

Does Leaders' Western Education Matter to Authoritarian Regimes' Reform? (1960-2000)

by

Mingzhe Xu

Department of Political Science
Duke University

Date: _____

Approved:

Joseph Grieco, Supervisor

Emerson Niou

Bahar Leventoglu

Thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of
the requirements for the degree of
Master of Arts in the Department of
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ABSTRACT

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Abstract

Journalists and policy makers give the impression that western education is a good, cheap way to spread democracy and spur development. The US government spends \$243 million a year to help subsidize foreign students. Conventional wisdom also implies that education enables a culture of democracy and common identity.

However, scientifically, are authoritarian leaders being educated in western classes more likely to promote democratization and economic development? With this question, I collected data of authoritarian leaders' educational background from 1960 to 2000 with three categories: western education, local education and military education, in an effort to examine the rightfulness of the previous arguments. Based on this original dataset, two models are built in this paper regarding the influences of western education on democratization and economic development which are featured by the change of polity score and GDP growth rate respectively. Unlike previous researches and arguments, I find no correlations between authoritarian leaders' western education and the promotion of reforms in the corresponding countries. The author argues that authoritarian leaders being educated in western countries are at almost at the same level with their counterparts in promoting democratization and developing economy.

Dedication

To my parents, Jianjun and Lanmei, your unconditional love and supports make this possible.

To Xibei, my husband, meeting you at Duke is the most beautiful and precious thing to me.

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1. Introduction

“Education is the most powerful weapon which you can use to change the world.”

---Nelson Mandela

Education has always been a significant factor in socialization and furthermore in political issues. Countries are spending more and more on this field believing that people’s ideology and identity, so to speak, are influenced greatly by education. Admittedly, education is a tool to make a better world – with more techniques, skills, critical thinking and logical reasoning cultivated in students. However, the correlation between educating students and “cultivating” their political identity as well as ideology is questionable. There is no evidence showing that students being educated in western countries are more pro-democracy than students educated in an authoritarian regime, or the number of students in autocracy supporting democratization is less than those in non-autocracies. Indeed it may have a very high probability that students in authoritarian regimes are even more pro-democratization and believing a democratic institution to be a better system. People living in a society are more likely to notice the disadvantages of the institutions they have. People living in authoritarian countries suffering from one-party regimes or restrictions on speeches and gradually think democratic countries are perfect. However, in democratic regimes, people may realize the problems of the system such as lower efficiency, the underneath “plutocracy”, gun

control, initiating wars to fawn on rich ammunition merchants, etc. Therefore, supporting democratization or not may not or cannot be “manipulated” by education.

In an effort to test whether being educated in a western democratic regime is an important factor in authoritarian leaders’ promoting of democratization, I collected an original data from 1960 to 2000 including almost all the authoritarian countries’ leaders in the world and applied scientific approaches to examine whether policy makers and researchers’ arguments on this issue is correct. I am not arguing against the overall great influences education can make on changing the world. The focus will be the influence of authoritarian leaders’ western education on the sheer change of the regimes’ democratization and economic development.

1.1 Research Question

Generally, this paper is aiming at seeking an answer for authoritarian regimes’ development and democratization – why some countries are more likely to enjoy economic growth or political reforms while others not. More specifically, the author wants to probe the impact of authoritarian leaders’ education on the countries reforms and changes. In 1990, out of 115 world leaders, 66 studied abroad and more than two thirds if only authoritarian countries are considered. This figure has continued to increase for the past twenty years. Will western-educated leaders in authoritarian

regimes be more likely to promote reforms in their country than their counterparts such as locally-educated leaders or those being trained in military bases that have no western educational background? Papers and articles are bragging about the political influences of education, especially education in a western democratic country. If there are correlations between leaders' educational background and the countries' democratic reforms as well as economic development, then which one is more correlated? Are they more likely to choose developing economy or improving political environment? If there is no correlation, previous literature and articles will be open to question.

This paper is to question and examine the legitimacy of papers and articles correlating western democratic education and leaders' motivations as well as capability of reforms by adopting scientific research approaches. From theoretical perspective, democratization and GDP growth are caused by numerous factors including domestic and international factors which most literature has covered. This paper is not arguing against the existence of these influences. Instead, they are partly included in the two models in this paper in order to test if education really matters in democratization and economic development by controlling other possible factors.

1.2 Literature Review

Previous literature on democratization seldom focuses on how leaders' educational background could have an influence on countries' political reforms. Most research sets the independent variables as economic development¹, colonial history², income growth and inequality³, religion, oil resources⁴, conflicts⁵ or international context.⁶

These factors could be categorized as domestic impacts and international influences. This paper is not denying the importance and relevance of these internal and

¹Boix, Carles, and Susan Stokes, 2003, "Endogenous Democratization", *World Politics*, 55(4): 517-549. Geddes, Barbara. 1999. "What Do We Know About Democratization After Twenty Years?" *Annual Review of Political Science*, 2(1):115-44. Przeworski, Adam, Michael Alvarez, Jose Antonio Cheibub, and Fernando Limongi, 2000 "Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-being in the World, 1950-1990", New York, Cambridge University Press

²Acemoglu, Daron, Simon Johnson, and James A. Robinson 2001. "The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation." *American Economic Review*, 91(5): 1369-1401.

³Bollen, Kenneth and Robert W. Jackman, 1985, "Political Democracy and the Size Distribution of Income", *American Sociological Review*, 50(4): 438-457. Freeman, John and Quinn, Dennis P. 2012. "The Economic Origins of Democracy Reconsidered." *American Political Science Review*. 106(1): 58-80. Ben Ansell and David Samuels. 2010. "Inequality and Democratization. A Contractarian Approach." *Comparative Political Studies*, 43(12): 1543-74

⁴Ross, Michael, 2012, "The Oil Curse: How Petroleum Wealth Shapes the Development of Nations", Princeton University Press.

⁵North, Douglass C., John Joseph Wallis, and Barry Weingast. "Violence and the Rise of Open Access Orders." *Journal of Democracy*. 20(1): 55 -69.

⁶Gleditsch, Kristian Skrede and Ward, Michael D. 2006. "Diffusion and the International Context of Democratization," *International Organization*, 60(4): 911-933. Brinks, Daniel and Coppedge, Michael. 2006. "Diffusion is no illusion: Neighbor Emulation in the Third Wave of Democracy," *Comparative Political Studies*, 39(4): 463—89

external factors with democratization. I am proposing the significance of authoritarian leaders' educational background. The role of leaders or a limited number of elites is debated and the argument that leaders and elites are very important and significant in the reforms and changes has been quite popular. Talcott Parsons in 1960 wrote that "within the existing elites, such people are most likely to be found among intellectuals, especially those who have direct contacts with the West, particularly through education abroad or under western auspices at home"⁷. History textbooks mostly are filled with famous peoples and their influences on the trajectory of history. Domestic and international contexts are important, but we cannot ignore the role of leaders, especially in authoritarian regimes.

In 1959, Seymour Martin Lipset emphasized the importance of education in political reforms, arguing that

"Education presumably broadens men's outlooks, enables them to understand the need norms of tolerance, restrains them from adhering to extremist and monistic doctrines, and increases their capacity to make rational electoral choices... If we cannot say that a high level of education is a sufficient condition for democracy, the available evident condition does suggest that it comes close to being a necessary condition."⁸

⁷Parson, Talcott, 1960 *"Structure and Process in Modern Societies"*, Glencoe, Ill. : Free Press

⁸Lipset, Seymour Martin, 1959, "Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy." *American Political Science Review*, 53(1), pp. 69-105

Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson, and Yared tried to check if Lipset was right on this issue by testing the causal relation between overall educational levels and democratization. Instead they find no robustness at all in a five-year period test.⁹ So they suspect that maybe in a long run mass education can have an influence, or there exists an omitted variable that correlate both with democratization and education. In 2009, Spilimbergo used a unique panel dataset on foreign students during 1950 to 2003 from the UNESCO Statistical Yearbook in order to explore the causal relation between democratization and the amount of foreign students; he showed that foreign-educated individuals promote democracy in their home country, "only if the foreign education is acquired in democratic countries".¹⁰ His model also includes a variety of control variables, such as democracy in trading partners, neighboring countries, level of income, and level and stock of education, etc..

