

ESSAYS

The Cry of the Heart: Russian and Ottoman Literary Enlightenments¹

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Abstract:

This article examines the works of Alexander Radishchev and Namık Kemal to explore how Russian and Ottoman Enlightenments conceptualized emotion as integral to political subjectivity. Moving beyond conventional interpretations of these traditions as reactionary or subordinate to Western Enlightenment ideals, the study argues that both thinkers redefined emotion as the foundation of autonomy and collective identity, challenging binaries between rationalism and sentimentality. Radishchev's *Journey from Petersburg to Moscow* demonstrates how emotional introspection enables the critique of social and political systems, transforming individual awareness into communal ethical engagement. Similarly, Kemal's writings merge Romantic individualism with Enlightenment rationality, advocating for emotional conscience as a basis for modernization and cultural reform in the Ottoman Empire. This comparative study situates Radishchev and Kemal within the broader nineteenth-century intellectual field, where tensions between reason and emotion, individuality and collectivism and internal versus external authority shaped debates about modernity. It ultimately reveals the transnational complexity of Enlightenment thought and its enduring relevance for understanding the intersections of emotional and rational paradigms in shaping modern political and cultural discourses.

Keywords: Alexander Radishchev, Namık Kemal, Russian Enlightenment, Ottoman Enlightenment, Radical Sentimentalism

INTRODUCTION

Recent scholarship has challenged the notion that non-Western versions of the Enlightenment qualify Western notions of modern progress. Rather than epitomizing a single vision, Enlightenment is now

interpreted as the result of cultural interchange and debate.² Since long before the meeting of French philosopher and *encyclopédiste* Denis Diderot and Russian monarch Catherine the Great, portrayed as the symbol of the clash between West and East, the question at the heart of the Enlightenment debate has been whether reason has limits.³ In the political register that is central to interpretations of the Russian and Ottoman Enlightenments, reason as individual sovereignty is limited by absolutism, traditional religion and a critique-resistant emotionalism which supports the old institutions. Russian and Ottoman challenges to the nature of reason are sometimes explained in this context as motifs of the theological or irrational which derive from strands of political conservatism, e.g. Slavophilism (*Славянофильство*) and the Ottoman imperial renewal (*İslamcılık* or 'islamization') in the nineteenth century.⁴ Yet, for Enlightenment thinkers Alexander Radishchev and Namık Kemal, emotion serves as the very basis for individual sovereignty, not a limitation or its qualification. Following this Enlightenment historiography, this article considers Russian and Ottoman Enlightenments as a contribution to the debate on the nature of reason, including its political ramifications, with a notion of the emotional subject.

Central to English and French as well as Russian and Ottoman Enlightenments, sentiment generates in the latter cases a form of subjectivity concerned with the nature of political authority and natural law: does law come from within or without?⁵ Moral sense theories originating in England were popular in Russia, and held that some moral codes are distinct from reason and operate like a sixth sense. The idea correlates with Jean-Jacques Rousseau's formulation of conscience, familiar in both Russian and Ottoman contexts, as a 'cry of the heart' which requires minimally intrusive cultivation.⁶ For Rousseau, the more deeply sentiment resided within the individual, the more justified was its power. Like the French debate surrounding Rousseau's position, the English moral sense school was concerned to reconcile this positive interiority of emotion, which promoted good will toward others, with a negative interiority of rational calculation, which promoted the needs of the individual.⁷ In this paradigm, reasonable efforts to look out for oneself—and reason itself—constitute individuality, while emotions work in the opposite direction to promote communalism. Some Russian and Ottoman writers like Nikolai Karamzin and Halid Ziya Uşaklıgil follow this line in distinguishing between solipsism and sympathy.⁸ But Radishchev and Kemal pursue different paths wherein emotions do not

mitigate the effects of a self-determining individual but carve out its very foundation. Similarly, for these thinkers, communalism is not in tension with interiorization but rather develops in parallel to it. Radishchev and Kemal thus create in their writings an emotion-based individualism, which is best captured, in Andrew Kahn's words, by a sentimentalist alternative to Cartesian rationalism as expressed in the phrase, 'I feel therefore I am'. But more than this, these thinkers also use emotional individualism as a basis for a sovereign political subject, cultivating a paradigm of radical subjectivity that was to have wide influence in each respective tradition.⁹

Known as one of the most radical writers of the Russian Enlightenment, Alexander Radishchev (1749–1802) was a prolific writer versed in the major ideas of the era (to which he was exposed in his studies at the University of Leipzig) and most known for his literary travelogue, *Journey from Petersburg to Moscow* (1790). This work develops a form of subjectivity by means of narrative perspective and themes of critique. The traveller, in fact, starts off as someone who has not much reflected before on the actual state of life in Russia, but by the end of his journey has become appropriately aghast at its injustices. In the language of vision that permeates the travelogue, Radishchev's narrator learns to see. The visual metaphor is commonplace in Enlightenment rationalist epistemology¹⁰ and yet, in a crucial departure from this association, the final perspective of Radishchev's *Journey* is only achieved by bouts of strong emotion, that is, by means of the heart—Rousseau's alternate Enlightenment metaphor for a source of truth still preserved within civilization.¹¹ The image of the heart as a dark internal chamber modulates the sense of exposure which the image of light symbolizes. In this more secret place, laws which are absent in the existing order are preserved. This preservation suggests a similar distinction which Radishchev elaborates between three tiers: customs as the lowest level of moral law, government as the second lowest and finally virtue (*добродетель*) the highest.¹² Shedding the delusions of the first two tiers of law, Radishchev's narrator learns to see the absence in Russia of the virtue of which his heart speaks, blurring the boundaries between what is available to the five senses and what is revealed through dreams. This process from one version of the sensible world to a deeper vision stakes out an inward journey that ends with a subject who is better able to judge his surroundings by his own inner laws—these are the laws of the heart. Constituted in literary form through the play of perspective, as when the narrator in the first chapter pictures himself from a bird's

eye view and wonders about the past and the future, this subject is communal. The institutional structure of literature itself promotes this communality: a coterie of readers is enticed to follow the narrator's same path. Indeed, readers are directly addressed by Radishchev's narrator in an overtly didactic style that would continue to influence Russian literary development in the works of Lev Tolstoy and Nikolai Chernyshevsky, among others. Radishchev thus creates an emotional-critical subject who travels deeper within himself and shares that process with others. It is readers who thus also complete the narrator's journey—his newly achieved subjectivity – by following along and receiving his emotional revelations.

Prominent Ottoman Turkish writer and reformer Namık Kemal (1840–1888), who introduced and popularized the ideas of the fatherland (*vatan*) and liberty (*hürriyet*) in public discourse, follows a similar path with Radishchev in his political, critical and creative writing. Kemal's reflections on the modernization of the empire are grounded in Enlightenment rationalism, albeit with a strong emphasis on emotional and affective factors. Kemal pursues universalist ideals in his discussions on civilization (*medeniyet*) and government, including natural rights, the social contract, universal education and a constitutional regime based on the principle of the sovereignty of the people. His liberalism and constitutionalism in politics, however, are countered by the prominence of emotions in his cultural criticism. The contradictions Kemal carried throughout his writing have been discussed by noted historians of the Ottoman Empire, who remarked on his attempts to compare and reconcile the traditional political thought of Islam with the ideas of Enlightenment.¹³ Yet, a detailed study of Kemal, the most influential literary figure in the late Ottoman and early Republican era, is yet to be conducted. In literary studies, with few exceptions, the broader contextualization of Kemal's idiosyncratic political philosophy has received little attention.¹⁴ The peculiar union of romantic individualism and Enlightenment rationality in Kemal's thought is comparatively constructed in relation to Islamic theology and to Western European secular thought. This unique model of the emotional-critical subject therefore calls for a comparative methodology in its analysis.

