

The Politics of Foreign Military Bases

by

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Dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of
the requirements for the degree of Doctor
of Philosophy in the Department of
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ABSTRACT

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Abstract

Foreign military bases are anomalies in a world of sovereign states. Why do major powers station their finite military forces to protect other countries and how does the distribution of these bases relate to a country's grand strategy? Why do host-nations give up their sovereignty and allow foreign forces, capable of existential violence, to deploy within their borders? This dissertation takes a mixed method approach to each of these questions. For the first, I combine descriptive case studies relating the basing postures of five major powers and to their respective grand strategies with a quantitative analysis of the correlates of the US military basing network. To answer the second, I test the role of host-nation security conditions on US military access and then conduct an in-depth process tracing of US-Philippine basing relations. I find that foreign military bases are essential for super-power status and are an arena for great power competition. I conclude that the US foreign basing posture is strongly aligned with American trade relationships and against US enemies. For host-nation motivations, I conclude that security threats to the host-nation matter, but not uniformly. External threats have the greatest influence in increasing foreign military access, but low-intensity revolutionary threats actually tend to decrease a host-nation's willingness to accommodate foreign forces.

Dedication

This work is dedicated to the Lord God who brought the peace that passes understanding in my dark night of the soul.

Disclaimer

The opinions and assertions expressed herein are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the United States Air Force or the Department of Defense.

Contents

Abstract.....	iv
Disclaimer.....	vi
Contents	vii
List of Tables	x
List of Figures.....	xi
Acknowledgements.....	xii
1. Introduction.....	1
1.1 Why Build Foreign Bases?	7
1.2 Why Allow Foreign Bases?.....	12
1.3 Defining Military Bases.....	25
1.4 Types of Foreign Bases	32
1.4.1 Basing Level Typology	34
1.4.1 Interest Balance Typology	39
1.4.2 Are Foreign Bases Consensual?	43
2. Major Powers and Foreign Military Bases	47
2.1 Russia	48
2.2 United Kingdom	56
2.3 France	64
2.4 China.....	72
2.5 The United States.....	80
2.5.1 US Bases in Europe.....	85
2.5.2 US Bases in Asia.....	87

2.5.3 US Bases in the Middle East.....	91
2.5.4 US Bases in Africa	94
2.5.5 US Bases in Latin America	99
2.6 Lessons about Sending-State Motivation	101
3. American Grand Strategy and the Correlates of US Military Basing.....	109
3.1 Measuring US Foreign Basing	111
3.2 Theoretical Correlates of US Military Basing.....	112
3.2.1 Security.....	112
3.2.2 Geography	116
3.2.3 Ideology.....	117
3.2.4 Economics	119
3.3 Data & Models.....	122
3.3.1 US Foreign Basing and Eras of American Grand Strategy	129
3.4 Conclusion.....	133
4. Host-Nation Motivations: Security Conditions and Foreign Military Access	136
4.2 Security Conditions and Foreign Military Access.....	136
4.3 Empirical Test.....	143
4.3.1 Dependent Variable.....	143
4.3.2 Independent Variables.....	147
4.3.3 Control Variables	151
Conflict Propensity	151
4.3.4 Models.....	154
4.3.5 Conclusion.....	164

5. The Philippines 1965-2013: A Within-Case Comparison	166
5.1 Methodology.....	168
5.2.1 Why the Philippines?	171
5.2 Prelude: The History of US Military Bases in the Philippines.....	175
5.3 The 1947 Military Basing Agreement: Dependent Independence	180
5.4 The 1979 MBA: Revolutionary Threat & Reduced US Access.....	183
5.5 The 1983 Extension: Increasing Intensity & Continued US Access.....	193
5.6 The 1988 "Open Options" Policy and the Dual Revolutionary Threat	196
5.7 The 1991 Post-Cold War Peace and the End of US Military Bases.....	201
5.7.1 Alternative Explanations and Other Factors	210
5.8 The 1998 VFA: The Return Great Power Conflict...and GI Joe	215
5.9 Epilogue.....	222
5.10 Conclusion.....	225
6. Conclusion	228
6.1 Academic Contribution.....	230
6.2 Limitations & Extensions	232
6.3 Policy Implications and Recommendations	236
Appendix A: Selected Interviews	241
Bibliography	243
Biography.....	261