Gift and Krcmaric add on to this debate of whether education is part of the reason for democratization by showing substantial correlation between western education and the corresponding countries' democratization prospects with the

⁹Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson, James A. Robinson, Pierre Yared, "From Education to Democracy?" *The American Economic Review*, Vol. 95, No. 2, 2005

¹⁰Spilimbergo, Antonio, "Democracy and Foreign Education" *American Economic Review*, Vol.99, No. 1: 528-543, 2009

emphasis on the leaders' socialization process and networks with western democratic countries.¹¹

As for leaders' educational background and how it influences the economic growth, there are also a couple of scholars testing the causal relation. A strong and neat one is presented by Juan Gabriel Valdés, the Pinochet regime's economists, known as the Chicago Boys. After graduating from the University of Chicago, they seized the chance in 1973 military coup to launch the first radical free market strategy thus boosting the economy of Chile.¹² There is also research on leaders' education and the influences on the income growth of the nation, showing positive correlation between them.¹³ However, there is no general research testing on a broader scale regarding how authoritarian leaders' education influences the economic development of their origin countries.

¹¹Gift, Thomas and Krmaric, Daniel, "Who Democratizes? Western-educated Leaders and Regime Transitions", working paper, (http://people.duke.edu/~tcg12/GiftKrmaric_WhoDemocratizes.pdf)

¹²Valdés, Juan Gabriel, 2008, "*Pinochet's Economists: The Chicago School of Economics in Chile*" Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1st edition

¹³Jones, Benjamin F., Benjamin A. Olken. 2005. "Do Leaders Matter? National Leadership and Growth since World War II", *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 120(3): 835-864

1.3 Limitations

This paper puts heavy emphasis on authoritarian individual leaders in terms of reforms. Most literature on democratization and development view states as “machines” with different parts coordinating together, such as institutions and domestic factors. These impacts from the opposition party, coalitions or groups of elites are important admittedly. However, if we analogically use “cars” as a metaphor of countries –the driver’s decisions and characteristics will be more significant to the results.

Therefore, viewing authoritarian regimes as a single unit led by the leaders is one key limitation of the paper. The author underlines the importance and significance of top leaders or limited number of elites in the social changes. More specifically, authoritarian states are more like “cars”. Though they have engines and external environment, mostly it is steered by the driver, which is the dictator, head of the country. Whether the country is heading north or south is under the control of drivers’ will. This is one of the assumptions for this paper and can also be viewed as a limitation. Authoritarian leaders are powerful and the center of power. Their ideas and decisions are more likely to be carried out compared with any other people’s proposals in the country. Therefore, in this paper, instead of following the previous thoughts on other levels of explanations, the author underscores the leaders’ will, and how a leader can make a difference. Also, most of the time, leaders being elected or designated are eager

to make their people better off and their country prosper. This is partly due to the reputation concerns which pressures them and partly due to their sense of patriotism and emotional connections.

1.4 Roadmap

This paper will proceed as follows. The next section will lay out a hypothetical theoretical foundation on how western education could have possible correlations with democratization and development based on common wisdom and traditional logical reasoning. It consists of five hypotheses including the null hypothesis of no correlation between leaders' education and reforms. There are also three possible mechanisms which are enlightening power, strong motivation and political identity. After theoretical analysis, there will be an empirical test of the proposed theory, sorted by data, method and evidence, including how the data was trimmed and the legitimacy of the chosen method. There are limitations of the original data and methodology, which will also be discussed in this section.

This will then be followed by a detailed discussion on the empirical results and findings which are very different from the conventional wisdom and "stereotypes" regarding the main independent variable "education". There are also discussions on other variables. At last, I will conclude that leaders with higher education from western

democratic country does not seem to have higher probability to promote political reforms or economic development compared with leaders with other types of education.

2. Theoretical Framework

Psychologically speaking, education could have a fundamental influence on students' outlook of life and world. The knowledge and information they take in will live with them inevitably for the rest of life. This is also the reason why almost every country devotes millions and billions of dollars into educational cultivation and patriotic education early for students in various ways either directly or indirectly. In this vein, studying in western democratic countries will help form the basis political knowledge and a different outlook which is more similar to western liberal and democratic paradigm. The channels making the common ideology possible are in-class and out-of-class education as well as experience.

However scientific analysis of this may tell a different story. Most leaders went abroad at their twenties which means that they've been spending the previous twenty years in the home countries may have determined who they are and where they belong especially that they are a self-selection group of people choosing to return back home. Furthermore, the locally educated leaders may also know about democratization by watching videos or reading books. When the great pressure comes from the society pushing for reforms, no matter where the leaders get their degrees, they will have to spur the political reforms or being kicked out of office due to the incapability.

Ideological speaking, by living in the developed democratic countries, the students' basic political ideology and identity might form with the influencing power of

both the society and government. Students may gradually realize the legitimacy of a democratic government and think that institutions and governing modes in a democracy is better than autocracy regarding both the people and the nation as a whole. In this vein, they are attracted by the subtle yet powerful “propaganda” of democracy. On the other hand, studying in western democratic countries is more likely to cultivate leaders with higher capability to govern country and knowing how to boost the market and economy. Most of those being educated in western countries then went back to become leaders were majoring in law or economy during their study in western countries. (Figure 1)




Figure 1. Distribution of western-educated leaders' majors (1960-2000)

What's more, after experiencing the benefits of capitalist and liberal market, they might be inclined to and more motivated to develop the economy in the home

countries.¹ However, it may be also true if leaders being educated in western liberal democratic countries do not maximize their countries' democratization and economic development. Therefore, there might be four categories of leaders regarding their promoting economy or politics elaborated in the following four hypotheses.

2.1 Hypotheses

Education has a broad scope: primary education, higher education, liberal study, literature, history, etc. Each has different influences on students' characteristics or value systems with specific features. Liberal Arts students differ from math majors; graduate students differ from high schools'. There is also a special group of students growing up in authoritarian regimes yet getting degrees from western democratic countries. Some of them then come back to home countries and become leaders. In-class education and out-of-class experience can enrich and enlighten their life as well as their thoughts.

However, people are people. Even after being educated in democratic countries, some may still hold previous outlook and identity, or simply continue being a "rational player" making rational choices without considering the consequences. Some may return back and continue dictatorship like their predecessor and simply sitting on the throne. Therefore, there might be no correlations between education and democratic

¹Spilimbergo, Antonio 2009. "Democracy and Foreign Education", *American Economic Review*, 99(1): 528-543.

reforms at all. So, if there are correlations between education and reforms, based on the leaders' home countries' economic development scale and polity score change, there are four types of leaders, coined as "favorable leaders", "masterful leaders", "liberal leaders", and "unfavorable leaders" (Table 1). If there is no correlation between these two factors, then the previous papers and articles on the significant influences of leaders' education on reforms will be questioned.

Table 1 Four types of leaders based on their promoting of political or economic development

Scenarios	Polity Scores Increase	Polity Scores Decrease
Positive GDP Growth	Favorable Leaders	Masterful Leaders
Negative GDP Growth	Liberal Leaders	Unfavorable Leaders

Leaders fostering both economic development and political reforms are favorable leaders such as Lee Teng Hui; boosting economy but not political democratization are masterful leaders, such as Lee Kuan Yew and Deng Xiaoping; pushing political reforms yet putting less efforts in economic growth are liberal leaders such as Chang Myun or Uganda President Godfrey Binaisa; leaders who fail to propel either economic development or political reform are labeled as unfavorable leaders. What I am very interested in is that compared with leaders who are not educated in western democratic countries, which type of the four categories this special group of authoritarian leaders are more likely to belong to.

2.1.1 Ordinary Leaders

Ho: This is no difference between western-educated leaders and leaders being educated or trained in a different place regarding democratization and economic reforms.

It is possible that western educated leaders return back to their home country and having almost exactly the same preference or motivation to promote democratization or economic development. This will be shown in the model as no significant correlation or very subtle estimated effects.