The comparative analysis of Kemal's writings with Radishchev's *Journey* proposed in this article gives a renewed insight into the nineteenth-century intellectual field during the modernizing attempts of these two empires, which were threatened by social and cultural change resulting from the French Revolution in the West. Among the differences between the thinkers are their historical contexts. Writing much later

than Radishchev and in a more tumultuous environment vis-à-vis the sovereign, Kemal was arguably less unique in his radical democratic ideals than Radishchev. Yet, the monolithic view of each of these cultural spaces as reactionary is precisely what this essay contests. Radishchev, no less than Kemal, had a broader influence on his cultural space than the portraits of these figures as isolated exceptions would suggest. This comparative study on the antinomic union of Enlightenment and Romanticism constitutes an illustrative case of the synchronicity of the non-synchronous, where the age of reason and its Romantic aftermath coexist. It shows how the major philosophical tensions of the Enlightenment between reason and emotion and between external and internal authority generate literary devices and discursive frameworks that persist into the Russian and Ottoman Turkish developments of the nineteenth century.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Behind the creation of the emotional subject are several core concerns of the Russian and Ottoman Enlightenments, including theories of perception, the capacity of literature to affect readers by means of *pathos* and the creation of enlightened communities through literary production and readership. A comparative analysis of these two thinkers in their wider Enlightenment context provides an intriguing window into the particularities of the Russian and Ottoman modernizations as well as a point of comparison for other contexts of cultural transition in the nineteenth century.

Russian literature during the Enlightenment did not reach a markedly new stage of development until the reign of Catherine the Great (1762–1796), when new publishing houses opened, education intensified and motives of literary practice expanded beyond court patronage to include moral instruction, contemporary manners, the expression of elite identity and (by the 1790s) cultural and philosophical purpose. Alexander Radishchev was among increasing members of the gentry whose broad education was actively promoted for the purpose of state service. Radishchev's role combined the humanistic purpose instilled by his education with a sensitivity to the workings of the Russian state. The connection between service and education was typical of the Russian Enlightenment, rendering some expressions of natural law, for example, ambivalent about the nature of authority. Many of Radishchev's contemporaries, such as M. M. Shcherbakov and N. I. Panin, followed versions of the idea that, 'since the natural law written by God in the

human heart requires a strong defender, and conscience prompts us to seek him, we must see God as the cause of authority. [. . .] Disobedience is a violation of natural law'.¹⁵ Exposed to deism as well as materialism, Radishchev took elements of both philosophies into his *Journey* but defined political power mostly along the lines of Rousseau and John Locke, that is, as a contract devoted to the protection of the natural rights of citizens.¹⁶ Radishchev parted ways with his Russian contemporaries who embraced masonic ideals by stressing individual reason as opposed to mystical devotion. In addition, he was steeped in sentimentalist modes of thinking, evidenced by his writings which thematize sensibility and psychological states (*Diary of One Week*, 1811) and the *Journey's* motifs of friendship, melancholy and moral perfection.

At a time when the perception of literature's purpose was shifting from the maintenance of morals within small coteries to a vision of authorship and reading as the exercise of reason, Radishchev tried his hand at the genre of the novel, relatively untested in Russia. Drawing on motifs from advice literature, philosophical études and sentimental *povesti*, Radishchev's *Journey* borrowed its overall framework from Laurence Sterne's *A Sentimental Journey* (1768). At the heart of Sterne's *Journey* is the self-analysis of the narrator, Yorick, who differs from Radishchev's traveller in important ways. Radishchev's traveller is sentimental like Yorick, and thus inwardly moved, but unlike Yorick he is more interested in the nature of the outside world than himself. Yet, although this outward focus seems to make Radishchev's narrator 'almost without a self', his access to the world depends on the his inward process of learning to see, as the subsequent analysis will demonstrate.¹⁷ In the historical background, this dynamic between external and internal processes is elaborated with the help of new ideas about perception that were coming from Moral Sense empiricism, whose presence in the *Journey* Grigory Makogonenko highlights by categorizing several recurrent narrative situations: firstly, the narrator meditates on an incident until the moral meaning is clear; secondly, he solicits information about the way of life of the people he meets and pondering this data, he reports his natural reactions to abuses; and lastly, he experiences a contrast between false representation and reality.¹⁸ In each of these scenarios, the narrator's internal processing of experience is not always reported by him but is consistently manifest in the exposition itself, allowing readers to partake in that same process rather than characterizing the narrator as external to themselves. Empiricism shows the process beginning with external stimuli, but what further differentiates Radishchev's narrator as

an emotional subject is the pre-Romantic, Rousseauian element of the heart as integral to the empirical process. Thus, a clearer and indeed more rational world emerges when the seer attunes to his own virtue by exposing himself to information, meditating on it, and experiencing contrast; that is, by utilizing what he already possesses in a concentrated way in the very moment of experience. Radishchev's narrator requires little intervention to enable him to hear his heart and properly see his world, but he does need the act of writing as a meditation that brings both internal resources and external stimuli into focus. This final element of the cultural background, namely, didacticism, is taken up by Radishchev from broader Enlightenment trends and appears in his text as the self-guided lessons that come from the representation of experience.

Enlightenment in the Ottoman literary context follows a similar pattern where discussions on natural law and human rights, both introduced and fervently advocated by Namık Kemal, clashed with the constancy of monarchy, constitutional or otherwise. The urgency of the imperial decline led to the formation of reformist and revolutionary ideas in the intellectual context. In an effort to reverse this decline, the constitutional movement spearheaded by the Society of the Young Ottomans in the 1860s, a group of intellectuals and political activists with various and incoherent agendas, introduced the idea of a liberal and constitutional regime.¹⁹ The universality of this political system, based on the sovereignty of the people, posed a significant threat to the already unstable religious basis of Ottoman sovereignty. This conundrum within liberalism created led Ottoman intellectuals to make incongruous and at times incoherent propositions. According to Niyazi Berkes, the best intellectual exposition of this confusion was made by Kemal, 'the first thinker to discuss the problems faced by the Muslims according to a coherent intellectual system'.²⁰

Namık Kemal drew inspiration from Rousseau, Montesquieu and Locke, whose works had been frequently translated in the second half of the nineteenth century. Ebüzziya Tevfik (1849–1913), who penned the first anthology of Ottoman literature in 1890, reports that Kemal attempts to translate Rousseau's *Du contrat social* (Şerait-i İçtimaiyye), but it had never been completed.²¹ Kemal developed a conceptualization of civilization based on such Enlightenment ideals as education, rationalism and universal rights, and promoted liberal doctrine on the basis of natural rights. The imperial decline, he argued, could only be overturned by following the requirements of nature. For this, he argued, the individual must become the basis

of the constitutional system and representative government, as in the West. This is where Kemal introduces the Islamic political thought into his theory by means of comparison, stressing the principle of the inviolability of the person.²² The Enlightenment individualism of universal rights is then transformed into the Romantic idea of the inner spirit and emotion. The ideas of divine justice, universal harmony and the problem of good and evil all become part of Kemal's emotion-based moral epistemology. The mechanical and pragmatic aspects of the Enlightenment are countered by emphasis on the sentiments, feelings and conscience of the individual. Kemal's distinctive synthetic discourse between the rational-material and the subjective-spiritual would later become the foundation of the conservative argument for Ottoman-Turkish modernization as appropriating the techniques of the West without also appropriating its vices.

