

Flawed Tactics: A Discussion of the U.S. Government's Faulty Approach to
Criminal Drug Flow and the International Framework Required to Address it

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Definitions

Note: These terms have the following meanings within my thesis

Linear

When the United States government implements strategies within the realm of the “War on Drugs” they are one-dimensional. The policies aim at one specific link along the chain of the drug trafficking industry.

Nation-State-to-Nation-State approach

In their efforts to stop the flow of drugs into the country, the United States government tends to design policies that only interact with one other nation-state. By only focusing on individual nations, the United States sets up artificial borders that drugs pass through.

Multilateral

When the United States government enacts policies that either a. span across three or more nations, or b. effect three or more entities.

Bilateral

This is a policy, strategy or initiative that affects two sides, be it nation-states or entities.

Global and Multi-Faceted Drug Industry

Initially the drug industry was just a network of criminal organizations that smuggled drugs from one country to another. It has transformed itself into a multi-million dollar, transnational business that engulfs everything from drugs, human smuggling, arms trade, kidnappings, investments, the legitimate world etc.

Eradication, Interdiction, Arrest

Throughout United States government policy in the “War on Drugs” there has been a direct focus on these three elements.

Eradication

This can encompass fumigation or the physical removal of drug crops to kill a specific patch of crops.

Interdiction

In this case it means the interception and prevention of the movement of drugs. The police set up roadblocks, raid houses and airplanes in attempts to seize drugs.

Arrest

The United States government has heavily stressed the necessity to capture, arrest and subsequently extradite (mainly from Colombia) members of drug cartels. This is in hopes of dismantling the cartels by removing leaders.


Introduction

During his 1968 presidential campaign, President Richard Nixon declared the United States government's "War on Drugs" thus making the fight against illegal drugs a staple of US policy (Icacson 2005).¹ Nixon's presidency saw drug abuse as "enemy number 1" and in response created the United States Drug Enforcement Administration (US DEA) in order to "establish a single unified command to combat 'an all-out global war on the drug menace'" (US Drug Enforcement Administration). Since the establishment of this approach to battling illegal drugs the US government has spent billions of dollars throughout the western hemisphere trying to stop the flow of drugs into the country. As policy evolved in the 1970s and 80s a greater focus and more pressure was placed on the Andean coca cultivating countries of Colombia, Bolivia and Peru. This course of action spiraled into a direct focus on Colombia's illegal drug industry during the 1990s. In addition there was a continued focus on Mexico's drug issues, culminating in intensive efforts in the 1990s and 2000s. Yet today Paul Kan, a professor of national security studies at the US Army War College, says, "estimates of the illicit global trade in narcotics are between \$150 billion and \$500 billion in annual sales ... and by the year 2000, drug trafficking already accounted for 2 percent of the world's economy" (Kan 2009, p. 2). While a substantial amount of United States government aid and resources have gone into the "War on Drugs", the results have been less than rewarding. Simply looking at global cocaine production from 1994 to 2008

¹ It was not until this past May 2009 that the Obama Administration's new drug czar, Gil Kerlikowske said that he wanted to "banish the idea that the United States is fighting 'a war on drugs' because the bellicose analogy was a barrier to dealing with the nation's drug issues" (Fields 2009).

in Figure 1 it can be see that production has not only refused to abate, but Colombia’s share in the Andean region has moved remarkably upward. With US government investment in the Andean region has moved remarkably upward. With US government investment in the fight against the flow of illegal drug at a substantial yearly amount with a low outcome, questions have been emerging about the policies that have been enacted and their effectiveness.²

Figure 1 (UN World Drug Report 2009)




The United States has been fighting against the trafficking of illegal drugs for the better part of a century, with undesirable results. This thesis embarks on the question of why this took place, and what the implications are for future policies – using Mexico and Colombia, two of the largest players in the drug industry, as case studies. The drug industry began as a network of drug cartels that smuggled drugs across borders. It has since blossomed into a transnational group of organizations involved in every sort of business, illegitimate and legitimate. Yet, United States government policies have maintained a linear

² See Figure 2

path of nation-state-to-nation-state strategies, focusing on specific links of the supply-side chain. This focus ignores the globalized nature of the drug industry and the drug cartels and traffickers are able to adapt and continue their businesses largely unscathed. My findings suggest that a framework consisting of international actors would provide the global perspective necessary to tackle the realities of the drug industry. To understand the development of this theory it is necessary to learn the history of United States government policy.

Money for the 'War on Drugs'

Budget authority in billions, by fiscal year



SOURCE: Office of National Drug Control Policy

Figure 2 (US Office of National Drug Control Policy)

Early United States Government Drug Policies

While Nixon coined the term, “War on Drugs,” United States’ administrations have been attempting to tackle drugs and their subsequent problems for over a century. Issues with drugs and the United States government date as far back as 1909 when delegates from thirteen countries met in Shanghai for the first international anti-opium conference - the beginning of a lengthy series of multilateral conventions to suppress the trade, manufacture and use of drugs. In the following years, the international agenda was expanded to include morphine, cocaine and marijuana. After the conference, the United States created many drug regulations, expanded law enforcement budgets and started initiatives to convince other nations, especially those in Latin America, to halt the export of drugs (Toro 1995, 6). After the signing of the International Opium Agreement at the 1912 International Opium Convention, an act that moved to suppress the trade, manufacture and

use of drugs internationally, drugs have been an issue that the United States government has been dealing with as an enemy and an entity that must be stopped.³ The drugs that were included in the agreement were declared illegal for production, exportation and consumption by the countries at the conference.

In the story of the United States government and its struggle against illegal drug trafficking, strategies and policies have remained under the same insignias. Starting in 1912 the United States government has attempted to stem the flow of illegal drugs by pushing for policies and change on a supply-side basis. Today it is no different - in a 2004 report issued by the US Department of State, *The International Narcotics Strategy Report*, it states that,

The cornerstone of US supply reduction strategy remains source-zone eradication. We continue to strongly believe that drug crops are the weakest link in the drug production chain; coca and poppy crops are detectable from satellite imagery, easily destroyed, and-unlike some people and institutions-immune to corruption (16).

This strategy encompasses creating policies that focus on crop eradication, interdiction, and arrest in the supply-side countries and it applies pressure on key points of drug flow before it reaches the United States. Since ninety percent of the illegal drugs that reach the United States come from the Mexican-Central American corridor, the area has become a hotbed for increased attention from the United States government. With this focus the United States government has given billions of dollars in aid to Colombia, Mexico, and the surrounding countries in hopes of blocking the flow. Unfortunately, these strategies have been unsuccessful - in fact they often create a negative backlash of violence and

³ These consisted of marijuana, heroine, morphine, cocaine and other opiates

consolidation by the very forces they hope to contain. By the late 1980s it was clear that a new strategy was needed.

Even with the statistics of a failing program, similar policies were continually followed. In a 1988 campaign speech President George H. W. Bush said, “the logic is simple. The cheapest and safest way to eradicate narcotics is to destroy them at their source... We need to wipe out crops wherever they are grown and take out labs wherever they exist” (Andreas, Bertram, Blachman, & Sharpe, 1992). Ever since, the policies of the United States government have been the same: destroy the drugs at their source and they will not be able to reach the United States border. Policy coalesced around the idea that if crop eradication was successful and the Andean governments were able to prevent the growth of these illicit drugs, this would in turn stop the movement of the drugs to the United States, and hence solve the nation’s drug problems. The policies that the United States government has employed for the better part of the past century have been directed towards the eradication of crops and the interdiction of drugs in the nations that harbor the supply-side of trafficking.

The largest portion of United States government policy in the “War on Drugs” has gone towards fighting drug cultivation and traffickers in the Andean region of South America. Collectively Peru, Bolivia, and Colombia produce more cocaine than any other region in the world. The first solidified, fully governmental move in the fight against drug

flow took place in 1990 with the enactment of the Andean Initiative.⁴ Yet, as time has moved forward and Colombia's coca output grew immensely, the United States government has focused in on Colombia as a main point in the battle. It is due to this focus of US policy on Colombia that this thesis uses Colombia as one of its case studies for United States policy in the "War on Drugs" in general. Additionally, and more profoundly recently, the United States government has focused on production in and trafficking coming from Mexico. In the 1980s a drastic shift took place within the drug trafficking world that brought the Colombian cartels and their drug trafficking to the Mexican corridor.⁵ This relocation brought the drug issue much closer to US soil and subsequently there have been many initiatives between the United States and Mexican governments to try and quell the flow of drugs and its aftermath. The central role of Colombia and Mexico in the drug world, and their high priority in United States policy make them key examples of how the United States has fought the "War on Drugs" and it has not worked. The death toll in the wake of drug violence is climbing everyday, and the drug flow into the United States is not abating despite billions of dollars that have been wasted on the problem. This thesis sets out to examine the cases of Colombia and Mexico in order to uncover the flaws in US policy and to use those findings to make recommendations for policy changes in the future.

In the last three years drug related violence in Mexico has increased so dramatically that it threatens the internal security of the United States' southern neighbor. Since 2006 a

⁴ The Andean Initiative provided enhanced military, law enforcement and economic assistance to Bolivia, Peru and Colombia.

⁵ This shift was the result of a successful US government interdiction in southern Florida that successfully closed it off as a hub for the Colombian cartels.

multi-faceted war over territory and smuggling routes encompassing actors from the government and the numerous drug trafficking organizations has cost thousands of people their lives - 5,600 in 2008, and 8,280 in 2009 (Beittel 2009). By August 20th, 2009, the situation in Mexico had reached a point of desperation that prompted the Mexican president, President Calderón, to approve a law that decriminalized the possession of small amounts of marijuana, cocaine, heroin, and other drugs.⁶ This move of decriminalization can be seen as a concession to the drug traffickers by the Mexican government in an attempt to quell drug violence.⁷

In the “War on Drugs”, United States administrations have approached the issue of drug trafficking by pushing for policies in supply-side countries. This is an effort to stop the flow at the source forming policy nation by nation, with regional initiatives as secondary plans. This bilateral nature of drug policy is a signature of the United States government strategy to suppress drug trafficking into the country. In both the Colombian and Mexican case, the US government has pursued policies that center around shutting down major hubs of activity for the drug cartels. Yet, faced with evidence that the drug networks of

⁶ The law mandates that if a person is detained with under the maximum personal use amount for a specific drug, they will no longer face criminal prosecution. No penalties have been established for noncompliance. (2009, August 12).

⁷ The United States government has had a long-standing relationship with its southern-border neighbor in many different realms of political, economic and social factors. Due to this close proximity that extends beyond the geographical, the situation between the United States and Mexico differs in important ways to that of the relationship with Colombia. A key difference, and one that has been very important in the crackdown on the trafficking of drugs, has been the vital trade between the two nations. Throughout the discussions about the “War on Drugs” in the recent decades, the US has emphasized the maintenance of a safe and stable trade within the other economic sectors between the two nations. Mexico is the US’s second biggest export partner, only after Canada, and ranks third on the list of US imports, after China and Canada (Economist Intelligence Unit 2008).

cultivation and transportation that the United States thought it was fighting against has turned into a global web of networks and trade, the problem is apparent. To combat a phenomenon that has evolved to fit the changing times and climate, a policy approach is necessary that is shaped with that in mind. Nevertheless, looking at the last few decades of US foreign policy in the realm of the drug wars, it can be seen that not much has changed. The United States government is dealing with this issue in the same ways that it has for the past forty or more years while the drug trade has become versatile and multi-faceted. Tracking US policy efforts demonstrates the single-venue approach that policy makers have headed down in their efforts to fight the on-going drug wars in Latin America.

Both Colombia and Mexico are significant actors in the United States' government strategy to reduce the flow of illegal drugs into the country. When looking at the strategies that have been pursued by the United States government a mythical creature comes to mind - the type of creature whose arms and heads would grow quickly back after being cut off. In the execution of strategies, all attempts are made at stopping the ports of entries of the drug traffickers. By attempting to cut off the arms of the drug cartels the US government is trying to hinder the movement of the cartels, in spite of that, the arms merely re-grow. For example, when the US DEA successfully closed off southern Florida to the flow of Colombian drugs, one of the arms of a globalized far-reaching creature, the arm simply grew back in a different place, through Mexico. As a result we have a situation that sees ninety percent of the illegal drugs that reach the United States coming through the Mexico-Central America corridor (Berman 2008). Similarly, when United States policy

focuses on supply-side strategies of eradication and interdiction in attempts to sever the drug cartels infrastructure at the head, it does not work because more violence ensues and one or two new heads grow back in its place. This globalized, mythical creature that is the drug industry is proving to be quite elusive to US government policy initiatives.

The first chapter of this thesis sets up this expansive, global view of the illegal drug industry. The following two chapters paint the picture of the history of United States relations in Colombia and then in Mexico. Throughout the stories it is visible that the failures of United States policy reside within the nation-state-to-nation-state approach that is pitted against a global phenomenon. The final chapter looks at the implications of these findings and what future policy makers must keep in mind in order to implement effective strategies. We will begin with a look at the reality of the global drug industry.

Chapter 1: Globalized Drug Industry

The illegal drug trade is an interconnected galaxy of money, drugs, arms and power. It is a network of illegal transnational corporations that have outfits and contacts in most major cities and with numerous legitimate enterprises.⁸ The capabilities and power of these groups play a key role in the failure of United States government policy's efforts to shut the cartels down. Historically when the United States government has attempted to reduce the flow of drugs into the country, they have embarked on a nation-state approach – one of applying pressure on specific sections of the drug trafficking chain connected to supply-side countries. However, due to the versatility and magnitude of the illegal drug trade the policies enacted are not broad enough to address the issue. This chapter constructs a picture of the global drug trafficking world and its expansion into realms of society that make it increasingly complicated and dense – to the extent that no one point is central enough to bring an entire arm of the illegal operation down. Given the global scope of the global state of the drug industry, a nation-state-to-nation-state approach is insufficient.

While most of the connections between groups are nearly invisible - when Irish Republican Army (IRA) bomb makers are found in the territory of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) in Colombia (Hodgson 2001), or when suspected extremist Iranian and Hezbollah agents living in the tri-border region of Argentina,

⁸ I identify the major drug cartels as transnational corporations because in this globalized context their capabilities and scope enable them to thrive and have a strong presence in various parts of the world at the same time.

Paraguay and Brazil are blamed for bombings that took place throughout the region in the 1990s (Blanche 2003) - the scope of the drug web comes into focus for a fleeting moment. Due to the underground nature of these illicit cartels, much of the work that they do, legitimate and illegitimate, is unseen to those on the outside. It is only when arrests are made, or responsibility for violent acts are taken that connections can be made and the linkages can be understood. The most powerful of these organizations have the globe as their playing field and are interconnected with organized crime throughout the world. To add to the depth of the situation, many of the world's drug cartels have started to enter the legitimate world through business investments and other enterprises. This only complicates the issue of shutting down drug trafficking as it becomes increasingly embedded in other spheres.

