What is a 'Good' Job? Cultural Logics of Occupational Prestige

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Lauren Valentino

Department of Sociology
Duke University

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Approved:

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Stephen Vaisey, Supervisor

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Christopher Bail

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Kieran Healy

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Jessi Streib

Dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of
the requirements for the degree of Doctor
of Philosophy in the Department of
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ABSTRACT

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Abstract

Symbolic valuation is an important but overlooked way that inequality is reproduced in the occupational structure. While much research has been devoted to the causes and consequences of material valuation of occupations (especially pay), this overemphasis on *class* has neglected *status*. Sociologists have traditionally measured status through occupational prestige scores. This dissertation challenges two longstanding assumptions about occupational prestige that have characterized the inequality and stratification literature: (1) that prestige is solely a function of material factors, like how much a job pays or how much education or training is required to perform the job, and (2) that everyone views the occupational status hierarchy the same way.

To do this, the dissertation draws upon a new data source that contains information about occupational prestige judgments and the people making those judgments, as well as information about the occupations. It combines data from the 2012 General Social Survey and with federal administrative data from sources such as the Bureau of Labor Statistics. By taking a culture and cognition approach, the three studies comprising this dissertation examine the underlying factors that influence how people make judgments about what makes a "good" job.

The first study focuses on the role of gender, and finds that people grant a "segregation premium" which rewards the gender segregation of jobs with occupational prestige – whether they are male or female. The second study focuses on the role of race, and finds that people perceive jobs with a higher proportion of whites as more prestigious, although this pattern is primarily driven by white and Asian raters and raters with a college degree. The third and final study uses an inductive approach to assess heterogeneity in the ways people construct the status hierarchy ("logics" of occupational prestige). It finds evidence for four distinct logics of occupational prestige, and demonstrates that the particular logic a person uses depends on their own social position.

Dedication

To Amol, my partner in the pursuit of truth.

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1. Introduction

"So, what do you do?" Many of us have had the experience of attempting to make small talk with strangers at a party, and asking what someone does for a living is a common starting point for such conversations. Our occupation – particularly in the United States[1] – is undeniably central to our identity, our interactions with others, and how we fare in terms of our wealth, health, and relationships.

But what does it *mean* when we respond to this question at the cocktail party by saying "I am a sociologist"? Is this a "good" job in the eyes of our interlocutor? What sort of judgment has this person now made about us? Where do they place us, as a "sociologist" relative to, say, an "economist"? To answer these types of questions, we need the tools of cultural sociology, which is the subfield that concerns itself with investigating meaning. In particular, the *culture and cognition* approach of this subfield aims to understand how people form perceptions and make judgments or decisions about phenomena with social consequences or antecedents (Vaisey and Valentino 2018).

One of the central meanings related to occupations that sociologists have historically emphasized is *status*. Status is often defined as the "social estimation of honor" that we accord a person based on their position in a given society (Weber

[1] For instance, Lamont (1992) finds that middle class men in the U.S. are much more likely to draw symbolic boundaries on the basis of a person's profession compared to middle class men in France. This suggests that occupations are more central to a person's identity in the U.S. than in France. My own personal experience having lived in both countries, while admittedly anecdotal, echoes this finding.

1968:932). A sociological concept as notoriously amorphous as "status" often proves difficult to measure. Yet social scientists in the mid-20th century generally agreed that "occupational prestige" is an effective way to operationalize status.

Thus, in the 1940s, sociologists began surveying people, asking them to rate a variety of occupations in terms of their social standing. The idea behind these subjective ratings was that they captured an additional component of occupations *beyond* their "class" component (generally understood to be the income a person derived from their occupation). Prestige thus reflected the power, honor, deference, and authority that the person working in a given occupation could expect to command – resources which were *not* entirely the function of a person's material or economic situation.

Once these data were collected, researchers averaged and scaled prestige ratings into occupation-specific "scores." These scores then helped stratification researchers to quantify the extent to which intergenerational mobility was taking place by assessing whether or not a son was working in an occupation of higher prestige than his father. Furthermore, by assuming that everyone, everywhere viewed prestige the same way, these researchers were able to compare intergenerational mobility rates over time and even across countries.

Occupational prestige scores eventually fell out of favor when some researchers argued that they were effectively useless. Prestige ratings were deemed to be merely "'error-prone' estimates of the socioeconomic attributes of occupations" (Featherman and Hauser 1976:405). Similarly, Bukodi and coauthors recently posited that, "respondents do not in fact tend to rate or rank occupations according to their 'prestige,' 'social standing,' etc., but rather according to a range of associated job requirements and job rewards" (2011:626). Socioeconomic indices have thus generally supplanted prestige scores as measures of a person's status. Duncan's SEI, for example, is a composite index of an occupational prestige rating (averaged across some surveyed participants) plus the pay and education level of the incumbents of that occupation. The idea that occupational prestige on its own has anything to tell us about the way we perceive social hierarchy has largely been abandoned by contemporary social scientists.

This dissertation represents a challenge to these assumptions about occupational prestige. The overarching argument of this dissertation is that occupational prestige *does* provide a window onto how people perceive and understand status. But, as I will show, the occupational hierarchy of the 21st century United States looks quite different than we had previously understood it.

For one, people's judgments of how much social status an occupation affords are shaped by far more than how much an occupation pays or even the education/training required to perform the occupation's duties – contra the "materialist" account of prestige ratings. Gender and racial segregation are deeply entrenched features of the occupation structure, and Chapters 2 and 3 show that they are also important signals or cues that shape people's occupational prestige judgments.

Second, people do not make these judgments in a uniform way. Instead, I will demonstrate that a person's social position informs how they perceive the occupational hierarchy. In Chapter 2, I will show that while both men *and* women reward gender-segregated occupations with more prestige, men overall reward predominantly-male occupations more than woman do, and vice-versa. In Chapter 3, I will show that a person's racial identity and level of education influence the degree to which they rely on a job's racial composition when making an occupational prestige judgment. In these two studies, I take a deductive approach to test specific hypotheses about whether and how occupations' gender and racial compositions factor into perceptions of the occupational hierarchy. In the third study, Chapter 4, I take an inductive approach to formally test whether different people make prestige judgments in systematically different ways. I find striking evidence that they do. The particular occupational hierarchy a person perceives is a function of their social position.

This dissertation therefore begins to scratch the surface of meanings about work and occupations in the contemporary U.S. By extension, it also sheds light on how people construct hierarchies and understandings around social status. The three studies of this dissertation reveal how extant gender and racial inequities in the labor market are further amplified and inscribed into status judgments. Furthermore, they reveal how the same occupation can (and often does) mean strikingly different things to different people, particularly if they come from very different walks of life. What a "good" job is, it turns out, depends on how gendered and racialized that job is – and the social vantage of the person being asked.

2. Study 1: The Segregation Premium and How Gender Shapes the Symbolic Valuation Process of Occupational Prestige Judgments

"Prestige, which is illusion, is of the very essence of power." – Simone Weil (1962:168).

2.1 Introduction

Scholars of gender, status, and work inequality have long wondered whether women's work is seen as low-prestige. A large body of research has established that predominantly female jobs tend to pay lower wages and have lower likelihood of promotion (see Charles and Grusky 2004; Altonji and Blank 1999; England 1992 for reviews).[1] The prevailing account that explains this phenomenon is *devaluation theory*. Devaluation theory posits that there is a widespread cultural belief that women's work is inherently less valuable (England 1992). An often-assumed implication of devaluation theory is that the more women who work in a job, the less prestigious it must be (Magnusson 2009; England 1979). Yet the relationship between gender composition and prestige has received scant attention compared to the relationship between gender composition and pay, hiring, and promotion.

In fact, the small number of studies which have examined the relationship between gender composition and judgments of occupational prestige paint an inconclusive picture at best. Some studies find that heightened female representation in

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[1] Although men may actually experience greater instances of promotion from predominantly female jobs (Maume 1999).

an occupation is related to *less* prestige, in line with devaluation theory's prediction (cf Wu and Leffler 1992; Beyard and Haring 1984; Bose and Rossi 1983; Touhey 1974a, 1974b). Yet other studies find that predominantly female jobs enjoy *greater* prestige (cf Baunach 2002; Shaffer et al. 1986; Rosenfeld 1980; Sewell, Hauser, and Wolf 1980; Hawkins and Pingree 1978). Still other studies find a *lack of difference* between predominantly male and predominantly female jobs in terms of prestige (cf Glick 1991; Powell and Jacobs 1984; Crino and White 1983; White, Crino, and DeSanctis 1981; England 1979; Suchner 1979). Furthermore, some studies even find a nonlinear relationship, in which gender-integrated occupations reap higher prestige than either predominantly-male or predominantly-female jobs (Gronlund and Magnusson 2013; Magnusson 2009).

In this chapter, I will argue that the inconclusive evidence regarding the relationship between gender composition and occupational prestige highlights the need to better integrate insights from cognitive and cultural sociology when examining how gender operates in the occupational hierarchy. The classic Weberian distinction between class and status implies that *class* reflects material processes of valuation, while *status* reflects symbolic processes of valuation (DiMaggio and Mohr 1985; Weber 1978). Cognitive and cultural sociology provides a set of conceptual and methodological tools that are vital for assessing how people make judgments of symbolic value. The present chapter thus challenges the longstanding assumption that we should expect the well-established *material* devaluation of women's work automatically to correspond to a parallel *symbolic* devaluation of women's work. Instead, it will draw on theories of gender and status to formulate a new hypothesis about how the gender composition of an occupation influences its symbolic worth, postulating instead that gender-segregated jobs reap the highest prestige – in other words, a segregation premium.

2.2 Symbolic Valuation

Cognitive and cultural sociologists define "valuation" as the mental recipe people use when making a judgment about something or someone's worth (Lamont 2012). Typically, this is studied by observing a rater who, whether consciously or subconsciously (Vaisey 2009), uses a set of criteria having some particular weight in order to assess an item's social value. That rater's judgment has a unique set of (1) salient criteria that go into making the judgment, and (2) weights (including valences) of those criteria (Jasso 2006).

Symbolic valuation thus involves making a judgment about an item's *symbolic* worth, such as the beauty, style, or appeal of a piece of art, a music genre, or a baby name (Lieberson 2000; Bryson 1996; Halle 1993; Peterson and Simkus 1992; Bourdieu 1984). These judgments of value may encompass questions of moral worth, personal preference, and/or perceptions of the status hierarchy.

Cultural sociology has established that these judgments are rooted in social criteria, and have discernible patterns within the population. For example the perceived “maleness” of heavy metal music shapes people’s musical tastes, and men are more likely to prefer “male” musical genres such as heavy metal (Lizardo and Skiles 2016; Bryson 1996). Work on symbolic valuation tends to focus on how people judge the worth of cultural “objects” (e.g. their preferences in art or entertainment), and has thus remained largely distinct from work on material valuation processes (e.g. discrimination in hiring, promotion, and pay).

Symbolic valuation studies seek to understand the mental criteria that lead to subjective judgments of worth and their consequences. Meanwhile, particularly in studies of the labor market, material valuation studies have focused on how people make decisions about the distribution of material goods, such as whether to hire someone (Pager, Western, and Bonikowski 2009; Correll, Benard, and Paik 2007; Pager 2003) or how to determine a fair wage (Jasso and Milgrom 2008; Jasso and Webster 1999, 1997; Jasso 1994; Jasso and Rossi 1977). Research on material and symbolic valuation inevitably aims to explain two different outcomes – class and status (Weber 1978). Given this foundational distinction, it is important to study how people assign both material *and* symbolic worth, particularly in the occupation structure. Research on the worth of work has focused almost exclusively on evaluations of the *material* worth of work, rather than evaluations of its symbolic worth – the focus of the present study. This study is motivated by the notion that the gendering of work – much as it shapes the worth people assign to musical genres, such as heavy metal – can also impact judgments of the symbolic worth of occupations.

2.3 Occupational Prestige

The bulk of research on cognitive processes of stratification in work and occupations has focused on material valuation – how people decide whether to hire someone or how much to pay them. A burgeoning line of inquiry, however, considers the underlying symbolic valuation processes expressed in judgments about the social prestige of occupations (Lynn and Ellerbach 2016; Zhou 2005; Wegener 1992).

The objective of this research is to understand the *process* by which occupational prestige judgments are made. Early work on occupational prestige was generally done in the interest of creating a stable, universal measure of status that would inform the stratification and mobility research being carried out at that time (cf Lin and Xie 1988; Treiman 1977; Hodge, Siegel, and Rossi 1964; Tiryakian 1958). The seminal work of Boltanski and Thévenot (1983), however, encouraged researchers to consider that subjective classification systems and hierarchies related to occupational position are ongoing social constructions that are rooted in power struggles. Using focus groups instructed to classify fictitious individuals into social categories based on their occupations, the authors found that the groups often disagreed about how to categorize the hypothetical cases, and that this disagreement was more prominent among socially heterogeneous groups.

This thread was later picked up by studies examining between- and within-person variations in occupational prestige. These studies have revealed two important findings regarding the symbolic process of valuation in the occupation structure. First, occupational prestige judgments vary in response to features of the particular occupation. Second, the extent to which a given feature matters depends on the individual rater's own characteristics.

MacKinnon and Langford (1994) find that the moral component of a job – its perceived "goodness" or "badness" – is an important determinant of occupational prestige, above and beyond an occupation's education and income, for a certain number of lower education/income jobs. For instance, they found that farmer, minister, housekeeper, carpenter, registered nurse, and baker are seen as morally "good" jobs, relatively speaking, while taxi driver, bill collector, salesman, real estate agent, and insurance agent are seen as morally "bad" jobs. Zhou (2005) finds that an occupation's pay and characteristics (its degree of knowledge salience, authority, creativity, and influence) are important determinants of perceived prestige. Moreover, the importance of these factors depends on a person's own race, gender, and class. Lynn and Ellerbach (2017) find that more educated individuals exhibit a greater degree of consensus around the importance of an occupation's educational requirements and place more weight on an occupation's educational requirements when making prestige judgments (see also Wegener 1992). These latter two studies in particular highlight the importance of considering differences in the way prestige is evaluated *between people*. A single aggregate prestige measure for an occupation that is averaged across an entire nation (e.g. Duncan's SEI[2]) or even cross-nationally (e.g. Treiman's constant) cannot capture the significant variation in symbolic valuation judgments that exist within a single society.

This previous work on evaluations of occupational prestige has highlighted educational requirements, pay, and job characteristics (such as industry) as the main criteria people use when judging an occupation's symbolic worth. Although research in cultural sociology has shown that the gender composition of musical genres is an important determinant of the symbolic valuation of music, research on judgments of occupational prestige has yet to definitively establish how gender is used as a criterion in symbolic evaluations of the twenty-first century gendered occupation structure in the United States. I fill this gap by examining the role of gender in judgments of occupational prestige. In particular, I test how the gendered nature of jobs – reflected in the gender composition of occupations' incumbents - influences prestige judgments about these jobs, and whether these evaluations differ between men and women in the US.

[2] In fact, Duncan's SEI is a nationwide average for each occupation that reflects a composite of an occupational prestige rating (averaged across some surveyed participants), as well as the pay and education level of the incumbents of that occupation. It is thus an impure measure of symbolic valuation of an occupation, since it includes material indicators (pay, education) as well as prestige ratings (see Warren, Sheridan, and Hauser 1998).

2.4 Gender, Class, and Status in the Occupational Hierarchy

Earlier studies of how gender influences the symbolic valuation of occupations did not take a culture and cognition approach when collecting and analyzing data. One group of studies relied on a single, aggregate prestige rating for each occupation averaged across large national or even international populations, and then compared either occupations or the men and women working in those occupations (cf Magnusson 2009, 2010; Baunach 2002; Wu and Leffler 1992; Powell and Jacobs 1984; Rosenfeld 1980; Sewell et al. 1980; England 1979; Wolf and Rosenfeld 1978; Treiman and Terrell 1975). These aggregate prestige judgments cannot capture the substantial between-person variation in the symbolic valuation process which has been documented for judgments of occupational prestige (see Lynn and Ellerbach 2017; Zhou 2005), nor can they speak to the potential gender differences between how men and women accord symbolic value in the gendered occupation structure.

A second set of studies did take a between-person approach to analyzing prestige judgments, but either collected ratings from non-representative samples and/or did not account for other cognitive criteria that have been shown to influence prestige above and beyond gender composition, such as pay or required education, training, or experience (cf Shaffer et al. 1986; Beyard and Haring 1984; Bose and Rossi 1983; Crino and White 1983; White et al. 1981; Suchner 1979; Hawkins and Pingree 1978; and Touhey 1974a, 1974b).

Furthermore, no study has yet investigated this question in the twenty-first century United States – most prior work relied on prestige judgment data collected in the U.S. in the 1940s through 1980s (cf Baunach 2002; Wu and Leffler 1992; Glick 1991; Schaffer et al. 1986; Beyard and Haring 1984; Powell and Jacobs 1984; Bose and Rossi 1983; Crino and White 1983; White et al. 1981; Rosenfeld 1980; Sewell et al. 1980; England 1979; Suchner 1979; Treiman and Terrell 1979; Hawkins and Pingree 1978; Wolf and Rosenfeld 1978; Touhey 1974a, 1974b) or from other countries (cf Magnusson and Gronlund 2013; Magnusson 2009, 2010). This study is the first of its kind to test this question using U.S. nationally representative data from prestige judgments and occupational data collected this century.