List of Tables

Table 1: Current Russian Military Bases	49
Table 2: Summary Statistics for Correlates of US Basing.....	123
Table 3: Correlates of US Foreign Military Bases, Full Sample (1983-2015)...	124
Table 4: Correlates of US Foreign Bases, Alternative DV, Logit Models	127
Table 5: Correlates of US Foreign Bases Across Foreign Policy Eras.....	130
Table 8: Summary of Findings; Correlates of US Basing	134
Table 9: Security Conditions and Foreign Military Access.....	137
Table 10: When Foreign Military Access Happens.....	149
Table 11: Security Conditions & Basing Access Control Variables	153
Table 12: Regression Table of Basing Access and External Threats	155
Table 13: Regression Table of Types of Civil Conflict & Basing Access	158
Table 14: Regression Table of Civil Conflict Intensity & Basing Access	160

List of Figures

Figure 1: Foreign Military Basing Levels.....	35
Figure 2: Current French Overseas Bases.....	65
Figure 3: Chinese Arms Importers, 2002-2017	78
Figure 4: US Defense Personnel and Facilities Abroad, 2017....	Error! Bookmark not defined.
Figure 5: Countries Hosting US Military Bases	Error! Bookmark not defined.
Figure 6: Nations Hosting US Military Bases by Basing Level	84
Figure 7: US Troops by Region	89
Figure 8: US Access Agreements with African States	97
Figure 9: African States Hosting US Military Bases, 2000-2015.....	99
Figure 10: Average Marginal Effects of Correlates on US Basing	126
Figure 11: Correlates of US Basing by Foreign Policy Era.....	133
Figure 12: Average Marginal Effects of External Threats.....	156
Figure 13: Effects of Low and High Intensity Revolutionary Threats	162
Figure 14: Effects of Low and High Intensity Separatist Threats	163
Figure 15: Process Tracing of Revolution Brewing and Military Access	170
Figure 16 Philippine Military Expenditure	206
Figure 17: US Security Assistance to the Philippines, 2000-2015	218
Figure 18: Timeline of Revolutionary Threats and Basing Negotiations	Error! Bookmark not defined.

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1. Introduction

In 2008 I left for my first overseas deployment as an American military officer. Sprawled on a Thermarest camping pad between slumbering US Army rangers and tied-down cargo pallets, my transcontinental flight was a virtual biopsy of the connective tissue of the American liberal leviathan. Our C-17 inter-theater airlift transited the US Air Force hub of Ramstein Air Base in the German Rhineland and refueled at a US naval station in the Gulf kingdom of Bahrain before executing a combat landing into the expeditionary airfield at Bagram Air Base in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. This completely unremarkable journey (or one like it) is repeated nearly every day somewhere in the world as US military aircraft connect Honduras to Honolulu and Thule to Thailand. The liberal world order is built on JP-8 jet fuel and HESCO barriers.

Nor is the United States the only great power with foreign bases. Russia, the United Kingdom, France, and, most recently, China all have established military bases in foreign countries. These global networks of foreign military bases are obscure to most civilians and taken for granted by many security scholars. However, a foreign military base is actually a puzzling phenomenon. A state's military forces exist fundamentally for the purpose of protecting that state's territory and citizens. Yet, great powers regularly station military forces abroad with at least the partial mission of protecting another countries' territory and people. Furthermore, these bases can come at great expense to the sending-state. One report estimated that the annual recurring cost to keep open an

American foreign base was between \$50 million and \$200 million.¹ Why are great powers willing to shoulder these costs?

For a potential host-nation the decision to allow a foreign country to station military troops in its sovereign territory is equally puzzling. At its core, this choice represents a fundamental tension between potentially increasing its security and possibly undermining its legitimacy. By granting foreign military access, a host-nation stands to gain protection from threats, access to advanced military technology and training, and often direct and indirect economic benefits. But it must also place its trust in another, usually much more powerful, actor. The host-nation thus cedes partial control of its foreign policy and gives the occupying state the opportunity and incentive to meddle in its domestic politics. This diminution of sovereignty erodes the host government's legitimacy. The basic social contract of modern governments is that they provide order and security, with some degree of popular representation, in exchange for the right to rule. By outsourcing a portion of the security-providing function to a foreign actor, host-nations weaken their legitimate claim to govern. How do potential host-nations calculate this tradeoff?