One of the major goals of United States government policy in this realm is to shut down a major hub of activity for the drug cartels and hope that this will have a strong enough effect to debase the system. The United States government implements strategies that rely solely on shutting down one nucleus of the drug trade in hopes that this will bring down the drug cartels worldwide. However, due to the intertwined nature of these organizations, when pressure is applied in one region they simply relocate their operations, or as will be seen, their point of entry into the United States. The linearity of

United States government foreign policy in the “War on Drugs” is proving to be no match for the multi-pronged web of the drug trafficking world.⁹

This paper introduces Mexico and Colombia as a case study of the United States governments approach to the “War on Drugs”. Both countries have dealt heavily with United States administrations and policies in an effort to quell their respective drug trafficking situations. The illegal drug trade in the western hemisphere centers around these two nations, yet its proliferation throughout South America, the Central American corridor and Mexico, creates an illegal drug network that spans across borders, drug cartels and governments. For this reason, the linear United States government approach is unsuccessful. Throughout this paper I will use the FARC, the Taliban and a few other multinational groups to exemplify the extent to which drug trafficking has become globalized. In this chapter I will lay out the transnational, globalized nature of the illegal drug industry and how the United States government’s focus on stopping the drug trade in one region does not work because of the very nature of business.¹⁰ It is important to understand this international nature of the industry, to comprehend its capabilities.

⁹ I use the term linear because when the United States government tries to put up a barrier to the drug cartels at a point of entry, their methods go along one wave-length of thought that is not conducive in the current globalized climate of the drug industry.

¹⁰ The globalization of the drug industry is a key component to why every aspect of US policy has failed. In the next chapter I comment on globalization and the failed US government idea of shutting down supply-side countries through eradication, interdiction and arrest. In this chapter though I use it to wholly discount the approach of the US government in trying to cut off one arm of these groups and thinking that that will be sufficient in bringing the drug cartels down.

The Growth of the Illegal Drug Industry

For a long time, the drug trade was limited to specific regions with separate operations, but a myriad of forces have since collided to bolster the industry and propel it into a flourishing business that now operates on a global scale. This section describes this evolution of the drug industry into a force that the United States government is proving to be ill equipped to stop. In April of 1994, then CIA director, R. James Woolsey went before the Congressional Subcommittee on Terrorism, Narcotics, and International Operations and gave a rousing speech on the proliferation of organized crime groups, where the illegal drug trade was included as one of many components. He walked the committee through the interconnected qualities of the dominant global groups and their impacts on society and the illicit market:

“the most capable drug trafficking organizations have fluid and decentralized structures to allow them not only to adapt to rapid changes in the marketplace, but to challenges, either from competitors or governments... and we need to understand the complex interplay between their illegal activities, their efforts to forge international criminal links, their money laundering schemes, and their impact on local, and even national and regional stability” (US Senate 1994).

Director Woolsey made these statements over fifteen years ago. Since then drug-related businesses, industries and trade have expanded globally many times over. This expansion is supported by the fact that criminal activity has the ability to adapt easily to new technologies. Without the restraints of laws, tariffs, or borders these organizations are able to adjust and acclimate to new and changing environments. As times have changed and technology has propelled the legitimate world forward into an era of fast globalization, the criminal drug world has developed right alongside it. Taking advantage of the fall of

political and economic barriers that came with the opening up of trade due to globalization, transnational crime organizations have been able to move goods, narcotics, and even humans from place to place with relative ease (Kerry 1997, 20). In 2005 the editor-in-chief of *Foreign Policy*, Moises Naim, wrote in his book, *Illicit*:

Not only can drug wholesalers use express delivery services, but by tracking a shipment online they can know whether it has arrived or whether it has been held up, alerting them to a possible interception and narrowing the window in which authorities can intervene before the traffickers take evasive action. Drug sales are routinely arranged on cell phones that are discarded after no more than a week's use, and traffickers coordinate by means of Instant Messaging, Webmail accounts, and chat rooms, often at public and anonymous computers in cybercafés (78).

This exhibits how modern day drug traffickers have been able to sculpt their practices to fit emerging technologies, and expand the scope of the capacity and methods by which they do business.

In his 1997 book, *The New War*, Senator John Kerry depicted the transformation that he had seen firsthand in his investigations as a member of congressional committees and laid out the intricate web of the international crime world.¹¹ As a result of his research he concluded that the global criminal axis is composed of five principal powers that are associated with an array of smaller groups: the Italian Mafia, the Russian Mafia, the Japanese yakuza, the Chinese triads, and the Colombian cartels.¹² At the time each group

¹¹ Senator John Kerry has had a unique perspective on the globalization of the drug trafficking networks as a member and chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on Terrorism, Narcotics and International Operations in the 1990s and now as the chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations.

¹² While these groups may not all be directly connected to the Colombian or Mexican cartels, I find it necessary to give a full picture of the globalized crime industry because it is all interrelated. Because of it, the possibility of there being a connection between two unfamiliar groups, from radically different regions of the world is not uncommon or strange, and actually very common.

had its own area of control in distinct countries and they all coordinated with “smaller but highly organized gangs with distinct specializations in such countries as Nigeria, Poland, Jamaica, and Panama” (Kerry 1997, 21). Thirteen years later we have a larger and more complicated version of what Senator Kerry described. After Mexico became a major player in the illegal drug industry in the 1990s, the Mexican drug cartels adapted their business models to fit the globalized nature of the industry. Naim wrote that, “partnerships, diversification, the development of financial expertise-in all these respects ... squeezed the maximum value from their territorial advantage” (Naim 2005, 75). This involved creating connections with the Russians, Ukrainians, and the Chinese through their Colombian suppliers and in addition the Mexican cartels granted other cartels use of their routes into the United States, charging large amounts of money for each use (Naim 2005, 76). Due to Mexico’s geographic proximity to the United States, international crime and drug groups based in other regions make it a point to establish important connections with the Mexican drug traffickers, since a business relationship with a Mexican drug cartel opens up the United States’ border. This collaboration between different sectors of the crime network amplifies the capabilities and far-reaching nature of these groups.

In addition to collaboration, the world’s organizations that work within the illegal sectors are changing and sculpting the very nature of the business – a dynamic that can be seen through the example of Russia. After the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, the Russian Mafia became stronger and drew together the once disconnected society of local gangs and thieves into an organization that had broad and international ambitions. Their criminal enterprise grew geographically to New York, Hong Kong, Cyprus, Switzerland, and Italy

with a “heroin pipeline [running] from the Golden Triangle of Myanmar across Asia Minor and the Balkans to Germany” (Kerry 1997, 22). With these moves, the Russian Mafia became a key player in the interconnected world of transnational crime organizations that had dealings in numerous different sectors, illicit and legitimate. While the Russian Mafia was expanding and gaining ground in its sector of the world, on the other side of the globe the Colombian cartels were engaging in their own expansionary efforts. Together, these two groups have alleged agreements that tie Eastern Europe, South America, and Mexico together into a vast drug trafficking scheme (Kerry 1995, 23).

The Linked Nature of the Drug Cartels

In an interview with Senator Kerry, a young man from a prominent Colombian family who had come under cartel authority due to gambling debts, explained that the cartels had investments in “Caribbean banks, Panamanian shipping, Peruvian copper mines, Miami real estate, and United States Treasury bonds” (Kerry 1995, 23). The encroachment of drug cartels into the legitimate business world only opens up more of the world. “Illicit trade is deeply embedded in the private sector, in politics, and in governments” and the might of the cartels only strengthens when the spheres in which it operates grows and their tentacles spread further (Naim 2005, 217). This example of the Colombian cartel and its legitimate enterprises perpetuates the image of the vast capacity and network of the drug cartels. The impressive depth and breadth of the reach of these organizations is striking, and drug trafficking is a key element in the funding of outside activities.

Moving deeper into the idea of the transnational corporation style of drug trafficking, journalist Gretchen Peters' book, *Seeds of Terror: How Heroin is Bankrolling the Taliban and al Qaeda*, sketches out her journey towards discovering the true story of the funding of the Taliban within the Afghan farmlands.¹³ This issue, one that she argues has largely been ignored by the United States government, has grown to such substantial proportions that Afghanistan now controls ninety percent of the global heroin supply (Norris 2009). In early 2003, links between terrorist groups and narco-traffickers across Pakistan and Afghanistan started appearing. Through Peters' interviews with "truck drivers, farmers, police, and several governors from the southern provinces [of Afghanistan]" she discovered that "insurgents... had teamed up with criminals. Kandahar's top counternarcotics cop put it this way: 'the smugglers forged a direct link to the Taliban and al Qaeda. They get the terrorists to move their drugs'" (Peters 2009, 3). In late 2003 the United States military found "a couple of wanted al Qaeda terrorists sitting on bales of heroin worth \$3 million" (Peters 2009, 3). The Taliban has frequently changed the laws on the legality of poppy as a crop in Afghanistan, but as it has grown it has become an important crop within the borders. Once the poppy has been cultivated it is brought to the borders of the country to be processed into heroin. It is smuggled out through Pakistan and Iran, and the money is then laundered back into the country (Norris 2009). In addition, United States "spy satellites tracked cargo ships leaving Pakistani shores laden with Afghan heroin, and returning with weapons and ammunition for the insurgency" (Peters 2009, 4).

¹³ Again, this does not directly connect to the Mexican or Colombian cases, but it is important to see that this is a global phenomenon that is constantly evolving.

The money from these trips is then funneled into parts of the legal and illegal sectors to be used to fund many aspects of Taliban operations. Due to the prohibitions on illicit drugs, the business of drug trafficking became extremely lucrative for all those taking part. This partnership continues to illustrate the relationship between drugs, profit and the ability to sustain an organization's operations within the illegal sector.

Not only are the individual organizations and their ties to one another growing stronger day-by-day, but also the regions to which they were once concentrated have evolved and expanded. A particular area that has become a hot spot for Arab extremists is the tri-border region among Brazil, Argentina, and Paraguay along the banks of the Parana River. This area of South America used to be overrun by drug smugglers, gunrunners, and bandits, and now an estimated 20,000 Arab extremists reside there. In the early 2000s they raised and laundered approximately \$50 million for terrorist organizations. By taking over the drug trafficking and gunrunning campaigns of the former inhabitants they have been able to thrive in the industry and fund group operations. General James T. Hill, head of the United States military's Southern Command, was reported saying in the Miami Herald that, "radical Islamic [branches of] groups such as Hezbollah, Hamas and Egypt's Al Gamaa al Islamiya are getting between \$300m and \$500m a year from the criminal networks" (Blanche 2003, 28). Not only are the agents of these groups reaping profits for their respective organizations, but also numerous attacks that have taken place within the region have been blamed on them. In July 1992, the Israeli Embassy in Buenos Aires was bombed, killed 28 people, and two years later in July 1994, a Jewish center in the city was attacked,

killing 86 (Blanche 2003, 29). The world's newspapers blamed both of these bombings on an extremist sect of Hezbollah. Examples such as these continue to prove the potential lucrative and hazardous nature of ties between drug cartels, criminal networks and radical groups.

The drug trafficking industry is innovative and adapts easily to achieve its goals of transporting drugs. Consistent with this behavior, Latin American drug cartels have realized the potential that lies within West Africa. Due to the strategic location of West Africa between the Latin American cocaine producing countries and Europe - the world's second largest cocaine market – this trade route has boomed. The region has become a new gateway for transporting drugs into Europe especially due to the easing of the borders between Africa and the European Union. The 2009 European Union Organized Crime Threat Assessment (OCTA) report indicated that there was a serious rise in the introduction of cocaine, heroin, cannabis, and other illicit drugs from Colombia that traveled through Western Africa before entering Europe.¹⁴ This increased presence of illicit substances in the European countries has been caused by an ever-growing influence in the African region by Latin American organized crime groups (European Union 2009). The West African Criminal Hub, as the OCTA has identified it, makes use of the Gulf of Guinea as a point of entry for the drug cartels and traffickers coming from across the Atlantic.

¹⁴ The EU OCTA understanding of West Africa includes: Morocco, Western Sahara, Mauritania, Cape Verde, Senegal, Gambia, Guinea Bissau, Guinea Conakry, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Ivory Coast, Ghana, Benin, Togo, Nigeria and Cameroon. (European Union 2009)

Additionally, it has been uncovered that the port of Constanta on the Black Sea has become a major transit point for the drugs that have been arriving through Turkey and the Balkans (Europol 2009).¹⁵ As technology has advanced and the movement and production of illicit drugs has become easier, the consumer pool for the illicit drug market around the world has opened up. As a result relationships form between the drug cartels based in the Andean region and those of Europe - mainly those from Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia and the Russian, Chinese, and Turkish organized crime groups (Europol 2009).¹⁶

Conclusion

The drug trafficking industry has become globalized alongside the rest of society. It has grown into a group of transnational drug corporations that have woven an intricate web that can be traced to varying parts of the world, in various forms. Radical Islamist branches of groups such as Hezbollah and Hamas have agents in the backwoods of South America funding their extremist activities from a cocaine drug smuggling trade that was once overrun by bandits and gunrunners. IRA members are found in FARC territory teaching the revolutionary guerrilla group their particular ways of bomb making. The Russian Mafia has created its own heroin pipeline running from the Far East to the European border. Colombian drug cartels have invested in some of the biggest enterprises

¹⁵ See Appendix B for Maps of this phenomenon

¹⁶ Mexico is not on this list because the Mexican drug cartels are much more focused on the route into the United States and there is not much evidence that they have expanded much farther than that.

in the region, and the FARC is funding its revolutionary civil war from the taxation of drug traffickers and its own plantations of coca leaves and poppies.

When an organization has connections in varying spheres, regions, countries, and populations it is not possible to simply shut down one hub and expect it to all come tumbling down. The United States government has spent decades fighting the illegal drug industry by focusing on exterminating particular areas with little success. In the next two chapters I paint the history of United States government's relations with Colombian and Mexican administrations. The policies and strategies that have been implemented upon United States government urgings and funding follow a path of pressure on specific parts of the supply-side chain in hopes it will bring down the industry. In an age where the illegal drug trade is a complicated network of drugs, money, and smuggling, this linear, nation-state-to-nation-state approach of United States policy is ineffective. The reason for the main failures of US drug strategies lies within the ignored reality of the globalized drug industry.

Chapter 2: Colombia

The United States government has chosen to repeatedly target Colombia and its drug traffickers in its “War on Drugs.” In the pursuit of quelling the flow of illegal drugs into the country, the United States government pours funding and programs into the country with poor results. In this chapter I lay out the last four decades of United States and Colombian government interactions on the issue of drug cultivation and trafficking. I argue that because of the nation-state-to-nation-state approach that the United States government continues to follow even when faced with evidence of the global drug networks, the fight against drug trafficking is faltering. With a single nation-state approach the United States government is failing to attack the global and multi-faceted aspects of the illegal drug industry. The focus on eradication, interdiction, and arrest in a main supply-side country is simply proving the proliferation and versatility of the drug cartels by showcasing their ability to adapt and infiltrate. In this chapter, I map the last forty years of initiatives, programs, and aid where it is possible to see the failures of this state centered approach to illegal drug trafficking.

Early Forms of United States Government Assistance

The first formal US antidrug assistance to Colombia began in 1973 with a bilateral agreement between the two countries for the transfer of aid and has followed a path of immense growth since. Beginning with US administration urgings, the Turbay Ayala (1978-1982) and Carter administrations signed an extradition treaty that officially became Colombian law on November 3, 1980, and the role of extradition and eradication became

key components in their efforts.¹⁷ In response to the extradition treaty, the US Congress sent an additional \$16 million in military assistance that year (Crandall 2008, 25). What followed were steps taken in the late 1970s and early 1980s by the Turbay administration to fumigate marijuana fields with the herbicide paraquat, again upon the urging of Washington. Unfortunately this resulted in a backlash in the form of an increase in coca production and a movement of marijuana production to other parts of the country. Because of the nature of drug cartels, and their ability to pay off officials and move to new fields with relative ease, the fumigation process proved to be less successful than originally expected. Looking back at President Bush's campaign speech in 1988, fumigation at the source was thought to be capable of stopping production all together but it did not factor in the cartels capabilities to adapt.