The first research question this chapter will address is *how the gender composition of an occupation influences its symbolic worth*. As mentioned previously, the prevailing assumption of devaluation theory is that the symbolic valuation of gendered work will mirror its material valuation. Practically, this means that gender composition has an important effect on prestige above and beyond the known material criteria of an occupation's educational requirement, pay, and job industry (Hauser and Warren 1997). Specifically, this hypothesis predicts that the more female incumbents who work in a particular occupation, the lower its prestige will be. Occupations will be symbolically devalued in addition to being materially devalued:

H_{1a}: Predominantly female occupations will be rated lower, net of educational requirement, pay, and industry.

However, two important concepts from the gender and status literature suggest that we should *not* expect the symbolic valuation of gendered work to mirror the material valuation process. Theories of *benevolent sexism* and *status contradictions* both lead us to instead expect that processes of class and status diverge when it comes to gender in the occupation structure.

Benevolent sexism, in contrast to hostile sexism, is a psychological attitude relatively prevalent in the U.S. in which women are exalted for performing stereotypically feminine duties, such as caring for others or tending the household, and embodying stereotypically feminine traits, such as beauty or fragility (Glick and Fiske 1996, 2001). Furthermore, social psychological research has shown that individuals are often rewarded in work-related interactions for exhibiting gender-typical traits, and denigrated when they exhibit gender-atypical ones (see Heilman 2001 for a review). Though benevolent sexism was originally formulated as an individual-level psychological attitude, researchers have hypothesized that there is a link between benevolent or paternalistic sexism and the stereotyping not just of individuals, but entire categories such as occupations. Fiske and Glick (1995:104) observe that, "occupations themselves are often sex typed in ways that may serve to maintain and reinforce stereotypical subtypes of women." They hypothesize that people differentiate between men's work and women's work – the latter of which they refer to as "pink collar jobs." According to the authors, "pink collar jobs are traditionally accepted work roles for women. They are stereotyped as requiring feminine, rather than masculine, personality traits and therefore mesh well with the 'traditional female' subtype" (ibid). The present study examines whether pink collar jobs are *elevated in status* as a result of this (positive) stereotyping process, alongside predominantly male jobs.

The theory of benevolent sexism thus leads us to expect that men's work *and* women's work receive a symbolic boost, as these occupations are seen as the ultimate embodiment of the "natural" abilities and talents of each gender. Highly gendered jobs – those in which the highest proportions of men and women are concentrated – should therefore be seen as more prestigious, while jobs that are less discernibly gendered would not receive a prestige boost.

The second theoretical concept is "status contradictions." In a canonical paper, Hughes (1945) argued that people learn to associate certain "auxiliary traits" (such as race or gender) with certain "master statuses" (such as occupational titles). Writing in 1945, he observed that most people tend to assume doctors are men. However, Hughes pointed out, as women in the mid-20th century increasingly enter the labor market, these mental conflicts between expected gender of one's physician and their actual gender would become more acute for clients and colleagues alike. A status contradiction between master status and an unexpected auxiliary trait leads to a "status dilemma" – a situation inviting some degree of marginalization or avoidance. Hughes predicted that the resolution to these status dilemmas would be the emergence of gender-segregated occupational niches: "women physicians may find a place in those specialties of which only women and children have need" (Hughes 1945:359).

Gender-segregated occupations, then, become the sites where status contradictions are least likely to occur. Men's work – jobs like carpenter and CEO – and women's work – jobs like nurse and fashion model – convey to us a clear mental picture of both the job itself and the gender of its incumbent. They confirm our expectations regarding master statuses and auxiliary traits, leaving no room for potential conflict, nor doubt about which gender the job best suits. Just as we typically reward people for meeting our expectations and marginalize those who defy them, jobs with fewer status dilemmas may be rewarded with greater symbolic worth. Gender-integrated jobs are most likely to create status dilemmas, and thus are expected to be judged as the least prestigious.

This hypothesis departs significant from H1a because it implies that the symbolic valuation process will look quite different from the material valuation process of gendered work, in which incumbents in predominantly-male occupations earn the highest material rewards. As would be predicted by theories of both benevolent sexism and status contradictions, this hypothesis argues that status-related rewards tend to accrue to performances of gender typicality and strongly gendered roles. H1b thus predicts that the most "gendered" occupations garner the highest symbolic worth, while gender-integrated ones garner the least. Specifically, I predict that the lowest *and* highest percentage-female occupations (i.e. the most gender-segregated) are rated as most prestigious, creating a segregation premium for symbolic worth:

H_{1b}: There is a nonlinear relationship between an occupation's gender composition and how prestigious it is judged to be. Both predominantly male and predominantly female occupations will rated the most prestigious, net of educational requirement, pay, and industry.

The second research question of this chapter assesses *the extent to which these processes of symbolic valuation differ for male and female raters*. Women and men are equally likely to devalue women's traits and abilities by penalizing fictional female candidates in terms of hiring, salary and promotion in studies on *material* valuation (e.g. Auspurg, Hinz, and Sauer 2017; Correll et al. 2007). If we expect this pattern of a lack of gender difference in the use of evaluative criteria to hold for symbolic valuation as well, this leads to the following hypothesis about gendered valuations of occupational prestige:

H_{2a}: The relationship between gender composition and prestige is the same for men and women raters.

However, the relatively universal devaluation of women's traits and abilities across genders may pertain only to *material* devaluation. A status process often diverges from a class one; thus we may expect that men and women use the criterion of gender differently in judgments of occupational prestige. Some researchers argue that symbolic valuations are more susceptible to in-group bias (Tajfel and Turner 1979). Indeed, research in cultural sociology regarding musical tastes finds that women are more likely to say that they think genres associated with a predominantly female audience are better, while men find genres associated with a predominantly male audience to be better (Lizardo and Skiles 2016). In the realm of occupations, girls are more likely to say they want to work in a predominantly female occupation, while boys are more likely to say they want to work in a predominantly male occupation (Jacobs 1989). These cases of gendered in-group bias make it possible that men will symbolically reward predominantly male jobs with prestige more so than woman do, and women symbolically reward predominantly female jobs with prestige more so than men do. This leads to an alternative hypothesis about gendered valuations of occupational prestige:

H_{2b}: Men rate predominantly male jobs more highly than women do, and women rate predominantly female jobs more highly than men do.

2.5 Data and Methodology

Cultural sociologists who study valuation look at within-person differences in judgments to understand how various criteria are used in the process of making a value judgment. They also look at between-person differences in how these criteria are used in order to understand how different people assign value in different ways. Thus, to answer the research questions about the criterion of gender in occupational prestige judgments, the data must have two levels of information: the individual (rater) level and the occupation level.

In 2012, the General Social Survey conducted an occupational prestige module for all members of the third wave of the 2008 in-person rotating panel. The primary purpose of this module was to update nation-wide averages of prestige ratings for each occupation (Smith and Son 2014). Although these data are not publicly available, I obtained the individual-level ratings data from NORC. Participants received one of twelve ballots containing 90 occupations (each ballot contained a unique set of 70 occupations, and all participants were asked to rate 20 "core" occupations). Participants were instructed to rate these occupations on a scale of 1-9 in terms of the occupation's "social standing." Ratings were not mutually exclusive; thus individuals could rate as many occupations using the same number as they wished. 1,001 respondents were asked to rate 860 total occupations[3] for a total of 1,113,700 ratings (see Smith and Son 2014 for more details on the data collection methodology). These individual-level descriptive statistics are presented in Table 1 below.

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[3] Respondents rated an average of 81.5 occupations out of the 90 with which they were presented.

Table 1: Demographic characteristics of raters.

	Proportion			
Female	.550			
Bachelors or higher	.315			
White	.791			
Black	.142			
Hispanic	.026			
Asian	.026			
Native American	.008			
Working full-time	.471			
South	.360			
	Mean	SD	Min	Max
Age	51.7	16.3	22	89
Household income[4]	58109	42652	0	150000

To study the criteria used in the evaluation, we also need information about the object being evaluated – in this case, the occupations. I therefore combine occupation level data from federal sources[5] with the individual level rater data. Information on the occupation's educational/training requirement comes from the U.S. Department of Labor's Occupational Network. This measure is an index known as "job zone" which reflects the amount of education, experience, and training necessary to perform the occupation (measured using the Specific Vocational Preparation [SVP] score [U.S. Department of Labor 1991]). For example, a cook in a fast food restaurant earns a job zone score of 1 ("little or no preparation needed"), a nursing assistant has a score of 2 ("some preparation needed"), an aircraft mechanic has a score of 3 ("medium

[4] Household income responses were provided in categories, so the category's midpoint value was used in these calculations.
[5] I took care to select information published in 2012 (or as close to 2012 as available) in order to accurately reflect the state of the occupation structure at that time, as these are the structural factors assumed to influence individual's prestige judgments which were made in 2012.

preparation needed"), an accountant has a score of 4 ("considerable preparation needed"), and an orthodontist has a score of 5 ("extensive preparation needed"). Information on the occupation's pay comes from the Bureau of Labor Statistics' 2012 employer reports, and reflects the mean wages of all workers who held that job title. The job industry reflects the 23 categories used to group occupations by the North American Industry Classification system. Information on the percentage of women in an occupation comes from data from the five-year American Communities Survey which was published by the U.S. Census in its Equal Employment Opportunity Report 2006-2010.[6] These occupation-level descriptive statistics are presented in Table 2 below.

[6] 93% of occupations that were rated by GSS respondents have complete data. Occupations without complete data include military occupations (federal data is unavailable for the military sector), special occupations that are not really occupations (e.g. "street corner drug-dealer," "businessman"), occupations that do not correspond to a single census code, and occupations that are missing reliable earnings data due to the nature of the job (e.g. actor, musician).

Table 2: Occupation-level variables.

	Mean	SD	Min	Max
Education / training	2.85	1.05	1	5
Pay	52374	29440	18720	230540
% female	37.8	26.6	1.1	97.7

Industry	Proportion
Architecture and engineering	.028
Arts, design, entertainment, sports, and media	.039
Building and grounds cleaning and maintenance	.009
Business and financial operations	.046
Community and social service	.015
Computer and mathematical	.022
Construction and extraction	.062
Education, training, and library	.022
Farming, fishing, and forestry	.025
Food preparation and serving-related	.022
Healthcare practitioners and technical	.051
Healthcare support	.017
Installation, maintenance, and repair	.059
Legal	.007
Life, physical, and social science	.034
Management	.094
Office and administrative support	.087
Personal care and service	.040
Production	.157
Protective service	.034
Sales and related	.044
Transportation and material moving	.078

The correlation matrix in Table 3 shows the bivariate relationships among occupation-level variables: pay, education/training, gender composition, and prestige judgment (averaged across all raters). As in previous research on determinants of occupational prestige (cf Hauser and Warren 1997), results show that education/training and pay appear to be important criteria for judging occupational prestige. As in previous research on the material valuation of women's work, results show that although jobs with more women in them tend to have a higher degree of required education, training, or experience, these jobs have a lower mean pay (DiPrete and Buchmann 2013).

Table 3: Zero-order correlations among occupation-level variables.

	Prestige[7]	Education / training	Mean pay
Education / training	.747		
Mean pay	.702	.734	
% female	.031	.143	-.131

NOTE: Unit of analysis is occupation.

However, these bivariate relationships may obscure independent relationships, such as that between % female and prestige once education/training and mean pay are controlled for, as well as any nonlinear relationships between variables. Moreover, treating prestige as a single average for each occupation may hide substantial variation in perception *within* the population. Prior work (e.g., Lynn and Ellerbach 2017) finds important differences in how much variance individuals from different backgrounds exhibit in their prestige judgments. Furthermore, there may be important differences between individuals in their *mean* prestige rating (e.g. some people may be "stingier" than others in their ratings overall). To account for these effects, I use individual change-score models, in which each rating is a function of that rater's mean and standard

[7] Prestige rating is presented here as an average across all raters. Person-level correlation matrices indicate that education/training and pay have a much lower mean correlation (.446 and .379 respectively), since people use the criteria of education/training and pay in different ways.

deviation for all ratings they provided. All models also include robust standard errors which are clustered at the individual level to adjust the errors for any dependency within a person's ratings.

Figure 1 below shows substantial variation in these prestige ratings across occupations and across individuals. Each occupation's mean is plotted as a black point, while each occupation's standard deviation is plotted as a gray bar around the mean.[8]

[8] While showing the names of all 860 occupations is impossible, I labeled every 20th occupation on the x-axis to give a sense of what the aggregate view of the occupational hierarchy looks like.

Figure 1. Occupation means and standard deviations (N=860).



The most prestigious job from this aggregate view is "surgeon," with a mean prestige score (out of 9) of 7.744. The least prestigious job is "table clearer in a restaurant," with a mean prestige score of 2.304. However, this aggregate view obscures important variation *between* people in how they perceive the occupational structure. In fact, even surgeon and table clearer were rated differently by different people: some evaluated the occupation of surgeon as low as 1 on the prestige scale, and some rated the occupation of table clearer as high as 9. Indeed, Figure 1 shows that some jobs exhibit more consensus than others. For instance, the occupation "hair stylist" has the smallest standard deviation (mean prestige rating = 3.845, standard deviation = 1.359) indicating the highest level of agreement as to where hair stylist figures in the occupational hierarchy. Contrast this with "fashion model," which has the largest standard deviation (mean prestige rating = 5.263, standard deviation = 2.613), indicating the lowest level of agreement as to where this occupation belongs relative to other jobs. The substantial variation in occupations' means and standard deviations shows the importance of taking a valuation approach by incorporating both occupation-level criteria *and* rater-level criteria when analyzing prestige judgments.



Figure 2: Rater means and standard deviations of ratings given (N=1,001).

Figure 2 shows the distribution of ratings (mean and standard deviation) for each rater. Raters' mean prestige rating for all occupations they evaluated ranges from 1.27 (the black dot furthest to the left on the plot), meaning they are a very 'stingy' rater, to 8.20 (the black dot furthest to the right on the plot), meaning they are a very 'generous' rater.[1] Variation across raters' *mean* prestige rating shows that different raters have different baselines from which they judge prestige. Variation across raters' *standard deviations* in prestige rating shows that different raters use broader or narrower ranges of

[1] I exclude from these calculations the 9 raters who rated all occupations in their ballot the same.

the prestige scale when evaluating occupations. Raters' standard deviations range from 0.45, meaning the rater evaluated occupations using a narrow portion of the 1-9 scale, to 3.47, meaning the rater evaluated occupations using a wide range of the 1-9 scale. The differences between raters in the baseline prestige score and breadth of scores suggests that a change-score modeling approach is indeed appropriate in order to account for scale usage effects in the way people judge occupational prestige.

Figure 3 below shows the distribution of ratings across raters for a single example occupation: teacher. As in prior studies, there is also substantial variation between people in terms of how prestigious they rate an individual occupation. In this example, results show that most people rated "teacher" as an above-average occupation (the equivalent of greater than 0 on their within-person standardized scale – to the right of the light gray reference line). However, a nontrivial proportion, 27.9% of raters, evaluated "teacher" as lower-than-average prestige (the equivalent of less than 0 on their within-person standardized scale – to the left of the light gray reference line). The variation of ratings *within* each occupation reinforces the importance of modeling differences in prestige ratings across raters, rather than relying on a single average for each occupation, such as the Treiman score or Duncan's SEI.



Figure 3: Distribution of prestige ratings for "teacher."

All models also include ballot fixed effects to account for any benchmarking that may be related to the subset of occupations they rated. Education/training, pay, and industry are treated as 'controls' in all models. In all tables which follow, I x-standardize the continuous variables (education/training index, mean pay, and percent female) so that all coefficients are comparable to one another and represent standard deviation units of within-person prestige rating.

To test Hypotheses 1a and 1b, I examine two sets of models: one with education/training, pay, and industry, and a second set that also includes an occupation's gender composition. As will be depicted in Table 4, Model 1 represents a purely material perspective on prestige, in which it is understood to be a function of education/training, pay, and industry. Models 2 and 3 in Table 4 introduce the "auxiliary" trait of gender composition into the models, alongside the education/training, pay, and industry variables. Model 2 tests Hypothesis 1a – that prestige is a linear function of its gender composition – in line with the way most prior studies have treated it (Baunach 2002; Wu and Leffler 1992; Glick 1991; Schaffer et al. 1986; Beyard and Haring 1984; Powell and Jacobs 1984; Bose and Rossi 1983; Crino and White 1983; White et al. 1981; Rosenfeld 1980; Sewell et al. 1980; England 1979; Suchner 1979; Treiman and Terrell 1979; Hawkins and Pingree 1978; Wolf and Rosenfeld 1978; Touhey 1974a, 1974b; for exceptions, see Gronlund and Magnusson 2013; Magnusson 2009, 2010). Model 3 tests Hypothesis 1b – that prestige is a nonlinear function of its gender composition – in line with the status rewards for segregation hypothesis.