To address these puzzles, this dissertation takes a multi-method approach to the politics of foreign military basing by combining historical case study and quantitative empirical analysis. Beginning in Chapter 1, I set the framework for the rest of the

¹ Lostumbo, Michael J., Michael J. McNerney, Eric Peltz, Derek Eaton, David R. Frelinger, Victoria A. Greenfield, John Halliday, et al. "Overseas Basing of U.S. Military Forces: An Assessment of Relative Costs and Strategic Benefits." Research Report. RAND National Defense Research Institute, 2013. https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR201.html, xxv.

dissertation by outlining and reviewing the literature on the two sides of foreign basing politics: sending-state and host-nation motivations. On the sending-state side, international relations scholarship tends to view foreign basing uniformly as great power beneficence to allies and as a deterrent against rival power encroachment but does not systematically explore why a great power place bases in a specific country as I do in Chapter Three. Those few books or think-tank reports that do address specific sending-state motivations tend to be either outdated or narrowly focused on policy prescription for specific US military service planners.

I then turn to the literature on basing politics which focuses on why host-nations allow or reject foreign military basing in order to establish a context for Chapters 4 and 5. I review the theoretical economic and security benefits as well as the sovereignty and legitimacy costs that affect host-nations' decisions. These decisions are not simply the choices of a unitary actor but should also be seen as the result of the interplay of multiple domestic political and bureaucratic groups within the host-nation. To end this introductory chapter, I establish a definition of foreign military bases and consider typologies of foreign basing. Although it might seem simple, defining what is and what is not a foreign military base is contested and somewhat complicated.

In Chapter 2, I explore sending-state motivations through a descriptive overview of the foreign basing postures of five "great powers": Russia, France, the United Kingdom, China, and the United States. I discuss the current state, historical legacy, and future prospects of foreign military bases for each major power and how these bases fit into their respective grand strategies.

In Chapter 3, I dive more deeply into the US basing motivation by conducting a statistical analysis of the correlates of American military bases. This study explores the characteristics most often associated with US overseas military basing locations through the late Cold War, 1990s, and the post-9/11 eras. Together these qualitative and quantitative chapters shed light on why great powers would want foreign military bases.

Next, I turn to the puzzle of why a host-nation would allow foreign military forces in their country. In Chapter 4, I attempt to fill a gap in the basing politics literature on the role of civil conflict in host-nations' decisions regarding foreign basing. The prevailing wisdom in international relations theory is that foreign military forces provide the host-nation with protection from external threats. But what drives host-nation decision-making when the threats to the regime are primarily internal?

A security-based explanation would suggest that a state facing internal threats would desire foreign military bases in order to gain military and economic aid and thus improve state capacity. On the other hand, the basing politics literature asserts that allowing foreign military forces access to sovereign territory reduces the host government's legitimacy. Therefore, the imperative to burnish nationalist credentials and mitigate competing sources of power could drive these embattled regimes to deny foreign military presence. States embroiled in civil conflict are thus caught with an acute need for both security and legitimacy.

I propose that the *type* of civil conflict matters in how states resolve this dilemma. I offer a theory of security conditions and civil conflict that accounts for external and internal security threats as well as the type and intensity of civil conflicts. This argument produces the testable hypotheses that states facing external or separatist internal threats

are more likely to increase and publicly acknowledge foreign military access, while states with revolutionary internal threats or no significant security threats are likely to decrease and obscure the presence of foreign military forces.

I test these hypotheses using a diversity of methodologies and geographic regions in Chapters 4 and 5. First, I perform a large-n quantitative analysis of global US military access from 1985 to 2015 to assess the general explanatory power of civil conflict intensity-types. In Chapter 5, I conduct a within-case study of the political process surrounding US base negotiations in the Philippines from the Cold War to the War on Terror in order to trace the mechanisms and observable implications suggested by my argument. This approach combines the strengths of case study analysis in tracing in depth the causal mechanisms of my argument while also testing its generalizability using cross-national longitudinal data.