ALEXANDER RADISHCHEV'S INWARD JOURNEY

It takes the entire *Journey* for Radishchev's narrator to cry out, that is, to write the book which we are reading. In this sense, the first step is also the last and is conceived not as a movement but as a look:

Я взглянул окрест меня – душа моя страданиями человечества уязвлена стала. Обратил взоры мои во внутренность мою – и узрел, что бедствия человека происходят от человека, и часто от того только, что он взирает непрямо на окружающие его предметы. ... Я человеку нашел утешителя в нем самом. “Отыми завесу с очей природного чувствования – и блажен буду”.

(I glanced about myself: my soul became lacerated by the sufferings of humanity. I directed my gaze to my inner being and beheld that the woes of man come from man, and often only because we do not inspect closely what surrounds us. [...] I found man's consoler inside himself. “Tear away the veil from the eyes of natural feeling – and I shall be gratified”).²³

In this passage from the preface, as in the whole of the text, visual vocabulary predominates: взглянул (cast a glance), взоры (gazes or looks), узрел (behold), взирает (direct a gaze), очей (eyes).²⁴ The final stage of the *Journey* occurs when looking turns inward and the narrator closes his eyes. Throughout the traveller's story he perceives suffering, but it is his writing that allows him to grasp it in the proper way, that is, from within. To reach this stage he first rejects the desolation into which he had been cast by his empathetic capacities, a gesture that symbolically rejects what Rudolf Neuhauser calls the aesthetic sentimentalism of the

period, wherein the beauty of the tear shed in response to witnessed suffering serves as the final destination (cf. Karamzin's "Poor Liza", the exemplar of such aesthetic sentimentalism).²⁵ This isolated state is traded for an inward look that yields an articulation of the heart to a broader community: evil is not natural but is caused by false perception. These insights are crucial, but the real lesson comes when the narrator applies this logic to others, saying, 'веселие неизреченное! – я почувствовал, что возможно всякому соучастником быть во благодействии себе подобных. Се мысль, побудившая меня начертать, что читать будешь' (p. 227; 'unspeakable joy, I sensed that everyone has the ability to participate in doing good for his equal. This thought prompted me to write what you are about to read', p. 2). In other words, the narrator completes his journey by recognizing that others are just like him. Before writing the preface, and thus only after writing the rest of the book, the narrator had not yet reached this stage. It is only in the development of the preface that we witness this process, which begins with an insular address to Aleksey Kutuzov as a shield against a potentially hostile audience and ends with a louder, more far-ranging cry. Sharing, in the end, is equivalent to knowing, and looking transforms into speech.

In the reflections which begin the *Journey*, the traveller focuses on himself while simultaneously aiming to be instructive. Unlike Adam Smith's 'spectator', a narrative position Smith discusses as appropriately removed from the witnessed suffering, Radishchev's traveller is not concerned about using the sympathetic imagination in order to determine the intentions of others by imagining himself in their shoes and thereby create a sound basis for judgment. On the contrary, he worries that his own intention be known and, in the spirit of Rousseau, confesses his own failings. Such reflections define a gaze that does not dissolve into its own representations nor ossify into a model of self-consoling sentimental capacity. It is instead critical, using the lens of the heart to bring reality and its own self into view. Inward and outward focal points are intertwined, despite Alexander Skaftymov's claim that the *Journey* favours meditative commentary in the vein of advice literature and gives us only schematic portraiture and description.²⁶ However schematic, portraiture and description – and, more often, framed narratives – are essential to the commentary, which cannot work without examples, just as the development of an inner vision cannot work without sense data, the stories of others, and the act of sharing combined.

The *Journey's* first three chapters provide a focused look at the subject's development. To begin with, in Sterne's *Sentimental Journey*, Yorick enters a different world across the English Channel, but Radishchev's traveller does not have to cross his own borders and, thanks to a coachman with a tendency to drive fast, passes only a few moments before finding himself outside St. Petersburg, which soon emerges as the locus of power and its many representations: epaulettes, documents, titles. Having made it quickly beyond the borders of these many illusions simply by starting out, the traveller has already begun his journey. As the experience of the first posting stations attests, the journey moves away from personal attachments and begins from its imagined end, making the first lesson the idea that through the experience of separation one is assured of the very opposite, that is, of homecoming. The pleasure anticipated through pain produces a statement outlining the *Journey's* own self-reflective conceit: 'Горестъ разлуки моея, преследуя за мною в смертоподобное мое состояние, представила меня воображению моему уединенна' (p. 228; 'The sorrow of my departure, pursuing me into my deathlike state, represented me to my imagination on my own', p. 3). In these lines the traveller imagines himself from above, riding in a carriage across an expansive valley. The image, which derives from the narrative doubling of author and hero, produces a new kind of pain: 'Един, оставлен, среди природы пустынный!' (Alone, abandoned, a hermit in the middle of nature!, *ibid.*). Having just dwelt in the melancholy joy of all that he was leaving behind, the traveller now doubts that he had ever experienced anything pleasant at all. Brought into the moment, divorced from all others, he begins to see his past joys as illusory. Imagination first enables the narrator's departure by layering into it his return, but now, imagination continues its work to a problematic extreme, circumscribing his whole image and showing him where he truly is: that is, not in the future, enjoying a pleasant reunion, nor even in the past, which had once seemed enjoyable, but rather in a desolate present which calls both past and future into question.

The desert of the present, however, turns out to be thick with bureaucracy. No sooner does the traveller awaken to his first posting station than he becomes entangled in exchanges which are determined by official as well as unofficial laws. Practical laws, or customs, contrast the Christian decrees invoked earlier when the traveller holds these laws, in the form of tips, to his chest 'как ходят иногда для защиты своей со крестом' (p. 229; 'in the way people sometimes walk with a cross to protect themselves', p. 5). Real laws and obeyed laws are

not the same thing, and there is also the difference between what civil servants, from postal commissioners to governors, say and what is truly the case. For example, in contrast to the commissioner's attestation that 'лошадей нет' (there are no horses), the traveller reports, 'Вышел на двор, сыскал конюшню, и нашел в одной лошадей до двадцати' ('I went out to the courtyard, found the stable, and there discovered up to twenty horses', *ibid.*). The traveller concedes the metaphorical stretch which might have justified the lie: 'хотя правду сказать, кости у них были видны, но меня бы дотащили до следующего стана' ('while it is true that their bones were showing, they would have dragged me to the next station', *ibid.*). As if questioning the nature of existence, the traveller has been cast into a world where the boundary between real and unreal is blurred. Crucially, he does not yet know which is which. Meanwhile, the commissioner, having lied, falls asleep: the two main features of civil service as the traveller experiences them. When the traveller finally shakes the commissioner awake, the commissioner compares the rude jolt to corporeal punishment, bringing every action in the story in relationship to law. The interaction is the first of many tests of the traveller's 'good citizenship', defined as the ability to check impulses and refrain from lashing out, especially toward inferiors. But the traveller's character is far from formed, since the motive for citizen-like restraint is circumstantial: the horses were simply ready, and this because of his earlier tip. At this point, the traveller lacks an internal basis for his actions and can slip at any moment from virtue to vice. Following the same self-serving laws as the commissar and the coachman, he navigates oppressive laws (the second tier) but have no connection to the moral directives (the third, virtue) which they themselves possess.