I test Hypotheses 2a and 2b – which predicted that male and female raters use gender composition the same/different way in their judgments of prestige, respectively – by interacting rater's gender with the criterion of gender composition, and comparing model fit to assess whether gender-specific effects for percent women in a job improve model fit enough to warrant the additional model complexity. These results will be presented in Table 5.

2.6 Findings

To test Hypothesis 1a-b, I examine model fit and effect sizes for Models 1-3, shown below in Table 4. In Model 1 (Table 4), we observe that education/training and pay are positively and linearly related to how prestigious an occupation is judged to be, as expected. In Model 2, I introduce the gender composition of an occupation as a criterion in the judgment process. Although % female appears to be negatively related to prestige in Model 2, the very small effect size and larger BIC value compared to Model 1 suggest that gender composition appears *not* to play an important role in the symbolic judgment process. However, Model 3 specifies the gender composition as a nonlinear term, and this model exhibits a substantial reduction in AIC and BIC values compared to Model 1, as well as much larger effect sizes for gender composition.[2] These results provide initial support for Hypothesis 1b, which predicted that gender-segregated occupations would reap the highest status rewards.

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[2] By BIC standards, for instance, this represents a model fit improvement of 228.9, "very strong" evidence that Model 3 is the best fitting (Raftery 1995:138-9)

Table 4: Prestige ratings without and with gender composition as a criterion.

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Education / training	.192*** (.008)	.195*** (.008)	.193*** (.008)
Mean pay	.230*** (.008)	.224*** (.008)	.225*** (.008)
% female	-	-.015** (.005)	-.053*** (.006)
% female (squared)	-	-	.061*** (.004)
AIC	204431.6	204424.2	204184.1
BIC	204757.2	204759.1	204528.3
Log likelihood	-102180.8	-102176.1	-102055.1
N	81,021	81,021	81,021

NOTE: Unit of analysis is individual-occupation rating. Lower values of AIC and BIC are preferred. * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. Ballot fixed effects, industry controls, and intercepts not shown to conserve space (available upon request). Robust standard errors are clustered at the individual-level.

However, to better investigate the shape and magnitude of the relationship between gender composition and symbolic value of a job, I illustrate this effect using predicted values of prestige from Model 3 across the range of percentage women in an occupation, holding constant all other controls at their means or modes. Figure 4 below plots this relationship, in which it becomes clear that the highest prestige occupations, ceteris paribus, are those which are gender segregated – confirmation of Hypothesis 1b.[3]

[3] I also test an alternate approach for nonlinearity in the effect of % female on prestige using two model specifications derived from Kanter's (1977) categories of sex ratios (gender-skewed and gender-tilted). Both specifications also support Hypothesis 1b (see Table 18 in Appendix).



Figure 4: Effect of percent female on prestige rating.

Using Kanter's (1977) 85:15 gender ratio cutoffs for what constitutes a "skewed" job, we can estimate that an occupation with 15% women in it experiences a boost of .102 standard deviations in prestige relative to a gender-balanced job with 50% women; this boost is equivalent to the prestige that would be gained by increasing an occupation's mean pay by around $14,000. An occupation with 85% women in it experiences a boost of .112 standard deviations in prestige relative to a gender-balanced job with 50% women; this boost is equivalent to the prestige that would be gained by increasing an occupation's mean pay by around $15,000. Thus, while gender composition has a statistically significant yet relatively small effect size compared to pay or education/training, the results from Table 4 above indicate that a job's gender composition does make a substantive contribution in explaining how people make judgments of occupations' symbolic worth.

Alternatively, we can interpret the results by calculating x-intercepts to see that occupations begin to experience a prestige penalty at around 20% female until they exceed around 75% female. We can thus define male-dominated occupations as those with fewer than 20% women working in them. These include jobs like aeronautical engineer, logger, and police officer. We can similarly define female-dominated occupations as those with more than 75% women working in them. These include jobs like flight attendant, occupational therapist, and seamstress. By this definition, gender-integrated occupations are those with 20-75% women, including jobs like bus driver, lifeguard, and pharmacist. Calculating the inflection point, we can see that below 49% female, more women in an occupation *decreases* prestige, while above this point, more women in an occupation *increases* prestige.

Let us further illustrate this effect by comparing pairs of similar occupations, such as statistician and computer programmer. Both occupations require at least a bachelor's degree, and demand considerable work-related skill, knowledge, or experience (U.S. Department of Labor 1991). Both occupations earn similar salaries: statisticians earned an average of $79,570 in 2012; computer programmers earned $78,260 on average. The occupation of statistician, however, is relatively gender-integrated at 47.3% women, while computer programmers are much more skewed toward men, with only 24.4% women in the field. Despite nearly identical levels of education/training and pay, however, raters on average scored the occupation of statistician as lower in prestige than the occupation of computer programmer (5.443 versus 6.024). Or consider physician assistants (PAs) and nurse practitioners (NPs). Both occupations require the highest level of education and training – a graduate degree and extensive skill, knowledge, and experience (U.S. Department of Labor 1991). The mean earnings for PAs was $92,460 in 2012, very similar to NPs' mean earnings of $91,450. PAs are relatively gender-balanced, with 67.2% women in the field. NPs, however, are overwhelmingly female, at 92.7% women. Yet NPs are rated as higher, on average, in prestige than PAs (a mean rating of 6.635 versus 5.975). This is particularly surprising given that PAs actually rank closer to doctors in medical authority than NPs. In fact, PAs often receive training in medical schools, alongside MD students, while NPs are trained in nursing schools (Hass 2016). These two contrasts illustrate that a gender-skewed occupation is perceived to be more symbolically valuable compared to an otherwise-similar gender-integrated occupation.

Which jobs experience the largest segregation premium? We can investigate this by looking at which occupations remain most *overrated* (i.e. have the largest residual) when their prestige is predicted by education/training, pay, and industry. Calculating this "premium" using aggregate prestige ratings averaged across the entire sample, the five most overrated occupations are fashion model (74.6% female), astronaut (4.7% female), nuclear technician (25.9% female), nuclear plant operator (7% female), and licensed practical nurse (93% female). Notably, four of these five occupations are gender-segregated by the present definition, with nuclear technician falling just short of the 20% cutoff for predominantly-male occupations.[4]

The second research question of this study investigates whether men and women use the criterion of gender composition differently in prestige judgments. To examine potential gender differences in valuation processes, I exploit the variation *between* respondents. For this analysis, I interacted a rater's own gender with the gender composition variable.[5] Results from these models are presented in Table 5 below. I reproduce results from Model 3, which allowed a nonlinear effect for gender composition. Model 4 then adds an interaction term with rater gender so that the gender composition variable can have unique coefficients for male and female raters.

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[4] As a robustness check, I also examined whether the observed effects of gender composition were being by how common that occupation is. Results are presented in Table 19 in the Appendix, and demonstrate that while the number of total incumbents in a particular occupation does have a small, positive effect on prestige, this effect appears to be orthogonal to that of gender composition.
[5] Results with separate models for male and female raters are presented in Table 20 in the Appendix. These results differ conceptually from those presented here by allowing *each* criterion (including ballot fixed effects and industry controls) to have a different weight and valence for male and female raters. Nevertheless, these results show a similar pattern to the one presented here: both men and women reward gender-segregated occupations with prestige, although men tend to favor predominantly-male jobs and women tend to favor predominantly-female jobs.

Table 5: Effect of gender composition on prestige ratings for male and female raters.

	Model 3	Model 4
Education / training	.193*** (.008)	.193*** (.008)
Mean pay	.225*** (.008)	.225*** (.008)
% female	-.053*** (.006)	
% female, squared	.061*** (.004)	
% female (men)		-.086*** (.008)
% female, squared (men)		.067*** (.005)
% female (women)		-.025*** (.007)
% female, squared (women)		.056*** (.004)
AIC	204184.1	204098.2
BIC	204528.3	204461
Log likelihood	-102055.1	-102010.1
N	81,021	81,021

NOTE: Unit of analysis is individual-occupation rating. * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$. Job industry controls not shown. Ballot fixed effects, industry controls, and intercepts not shown to conserve space (available upon request). Robust standard errors are clustered at the individual-level.

The interaction terms are statistically significant, indicating that the coefficients for % female ($F = 45.22$, $p < .001$) and % female squared ($F = 6.05$, $p < .05$) are different for male and female raters. Model fit is also improved by introducing rater gender-specific effects for occupation's gender composition, as evidenced by the smaller AIC/BIC values for this model as compared to Model 3.[6] This lends support to Hypothesis 2b – that men and women use the criteria of an occupation's gender composition differently. The results are plotted separately by gender in Figure 5 below as predicted values from Model 4.

[6] Additional analyses indicate that this in-group gender bias does not meaningfully differ across income and education levels.



Figure 5: Effect of percent female on prestige rating, by gender of rater.

Figure 5 shows that men tend to valorize men's work, and give less of a boost to women's work, while women exhibit the opposite pattern, giving less of a boost to men's work and valorizing women's work more so than men do. This pattern of horizontal shift suggests a gendered in-group bias in occupational valuation, where women ascribe higher value to women's work, and men ascribe higher value to men's work, support for Hypothesis 2b. These gender differences are, however, quite small, and overall we observe that both men and women accord a premium for segregation, rating the most predominantly-male and predominantly-female occupations as more prestigious than gender-integrated ones. Thus we can conclude that although men and women evaluate occupations in a *quantitatively* different way, these valuations do not *qualitatively* differ.

To summarize all of the results, the gender composition of an occupation is a factor that plays an important role in people's occupational prestige judgments, above and beyond that occupation's required education/training, pay, and industry. The symbolic valuation of work involves a segregation premium, in which predominantly male and predominantly female occupations are seen as the most prestigious jobs, as these jobs minimize status contradictions and confirm gender roles. Unlike studies of material valuation of work, which tend to find consistency in valuation judgments across men and women, in the case of symbolic valuation, men tend to valorize men's work more than women do, and women tend to valorize women's work more than men do. This finding is more in line with cultural sociology studies, which find gendered in-group bias in symbolic valuation. Although these represent important quantitative differences in how men and women assign symbolic worth to jobs, overall the qualitative pattern of status rewards for gender segregation is present in both male and female raters' prestige judgments.

2.7 Discussion

This chapter has argued that "auxiliary" traits like gender are important not just in material valuation of work, as established by prior research, but also in its symbolic valuation. In accordance with the key predictions from the gender and status literature on benevolent sexism and status contradictions, I find evidence for a segregation premium -- occupational gender segregation is rewarded with status because these jobs reify gender-typical roles. These results highlight the importance of Weber's classic distinction between class and status, between material and symbolic processes of valuation. In particular, I find that the way work is symbolically valued, measured here via occupational prestige, differs markedly from the way work is materially valued, typically measured through rewards like pay. Unlike material valuation of gendered work, in which jobs dominated by women experience a penalty, I find that symbolic valuation rewards the most gendered work, that in which an overwhelming majority of incumbents are either male or female. Figure 6 below illustrates the divergence between the two processes of valuation and the segregation premium at work in symbolic valuation. The solid line represents mean pay across the spectrum of gender composition, illustrating the material devaluation of women's work. The dotted line represents occupational prestige across the spectrum of gender composition, showing the segregation premium for prestige among predominantly male and predominantly female jobs.



Figure 6: Devaluation in material valuation versus a segregation premium in symbolic valuation.[7]

The motivating theoretical warrant of this chapter centered around whether processes of symbolic valuation mirror processes of material valuation in the gendered occupation structure, an often-assumed implication of devaluation theory. The findings clearly indicate that symbolic valuation does *not* always mirror material valuation. Unlike some previous researchers, who interpreted a lack of symbolic devaluation of women's work as evidence against gender devaluation theory more generally (cf

[7] Material value is calculated as occupation-average salary as a function of gender composition; symbolic value is calculated as occupation-average prestige as a function of gender composition (net of industry, pay, and required education/training).

Gronlund and Magnusson 2013; Magnusson 2009), the findings of the present study reiterate the importance of considering the material and symbolic valuation as distinct processes. Instead, these findings represent an important modification to devaluation theory by reminding us that class and status processes diverge when it comes to the role of gender in the occupation structure.

This study is the first to find evidence that gender segregated occupations are viewed as most prestigious. Most prior work did not account for the possibility of a nonlinear effect, which may explain why previous results were mixed and thus painted such an inconclusive picture about the relationship between gender composition and occupational prestige. One notable exception is Magnusson (2009), who found that gender-integrated jobs are seen as the most prestigious. These divergent findings are likely due to differences in social context. The data used in that study were specific to Sweden, while the present study examines the U.S. Compared to the U.S., Sweden is much more gender-egalitarian overall (Baxter and Kane 1995). Gendered class and status processes are part and parcel of a society's gender attitudes (such as benevolent sexism), gender expectations (such as status contradictions) and gender roles. Cross-national and historic variation in the extent to which the material and symbolic processes of valuation diverge represents an important area of future research.[8]

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[8] Like most of the prior research on symbolic valuation of work, that study does not take a culture and cognition approach to account for potential between- and within-person differences in valuation. There are

This chapter also tested whether there were differences between women and men in the way gender is used as a criterion in judgments of symbolic valuation. In line with prior research in cultural sociology on gender differences in judgments of symbolic worth, I find that men and women exhibit small but significant in-group biases that valorize "men's work" and "women's work," respectively. Overall, though, men and women accord status to occupations that are sex-segregated, even when comparing occupations which are similar in terms of pay, required education or experience, and industry.

Taken altogether, these findings have important implications for the gender and work literature. The prestige premium enjoyed by gender-segregated occupations and the concomitant penalty incurred by gender-integrated ones may represent another way that the gender revolution has stalled (England 2010; England and Li 2006). The persistent gendering of work likely reinforces - and is reinforced by - symbolic status processes such as those uncovered here.

This research raises a new important question for social scientists: why is it that women's work – the predominantly-female jobs – which, as we have seen, reap such high symbolic rewards, are not matched with high material rewards? It seems that

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important differences in scale usage and benchmarking within populations, meaning that country-wide averages of prestige scores can obscure important patterns in symbolic valuation *within* that country.

women's work represents the mental space in which the material and symbolic judgments diverge: these are among the least valued jobs materially, and among the most valued jobs symbolically. The present study raises an interesting possibility: we may symbolically value women's work to compensate for its material devaluation. Zelizer (1993) found a similar process at work in terms of children: over the past two centuries, as they lost economic value, they gained sentimental (or symbolic) value. The gender-specific compensation of diminished material value with symbolic value may be driven by the persistent association between women's work as altruistic and women's wages as "butter and egg" money, rather than men's "breadwinner" wages (England, Budig, and Folbre 2002; Kessler-Harris 1990). Indeed, the symbolic valuation of women's traditionally feminine work may be the way we justify its material devaluation, since benevolent sexism works in tandem with hostile sexism to uphold systems of gender inequality (Jost and Kay 2005).

An important limitation of the present study is that people's perceptions of occupational characteristics, like gender composition, are unobserved. In all studies that examine judgments of material and/or symbolic worth, it is assumed that people are at least minimally cognizant of the evaluation criteria associated with that object – in this case, a job's requirements, rewards, and gender composition. In their study of perceptions related to sex-segregated occupations, Cejka and Eagly (1999:418) found that people's "perceptions of the distribution of sexes into occupations were highly related to the actual distribution," with a Pearson correlation of .92 between estimated percent women in a job and the actual percent women in a job. Moreover, Liben, Bigler, and Krogh (2001) find that children as young as six distinguish between occupations on the basis of their gender compositions. Thus, we may expect that most Americans are reasonably aware of occupations' gender compositions. Furthermore, the hypotheses predicted here do not hinge on raters having perfect information about occupations' gender composition, but instead having a relatively defined sense of whether a job is highly gendered, and whether it is gendered in favor of men or women. Nevertheless, an important avenue for future work lies in investigating the extent to which imperfect information related to perceived characteristics of occupations influences judgments of prestige, following the model of Lizardo and Skiles' (2016) work on judgments of musical genres.

A second limitation is that the link between gender composition and prestige has been inferred from cross-sectional data. There may be additional perceived qualities of occupations that are related to both gender composition *and* prestige. Future work, such as survey-experiments comparing conditions in which people guess an occupation's gender composition versus those who are told an occupation's gender composition, can better establish the extent to which this relationship is causal, as well as the mechanisms driving it.

Future work on symbolic valuations in the occupation structure is needed to parse out whether these prestige judgments reflect different evaluations of status, personal preference, or moral judgments. As it stands, we cannot know precisely which kind of symbolic valuation judgment people are making, and future work should try to resolve this by collecting and comparing different kinds of data. EPA ratings from ACT theory represent one potential way of capturing the distinctly moral dimension (cf Freeland and Hoey 2018; MacKinnon and Langford 1994), while occupational aspirations represent one potential way of capturing the distinctly preferential dimension (cf Morgan, Gelbgiser, and Weeden 2013; Jacobs 1989).

2.8 Conclusion

This chapter represents the first study of its kind to analyze twenty-first century cultural models of occupational prestige in the United States. Previous work investigating occupational prestige in the U.S. was based on prestige ratings collected as recently as 1989, and tended to use occupation-level data from the 1970s or earlier. Given the remarkable changes to both the occupational structure and the labor force in the last 30 years, it is important to update our understanding of how individuals perceive the occupational hierarchy.