This scenario of statistical significance is possible since leaders being educated in western countries might not be different from leaders educated locally or in military bases. Students who have no experience of western study can also be interested in democracy and liberalization. With the increasing transparency, availability and fastness of information, they can find everything from the internet and don't necessarily have to go abroad to experience everything to know about western liberal democracy. Also, some leaders studying abroad and then return back to home country have political ambitions and the western experience is a tool for them to open the gate of politics back home and higher possibility to climb up the political ladders. What's more, people who have not been to western democratic countries may have a cabinet full of dashing young graduates being educated or growing up in western capitalist democracies. Therefore, these may lead to the final insignificance of the correlation between democratization/development and western education.

2.1.2 Favorable Leaders

H1: Leaders with western education are more likely to be favorable leaders compared with leaders being educated locally or militarily.

Leaders being educated in western countries to some extent could be psychologically, sociologically and professionally different from leaders with other background. This possibly could make them favorable leaders propelling both economic and political reforms. Psychologically speaking, education could bring them more emotional bonds to the western culture and civilization. The experience of living in a western democratic country itself may add on to the western influences. People they meet every day, articles and books they read in class or out of class, food they buy in the supermarket and restaurants they often dine in, etc. can all contribute to their value system and world view. Perhaps they will be more convinced by the western political and economic systems and become eager to build similar institutions back in home countries. And after realizing the deep gap between the origin country and host country, they may be greatly motivated to promote the home country to keep up with the developed countries where they've been studied in. Generally speaking, leaders' educational background seems to have association with the probability of them executing reforms.²

² Axel Dreher, Michael J. Lamla, Sarah M. Rupperecht and Frank Somogyi, "The Impact of Political Leaders' Profession and Education on Reforms" (<http://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/50822/1/520092163.pdf>)

2.1.3 Masterful Leaders

H2: Leaders with western education are more likely to be masterful leaders comparing with leaders being educated locally or militarily.

After enjoying the sufficient life necessity and unlimited material resources as ordinary persons in western countries, leaders may have the incentive to develop their home countries so that ordinary people in their countries could live in such an affluent place. However, in terms of politics, western-educated leaders may not want to fully democratize the country due to the advantages of high efficiency.

Take Singapore leader Lee Kuan Yew as an example. He graduated from Cambridge Law School and served the country since the pre-independent era. He made piles of reforms but political reform regarding democratization. In his mind, governance of country is more about efficiency and effectiveness. Singapore, under his governance, became a miracle in economic development but politically, it is still an authoritarian regime. He is also a firm believer of meritocracy. And he once said, "If Singapore is a nanny country, I am proud to have fostered one."³ Also, being educated in western countries may favor them by the bonds and networks they have with local people who later happen to be powerful in either commerce or politics. These bonds can serve as valuable resources for them to development economy in a way of drawing foreign direct investment (FDI) or building more economic connections that may boosting the market.

³Lee, Kuan Yew. 2000. *Third World to First, The Singapore Story: 1965-2000*, Harper Collins, 1st Edition.

What's more, most authoritarian leaders care about reputation. If they could make their countrymen's life better off, the praise and good reputation will stay in the history. So this is what Lee has done – let his people living a better life yet the power of doing so is based on the controlling power in his pocket. Another example is Deng Xiaoping, educated in France and assumed leadership in China in late 1970s. He pushed forward the opening up reform in 1978 yet refused to open any further beyond economic zone. Any political reform proposals were killed in cradles and any plan regarding democratization was aborted. Therefore, it might be a second hypothesis that leaders with western education will be more likely to boost economy instead of political reform.

2.1.4 Liberal Leaders

H3: Leaders with western education are more likely to be liberal leaders compared with leaders being educated locally or militarily.

Liberal leaders are more likely to give impetus to political reforms rather than economic development. Western educated leaders, after being educated in a democratic environment, might be more capable of pushing forward political liberalization. However, economically, they are less likely to devote greatly since political reform may bring pressure on economic development. For example, South Korea leaders Chang Myun, he promoted greatly to the political reforms, but not the economic growth. His political reforms on individual liberty generated chaos and instability of the society and

economy was pulled back.⁴On the other hand, even if they are pushing forward the economic growth, leaders who are locally educated may also dedicate to economic development with higher efficiency due to the centralization of power. In this case, the economic growth of those countries led by western educated leaders will not witness significant economic development compared with those led by locally educated leaders. Aside from this, leaders with western education may be eager to develop their home country, but realize the institutions are too old, rigid and restraining to unleash the economic development. Therefore they started to develop political environment first and then push forward economic development a few years later.

2.1.5 Unfavorable Leaders

H4: Leaders with western education will be more likely to be unfavorable leaders compared with leaders being educated locally or militarily.

“Rational choice theory” argues that the social behavior of human beings is based on the wanting of more rather than less of a good.⁵Leaders are human beings and they are inevitably wanting more than less for themselves. Assuming their rational behavior and breaking the old authoritarian power system may be a big obstacle for their getting more, liberalization and democratization will be aborted since they will lose

⁴http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chang_Myon

⁵Lawrence E. Blume and David Easley, “Rationality”, June 2007, <http://tuvalu.santafe.edu/~leb/rat03.pdf>

the absolute power by democratization as well as property by liberalization. In this case, greatly promoting political and economic reforms is almost impossible. So, as a rational person, the leader may be unwilling to unleash his power to others. Compared with other two groups of leaders, those with higher western education may be more able to do or better at doing what is in their mind. So there might be more unfavorable leaders among the western educated group. After perceiving the best interests for them, these leaders with more capability and have higher western education will be more likely to achieve their goals.

2.2 Hypothetical Theory

Yeats says, "Education is not the filling of a pail, but the lighting of a fire". If the fire is being enlightened, it may light up a whole country. Leaders being educated in western democratic countries have psychological cultivation, sociological bonds and professional competence. And their being leaders could be the channel bring western development and democracy to their home countries. This paper holds that authoritarian leaders with western education will be different from leaders with other types of education, and these features could be reflected in their approaches of governance and policy preference.

2.2.1 Enlightening power

Education enlightens young people at the very starting point of their life before they enter society. It includes teaching formal knowledge such as reading, writing, and math, as well as other things such as morals, values, and ethics. Learning these does not mean that leaders can have their world outlook totally changed from the one formed in the past ten or twenty years in their home country. Instead, it is an enlightening process, lightening up an approach of reform that they may have never seen or experienced. This experience expands their visions and perspectives.

These influences can be divided into two categories: macro-level and micro-level impacts. From macro-level analysis, education is not merely inside the specific schools or specific rules; rather a more general influence from the whole social institutions in the country. Clearly we could see the differences between democratic and authoritarian institutions that could have influences on education. In authoritarian regimes, things, especially sensitive things, are not very much transparent. Social media are mostly the tools for government propaganda. Whole environment of society is either violent or unstable, or repressive. In this vein the social forces lead the educational institution to instill more values about obedience and listen instead of challenge authority and questioning. However, in democratic countries, the environment is different. Students can pick whatever debate topic they can; join or hold whatever kinds of organization or union they like. The freedom of speech also add on to the open environment, leading to

a more liberal and tolerant social environment. Aside from general environment, they have different ideological instillation. Previously my thought is that only authoritarian regimes are good at propaganda and PR itself to attract peoples. They try to make it widely known that the legitimacy of the party or the person is unshakable and only rules by this government will benefit people. However, I also realize in western countries, especially democratic countries, ideology and the instillation of certain paradigm can never be weaker than authoritarian regimes. In the 1990s most people buy western ideology because of the attractiveness of this paradigm. However, the attractiveness lies in the “propaganda” in a more subtle and smart way. Same is to western education. The instillation of western values, or the so-called universal values which are not universally successful, can also be strong in either schools or other social institutions. Students under western democratic environment will be more likely attracted by the set of philosophical values and paradigm which will later be deeply rooted in their mind.