The successor to President Turbay, Belisario Betancur Cuartas (1982-1986), had different plans in terms of the relationship with the US government and initially refused to enforce the 1980 extradition law. This lasted only a short period of time when on January 5, 1985 he sent four Colombian nationals to the US to be tried. This change of heart took place only after his Minister of Justice, Rodrigo Lara Bonilla, was assassinated by a Colombian drug cartel. Lara Bonilla had worked with the US DEA in the discovery and decimation of a cocaine lab on the Yari River. In their mission they captured seven aircrafts and approximately fourteen metric tons of cocaine, holding an estimated \$1.2 billion market value (Bagley 1988, 85). The drug cartels retaliated by murdering Bonilla and

¹⁷ As noted earlier, this treaty was found unconstitutional by the Colombian Congress in 1987

placing bounties on the heads of high-level officials throughout the country. Again, in February of 1987, an elite anti-narcotics police unit arrested cartel kingpin Carlos Lehder and fifteen of his bodyguards and the Virgilio Barco Vargas administration fluidly extradited him to the US for trial. According to Bruce M. Bagley's essay, "Drug Trafficking, Political Violence and US Policy in Colombia in the 1990s",

Lehder's extradition appears to have stemmed neither the flow of cocaine from Colombia nor its wave of drug-related violence. It may even have increased the mayhem by stimulating rivals like the Cali group to challenge the Medellin cartel (Bagley 1988, 86).

This exhibits the unexpected backlash of US pursued policies. Trying to bring down the drug cartels by capturing and extraditing a few of the key leaders is not a successful course of action in a network such as the drug industry. Even though the actions and strategies being pursued by the United States and Colombian governments did not result in a reduction of violence or a decrease in the amount of drugs flowing into the US, the US government tripled its antidrug assistance during Betancur's presidency and President Reagan publicly praised his work (Crandall 2008, 25). This trend of denial in the face of disagreeable outcomes continues throughout the relationship between these two countries over the fight against illegal drugs.

At the time of the first President Bush's arrival to the White House, the South American nation was dealing with a level of political violence that labeled 1988 as the "year of the massacres" - after 3,000 Colombians were killed in the violence, and narcotics traffickers had killed the Attorney General, Carlos Mauro Hoyos. President Barco was only in his second year in office as the nation was being torn apart (Hinojosa 2007, 15). In

August of 1989 when a presidential candidate, Senator Luis Carlos Galan, was assassinated, Barco's administration went into full force against the drug traffickers, declaring its own war on drugs. In response, Barco demanded that the Mexican Congress allow for the extradition of Mexican citizens to the United States.¹⁸ The day of Galan's assassination, Barco's Council of Ministers approved a mechanism that allowed the President to bypass the court decision against extradition on the grounds that it was "an administrative measure, not a judicial one" (Hinojosa 2007, 16). The four weeks that followed Galan's death saw 535 suspected traffickers arrested and charged, and more than 10,000 other suspects were detained and then released, and four drug traffickers linked to the Medellin cartel were extradited to the US. "In the wake of Barco's declaration of total war on Colombia's drug barons, Bush delivered news of America's \$65 million emergency aid package to Colombia, publicly lauded Barco's "courageous" efforts, and met with him personally" (Bagley, 1989, p.164). By awarding nations more funding the United States government showed its approval of progress and strategies. It was just another manner in which the administration was able to keep in place the types of policies it found to be desirable for combating the drug trade.

The nation's drug lords countered Barco's war against them with their own declaration of all-out war on Colombian government officials, judges, businessmen, and journalists. By the end of October, just three months later, they had carried out nearly 200 bombing attacks nationwide against government offices, banks, business, newspapers, hotels, supermarkets, and even schools (Baley 1989, 157). This response by the drug

¹⁸ On June 25, 1987 the Colombian Supreme Court had found the extradition law to be unconstitutional.

cartels is a key point in showing the effects of the use of arrest, incarceration, and extradition to fight such large, multi-faceted groups. Instead of the cartels disintegrating because leaders are arrested or killed they instead use more violence in response, and a new leader turns up. Even after such vocal, violent outbursts, the US and Colombian governments still continued to implement strategies that followed the same dynamics even though desired ends never appeared – a reduction in the flow of drugs into the United States.

The Andean Initiative and its Aftermath

On February 15, 1990 the Colombian government hosted the Regional Drug Summit in Cartagena with the presidents of Peru, Bolivia, Colombia, and the United States in attendance. The product of the meeting was the Andean Initiative¹⁹. Following the logic of focusing on source countries and eradication at the source, the Carter administration created a plan based on the Regional Drug Summit in Cartagena that dealt with the three main source countries of cocaine in Latin America: Peru, Bolivia, and Colombia. The five-year, US “counter-cocaine” strategy was laid out in to three parts:

- 1) To strengthen the political and institutional capabilities of the Andean governments in order to enable them to take the necessary steps to disrupt narcotics trafficking activities. Initiatives such as increased political incentives, legal advisory teams, public awareness programs, strengthen the government’s abilities to prosecute, extradite and punish narcotics traffickers by supplying the necessary expertise and providing better security for political, police, military and judicial officials so they will not be intimidated in their jobs.

¹⁹ The Andean Initiative was a US government plan that lasted for five years until issues with the certification of Colombia arose and funding was lowered. It continued even after US Senate advising panels found it to be unproductive in 1992 and 1993.

2) An effort to increase the effectiveness of military and law enforcement activities. Implementing roadblocks, airfield control, shipment checks of key chemicals, destruction of labs and processing center and the usage of alternative development with eradication efforts.

3) Inflict substantial damage to the trafficking organizations by apprehending the leadership and disrupting or dismantling their operations. (Department of State). One of the main points of this strategy has yet to be unclassified but the two other points were an effort to impede the transfer of drug-generated funds and to seize financial and operational assets of traffickers in the US and other nations in which they operate.

An estimated two billion US dollars provided enhanced military, law enforcement, and economic assistance to enforce the three parts of this Initiative. As can be seen in the text, the Carter administration focused largely on increasing Colombia's capabilities in arrest and interdiction, with the inclusion of the need for extradition at the end of the process. With these provisions in the text, the United States government continued to place pressures on activities within the supply-side nations. Yet, just two years after the enactment of the Andean Initiative, there was a hearing before the Subcommittee on Terrorism, Narcotics, and International Operations of the Committee on Foreign Relations (Senate) already identifying the failures of the program. The chairman of the committee, Senator John Kerry, even stated that coca production had actually gone up in the past two years and cocaine production was at record levels. This demonstrates that there is a level of understanding of the situation within Congress and the administration, but there is a failure to transform that into policy.

In Colombia there persisted a major processing capacity for cocaine and additionally they had become major growers of heroin. Peru had seen an increase in coca production and coca manufacturing with the Peruvian military not acting as an aid in the

fight. Bolivia saw a leveling of coca production, an improvement in police, but the courts and judicial system were rampant in corruption and coca processing was up (US Senate 1992).²⁰ Therefore this increase in capacity, production, and manufacturing in most of these nation states further proves that it is not possible to deal with the drug trade at a nation-state-to-nation-state level. Rather it is necessary to broaden the strategy to encompass a bigger picture.

The subsequent years following the implementation of the Andean Initiative were a dim light in the relationship between Colombia, the incoming world leader in cocaine production, and the largest cocaine consumer, the United States. When President Clinton came into office in 1993 his administration conducted an “extensive classified review” of the US antidrug effort in the Andes, concluding that the efforts to date had been ineffective. Subsequently, the FY1993 budget of \$387 million in antidrug aid for the Andean countries was cut down to \$174 million. Even beyond that, the Office of National Drug Control Policy was reduced from 146 staff positions to 25 (Crandall 2008, 31). While this decrease in funds strained the relationship between the two nations, the situation in Colombia pushed the relationship even further.

The Samper Administration, 1994-1998

The year after Clinton became President, 1994, Ernesto Samper was inaugurated as the new Colombian president. Unfortunately rumors of a cartel funded campaign donations tainted his possible efficacy. This implication did not sit well within the walls of

²⁰ These trends can be seen in Figure 1

Congress and alongside that, his predecessor had left him with a situation that the United States administration found less than desirable. Towards the end of President Gaviria's term, Washington officials believed the Cali Cartel had influenced antidrug efforts in Colombia. This was not always the case. At the beginning of his term Gaviria was seen to be an ally, but by the end his independent stance on the issue of drugs made him a happy sight to see leave. The US government uses funding, aid, and pressures to place strategies and policies into place that it finds desirable. With an independent administration such as Gaviria's, this control over policy was largely lost. Samper is often cited as keeping a "narco-democracy" - a government that is at least partially funded by drug money and thus in turn, many decisions are made and things are overlooked that favor the position of the drug cartels - but much evidence indicates that it started with Gaviria (Crandall 2008, 32).

While the relationship between the US government and the Samper administration remained strained, the drug certification of Colombia became a contentious issue when the United States administration decertified them in 1995 (they had been fully certified in March of 1994, just before Samper came to power).²¹ The implications of the

²¹ The 1986 Anti-Drug Abuse Act created an annual drug certification process that linked source-country cooperation on counternarcotics efforts with eligibility for US foreign aid along side US support within international institutions. The criterion under review every year by the president is whether or not the country under question has done enough to combat drugs. The president then has the decision to apply either full certification, denial of certification or a "vital national interest" certification" to the country and then certification is then put to a vote in Congress. If a nation is decertified then sanctions are imposed and there is a 50 percent deferment of US assistance for that fiscal year. This process is an attempt to link the constituents more closely with the foreign policy that directly affects a drug situation at home (Crandall 2008, 38).

The clearest way in which the United States government is able to dictate the types of policies that are put into place in regards to the fight against illegal drugs has been through the control of aid with the drug certification process. A large portion of the funds that Colombia and Mexico spends on the fight against illegal drugs comes from the United States. Subsequently the United States government is able to put pressures and obligations on the aid they give, specifically with the drug certification process. This process gives the US government an opportunity to deem

decertification were buffered because the country was granted a national interest waiver that spared it the penalties of the decertification²², but it was still judged as a failure to cooperate with the United States government. Subsequently, the US State Department gave the Colombian government six actions that needed to be taken by June 1995 to demonstrate that they were willing to cooperate with the US government. These included arresting at least one high-level member of the Cali Cartel, passing money laundering legislation, enacting tougher sentencing guidelines for convicted drug offenders, and meeting specific eradication targets. What this demonstrates is the power of the United States to set the domestic policy agendas within the borders of key producers of illegal narcotics.

According to the General Accounting Office (GAO), Colombia made progress on all actions and exceeded targets for coca eradication (US GAO 1995). Yet even with the success of the administration's actions, the US government continued to apply pressure on the Samper government during 1995 over matters of political nature and they were yet again decertified in March of 1996. To make matters worse, just after Samper was acquitted of his campaign financing scandal, the United States administration responded with a demand for the extradition of four members of the Cali cartel and revoked President Samper's

whether or not a nation has been complying with a defined set of guidelines in regards to the "War on Drugs", and thus if it should be given its full funding in all spectrums of aid. With this tool at hand the US government has pressured governments, namely the Colombian and Mexican, into implementing the strategies that the United States deems most appropriate for fighting drug trafficking. To add to the situation, both the Colombian and Mexican governments have been successively trying to win US approval and funding by shaping their policies and actions to fit with the strategies of US foreign policy. Even in the rare cases where presidents and their governments have tried to move away from US influence and strike out on their own, they have had to crawl back into US favor.

²² The waiver was granted because of compelling US national interests

travel visa, prohibiting him from entering the US, even for UN events. These final two measures ended the relationship between the two presidents, although continued cooperation existed at lower levels and specialized law enforcement agencies (Hinojosa 2007, 42). The significance of the end of cordiality between the two heads of state was the impact it would have on funding in the future.

Thus, when President Clinton was inaugurated for his second term in 1997, US-Colombian relations were at their lowest point in recent history. Yet again in March 1997, Colombia was decertified, sparking anger and outrage from the Colombian government. Even with the furor over the US decision, the Samper administration continued to implement US policy provisions in hopes of regaining favor, and in turn aid. One of these concessions, and a key component to the certification debate on the US side, took place in December 1997 when the Colombian Congress authorized the reinstatement of extradition to the US. The following March they were given a national interest waiver and received the full benefits of a certification (Hinojosa 2007, 58).

As time passed, it finally became clear that a change in strategies was needed. The Western Hemisphere Drug Elimination Act of 1998 signed by Congress demonstrates that something was indeed being done. This supplemental appropriations bill added \$690 million to the fight against drugs in the western hemisphere. Colombia's total allotment of the US counter-narcotics budget for fiscal year 1999, totaled \$289 million, a number more than three times the allotment they received in 1998. This shift of intense focus and monetary support to Colombia shows a distinct move away from targeting the Andean

Region as a whole, to an exclusive emphasis on Colombia. Yet, this shift of focus still was directed at nation-state-to-nation-state strategies of action. Along with this shift came the election of Andres Pastrana in 1998 running on a platform of controlling the drug trade. The United States government supported Pastrana because his approach to the drug trafficking issue was in line with that of the US administration. His election in turn ended the period of hostility between the two countries (Hinojosa 2007, 59). The narrowing of the scope of the fight against the drug trafficking world is where a large part of the failure in the United States government "War on Drugs" resides. As I have demonstrated in this section, the United States government's focus on specific countries within the globalized drug trafficking world did not lead to a reduction in illegal narcotics entering the United States. The production operations in Colombia, Bolivia, and Peru are mobile and amorphous, limiting the efficacy of a rigid nation that based its approach on drug eradication.

Plan Colombia

While entrenched in failed peace negotiations with the FARC, President Pastrana was able to make progress gathering international support for his nation's fight against the drug traffickers. In August of 1999, US Undersecretary of State Thomas Pickering traveled to Colombia, the highest ranking US official to visit in many years, to continue the discussions about the future of aid with the nation's leaders (Hinojosa 2007, 60). It was at this meeting that President Pastrana introduced Plan Colombia - a \$7.5 billion plan that he

hoped would move the nation towards eradicating illicit crops, jump start the Colombian economy, promote social development, and move forward stalled peace talks. The plan was another continuation of the types of policies and strategies that the US government had been working towards in the previous decades. With a substantial focus on eradication, interdiction, and arrest in a supply-side nation, the cycle of US foreign policy continued.

Pastrana's plan was made up of three sections. A \$3.5 billion portion was to be provided by the international community with the US government supplying the main military effort in the strategies pursued. The European Union was to provide the humanitarian based aid, and the remaining \$4 billion was coming from the Colombian government (Crandall 2008, 123).²³ In the meeting with Pickering, Pastrana is reported saying to US government representatives, “we [Colombia] need a Marshall Plan” (Hinojosa 2007, 60). The plea for a likeness to the program built by the US government in the aftermath of World War II was not unfounded due to the distressing domestic situation but that is not the kind of package of policies and strategies that were implemented by the United States government.

²³ Table 1 in Appendix C lays out what US funding went towards in 2000.