By taking a culture and cognition approach, this study resolves some paradoxes observed in prior studies of occupational prestige regarding the mixed influence of gendered representation on prestige judgments (cf Magnusson and Gronlund 2013;

Magnusson 2009, 2010; Baunach 2002; Wu and Leffler 1992; Glick 1991; Schaffer et al. 1986; Beyard and Haring 1984; Powell and Jacobs 1984; Bose and Rossi 1983; Crino and White 1983; White et al. 1981; Rosenfeld 1980; Sewell et al. 1980; England 1979; Suchner 1979; Treiman and Terrell 1979; Hawkins and Pingree 1978; Wolf and Rosenfeld 1978; Touhey 1974a, 1974b). Indeed, as seen in Model 2 of Table 4, the gender composition of an occupation appears to have a very small negative effect on prestige judgments. However, I have shown that the best-fitting model of occupational prestige is one that allows for nonmonotonic effects of percent of women in an occupation.

The current work also highlights the importance of considering "auxiliary" influences on occupational prestige judgments, influences which go beyond the typical criteria of education, pay, and job characteristics. Finally, this work underscores the necessity to consider material valuation and symbolic valuation as distinct processes – harkening back to Weber's classic distinction between class and status. This does not represent a disqualification of devaluation theory so much as it demonstrates how gender and status play out differently than gender and class. Furthermore, the process of material valuation in the gendered occupation structure is generally invariant across men and women, whereas the process of symbolic valuation does seem to exhibit unique social patterning by gender. These differences reiterate the importance of discerning status processes from class ones.

By considering material and symbolic valuation processes, we can better understand the dynamics at work in the gendered occupation structure. Moreover, there is growing momentum to consider institutions related to stratification and mobility – such as educational systems, poverty, labor markets, and social movements – as cultural objects in and of themselves. By making use of theories and methods from the sociology of cultural and cognition, inequality researchers can better understand the beliefs and perceptions that guide people as they navigate and gate-keep in these institutions.

3. Study 2: Learning to Discriminate? The Role of Race and Education in Occupational Prestige Judgments

> *"The status composition of a job – that is, the extent to which it is typically filled by males or females, whites or blacks – is intrinsically part of the labor process as well as the reward structure of the organization." – Donald Tomaskovic-Devey (1993a:12).*

3.1 Introduction

Occupations, like many features of American life, are sharply segregated by race. Although occupational racial segregation has declined since the passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act which outlawed labor market discrimination, it has remained stubbornly persistent (Tomaskovic-Devey et al. 2006). As of 1988, 29.3% of either Black or white workers would need to change jobs in order to achieve an equitable racial distribution across occupations (King 1992). The most recent analyses available indicate that Hispanic and Asian workers are even more likely than African Americans to work in racially segregated jobs (Alonso-Villar, Del Rio, and Gradin 2012). Furthermore, racial segregation in the labor market is linked to racial inequities in pay (Huffman and Cohen 2004; Catanzarite 2000; Tomaskovic-Devey 1993b)

Thus, we know that the racial composition of jobs is a salient feature of the occupational landscape, and that this uneven racial composition impacts wages. This chapter, however, focuses on the relationship between racial composition and occupational prestige. While pay is an important reward conferred to workers based on the performance of their occupational role, status is also an important reward that individuals receive, and one that depends – at least in part – on their occupation (Weber 1978).

Earlier perspectives on occupational prestige presumed that prestige is entirely determined by an occupation's pay and educational/training requirement (e.g. Featherman and Hauser 1976; Lin and Xie 1988; Hauser and Warren 1997; Bukodi, Dex, and Goldthorpe 2011). Yet an emerging consensus has established the importance of other factors in occupational prestige judgments, such as the affective qualities of a job (MacKinnon and Langford 1994; see also Freeland and Hoey 2018), an occupation's authority and autonomy (Zhou 2005), and the gender composition of an occupation (see Chapter 2 of this dissertation). To understand why we might expect the racial composition of an occupation to shape where it falls in the occupational status hierarchy, I turn to prior work that has examined the extent to which people rely on aggregate racial cues (like racial composition) when making judgments and organizing the environment around them.

3.2 Racial Composition as a Salient Cue in Social Perceptions

Evidence points towards the importance of racial composition as a salient cue that people use[1] when they make judgments about the social world. For instance, a large body of work suggests that the racial composition of a neighborhood (both real and

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[1] Language such as "use" should not be taken to mean that people are necessarily consciously aware of how they make these judgments.

perceived) – in particular, its percentage of minority inhabitants – is an important determinant of how "good," desirable, or safe that neighborhood is judged to be. Quillian and Pager (2001) find that perceptions of crime in Chicago, Seattle, and Baltimore are positively associated with the percentage of young Black men living in the neighborhood. Chiricos, McEntire, and Gertz (2001) have shown that the perceived proximity to both Blacks and Latinos increased Floridians' perceptions that they might become a crime victim. Sampson and Raudenbush (2004) find that a neighborhood's racial composition predicts residents' perceptions of disorder, both physical and social. Furthermore, St. John and Bates (1990) conducted a vignette study which revealed that hypothetical neighborhoods with higher proportions of Black residents – even with crime, cleanliness, housing quality, and other characteristics held constant – are judged as less desirable by whites.

Perceptions of neighborhoods are not the only aspects of the social world which are shaped by racial composition. Racial composition of schools is also an important cue that impacts how people perceive the quality of those schools and their willingness to enroll their children there. Goyette, Farrie, and Freely (2012) investigated this phenomenon among white residents of the Philadelphia area. They found that parents were more likely to perceive their child's school quality as having declined when the number of Black students enrolled in the school increased – even when quantifiable measures of school quality showed no such decreases. In a vignette study, Billingham and Hunt (2016) asked white parents to consider where they would enroll their hypothetical five-year old child for kindergarten. They found that the percent of students who are Black at the hypothetical neighborhood school was an important predictor of school choice, net of other manipulated school characteristics (e.g. state ranking, physical condition, and level of security).

Neighborhoods and schools are two social institutions which are highly racially segregated in the U.S. Yet, I have shown above, the occupational landscape is also highly stratified by race. As Tomaskovic-Devey (1993a:6) argued, “the typical sex or race of a class of jobs in workplaces becomes a fundamental aspect of the jobs, influencing the work done as well as the organizational evaluation of the worth of the work.” While much research has focused on the *material* worth of racially segregated work, little work has looked at the *symbolic* worth of racially segregated work, such as occupational prestige. Indeed, only two studies have examined the potential role of racial composition in perceptions of an occupation’s prestige. Wu and Leffler (1992) found that racial composition is a more important determinant of occupational prestige than gender composition, and that occupations composed of white men reap the highest prestige rewards. Nevertheless, their analysis only looked at 52 occupations, and did not adjust for other factors (such as education/training or pay) that are known to influence perceptions of prestige.

More recently, Crawley (2014) conducted a survey experiment among undergraduates at single university and asked them to rate a hypothetical occupation in terms of status. She did not find that altering the racial composition of the hypothetical occupation impacted its perceived status. However, this approach lacks external validity, as it requires participants to make judgments about a single unfamiliar occupation – a much more unusual task than asking participants to make judgments about an unfamiliar neighborhood or school (something which most of us have done or will do in our lifetimes). Furthermore, the aforementioned study relied on a sample of mostly white college students, limiting its generalizability to the broader U.S. population.

Thus, the first research question this chapter will answer is *how does an occupation's racial composition impact its perceived level of prestige*? Based on the prior research on judgments and perceptions about neighborhood and schools, I expect that occupations with more white incumbents will be seen as more prestigious, net of other known occupation-level characteristics that shape prestige judgments (such as required level of education/training, pay, industry, and gender composition).

H1: The percentage of white incumbents in an occupation is positively related to the occupation's perceived prestige.

3.3 The Role of Rater's Race in the Usage of Racial Cues

The second research question this chapter will answer is *does the impact of an occupation's racial composition on occupational prestige judgments depend on a rater's own race?* In other words, should we expect that all racial groups rely on racial composition – and in the same way – when they are making judgments about where an occupation falls in the status hierarchy? Some of the research that has examined the role of racial composition in judgments has focused solely on white individuals (e.g. Billingham and Hunt 2016; Goyette et al. 2012), and for good reason: whites generally control the majority of resources in terms of housing wealth and educational credentials in the U.S., and so their perceptions and concomitant choices are arguably more influential on the distribution of material and symbolic rewards in American society (Alba 1990; Schelling 1969). At a more practical level, estimating rater-specific race effects can be prohibitive due to small cell sizes among nonwhite subgroups, particularly in small-N studies.

Among the four aforementioned studies of racial composition effects which did investigate the possibility of rater-specific race effects, three out of four found different relationships between racial composition and the outcome, depending on the individual's own race. Quillian and Pager (2001) found that the effect of racial composition on perceptions of crime was stronger for white residents than Black residents. Chiricos and coauthors (2001) found that the (perceived) proportion of Black neighbors and Latino neighbors led white and Latino residents to perceive higher levels of crime victimization, but neither proportion impacted Black residents' perceptions. Sampson and Raudenbush (2004) did not find a difference between Black residents and white residents in terms of racial composition's relationship to perceived neighborhood disorder. Lastly, St. John and Bates (1990) found a negative, linear relationship for whites between the percentage of Black residents and a neighborhood's desirability, while for Blacks the relationship was nonlinear (they preferred more Black neighbors up to a point).

The preponderance of evidence thus leads to an expectation that there will be a dependency between a rater's own race and the relationship between an occupation's racial composition and prestige judgment. In particular, I predict that white raters will rely more on racial composition than nonwhite raters in their assessment of an occupation's prestige, net of all other occupational characteristics.

H2: The relationship between the percentage of white incumbents in an occupation and an occupation's perceived prestige depends on a rater's race.

3.4 The Role of Education within Racial Categories in the Usage of Racial Cues

Finally, the third research question of this study asks *does education mitigate or enhance the relationship between an occupation's racial composition and how prestigious it is judged to be?* In the racial attitudes literature, two conflicting perspectives point toward two different predictions.

On the one hand, many studies find that people with lower levels of education have more prejudicial and less tolerant racial attitudes. Bobo and Kluegel (1993) find that education has a positive effect on a respondent's support for race-targeted policies aimed at ameliorating inequality. Sniderman and Piazza (1993) find a strong negative relationship between number of years of schooling and number of negative characterizations about Blacks. Bobo and Kluegel (1997) find that education has an overall negative effect on both "Jim Crow"-style racism and endorsement of Black stereotypes among whites, and has a positive effect on whites' support for government helping improve the standard of living for Blacks. Sears and coauthors (1997) similarly find that education is negatively related to anti-Black attitudes in three out of four datasets under consideration. In the most recent review of the evidence that looked at 40 years of GSS data, Bobo and coauthors (2012) find lower education is consistently related to more negative racial attitudes among whites. Overall, then, this group of studies indicates that education may serve to enlighten people to have more progressive racial views. This leads to the prediction that more-educated individuals should be *less* likely to draw on racial composition as factor in their judgments of an occupation's prestige.

H3a: The relationship between the percentage of white incumbents in an occupation and an occupation's perceived prestige is weaker among higher educated raters as opposed to lower-educated ones.

On the other hand, a number of scholars have suggested that the espousal of progressive racial attitudes among the well-educated is a function of their socialization into the belief that racial prejudice is unseemly – but that this group may not necessarily *truly* hold racially progressive beliefs. Instead, these scholars argue, the well-educated are simply better at hiding their prejudicial views, while also espousing attitudes that seemingly justify their social group's dominance. Jackman and Muha (1984:751) encapsulate this view based on their reading of GSS data: "We argue that dominant social groups routinely develop ideologies that legitimize and justify the status quo, and the well-educated members of these dominant groups are the most sophisticated practitioners of their group's ideology." Further evidence for this perspective can be found in the fact that there is no difference between educational groups in terms of their likelihood of showing racial bias on the Implicit Association Test (Greenwald and Krieger 2006).

Most recently, Wodtke (2012) finds evidence of an attitude/policy divergence among the well-educated: among whites, Blacks, and Latinos, more education is related to a greater tendency to reject negative stereotypes about the outgroup and an increased awareness of discrimination against racial minorities, but more education is *not* related to an increased propensity to support racially progressive policies. In a related 2016 study that aimed to isolate the effect of intelligence, Wodtke (2016) concluded that whites with high verbal ability are less likely to report prejudicial attitudes toward minorities and more likely to support racial equality in principle, but are *not* more likely to support policies promoting racial equality. Specifically in regards to occupational prestige, Lynn and Ellerbach (2017) found that higher-educated raters were more likely to draw on an occupation's education as a criterion when evaluating its prestige. Overall, then, this competing perspective would suggest that education is a means for ideological refinement and social closure, allowing individuals to become more discriminating in their ability to discern hierarchies – of which racial composition is an important criterion.

H3b: The relationship between the percentage of white incumbents in an occupation and an occupation's perceived prestige is stronger among higher educated raters as opposed to lower-educated ones.

Because most of these prior studies have focused exclusively on the relationship between education and racial attitudes among *whites*, I will examine education effects separately for raters of different races.[2]

3.5 Data and Methodology

To test these hypotheses, I will once again draw on the linked dataset that I created which incorporates prestige judgments and occupational characteristics. Prestige judgment data were collected as part of the 2012 General Social Survey module.

[2] Among studies of this nature which did include racial minorities, there is some evidence of a strikingly different relationship between education and progressive racial attitudes between white vs. nonwhite respondents. For instance, Bobo and Kluegel (1993) found that increased levels of education have a *negative* effect on racial attitudes among Blacks.

Members of the 2008-2012 in-person portion of the rotating panel were asked to rate a ballot of 90 occupations as part of the 2012 data collection wave. Respondents were given one of twelve ballots with a set of 70 occupations unique to that ballot, while every ballot also contained 20 “core” occupations to rate. Respondents were instructed to rate each occupation on a scale of 1-9 in terms of its social standing, and ratings were not mutually exclusive (so respondents could place as many occupations as they liked at the same place on the scale, making it a true “rating” and not a “ranking”). (See Table 1 in Chapter 2 for demographic characteristics of raters in the sample.)

Occupational data were assembled from various federal sources. The key independent variable, racial composition, was obtained from the U.S. Census’ *Equal Employment Opportunity Report (2006-2010),* and is operationalized as the percentage of job incumbents who are white. Gender composition also comes from this report, and is operationalized as the percentage of job incumbents who are female. Control variables include: an occupation’s level of education/training (obtained from the U.S. Department of Labor’s Occupational Network as the “job zone” index), an occupation’s mean pay (obtained from the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ 2012 employer reports), and an occupation’s industry (using the North American Industry Classification’s system). Table 6 below shows descriptive statistics for the dataset at the occupation level.

Table 6: Descriptive statistics at the occupation level.

	Mean	SD	Min	Max
Education / training	2.85	1.05	1	5
Pay	52374	29440	18720	230540
% white	74.7	9.2	41.3	95.2
% female	37.8	26.6	1.1	97.7

Industry	Proportion
Architecture and engineering	.028
Arts, design, entertainment, sports, and media	.039
Building and grounds cleaning and maintenance	.009
Business and financial operations	.046
Community and social service	.015
Computer and mathematical	.022
Construction and extraction	.062
Education, training, and library	.022
Farming, fishing, and forestry	.025
Food preparation and serving-related	.022
Healthcare practitioners and technical	.051
Healthcare support	.017
Installation, maintenance, and repair	.059
Legal	.007
Life, physical, and social science	.034
Management	.094
Office and administrative support	.087
Personal care and service	.040
Production	.157
Protective service	.034
Sales and related	.044
Transportation and material moving	.078

Occupations with among the lowest proportions of white incumbents include manicurist (46.3% white), English language translator (51.5% white), and barber (52.4% white). Occupations with among the highest proportions of white incumbents include cattle rancher (95.2% white), veterinarian (92.6% white), and meteorologist (91.1% white). Bivariate correlations between the occupation-level variations are shown in Table 7 below.

Table 7: Zero-order correlations among occupation-level variables.

	Prestige[3]	Education / training	Mean pay	% white
Education / training	.747			
Mean pay	.702	.734		
% white	.433	.460	.485	
% female	.031	.144	-.131	-.260

Consistent with the prior literature on racial occupational segregation, we can see that the percentage of an occupation's incumbents who are white is positively related to the occupation's required education/training and mean pay. It is negatively related to the proportion of women in an occupation, which reiterates earlier findings about patterns of social closure and status composition that keep women and minorities siloed in particular jobs (Tomaskovic-Devey 1993a). Finally, we see some initial evidence to support Hypothesis 1: % white is positively related to prestige when averaged across all raters. Nevertheless, models which control for other occupational characteristics and which account for rater effects are necessary to isolate this effect.

[3] Prestige rating is presented here as an average across all raters.

Therefore, I will use a change-score approach, which permits me to account for rater-specific differences in scale usage and benchmarking, while simultaneously employing the full range of occupational data. This linear regression model thus predicts how different occupational characteristics are used by different raters in the process of prestige judgments. Prestige judgments are scaled to reflect person-specific deviations from their means. All models include the aforementioned occupational characteristics as controls (required education/training, mean pay, % female and % female squared [as previous research has found that more gender-segregated occupations reap more prestige rewards than gender-integrated ones; see Chapter 2 of this dissertation], and industry categories), as well as ballot fixed effects. All coefficients are x-standardized to facilitate comparison of effect sizes across variables. All models also include robust standard errors which are clustered at the individual rater level.