From micro-level perspective, education in democratic countries emphasizing more on critical thinking and challenging the past knowledge. Especially in the US, students can raise questions in the middle of class when teachers are talking. This has nothing to do with irrelative deeds in a western classroom. Yet, in most autocracies, students are not supposed to ask questions during the class. They need to ask them after class because when teacher is talking they are supposed to be listening instead of

questioning. This can create a sense of ignorant obedience. What's more, textbooks especially history textbook are the key channel to instill ideas and values. It is very hard to be objective for almost everyone when it comes to history no matter on home country or the whole world. This innate bias will surely be embodied in textbooks. No exception for all countries, though in some cases the bias may be lighter while in others heavier. This dissimulation of values and ideas will greatly influence the foreign students from authoritarian regimes if the paradigm can successfully attract those students. Moreover, western democratic countries happen to be richer and more affluent than authoritarian countries. Commercialization and capitalism is deeper and more mature in western countries. Therefore, students, especially young people, are inclined to be attracted by the "colorful world" instead of daddies' or predecessors' dull and serious air filled with forbidding rules. Therefore, if they later become authoritarian leaders, breaking down those rules and building new ones will surely be a must.

This whole process of macro-level and micro-level influences could be both under the socialization process. Students being educated in classes are being socialized at the same time. One of the founders of the modern sociology, Emile Durkheim, believes that

"Society can survive only if there exists among its members a sufficient degree of homogeneity; education perpetuates and reinforces this homogeneity by fixing in the child, from the beginning, the essential

similarities that collective life demands. And education consists of a methodical socialization of the young generation”⁶

Socialization is, to some extent, to make people alike and get them ready to get into a certain society. And education serves this purpose well by generating a group of people with similar fundamental beliefs. However, among different societies, education and socialization processes are different so as to generating students with different views and beliefs. Therefore, if leaders educated in a western country, it is highly likely that they grasp the western ideology more and have stronger common identity with western democratic communities.⁷

2.2.2 Strong Motivation

Most leaders who have been educated in western countries are more likely to be highly motivated to develop their own country. This is partly because of their eagerness to build a country that can catch up with the country where they have been studied in; and partly because they have been undergoing a stage of emotional uneasiness when they first come to the host countries. This feeling becomes stronger as they staying in the developed country which triggers their strong motivation to make a difference.

Living in a developed country is more comfortable than living in a developing country regarding material sufficiency and spiritual needs. However, for those who

⁶Durkheim, Emile, 1956, *“Education and Sociology”*, Free Press

⁷Akerlof, George. A and Rachel. EKranton, *“Identity and Economics of Organization”*, *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 19(1): 9-32

newly arrive at a developed country from an under developed one, the first thing to experience is not joy or comfort; rather, it is more of uneasiness. They feel the differences this new place bringing to them: sufficiency of basic daily needs and necessities, freedom of speech and liberty, etc. Instead of comfortably staying here, there is uneasiness aroused questioning the differences. How come people living in developed countries are having a better life than those in home countries? Why eating pizza and drinking coke is such a normal thing but they are viewed as a luxury back in home countries simply because people can't afford them? Why people can say anything they want to say and post on the internet freely but people even dare not hold a demonstration back at home countries? Why buying a nice car is a piece of cake here but it is a symbol of bourgeoisie back in home countries? Why students in classes here can ask anything in their mind and interrupt the teacher in the middle without being scolded? Questions like these are tons and the more questions they have, the stronger uneasiness they feel.

This feeling is a trigger. After enjoying the superiority of living in a developed country, they feel the anxiety for going back and being devoted to the development and change of their country and people. This happens to Lee Kuan Yew, who became anti-colonialist when studying in LSE. He went to study in UK, yet actively objected to the UK's rule of his own country. And then he went to study at Cambridge get a JD degree. He fought for the self-governance after he became congressman and premier after

independence. During his presidency, he greatly increased the living standard of his people and very good reputation was obtained. Uneasiness is hard to detect for people living in developed countries for all their life. However subtle, this feeling exist in most international students who come from developing countries. Some may choose to dispel this uneasiness by being immersed in the coziness and change their nationalities. Some keep this uneasiness and return back to home country. They then become leaders and make a difference.

2.2.3 Political identity

Leaders coming back home wanting to be leaders is not an easy piece of cake in most cases. In cases where leaders come from an imperial or royal family, their legitimacy derives from their family. However, in most cases, leaders need to “campaign” or climb the political ladder. Even in authoritarian countries, political identity is important, and can even become the source of a leader’s legitimacy. Political identity can be considered as political beliefs and which political group they are in based on the fundamental policy preferences. It is like in the US, democrats are liberal donkey heads while republics are conservative elephants; being a democrat means supporting labor union, immigrants and ethnic minorities while being a republican means restriction on immigrants, anti-gay marriage and small government. In authoritarian country, one’s political path is also labeled. Being educated in western country is a label of liberalist and reformist. With this identity, these politicians need to on one hand

actively doing these with innate motivation, on the other hand living up to it because of how he is labeled.

As an old saying goes, “birds of a feather flock together”. Leaders who are liberalist and reformist will recruit more people of the alike. Recruitment plays an important role in authoritarian regimes since appointment is not solely based on institutions; rather it is more based upon the top leaders’ will. Since the assumption is that leaders are rational actors, so evidently they are more willing to work with a group of people who have the same background. This will lead to a reinforcing impact on leaders’ reforming policies and it is possible that more people supporting reforms there will be better guidelines and pathways towards democracy.

Therefore, recruitment is another mechanism adding up to the process of democratization due to consensus of the leaders’ political identity. Leaders are more likely to recruit people with the same political opinions so as to completely avoid the “bill killer” or unexpected “filibuster”. Since appointment in authoritarian regimes are mostly controlled by the “upper insiders” where most people see as a black box. Or even if there is a reform on the recruitment policies, being educated in a foreign democratic countries may be added in as one requirement. Therefore, more western educated people may be recruited into the cabinet, legislature or executive branch. In this case, people with liberal and democratic education are more likely to consent on reforms and opening up. What’s more, in autocracies, clandestine patronage is popular and mostly

relatives or close friends were being appointed because they have relations with some leaders. Therefore, friends of the western educated leaders will be easier to get into the cabinet or senior and key positions. These people are also on the same boat with the leaders, thus supporting political liberalization and democratization.

3. Data and Method

Cases regarding leaders who have been educated in a western country and the corresponding democratization are collected originally by the author. The authoritarian leaders' information can be found from Archigos dataset¹. The chosen countries are a list of states from Jessica Weeks dataset on Authoritarian regimes². Based on this list of authoritarian states from 1960 to 2000, I subtracted leaders' information from Archigos dataset and merge these two data sets into one panel data of leaders and regime types. I further extract data and reframe it into leader-based dataset, with leaders' names, countries, in office and out of office date, regime types and polity scores when they get into office and when they leave. The whole dataset is not a panel data; rather, for each leader there contains two main time points: in office date and out of office date. The models are generally linear regression models with the exactly same independent variables and control variables in the two models.

3.1 Data

There are no specific dataset on authoritarian leaders' educational background.

The author collected the leaders' education through mainly five resources. One is

¹ H. E. Goemans, Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, and Giacomo Chiozza, 2009, "*Archigos: A Data Set on Leaders 1875 - 2004*", Version 2.9 (<http://www.rochester.edu/college/faculty/hgoemans/Archigos.2.9-August.pdf>)

² Weeks, Jessica, 2012, "Strongmen and Straw Men: Authoritarian Regimes and the Initiation of International Conflict," *American Political Science Review*, 106(2)

Archigos Dataset on political leaders³; second is Lentz's book *Heads of States and Governments: A Worldwide Encyclopedia of over 2,300 Leaders from the year 1945 to 1992*⁴; third one is a biographical dictionary of modern world leaders from 1900 to 1991⁵; fourth resource is mainly from Wikipedia and Britannica, mostly focusing on leaders' educational background and majors; fifth resource is the leaders' biographies or autobiographies if they are available. With this original dataset, I also merged it with other data such as GDP and Polity score and coded some variables such as US ally and British colony. Based on these resources the original data was built with leaders' education types and in-office out-of-office years.

There are mainly three types of educational backgrounds categorized in the data: western-educated, locally educated and militarily trained leaders. There can also be blurred boundary for some cases. For example, some leaders went to military academy in western democratic countries. To code this, I did not code leaders "1" for both western education and military training. I categorize them under western education instead of both. There are pros and cons for this: it makes the data categorization clearer, but some militarily trained leaders will be in the western educated leaders group.