Although the contingency of the horse situation only accidentally produces virtue and thus seems to contradict its very meaning, contingency continues to play an important role in building up the virtuous subject which the traveller will eventually become. The road from Petersburg, travelled by Catherine the Great herself, changes according to the weather: not even the tsar is protected from contingency and, in any case, the traveller must make his own way. 'Making one's own way' proves to be an important contrast to the presumptions of noble lineage, which are invoked in the second posting station by a registrar of the Service Archive, *razriadnyi arkhiv*, who boasts he has used his position organizing records of state service to gather and sell information regarding noble status. Accepting money from the traveller as a form of charity for his ironically portrayed 'good work', the registrar is an

odd version of the alms-begging monk who begins Sterne's *Sentimental Journey*. Yorick only gives money to the monk for fear that others might have perceived his initial hardheartedness, but Radishchev's traveller fulfils a different expectation: one that is put upon him as a nobleman to honour his own class. This complacent act of charity is nevertheless bestowed with a searing critique of noble lineage. The traveller is beginning to cry out, even in contrast to his actions.

Despite the insight about imagination in the departure and recriminations of the first two stations, the traveller has not yet gained perspective on himself. A more complete self-vision comes in the third station, where he encounters a ploughman. Once again, the traveller must make his own way on the road on foot when he is compelled to exit his jolting carriage. Only on foot can he find equal ground with a different rank, particularly the peasantry. The point is made in philosophically before it plays out narratively when the traveller wistfully says that spiritual escape can only go so far before corporeality asserts itself. The goal is therefore not simply to perceive injustice in the mind's eye but to make connections to one's own bodily self as part of unjust realities. This is precisely what the traveller does when he begins to see himself in light of the serf-owners whom he had begun to criticize as a result of his encounter with the peasant.

Углубленный в сих размышлениях, я нечаянно обратил взор мой на моего слугу, который, сидя на кибитке передо мной, качался из стороны в сторону. Вдруг почувствовал я быстрый мраз, протекающий кровь мою, и, прогоняя жар к вершинам, нудил его распространяться по лицу (p. 234).

(Plunged into these meditations, I unwittingly turned my gaze to my servant who, seated in front of me in the carriage, was swaying from side to side. Suddenly, I felt coursing through my blood a rapid chill that, by driving the heat upwards, forced it to spread across my face, p. 15).

In this passage a precise course is traced through the body in its production of shame. In the process, the traveller realizes an equality with the serf-owner in the same way that he does with the serf. This is the foundation of his sense of equality, which goes in directions both pleasing and shameful. We have a foundation for the final lesson of communality through inwardness, but there is still much to be learnt as the posting station in Chudovo shows. Here, the traveller falls back on the moderation for which he had only just criticized himself when he tries to impel a friend to return to Petersburg and accept the delusions

from which he had himself only just emerged. Moreover, the traveller does this despite hearing the friend's story of a local officer in the port-city Kronstadt failing to rescue a stranded ship. The friend is incensed by the acquiescence of Petersburg society to the officer's excuse that such rescue did not fall within his proscribed duties. Although the traveller listens with apparent sympathy, like the rest of Petersburg society he makes excuses for the state when he opines that, 'the small and partial flaws of society will not destroy its bonds, just as a speck that falls into the expanse of the sea is unable to trouble the surface of the water'. To this his friend answers, 'Когда бы я малая дробника пошел на дно, то бы конечно на Финском заливе бури неделалось, я бы пошел жить с тюленями' (If I, a small speck, sank to the bottom, it is of course clear that no storm would occur in the Bay of Finland. I'd be off to swim with the seals, though) (p. 241, Trans. 27). This last statement by the friend echoes what the peasant says to the traveller when he tries to placate the peasant's hardship by saying that the laws, though flawed, prohibit the worst of injustices. To this the peasant had responded: 'Правда; но небось барин, не захочешь в мою кожу (This is true; nonetheless, Master, I venture you would not want to be in my skin) (p. 233). In 'Chudovo', then, the traveller is re-learning a previous lesson. His appeals to general welfare cannot compare to individual experience; he must continually learn that 'small specks' are universally meaningful.

The image of the *malaja drobnika* serves as a metaphor for the nature of the subject at the heart of the traveller's own inward journey. It first appears in the traveller's complacent response to the friend, when he says that a small piece of shotgun shell (*drobnika*) would not disturb the surface calm of the bay – a metaphor for a mostly functioning social system. *Drobnika* in this context signifies a flaw, but his friend alters the meaning to refer to himself as an individual. The original metaphor brings us full circle to the theme of the storm at the center of the embedded tale in 'Chudovo', which symbolizes the dangers of a placid system rather than its disturbance. Those stranded on the ship watch as two members disappear into the horizon and eventually return as two black specks on the water, 'два пятна черныя на воде' (two black specks on the water) (p. 238, Trans.). These specks may sink into the overwhelming sea but they may also (and eventually do) save the day. More than this, the specks make the current story possible, which reverberates outward from its frame into the *Journey* itself. As the traveller acquires the vision that would allow him to see these specks as significant, he moves from what is first a negative task to see beyond

customary laws, such as rank recognition, to a more active discernment of his surroundings.

The sovereignty of individual vision, protected by its internal motivation in the heart, develops in parallel to the traveller's connection to himself as a broader exposition of subjectivity in which a wider community takes part. For this reason, the ultimate achievement of the traveller to 'become a co-participant in the well-being of humanity' reads like a typically sentimentalist principle but has a communal emphasis that ultimately suggests a unique version of the emotional subject. Prefiguring the Romantic subject with its inwardness, this subject simultaneously offers a different direction of literary development by linking inwardness with literature as a communal practice and as a medium to focus on an external world of others, which turns out to be the very context in which the rarefied realm of the heart can be accessed.