Figure 3 US Aid to Colombia (Lemus, Stanton and Walsh 2005, 108)

Beyond Pastrana’s call for aid, a movement within the United States government also called for an increase in aid. Just a month before the big meeting between Pickering and Pastrana, US Drug Czar Barry McCaffrey leaked a US State Department memo calling for a \$1 billion dollar increase in aid to Colombia indicating that there was a push within the administration to aid the Colombian government even further in their battle. Similarly, in August of 1999 Secretary of State Madeleine Albright published an op-ed article in the New York Times bearing the title, “Colombia’s Struggles, and How We Can Help” (Albright 1999). The timing of all of these elements was a breeding ground for a new arrangement and initiative, and Plan Colombia was born in 2000. The Clinton administration originally included in the annual budget request on February 7, 2000, a fiscal year 2000 supplemental appropriations of \$954 million for assistance in the counternarcotics efforts in Colombia and the Andean region (Serafino 2001). In July of that year the US Congress passed, and Clinton subsequently signed, the supplemental appropriations bill that increased total US

aid to Colombia to \$1.6 billion over the next two years, from the fiscal year 1999 aid amount of \$164 million (Serafino 2000).²⁴ This substantial increase in aid was implemented in an effort to help fund Pastrana's "Plan Colombia: Plan for Peace, Prosperity, and the Strengthening of the State" (Hinojosa 2007, 61).

"Push into Southern Colombia Program" was a key initiative of President Pastrana and the main focus of increased foreign aid. Its main focus lay within the eradication and interdiction of illicit crops in the country, targeted at the region largely inhabited by the FARC. The FARC, the Colombian revolutionary guerrilla group using its relationship with the drug industry as a way to fund their operations, resides within the southern region of the country making this region of Colombia under suspicion for coca cultivation and drug trafficking activities (Lemus, Stanton, & Walsh 2005, 108). In the last twenty years of the "War on Drugs" eradication, interdiction, and arrest in key coca cultivating regions were a central focus of US policy in the drug wars. Plan Colombia, and subsequently the "Push into Southern Colombia" proved to be no different. The fiscal year 2000-2001 appropriations bill saw \$521 million go towards the effort of control and eradication. The plan called for equipping a Special Forces unit within the Colombian Army, the Colombian Counternarcotics Battalion (CNBN), with dozens of Blackhawk and Huey helicopters to be used in missions to transport counter-narcotics squadrons from their bases to the areas of conflict.²⁵ The 2,300-man brigade was set up to move into the region and gain control of the areas easing the way for massive eradication and fumigation efforts by the Colombian

²⁴ Figure 3 charts the amount of US aid for Plan Colombia from 1997 - 2005

²⁵ See Appendix B for a full list of provisions

military (Lemus, Stanton, & Walsh 2005, 108) (US Senate 2001). The results of this increased effort of eradication can be seen in Table 1. After the implementation of Plan Colombia in 2000 there was a drastic increase in the amount of coca and poppy crops that were eradicated in Colombia.

	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004
Coca crops eradicated (ha)(acres)	43,246 106,861	47,371 117,054	84,251 208,184	122,695 303,179	132,817 328,191	136,555 337,427
Poppy crops eradicated (ha)(Acres)	NA NA	9,254 22,867	2,583 6,383	3,371 8,330	3,830 9,464	3,060 7,561

To supplement the ongoing initiatives, President George W. Bush, who had come into office during the final stages of the planning of Plan Colombia, created the Andean Regional Initiative (ARI) and the Andean Counterdrug Initiative (ACI, but since fiscal year 2008 the Andean Counterdrug Program). He in turn placed Plan Colombia under the ACI in order to continue supporting and funding it. On April 9, 2001, the new Bush Administration requested \$731 million in the budget for fiscal year 2001 to fund a more extensive strategy, the ACI, which would also have funding from the International Narcotics Control²⁶ account. Alongside the ACI, the ARI was formulated to help stabilize Colombia's bordering nations. The initiative attempted to encompass parts of the counterdrug plan not included in Plan Colombia. The outlined ARI goals were the "three D's": democracy, development, and drugs (Crandall 2008, 136). There are two main differences between the ARI and Plan Colombia,

²⁶ The INCB is the "independent and quasi-judicial control organ monitoring the implementation of the United Nations drug control conventions" (INCB website)

first of all, spending on economic and social programs would be roughly equal to the drug control and interdiction components that had been the primary focus of Plan Colombia, and secondly, more than half of the assistance was targeting neighboring countries experiencing spillover effects from Colombia's civil conflict and from narcotrafficking activities in that country (Lee and Perl 2002). This modest expansion of the single country focus that has characterized United States government policy represents an understanding of the need for a broader strategy. Yet it falls short because it is still single nation focused, and continues to pursue the same strategies of eradication, interdiction, and arrest just as was done in previous plans.

Since his election in 2002 on a platform rejecting the Pastrana-led peace process, President Uribe has seen a much greater success in fighting the war against drugs. He also has strong popular support within the country due to his ability to work within American interests. Coming in to office after September 11, Uribe was successful in reframing his domestic war in terms of the US war on terror, creating a lasting partnership with the Bush administration (Crandall 2008, 147). One of the first and biggest counterinsurgencies in Colombian history took place in 2003 with the deployment of 15,000 troops to take on the FARC. With the aid of US military assistance and training, Plan Patriota forced the FARC to retreat and by early 2004 the Colombian National Police had regained and established a presence in each of the 1,098 municipalities, a first in Colombian history (Crandall 2008, 149). The president's popularity increased substantially after a March 2008 Colombian military raid of a FARC camp in Ecuador that resulted in the death of a top guerrilla commander and the subsequent seizure of his computers and files.

Just months later in July of 2008, another Colombian military success story involved the rescuing of fifteen hostages that had long been held by the FARC, including Colombian presidential candidate Ingrid Betancourt a FARC captive since February of 2002. Upon coming to office, Uribe began a hard-line fight against drug trafficking and violence by increasing the size of the military and police, through the recruitment and training of peasant soldiers.²⁷ This initiative has been mostly possible through a one-time 1.2% war tax on wealthy citizens and businesses. He also gave authorization for widespread aerial fumigation of coca crops that had previously been limited to small plots of growers who had signed eradication pledges (Beittel and Seelke 2009). While all of these initiatives have significantly helped to quell some of the violence in Colombia, the amount of Colombian drugs entering the United States is not subsiding. Therefore while Uribe has been successful in controlling threats to national unity and drug production within the country's borders, this has not resulted in a successful outcome for the United States, yet this approach continues.

The Andean Counterdrug Program (ACP) is now the primary US government program that supports Plan Colombia. It was designed to provide assistance to seven countries within the Andean region: Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Panama, Peru, and Venezuela. The objectives of the ACP program are "to eliminate the cultivation and production of cocaine and opium, build law enforcement infrastructure, arrest and prosecute traffickers, and seize their assets" (Veillette 2007). From fiscal year 2000 to

²⁷ Peasant Soldiers receive less training than regular troops, and are based near their own hometowns, serving for two years.

2005 ACI funding for Plan Colombia was approximately \$2.8 billion.²⁸ With Foreign Military Financing (FMF) program and the Department of Defense (DOD) assistance accounted for, the total jumps to \$4.5 billion (Veillette 2006). In 2002 the US Congress granted the administration the flexibility to use US counterdrug funds for a unified campaign to fight drug trafficking and terrorist organizations (Beikkel & Seelke 2009).²⁹ With this substantial increase in funding for the initiatives taking place in Colombia and the surrounding region, the United States has ramped up its efforts in South America. As I argued before the United States government continually embarks on strategies that focus on eradication, interdiction, and arrest in the supply-side country. Therefore the ACP demonstrates persistence in a plan of attack because of its objectives.

Conclusion

In 2005, the US Congress continued funding for the ACI and for fiscal year 2006 approving the Bush Administration's request for \$734.5 million for the ACI in the Foreign Operations Act. The continuation of funds included \$30 million for a Critical Flight Safety

²⁸ Tables 5-11 in Appendix C show the annual funding for the seven countries included in the ACI

²⁹ The September 11, 2001 attacks altered the way that the United States saw foreign aid and development. Alongside a growing Colombian counterinsurgency crisis, the attacks fueled the Bush administration to undertake a shift in Colombian policy towards a removal of the distinction between counternarcotics and counterinsurgency assistance. The FARC and ELN had already been on the State Department's list of foreign terrorist organizations since 1997, and the AUC, a third Colombian drug cartel, was added to the list on September 10, 2001. This shift manifested itself in February 2002 when the Bush Administration put in their FY2003 budget proposal a request for \$98 million in foreign military financing that would create an elite Colombian counterinsurgency battalion to protect the Cano Limon-Covenas oil pipeline. On March 21, 2002 the administration submitted a \$28.9 billion emergency budget request for counterterrorism, it was subsequently passed on August 2, which included a provision allowing Colombia to use all counterdrug aid for "a unified campaign against narcotrafficking [and] against activities by organizations designated as terrorist organizations" (Crandall 2008, p. 139).

Program allocated for upgrading and refurbishing aircrafts used for eradication and interdiction missions (Veillette 2006a).³⁰ The US Congress also capped the number of US military and civilian contractor personnel that can be stationed in Colombia under the guise of Plan Colombia, at 800 and 600 respectively (Beittel & Seelke 2009). The US foreign policy situation in the fight against illegal drug cultivation and trafficking in Colombia and its neighboring regions continues on the same path as that of the last two decades. With the Andean Counterdrug Program at the helm, encompassing Plan Colombia and the Andean Regional Initiative, the US government is continually striving to fight the drugs at their source and supply with the use of interdiction, eradication, and arrest. While the initiatives that are presently active have regional components to them, much of the policies have stayed the same.

The United States government has been invested in Colombia's fight against the drug wars for many decades. Yet numerous initiatives, aid packages and strategies proposed by both governments are not reaching their goals. The problem lies within the types of policies that are being enacted. The United States government is trying to fight a global network of criminals with a supply-side, state-to-state approach. Due to the depth, strength, flexibility, and versatility of international dimensions of the drug cartels and their traffickers, this nonflexible single nation approach is proving to be ineffective.

³⁰ Support and aid has continued through the ACP and other government venues, while in FY2008, alternative development programs were shifted from under the ACP account to the Economic Support Fund (ESF) account.

Chapter 3: Mexico

In the last three years Mexico has faced an increase in drug related violence that is threatening internal security of the United States southern neighbor. Since 2006 the country has seen growth of a multi-faceted war encompassing actors from the government and numerous drug trafficking organizations. They are fighting over territory and smuggling routes in the drug trade that has cost thousands of people their lives - 5,600 in 2008, and 8,280 in 2009 (Beittel 2009) (“Mexico/USA politics” 2010). On August 20th, 2009, the situation in Mexico reached such a point of desperation and a need for action that President Calderón answered by approving a law that decriminalized the possession of small amounts of marijuana, cocaine, heroin and other drugs. The law mandates that if a person is detained with under the maximum personal use amount³¹ for a specific drug, they will no longer face criminal prosecution. Yet, it also holds that if an individual is caught three times, treatment is mandatory (Mexico Legalized Drug Possession 2009). This move of decriminalization can be seen as a concession to the drug traffickers by the Mexican government in an attempt to quell drug violence.³²

The history of the Mexican government’s battle with the drug kingpins and traffickers has proved futile in most other ventures to stop them. This chapter charts the story of United States and Mexican government’s strategies and policies in their attempt to

³¹ The maximum for marijuana is 5 grams, half a gram of cocaine, 50 milligrams of heroin, 40 milligrams for methamphetamine and 0.015 milligrams of LSD. No penalties have been established for noncompliance. (Mexico Legalizes Drug Possession 2009)

³² With the move to decriminalize drugs, albeit a small one, the Mexican government is allowing Mexican citizens and the drug cartels some leeway in their organizations.

bring the drug trafficking network down. Just as in the Colombian case, I argue that the United States government has followed a path of supply-side, nation-state-to-nation-state policies that do not properly address the way the global drug networks actually operate. With a single direction approach of strategy that pushes only on specific points, the United States government is not tackling the full scope of the drug cartels.

After Mexico became a major player in the illegal drug industry in the 1990s, the Mexican drug cartels adapted their business models to fit the globalized nature of the industry. Naim wrote in his book that, “partnerships, diversification, the development of financial expertise-in all these respects ... squeezed the maximum value from their territorial advantage” (Naim 2006, 75). This involved creating connections with the Russians, Ukrainians, and the Chinese through their Colombian suppliers. Additionally the Mexican cartels allowed other trafficking groups to use their smuggling routes for a fee (Naim 2005, 76). Because of Mexico’s geographic proximity to the United States, international crime and drug groups based in other regions make it a point to establish important connections with the Mexican drug traffickers, since a business relationship with a Mexican drug cartel opens up the United States border to their goods.

The United States government has had a long-standing relationship with its southern-border neighbor in many different realms of political, economic, and social factors. Due to this close proximity that extends beyond the geographical, the situation between the United States and Mexico differs in important ways to that of the relationship with Colombia previously discussed. A key difference, and one that has been very

important in the crackdown on the trafficking of drugs, has been the vital trade in legitimate goods between the two nations. Throughout discussions about the war on drugs in the recent decades, the United States government has emphasized the maintenance of a safe and stable trade within the legal economic sectors between the two nations. Mexico is the US's second biggest export partner, only after Canada, and ranks third on the list of US imports, after China and Canada (Economist Intelligence Unit 2008). Due to the key role that Mexico plays in the United States trade economy the US government has treated relations with the Mexican government differently than is seen in the Colombian case. Not wanting to overturn the balance established, policy implementation and enforcement has been less stringent.

The neighboring nations' century-long engagement in the effort against drug trafficking has hit many highs and lows along the way. The history of Mexico's drug network is lengthy, but its exponential growth within the global drug trafficking system, where it has become a huge player, has been a much more recent phenomenon, only appearing in the most recent decades. The original state of the Mexican drug rings was a family-based network that smuggled drugs, mainly marijuana and heroin, and contraband in to the United States market (Freeman and Sierra 2005, 263). Issues over drugs between Mexico and the United States date as far back as 1909 when delegates from thirteen countries met in Shanghai for the first international anti-opium conference, the beginning of a lengthy series of multilateral conventions to suppress the trade, manufacture and use

of drugs.³³ After the conference, many drug regulations came into play in the United States, along with larger law enforcement budgets and initiatives to convince other nations, especially in Latin America, to halt the export of drugs. These efforts proved to be mostly futile, except in Mexico where the government officials tried to restrict drug-related activities with limited success (Toro 1995, 6).

Early Relations between the United States and Mexican Governments

Throughout US-Colombian and US-Mexican relations in the fight against drug trafficking the United States government view on strategy in the majority of initiatives has dictated policy implementation. After the adoption of the Eighteenth Amendment to the US Constitution in 1919 - the prohibition of the consumption and production of alcohol in the US - bordering countries were pressured to stop the movement of the illegal beverages. In 1923, Mexican President Alvaro Obregon prohibited the importation of all narcotics and alcohol, built an airfield in Ciudad Juarez in an attempt to stop liquor runs across the border, and created a fifty-mile-wide dry zone along the northern border in hopes that “many transgressions might be atoned for by helping to make the prohibition laws [in the US] effective” (Toro 1995, 8). This reaction to US government pressure became common in the relationship. At the time of the enactment of the Eighteenth Amendment, alcohol was treated much like drugs are treated by the administration today. The United States’ neighbor’s response was indicative of the nature of future relationships. It helped

³³ In the following years, the international agenda was expanded to include morphine, cocaine, and marijuana.

synthesize the neighboring nations' objectives and policies in regards to illegal substances, yet mainly catering towards the US government plans for the illegality of certain drugs. In another reaction to US government pressures Obregon's successor, President Plutarco Elias Calles, banned the export of heroin and marijuana in 1927³⁴. This in turn created an underground narcotics trade along the US-Mexican border (Toro 1995, 8). This history set the stage for the coming decades when the movement of illegal drugs increased dramatically in the region and Mexican officials continually argued that they "were fighting production and smuggling as a result of widespread drug consumption in the US" (Toro 1995, 16). With this stance Mexican officials maintained that the production increased only due to an increase in consumption in the US, which was yet another reaction to pressure from the United States government.