Finally, in Chapter 6 I conclude by discussing the academic contributions and policy implications of this dissertation as well as its limitations and possible extensions. This project makes important contributions to debates within the study of American grand strategy as well as to basing politics, an understudied area of security scholarship. It bridges a theoretical gap between international relations, which privileges the external system, and comparative politics, which focuses on domestic institutions, and neither of which address the role of internal conflict. As intrastate conflict has become more common than interstate war, the lack of a theory of civil conflict and foreign basing has left a gaping hole in our understanding of how states make decisions about foreign military access.

It is right to acknowledge that this dissertation is limited in several important ways. First, for data availability reasons my quantitative analysis is scoped to the last 30 years and focused on the United States. This choice could limit the generalizability of the findings for non-Western powers, but also provides the opportunity for further research to extend the analysis backward in time and more broadly to other sending-states. Second, this dissertation is limited in that I chose to model the decisions of the sending-state and host-nation separately. This choice allows me to isolate each decision and unpack the specific factors affecting it, but this approach does account for the strategic interaction between the great-power and potential host. A valuable extension of this work would be to formally model this game theoretic interaction. Finally, the path dependence of foreign bases, my country-year unit of analysis, and the way I measure basing may reduce variation in the dependent variable.

The policy and strategic relevance of this dissertation is clear. Gaining and maintaining military access to key regions of the world is vital to American grand strategy. Since the early 2000s the United States has shifted its basing strategy from relying on a few large main operating bases (MOBs) on the territory of stable, long-standing allies to a “lily-pad” strategy of smaller, more dispersed and more temporary facilities. Consequently, the United States is seeking greater access in less developed and politically unstable states where civil conflict and internal threats predominate over external threats. As is playing out in real time in Iraq today, the domestic pressures facing host-nation governments have significant effects on America’s ability to execute its regional strategies. For American policymakers, protesters along the fence-line may pose

greater threats to their foreign bases than enemy ballistic missiles, and my project sheds important light on the political currents swirling around host-nation access decisions.

Furthermore, American policymakers are focused on responding to the return of great power conflict after decades of low-intensity conflict. Understanding why and where great powers seek foreign military bases will be crucial for American strategists as they confront a Russia and China that are both seeking to expand their foreign basing posture.

1.1 Why Build Foreign Bases?

Foreign military bases are expensive, require robust communication, transport, and supply networks, and impose substantial burdens on servicemembers and their families. Why then do great powers build them? The international relations and defense policy literature has identified two main reasons: power projection and deterrence/assurance.

At its most basic level, states build foreign military bases because they have external interests for which deploying military forces from the home country is insufficient. Foreign military bases greatly enhance a country's ability to project force. Even with modern transportation systems it is difficult to move large numbers of soldiers, equipment, and supplies long-distances on short timelines. Therefore, states with global interests find it helpful to forward deploy military forces near areas of potential conflict. Even with the advantages of modern airlift, the distance of transoceanic travel means that a unit coming from Vicenza, Italy could respond for a non-combatant evacuation operation (NEO) in North Africa in a third of the time it would take to fly from Fort Bragg, NC. This is especially true when threats are persistent and difficult to predict, as

with transnational terrorism and international piracy. Moreover, the hardest part of planning expeditionary military operations is ensuring logistical requirements are met. Prepositioning equipment and supplies in forward bases greatly simplify these logistical challenges.

The foreign basing literature has long recognized this benefit of basing. Robert Harkavy (1981, 1989, 2007), in the foundational works on foreign basing, established that sending-states want foreign bases because they extend the reach and effect of that state's military power.² Morrow (1991), in his "autonomy-security tradeoff" model of alliance bargaining, affirms this concept of basing as enhancing the stronger ally's power projection capability, which in turn increases the it's autonomy.³

Pettyjohn (2011) documented that as the United States' global ambitions and interests grew so did the extent of its overseas military presence as forward basing allows America to respond rapidly to faraway crises.⁴ The power projection benefit of foreign basing is a comprehensively detailed in a number of RAND strategic posture analyses.⁵

Foreign military bases can enable not only direct power projection of the sending-state but also power projection through proxies in the form of security cooperation.