³ <http://www.rochester.edu/college/faculty/hgoemans/data.htm>

⁴ Lentz, Harris M. 1994. *Heads of States and Governments: A Worldwide Encyclopedia of Over 2,300 Leaders, 1945 - 1992*. Jeerson, N.C.: McFarland.

⁵ Frederickson, John C. 2004. *Biographical Dictionary of Modern World Leaders: 1900-1991*. New York, N.Y.: Facts on File.

The polity score was coded based on a case-by-case approach. The polity score can only demonstrate the year's score, which cannot be specified to the month or day the leader left the office. Therefore, if merely merge the polity data with the original data based on the same in-office and out-of-office year, there will be problems due to this lagged effect. So, two coding rules are generated to avoid the miscoding.

First, for leaders staying in office for more than a year, the polity score for in-office year should be the polity score of the precede year, and the same applied the out-of-office year. For example, President of Nigeria Balewa went into office in 1960 and was overthrown by coup in 1966. If merely merge the data based on the exact year of in and out-of-office year, it will be 8 for the year 1960 and -7 for 1966. However, in 1966 it was due to the coup that the score got decreased not due to President Balewa. Therefore, I need to code the polity score of the year precede the in-office year and out-of-office year. In this case, President Balewa will get the in-office polity score 8 and out-of-office score 7. In the same vein, the succeeding Gowon junta government will be coded 7 when he entered office and -7 when he left. Second, in other cases where the government stayed in office for less than one year and it starts and ends in the same year, the coding rule may change a little bit: the in-office polity score will also be the polity score of the preceding year, but the out-of-office score will take the same year's score as they went out of office.

As for the GDP growth rate, GDP per capita data merging with the original dataset, I take the preceding year of the in-office year's GDP data as the in-office data and the data for the preceding year before they are out of office. For leaders who stays in office for less than one year and the starting and ending point are in the same year, then the in-office GDP data will take the preceding year's GDP, while the out-of-office data will apply the exact year they went out of office. By doing so, this can minimize uttermost the error caused by the time lag between original data, polity score and the GDP data.

3.2 Method

The method applied is general linear regression model, with two key dependent variables and a couple of independent variables. There are two models in total: the first one is about the western education and its influences on polity score changes; the second one features economic development scale which is the growth rate as the dependent variable.

The key independent variable is the educational background of leaders, categorized into three types: western education, local education and military academy training. They are dummy variables coded as "0" or "1". The information of leaders' education are assorted from several sources: Wikipedia, Encyclopedia Britannica, Lenz

and Fredriksen' books on leaders' biographic.⁶ Also, the coding of western education considers the foreign education is from a democratic country or not. If the education is not from a democratic country such as Soviet Union, it will not be counted as western higher education. Instead, it will be coded 1 under local higher education category. Another category is military academy education where there are a couple of leaders went through military education and started political career as a military officer.

There are several controlled independent variables. One is development of a country, featured by GDP index. The relation between economic development and reforms is well articulated and proved by previous literature.⁷ Economic development can foster democratization and affluence may have a strong link with the rates of transition. There are various mechanisms. With better economy, there will be higher probability of top-down reforms in order to further unleash the political confinement of economic development. With more middle class asserting for civil rights, pressures will increase on the incumbent. Economic growth may also increase the gap between rich and poor in a specific period of time, thus propelling democratization.

⁶ Lentz, Harris M. 1994. *Heads of States and Governments: A Worldwide Encyclopedia of Over 2,300 Leaders, 1945 - 1992*. Jeer son, N.C.: McFarland.

Fredriksen, John C. 2004. *Biographical Dictionary of Modern World Leaders: 1900-1991*. New York, N.Y.: Facts on File.

⁷ Boix, Carles, and Susan Stokes, 2003, "Endogenous Democratization", *World Politics*, 55(4): 517-549

Second independent variable is oil. Natural resources especially oil can greatly devote to autocracy. ⁸Since exporting oil can lead to an increasing amount of “opaque” revenue, this will inevitably encourage corruption or heavy vote buying. In order to control oil, I set a dummy variable of all OPEC countries. Including this variable will control the exporting countries of oil and petroleum. What’s more, British colony was also controlled in this model. As shown in Boix and Strokes regression models, British colony has a significant influence on the transition of an authoritarian regime.

Another control variable is the total capacity of countries. This variable is depicted by CINC score from COW data. The total capacity of a state can influence on domestic politics. The duration of leaders’ term is also included in this model. If the stay is quiet short then probably the chances of reforms are low, either because of short period of time, or an expectation of short stay. For leaders’ staying in office for a longer period of time, it may be correlated with the high economic growth rate or a peaceful transition. The total population of the country is also controlled. Democratization in countries with much larger population might be at different pace or facing dissimilar problems from countries with less population.

The variables are not on the same scale and the coefficients might be one two extremes – either too small or too large. In order to make them in scale, I logged some large variables such as GDP data, military expenditure, and the total population. There

⁸ Ross, Michael, “Oil Curse: How Petroleum Wealth Shapes the Development of Nations”

is also an interaction variable in the second model with leaders' in-office duration interacting with western education background to see if western educated leaders having longer in-office time make a difference in promoting economic development. Also for those who are being logged, I add one to each variable to avoid biased results since the log of 0 is not defined and log value for 0-1 are negative. By doing so the log won't change the coefficients substantially.

3.3 Limitations

One of the limitations for the data is regarding the dependent variables. First, the categorization of leaders' educational types might be blurred in some cases. As mentioned before, the leaders' education may be from both a western college and a military training, or local military school. In this case, the coder simplified them to one type: western military schools are coded as western education; local military schools are coded as military education. What's more, the typology of leaders' education should be more specific. In current dataset, leaders with western democratic education are coded as western; but for those who have been studied abroad in a non-democratic country I have coded them as being educated in a local college.

Second limitation is the economic development dataset. There are other datasets that may be a better fit for economic openness or business environment. However, the availability of these dataset within the time scope of 1960-2000 is limited and mostly is

five-year based datasets. So, turning to GDP data can guarantee the availability yet not the best fit as the proxy for economic openness and reforms.

Another limitation is the time period of data which is from 1960 to 2000, including 399 authoritarian leaders in total. The limited time range could also be a restriction of the findings as well as results.

4. Result and Discussion

Based on the original data collected, the author first makes a distribution graph with leaders' polity score change and economic growth scale located in a coordinate. Leaders are grouped in to the three types and each coordinate features one type of leader. These graphs show the distribution of leaders developing economy and improving political systems with no other control variables.

First graph (Figure 2) features authoritarian countries' reform scales with western-educated leaders. There are in total 85 observations. With all the leaders being educated in western countries, 9 of them see decreasing polity scores during their rule. And there are 19 of them promoting political reforms and saw increases in polity score. This means that more western educated leaders are capable of and inclined to increase their countries' polity score by either improve the recruitment system, making political competition or increase the institutionalization of government authority. Most of the dots are scattered on the x-axles coordinate. But at the same time there are negative scores for the change of polity score meaning a decreasing political openness during the leaders' ruling period. Generally speaking, there are more positive growth dots than negatives.




Figure 2. Distribution of economic growth and polity scores changes for western-educated leaders cases (85 obs.)

The second graph (Figure 3) is about the locally educated leaders and their distribution of developing economy as well as polity score increase. There are 168 observations in total and these leaders are educated in local colleges or universities, including some leaders who also have a foreign degree but not in democratic countries. 39 observations boosting political reforms and 19 of them have decreasing polity scores. Clearly, these leaders, compared with western-educated leaders are not very actively increasing the GDP growth rate and there are a couple of negative growth rates cases in the coordinate. Even though there are some polity score increase cases, most of the polity scores are centered on the x-axis with 0 polity score change or slightly negative.




Figure 3. Distribution of economic growth and polity scores changes for locally-educated leaders cases (168 obs.)

Third graph (Figure 4) is about the cases with militarily-trained leaders. Overall there are 150 observations with 36 having decreasing polity scores and 41 having positive polity score increase. Mostly, polity score changes are subtle and countries with militarily trained leaders are less likely to have high polity score increases. Interestingly the economic growth is very impressive for militarily educated leaders. Mostly are positive and even comparable to the cases of western educated leaders.