In the subsequent years, little was done to stop the actual production of illicit drugs and the fields flourished throughout Mexico. The year 1948 saw Mexico's first national eradication campaign, La Gran Campaña. Its aim was to cover the whole country and become a permanent program for certain branches of the Mexican police. The military was called in to destroy plants, and in its 1948-1949 annual report, the Mexican military recorded that it had covered nearly 10,968 kilometers and destroyed 680 fields, much of which was done by hand (Toro 1995, 12). This plant eradication strategy became a permanent task that took place every four to six months, but after a few years it became

³⁴ Heroin and Cocaine were regulated by the 1914 US Harrison Narcotics Tax Act, which regulated and taxed the distribution, production and importation of opiates. In 1923 the United States Treasury Department's Narcotics Division banned all legal narcotics sales. (Opium Throughout History, 1998)

clear that the program was not being successful in the reduction of production. Rather, it contributed to an increase as growers bribed or killed law enforcement officials, or simply moved to a new area (Toro 1995, 13). This displays another ineffective policy of eradication and an unsuccessful attempt to pressure the drug cartels at this single level.

At the end of the 1960's the side effects of the versatile, globalized, drug industry were seen in Mexico. As a result of eradication programs and a government ban on opium production in Turkey, then the primary source country for heroin to the United States, the traffickers that had been displaced from Turkey brought heroin production and drug smuggling to Mexico. Additionally, this movement came alongside the breakdown of the "French Connection" and the enforcement of stricter laws in other parts of the world. Mexico's difficulties with fighting the battle against drugs domestically also played a role in making Mexico a major player in the heroin market (Toro 1995, 16).³⁵ The Mexican drug producers and traffickers had never had such a large stake in the global drug industry before. Data produced by the US Assistant Secretary of State for International Narcotics Matters in 1975, Mathea Falco, indicated that by 1975 Mexico was the main supplier to the United States for heroin and marijuana, providing eighty-seven and ninety-five percent respectively. The US President's Commission on Organized Crime estimated that there was an increase from 10-15 percent in 1972 to at least 80 percent in 1975 of the supply of Mexican heroin in the US (Toro 1995, 16). This is the first example of regional and nation-

³⁵ The "French Connection" was a ring of heroin manufacturers headquartered in Marseilles who had developed extensive distribution networks in the United States

state-to-nation-state pressures on the drug industry, which primarily created a shift of production and flow.

As the growth in illegal agricultural production and smuggling exploded domestically, (up to 10 tons of heroin were processed annually and 6.5 tons of heroin were smuggled in 1975) the Mexican government faced a dire problem of drug related violence and trafficking which they were unable to deal with by themselves and as a result called for US government assistance (Toro 1995 16). In pursuit of strategies and programs to deal with the problem, the Mexican government needed support and funding from the United States government. Upon US administration urgings, the Mexican government turned to an extensive aerial herbicidal spraying campaign, a program that the US administration had been trying to convince the Mexican government was the best manner in which to fight the drug problem.

Domestically, the US government was busy trying to figure out how best to reduce the flow of drugs entering the country and lower the production globally. In 1972 the United States Narcotic Control (USNC) program was created in an effort to formalize the US government's narcotic control assistance programs and established a fund designated specifically for these efforts. The USNC provided training and funding for research and development programs in crop and income substitution, drug abuse treatment, and prevention, and provided narcotics enforcement support including training, vehicles, aircraft, and communication equipment to enhance illicit drug crop eradication and illicit

traffic suppression.³⁶ United States government officials had tried for many years to convince Mexican officials that the “key to any effective antidrug program lay in eliminating the illicit product at the source [and] until such time that herbicides were applied on a massive scale against marijuana and opium poppies ... the annual Mexican campaign would prove an exercise in futility” (Craig 1980). Due to the US government belief that eradication is one of the key avenues to pursue in the reduction of illegal drug trafficking and illegal crop growth, pressure was applied on the Mexican administration to enact a program that would follow in those footsteps (Toro 1995).

Operation Condor and its Aftermath

In November 1975, a secret meeting took place between Mexican Attorney General Pedro Ojeda Paullada and the senior advisor to the US Secretary of State and coordinator for International Narcotics Affairs, Sheldon Vance. During this meeting Ojeda Paullada announced the plans for Operation Condor, an accelerated fumigation of illicit crop fields on a scale that had never been seen before in the region (Craig, 1980). This program was a continuation of a previously US government sanctioned program. The United States government provided aerial photographic equipment useful in plotting fields from the air, as well as telecommunications, helicopters, and forty aircrafts to transfer soldiers and

³⁶ A report issued by the Committee on Narcotics Abuse and Control in May of 1984, *International Study Missions Summary Report 1984*, identified a failure to bring any meaningful or long-term reduction in the production and trafficking of drugs in all major narcotic-producing countries other than Mexico and Turkey (US House of Representatives 1984). They found that Mexico was the only country, between Mexico, Peru, Bolivia, Colombia, and Jamaica, that had a government that recognized its obligation to detect and eradicate the illicit cultivation of narcotic crops and “demonstrated a national will and commitment to eliminate that cultivation” (US House of Representatives 1984).

spare parts. The US government also provided training in spraying marijuana and poppy fields for Mexican pilots. At the time it appeared to be successful, but it was not for another decade that the unintended consequences came into view. In the first year of the program, from September 1, 1975 to August 31, 1976, 21,405 opium plots were destroyed, 16,686 marijuana fields were eradicated and 4,399 individuals were arrested on drug charges³⁷ (Craig, 1980, p.349). The spraying was also successful in that smaller businesses and traffickers were pushed out because their crops were ruined, but powerful cartels remained and grew into their place. Because of the nature of cartels – they are expansive and mobile-- they were able to survive the eradication by simply moving and using a different region to grow their crops. Additionally, they were able to move into the sector that the small businesses had dominated before (Toro 1995, 17). As the director of the Center for International Studies at El Colegio de México, Maria Celia Toro, put it in her book *Mexico's "War" on Drugs: Causes and Consequences*:

In theory stiffer antidrug law enforcement, particularly eradication and interdiction programs, tend to have a “cartelization” effect on the market, in the sense that they push less daring and smaller traffickers out of the business and thus benefit the most powerful and organized. Furthermore, those willing and capable of resisting increased enforcement reorganize their business, relying heavily on their comparative advantages: buying protection or escalating the use of violence (Toro 1995, 17).

With the ability to morph and adapt unlike smaller groups, the drug cartels are able to grow into what we are seeing today in the drug sphere, transnational groups that are more expansive than ever before. In this case, by wiping out small producers, United States

³⁷ This is in comparison to the 1974-1975 span where 13,580 plots of opium were destroyed, 6,762 marijuana fields, and 2,752 individuals were arrested. (Craig, 1980, p.349)

policy inadvertently made the cartels stronger – just the opposite of their goal. With Operation Condor in the works, the Mexican government formalized the presence of US Drug Enforcement Administration (US DEA) police agents in Mexico who had been working on drug-related intelligence for decades. With this US government agency presence the US government is able to have a more direct, hands-on, approach with the enactment of Mexican government policies in relation to the drug war.

Nearly thirty US agents were given permission to stay and oversee the implementation of the program and to offer assistance in intelligence matters. Alongside Operation Condor, a three-pronged approach emerged in the Mexican-US fight against drugs: eradication of marijuana and opium poppy fields, interdiction of narcotics in transit, and the dislocation of trafficking organizations. With the help of US government funding and equipment, and more specifically the US DEA, specialized police groups were organized and modeled after the US DEA tactics. With the aid of the US government the results were impressive (Toro, 1995, p.25). From this point forward, US government presence in the Mexican fight against the trafficking of illicit drugs was permanent; furthering the capacity of US administrations to have their hand in Mexican government drug related policies.

A Shift in Drug Trafficking Routes

Already facing serious drug trafficking related issues, the Mexican government was ill equipped to handle the next shift in the global drug trafficking networks. In the 1980s President Reagan created a task force, the Vice President's Task Force on South Florida,

headed by then Vice President George H. W. Bush. The task force was able to shut southern Florida down to Colombian drug traffickers as a gateway into the United States (Freeman and Sierra 2005, 263).³⁸ In the early 1980's approximately 70 percent of all marijuana and cocaine entering the US came through southern Florida.³⁹ Drug smuggling was one of the region's major industries, boasting a value from \$7 billion to \$12 billion a year (Kelly 1981). Because of the shut down in southern Florida the Colombian drug traffickers needed to find a new port of entry into the US and the Mexican drug trafficking networks stepped in to fill the void. The Mexican corridor became the primary transit route into the United States. What had been a smaller industry turned into a national phenomenon that ended up shaking the nation-state and its government. Mexican trans-shipments boomed and changed the nation into one fraught with corruption and drug dissemination (Gootenberg 2009). This case highlights a key component of the ineffectual "pin-point" pressure strategy that can be found throughout US government policy – the drug industry is global and versatile, able to adapt and change easily and consequently impossible to pin down.

As drug-trafficking activity increased in Mexico, previously unseen levels of bribery and violence emerged there as well. In November 1984, former Defense Minister Juan Arevalo Gardoqui was implicated in a scandal at Buffalo Ranch, a marijuana plantation owned by a major kingpin Rafael Caro Quintero that was twelve square kilometers and

³⁸ In the early 1990s seventy to eighty percent of the cocaine smuggled out of Colombia entered the US from Mexico, while only twenty to thirty percent continued to come in via the Caribbean (Bagley 2005).

³⁹ The increase in heroine flows from Mexico that took place in the 1960s was still the case when the shift of cocaine and marijuana happened in the 1970s.

employed 12,000 people. The US DEA agent who was investigating political and law enforcement ties to Buffalo Ranch, Enrique Camarena Salazar, was kidnapped, tortured, and murdered in February of 1985 (Freeman and Sierra 2005, 271). The murder of Camarena, the first time Mexican corruption had led to the death of a US agent, brought tensions between the Mexican and United States administrations for many years. In 1986, the underlying layer of distrust between the two nations had planted its seed and the US government reacted with a new antidrug strategy that reinforced the military aspect of drug control. The US Congress implemented a requirement that drug production or transit nations, including Mexico, be certified annually as to whether they have been cooperating with US drug control efforts (Freeman and Sierra 2005, 272). The relationship between the United States and the Mexican governments has experienced many ups and downs, but a constant has been a US government dictation of policies – even in times of bad relations and communication.

Just before President George H. W. Bush came into office in 1989, Carlos Salinas de Gortari was elected President of Mexico. The two administrations worked hard fighting the drug traffickers with the US government continually providing aid in support of activities centered on interdiction, eradication, and arrest. During Salinas' first official state visit to the US, he fervently expressed that there would not be any joint operations with US forces on Mexican soil. At the time there were joint operations taking place in Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru, but Salinas rejected that strategy in regards to Mexico. This made it clear to the US administration that there were limits to how far Salinas' administration was willing to

go (Hinojosa 2007, p. 27). The Mexican government announced that because of president Salinas' efforts towards bringing down the drug cartels during the first 88 days of his presidency 780 kilos of cocaine and 80,000 kilos of marijuana had been seized, 1,700 arrests had been made, and funding for narcotics control was increased 174 times (Hinojosa 20087, 25). While there were some apparent achievements in interdiction and arrest, the situation was not getting better on the ground. Rampant corruption was repeatedly exposed among high-level officials and agencies, yet US-Mexican cooperation continued to improve. There was an increase in operational cooperation, with US Customs officers flying and guiding anti-narcotics police forces to sites of drug operations and raids. When the Mexican Chamber of Deputies voted for "an exhaustive investigation" of implications of corruption and requested reports from US Customs and DEA officials in Mexico to aid in an investigation, the US agencies handed them over.

With encouragement from the United States government, in 1988 the Salinas' administration formed the Center for Drug Control Planning (Cendro), the nation's drug intelligence analysis center. In 1992 he followed that up with the creation of the National Institute to Combat Drugs (INCD) an institution modeled after the US DEA. The INCD was in turn broken up when allegations that its director, General Jesús Gutiérrez Rebollo, was on the payroll of the Juárez cartel. In its place came the Special Prosecutor for Crimes Against Healthy (FEADS) with US funds providing the technical support needed for the new agency. FEADS was in turn broken up in 2003 after agents were found to be extorting drug traffickers (Freeman & Sierra 2005, p. 268). Many reasons can be identified for the

continued cooperation of the US government but the dominance of legal trade and the “War on Drugs” in the relationship are key elements.

In 1993, the year President Clinton was elected proved to be a difficult one in the neighboring nations’ relationship. It started when Mexico refused US counter-narcotics aid and “assumed responsibility for most of the costs of the counternarcotics effort” domestically and as a result Mexico received a trivial \$2.6 million in 1995 in anti-drug aid (Hinojosa 2007, 44). This move was an effort by the Salinas’ administration to stand on its own. In addition, the Mexican government was being resistant to US agency efforts to monitor the use of US-funded equipment, a procedure that is mandated by US law. To further matters, in May 1994 Cardinal Jesús Posadas Ocampo and six others were assassinated at the Guadalajara airport, and their killers managed to escape. Drug cartel members were thought to be the culprits, and the intent of the killings was to send a message of their power to the Mexican government. The killers’ escape is another sign of the corruption and deep-seeded web of the drug networks. Their ability to get away with a murder of such public scale with ease provided an image of the magnitude of the infiltration of the drug cartels within the police force, government, and even the military.

Only one month later President Salinas announced the creation of the National Institute for the Combat of Drugs (INCD), an agency designed to function similarly to the US Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) by having all counter narcotics efforts in

one department.⁴⁰ Followed by another crackdown on law enforcement that led to the firing or arrest of 67 law-enforcement officers (including four senior officials from Jalisco and the former Mexico City police chief) and charging of four Supreme court magistrates, Salinas took steps towards creating an even closer relationship with the US government and agencies (Hinojosa 2007, 44). By taking these actions, the Mexican administration exposed their incapacity to handle the devastating situation with the drug cartels and traffickers.

With the enactment of NAFTA on January 1, 1994, the ensuing uprising of the Zapatistas in the state of Chiapas, and a presidential election touched by violence the narcotics issue was ignored.⁴¹ However, in December of 1994, when Ernesto Zedillo came into office he declared that drug trafficking remained “Mexico’s number one security threat” (Ford 1996), but the Peso collapsed shortly afterwards, and an economic crisis engulfed the two nations for the ensuing year. In January of 1995 the US government announced an assistance program for Mexico and loans began to accumulate through December. In 1996 the illegal drug problem resurfaced and the US Embassy in Mexico City made counternarcotics its “co-first priority, which is shared with the promotion of US business and trade” (Ford 1996). During that year the US and Mexican governments created the High Level Contact Group for narcotics control, which created an atmosphere

⁴⁰ The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 established the ONDCP in 1988. The purpose of the ONDCP is “to establish policies, priorities, and objectives for the Nation’s drug control program. The goals of the program are to reduce illicit drug use, manufacturing, and trafficking, drug-related crime and violence, and drug-related health consequences” (US ONDCP)

⁴¹ The enactment of NAFTA proved to be another barrier to the US government implementation of their own strategies because the trading relationship had to be maintained, and thus there are many examples of times that the US government overlooked issues of corruption and human rights violations.

for ranking officials who were in charge of managing narcotics policy on both sides of the border to come together for periodic meetings to discuss the needs of each side (Hinojosa 2007, 46). This was an important step in the relationship between these two nations because it gave Mexico a voice in the discussions and they could make concessions on the part of the United States.