3.6 Findings

To test Hypothesis 1 – whether racial composition has a significant and substantive effect on occupational prestige judgments – I test two models: one which predicts prestige as a function of the occupational control variables only (education/training, mean pay, and gender composition) – Model 1, and one which adds the racial composition variable to the prediction equation – Model 2. As Table 8 shows below, % white has a small but statistically significant effect on prestige. Furthermore, model fit improves substantially by AIC and BIC standards when racial composition is included as a criterion in the judgment process.

Table 8: Models without and with racial composition.

	Model 1	Model 2
Education / training	.192*** (.008)	.183*** (.008)
Mean pay	.226*** (.008)	.221*** (.008)
% female	-.051*** (.006)	-.029*** (.006)
% female (squared)	.061*** (.004)	.048*** (.004)
% white	-	.037*** (.004)
AIC	202892	202810.9
BIC	203236	203164.1
Log likelihood	-101409	-101367.4
N	80,518	80,518

NOTE: Unit of analysis is individual-occupation rating. Lower values of AIC and BIC are preferred. * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. Ballot fixed effects, industry controls, and intercepts not shown to conserve space (available upon request). Robust standard errors are clustered at the individual-level.

To give a better sense of the magnitude of this effect, I calculated relative sizes based on predicted prestige values at varying levels of racial composition versus another independent variable – mean pay. Increasing an occupation's racial composition from 50% white to 90% white leads to a corresponding boost in prestige of .158 standard deviations – equivalent to the prestige boost that could be achieved by increasing an occupation's pay by approximately $21,250. The impact of racial composition on prestige can also be illustrated from the predicted value plot, illustrated below in Figure 7.



Figure 7: Effect of racial composition on prestige.

All in all, we see that occupations below the mean racial composition of 75% white are seen as less prestigious, while occupations above 75% are seen as more prestigious. This calculation takes into account effects of an occupation's required education/training, pay, gender composition, and industry on prestige judgments. White workers made up 80% of the labor force in 2012 (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 2013), so the prestige boost for racial composition begins just short of this figure. This suggests that occupations which are whiter than the prototypical job in terms of the labor market's overall racial balance are those which are seen as the most prestigious. I therefore conclude that Hypothesis 1 is supported: racial composition is an important factor that people use when making judgments about occupational prestige, and whiter jobs are seen as more prestigious.

Next, I turn to Hypothesis 2, which examines whether the racial composition effect shown in Model 2 depends on a rater's own race. To test this hypothesis, I introduce an interaction term between rater's race and % white. This is the model specified as Model 3 in Table 9 below.

Table 9: Race-specific effects of racial composition on prestige.

	Model 2	Model 3
Education / training	.183*** (.008)	.183*** (.008)
Mean pay	.221*** (.008)	.220*** (.008)
% female	-.029*** (.006)	-.030*** (.006)
% female (squared)	.048*** (.004)	.048*** (.004)
% white	.037*** (.004)	-
% white (white rater)	-	.041*** (.004)
% white (Black rater)	-	.002 (.014)
% white (Hispanic rater)	-	.009 (.030)
% white (Asian rater)	-	.123*** (.017)
% white (Native American rater)	-	.011 (.053)
AIC	202892	202763.5
BIC	203236	203154
Log likelihood	-101409	-101339.8
N	80,518	80,518

NOTE: Unit of analysis is individual-occupation rating. Lower values of AIC and BIC are preferred. * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. Ballot fixed effects, industry controls, and intercepts not shown to conserve space (available upon request). Robust standard errors are clustered at the individual-level.

Results indicate that model fit is indeed improved by allowing the racial composition effect to depend on a rater's own race (Model 3). This improvement is likely driven by the difference between white and Asian raters relative to raters of other races:

Black, Hispanic, and Native American raters do not grant a premium to whiter jobs, while whites and Asian raters do. This interpretation is bolstered by results of Wald tests for differences in coefficients. The difference between white and Black raters in their usage of racial composition is significant ($F(1, 985) = 6.13$, $p < .05$). Asian raters are significantly different from all other racial groups in how they use % white in their occupational prestige judgments: white versus Asian ($F(1, 985) = 22.49$, $p < .001$), Hispanic versus Asian ($F(1, 985) = 11.39$, $p < .001$), and Native American versus Asian ($F(1, 985) = 4.05$, $p < .05$).

These differences can be summed up in Figure 8 below, which shows how raters of different ethnoracial backgrounds use racial composition differently when making prestige judgments (again, net of how they use all other occupational characteristics). Hypothesis 2 is therefore supported: white raters and Asian raters rely on racial composition when assessing an occupation's prestige, while Black, Hispanic, and Native American raters do not.



Figure 8: Race-specific effects of racial composition on prestige.

Finally, I test Hypotheses 3a and 3b by examining the possibility that raters of different educational backgrounds use the racial composition criterion differently. Because prior literature led me to expect that this relationship might be different within different racial categories, I allow for a dependency between the rater race * racial composition effect on prestige (this is, in effect, a three-way interaction). For ease of interpretation, I have dichotomized the education variable into those who have a college degree or higher (31.4% of the sample) and those who have less than a college degree (68.6% of the sample).

Results of this test are shown in Model 4 of Table 10 below. Model 4 specifies racial composition coefficients that are unique to each group of raters in terms of their race *and* education level.[4] We see substantial improvement in model fit between Models 3 and 4, suggesting that the added complexity of race-and-education-specific coefficients for racial composition is indeed necessary.

[4] This specification assumes all other occupational characteristics are common across these subgroups – an assumption that allows for model fit comparisons, but an assumption which I will investigate further in Chapter 4 of this dissertation

Table 10: Race-and-education-specific effects of racial composition on prestige.

	Model 3	Model 4
Education / training	.183*** (.008)	.184*** (.008)
Mean pay	.220*** (.008)	.220*** (.008)
% female	-.030*** (.006)	-.030*** (.006)
% female (squared)	.048*** (.004)	.048*** (.004)
% white (white rater)	.041*** (.004)	-
% white (white, no college rater)	-	.014* (.007)
% white (white, college rater)	-	.093*** (.010)
% white (Black rater)	.002 (.014)	-
% white (Black, no college rater)	-	-.017 (.015)
% white (Black, college rater)	-	.081* (.033)
% white (Hispanic rater)	.009 (.030)	-
% white (Hispanic, no college rater)	-	.000 (.030)
% white (Hispanic, college rater)	-	[a]
% white (Asian rater)	.123*** (.017)	-
% white (Asian, no college rater)	-	.117*** (.033)
% white (Asian, college rater)	-	.126*** (.005)
% white (Native American rater)	.011 (.053)	-
% white (Native American, no college rater)	-	.023 (.060)
% white (Native American, college rater)	-	[a]
AIC	202892	202580.9
BIC	203236	202999.3
Log likelihood	-101409	-101245.5
N	80,518	80,518

NOTE: Unit of analysis is individual-occupation rating. Lower values of AIC and BIC are preferred. * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. Ballot fixed effects, industry controls, and intercepts not shown to conserve space (available upon request). Robust standard errors are clustered at the individual-level. [a] Cell sizes are too small to produce reliable estimates, so these coefficients are omitted.

Table 10 shows that there is substantial variation within racial groups – as well as between them – in terms of how they use the racial composition criterion. Among whites, those without a college degree rely very little on racial composition, while those with a college degree place much greater weight on it. The difference between the education coefficients is significant ($F(1, 985) = 35.37$, $p < .001$). These effects are depicted in Figure 9 below.



Figure 9: Education-specific effects of racial composition on prestige for white raters.

Among Black raters, those without a college degree do not see whiter jobs as more prestigious. If anything, they may see nonwhite jobs as more prestigious, although this coefficient is not significant. Black raters with a college degree do see whiter jobs as more prestigious, although this effect is smaller in magnitude relative to the white college educated raters and Asian college educated raters. The difference between the two education groups among Black raters is significant (F(1, 985) = 7.10, p < .01). These effects are depicted in Figure 10 below.



Figure 10: Education-specific effects of racial composition on prestige for Black raters.

Finally, in terms of Asian raters, those without a college degree do see whiter jobs as more prestigious, but this effect is even larger for Asian raters *with* a college degree. Nevertheless, this difference in coefficients it not statistically significant (F(1, 985) = 0.06, p = .804). These effects are shown in Figure 11 below.



Figure 11: Education-specific effects of racial composition on prestige for Asian raters.

Altogether, these results provide qualified support for Hypothesis 3b. For white and Black raters, having more education means that they are *more* likely to use the criterion of racial composition when making occupational prestige judgments, and this is especially true for white raters. White and Black raters without a college degree only marginally (in the case of whites) or do not at all (in the case of Blacks) positively consider the number of white incumbents in an occupation when assessing its prestige. For Asian raters, however, education has a less discernible effect: raters with and without a college degree both similarly rate whiter jobs as more prestigious.

3.7 Discussion and Conclusion

This chapter began with the observation that there is persistent racial segregation in the American occupational structure. Like the body of work that has studied the effects of gender-segregated jobs, there is much research which demonstrates that racial segregation leads to lower wages. Yet, similar to what I have argued in Chapter 2 in regards to gender composition, we know surprisingly little about how racial composition relates to the symbolic rewards of occupations: status – or, as it is commonly operationalized, occupational prestige. Although prior research has examined the impact of racial composition on judgments and perceptions about other institutions in American society, researchers have yet to fully investigate the impacts of racial composition on judgments and perceptions about the occupational structure. The purpose of this chapter has been to shed light on this longstanding question.

The findings from this chapter demonstrate that racial composition is a salient cue that features prominently in people's assessments of where an occupation falls in the status hierarchy. Much like when people make judgments about neighborhoods and schools, I find that the proportion of white workers in an occupation signals status – and the whiter the occupation, the higher the status. It is notable that these effects are visible even with other known components of occupational prestige (such as a job's required education/training, pay, gender composition, and industry) accounted for.

However, the story is not so simple. Not everyone relies on the cue of racial composition when making occupational prestige judgments – or to be more precise, not everyone relies on it *in the same way* or *to the same degree*. Whites and Asians draw on the whiteness of an occupation, rewarding jobs with more white workers in them. Blacks, Hispanics, and Native Americans, meanwhile, do not see whiter jobs as more prestigious. Part of these race differences in the usage of racial composition can be explained by educational differences between racial groups: when comparing college-educated white and Black raters, there is a roughly similar reliance on percent white when judging prestige, although Black college-educated raters are somewhat lower in their rewarding of occupational whiteness relative to white college educated raters. Among non-college educated raters, however, race differences are quite prominent: whites give a slight edge to whiter occupations, and Asian raters reward whiter occupations with a very large prestige premium; meanwhile, Black raters without a college degree do not reward whiter occupations.

Overall, then, these findings reinforce the importance of social factors – like gender and racial composition – in shaping occupational prestige judgments, further reiteration of points made in Chapter 2. An occupation's "pure" material factors – like required education/training, pay, and industry – are not the only components of work that impact perceptions of status in the occupational structure. Results from this chapter also underline the fact that perceptual differences are not uniform across social groups:

race acts as a filter that influences the way people perceive and order their social world. Finally, I have provided evidence in favor of the "ideological refinement as social closure" theory regarding education's effects on attitudes. No matter a person's race, having more education resulted in a rater relying more on the cue of racial composition as a way of organizing the occupational status hierarchy. Education in this case makes people more racially discriminating.

Examining the role of racial composition in perceptions and judgments provides an unobtrusive way of examining racial attitudes, an approach that is arguably less subject to the well-known social desirability bias that has plagued traditional survey research about race and ethnicity (Krumpal 2013). Nevertheless, we cannot know whether *(in)accuracy* in perceptions about racial composition was driving the differences between lesser and more educated raters. Perhaps higher-educated raters are simply more *aware* of an occupation's racial composition. This seems unlikely, however, given that it is *lower* educated individuals who are most likely to work in occupations with those of another race: indeed, Table 7 above shows that there is a large positive correlation between the percentage of white workers in an occupation and the required education/training of that job. The extent to which people are consciously aware of the occupational prestige judgment-making process – especially their discursive beliefs about whether/how they use criteria like racial composition – represents an important next step in this line of research, and would have implications for dual process theories of cognition and decision-making (Miles, Charron-Chénier, Schleifer 2019; Vaisey 2009).

The fact that racial composition is further inscribed in subjective perceptions of status like occupational prestige suggests that race casts a longer shadow than we have previously acknowledged on status and its attendant outcomes. Sociologists have long theorized that the prestige of a person's occupation frames how others interact with them: the deference they are accorded, the benefit of the doubt they receive, the authority they can draw upon, and the power they have at their disposal. Furthermore, the effects of occupational prestige as status extend far beyond the workplace: occupation-derived status shapes health and well-being (Fujishiro, Xu, and Gong 2010), civic participation (Sobel 1993), marriage and family formation (Kalmijn 1994), and interactions with the criminal justice system (Lizotte 1978). Thus, if nonwhite occupations are symbolically devalued simply by virtue of their racial composition, this further restricts the mobility and life chances of the people working in these kinds of jobs.

The pattern of rewarding whiteness with prestige likely has important implications for social closure. Indeed, this may be a two-way process: whites may reward predominantly-white occupations with prestige, but they may also gatekeep predominantly-white occupations on the basis of race in order to maintain the status privilege of those positions. Royster (2003) finds ethnographic evidence for this type of gate-keeping among blue collar workers, but future research should examine these micro-level processes of racial exclusion among white collar workers and hiring managers.

Finally, this chapter has revealed an interesting paradox in the way people make occupational prestige judgments. Why would Asian raters and Black college-educated raters reward predominantly white occupations with prestige when this would seemingly go against their own self-interest? This finding contradicts in-group/out-group-style theories of social conflict (e.g. Tajfel and Turner 1979). Instead, it is indicative of a cross-group tendency to reward whiteness with status in the occupational structure *regardless* of one's own race. Furthermore, it can seem paradoxical, on its face, that this tendency for minority raters to reward whiteness with status *increases* with more education. I can see two possible reasons for this. First, educational institutions (particularly universities) are sites of secondary socialization which explicitly and implicitly convey messages about the worth of work and what is considered "prestigious" (Binder, Davis, and Bloom 2016). Alternatively, college-educated people of color may suffer from a self-serving bias, akin to pulling up the ladder of opportunity behind them. They may feel like they were able to find success, so people of their racial group who did not are thus not deserving of status and prestige. Relatedly, they may feel the need to construct stronger symbolic boundaries between themselves and lower-educated members of their group to access status privileges (Anderson 1999). Future research is needed to adjudicate between these two possibilities.

Since Tomaskovic-Devey (1993a) introduced the concept of status composition, sociologists have been attentive to the way occupations' gender and racial compositions influence the allocation of societal rewards. Yet symbolic rewards, like status, have been neglected in these analyses. This chapter has shown that perceptions of status – judgments of occupational prestige – are profoundly influenced by racial composition, and in ways that depend on a person's own social position. I will further explore the intricacies of how social position shapes the way people construct status hierarchies in the next chapter, which is the final study of this dissertation.

4. Study 3: Occupational Heterarchy and Diverse Logics of Prestige.

> *"Our ability to form beliefs is inseparable from our understandings of our position in the social world with its adjacencies, hierarchies, and oppositions." – John Levi Martin (2000:5).*

4.1 Introduction

Max Weber famously defined status as the "social estimation of honor" afforded to a person or their position (1968:932), noting that the status order is "the way in which social honor is distributed in a community" (927). Yet Weber provided little insight as to *how* these social estimations of honor are made in the first place. Other theorists attempted to answer this question by suggesting that society itself is defined by its singular, homogeneous view of the status order. For instance, Émile Durkheim's notion of the *conscience collective* captures the idea that there is a set of fundamental representations or symbols shared in common among all members of a society (Durkheim 1912). In Durkheim's thought, these shared representations or symbols encode social categories and classification systems. In the transition from a "primitive" society (i.e., one characterized by mechanical solidarity) to a "modern" one (i.e., one characterized by organic solidarity), the division of labor comes to prescribe a set of fixed roles that enable social cohesion. In sum, Durkheim argued that social meanings are widely shared precisely because everyone understands where they fit into society's hierarchy.

Talcott Parsons also viewed societies as having relatively high levels of value consensus. This purported value consensus leads to several core features that, in Parsons' view, characterize a social system: a system for categorizing people, places, and things; role definitions; a system for allocating people to those roles; and, most importantly, a system for allocating "sanctions and rewards, especially prestige and status" based on the performance of these roles (Parsons and Shils 1951:257). For Parsons, much like Durkheim, a society is in fact *defined* by its members' adherence to a singular view of status and concomitant prestige.