Figure 4. Distribution of economic growth and polity scores changes for militarily-trained leaders' cases (150 obs.)

4.1 Result

Based on the originally collected dataset, two models are built to examine and explain the relationship between western education and political as well as economic development. The first model is one with polity score change as the dependent variable. The polity score ranges from -10 to 10 with -10 as hereditary monarchy and 10 as consolidated democracy. The change of polity score could be from -10 to 10 but very rare of this situation.

These two models are OLS regression models with all types of education background variables included and also a list of control variables. Looking into the regression models result, we can notice several main findings with regards to democratization as well as development and leaders' educational background.

Model 1:

*Change of Polity score ~ Western education + Duration + Local education +
In-office GDP + in-office CINC + Change of CINC +
In-office Democ + Amity with US + OPEC + Military Expenditure +
Total Population + Natural Resources + Colony History*

Table 2 Regression model of authoritarian leaders and political reforms

```

Call:
lm(formula = XPOLITY ~ WEST + DUR + LOCAL + GR + log(GDP1 + 1) +
    cinc1 + X.cinc + democ + Amity.US + OPEC + log(milex1 + 1) +
    log(tpop1 + 1) + log(irst1 + 1) + Colonial.History, data = mydata)

Residuals:
    Min       1Q   Median       3Q      Max
-15.0470  -2.1714   0.0037   2.6196  16.0003

Coefficients:
                Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)
(Intercept)    -6.59298     6.19270  -1.065  0.28788
WEST             1.44164     0.93411   1.543  0.12378
DUR              0.08101     0.07181   1.128  0.26012
LOCAL            0.18610     0.79326   0.235  0.81467
GR              -0.08353     0.08251  -1.012  0.31221
log(GDP1 + 1)   0.29275     0.34369   0.852  0.39499
cinc1           54.20534    55.12106   0.983  0.32619
X.cinc          -420.34815  302.52028  -1.389  0.16569
democ           -0.02169     0.01392  -1.558  0.12033
Amity.US        0.33433     0.70621   0.473  0.63626
OPEC            -1.27869     1.46869  -0.871  0.38463
log(milex1 + 1)  1.04227     0.32866   3.171  0.00167 **
log(tpop1 + 1)  -1.29678     0.48195  -2.691  0.00752 **
log(irst1 + 1)  -0.24934     0.20555  -1.213  0.22604
Colonial.History 0.05461     0.94396   0.058  0.95390
---
Signif. codes:  0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1

Residual standard error: 5.88 on 306 degrees of freedom
(41 observations deleted due to missingness)
Multiple R-squared:  0.08424, Adjusted R-squared:  0.04234
F-statistic: 2.011 on 14 and 306 DF,  p-value: 0.01682

```

In the first model regarding democratization, leaders' education does not have significant correlation with the dependent variable. There are only two variables having

significant relations with the political reform in this model. Military expenditure is positively related countries' democratization, meaning that during the process of democratization, there might be an increased use of troops or arms that pull up the military spending. This is true to some extent since not all democratization process are peaceful. Indeed, most of them are violent. Many researches are focusing on the democratization process and conflicts as well as violence. The process requires the change of social norms, shift in the balance of power or the distribution of resources. Violence might even be inevitable and researchers have proposed an inverted U shape to describe the relation between violence and the process of democratization.¹ This result of positive correlation between political transition and military spending could indirectly prove the significant relationship between violence and the process of political transition.

Another variable is population, which has significantly negative correlation with political reforms. This depicts the situation where countries with larger population is less likely to democratize comparing with a smaller country given other variables are the same. Democratization does have relation with demography. One demographer once published a paper on Foreign Policy about Arab Spring and demography.² In that paper,

¹Klopp, Jacqueline M. and Elke Zuern, 2007, "The Politics of Violence in Democratization: Lessons from Kenya and South Africa", *Comparative Politics*, 39(2), pp. 127-146

²Cincotta, Richard, 2012, "Life Begins after 25: Demography and the Societal Timing of Arab Spring", *Foreign Policy* (http://www.fpri.org/enotes/2012/201201.cincotta.demography_arabspring.pdf)

general linkage can be shown between democratization and the overall population. This can be self-explanatory to the extent that more people means more complicated distribution of resources during transition and this may add on to the difficulty of making the political change to democracy. For other variables the p-value is not as significant as these two but their estimated effects are interesting. The original GDP is positively related to democratization, so is the Composite Index of National Capability (CINC) of a country. This result is consistent with the previous researches on democratization.³ The US allies are more likely to democratize as featured in the model as Amity to the US. OPEC countries are rich in oil and natural resources and this is negatively correlated with political reform and liberalization.

³Boix, Carles, and Susan Stokes, 2003, "Endogenous Democratization", *World Politics*, 55(4): 517-549

Model 2:

Economic Growth ~ *Western education* * *Duration* + *Duration* + *Local education* + *OPEC*
In-office Democ score + *in-office CINC* + *Amity with US* +
Military Expenditure + *Total Population* + *Colony History*

Table 3 Regression model of authoritarian leaders and economic growth

```
Call:
lm(formula = GR ~ WEST * DUR + LOCAL * DUR + LOCAL + DUR + OPEC +
    democ + cinc1 + Amity.US + log(milex1 + 1) + log(tpop1 +
    1) + log(irst1 + 1) + log(GDP1 + 1) + XPOLITY + Colonial.History,
    data = mydata)
```

Residuals:

```
      Min       1Q   Median       3Q      Max
-8.334 -0.939 -0.102  0.575  59.706
```

Coefficients:

	Estimate	Std. Error	t value	Pr(> t)	
(Intercept)	5.823086	4.285504	1.359	0.17522	
WEST	-0.206810	0.884210	-0.234	0.81523	
DUR	0.290320	0.063638	4.562	7.35e-06	***
LOCAL	0.893757	0.743857	1.202	0.23048	
OPEC	0.512573	1.019596	0.503	0.61552	
democ	0.004074	0.009630	0.423	0.67254	
cinc1	-68.991707	30.268097	-2.279	0.02334	*
Amity.US	-0.117333	0.486063	-0.241	0.80941	
log(milex1 + 1)	0.643888	0.227621	2.829	0.00498	**
log(tpop1 + 1)	1.083627	0.334669	3.238	0.00134	**
log(irst1 + 1)	0.021777	0.141983	0.153	0.87820	
log(GDP1 + 1)	-1.057698	0.229246	-4.614	5.83e-06	***
XPOLITY	-0.045636	0.039109	-1.167	0.24416	
Colonial.History	-1.438340	0.646394	-2.225	0.02680	*
WEST:DUR	0.200754	0.118866	1.689	0.09226	.
DUR:LOCAL	-0.118407	0.103783	-1.141	0.25480	

```
---
Signif. codes:  0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1
```

Residual standard error: 4.041 on 305 degrees of freedom
(41 observations deleted due to missingness)

Multiple R-squared: 0.2215, Adjusted R-squared: 0.1832

F-statistic: 5.784 on 15 and 305 DF, p-value: 1.658e-10

In the second model, the western education and local education are all not significantly related with economic growth while having all other variables controlled.

The coefficient between economic growth and duration of leaders is very significant.

They are positively related with discernible estimated effect. This could be related to the resilience of leaders' regime and economic growth: as long as growth rates are high, neither dictatorships nor democracies experience challenges.⁴ This is also the case in China and Vietnam where they mix political repression and growth-generating public goods, producing resilient authoritarian regimes supported by excellent economic development.⁵ The military expenditure is positively correlated with economic growth, which is not a surprise since military spending can also boosting economy by stimulating employment in various industries. The original CINC score is negatively related to the dependent variable with very large estimated effect. If overall capacity of a country is already high, the growth rate might be smaller since the base number is large. This is also the case for the original in office GDP, which is also negatively related to the economic growth. As for population, this model shows that the population is positively related to the economic growth. For authoritarian regimes, mostly they are developing countries with less mature markets. The total population is a very important factor in boosting development. Chinese market is an example with the advantages of a large population; its economic growth maintained two digits for more than a decade at the beginning stage of economic development.