The use of the drug certification process is clearly seen in the Colombian case, but it has also played a role in Mexican-US government relationship, albeit a lesser one. The trading partnership that the United States and Mexican governments have, especially after the implementation of NAFTA in 1994, clearly complicates the certification process because the US government does not want to disrupt the balance and trading flows that have been established. A top US DEA official told the editor-in-chief of *Foreign Policy*

Moises Naim:

Before every trip I took to review with my counterparts in the Mexican government their efforts to combat drug trafficking, I was given a detailed briefing by our intelligence agencies about the ties between some of the high-level Mexican officials that I was going to meet and the drug traffickers. Yet after that I would go to another briefing where I was told that NAFTA was a priority for the United States and that I should be careful not to do anything that would jeopardize it (qtd in Naim 2005, 80).

The year 1997 saw more corruption scandals that proved to test the working relationship of the agencies within the country and then DEA administrator Thomas Constantine was reported saying “there is not one single law enforcement institution in Mexico with whom DEA has an entirely trusting relationship” (Freeman & Sierra 2005, p. 272). The arrest of the director of the National Institute to Combat Drugs (INCD) for being an employ of Amado Carrillo Fuentes’ Juarez drug cartel only proved to the US government that

corruption had reached new heights and the certification decision came under heavy debate. On May 1 1997, President Zedillo announced that the administration was making substantial changes to the nation's antinarcotics forces by disbanding the INCD with a new agency and firing 1,000 officers thought to be corrupt. President Clinton subsequently traveled to Mexico, the first state visit by a US president in 20 years and announced that the US would aid Mexico with six million dollars in funds to train the replacement officers. In response to numerous instances of corruption many US Congress members called for an overturn of Mexico's certification, but full certification was granted. Again the aspects of trade and the necessity to suppress the drug trafficking coming from Mexico overtook the issue of corruption. The same occurrence of corruption took place again in 1998 (Spencer 1998).

The following year saw an even worse situation when an undercover operation by US law enforcement agencies to stop the illegal laundering of Colombian drug profits by Mexican banks and bankers ended up in the arrest of 167 people, 26 of which were Mexican bankers, and the seizure of millions of dollars in illicit profits. It was "the largest, most comprehensive drug-money-laundering case in the history of US law enforcement" taking place unauthorized on Mexican soil (Hinojosa 2007, 64). A success on paper, it was disastrous for the nations' relationship because in the eye of the Mexican government, the US agents had been working without authorization and broke numerous Mexican laws in the process and violated sovereign rights (Hinojosa 2007, 64). The cooperation and communication between Mexico and the US reached a very low point in the ensuing

months and operations on the ground were unmoving and extremely tense. As time moved forward, the wounds healed and relations between the two nations restored themselves. In 1999, President Zedillo announced a \$500 million initiative to combat narcotics trafficking and President Clinton once more traveled to Mexico and praised Zedillo's efforts (Hinojosa 2007, 66).

During President George W. Bush's first official foreign visit in February 2001 he traveled to Mexico to meet with President Vicente Fox (2000-2006). Together they pledged to pursue a "partnership for prosperity" and they agreed to strengthen law enforcement cooperation. When President Fox came for his official state visit in September 2001, he asked Congress to pass legislation to suspend the drug certification requirements a sign of faith in the new administration. Even with the trading partnership as a type of buffer from the drug certification process, President Fox's administration was feeling the pressure from it. The US Congress modified the certification process for three years and the requirements were waived for fiscal year 2002. The subsequent years saw an increase in cooperation and communication between US and Mexico, with the US government continually providing training, equipment, and funds to strengthen the anti-drug efforts within the borders of Mexico (Ewell 2005, 80).

With every new president in Mexico came a new affirmation towards the destruction of the illegal drug trafficking networks. In 1999, President Zedillo announced a \$500 million initiative to combat narcotics trafficking and President Clinton once more traveled to Mexico and praised Zedillo's efforts (Hinojosa 2007, 66). In 2006 Felipe

Calderón won the presidential election and he made combating the drug cartels a top priority. He started sending thousands of soldiers and federal police to drug trafficking “hot spots” and they were given the task of arresting traffickers, establishing check points, burning marijuana and opium fields, and interdicting drug shipments along the coasts (Beittel 2009). Since taking office, the Calderón administration has increased security spending, with a 24% increase in 2007 and a near \$5 billion increase in 2009 (Seelke 2009). He has also been willing to cooperate with the US administration on counterdrug measures, something that his predecessors were not always willing to do.

Merida Initiative

On October 22, 2007 the United States and Mexican governments issued a joint statement announcing a multi-year \$1.4 billion plan called the Merida Initiative. The bulk of the funding and aid for the program would come in the form of US government assistance to combat drug trafficking and other criminal organizations in Mexico and Central America. A report issued by Howard Berman, the chairman of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, on May 22, 2008, provides an outline for the bill which authorizes assistance to Mexico and the countries of Central America in the areas of: “counter-narcotics, the fight against organized crime and youth gang violence, law enforcement modernization, and institution-building and rule of law support” (Berman 2008).⁴²

⁴² In the same report it contains a statement issued by the US Congress that found key items pertaining to the drug war in Mexico that were of vital importance to US Lawmakers. The full list can be found in Table 4 in Appendix A.

On June 30, 2008 President Bush signed the initiative into law. The three-year, \$1.4 billion⁴³ counternarcotics package's central aim:

Is to use US money, training, and equipment to strengthen Mexico's [and Central American nations'] military and law enforcement agencies, thereby giving them the capacity to take and hold the initiative in the fight against the cartels (Brands 2009).

The funding that is provided through the Merida Initiative falls under three broad categories. Under the largest category of aid, Counternarcotics, Counterterrorism, and Border Security, equipment and technological infrastructure is provided as an effort to improve the capabilities of Mexican military and law enforcement agencies. These funds have gone towards transport of helicopters, surveillance planes, Customs inspections equipment, a secure communications system, and numerous other technological advances to aid in modernization of existing programs. The second category, Public Security and Law Enforcement, equipment and funding is for the police in Mexico's Ministry of Public Security. Under this category the Mexican federal police is heavily funded to improve their capabilities to reduce drug demand, fight money laundering, and other domestic and public interest issues. The final category, Institution Building and Rule of Law, funding is going to be used to modernize the forensic system, information management and training at the Office of the Attorney, and support the anti-gang and anti-organized crime units, victim and

⁴³ In March 2009, in the FY2008 Supplemental Appropriations Act, Congress appropriated \$400 million in assistance for Mexico and \$65 million for Central America, Haiti, and the Dominican Republic. Just a few months later in June 2009, Congress passed a supplemental appropriation that added \$420 million in Merida assistance to Mexico. Subsequently, the Obama Administration requested \$450 million for Mexico and \$100 million for Central America for FY2010 and on July 9, 2009 the House passed the FY2010 State Department/Foreign Operations Appropriations Act, providing \$235.8 million for Mexico and \$83 million for Central America under a new Central America Regional Security Initiative, and \$37 million under a new Caribbean Basin Security Initiative.⁴³ (See Table 1 in Appendix A)

witness protection program, and extradition training (Cook and Seelke 2008). With these three categories the Merida Initiative has a wide reaching agenda and hopes are high in the realm of drug trafficking reduction.⁴⁴

In the fiscal year 2010 budget, the United States Congress requested \$450 million for Mexico and \$100 million for Central America (US Department of State 2009). Yet, even with these large sums of money going towards the fight, the policy initiatives are lacking. Following the same path for the last four decades, the United States is approaching a global problem with a supply-side, nation-state-to-nation-state strategy, which repeats the same policies over and over again. While the current agenda for the US government in Mexico is much more technological and advanced than it was when it was first implemented, the goals and end-result have not changed -the prevention of illegal drugs flowing into the US by reducing it at the source. The globalized nature of the drug industry calls for a policy plan that is much more expansive and encompassing of the capacities of the drug cartels.

⁴⁴ See Appendix A for more explicit information on the allocation of funds.

Chapter 4: Policy Implications

The drug industry is a global network of actors with immense capabilities. With a large network that spans the world over, the main organizations, alongside the smaller ones, are interconnected webs of illegal and legal transactions and movements. The cartels and traffickers of Colombia and Mexico are directly intertwined within each other's networks. The magnitude of the power and versatility of each group and its arms of traffickers makes the organizations the forces of illegality and trade we see today. The governments of the United States, Mexico, and Colombia have been working for a century towards stopping these ever-growing forces. Their approach has been one of nation-state-to-nation-state policies that focus on specific hubs of the drug trafficking supply chain. The attempts of the United States government to apply pressure on one single sector at a time have been fruitless because the drug trafficking organizations simply move their business and/or their point of entry into the country. A clear example of this was the successful shut down of southern Florida by US DEA agents to the Colombian drug cartels and the cartels' subsequent move to the Mexican corridor as their entryway to the United States. In light of the capabilities of the drug cartels to circumvent the governments' initiatives, it is clear that a change of direction is necessary.

I have presented two nation-states – both key nation-states in the drug trade – in which the policies pursued by the United States government have not produced the desired results. In this chapter I explain what the implications of my findings suggest for future policy makers. With the flow of drugs into the United States not receding it is important to scrutinize the types of policies employed and the ways in which they have been

implemented. In light of the globalized nature of the drug industry and its actor's abilities to adapt, a nation-state-by-nation-state approach is not appropriate. This strategy fails to take into consideration the very nature of the industry. The United States government is embarking on, and thus imposing on Colombia and Mexico, a plan that focuses on specific points of the supply-side chain. This narrow focus does not take into account the actors within the globalized drug industry and their versatility. I embark on an attempt to understand the implications of my findings, and what it means for the coming decades of policy. My findings suggest that an international framework would provide the most appropriate perspective in dealing with the situation. Faced with a global drug industry, the global viewpoint of an international organization such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank, or the United Nations is the most qualified. Later on in this chapter I make the argument for classifying the Mexican case as one of civil war. This classification furthers the argument that an international source would be most capable of handling the internal situation, and mounting an attack on the worldwide phenomenon of drug trafficking.

In the first chapter I painted a picture of this expansive network of drug cartels and crime organizations which all work together, at least on some level. Collectively they create a far-reaching and powerful system. When closing that chapter I argued that the United States government approach in regards to Colombia and Mexico did not encompass this vital component of the illegal drug trade. Due to the expansive and intricate nature of these organizations they are able to infiltrate various realms of society, and it is not possible to shut down one sector of these operations and expect the remainders to fall apart. Chapters two and three looked back over the history of United States relations with

Mexico and Colombia, respectively. In both circumstances the policies that were implemented were guided by United States government strategies. There has been a focus on eradication, interdiction, and extradition within the initiatives pursued by the Colombian and Mexican governments. By applying pressure to specific points of the drug chain – crops, labs, transition points, etc. – the governments have been trying to bring down the cartels by disabling specific parts of them. Yet, these programs have not produced the desired results; violence has drastically increased in Mexico and the drug supply flowing from both Mexico and Colombia has not ebbed. These unmistakable lapses in United States government policy are in large part the reason that the ultimate goal - reducing the flow of illegal drugs coming into the United States - has failed. Faced with the reality of the drug trafficking world, and the failures of policies thus far, a new stage of policy is necessary.

This leaves the question of what can be done differently that would yield a more favorable result? While this is a complicated question to consider, there is no doubt that something needs to change.⁴⁵ In this chapter I embark on an attempt to argue that it is advantageous to look at the situation in Mexico from the point of view that the nation-state has reached a state of civil war and thus needs an international framework to make the necessary changes. I choose not to classify Colombia as being in a state of civil war, such as Mexico, due to a decrease in domestic violence and the stability of its government.⁴⁶ The

⁴⁵ This is an incredibly difficult question to tackle in large part because this situation has never existed before to quite this extent. I can only move forward and hypothesize a strategy towards creating a better framework, and not actually what the framework would be.

⁴⁶ I use Mexico as the case study for policies that the Colombian state could in turn implement. Colombian drug-related violence has improved in recent years and the Colombian government is more stable and considered to be less corrupt than the Mexican government.⁴⁶ On these grounds I

preceding chapter painted a picture of a Mexican government that is struggling in its attempts to bring down the damaging and violent drug cartels. The situation in Mexico has left the realm of the capabilities of the United States and Mexican governments. The Mexican state is faltering under the pressures of the armed conflict that it finds itself in against the drug cartels. According to estimates by a Mexican newspaper, *El Universal*, there was a 38% increase in drug killings in 2009 from the previous year, after there had already been a doubling in 2008.⁴⁷ With the classification of civil war the issue broadens and a single-nation approach becomes inadequate and the only organizations that have the capacity to enact change are international assemblies with a global perspective.

Civil War

Before moving forward to future policies, it is necessary to ground my civil war argument. Civil War, as explained by James D. Fearon of Stanford University, “a civil war is a violent conflict within a country fought by organized groups that aim to take power at the center or in a region, or to change government policies” (Fearon 2007, 22). In addition, sociologist Ann Hironaka wrote that a civil war is a,

Large scale, organized, and sustained conflict between a state and domestic political actors ... they involve major casualties and significant amounts of resources, in contrast to less deadly forms of social conflict such as riots or social movements. The Correlates of War dataset⁴⁸ ... classifies civil wars as

am approaching the situation from the viewpoint that if the following policies are found to work in Mexico then the Colombian government has the capacity to implement policy changes.

⁴⁷ In chapter 3 I stated that 2009 saw 8,280 drug-related deaths. This was an estimate by Milenio TV, a television news channel in Mexico. Reforma and El Universal, Mexican newspapers, had different estimates, at 6,587 and 7,724 respectively (“Mexico/USA politics.” 2010).

⁴⁸ J. D. Singer, a political scientist at the University of Michigan, founded the Correlates of War Project in 1963 with the goal being the “systematic accumulation of scientific knowledge about war.” The core of the project is the assembly of data sets that measure many of the factors associated with and accounted for war (Correlates of War).

conflicts in which over a thousand war-related casualties occur per year of conflict (Hironaka 2005, 3)

From these definitions it can be derived that an internal conflict must have these certain components to be classified as a Civil War: organized groups trying to gain power regionally or to change policy, the actors must be engaged in an organized and sustained conflict, and there must be over a thousand war-related deaths every year.⁴⁹ If we compare this definition with the Mexican story, the cases fit together very well.

Let us compare. Walking through these components in comparison with the facts of the Mexican state of affairs illuminates the similarities. It is possible to argue that because numerous drug cartels make up the domestic actors in this situation, they are not unified. Yet, they are all fighting for the same thing - control over smuggling routes, sources, and territories. This unifying element bands the organizations together against the Mexican government creating a group that has been going head-to-head with the Mexican government in a conflict that has lasted for over 30 years.⁵⁰ Along this same thought, the conflict has been ongoing over a similar theme throughout its existence – the ability to grow, produce, and move drugs freely in the country. The conflict is organized over the fight for mobility and territory. Lastly, as stated earlier, the drug-related death toll is many times over the “thousand war-related deaths” required under the Civil War definition.