NAMİK KEMAL AND THE ROMANTIC ROOTS OF THE OTTOMAN ENLIGHTENMENT

Namık Kemal came from a family of high-level Ottoman bureaucrats. In 1863, he started his career at the Babiali Translation Office, a state institution founded in 1821 for Ottoman diplomatic missions with the West. Here, he met İbrahim Şinasi (1826–1871), the pioneer of journalism and a promoter of vernacular writing. Kemal took over Şinasi's newspaper *Tasvir-i Efkar* (Herald of Ideas) after Şinasi left for Paris in 1865. He published his views on the constitutional and parliamentary system of government until the Ottoman court shut down the newspaper and exiled him as the deputy governor to Erzurum. Kemal fled to Paris instead and continued his journalism and political activism as part of the Young Ottomans. In 1870, he was pardoned by the court on condition that he stayed away from politics. This tension between the Ottoman authorities and Namık Kemal continued for decades. Kemal spent most of his life in exile in Gallipoli, Cyprus, Crete, Lesbos, Rhodes and Chios, where he passed away in 1888. During his 'missions' in exile, Kemal proved himself to be an effective and dedicated bureaucrat and was awarded the *Nişan-ı Ottoman* medal in 1882. On one occasion when Kemal returned to Istanbul after his exile, he even collaborated with the new regime under Abdülhamid II. Sultan Murat V was deposed on the grounds of his mental disorder and Abdülhamid established a commission to draft the first Ottoman Constitution. Kemal, a disgruntled member of the commission, recited a couplet in the parliament, implying

that Abdülhamid could be dethroned just like Abdülaziz and Murat V. Kemal was tried in court, found guilty and sentenced to six months in prison for disturbing the public order. He was later acquitted and forced to reside on the island of Crete.

Despite his unrelenting opposition to monarchy and passionate dissidence, Namık Kemal was no radical. In his treatises on the foundations of government, he mostly kept within the tradition of Ottoman thought. He connected the enlightened concepts he fervently advocated, such as equality before the law, civic consciousness, freedom and fatherland, within Islamic theology, producing, as a result, an incoherent and unconvincing political theory.²⁷ Moreover, as Niyazi Berkes points out, Kemal's ideology of patriotism, intended to arouse the masses against the unconstitutional regime, 'slipped from his control and was utilized by the obscurantists to kill the constitutional movement'.²⁸ Kemal's passionate defence of representative government, his romantic nationalism coupled with his adherence to pan-Ottomanism and Islamist nationalism, along with other antinomies in his thought have been locked into debates about the Ottoman versus the West, conservative versus progressive, the universal versus the particular, as part an effortless binary ideology, highly prevalent to this day. Kemal has been simultaneously regarded an unrelenting westernizer, a devout conservative, a freedom fighter, and an extreme nationalist. Just as in Radishchev's case, we need to relocate Kemal's thought within a broader political and intellectual field than these binaries allow, by taking the contested nature of Enlightenment views into account.

In addition to Kemal's political and intellectual interventions, there is also the matter of literature. Two literary works played a pivotal role in his struggle against totalitarian monarchy. The first of these is his play *Vatan Yahud Silistre* (The Fatherland, or Silistra, 1873), which was first staged in the theatre of Güllü Agop in Gedikpaşa in Istanbul on the night of April 1, 1873. The eventful performance became a milestone in Ottoman theatre due to the police raid and an ensuing censorship on theatre that was to last until 1908.²⁹ The story revolves around the romance between Islam Bey, a young man who enlisted voluntarily in the army during the Crimean War (1853–1856) between the Ottoman Empire and Russia, and Zekiye, a young woman who followed him to Silistra (present-day Bulgaria), during the city's siege by Russian forces. The internal and psychological dynamics of the love story parallels the heroic struggle of the Ottoman soldier against the Russian siege. Moved by the patriotic sentiments fervently expressed in the play, the spectators

rallied on the streets in support for their own ‘vatan’, the empire in rapid decline. The play brought about thirty-eight months of imprisonment for its author, increased censorship on the emerging public opinion in print media, and literary innovation whose effects would continue for the decades to come. It is also a literary testament to Kemal’s Romantic ideology of patriotism.

The second literary work by Kemal that played a major role in the nineteenth-century cultural and political scene is ‘Hürriyet Kasidesi’ (An Ode to Liberty).³⁰ Written after his return to Istanbul from the thirty-eight-month exile, the poem glorifies freedom not only as a political ideal, but also, in line with the traditional Ottoman poetic tradition, as the beloved. The *Kaside* form in the Ottoman tradition typically praises a political or religious authority, seeking their protection or forgiveness. Kemal masterfully uses this traditional form only to defy its subject matter, that is, to condemn the monarch and glorify popular sovereignty.³¹ The stylistic and linguistic complexity of the traditional *kaside* is in complete contrast to its intended addressee (the people instead of the sovereign) and the subject matter (freedom instead of fealty).

Ne mümkün zulm ile bî-dâd ile imhâ-yihürriyet
 Çalış idraki kaldır mukteditersen âdemiyyetten
 [...]
 Ne efsûnkâr imişsin âh ey didâr-ı hürriyet
 Esîr-i aşkın olduk gerçi kurtulduk esâretten
 Senindir şimdi cezb-i kalbe kudret setr-i hüsn etme
 Cemâlin tâ ebed dûr olmasın enzâr-ı ümmetden

(It is not possible to obliterate freedom with tyranny and injustice;
 If you are able, try and remove reason from men.

[...]

How marvelous you are, O beautiful face of liberty

We are now prisoners of your love, though we are free from servitude

Now you have the power to conquer the heart, don’t hide your beauty

Don’t let your beauty stay away from the eyes of the nation forever)³²

Behind these couplets lies Namık Kemal’s complex political philosophy that finds its full expression in his poetry. Freedom as a political ideal needs to be experienced internally with emotional investment (*aşk*) by the subject. Political authority – the state – cannot supersede the subjective will of the individuals. The individual will, in return, does not emanate from the liberal idea of an indeterminate will (*nefs*) that could potentially transgress the ideals of truth (*sıdk*) and justice (*dâd*). Every human has the

capacity (*ehl-i idrak*) in their nature to observe and know the truth and act morally accordingly. Yet, this capacity to reason (*idrak*) can only be reached through the heart (*kalb, gönül*). What speaks to the heart is beauty (*hüsn*), which becomes the metaphysical source of liberty. This is what we have already called here the Romantic side-effect in Enlightenment universalism, which in Namık Kemal finds expression in conjunction with the principles of Neoplatonic Islamic philosophy. However, this idea of beauty as the source of social harmony and liberty is neither esoteric nor eschatological, but rather egalitarian and worldly.

Namık Kemal's Romanticism and theory of popular sovereignty drew inspiration from his Western antecedent, Rousseau. The ideal of liberty, which is achieved through reason (*idrak*) and passionately connected with one's heart (*kalb*), bears striking parallels with Rousseau's conception of morality in *Emile* (1762), which was widely read and translated in the second half of the nineteenth century within the Ottoman Empire. In the renowned passage of Vicar's speech in *Emile*, Rousseau writes that justice and goodness (*justice et bonté*) requires rational appreciation, they 'are true affections of the soul enlightened by reason'. However, 'by reason alone, independent of conscience, no natural law can be established; and that the entire right of nature is only a chimera if it is not founded on a natural need in the human heart'.³³ Conscience as the source of morality, which impels one to love justice and goodness and which is simultaneously based on human reason to comprehend them, illustrates the 'heart that thinks' in Althusser's terms. It also ensures that human nature is fully achieved, unlike the deformed and monstrous chimera which is devoid of conscience.