Embedded in these definitions of society is an assumption that all people hold the same view of the status order. By this logic, the division of labor necessitates various roles, and every member of society shares a common understanding of how that role should be rewarded. This is a perspective I term *homoarchy*, borrowing the concept from anthropology (see also Stark 2012). Bondarenko (2007) defines homoarchy as the organizing principle of a social hierarchy in which "the ordering of the dimensions of society [occur] mainly according to a *single hierarchical tenet*" (pp. 187, emphasis added). Thus, a homoarchy implies that everyone perceives the status order in more or less the same way. As I will demonstrate, the homoarchy perspective persists in much of the contemporary sociological work that concerns itself with status. This is particularly the case for research involving one of the oldest measures of social status available to social scientists: occupational prestige. Occupational homoarchy implies that there is a single, unifying logic that shapes how people ascribe worth in a society's division of labor. Nevertheless, an emerging framework from cultural and cognitive sociology has put forth an alternative perspective – *heterarchy* – that instead predicts that people perceive the prestige structure differently depending on their social position. The heterarchy perspective therefore implies that there are multiple – perhaps conflicting – logics that shape how people assign value to occupations.

4.2 Classic Work on Occupational Prestige and the Homoarchy Perspective

Occupational prestige began as a way to operationalize Weber's concept of status, and has proven to be a fundamental tool for measuring social mobility across time and place (Hout and DiPrete 2006). North and colleagues (1961) conducted the first known study of occupational prestige in 1947 by asking a nationally representative sample of survey-takers to rate the prestige of 90 occupations. In that study, as well as its replications in 1964 and 1989, researchers have concluded that there is a general consensus, with negligible differences between social groups, as to how people rate occupations' prestige (Hodge, Siegel, and Rossi 1964; Stevens and Featherman 1981; Nakao and Treas 1994). This presumption of homoarchy is well encapsulated by Hodge, Siegel, and Rossi (1964), who wrote:

> The prestige hierarchy of occupations is perhaps the best studied aspect of stratification systems of modern societies. Extensive empirical studies have been undertaken in a variety of nations, socialist and capitalist, developed and underdeveloped. Intensive analyses have been undertaken of results of particular studies searching for the existence of disparate prestige hierarchies

> held by subgroups within nations. Despite rather extensive searches conducted by a variety of techniques, it appears that occupational-prestige hierarchies are similar from country to country and from subgroup to subgroup within a country. This stability reflects the fundamental but gross similarities among the occupational systems of modern nations. Furthermore, knowledge about occupations and relatively strong consensus on the relative positions of occupations are widely diffused throughout the populations involved (pp. 286-7).

International comparisons that looked at occupational prestige in other countries including developed countries in Europe and East Asia (Inkeles and Rossi 1956), the Philippines (Tiryakian 1958), China (Lin and Xie 1988), and a meta-analysis of 53 other nations (Treiman 1977) concluded that people tend to rate occupations the same way, regardless of their country of residence. This seemingly-invariant prestige structure, often referred to as the "Treiman constant," has been described as perhaps "the only universal sociologists have discovered" (Hout and DiPrete 2006:3).

Under a framework of homoarchy, people are understood to use a single, unifying logic to assign worth to occupations. What form does that logic take? Many early stratification studies noted the high correlations between an *occupation's pay* and *required level of education* with prestige. Duncan (1961), for instance, found that 83% of prestige is explained by an occupation's mean level of education and income among its incumbents. This led many researchers to conclude that, "prestige scores are [merely] 'error-prone' estimates of the socioeconomic attributes of occupations" (Featherman and Hauser 1976:405). More recently, Bukodi, Dex, and Goldthorpe (2011) advocated abandoning occupational prestige as a measure in favor of objective occupational characteristics because “respondents do not in fact tend to rate or rank occupations according to their ‘prestige,’ ‘social standing,’ etc., but rather according to a range of associated *job requirements* and *job rewards*” (pp. 626, emphasis original). The single, unifying logic of occupational prestige in the homoarchy framework is what I call a *materialist logic*: the larger an occupation’s salary, and the greater its educational/training requirement, the more prestigious it is presumed to be.

Yet recent evidence has called into question the assumption of homoarchy and the materialist logic. First, several studies find considerable evidence for variation across subgroups in the way occupations are perceived and valued. For instance, Zhou (2005) found that a person’s education, race, and gender impact the way they rate an occupation’s prestige. Furthermore, Lynn and Ellerbach (2017) showed that a person’s level of education influences the degree of consensus they exhibit around occupational prestige, with higher-educated individuals exhibiting greater consensus than less-educated ones. In addition, they demonstrated that higher-educated people place more of an emphasis on an occupation’s education when assessing its prestige. Most recently, Gauchat and Andrews (2018) examined scientific prestige and credibility related to the occupations of seven “expert” professions such as “economist” and “sociologist,” finding that a person’s gender, race, and social class shape how they perceive these jobs. Within medical professions specifically, Hinze (1999) finds that some women in medicine, though aware of a “dominant” prestige hierarchy in which “interventionist” specialties like surgery and internal medicine are at the top, resisted this hierarchy. As one female psychiatrist was quoted in that study, "women in medicine tend not to buy into that [view of the hierarchy] as much" (pp. 223).

Second, recent work has established that a number of other criteria beyond job requirements and rewards are important in shaping how prestigious an occupation is judged to be. Two studies have established the importance of an occupation's relationship to formal knowledge, authority, and science for its prestige (Zhou 2005; Gauchat and Andrews 2018; see also Hinze 1999). Further work has shown that a job's gender composition (see Chapter 2 of this dissertation) and racial composition (see Chapter 3 of this dissertation) are important factors impacting how prestigious it is rated. It seems that the materialist logic is not sufficient for capturing how people make judgments of occupational prestige. We now know that a number of occupational characteristics play a role in how people assign worth in the hierarchy of work; a job's requirements (educational/training requirement) and rewards (pay or salary) matter, but so too do a job's relationship to science/formal knowledge, and the degree to which a job is gendered and racialized.

In addition to this new crop of evidence challenging the assumptions of occupational homoarchy and the materialist logic, limitations in terms of data and analytic techniques also give reason to question the notion that everyone uses a single, materialist logic – and does so in the same way – to evaluate an occupation's worth.

Much of the prior research investigating this process has relied on data from the twentieth century. Indeed, the National Opinion Research Center (NORC) conducted occupational prestige modules in 1947, 1964, and 1989, and occupation-level characteristics were often taken from much earlier censuses (i.e. for studying the 1989 ratings, researchers tend to rely on 1970 occupational data – e.g. Lynn and Ellerbach 2017). Some research on occupational prestige has relied on non-representative samples (e.g. Freeland and Hoey 2018). Still others analyze aggregate occupational prestige scores that are averaged across entire populations (e.g. Treiman 1977). These shortcomings may have obfuscated the extent to which variations occur within and between societies in terms of occupational prestige. Meanwhile, new approaches and techniques for assessing the potential plurality of hierarchies in terms of tastes, preferences, attitudes, and beliefs have emerged in the sociology of culture and cognition.

4.3 The Emergence of the Heterarchy Perspective from the Sociology of Culture and Cognition

In the post-Parsons era, the study of culture has revealed the many ways in which means *and* ends can vary within a single society (c.f. Swidler 1986, 2001; DiMaggio 1997; Harding 2007; Lizardo and Strand 2010; Patterson 2014). Cultural sociology has tended to focus its lens on social differences in tastes, preferences, attitudes, and beliefs (Spillman 2002). Nevertheless, a part of this new perspective on culture has been the emergence of the idea that there are also social differences in *perceptions of the status order*. Pierre Bourdieu, arguably the foundational theorist of cultural sociology (Lizardo 2012), was among the first to postulate the existence of different mental structures (what he termed "habitus") between social classes. While most social scientists have attended to Bourdieu's observation that class-based socialization creates different patterns of cultural comportment and consumption, less attention has been paid to his observation that social position also creates different views of the status hierarchy. As Bourdieu succinctly wrote in *Distinction,* "people's image of the classification [structure] is a function of their position within it" (1984:473).

A few cultural sociologists have picked up on this idea that there are multiple logics for conferring worth within a single society. Lamont (1992, 2000) investigated the different ways that French and Americans of divergent social class backgrounds confer worth to various social groups. Sauder (2006) found evidence for historical variation in logics: the organizing principles of law school prestige have changed over time as third-party organizations such as U.S. News and World Report rankings become more prominent. Specific to the realm of work, Stark (2012) showed that there can be competing criteria of worth within a single firm, leading to a sense of dissonance. Despite the burgeoning idea from the sociology of culture and cognition that there are multiple logics of valuation in various domains of social life, no study has fully tested this possibility in the realm of occupations. Furthermore, no study has inductively assessed the logic(s) of occupational prestige judgments using up-to-date data and tools (though see Abbott 1981 for an earlier incarnation).

In addition to theoretical insights about how and why heterarchy likely occurs, cultural sociology also provides some tools for measuring logics. Given that the field has historically sought to examine how people make evaluations – what kinds of music they like, what kind of art they prefer, etc. –, this has led to a robust debate among scholars about the *organizing principles* behind these evaluations (Lamont 2012). Do people distinguish between "high brow" and "low brow" art forms (Bourdieu 1984)? Or are some people "omnivores" – preferring lots of genres and cuisines, while others are "univores" – preferring only one or two (Peterson 1992; Peterson and Kern 1996; Johnston and Baumann 2007)?

Though often focused on tastes, preferences, and consumption related to art, the media, and other cultural objects, the cultural sociology approach for assessing how people make judgments remains a useful analytic framework for understanding the judgment and decision-making process more generally (Vaisey and Valentino 2018). This is therefore an approach that can be easily applied to the study of judgments of *occupational prestige*. Indeed, a number of recent advances in analytical methods, such as Relational Class Analysis (Goldberg 2011) and Correlational Class Analysis (Boutyline 2017), have enabled finer-grained, inductive investigations of how people make judgments. Rather than simply – and deductively – looking at correlations across or between populations in terms of how they rate occupational prestige, as previous research has tended to do, these new tools enable researchers to examine in greater detail how people perceive prestige.

A drawback to these approaches, however, is that they rely on an examination of the relations between cultural *objects* themselves, rather than between cultural *logics*—that is, the cultural meaning structures (Mohr 1998).[5] To pinpoint the logic(s) of occupational prestige, we need to understand *whether and how people use different (or the same) criteria (i.e. occupational characteristics) when making occupational prestige judgments*. We therefore need (1) a method that enables this type of analysis, as well as (2) recent data on both occupational prestige judgments, the people making those judgments, and the characteristics of those occupations. This will then allow us to evaluate whether there is one single logic or whether there are multiple logics for perceiving the occupational hierarchy, as well as what the(se) logic(s) look like in practice.

4.4 Data and Analytic Approach

To test whether the occupational hierarchy is best described as a homoarchy or a heterarchy, I rely on the most recently-released NORC module for occupational prestige – and the only one known to be available with national data on prestige judgments from the twenty-first century. These data were collected in 2012 as part of the General Social

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[5] Following the institutional logics literature (March and Olsen 2006; Meyer and Rowan 1977), I define a *cultural logic* as a mental recipe for making an evaluation.

Survey's (GSS) in-person rotating panel (see Smith and Son 2014 for methodological details on the data collection process). The module was intended to facilitate the creation of new occupational prestige codes for each occupation in the GSS, but I obtained the raw prestige ratings from NORC since I am interested in the *process* of how these evaluations are made. For the rating task, GSS respondents (N = 1,001) were asked to perform a card-sorting task in which they were provided a ballot of 90 occupations[6] and a "ladder" with 9 slots (labeled 1-9) into which they were instructed to place the occupations based on their "social standing," with 1 being the lowest and 9 being the highest. Respondents were informed that they could place as many occupations into a single slot as they saw fit; thus these occupational prestige judgments truly reflect *ratings* rather than *rankings.*

I also link the occupational prestige *raters* to their demographic characteristics in the GSS, which is important for assessing the extent to which a person's logic of occupational prestige is linked to their social position. Social position variables fall into four main categories: (1) *basic demographics* (including gender, race, education level, household income, and age), (2) *work-related factors* (including current work status, whether the respondent has ever worked, and the job sector of their current occupation), (3) *cultural characteristics* (including religion, religiosity, political views, and political

[6] Respondents were randomly assigned one of twelve ballots, each containing 70 occupations. All respondents were also asked to rate 20 "core" occupations, for a total of 90 occupations per person.

party), and (4) *geographic residence* (including census region and urbanicity). Descriptive statistics for the raters on these variables are presented in Table 11 below. Continuous variables (education level, household income, age, political views) are presented with ranges, means, and standard deviations, while categorical variables (gender, race, work status, ever worked, current job sector, religion, religiosity, political party, census region, urbanicity) are presented with their categories and proportions.

Table 11: Demographic characteristics of prestige raters (N=1,001).

Continuous variables	Range	Mean, SD
Education level (years)	0 to 20	13.738 (2.985)
Household income (dollars, logged)	0 to 150,000	58,109.43 (42,652.30)
Age (years)	22 to 89	51.633 (16.326)
Conservatism (scale)	1 to 7	4.127 (1.419)
Categorical variables	**Categories**	**Proportion**
Gender	Male	.449
	Female	.551
Race	White	.796
	Black	.143
	Hispanic	.026
	Asian	.026
	Native American	.008
Work status	Working less than full-time (or not at all)	.527
	Working full time	.474
Ever worked	No	.013
	Yes	.987
Job sector	Management, Business, Science, and Arts	.362
	Service	.171
	Sales and Office	.245
	Natural Resources,	.083

	Construction, and Maintenance	
	Production, Transportation, and Material Moving	.139
Religion	Protestant	.532
	Catholic	.202
	Jewish	.019
	None	.176
	Other Christian	.045
	Other (not Christian)	.025
Religiosity	Attends once a month or less	.611
	Attends more than once a month	.389
Political party affiliation	Democrat	.494
	Independent	.153
	Republican	.353
Census region	New England	.030
	Middle Atlantic	.107
	East North Central	.190
	West North Central	.063
	South Atlantic	.226
	East South Central	.041
	West South Central	.093
	Mountain	.087
	Pacific	.164
Urbanicity	Rural/suburban	.525
	Urban	.476

Equally important to obtaining a national sample of *raters* is obtaining a comprehensive sample of *occupations*. Raters were asked to provide judgments of occupational prestige for a total of 860 occupations, spanning the job titles of the standard occupational classification system (Bureau of Labor Statistics 2018). I then matched the occupational titles people rated to occupation-level characteristics for each job. I obtained these data from federal sources, attempting to gather occupational characteristics from as close to 2012 as possible. Based on the prior work on factors shown to impact occupational prestige evaluations, I collected data on each occupation's industry (as a proxy for scientificity), level of education/training needed to perform the job (as a measure for occupational requirements), mean pay for incumbents working in that job (as a measure of occupational rewards), percentage of women (since prior work has shown that more gender-segregated jobs reap higher prestige [Chapter 2]), and percentage of workers who are white (as a measure of racial composition, also shown to positively influence prestige for some raters [Chapter 3]). Descriptive statistics for the occupations on these variables are presented in Table 12 below, as well as the data source from which that variable was taken. Continuous variables (required education/training, pay, and % white) are presented with ranges, means, and standard deviations, while the categorical variables (gender segregation, industry) are presented with their categories and proportions.

Table 12: Characteristics of occupations and data source (N=860).

Continuous variables	Source	Description	Range	Mean, SD
Required education/ training	ONET 2012	"Job zone" (index of Specific Vocational Preparation and degree)	1 to 5	2.846 (1.051)
Pay	Bureau of Labor Statistics 2012	Mean pay in $1,000s	18.72 to 230.54	52.375 (29.441)
Racial composition	ACES EEO 2006-2010	% white	41.3 to 95.2	74.706 (9.246)
Categorical variables	**Source**	**Description**	**Categories**	**Proportion**
Gender segregation	ACES EEO 2006-2010	Segregated if < 20% female or > 75% female	Segregated	.446
			Integrated	.554
Industry	2012 North American Industry Classification System	Proxy for scientificity	Management,	.094
			Business and Financial Operations	.046
			Computer and Mathematical	.022
			Architecture and Engineering	.028
			Life, Physical, and Social Science	.034
			Community and Social Service	.015
			Legal	.007
			Education, Training, and Library	.022
			Arts, Design, Entertainment,	.039

Sports, and Media	
Healthcare Practitioners and Technical	.051
Healthcare Support	.017
Protective Service	.034
Food Preparation and Serving Related	.022
Building and Grounds Cleaning and Maintenance	.009
Personal Care and Service	.040
Sales and Related	.044
Office and Administrative Support	.087
Farming, Fishing, and Forestry	.025
Construction and Extraction	0.062
Installation, Maintenance, and Repair	.059
Production	.157
Transportation and Material Moving	.078
Military	.007

As I have argued, the homoarchy and heterarchy perspectives imply different *logics* of occupational prestige. The homoarchy perspective predicts that everyone evaluates prestige the same way, following a materialist logic. The heterarchy perspective predicts that there are multiple logics, potentially including – but not limited to – a materialist logic. In particular, we need a method to capture *systematic variation* in the way people perceive the occupational status hierarchy based on the way they use particular feature(s) of occupations in their judgments. Latent Class Regression (LCR) is an analytic technique well suited for inductively uncovering these different patterns. LCR groups people into latent classes based on how similar they are in terms of regression coefficients related to an outcome (Vermunt and Magidson 2016). These regression coefficients are, in this case, the weights and valences of occupational characteristics (the variables from Table 12) in a person-specific regression that specifies how they make occupational prestige judgments. The LCR model simultaneously estimates both those weights and valences *as well as* a person's likelihood of membership in a given class, based on their person-level characteristics like social position (in this case, the variables from Table 11). The outcome is within-person standardized occupation ratings, thus eliminating any differences between raters in terms of scale usage. I standardize continuous occupational variables for ease of comparison. Additionally, all models include ballot fixed effects to account for any benchmarking based on the particular slate of occupations a respondent was asked to rate.