⁴Gallagher, Mary and Hanson, Jonathan K., "Authoritarian Survival, Resilience, and the Selectorate Theory", Prepared for *"Why Communism Didn't Collapse: Understanding Regime Resilience in China, Vietnam, Laos, North Korea and Cuba"*. 2013, Ed. Martin Dimitrov, Cambridge University Press, chapter 7

⁵Perrings Charles. 2006, "Resilience and Sustainable Development", *Environment and Development Economics* 11, pp. 417-427

Coming back to the original question: does western education matter in democratization and economic development? The answer is no, different from previous hypotheses and traditional wisdom. Why it doesn't matter? I will delve into this question in the following discussion with case analysis.

4.2 Discussion

First question, why leaders educated in western democratic regimes generally perform similarly to those educated in local schools or those trained in military bases? After reading through the list of western educated leaders and their relating information, I believe there are broadly three main factors summarizing the reasons.

First is the questionable motivation for foreign degree. People choosing to study abroad have various reasons and goals. Some are eager for cutting-edge knowledge; some for the love of academic studies; some for more job opportunities; some for the better living conditions; and some for enhancing the value of their degrees, etc. However, different from the hypotheses that leaders being educated in western countries are more likely to be socialized by making friends with western people and everyday media, authoritarian leaders mostly gain this degree in order to have the stepping stone to get into politics or climb higher on the ladder of power at home country. With this political ambition in mind, their eyes won't be blurred by the ideological influences since they have certain experience at home country endorsing

them with two perspectives instead of a one-way thinking mode. As for social connections, people tend to seek safety feelings by finding friends with identical or common interests or thoughts so that they could share and then gain happiness. This is especially true when people coming to a new place. Based on this, these students from authoritarian regimes will be more likely to hang around with people of their kind instead of “foreigners”. Therefore, the socialization process is weakened and they are no more different than those educated in local college or university.

Looking into the cases, there are leaders being educated in western countries yet didn't help promoting democratization after going back to home countries. They are politicians playing politics and their experience of studying in western democratic countries is used to get to a high position. So the education could not change much on them. President of Chad Habre was educated in Paris majoring in Political Science and got his PhD. However, his rule in Chad from 1982 to 1990 was denounced with human rights abuses and atrocities. His bloody eight-year rule is a disaster for Chad peoples. His one party regime has been killing and torturing tens of thousands of his opponents.⁶ He also set up a special group of force called “Documentation and Security Directorate (DDS)” to detect and kill political opponents. Although this was an inhumane authoritarian state, Chad was US ally at that time. The United States in an effort to balance against Libya in that area is in buttress of President Habre so as to counter

⁶ According to UN International Court of Justice

Qadaffi's forces. Based on the Human Right Watch reports⁷, the United States provided Habre's DDS with training, intelligence, arms, and other support despite knowledge of its atrocities. Those supports and President Hebre's western Politics education did not bring democratization to the country; instead, they might even teach him more about how to play "politics". The polity score goes down 7 points during his governance.

Another example is the prime minister of Thailand from 1976-1977, Thanin Kraivichien, who was educated in LSE majoring in Law. He returned to Thailand and was appointed the President of the Supreme Court of Thailand. Later on, in the 1976 Massacre he was appointed by the king as the Prime Minister. During his one-year regime, the country suffered from dissolved parliament and outlawed political parties. Thanin's belief was anti-communism and had published books admonishing the peril of it. However during his ruling period, troops were sent to destroy liberal bookstores and burnt almost 45,000 books such as those written by Thomas More or George Orwell.⁸ Also, he repressed the trade unions and deeply influenced the economic development. There are even students' and farmers' associations join the underground structures of the Communist Party of Thailand. Instead of weakening the communists, his rule was even a booster of communist power. The polity score was decreased by 10 in this one year.

⁷<http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/08/07/trap-dictator-chad-s-hissene-habre>

⁸Kulick, Elliott and Wilson, Dick, 1996, *Time for Thailand: Profile of a New Success*, Bangkok: White Lotus

Second is the leaders' willingness to stay in office. Democratic Peace theory argues that democratic countries' leaders are caring about staying in office and fearing being voted out. This is almost the same for autocracies. An authoritarian leader cares about staying in the office and a country that under his reign. However, if he is not serving the people and ruling the country in a right way, the result for him might be very cruel, not to mention being voted out. Therefore, for authoritarian leaders, especially in this Information era, staying in office is very difficult no matter what kind of education he has. Under strong social pressure that may possibly overthrow him, even a member or leader of previous coup may give in and carry out political reforms. As I look into the cases, there are leaders who have been trained in military but also robust in buttressing democratization. Roh Tae-woo, a military trained leaders and South Korea president from 1987 to 1993, had been very active in promoting democratization. In 1987 he was named by Chun as the president candidate. This triggered movements and rallies in South Korea called the "June Democratization Movement". Under the social pressure, Roh promised to carry out reforms gradually. And true to his word, he remained committed to democratic reforms from the beginning of his reign in 1987. Another example is Poland president Jaruzelski who served in the military at an early age. Jaruzelski was praised as the harbinger of Poland democracy. He created "bicameral legislature" and legalized Solidarity. His series of domestic policies highly stimulated the political reforms in Poland in the late 1980s.

Third reason is the increasing openness of information. Countries like DPRK are rare recently due to globalization and the era of Information. The world is flat and people don't have to go to other places to know what's happening there. Local education in authoritarian regimes is increasingly objective since everything is open and available on the Internet, just with a click of a mouse. Under this circumstance, there are no fundamental differences between local education and western education. Leaders haven't been abroad can also know what is democracy and how it operates in western countries. Students majoring in Law or politics are learning almost the same knowledge as student abroad. A leader hasn't been to western country or educated there doesn't mean he doesn't understand what is democracy and institutions. The king of Spain in 1975 Juan Carlos have never been studies abroad, but soon after enthronement, Juan Carlos introduced reforms to dismantle the Francoist regime and begin the transition to democracy. This led to the approval of the Spanish Constitution of 1978 in a referendum, which established a constitutional monarchy. He was graduated from a university in Spain majoring in Law and a man who can boost the polity score from -7 to 8 must know what democracy is.

The next question is why western education has no correlation with economic development in the authoritarian country. First is the leaders' cabinet composition. Even the leader is not being educated in a western country or a higher degree in economy, his cabinet may be composed of a group of elites who are well-educated and professional in

boosting economy. For example, in Chile the Pinochet government, the “Chicago boys” are appointed to improve the Chilean economy. Even though Pinochet is a leader with military background, during his governance the Chile economic growth rate keeps high during his in office years. This is not due to his capability of promoting economy but a group of graduates who have been formally educated in economy.

What’s more, boosting economy is not related to the leaders’ educational background. Most western educated leaders are law or politics majors. Economy is not their specialty, not to mention there are many factors influencing the economic development complicating the process of stimulating growth. Even if they hired or co-opt people who are economy majors, let’s say, with western education, it is highly possible that they are having no significant difference with those educated locally. One problem is localization of the policies. The original economy in home country is a key factory to be considered while designing a policy. But for those who have been studying abroad, they may be less informed of the real economic situation back at home countries. Good policies do not equal to successful implementation. Chilean Chicago boys situation is an outlier – not all countries have the opportunity to have a coup and give all finance and economy majors a chance to overthrow all previous economic institutions and build a totally brand new systems. China’s opening up policy was fostered and propelled by Hu Yaobang, Zhao Ziyang and Xi Zhongxun - none of which had been educated abroad, yet they know that only opening up could help Chinese economy and

improve people's living conditions. Jiang Zemin used to be an engineer in China and educated in local college but during his term Chinese economic growth rate continued to be two digits. Therefore, even other factors are controlled in this model, there is no coefficient found between economic growth and the leaders' educational background.