Conscience (*vicdan*) is the key concept in Namık Kemal that connects the internal law with the external, the subjective with the objective, spontaneity of sentiments with rational analysis. In his seminal essay on the concept of fatherland (*vatan*) Kemal understands the notion of conscience as the essential sentiment in human nature that transcend the material world of reason and creates fundamental human bonds: 'if the Creator had created human mind like a multiplication table (*kerrat cedveli*) and human conscience like a geometric tool (*hendese mikyâsı*), there would have been no possibility to imagine family, nation, home, fatherland in the world'.³⁴ Kemal de-emphasizes the mechanistic aspect of Enlightenment thought with an emphasis on conscience as the essence of human nature. The heart is identified as the locus of essential truths that do not function like mathematical tools. The critique of utilitarianism in Kemal, however, does not reject objectivity and rationalism. Instead, as we see in Rousseau and Radishchev, conscience

enables one to access an objectivity that is inherently and inextricably moral, experienced on a personal level.

Human nature, like in Rousseau, gains its true form through the balance between conscience and reason, which, according to Kemal, can be achieved by way of literature. Fatih Altuğ, in his detailed conceptual study on Namık Kemal, demonstrates the centrality of the concept of conscience in his definition of literature, citing his 1874 letter to İrfan Pasha. Kemal writes that literature translates (*tercüman*) reason and conscience into ideas (*müdrikat*) and feelings (*hissiyat*).³⁵ A heart that thinks, literature has two grounds (*kaide*): it simultaneously appeals to reason and conscience. While the former comprehends ideas, the latter decodes feelings. In the introduction to his first novel *İntibah* (The Awakening, 1876), Kemal attacks purely entertaining or didactic style and describes the task of the novelists as analyzing the human nature (*tabiât-ı beşeriyenin tahliline çalışmak*):

Vicdân-ı beşerdeki serâiri kalbin en gizli köşelerine nazar tahalluk etmedikçe bulmak muhâldir. Serâir-i kalbiye bilinmedikçe bir adama söylenilen sözleri teessür ettirmek ise bütün bütün adîmü'l-ihtimâldir. Çünkü fikir her ne tasavvur ve müşahede ederse bir kere zihnindeki mahzûzât ve gönündeki teessürâta tatbik eder. Benzerse kabul eyler, benzemezse etmez.

(It is not possible to find the secrets in one's conscience unless one looks into the most hidden corners of the heart. Unless the secrets of the heart are known, it is entirely impossible to make a man feel the words spoken. Because whatever the mind thinks and observes, it applies them at once to the desires in his mind and the sorrows in his heart. If they are similar, it [the mind] will accept them [what is imagined and observed], if they are not, it will not).³⁶

This short passage demonstrates the main pillars of Kemal's theory of morality and literature. Perceptions of outside world need to find echo in the feelings of the heart. If not, the latter overrules the former. The inner self emerges again as the locus of essential truths. Unless its secrets are uncovered, literary representation would fail to have any effect on the subject. Peering into the inner workings of the heart, therefore, is the most effective form of representation of truth (what the mind observes). Like in Radishchev, we observe that the internal gaze once again becomes the most reliable form of realism. Kemal's understanding of literature is contingent on subject's interiority which is neither determined by, nor independent of, outside world. One becomes invested in truth (*hakikat*) only by way of one's conscience.

Kemal combines secular morality based on equity with a Romantic epistemology based on emotions. Every human has the capacity and the

right to observe and thus know truth, for Kemal, but this capacity can only be achieved and activated through conscience. The fundamental role of literature is to speak to its readers' conscience and to have a positive influence on their actions. Kemal uses the principle of equality (*müsavvat*) in his advocacy for the democratization of the literary field, the simplification and standardization of written language and writing in an accessible style.³⁷ He repeatedly draws attention to the significant gap between a society's spoken language and the conventional literary language. 'Our classical literature (*asar-ı atikamız*) has been exclusively written for the elite (*havas*)', he writes, 'while the people (*avam*) do not understand a work that is not written for them'.³⁸ New literature (*edebiyat-ı cedide*), in his view, needs to leverage the communicative and pragmatic function of language and strive to cultivate civic consciousness, a view soon to be challenged by the Cedide movement in the 1890s. The poetics of sentiment is thereby joined with a didactic imperative, instead of one overriding the other.

Modernist author and literary critic Ahmet Hamdi Tanpınar claims that the concept of conscience was introduced into the Ottoman cultural environment in the nineteenth century.³⁹ The theory of conscience, imagined as such by Namık Kemal, was integrated in the Ottoman cultural milieu, a result of its engagement with Western modernity and the Enlightenment thought. It is important to note in this context that the Ottoman engagement with the Enlightenment and Romanticism does not represent a conventional narrative of influence, belated emulation or imitation, but that of a comparative and cross-cultural interpretation that allows for a mediated process between Arabo-Persian literary tradition, Islamic philosophy, Enlightenment thought, and French realism and Romanticism.⁴⁰ Kemal's political and cultural theory is precisely where literature becomes crucial to the universalist endeavor of the Ottoman Enlightenment. Truth has no nation or garments (*hakikat milliyet ve kıyafet düşünmez*) and literature has no fatherland (*edebiyatın vatam yoktur*).⁴¹ He simultaneously formulated the idea of cultural uniqueness most clearly and has been the source of inspiration for all subsequent forms of patriotism and cultural nationalism. In the late-Ottoman political and cultural field, Kemal spearheads both Romantic thought and Enlightenment universalism—a unique combination that bear upon the historical conditions of the Ottoman experience of the modern, exposing the Romantic roots in the Ottoman literati's critique of Enlightenment.

CONCLUSION

The Ottoman and Russian literary Enlightenments present two converging paths traversed in the wake of the imperial decline. Alexander Radishchev and Namık Kemal both pursued emotion-based political subjectivity, wherein emotions do not arrest autonomy but animate it. They do not lead to a navel-gazing subject but to a view of the self connected to the broader collective. In Radishchev's case, the *Journey's* prominent motif of vision is shown to encode a collective process of learning to see in a way that is not filtered by other authorities. The attainment of such autonomous vision is contingent on emotion, a contrast to the placid acceptance of 'moderate' men (recalling how the narrator mocks himself for self-justifications: 'Oh, moderate man!'). Only by attending to the sparks of conscience, which appear in the body and are thus emotional before they are conscious, can the narrator study his surroundings more carefully, and thus learn that 'specks' which once meant things without significance are in fact the details which flesh out the reality of his social world. This newly empowered self is, however, wholly dependent on the friendly readers he must imagine in order to begin his journey and, indeed, the *Journey*: both the formation of the radical subject and the written work, which are inextricably linked and which, together, lay down a foundation for a future development of Russian literary form more than critical assessments of the *Journey's* historical importance alone have suggested. Kemal's integration of secular morality based on equity with a Romantic epistemology centred on emotions was a groundbreaking addition to Ottoman culture. His introduction of the notion of conscience, informed by Western modernity and Enlightenment thought, shaped the Ottoman-Turkish cultural landscape for decades to come, bridging Arabo-Persian literary traditions, Islamic philosophy and Western literary movements. In essence, Kemal's contributions showcase a unique blend of Romantic thought and Enlightenment universalism, which significantly impacted the Ottoman experience of modernity. His ideas laid the groundwork for the subsequent development of patriotism and cultural nationalism, revealing the Romantic roots within Ottoman literati's critique of Enlightenment ideals.