The principal way I adjudicate between the homoarchy and heterarchy perspectives is by comparing model fit between a one-class model solution – one that presumes that everyone follows a single logic when making prestige judgments – and solutions with more than one class. I rely on the parsimonious Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) to assess model fit (Raftery 1995). After a close examination of the resultant logic(s) from the best-fitting model, I then use the posterior probabilities of class membership to investigate the extent to which social position shapes the logic a person uses for perceiving occupational prestige.

4.5 Findings

I begin by assessing the number of logics that best fit the occupational prestige ratings from the 1,001 GSS respondents. I conducted five rounds of analysis with different covariate (person-level characteristics) specifications. These specifications were: (1) a ballot effects only model, (2) a model with ballot effects plus basic demographic characteristics like gender, race, age, and class, (3) a model with ballot effects plus basic demographic characteristics, and work-related variables like work status and job sector, (4) a model with ballot effects plus basic demographic characteristics, work-related variables, and cultural factors like religion and political views, and (5) a model with ballot effects plus basic demographic characteristics, work-related variables, cultural factors, and geographic residence variables, like census region and urbanicity. As shown in Figure 12, regardless of specification, a solution with more than one class is always better-fitting, strong evidence in favor of the heterarchy perspective.

Since smaller BIC values indicate a better-fitting model, we can see that all specifications markedly improve between a single-logic model and the multiple-logic models. A BIC difference of greater than 10 is considered "very strong evidence" in favor of the model with the smaller BIC value (Raftery 1995:139). The differences observed between the one-class model and the multi-class models approach or exceed 8,000. For each specification, the open circle in Figure 12 indicates the best-fitting model overall. While the best-fitting model occurs with ballot effects specification and is a six-class solution, I will present results from the most comprehensive specification (one with ballot effects, basic demographics, work-related variables, cultural factors, and geographic residence), which is a four-class solution.



Figure 12: Model fit for single-logic (homoarchy) and multiple-logic (heterarchy) hierarchies of occupational prestige judgments.

What do these four logics look like? Table 13 below shows how the criteria (weights and valences) of the occupational characteristics are used in each of the four logics.

Table 13: Criteria across logics.

Criterion	Logic 1	Logic 2	Logic 3	Logic 4
Occupation's required education/training	.242*** (.010)	.163*** (.014)	.061 (.033)	-.260*** (.030)
Occupation's mean pay	.330*** (.008)	.248*** (.021)	-.015 (.026)	-.274*** (.024)
% white in occupation	.067*** (.005)	.035*** (.009)	.010 (.013)	-.032 (.020)
Gender segregation	.013 (.012)	.044* (.020)	.109* (.053)	-.059 (.053)
R^2	.498	.260	.047	.373

NOTE: N = 992. * p < .05 ** p < .01 *** p < .001. Robust standard errors shown in parentheses.

Firstly, we can see that there is substantial variation in terms of whether – and how – these occupational characteristics are used in the prestige judgment process. Let us begin by assessing the two key criteria that make up the *materialist* logic: occupational requirements (education/training) and rewards (mean pay). Logics one and two place a large relative importance on occupational requirements and pay, though this is more the case for logic one than for logic two, as evidenced by the larger effect sizes of these variables in logic one. Logic three does not rely on an occupation's requirements or rewards. Logic four places a large relative importance on occupational requirements and pay, but in a *negative* way, such that the more an occupation pays or the higher degree or training required, the lower in prestige it is judged to be.

Next, I turn to the non-materialist criteria that reflect how gendered and racialized an occupation is: its proportion of white workers and whether or not it is gender-segregated. Logic one rewards whiter jobs, but does not take into account gender composition. Logic two relies on both the race and gender composition criteria: raters award more prestige to whiter occupations and those jobs which are more gender-segregated. Logic three offers the greatest prestige reward for gender-segregated work, but does not rely on a job's racial composition. Logic four does not rely on either.

We can also see from the variation among classes in terms of their R-squared that some classes' judgment process is well-described by these occupational criteria, and others are not. Logic one is relatively well explained by these criteria, with 49.8% of variation in ratings explained by these occupational characteristics. Logic four is also relatively well explained, with 37.3% of ratings accounted for by these criteria. Logic two is somewhat less well described by these criteria, with 26.0% of variance in ratings explained. The occupational prestige judgment process of those using logic three, on the other hand, is *not* very well captured by occupational requirements, rewards, industry, and gender and racial composition, with only 4.7% of variation in prestige explained by any of these characteristics.

To get a better sense of the content of the logics, I also present the hierarchy for each class in two ways: first by industry, and second by examining the "top five" and "bottom five" occupations in each logic's classification system. Table 14 below shows the hierarchy of industry for each of the four logics.

Table 14: Industry rankings by logic.

Logic 1	Logic 2	Logic 3	Logic 4
Arts, Design, Entertainment, Sports, and Media	Military	Healthcare Practitioners and Technical	Building and Grounds Cleaning and Maintenance
Education, Training, and Library	Education, Training, and Library	Education, Training, and Library	Management
Architecture and Engineering	Healthcare Practitioners and Technical	Military	Sales and Related
Military	Healthcare Support	Architecture and Engineering	Construction and Extraction
Life, Physical, and Social Science	Protective Service	Protective Service	Installation, Maintenance, and Repair
Healthcare Practitioners and Technical	Architecture and Engineering	Construction and Extraction	Production
Community and Social Service	Life, Physical, and Social Science	Transportation and Material Moving	Transportation and Material Moving
Computer and Mathematical	Community and Social Service	Building and Grounds Cleaning and Maintenance	Business and Financial Operations
Healthcare Support	Legal	Healthcare Support	Personal Care and Service
Protective Service	Computer and Mathematical	Community and Social Service	Farming, Fishing, and Forestry
Legal	Arts, Design, Entertainment, Sports, and Media	Life, Physical, and Social Science	Food Preparation and Serving Related
Business and Financial Operations	Office and Administrative Support	Production	Computer and Mathematical

Food Preparation and Serving Related	Transportation and Material Moving	Farming, Fishing, and Forestry	Office and Administrative Support
Farming, Fishing, and Forestry	Business and Financial Operations	Food Preparation and Serving Related	Legal
Office and Administrative Support	Installation, Maintenance, and Repair	Management	Life, Physical, and Social Science
Personal Care and Service	Farming, Fishing, and Forestry	Computer and Mathematical	Community and Social Service
Production	Construction and Extraction	Installation, Maintenance, and Repair	Healthcare Practitioners and Technical
Transportation and Material Moving	Production	Office and Administrative Support	Arts, Design, Entertainment, Sports, and Media
Management	Food Preparation and Serving Related	Arts, Design, Entertainment, Sports, and Media	Healthcare Support
Installation, Maintenance, and Repair	Personal Care and Service	Personal Care and Service	Architecture and Engineering
Construction and Extraction	Management	Business and Financial Operations	Education, Training, and Library
Sales and Related	Building and Grounds Cleaning and Maintenance	Legal	Protective Service
Building and Grounds Cleaning and Maintenance	Sales and Related	Sales and Related	Military

We can see in Table 14 that logic 1 is characterized at the top of its hierarchy by occupations that are relatively high in cultural capital (e.g. arts, design, entertainment, sports, and media; education, training, library; architecture and engineering), with service jobs as well as blue collar jobs at the bottom (e.g. installation, maintenance, and repair; construction and extraction; building and grounds cleaning and maintenance). Logic 2, by contrast, rewards "helping" industries like the military; education, training, library; and healthcare occupations with the most prestige, and is least rewarding of service jobs as well as occupations in the sales industry and management jobs. Logic 3 also rewards "helping" industries like healthcare; education, training, library; and military, but also places some traditional blue collar-type jobs, like protective service; construction and extraction; and transportation and material moving toward the top of its hierarchy. At the bottom of its hierarchy are some traditional white collar-type jobs: sales and related, legal, and business and financial operations. Finally, logic 4 places some traditional blue collar jobs as well as white collar jobs at its apex, such as building and ground cleaning and maintenance, management, and construction and extraction, while at the bottom are military; protective service; and education, training, library occupations.

The second way to illustrate these four logics is by looking at specific job titles that were rated at the very top and bottom of the occupational hierarchy by each logic.

Table 15 below shows these five most prestigious and five least prestigious occupations for raters of each of the four logics.

Table 15: Top and bottom occupations in each hierarchy.

	Logic 1	**Logic 2**	**Logic 3**	**Logic 4**
Top 5	Surgeon Physician Member of the board of directors of a large corporation Mayor of a large city Professor of physics	Surgeon Physician Professor of physics Mayor of a large city Obstetrician/ gynecologist	Biomedical engineer Priest Oil-well driller Registered nurse Surgeon	Carpet cutter for a rug manufacturer Poker room supervisor Grocery bagger Dormitory counselor Key maker
Bottom 5	Soda jerk Table clearer in a restaurant Counter clerk in a fast food place Egg crate packer Grocery bagger	Telephone solicitor Cloth dyer Leaflet distributor Parking lot attendant Soda jerk	Door-to-door salesman Loan officer Video game repairer in an arcade Telephone solicitor Lobbyist	Physicist Professor of business administration TV director Electrical engineer Clergyman

How different or distinct are these logics? Figure 13 below plots the logics relative to one another. We can see that logics 1 and 2 are very similar in how they rate occupations (Pearson correlation of .966). Logics 1 and 3 are much less similar (Pearson correlation of .412), and Logics 1 and 4 are strikingly inverted in their relationship to one another (Pearson correlation of -.985). Logics 2 and 3 are slightly more similar than Logics 1 and 3 (Pearson correlation of .570), and, unsurprisingly, logics 2 and 4 are also highly inversely related (Pearson correlation of -.985). Finally, logics 3 and 4 are somewhat negatively related (Pearson correlation of -.496). Thus, while logics 1 and 2 indistinguishable from one another in terms of rating, logics 3 and 4 are unique from this logic.



Figure 13: Scatterplot matrix of logics.

What are the differences, if any, between logics 1 and 2? Figure 13 demonstrates that their pattern of *rating* is similar, but perhaps they pattern of *ranking* is different. A Wilcoxon signed-rank test indicates that this is indeed the case (z=-2.176, p < . 05). To further explore where these ranking differences lie, I examined the 15 occupations with the largest difference in ranking between the two logics (shown below in Table 16). We can see that a distinguishing feature of logic 1 is that it rewards cultural occupations with a much higher ranking than logic 2. Seven out of 13 occupations which received higher prestige in logic 1 are culturally-related: member of a rock band, drama therapist, ballet dancer, disc jockey, restaurant critic, theatrical agent, and jazz musician. These occupations are relatively high in prestige for logic 1 (all falling above the median) and relatively low in prestige for logic 2 (all but one, jazz musician, are below the median).

Table 16: Differences in prestige rankings between logics 1 and 2.

Occupation	Ranking in logic 1	Ranking in logic 2
Lobbyist	**149**	698
Member of a rock band	**260**	797
Drama therapist	**318**	757
Currency sorter in a bank	725	**306**
Public opinion pollster	**345**	719
Ballet dancer	**156**	524
Advertising salesman	**349**	712
Disc jockey	**387**	728
Restaurant critic for a newspaper	**227**	567
Manager of a commercial bakery	**234**	573
Theatrical agent	**206**	535
General manager of a moving and storage company	**383**	711
Jazz musician	**103**	416
Tax collector	**301**	612

Owner of a mail order house	**257**	565

NOTE: Bold indicates logic for which the ranking is higher.

We can describe the similarities/differences between all four logics by examining a handful of occupations in particular to see where they fall in each hierarchy. First I will consider a typical, white collar profession: "lawyer." For logic 1, lawyer is a very prestigious job, ranking 20th out of 860 occupations in their hierarchy. For logic 2, lawyer is also a prestigious job, though not quite as highly ranked – 44th for them. For logic 3, lawyer is a job very low in social standing – ranking 751st. Finally, for logic 4, lawyer is also very low in prestige – though not quite as low as it is for logic 3 – at 666th. Next, I will consider a typical, blue collar profession: "janitor." For logic 1, janitor is one of the least prestigious occupations in their hierarchy, ranking 833rd. Janitor is also low-prestige – though not quite as low on the hierarchy – for logic 2, at 804th. For logic 3, janitor ranks 407th, right in the middle of their hierarchy. Finally, for logic 4, janitor is a fairly honorable job, ranked 61st. This reinforces the similarities between logics 1 and 2 – which, though very alike, are slightly different in their *rankings* – as well as their distinctiveness vis-à-vis logics 3 and 4.

Having now explored the particular contours of the hierarchy of each logic in greater detail, we are better able to characterize them. Logic 1 can be described as a *cultural capitalist* logic that valorizes jobs in the arts sectors and those requiring the highest level of education, and with few minority incumbents. Logic 2 can be described as a *traditionalist* logic that valorizes helping jobs and those with moral authority, as well as white and gender-segregated occupations. Logic 3 can be described as a *blue collar* logic that valorizes occupations that are not necessarily high in requirements or rewards but which, nonetheless, are common and attainable professions and jobs characterized by a high degree of gender segregation. Finally, logic 4 can be described as an *inverted* logic that represents an upside-down image of the traditional materialist logic, as it devalues jobs with the highest requirements and rewards.[7]

What is the distribution of raters into logics, and, most importantly, who uses which logic? I turn now to class membership as defined by a GSS respondent's posterior probability. This probability is a calculation of each rater's likelihood of belonging to a given class, and I therefore sort raters into classes based on the highest class of probability assigned to them by the best-fitting LCR model. Out of the 14 covariates tested among the four categories, six varied significantly between classes at the $p < .05$ level, and two additional covariates vary at the $p < .10$ level, suggesting that these are

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[7] I conducted supplementary tests to evaluate whether the GSS respondents using the *inverted logic* were potentially confused, purposely answering incorrectly, and/or interviewed incorrectly. In fact, when constructing the latest GSS prestige scores, these respondents' ratings were likely tossed out, as Smith and Son (2014) concluded that a subset of individuals who rated seemingly low-prestige occupations the highest must have erroneously performed the card-sorting task. I found little evidence for such mistakes, however, among this group. *Inverted* logic-using respondents do not differ significantly from the respondents in logics 2 or 3 in terms of how well the GSS interviewer rated their comprehension of the interview (they did, however, score significantly lower than logic 1 in terms of comprehension). *Inverted* logic-using respondents do not differ significantly from the other respondents in terms of how cooperative the GSS interviewer rated them during the interview. Finally, respondents using the *inverted* logic were not confined to one "bad" GSS interviewer. There were 18 total GSS interviewers for these 30 respondents, and no interviewer conducted interviews with more than 4 respondents from this group.

important characteristics which uniquely define class membership.[8] Table 17 below reports Wald chi-square tests and results for these covariates across logics.

Table 17: Covariates across logics.

Covariate	Wald chi-square	Cultural capitalist	Tradition-alist	Blue collar	Inverted
White	73.463***	.857	.720	.783	.867
Black		.089	.192	.166	.100
Hispanic		.010	.042	.026	.033
Asian		.036	.028	.000	.000
Native American		.003	.010	.017	.000
Female	11.497**	.608	.540	.396	.667
Male		.392	.460	.604	.334
Mean education (years)	31.013***	14.952	12.858	12.353	13.036
Income (dollars)	22.737***	$45,000	$32,500	$18,750	$23,750
Mean age	7.179+	50.193	51.432	56.906	48.973
Catholic	73.908***	.180	.236	.171	.167
Protestant		.502	.531	.558	.667
Other Christian		.038	.057	.042	.000
Jewish		.036	.008	.000	.033
Other (not Christian)		.027	.029	.010	.000
None		.208	.134	.212	.133
Attends religious services once a month or less	6.937+	.584	.626	.621	.700
Attends religious services more than monthly		.416	.374	.379	.300
New England	181.531***	0.052	0.009	0.018	0.033
Middle Atlantic		0.123	0.100	0.057	0.234
East North Central		0.143	0.179	0.344	0.166
West North Central		0.061	0.081	0.037	0.000

[8] Ballot was also significantly different across logics, indicating that ballot effects shaped prestige judgments as well. These results are not shown to conserve space.