With these three variables that are accepted among scholars of civil war as making up the definition of civil war aligning clearly, it is clear that the Mexican case could be classified as such. Yet, I do have concerns about this approach that I find necessary to voice.

⁴⁹ These key classifications can be found throughout academic research on civil wars and there appears to be a general consensus on the definition and key components necessary for an armed conflict to be deemed a civil war.

⁵⁰ The first joint US-Mexican venture took place in the 1970s when the situation had reached a climax that required outside aid.

In the case of labeling an armed conflict as civil war there is a legitimization of the domestic actors that takes place, in this case the drug cartels.⁵¹ The drug cartels are not fighting for a political voice or social change, rather they are using violence and death to fight for the right to create and then move illegal substances around the country. With this in mind I am not formally going to discuss the Mexican case as civil war, but because it fits many aspects of the definition of a civil war, I am going to approach the situation and apply a strategy for future changes as though it is in such a state. Seeing this conflict as a civil war has advantages that outweigh my concerns over legitimizing the traffickers in this manner. Using the classification of civil war upgrades the armed conflict to a level that necessitates and allows for the international organizations to step in and take charge. Throughout history there are cases where the International Monetary Fund, World Bank, and/or the United Nations have stepped in to help bring some peace and stability to a situation. For this reason identifying the Mexican case as being in a state of civil war calls attention to the situation's desperate need for an organization with international capacity to make effective changes.

Implications for the Future

I have gone over the policies that the United States government has followed in the past, described the present, and now it is time to look forward. Ninety percent of the drugs that enter the United States transit through Mexico giving the United States government plenty of incentive to attempt to quell the power of the drug cartels in their trafficking

⁵¹ I am not comfortable with labeling the Mexican, or Colombian for that matter, drug cartels as legitimate actors in an armed conflict. For this reason I am excusing myself from identifying them as such and rather just creating a strategy that would be used if they were classified as such.

routes (Cook 2007). Nevertheless, I propose that the situation in Mexico has reached a breaking point that requires an internationally sanctioned joint undertaking. President Pastrana was not far off when he likened his needs to that of the Marshall Plan from World War II (Hinojosa, 2007, 60). There are aspects to the Mexican government and society that are key factors in sustaining the proliferation of the drug trafficking and drug cartel environment and in hindering the programs and strategies that have been put in place to fight them that need to be addressed. I identify two that hold a great level of importance: poverty and corruption.⁵² Both of these elements are hindrances to the United States government's strategy to quell the drug trade; they have also been large players in creating the current atmosphere within the country. While this paper does not have the space nor is it the focus, it is important to identify these key facts because they are part of the policy changes that need to be put into effect in order to see more success. According to the CIA World Factbook, 18.2% of the Mexican population is below the poverty line using a food-based definition of poverty, and 47% of Mexicans are below the poverty line according to asset based poverty measures (The World Factbook: Mexico).⁵³ With an economic situation such as this one the drug cartels can find workers, traffickers, and farmers in need of money with relative ease.⁵⁴ It is hard to stop the cycle of drug trafficking if economic opportunities are far and few between.

⁵² An entire book could be written on the numerous aspects of a government that make it hospitable for the drug cartels to flourish. I identify these two because they are two elements that are interrelated and can be looked at easily through the framework that follows. I am not going to go in-depth on the intricacies of each of these factors, but I found a necessity to lay them out to create the visual of the context.

⁵³ This is based off of 2008 figures.

⁵⁴ The Colombian situation is not much different. The figures for 2005 indicate that 49.2% of the population resides below the poverty line. (The World Factbook: Colombia)

In addition to economic worries the rampant corruption that can be found throughout the Mexican government is another great obstruction to the fight against drug trafficking. Corruption among government officials and agencies greatly impedes the success of anti-drug campaigns in two large ways - in the implementation of strategies and the easing of the movement of the drug traffickers through bribery and other means. If we look back to 1997, then DEA administrator Thomas Constantine said, “there is not one single law enforcement institution in Mexico with whom DEA has an entirely trusting relationship” (Freeman and Sierra 2005, 272).⁵⁵ Shortly thereafter there was a purging of corrupt police officers that has turned into an annual event. The Mexican National Institute to Combat Drugs, an agency similar to the US DEA, was disbanded in 1997 after its director, General Jesús Gutiérrez Rebollo was found to be on the Juárez cartel payroll. Its successor, the Special Prosecutor for Crimes Against Health was in turn disbanded in 2003 after agents were discovered to be extorting drug traffickers (Freeman and Sierra 2005, 274). Similarly there was a Mexican chief of police that attempted to bribe a US border Patrol agent by offering him \$25,000 per load of marijuana he would let into the country (Gannett 2010). These examples are just a few of the numerous cases of the rampant corruption within the Mexican government and its agencies. With these kinds of circumstances it is hard to implement broad strategies and trust those who are doing the work. The policies and changes that could be put into place by an international organization must be continued with force and perseverance even after the agencies leave. Not only does the state of civil war affect those touched by violence and drugs but it is also a hindrance

⁵⁵ This quote originally appeared in Chapter 3

towards growth and prosperity, “civil war is ... an important issue for development” (Collier et al. 2003, 1).

Combining the elements of a globalized drug trade and the atmosphere of a civil war, the circumstance is dire. Based on the failures of previously seen policies, my findings suggest that the situation requires an international approach that would call for a global perspective. In previous cases of civil war throughout the world various international organizations have stepped in to help with peacemaking, rehabilitation, and reconstruction. In the case of the Tajikistani civil war that spanned from 1992-1997, killed 50,000 people, and left 1.2 million people as refugees or internally displaced persons, the United Nations was significant in brokering peace in 1997. The international organization has maintained a political office in the country and twelve aid agencies in the effort to maintain stability and economic recovery in the aftermath of the civil war (Goryayev). These international groups have experience and a global perspective that enables them to enact policies and strategies that are most fitting for armed conflicts of this magnitude.

With the information presented in this chapter and the preceding ones it is unmistakable that some things need to change in future policy-making decisions. In the realm of change I make the argument that there are three main aspects of policy that need to be adjusted in the effort to suppress the illegal drug flow and its subsequent violence: the political, financial, and judicial policies and structures. In the realm of these three aspects the Mexican government needs to expand and change the way it approaches each one. Politically, corruption greatly impedes the capabilities of the Mexican government. Changes within political policy would strengthen the ability of the state to implement the policies necessary to fight the drug cartels. The financial sector of policy needs to advance

the economic opportunities for all citizens. Reforms in this realm could potentially take away a large part of the base of the farmers, traffickers, and workers that the drug cartels thrive off of. With greater economic opportunity comes less of a need to work within the illegal sector. Within the judicial sector, increasing the capabilities of judges, law enforcement, and the legislative branch would aid in maintaining peace within the country. These three elements are important to the stability of the Mexican government and society. With increased strength, they would create a greater base for economic growth and peace. Yet, to this point, the United States and Mexican governments have been unable to address these issues. Corruption is rampant in all levels of the Mexican government, and forty-seven percent of the population lives below the poverty line. While I do not wish to suggest specific types of policies, or what they would entail, these three aspects of policy are vital to the work that needs to be done. My best understanding at this point finds that an international response would be the most capable to tackle these three elements. Experts involved with the United Nations, the World Banks, and the IMF all have vast experience in matters of armed conflict, and failing government structures. Together these international organizations are the most knowledgeable and adept at shaping policy to create the kind of environment necessary to conquer the violence and make strategic changes for the future. Bringing the three groups together would create a framework that has the capacity to act in larger, more effective ways. On the following pages I embark on an argument for a unified international response to a situation that I deem as civil war.

To start to address the drug trafficking issue that the United States government has attempted and failed to do successfully, it is necessary to call in international agencies that have a higher capacity to deal with the types of issues at hand. The Mexican government,

alongside the United States government, has proven time and time again that their strategies and manner of approach are not working. According to available figures the policies and strategies currently and historically undertaken by the United States government have not produced the desired results: a reduction in the amount of drugs entering the United States. Not only that, but violence is following at a staggering rate of increase in Mexico. Even the United States government identifies that structural changes need to be made to further the progress of drug reduction: “since drug cultivation flourishes in environments where state authority is weak and economic development is low, support for law enforcement institutions must be mainstreamed into overall efforts to achieve sustainable development” (US Department of State 2008). To tackle the changes that are necessary it is time for the international agents to step in and provide a global perspective.

The capacity that the Mexican government has right now to continue fighting the drug cartels and meanwhile change policy and strategies is weak. I propose that international organizations, such as the IMF, United Nations, and the World Bank use their expertise in these types of situations to tackle the elements of political, financial, and judicial policy. This global perspective would bring a more holistic viewpoint to tackling the domestic violence and drug trafficking. If the roots of the problems in Mexico are not changed – aspects such as the foundation of the state, the economy, and the poverty level - then the drug issue will continue to proliferate and never be resolved. Because of the innate nature of each of the three groups, the changes in spending, policy, and programs would stabilize the weakening state and create an opportunity to flush out the drug cartels by creating a stronger base for law enforcement and the judicial branch. These three agencies

have all been active participants in reconstruction in post-conflicts and weak state situations, and bringing them into the illegal drug arena could potentially create an integrated approach to a deadly, complicated problem.

International Organizations

All three of the organizations that I am introducing as good candidates to handle this situation have a large and long history in dealing with civil war and armed conflict situations and their aftermath. Since 1945 the United Nations has increasingly become involved in “civil wars as an observer, provider of humanitarian aid or assistance, and more rarely, peacekeeper” (Hironaka 2005, 139). Evan Luard claimed in his 1972 book, *The International Regulation of Civil Wars*, that “though the UN missions did not immediately bring the wars concerned to an end, there is scarcely a single one in which the situation was not improved through their operations” (Luard 1972, p. 216). Often when the UN steps on to the scene peace negotiations as an attempt to stop the fighting is pursued swiftly. Unfortunately, as has been seen in the history of attempts by the Colombian government, negotiations with the rebel groups and drug cartels proves to be futile in most situations. Internationally, “fewer than 30 percent of post-1945 civil wars have terminated with the signing of a peace treaty [and] many of the treaties that end civil wars are unstable and collapse into renewed fighting” (Collier 2003, 147). There are many theories as to why this is the case, but the clearest and most agreed upon among civil war scholars is the lack of credible guarantees for a settlement. This information paints a picture that does not bode well for the future of negotiations between the Mexican government and the drug cartels. Yet, I do not want to completely discount this approach as a means to taking small

steps, while implementing larger, more national policies and strategies. Not only has the UN been focusing on peace through negotiation but the organization has also been active in the realm of the trafficking of illegal drugs.

In 1988 the UN adopted the *Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances* that stated that it was concerned with “strengthening and enhancing effective legal means for international co-operation in criminal matters for suppressing the international criminal activities of illicit traffic” (Leduc and James 2003). In 1997 the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) was created to assist Member States in their fight against illicit drugs, crime, and terrorism. At varying times the UNODC has supported programs in Afghanistan, Colombia, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Peru, and Thailand that create development opportunities for coca and poppy farmers (Costas 2009). Mexico needs a plan that could tackle some of the problems that are persisting in the government and society and the United Nations has experience that could bring new strategies into fruition.

The World Bank and the IMF are “twin intergovernmental pillars supporting the structure of the world’s economic and financial order” (Driscoll 1996). The goals and projects of the two agencies often intersect in their attempts to strengthen economies globally. The IMF has been active in the last decades helping countries in “post-conflict or other fragile situations ... through lending and technical assistance. [They] help rebuild or strengthen institutions and economic management-essential elements of state building” (Strauss-Kahn 2009). The World Bank in turn aids poorer nations in development with “funding for projects and policies that will realize the countries’ economic potential” (Driscoll 1996). Capabilities to funnel money into an emergency assistance package for

countries in the wake of armed conflicts are one of the IMF's vital tools in reacting to nation's immediate needs. The IMF's engagement in post-conflict states is done through technical assistance, policy advice and financial assistance, just what the Mexican state needs.⁵⁶ In 1995 the IMF created the IMF Emergency Post-Conflict Assistance Program. In 1998 the IMF approved Emergency Post-Conflict Assistance for the Republic of Congo after the civil war of June-October 1997 (International Monetary Fund 1998). The strategies and policies that these two groups have a history of implementing in need-based, weak states is what the Mexican case is looking for; a structuring of economic, political, and judicial policies to better serve the citizens, and in turn create a stable, more prosperous environment, that pushes down the drug cartels and their operations. The better equipped the Mexican government is to have legitimate police operations and a strong judicial branch, the easier it will be to affect change. A fall in the number of citizens that live below the poverty line from development aid and programs takes away a base of citizens from the drug cartels.

Lastly, I would like to propose an idea outside of the realm of my thesis. Throughout my research it has become apparent that an international approach is necessary – just as I argue throughout this thesis.⁵⁷ However, rather than just calling in the main, overarching international agencies, could we create an international organization built to deal specifically with the drug industry? As explained in chapter one of this thesis, the drug industry reaches into every corner of the world. The major criminal organizations often use

⁵⁶ Mexico is not post-conflict by any measure, but it is a unique case. Usually the IMF and the World Bank do not step in until disputes have been resolved, but in the Mexican case it is not an official war and the best way to end the conflict is through the policies that would be put into place by the IMF and the World Bank.

⁵⁷ This paragraph is not central to my thesis, but I found it necessary to present this one final idea that formed in the final phases of my writing.

drug trafficking to fund their operations. The Russian mafia is connected to the Colombian drug cartels, which are in turn connected to the Irish Republican Army. Crop growth around the world is on the rise. The UNODC was designed with this very idea in mind. The organization's mission statement says that,

It works to educate the world about the dangers of drug abuse and to strengthen international action against drug production, trafficking and drug-related crime... carries out a broad range of initiatives, including alternative development projects, illicit crop monitoring and anti-money laundering programmes (United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime 2007).

Every year the UNODC issues a World Drug Report on the state of drug growth in the world. Yet, no major initiatives are tackled within the organization. I suggest that it is possible to look at the structure of the World Trade Organization (WTO) for ideas on how to make a global drug platform. According to the WTO mission statement, "everything the WTO is the result of negotiations...it's a forum for governments to negotiate trade agreements" (World Trade Organization). Would an organization that created a platform for discussions between drug-production nations allow for more cohesive policies? An international organization to promote conversation between nations and give financial and policy support for those nations that needed it could prove to be a tough opponent against the global drug trafficking industry. That being said, an international approach – be it through the United Nations, World Bank, International Monetary Fund, or something similar - is necessary to provide the global perspective necessary to break down the global drug trafficking network.

Conclusion

On the international day against the use and illicit trafficking of drugs President Felipe Calderón called “drug addiction a modern form of slavery” (Costa 2009). While this may not be a perfect analogy for drugs, it hones in on the severity of the issue. Mexico is in a state of armed conflict that I put on par with a civil war. With three areas of focus, the financial, judicial, and political the question of capacity comes into account because the Mexican government has so far been unable to handle the conflict and drug issue, even with the United States government lending troops, aid, and services. Coming from this vantage point it is clear that outside help is necessary to pull Mexico out of its perilous situation, and from there the triad of international agencies appears. I propose that the IMF, United Nations, and World Bank come together with a strategy for helping Mexico conquer a monster of sizeable portion that has a rising death toll by the day. The capabilities and capacities of these agencies, financially, strategically and through policy changes, could make the appropriate changes necessary to pull some of the 47% of Mexicans living below the poverty line upwards, and strengthen the power of the Mexican people to bring down the drug cartels in a way they cannot do now.