We have tried to demonstrate that both of these approaches are suggestively more radical than is sometimes assumed. Both their works testify to the copresence of rationalist epistemology with emotional and moral codes, and the ideas of autonomous individuality with the collective subject, along with residual traces of pre-modern and

pre-romantic moral philosophy and literary forms. The simultaneity of the non-simultaneous in the comparative case study here displays a path of subjectivity that does not necessarily pick between egoism and altruism, as the Western discourse often has it, where the ‘conservative’ East lacks the ego to a detrimental extent. These authors imagine a type of moral-sentimental political subject wherein conscience is the privileged model of truth (and truth is the locus of literature). Finally, the comparison of these two authors reveals not only parallels between the Russian and Turkish intellectual traditions in terms of responding to the challenges of modernizing their respective empires. It also demonstrates the complexity of the nineteenth-century intellectual field and how the Enlightenment tensions between emotion and rationality persist into modern times. Within this contextual framework, a prospective avenue for analysis, albeit beyond the purview of this article, involves a comparative exploration of the economic trajectories of both empires. Examining how the evolution of the nascent emotional-critical subject/citizen correlated with the distinct integrations of Russia and the Ottoman Empire into the global economy, specifically as peripheries within world-systems analysis, presents a potential area for further investigation.

NOTES

- 1 This article received funding from the European Research Council (ERC) project NONWESTLIT under the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation program (Grant agreement No. 950513).
- 2 For example, Jonathan I. Israel, *Enlightenment Contested: Philosophy, Modernity and the Emancipation of Man 1670–1752* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), David Graeber and David Wengrow, *The Dawn of Everything: A New History of Humanity* (London: MacMillan, 2020), Larry Wolff, *Inventing Eastern Europe: The Map of Civilization on the Mind of the Enlightenment* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994). For the European interest in Asia in the Age of Enlightenment see Jürgen Osterhammel, *Unfabling the East: The Enlightenment’s Encounter with Asia*, translated by Robert Savage (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2018). For a recent study on sensual genealogy of secularity connected to affect, race and power, see Marek Sullivan, *Secular Assemblages: Affect, Orientalism and Power in the French Enlightenment* (London: Bloomsbury, 2021).
- 3 On the meeting of Diderot and Catherine, see Gary Hamburg, ‘Politics and Enlightenment in Russia’, in *The Palgrave Handbook to Russian Thought*, edited by M.F. Bykova and others (New York: Springer, 2021).
- 4 See, for example, *Facets of Russian Irrationalism between Art and Life*, edited by Olga Tabachnikova (Leiden/Boston: Brill Rodopi, 2016), V.V. Zenkovsky, *A History of Russian Philosophy*, translated by George L. Kline, 3 volumes (New York: Columbia

- University Press, 1953). For the Ottoman case, see Şerif Mardin, *Türkiyede Din ve Siyaset: Makaleler 3* (Cağaloğlu, İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2012), pp. 11–36.
- 5 On natural law theory in Russia see К.Д. Бугров, М.А. Киселев, *Естественное право и добродетель: интеграция европейского влияния в российскую политическую культуру XVII века* (Ekaterinburg: Ural University Press, 2016).
 - 6 On Rousseau in Russia see Ю.М. Ломман, *Русская литература и культура* (Moscow: OGI, 1998); in Ottoman Empire see Rukiye Akkaya, *Osmanlı Türkçesinde J. J. Rousseau Araştırmaları* (İstanbul: Der Yayınevi, 2022).
 - 7 William M. Reddy, ‘Sentimentalism and Its Erasure: The Role of Emotions in the Era of the French Revolution’, *The Journal of Modern History*, 72 (2000), 109–152; Adam Potkay, ‘Pity, Gratitude, and the Poor in Rousseau and Adam Smith’, *Studies in Eighteenth-Century Culture*, 46 (2017): 163–182; Natasha Gill, *Educational Philosophy and the French Enlightenment: From Nature to Second Nature* (Farnham, UK: Ashgate, 2010).
 - 8 Gitta Hamburg, *From the Idyll to the Novel: Karamzin’s Sentimentalist Prose* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006). Halid Ziya’s novels, particularly *Mai ve Siyah*, showcases the conflict between solipsistic view of the world and empathy towards others’ suffering found in sentimentalist fiction.
 - 9 Andrew Kahn, ‘Russian Literature between Classicism and Romanticism: Poetry, Feeling, Subjectivity’, in *The Oxford Handbook of European Romanticism*, edited by Paul Hamilton (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018), p. 2.
 - 10 Marcus Levitt, *The Visual Dominant in Eighteenth Century Russia* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2012).
 - 11 Louis Althusser, *Lessons on Rousseau*, translated by G.M. Goshgarian (New York/London: Verso, 2019).
 - 12 On the history of the concept of ‘добродетель’ see Boris Maslov, ‘Рождение и смерть Добродетели в России: о механизмах пропаганды понятий в дискурсе Просвещения’ in *Понятие о России: к исторической семантике имперского периода*, volume 1 (Moscow: Novoe literaturnoe obozrenie, 2011), p. 343–381.
 - 13 See Niyazi Berkes, ‘The Young Ottoman Ideology’ in *The Development of Secularism in Turkey* (New York: Routledge 1999), pp. 208–15; Boran Behice, ‘Namık Kemal’in Sosyal Fikirleri’, in *Behice Boran Yazılar, Konuşmalar, Söyleşiler, Savunmalar*, 3 volumes (İstanbul: Sosyal Tarih Yayınları, 2010), 1, pp. 245–66; Şerif Mardin, ‘Namık Kemal: the Synthesis’, in *Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2019), pp. 283–336.
 - 14 See Fatih Altuğ, ‘Namık Kemal’in edebiyat eleştirisinde modernlik ve öznellik’ (unpublished PhD Dissertation, Boğaziçi Üniversitesi, 2007).
 - 15 Quoted and translated in Michael Breger, ‘In a Sentimental Mode: The Literary and Philosophical Strains of Dissent in Alexander Radishchev’s *Journey from St. Petersburg to Moscow*’, *Western Tributaries*, 7 (2021), p. 11, from *Феофан Прокопович, Слова и речи*.
 - 16 Allen McConnell, *A Russian Philosopher: Alexander Radishchev, 1749–1802* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff 1964), p. 30–41.
 - 17 Andrew Kahn, ‘Self and Sensibility in Radishchev’s *Journey from St. Petersburg to Moscow*’: Dialogism, Relativism, and the Moral Spectator’ in *Self and Story in Russian*