South Atlantic	0.251	0.212	0.224	0.067
East South Central	0.035	0.048	0.023	0.133
West South Central	0.064	0.105	0.106	0.267
Mountain	0.104	0.095	0.035	0.033
Pacific	0.168	0.170	0.158	0.067
Proportion of sample	.418	.400	.152	.030

Proportions are presented for categorical variables, and means are presented for continuous ones. Only covariates which varied significantly are shown in Table 17 – there were no significant differences in terms of work status, ever worked, job sector, political party, political views, or urbanicity across classes, suggesting that these factors do not shape the logic of occupational prestige a rater uses. The *cultural capitalist* logic is the most commonly used, with 41.8% (417 raters) employing it. The *traditionalist* logic is also relatively common, with 40.0% of users (399 raters). The *blue collar* logics was less common, at 15.2% (146 raters). The *inverted* logic was comparatively rare, with only 3% of users (30 raters).[9]

In terms of race, we can see that the *cultural capitalist* and *inverted* logics are relatively more white compared to other logics. The *traditionalist* logic is relatively more Black, Hispanic, Asian, and Native American. As for gender, *cultural capitalist* and *inverted* logics also evince the highest proportion of female raters, while the *blue collar* logic has the highest proportion of male raters. Unsurprisingly, the *cultural capitalist*

[9] Nine raters (slightly less than 1% of the sample) rated every occupation identically – as a flat (non-) hierarchy. Those raters were excluded from these analyses, but could also be considered a separate and unique logic. Their extreme scarcity, however, means this perception of the occupational hierarchy is likely exceedingly rare, and I therefore refrain from discussing it here.

logic has the highest level of education among its raters, with the *blue collar* logic having the least-educated raters. Similarly, *cultural capitalist* logic users have the highest income of all groups, while *blue collar* logic users have the lowest income. Those espousing the *blue collar* logic are also the oldest raters, whereas those espousing the *inverted* logic are the youngest.

In terms of religion, the *cultural capitalist* and *blue collar* logics have the most raters who do not subscribe to a particular religion, while the *traditionalist* logic has the fewest non-identifying individuals. Yet *cultural capitalist* logic users are the most likely to attend a religious service at least once a month, while *inverted* users are the least likely to do so. Finally, there is substantial variation geographically in terms of how the region in which a person lives in shapes their logic. The *cultural capitalist* logic in particular enjoys greater usage among the East and West coasts, while the *blue collar* logic is more likely to be used from those among the Midwest and Gulf Coast states. The *inverted* logic has relatively high proportions of those from the South. We can therefore conclude that a person's social position – in particular their race, gender, education, income, age, religion, religiosity, and geographic region – shapes which logic they are most likely to use when perceiving the occupational hierarchy.

4.6 Discussion

This study's primary aim was to assess whether the occupational hierarchy is best described as a homoarchy – a hierarchy organized by a singular principle in which occupations are valued based on their requirements and rewards – or as a heterarchy – a hierarchy organized by multiple principles in which different people use various evaluation criteria, and in different ways, to accord prestige. Using 2012 data of nationally-representative judgments of occupational prestige, linked to federal occupation-level data, I tested these two frameworks through the inductive analytic technique of Latent Class Regression. The results provided strong support for the heterarchy perspective: the best-fitting model is one in which there are *multiple* logics of evaluation at work in the occupational prestige judgment process, not just a single logic. This finding was robust to alternative covariate specifications. Moreover, I found that which logic a person uses in the occupational prestige judgment process is a function of their social position, echoing Bourdieu's insight that "people's image of the classification [structure] is a function of their position within it" (1984:473).

While the stratification literature has tended to presume that occupational prestige is the result of a materialist logic in which jobs with the highest requirements and rewards reap the greatest prestige, I did not find evidence that contemporary Americans employ this logic. Instead, I found that people tend to make prestige judgments through either a *cultural capitalist* logic, a *traditionalist* logic, a *blue collar* logic, or an *inverted* logic. The cultural capitalist logic valorizes occupations in the arts sector, and those with high educational requirements, and fewer minorities. This logic was well explained by the occupational criteria, and is the most commonly used. Those who employ this logic tend to be white, female, and are the most well-educated and highest-earning of all logics. They are either mainline Christian or not religious at all, attend religious services frequently, and tend to dwell on the Coasts. The traditionalist logic rewards helping industries like the military, educational sectors, or health care jobs, and is also relatively well explained by the occupational criteria from this study. Its adherents are more likely to be ethnoracial minorities, and are evenly split between men and women. Its users are the most religiously identified, especially true for Catholics.

The blue collar logic does not rely on an occupation's education or pay to determine its prestige. In this view, the top of the hierarchy is made up of occupations that are more gender-segregated. It is the least well-explained logic out of the four, suggesting it may either reflect a general lack of consensus about occupational prestige for those using it (Lynn and Ellerbach 2017), or that it may simply be less organized as a classification principle compared to other logics (Boutyline and Vaisey 2017). Adherents of this logic are likely white or Black in race, are the most likely to be men compared to all other logics, and are the oldest. They are the lowest in terms of education and earnings. They are also more likely than users of other logics to live in the Midwest and the Gulf Coast states. In some ways, this logic resembles the valuation of manual labor – as opposed to mental labor – that Willis (1977) found in his study among the working class "lads" of countercultural England.

Finally, the inverted logic accords prestige to occupations with the lowest education and pay. The "inversion" of the materialist criteria is suggestive of a resistance to the "conventional" hierarchy, like that found among women in Hinze's (1999) study of the medical professions. This logic is relatively well explained by these occupational characteristics, and tends to place at the top of its hierarchy business industries like sales and management. Compared to the three other logics, it is the whitest, and has the most women. People who use this logic are relatively well-educated, so their resistance is not the product of isolation from mainstream institutions (Wilson 1996; see also Young 2004). People using the inverted logic are the youngest, and many live in the South.

Overall, then, we see that there is some resemblance between the cultural capitalist and traditionalist logics to the materialist logic. Both of these logics *do* positively reward occupations with prestige when they are high educational/training requirements and pay, just as the materialist logic was presumed to operate. Nevertheless, they *also* rely on non-materialist criteria to assess where occupations fit in the hierarchy, such as a job's gender composition or racial composition. Furthermore, two logics – the blue collar logic and the inverted logic – contrast sharply with the materialist logic, either rewarding occupations with *lower* requirements and rewards with prestige, or eschewing these criteria altogether in their organization of the occupational hierarchy. These two logics are used by 18.2% of respondents, suggesting that these are not uncommon views of how work should be valued in the U.S.

4.7 Conclusions and Implications

What does occupational heterarchy mean for a society? The presence of multiple logics of evaluation invites *classification struggles*. These are conflicts to define whose logic determines the distribution of status and power within a society (Bourdieu 1984; Lamont 1992). I would therefore expect that adherence to a particular logic of occupational hierarchy is predictive of how someone interacts with various institutions, such as museums, doctors or hospitals, and whether they regularly go to the polling booth. This is an important area for future research, and represents a potential new dimension to the notion of a "worldview" (Geertz 1957). Given that worldviews shape attitudes and behaviors, it is plausible that different conceptions of the status hierarchy likely shape attitudes and behaviors as well (Vaisey 2009).

For work on inequality and stratification, the presence of an occupational heterarchy suggests that inequality is reproduced in the U.S. partly because different people view – and navigate – the status hierarchy differently, depending on their social position. It is not so much that the less-advantaged in society develop *amor fati* (resigning themselves to their fate), as Bourdieu (1984:243) presumed. Instead, inequality likely occurs in part because people are pursuing different *ends* altogether, with different ideas of what those ends *mean*.

Specific to the concept of occupational prestige, researchers should acknowledge the fact that prestige ratings are likely *not* widely shared measures of subjective social standing. A particular occupation will convey an entirely different meaning to different people. As I have shown, a lawyer is seen as a very honorable occupation to someone under the *cultural capitalist* logic, but is considered thoroughly deplorable to someone using the *blue collar* logic; a janitor is seen as a very honorable occupation to someone under the *inverted* logic and a very low-prestige occupation to someone under the *traditionalist* logic. We can no longer assume that the occupational hierarchy mirrors social scientists' classificatory logic – a logic that places highly-educated, scientific occupations such as our own at the top. Indeed, the answer to the question, "what is a good job?" depends, in fact, on a person's own social position, and we social scientists are no exception to this heterarchy.

5. Conclusions

The work we do provides us with more than just a paycheck. It also gives us power and authority in and out of the workplace – symbolic resources often referred to as *status*. Even though social scientists have long acknowledged that occupational rewards are both material and symbolic, most research has focused on the former rather than latter. This dissertation set out to correct this imbalance. Using tools from cultural and cognitive sociology, the three studies herein sought to understand how we accord symbolic worth to work, commonly measured as *occupational prestige*. By taking occupational prestige judgments as objects of study in and of themselves, this dissertation has challenged two longstanding assumptions about how occupational status is conferred in the contemporary U.S.

First, it challenged the materialist account of occupational prestige, which posits that an occupation's place in the hierarchy is solely a function of its requirements (education/training) and rewards (pay). Instead, the three studies of this dissertation demonstrate that gender and racial segregation of occupations are also important social facts that shape how prestigious an occupation is judged to be. Second, the dissertation challenged the homoarchy assumption of occupational prestige – that all people perceive the same hierarchy. Each of the three studies of this dissertation has demonstrated that a person's social position colors the way they view the occupational hierarchy, regardless of whether this is approached deductively (Chapters 2 and 3) or inductively (Chapter 4).

What do the findings from this dissertation mean for the way status – and inequality more generally – operate in the occupational structure (and beyond)? There are two sets of implications: one at the individual (rater) level and one at the occupation (worker) level. At the individual level, the considerable systematic and patterned variation in people's views of the occupational status hierarchy is indicative of yet another area in which cultural variation takes place *within* societies. Durkheim and Parsons expected social solidarity to occur in modern societies as a result of shared and commonly-held understandings of occupational roles and the division of labor. Yet the diversity of these cultural meanings I have uncovered here challenges this as the basis of social cohesion and consensus. More concretely, I expect that different beliefs and perceptions about occupational hierarchy are linked to how people perceive and navigate other aspects of society, e.g. how trustworthy they find particular institutions like schools and hospitals or how likely they are to participate in civic and voluntary organizations and elections. If different people have different roadmaps of what society looks like, we should expect that they navigate it in strikingly different ways – and in ways that lead them to very different places.

At the occupation level, the findings here suggest that we should not abandon occupational prestige ratings as merely "'error-prone' estimates of the socioeconomic attributes of occupations" (Featherman and Hauser 1976:405). Instead, occupational prestige judgments reflect and amplify gendered and racialized elements of the labor market. People who work in gender-segregated occupations receive extra status rewards, as do people who work in whiter jobs. This suggests that we should not only observe higher income among incumbents of predominantly-male and predominantly-white occupations, but these workers are also likely able to leverage these privileges into advantages on the marriage market, in the criminal justice system, and even for their own health and well-being. Nevertheless, the heterarchic nature of prestige means that whether or not that status can be activated depends on the particular interaction in which a person finds herself. Indeed, findings from Chapter 4 suggest that each occupation should have *four* distinct occupational prestige scores, and the prestige score that matters depends on the people in a given interaction.

What are the implications of these findings for scholars interested in meanings more generally, such as cultural and cognitive sociologists? This dissertation has offered two conceptual tools that help solve problems for the subfield. First, I have provided an empirical, quantitative way to concretize the key concept of "logics." A logic is generally understood in the subfield as a cognitive recipe for making a judgment or decision. Sociologists of culture have long been interested in capturing the way different people perceive or assess cultural objects, but have lacked an empirical method for doing so. By measuring logics as patterns of weighted criteria, I have shown the various factors that shape occupational prestige judgments, as well as the direction and degree to which those factors matter. This approach to logics can be easily generalized and applied to other types of judgments, such as consumption choices (e.g. tastes in music or food) or sociopolitical attitudes (e.g. preferences in candidates or policies). Second, this approach to logics allows for a straightforward test of the number and kinds of organizing principles at work in a given domain or field. Once a researcher has identified the type of criteria that are salient in a particular field, they can then use the Latent Class Regression technique from Chapter 4 to systematically assess whether or not people use a single logic or multiple logics, as well as how these logics are distributed in the population.

The three studies of this dissertation help us understand how people construct meanings in an increasingly unequal society. As I have shown, these meanings are often built from the raw materials of existing inequities, and the content of these meanings are unevenly distributed across a society. Cultural meanings are part and parcel of how inequality happens. By better understanding the processes that shape these cultural meanings, we can better understand the processes that produce and reproduce inequality.

Appendix

Table 18: Using Kanter's categories of gender ratios.

	Skewed	Tilted
Education / training	.198*** (.008)	.199*** (.008)
Mean pay	.227*** (.008)	.228*** (.008)
Predominantly male[a]	.190*** (.016)	.071*** (.009)
Predominantly female[a]	.064*** (.015)	.127*** (.010)
AIC	204247.3	204624.4
BIC	204591.5	204608.6
Log likelihood	-102086.6	-102095.2
N	81,021	81,021

NOTE: Unit of analysis is individual-occupation rating. [a] Reference category is gender balanced. * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. Ballot fixed effects, industry controls, and intercepts not shown to conserve space (available upon request). Robust standard errors are clustered at the individual-level.

Kanter's (1977) theory of tokenism argued that occupational dynamics are determined, in part, by the proportion of men/women in a given workplace or job. She distinguished between four dynamics: (1) a uniform group, in which all members of the workplace/occupation are of the same gender, (2) a skewed group in which the ratio of genders is 85:15, (3) a tilted group in which the ratio of genders is 65:35, and (4) a balanced group in which the ratio is 50:50. Using these guidelines, I tested the relationship between gender-skew/gender-tilt and prestige. In the "skewed" model, predominantly male occupations are those with 15% or fewer women, while predominantly female occupations are those with more than 85% women. In the "tilted" model, predominantly male occupations are those with 35% or fewer women, while predominantly female occupations are those with 65% or more women.

The overall interaction for the gender-skew variable is statistically significant ($F = 88.95$, $p < .001$), as well as for the gender-tilt variable ($F = 104.11$, $p < .001$). Results of both model specifications show that gender-skewed and gender-tilted occupations experience a prestige boost compared to gender balanced ones.

Table 19: Robustness checks with commonality.

	Original model	With total employed
Education / training	.193*** (.008)	.193*** (.008)
Mean pay	.225*** (.008)	.223*** (.008)
% female	-.053*** (.006)	-.054*** (.006)
% female (squared)	.061*** (.004)	.061*** (.004)
Total employed	-	.009* (.004)
AIC	204184.1	204179.9
BIC	204528.3	204533.4
Log likelihood	-102055.1	-102051.9
N	81,021	81,021

NOTE: Unit of analysis is individual-occupation rating. * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$. Ballot fixed effects, industry controls, and intercepts not shown to conserve space (available upon request). Robust standard errors are clustered at the individual-level.

As a robustness check, I looked at whether gender-segregated occupations were simply more common occupations. I tested this possibility using the total employment figures for each occupation. Results demonstrate that how common a particular occupation is does have a small, positive net effect on prestige, but this effect appears to be orthogonal to that of gender composition, as it does not alter the relationship between % female and prestige.

Table 20: Separate prestige models for male and female raters.

	Men	Women
Education / training	.188*** (.011)	.197*** (.010)
Mean pay	.200*** (.012)	.245*** (.010)
% female	-.091*** (.009)	-.020* (.008)
% female, squared	.063*** (.006)	.060*** (.005)
Log likelihood	-46895.63	-55013.58
N	36,752	44,269

NOTE: Unit of analysis is individual-occupation rating. * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. Ballot fixed effects, industry controls, and intercepts not shown to conserve space (available upon request). Robust standard errors are clustered at the individual-level.

Table 21: Care work as a potential mechanism.

	Original model	With care work
Education / training	.193*** (.008)	.193*** (.008)
Mean pay	.225*** (.008)	.224*** (.008)
% female	-.053*** (.006)	-.053*** (.006)
% female (squared)	.061*** (.004)	.061*** (.004)
Care work	-	.016 (.021)
AIC	204184.1	204185.5
BIC	204528.3	204539
Log likelihood	-102055.1	-102054.7
N	81,021	81,021

NOTE: Unit of analysis is individual-occupation rating. * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. Ballot fixed effects, industry controls, and intercepts not shown to conserve space (available upon request). Robust standard errors are clustered at the individual-level.

Are jobs with more women in them simply jobs that involve servicing, enriching, and developing others? Using a care work variable adapted from England, Budig, and Folbre (2002), I tested this possibility. Results show no significant effect of care work on prestige judgments, and, more importantly, this effect did not in any way alter the relationship between gender composition and prestige.

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Biography

Lauren Valentino is a native North Carolinian who attended Wesleyan University, where she received a B.A. in Sociology (with Honors) and a B.A. in French Studies in 2010. She then studied at the École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales in Paris before beginning her graduate studies at the University of North Carolina (Charlotte). There she earned her M.A. in Sociology in 2013, where she received the Graduate Student Research Award and coauthored four articles pertaining to educational inequality. She began her doctoral studies at Duke University in 2013, where she specialized in culture and inequality/stratification, and earned a Certificate in College Teaching. While at Duke, she coauthored two additional articles: "Being and Becoming Poor: How Cultural Schemas Shape Beliefs About Poverty" in *Social Forces* (2017) and "Culture and Choice: Toward Integrating Cultural Sociology with the Judgment and Decision-Making Sciences" in *Poetics* (2018).

At Duke, Lauren was the recipient of the James B. Duke Fellowship, the Kenan Institute for Ethics Graduate Fellowship, the Vorsanger-Smith Scholar award, and the Graduate Student Teaching award. She was also selected to be an Education and Human Development Scholar, and was awarded two Bass Connections grants and a Graduate School professional development grant. She will receive her Ph.D. in summer 2019, and plans to begin work as a postdoctoral associate at the Kenan Institute for Ethics beginning in fall 2019.