What it comes down to is that United States government policy has failed in Colombia and Mexico. The flow of drugs into the United States has not decreased rather it has shot upwards. In the face of a globalized drug trafficking network the policies undertaken have been nation-state-by-nation-state and single element focused. With Mexico in a state of civil war, outside help and resources are needed. The United Nations, International Monetary Fund, and the World Bank are all international organizations that have the capabilities and experience to deal with the situation at hand. In order to quell the

violence, bring the death toll down, and reduce the amount of drugs flowing into the United States, the current policies are not enough – the drug industry is too vast and global.

Appendix A: Mexico

Table 1: Mérida Funding Status as of September 30, 2009

(Dollars in millions)			
	Appropriated^a	Obligated balance^b	Expended balance
Mexico			
FY08 Supplemental ^c	\$400.0	\$375.1	\$24.2
FY09 Omnibus	300.0	41.0	0
FY09 Supplemental	420.0	336.5	0
Mexico total	\$1,120.0	\$752.6	\$24.2
Central America			
FY08 Supplemental ^c	\$60.0	\$57.92	\$2.07
FY09 Omnibus	105.0	14.9	0
FY09 Supplemental	-	-	-
Central America total	\$165.0	\$72.82	\$2.07
Caribbean^d			
FY08 Supplemental ^c	\$5.0	\$5.0	\$0
FY09 Omnibus	5.0	0	0
Caribbean total	\$10.0	\$5.0	\$0
Mérida total	\$1,295.0	\$830.42	\$26.27

Source: GAO analysis of State Department data.

Source: Engel, Eliot L. *Status of Funds for the Merida Initiative*. United States Government Accountability Office. December 3, 2009. GAO-10-253R

Table 2: Mérida Funding Status for Mexico, by Account, as of September 30, 2009

(Dollars in millions)			
	Appropriated^a	Obligated balance^b	Expended balance
Mexico			
International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE)			
FY08 Supplemental ^c	\$263.5	\$252.6	\$10.2
FY09 Omnibus	246.0	0	0
FY09 Supplemental	160.0	76.5	0
Total INCLE	\$669.5	\$329.1	\$10.2
Economic Support Fund (ESF)			
FY08 Supplemental ^c	\$20.0	\$19.3	\$0.7
FY09 Omnibus	15.0	2.0	0
FY09 Supplemental	0	0	0
Total ESF	\$35.0	\$21.3	\$0.7
Foreign Military Financing (FMF)			
FY08 Supplemental ^c	\$116.5	\$103.2	\$13.3
FY09 Omnibus	39.0	39.0	0
FY09 Supplemental	260.0	260.0	0
Total FMF	\$415.5	\$402.2	\$13.3
Mexico total	\$1,120.0	\$752.6	\$24.2

Source: GAO analysis of State Department data.

Source: (Engel 2009)

Table 3
Planned Procurement, Mexico

Account	Major area of focus
International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE)	INCLE funds will support the development of the government of Mexico's (GOM) institutional capacity to detect and interdict illicit drugs, explosives and weapons, trafficked/smuggled persons, and individuals seeking to enter the United States to conduct criminal activities. For example, INCLE funds will be used to acquire three Black Hawk helicopters for Mexico's civilian Public Security Secretariat (SSP) to improve air capacity to deploy federal police agents quickly. INCLE funds will also be used to expand and modernize information system capacity. For instance, INCLE funding will be used to improve inspection and security systems for key mail facilities, provide secure communications for law enforcement agencies, and enhance data management and analysis capabilities of the Mexican intelligence service (CISEN). Furthermore, INCLE will be used to purchase mobile nonintrusive inspection equipment to improve overall law enforcement infrastructure.
Foreign Military Financing (FMF)	FMF funds will be used to improve surveillance and land and maritime interdictions. FMF funds will purchase up to four CASA 235 maritime patrol aircraft, up to five Black Hawk helicopters, and up to eight Bell Helicopters to support efforts of the Mexican Navy (SEMAR) and Mexican Army/Air Force (SEDENA) to control their national territory. Funding for the aircraft also includes transition training (training for experienced pilots to fly a new type of aircraft) for Mexican pilots, and initial spare parts and maintenance packages. FMF funds will also purchase ion scanners to help detect illicit drug and arms trafficking through remote areas of Mexico and support GOM's effort to mount effective interdiction operations on land routes.
Economic Support Fund (ESF)	ESF funds will be used to promote rule of law and human rights by supporting Mexico's justice sector reforms and respect for human rights. For example, to assist in implementing the justice sector reforms, ESF funding will support professional peer exchanges between Mexican and U.S. judges at the federal and state levels. Funding will also support technical assistance to help Mexican prosecutors' offices as they implement justice sector reforms at the state and federal levels. In addition, funding will provide training and technical support to justice sector personnel (judges, prosecutors, and public defenders) and human rights nongovernmental organizations (NGO) to expand the use of alternative case resolutions such as first offender's programs, mediation, and restorative justice. Moreover, funding will provide training to human rights NGOs and civil society on the code of criminal procedures, as well as on international, regional, and national laws protecting human rights in order to build NGO capacity to properly monitor and document human rights violations.

Source: State Department data.

Source: (Engel 2009)

Table 4: 2008 Berman Report for the United State Congress
Key findings pertaining to the drug war in Mexico that are of Vital Importance to US Lawmakers


1. The drug crisis facing the US remains a significant national security threat
2. The GAO estimates that 90 percent of illegal drugs that enter the US come through the Mexico-Central American corridor.
3. The same smuggling routes that are used to bring illegal narcotics north are utilized to illegally distribute arms, precursor chemicals, and bulk cash transfers south
4. Drug gangs that operate in the United States, Mexico and Central America have become sophisticated and vertically integrated operations expert at penetrating the US-Mexico border.
5. Narcotics-related activity and expanding cross-border trafficking is dangerously undermining the security environment for our neighbors to the South, as well as in the US
6. Mexico can and has served as a critical ally and partner in stemming the flow of illegal narcotics into the US. Under the leadership of Mexican President Felipe Calderon, the US and Mexico have initiated an approach of joint responsibility to confront the threat of illicit narcotics trafficking and organized crime in the Western Hemisphere.
7. The spread of illicit narcotics through the US borders and the violence that accompanies it cannot be halted without a comprehensive interdiction and security strategy planned and executed jointly with our southern neighbors.
8. In March 2007, President George W. Bush and Mexican President Calderon held a summit in the Mexican City of Merida and agreed that the US and Mexico must expand bilateral and regional cooperation to fight violence stemming from narco-trafficking and regional criminal organizations.
9. On October 22, 2007, the US and Mexico issued a joint statement announcing the Merida Initiative, a program to fight illicit narcotics trafficking and criminal organizations throughout the Western Hemisphere.
10. In the joint statement-
 - a. Mexico pledged to “strengthen its operation capabilities to more effectively fight drug-traffickers and organized crime”
 - b. The US pledged “to intensify its efforts to address all aspects of drug trafficking (including demand-related portions) and continue to combat trafficking of weapons and bulk currency to Mexico”;
 - c. Both nations pledged to “augment cooperation, coordination, and the exchange of information to fight criminal organizations on both sides of the border”.
11. A long-term strategy to adequately contain the northbound and southbound flows of illicit narcotics along the US-Mexico border, as well as protect the vast and free flow of trade, will require the US to partner with its southern neighbors in their efforts to build the capacity of their own law enforcement agencies and enhance the rule of law, as well as to fortify US illicit narcotics reduction efforts.

Appendix B: Maps of the European Drug Market


Source: (European Union 2009)

The European Union Organized Crime Threat Assessment Report identifies 5 major criminal hubs in the European region. The following five maps depict the movement of the flow of the sources of these hubs. As can be seen all five hubs have strong arrows coming from the south (Africa), and southwest (Africa and South America).

Northwest Criminal Hub



Northeast Criminal Hub



Southeast Criminal Hub



Southern Criminal Hub



Southwest Criminal Hub



Appendix C: Plan Colombia

Table 1. Plan Colombia-Assistance for Colombia : 2000 (\$ millions) (Crandall 2008, 128)

Aid Type	Amount
Military Assistance	519.2 (\$416.9 million funded "Push into Southern Colombia)
Police Assistance	123.1
Alternative Development	68.5
Aid to the displaced	37.5
Human Rights	51.0
Judicial Reform	13.0
Law Enforcement/Rule of Law	45.0
Peace Process	3.0
Total	860.3

Table 2. Comparison of the Administration Proposal and the House version of H.R. 3908 (\$ millions) (Serafino 2000)

	President's Proposal: FY2000 Supplemental	President's Proposal: FY2001 Budget	House Version of H.R. 3908 FY2000-FY2001
Assistance for Colombian Army Counternarcotics Battalions (CANB) (Push into Southern Colombia)	500	69	521
	30 Blackhawk and 15 Huey helicopters, and to sustain 18 hueys already in Colombia, for the operation of the existing CACB, train and equip two new Army CN battalions, upgrade army bases and facilities, provide logistics and intelligence support		Same, except only 28 Blackhawk helicopters for the Army
Assistance for the Colombian National Police (CNP)	68	28	122.2
	To improve eradication capabilities of the CNP through the upgrade of existing aircraft, the purchase of spray aircraft, the construction of secure bases and the provision of intelligence		Same but it adds \$26 million for the provision of 2 Blackhawk helicopters to the CNP
Interdiction and Related Activities (Colombian, Regional and Related US Efforts)	238	102	456.9
	Colombia: ground-based radar and command control, 25; aircraft, airfield upgrades and air operations support, 67; ground interdiction, 5; riverine interdiction, 26.		C: radar, 25; aircraft etc., 61.8; ground interdiction, 5; riverin interdiction, 15.
	US customs, intelligence and related		US: 158.5. For DEA activities in Colombia and the Andean Region: 10.5

	efforts, 133		Regional: 181.6. Ecuador, 61.3; Aruba/Curacao, 54.2; and related, 1.1; For interdiction in Peru, 27; Bolivia, 8; Ecuador, 12; and Brazil, Costa Rica, Panama and Venezuela, 18.
Economic Development/ Alternative Employment/ Resettlement	74 Colombia: \$12 in S. Colombia funding	72 Colombia: \$19 in S. Colombia funding	147.5 Colombia: \$31 in S. Colombia funding
	30 (Peru, 15; Bolivia, 12; Ecuador, 3)		71 (Peru, 15; Bolivia, 49; Ecuador, 8)
Human Rights/ Governance/ Rule of Law/ Peace Process	45	48	98.5
Totals	954	318	\$1,418.5

Table 3. US Counternarcotics Assistance to Colombia, FY2000-FY2007 (\$ millions)⁵⁸

	ACI		FMF	IMET	NADR	DOD	Total
	Interdict.	Alt. Dev.					
FY2000	686.4	208	-	.9	-	229.2	1,124.5
FY2001	48	-	-	1	-	190.2	239.2
FY2002	243.5	136.4	-	1.2	25	119.1	525.2
FY2003	412	168.2	17.1	1.2	3.3	165	766.8
FY2004	324.6	159.3	98.5	1.7	.2	122	706.3
FY2005	310.7	152.1	99.2	1.7	5.1	200	767.8
FY2006	307.7	157	89.1	1.7	5.48	122	682.95
FY2007	298.93	166.07	85.5		3.96	na	556.07
Total	2,631.83	1,147.07	389.4	10.98	43.04	1147.5	5,368.82

Table 4. US Counternarcotics Assistance to Peru, FY2000-FY2007 (\$ millions)

	ACI		FMF	IMET	Total
	Interdict.	Alt. Dev.			
FY2000	55	25	-	.5	80.5
FY2001	21	27	-	.5	48.5
FY2002	75	67.5	-	.5	143
FY2003	59.5	68.6	1	.6	129.7
FY2004	66.3	49.7	-	-	116
FY2005	61.5	53.9	-	-	115.4

⁵⁸ Tables 3-9. Veillette, Connie. "Andean Counterdrug Initiative (ACI) and Related Funding Programs: FY2007 Assistance." August 30, 2007

FY2006	58.4	48.5	-	-	106.92
FY2007	56	47.17	.03	.05	103.24
Total	392.3	387.37	1.03	2.15	843.26

Table 5. US Counternarcotics Assistance to Bolivia, FY2000-FY2007 (\$ millions)

	ACI		FMF	IMET	Total
	Interdict.	Alt. Dev.			
FY2000	57	101	-	.5	158.5
FY2001	32	20	-	.7	52.7
FY2002	48	39.6	2	.7	90.3
FY2003	49	41.7	2	.8	93.5
FY2004	49.2	41.8	4	.6	95.6
FY2005	48.6	41.7	-	-	90.3
FY2006	42.6	36.6	-	-	79.2
FY2007	35	31	.03	.05	66.08
Total	326.8	353.4	8.03	3.35	726.18

Table 6. US Counternarcotics Assistance to Ecuador, FY2000-FY2007 (\$ millions)

	ACI		FMF	IMET	Total
	Interdict.	Alt. Dev.			
FY2000	13.2	8	-	.6	21.7
FY2001	2.2	-	-	.6	2.8
FY2002	15	10	-	.6	25.6
FY2003	15	15.9	1	.6	32.5
FY2004	20	15	-	-	35
FY2005	10.9	14.9	-	-	25.8
FY2006	8.4	11.5	-	-	19.8
FY2007	8.9	8.4	.03	.05	17.38
Total	93.6	83.6	1.03	2.35	180.58

Table 7. US Counternarcotics Assistance to Brazil, FY2000-FY2007 (\$ millions)

	ACI		IMET	Total
	Interdict.	Alt. Dev.		
FY2000	5	-	.2	5.2
FY2001	2	-	.3	2.3
FY2002	6	-	.4	6.4
FY2003	6	-	.5	6.5
FY2004	10.2	-	-	10.2
FY2005	8.9	-	-	8.9
FY2006	5.9	-	-	5.9

FY2007	4	-	.05	4.05
Total	48	-	1.45	49.45

Table 8. US Counternarcotics Assistance to Venezuela, FY2000-FY2007 (\$ millions)

	ACI		IMET	Total
	Interdict.	Alt. Dev.		
FY2000	4.2	-	.4	4.6
FY2001	1.2	-	.4	1.6
FY2002	5	-	.5	5.5
FY2003	2.1	-	.7	2.8
FY2004	5	-	-	5
FY2005	2.98	-	-	2.98
FY2006	2.23	-	-	2.23
FY2007	1	-	.04	1.04
Total	23.71	-	2.04	25.75

Table 9. US Counternarcotics Assistance to Panama, FY2000-FY2007 (\$ millions)

	ACI		FMF	IMET	Total
	Interdict.	Alt. Dev.			
FY2000	5	-	-	.1	5.1
FY2001	1	-	-	.2	1.2
FY2002	5	-	-	.2	5.2
FY2003	4.5	-	1	.2	5.7
FY2004	6.5	-	2	.6	9.1
FY2005	5.95	-	.99	.96	7.9
FY2006	4.46	-	.99	.89	6.34
FY2007	4	-	.78	.62	5.4
Total	36.41	-	5.76	3.77	45.94

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