- History*, edited by Laura Engelstein and Stephanie Sandler (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2000), pp. 284–285.
- 18 Г.П. Макогоненко, ‘О композиции “Путешествия из Петербурга в Москву” А.Н. Радищева’ in XVIII век (Институт русской литературы Пушкинский дом РАН) volume 2, 1940.
- 19 See Mustafa Fazıl Paşa’s letter to the sultan Abdülaziz published in French in Paris in 1867 with the title *Lettre adressée à S. M. le Sultan par S. A. le Prince Mustapha-Fazil-Pacha* (Paris: C. Schiller, 1867); cited in Mardin, *Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought*, pp. 38–39.
- 20 Berkes, *The Development of Secularism in Turkey*, p. 209.
- 21 Cited in Cevdet Perin, *Tanzimat edebiyatında Fransız tesiri* (Istanbul: İstanbul Üniversitesi Edebiyat Fakültesi, 1946), p. 241.
- 22 Namık Kemal, ‘İfade-i Meram,’ *İbret*, 20 (30 September 1872) and ‘Hukuk-u Umumiye,’ *İbret*, 18 (8 July 1872) in *Namık Kemal ve İbret gazetesi*, edited by Mustafa Nihat Özön (Istanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 1938) pp. 38–43 and 93–102. Also see Mardin’s discussion of this principle in the Islamic thought through the concepts of (*zımma, hurriya, ibaha*) Mardin, *Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought*, p. 93.
- 23 А.Н. Радищев, *Полное собрание сочинений*, vol 1, ed. by И.К. Луппола and others (Moscow and Leningrad: Akademiia nauk SSSR, Pushkinskii dom, 1938), p. 227. Alexander Radishchev, *Journey from St. Petersburg to Moscow*, translated by Andrew Kahn and Irina Reyfman (New York: Columbia University Press, 2020), p. 1. Subsequent references to this work will be given in the main body of the article.
- 24 Kahn lists ‘optical vocabulary’ in the *Journey*, see ‘Self and Sensibility’, p. 290. More recently, Ani Kokobobo analyzes the visual motifs in the *Journey* as a generic departure from the ode and its ties to the court. Her treatment is complementary to the present argument, wherein the use of vision is both structurally innovative—moving in some ways toward the novel—and politically radical. Ani Kokobobo, ‘The Travelogue and the Ode—Aleksandr Radishchev’s Polemic with the Court Ode in Puteshestvie iz Peterburga v Moskvu’, *The Russian Review* 72:4 (2013): 607–621.
- 25 Rudolf Neuhauser, *Toward the Romantic Age: Essays on Sentimental and Preromantic Literature in Russia* (New York: Springer, 1973).
- 26 А.П. Скафтымов, ‘О стиле “Путешествия из Петербурга в Москву” А.Н. Радищева’ in *Статьи о русской литературе* (Saratov: Саратовский государственный университет, 1958), pp. 77–103.
- 27 See Mardin, *Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought*, p. 308.
- 28 Berkes, *The Development of Secularism in Turkey*, p. 219.
- 29 See Metin And, *Tanzimat ve İstibdat Döneminde Türk Tiyatrosu (1839–1908)* (Ankara: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 1972) and Refik Ahmet Sevensil, *Türk Tiyatrosu Tarihi* (Istanbul: Alfa Yayıncılık, 2015).
- 30 A striking similarity exists between Kemal’s poem and Radishchev’s poem, which bears the same title. Composed in 1781–3 and included in the *Journey* in the chapter ‘Tver’, ‘Volnost’ has been the subject of much critical attention. McConnell writes, ‘[The poem’s] attack on priestly power is . . . conventional, but the attack on despotism is not. It is no way foreshadowed by anything Radishchev or any other Russian had written hitherto, with the exception of the brief footnote on autocracy in his translation of Mably’s *History of the Greeks*’ (*A Russian Philosopher*, 88). For

- a recent study of the genre of the ode in connection to the poetics of the *Journey*, see Kokobobo, 'The Travelogue and the Ode.'
- 31 Written in the *kaside* form as a critique of the monarch's misuse of power, discriminatory policies, and injustice, the poem carries significant parallels to the prison poem genre (*habsiyye*) of the Urdu, Arabic and Persian tradition. While the genre per se does not exist in the classical Ottoman-Turkish tradition except for few examples which could be considered *habsiyye* only retrospectively, Kemal's use of prison imagery bears strong parallels to the genre. We thank the reviewer for this observation.
- 32 Namık Kemal, 'Hürriyet Kasidesi', in Mehmet Kaplan, *Şiir Tahlilleri 1: Tanzimat'tan Cumhuriyet'e* (Istanbul: Dergah Yayınları, 1998), pp. 39–41. All translations from Ottoman Turkish are by Ö. Dolcerocca unless otherwise stated.
- 33 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *Emile: Or, On Education*, translated by Allan Bloom (New York: Basic Books, 1979), p. 235. The original text in French reads: 'je ferais voir que justice et bonté ne sont point seulement des mots abstraits, de purs êtres moraux formés par l'entendement, mais de véritables affections de l'âme éclairée par la raison, et qui ne sont qu'un progrès ordonné de nos affections primitives ; que, par la raison seule, indépendamment de la conscience, on ne peut établir aucune loi naturelle; et que tout le droit de la nature n'est qu'une chimère, s'il n'est fondé sur un besoin naturel au cœur humain' Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *Emile, ou, de l'éducation*, <https://classiques.uqam.ca/classiques/Rousseau_lj/emile/emile.html> [accessed 17 January 2025].
- 34 Namık Kemal, 'Vatan', *İbret*, 121 (22 March 1873), in Özön, *Namık Kemal ve İbret gazetesi* 263–72 (p. 264).
- 35 Altuğ, 'Namık Kemal'in edebiyat eleştirisinde modernlik ve öznellik', pp. 146–47.
- 36 Namık Kemal, 'Kemal Bey' in 'Bir Makalesi', *Şark*, 1:5, 97–101.
- 37 Kemal develops this idea in his article on Ottoman language 'Lisân-ı Osmaninin Edebiyatı Hakkında Bazı Mülâhazâtı Şâmildir,' *Tasvîr-i Efkâr*, 416 and 417 (1866) in *Yeni Türk edebiyatı antolojisi II, 1865–1876*, edited by Mehmet Kaplan, İnci Enginün, and Birol Emil (Istanbul: İstanbul Üniversitesi Edebiyat Fakültesi, 1978), pp. 183–92. Also see *Namık Kemal*, 'Mesele-i Müsavat,' *Hürriyet*, 15 (5 October 1868) in *Namık Kemal, Sürgünde Muhalefet: Namık Kemal'in Hürriyet Gazetesi 1*, edited by Alp Eren Topal (Istanbul: Ofset, 2019, pp. 181–89).
- 38 Namık Kemal, 'Mukaddime', *Bahâr-ı Dâniş*. (Konstantiniye: Matbaa-i Ebüzziya, 1874): 5–18.
- 39 Ahmet Hamdi Tanpınar, *XIX. Asır Türk Edebiyatı tarihi*, edited by Abdullah Uçman (Istanbul: Yapı Kredi, 2009), p. 693.
- 40 One such source from the Persianate and early Turkic tradition would be the genre of advice literature and mirror for princes, typically called *naşihatname*, *siyasetname* or *ishlahatname*. In many *siyasetname*, as well as in its early modern examples from Europe, the heart is often likened to the sovereign. Just as a malfunctioning heart can disrupt the body's functioning, a ruler's justice and morality are vital for preventing corruption and deterioration in governance. This highlights the ruler's role as a moral exemplar with affective connotations, transcending the more rational administrative duties.
- 41 Namık Kemal, 'Tiyatrodan Bahseden Arkadaşlara', *Hadîka*, 33 (1872): 2–3.