² Robert E. Harkavy, *Great Power Competition for Overseas Bases: The Geopolitics of Access Diplomacy* (Pergamon, 1982); Robert E. Harkavy, *Bases Abroad: The Global Foreign Military Presence* (Oxford University Press on Demand, 1989); Robert E. Harkavy, *Strategic Basing and the Great Powers, 1200-2000* (London ; New York: Routledge, 2007).

³ James D. Morrow, "Alliances and Asymmetry: An Alternative to the Capability Aggregation Model of Alliances," *American Journal of Political Science* 35, no. 4 (November 1991): 904.

⁴ Stacie L. Pettyjohn, *U.S. Global Defense Posture, 1783/2011* (Santa Monica, California: RAND, 2012).Pettyjohn, 11.

⁵ Pettyjohn, *U.S. Global Defense Posture, 1783/2011*; Lostumbo et al., "Overseas Basing of U.S. Military Forces:An Assessment of Relative Costs and Strategic Benefits"; Stacie L. Pettyjohn and Jennifer Kavanagh, *Access Granted: Political Challenges to the U.S. Overseas Military Presence, 1945-2014*, Research Report, RR-1339-AF (Santa Monica, Calif: RAND Corporation, 2016).

Security cooperation is a broad term that includes security assistance (arms and military equipment sales or transfers), military training and exercises, intelligence sharing, combat and security sector advisement, logistical support, and even combined warfighting. While a major power could provide this assistance without a base, an enduring military presence makes it easier. Security cooperation could be directed against external state threats, as in the US-South Korea case. When security cooperation is directed against internal threats, US military doctrine calls it foreign internal defense (FID). FID is the “participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government or other designated organization to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats to its security.”⁶ These operations often involve many political and economic development activities, but almost always include training and advisement to increase security force capacity. Many of the newest American bases, especially the Cooperative Security Locations, primarily serve the function of building host-nation capacity, most often in the counterinsurgency and counterterrorism arenas. Although they may not actually use the term “foreign internal defense,” many states engage in security cooperation by attempting to prop up allies and client states against internal threats. Besides the prominent examples of the United States’ prolonged conflicts in Vietnam and Afghanistan, Cuba’s military involvement in Angola and Mozambique during the Cold War and Russia’s current support for the Assad regime in Syria all constitute foreign internal defense operations.

⁶ US Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Joint Publication 3-22: Foreign Internal Defense,” July 12, 2010.

Foreign bases also play an important role in extended deterrence and the coercion of rivals. Fifty years ago, Thomas Schelling (1966) wrote about the difficulty of making a credible commitment, in the eyes of enemies, that the United States would actually go to war on another's behalf. He argued that foreign military deployments were a way of extending the credibility of commitment from the homeland to other states. How does the United States do this? By stationing US forces in another state to act as a "trip wire" or "plate glass window." As Schelling writes of the US garrison in Berlin, against the mass of the Soviet Union, "what can 7,000 American troops do, or 12,000 Allied troops? Bluntly, they can die. They can die heroically, dramatically, and in a manner that guarantees that the action cannot stop there."⁷ While foreign military bases extend deterrence by raising the cost of inaction, they conversely enable coercive diplomacy by lowering the cost of action. A major power's coercive threats are more credible when the forces needed to carry them out are already mobilized and in position.

Foreign military bases can not only help deter enemies, but also assure allies who are often fearful of abandonment. These bases provide tangible reminders of the major power's commitment and a material incentive to defend its host-nation ally. Ikenberry (2011) argues that US security provision has been key to maintaining its liberal hegemony and preventing counterbalancing by other states.⁸ The assurance that American allies have gained from US military bases on their soil is a major component of this security provision.

⁷ Thomas C. Schelling, *Arms and Influence*, Yale University Press, 1966, 47.

⁸ G. John Ikenberry, *Liberal Leviathan: The Origins, Crisis, and Transformation of the American World Order*, (Princeton University Press, 2011), 134.

