000
DV dummy	-0.069	0.044	-1.554	0.121
AIC:	759.27			

and the different samples are in effect self-selected, with non-partisans being represented far less frequently in the sample.

We can only speculate whether an even larger contrast in information in the experimental manipulation would have made the “treatment” effect larger. We expected (and found) that the potential of a party’s being excluded from a general election would alienate partisans. We also expected (but did not find) that the same logic would lead to stronger support for a blanket primary among non-partisans. Because primaries are associated with parties already, those citizens who do not identify with a political party may be sufficiently informed and experienced to infer the partisan consequences of the blanket primary even in the absence of an explicit description of that institution. Thus, the critical test of the Rikerian hypotheses

lies in the preferences of partisans compared to independents. And these differences are dramatic in their clarity and in their support of Riker's claims.

6 Conclusions

It has been nearly a half-century since Riker published his magnum opus on federalism (Riker 1964), and it has been well over that mark since he and Schaps wrote about, and studied empirically, the effects of the "disharmony" caused by divided partisan control of government at the various levels (Riker and Schaps 1957). To the best of our knowledge, we offer the first test of these relationships that define one of Riker's singular contributions to the study of political institutions. We do so in a context of a proposed reform that has been discussed for some time and that has reasserted itself recently.

And we find that the population appears able to respond just as Riker claimed. With the unaffiliateds now amounting to a plurality (and apparently growing plurality, even when restricted purely to self-described "independents"), the support for such reforms is presumptively growing as well. And it is doing so in a context in which there has been relatively little public discussion and campaigning over these institutional matters. The electorate is able to respond to the blanket primary in patterns that reflect, by and large, their institutional self-interests, without there being a rich informational context in which to formulate such induced preferences. This is strong confirmation of the approach championed by Riker at and through Rochester, let alone the detailed consideration of these specific claims derived from his theory of federalism.

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Appendix: Specific survey question

Please randomize respondents into two groups and show $\frac{1}{2}$ the group response option (b) and $\frac{1}{2}$ response option (c). All should receive response option (a). (The labels a, b, and c should not appear on the questionnaire the respondents see but are used here for labeling purposes only).

Some states are considering changing how they nominate candidates for each elected office in the November elections. Currently, states use party primaries where each party selects one person to be their nominee for the November election. The new system is one where for each office all candidates run in a single primary, with the two candidates receiving the most votes running against each other in the fall. How about you, which do you prefer?

- (c) Party primaries or caucuses in which the winners of each party's primary or caucus run against each other in the November election.
- (d) A primary in which all voters vote for any candidate running.
- (e) A primary in which all voters vote for any candidate running. The two candidates receiving the most votes run in the November elections, whether they are members of the same party or different parties.

Eit her / Or

In the table that follows, the *top row* subjects are presented with choice (a) versus choice (b). The *bottom row* subjects are presented with choice (a) versus choice (c).

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