5. Conclusion

This paper questions the previous arguments on the relationship between western education and the democratization of autocracies and proves scientifically that there is no significant correlation. Leaders being educated in democracies don't have significant distinctions from leaders who are educated in local schools, military bases or universities. This result is surprising given the previous arguments on and conventional wisdom of how western democratic civic education can bring a significant difference to the world democratization process. Looking into the leaders' information one by one, I find interesting cases such as leaders with military training background promoting democratization of the country and the polity score was increased from -7 to 8, or leaders having law degree from western democratic countries returned back and implemented harsh restriction policies, etc.. So after delving into cases, I discovered that leaders' western education does not necessarily relate to the democratization or economic growth in a couple of ways. First, the leaders' education in western democratic countries may be acquired to be served as a stepping stone for them to enter the politics and they will still focus on their home country, learning in order to practice back at home, such as Singapore then Prime Minister Lee Guan Yew. Also, locally educated leaders, even without the experience of studying abroad, can still know about the western liberal democracy and how it is operated due to the advanced technology and deepened globalization in the information era. So, leaders don't have to be educated in

western or being socialized there in order to promote political and economic reforms. What's more, leaders, no matter where they get their degree, when facing the dilemma of being kicked out of office or stay with less personal power, they will choose to stay in office. This choice has little to do with leaders' educational background.

There are admittedly some limitations to this thesis as discussed in the above section. First is the over-emphasis on the authoritarian leaders. For future research, more leaders are needed to be added such as the leaders in the Cabinet who may have a say in the policy making process. Second limitation is the control variables. The data set could be enlarged by adding more variables related to this issue, for example, the overall literacy rate of the country, overall students in the authoritarian country studying abroad, Foreign Direct Investment, or for the economic growth rate model, conflicts, civil wars, neighboring democracies or capitalist countries, etc.. Third one is the coding rules of the dataset. If more categories of leaders' education or their type of majors could be available, the results will be more convincing. For example, in the current data set, leaders' foreign educational background is only coded as western if the host countries are democratic one. However, for leaders who acquire degrees from a foreign non-democratic country, the coding rule arbitrarily assigned to local education. What's more, for future research, I would suggest more testing research on the authoritarian regimes' first image analyses such as leaders' ages or policy preferences. In the meantime, more

emphasis can be put on the authoritarian countries' endogenous factors in democratization and development such as demographic issues.

Back to the question: can individuals from autocracy being educated in a western democracy change their ideology and form strong democratic values? The U.S. government expects the answer to be yes, and so do most journalists and researchers. The US Department's Agency for International Development and other government organs have spent hundreds of millions of dollars annually on drawing students from emerging democratic countries or autocracies to study in US with civic education. It has not been very successful.¹ The overall proportion of western educated authoritarian leaders promoting democratization is fairly small among the overall autocracies' leaders being educated in democracies, not to mention the proportion of students who go through civic education in US returning to home countries and buttressing democratization to the overall students being accepted and attracted to the U.S. from autocracies.

From 1960 to 2000, among all the 85 leaders being educated in western countries and returned back to be a leader, only 9 promote the political environment featured by the positive increase of polity score. Thousands of students from autocracies were being

¹ Carothers, Thomas, 1999, *Aiding Democracy Abroad: The Learning Curve*, Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace;
Carothers, Thomas, 1996, *Assessing Democracy Assistance: the Case of Romania*, Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace;

educated in the US during that period, and the chance of them going back to home country and becoming leaders that can promote democratization is very tiny. What the US government is doing by spending tax payers' hundreds of millions of dollar on a field with extremely little chance to achieve their goal? The U.S. government should really think about this.

Appendix A

List of leaders being educated in western countries:

<i>Country</i>	<i>In year</i>	<i>Out year</i>	<i>Leader</i>	<i>Edu. major</i>
Korea South	1979	1980	Choi Kuy Hay	
Bangladesh	1981	1982	Sattar	Law & Polisci
Korea South	1960	1961	Myun Chang	
Bulgaria	1989	1990	Mladenov	IR
Uganda	1979	1980	Banaisa	Law
Afghanistan	1971	1972	Abdul Zahir	MD from Columbia
Congo Brazzaville	1992	1997	Lissouba	Agriculture
Sierra Leone	1996	1997	Kabbah	Law & Econ
Sierra Leone	1964	1967	Margai, A	Medicine
Bangladesh	1996	1996	Mohammad Habibur Rahman	
Burundi	1966	1966	Ntare	
Greece	1963	1963	Pipinelis	Law & Polisci
Greece	1963	1963	Pipinelis	Law & Polisci
Greece	1963	1963	Pipinelis	Law & Polisci
Greece	1963	1963	G. Papandreou	Law
Greece	1963	1963	G. Papandreou	Law
Greece	1963	1963	G. Papandreou	Law
Greece	1967	1967	Kanellopoulos	Law
Greece	1967	1967	Kanellopoulos	Law
Haiti	1988	1988	Manigat	History
Haiti	1988	1988	Manigat	History
Korea South	1961	1961	Chang Do Yong	Social Science
Korea South	1980	1980	Park Choong Hoon	acting education
Laos	1964	1975	Souvanna Phouma	Engineer
Laos	1960	1960	Souvanna Phouma	Engineer
Laos	1960	1960	Souvanna Phouma	Engineer
Laos	1960	1960	Souvanna Phouma	Engineer
Laos	1960	1960	Souvanna Phouma	Engineer
Laos	1962	1964	Souvanna Phouma	Engineer
Mauritania	1979	1979	Ould Sidi	Economy
Mauritania	1979	1979	Ould Sidi	Economy
Nigeria	1993	1993	Shonekan	Law
Panama	1968	1968	Arias, A.	Medical-Harvard
Sierra Leone	1967	1967	Lansana	
Sierra Leone	1996	1996	Bio	Intl. Affair
Syria	1961	1961	Al-kuzbari	Law
Thailand	1975	1975	Seni Pramoj	Law

Thailand	1976	1976	Seni Pramoj	Law
Thailand	1976	1976	Seni Pramoj	Law
Vietnam South	1965	1965	Quat	Medicine
Vietnam South	1965	1965	Quat	Medicine
Vietnam South	1965	1965	Khahn	
Vietnam South	1965	1965	Khahn	
Benin	1965	1967	Soglo	Law &econ
Benin	1963	1964	Soglo	Law &econ
Benin	1964	1965	Apithy	Legal &econ
Togo	1963	1967	Grunitzky	civil engineer
Sierra Leone	1968	1985	Stevens	labor relation
Ghana	1969	1972	Busia	History
Syria	1962	1963	El-Kudsi	Law
Benin	1991	1996	Soglo, C	Law &econ
Ghana	1979	1981	Limann	Polisci
Afghanistan	1972	1973	Mohammad Musa Shafiq	Columbia
Nicaragua	1967	1979	Anastasio Somoza Debayle	West Point
Senegal	1981	2000	Diouf	Law
Honduras	1990	1994	Callejas	agricultural economy
Syria	1961	1962	El-Kudsi	Law
Mali	1968	1991	Traore	Engineer
El Salvador	1982	1984	Magana Borjo	U Chicago master
Chad	1982	1990	Habre	Polisci
Ghana	1978	1979	Akuffo	Law
Botswana	1980	1998	Masire	South Africa
Ivory Coast	1993	1999	Konan Bedie	
Bangladesh	1990	1991	Ahmed	Politics
Panama	1968	1981	Torrijos Herrera	WHINSEC
Afghanistan	1973	1978	Sardar Mohammad Daud Khan	
Peru	1963	1968	Belaunde	Architecture
Honduras	1994	1998	Reina	social science
Nicaragua	1990	1997	Violeta Chamorro	U Virginia
Greece	1964	1965	G. Papandreou	Law
Tanzania	1985	1995	Mwinyi	Econ &History
El Salvador	1989	1994	Cristiani	Business
Guatemala	1991	1993	Serrano Elias	Stanford
Thailand	1975	1976	Kukrot Pramoj	Philosophy
Malaysia	1970	1976	Razak	Economy
Thailand	1973	1975	Sanya	Law
Thailand	1976	1977	Thanin Kraivichien	Law
Turkey	1972	1973	Melen	Finance
Philippines	1986	1992	Aquino	Math &French
Thailand	1991	1992	Panyarachun	Law

Thailand	1988	1991	Choonhavan	
Indonesia	1998	1999	Habibie	Engineer
China	1980	1997	Deng Xiaoping	Law

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