The demonstration of military power that is inherent to foreign bases is not entirely beneficent, though. The foreign military presence also serves as a warning against defection by the host-nation ally. If the host-nation sought to dramatically reorient its foreign policy, the presence of military forces might enable the sending-state to support a coup, break away a piece of territory, or even directly overthrow the government. Foreign military bases thus allow sending-states to not only assure allies, but, to a degree, control them. This is a motivation that many anti-basing advocates ascribe to the United States in their critiques of foreign military basing.⁹

The sending-state motivations discussed above are not mutually exclusive; a single base may have several functions simultaneously. Also, the functions that an individual base plays may depend as much on the perspective of the viewer and the regional security environment as on the character of the specific base. As an example, one can compare Papa Air Base, Hungary and Soto Cano Air Base, Honduras. Papa AB serves a main base for the NATO Strategic Airlift Capability, an initiative where NATO allies jointly operate a shared heavy airlift wing.¹⁰ This base simultaneously serves as an assuring show of presence to Eastern European NATO allies, a deterrent to Russia, a power projection platform into the Middle East and Central Asia, and a capacity building security cooperation program for the ten participating NATO allies. Soto Cano AB, on the other hand, is a similar-sized base whose Joint Task Force Bravo serves the primary

⁹ Catherine Lutz, ed., *The Bases of Empire : The Global Struggle against U.S. Military Posts* (Pluto Press, 2009); David Vine, *Base Nation : How U.S. Military Bases Abroad Harm America and the World*, First edition. (New York: Metropolitan Books, Henry Holt and Company, 2015).

¹⁰ NATO Support and Procurement Agency. "Pápa Air Base - SAC Main Operating Base." Accessed December 10, 2019. <https://www.nspa.nato.int/en/organization/NAMP/papa.htm>.

functions of power projection against transnational criminal organizations and security cooperation with other Latin American militaries.¹¹

What we know from the extant literature on sending-state motivation is that foreign military bases are valuable to countries who can afford them because they enable states to extend their power, deter their enemies, and influence their allies in ways that they cannot from within their national borders. In Chapters Two and Three I attempt to correct where this literature falls short. The international relations scholarship tends to focus on the theoretical motivations of why sending-states might want foreign bases in principle but do not address why states put bases in the countries that they do. The think-tank reports on US basing posture are detailed and specific but are focused on prescription for the United States government and not on a more universal understanding sending-state motivation. Finally, Harkavy does analyze multiple great powers and situates their basing postures within their broader strategic goals, but his emphasis is on the Cold War and his analysis barely extends to the early 2000s. My analysis in Chapters Two and Three can be seen as picking up the basing politics torch from Harkavy and extending it into the 21st century. In this next section I will review the literature on the flip-side of the foreign basing coin: why host-nations allow foreign bases.

1.2 Why Allow Foreign Bases?

Why do states voluntarily allow other countries to base military forces on their territory? The presence of these foreign forces reduces the host-nation's sovereignty and

¹¹ Joint Task Force- Bravo. "About Us." Accessed December 10, 2019. <https://www.jtfb.southcom.mil/About-Us/>.

undermines the government's legitimacy. Yet, scores of states allow foreign militaries to base on their territory. The United States currently has real property in 41 foreign countries.¹² Djibouti hosts not only an American military base, but also a French and Chinese one as well. If granting foreign military access undermines a state's legitimacy, why do so many do it?

Host-nations allow foreign military bases in their sovereign territories because they receive economic and security benefits for doing so. Thus, the decision facing potential host-nation regimes regarding whether to allow foreign basing is about choosing between economic and security benefits and political costs. I formalize this tradeoff deductively in Chapter 4, but a more intuitive picture of this tension involves a reformulation of the old "guns vs butter" model. In the simplest terms, a host-nation's choice regarding foreign basing is a choice between guns *and* butter versus votes.

This next section reviews the international relations and basing politics literature to substantiate the economic/security benefits versus political costs tradeoff that I propose. I then discuss the balance between sending-state and host-nation interests, how consensual basing relations really are, and the role of domestic political groups in the host-nation.

Economic Benefits

The economic benefits that a foreign basing host-nation receives can come directly through lease payments as foreign aid or loans. Harkavy (1989) found a link between US and Soviet economic assistance and the states where each superpower had

¹² Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Energy, Installations, and Environment, "Base Structure Report- Fiscal Year 2017 Baseline: A Summary of Real Property Inventory."

their respective bases during the Cold War.¹³ Clarke and O'Connor (1993) argue that despite official American reluctance to openly acknowledge foreign aid to basing countries as “rent,” this is the best description of reality.¹⁴ Calder (2007), using an admittedly small sample, shows that economic assistance increases to countries that host new US bases and declines when countries reject US bases.¹⁵ In addition to these direct assistance carrots, a host-nation might offer more indirect economic incentives such as debt forgiveness, foreign direct investment, or beneficial trade terms. As an example, the (now defunct) Kharkov agreement signed by Russia and Ukraine in 2010 extended Russia’s lease of its Black Sea Fleet base in Crimea by 25 years in exchange for a 30% subsidy in the price of Russian natural gas.¹⁶

A host-nation can also receive “milieu” economic benefits that are not quid-pro-quo transfers from the sending-state. Jones and Kane (2012) show that the presence of US troops in a country increases the host-nation’s economic growth. They attribute this outcome both to the regional peace and stability brought by the presence of US troops as well as the transfer of wealth-producing technology, institutions, and ideas.¹⁷ Jones (2012) even finds that US troop presence improves less intuitive aspects of social development such life expectancy, infant mortality rates, and telephone infrastructure.¹⁸

¹³ Harkavy, *Bases Abroad* 349-364,

¹⁴ Clarke, Duncan L., and Daniel O’Connor. “US Base-Rights Payments after the Cold War.” *Orbis* 37, no. 3 (1993): 441–457.

¹⁵ Kent E. Calder, *Embattled Garrisons: Comparative Base Politics and American Globalism* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007), 202.

¹⁶ Watson, Ivan, and Maxim Tkachenko. “Russia, Ukraine Agree on Naval-Base-for-Gas Deal.” *CNN*, April 21, 2010. <http://www.cnn.com/2010/WORLD/europe/04/21/russia.ukraine/index.html>.

¹⁷ Jones, G., and T. Kane. “U.S. Troops and Foreign Economic Growth.” *Defence and Peace Economics* 23, no. 3 (June 1, 2012): 225–49.

¹⁸ Kane, Tim. “Development and US Troop Deployments.” *Foreign Policy Analysis* 8, no. 3 (July 1, 2012): 255–73.

The employment of local labor, the engagement of local companies as base suppliers, and the consumer activity of foreign military personnel in the local economy all provide micro-level economic benefits to the host-nation. Blankenship and Miles-Joyce (2019) demonstrate a strong link between US defense spending and US military access as well as a positive relationship between US defense spending in a country and that state's economic growth.¹⁹

It is clear that most states who host foreign military bases receive some economic benefit for doing so, whether in the form of direct rents or from more diffuse “milieu” mechanisms. Some scholars, such as Cooley and Nexon (2013) and Blankenship and Miles (2018), conceptualize basing negotiations primarily as a marketplace between buyers (sending-states) and sellers (the host-nation) in which these direct or indirect forms of rent are the primary incentives with little regard for host-nation security concerns.²⁰ However, economic motivations are clearly not the only factor; in some cases, such as Japan, the host-nation actually pays to defray the cost of US military presence. How much the sending-state needs to directly pay for basing access has a lot to do with how much the host-nation values the security benefits of foreign basing. While military bases may have economic benefits, their function is primarily military and so security benefits are an essential part of the host-nation motivation story.

Security Benefits

¹⁹ Blankenship, Brian, and Renanah Miles Joyce. “Purchasing Power: US Overseas Defense Spending and Military Statecraft.” *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, June 18, 2019.

²⁰ Miles, Renanah, and Brian Blankenship. “Market for Access: Competition, Need, and the Prospects for Power Projection.” Unpublished, 2018; Cooley, Alexander, and Daniel H. Nexon. “‘The Empire Will Compensate You’: The Structural Dynamics of the US Overseas Basing Network.” *Perspectives on Politics* 11, no. 4 (2013): 1034–1050.

It is intuitive that a host-nation might allow foreign military bases for financial reasons. A slightly, less intuitive reason, but the one most commonly put forth in international relations scholarship, is “great power protection. These security benefits come in two forms: 1) great power protection against external invasion and 2) security assistance that increases host-nation military capacity.

IR scholars have long thought of foreign military basing as a form of great power protection against external invasion. Schelling (1966) asserted that while it was easy to convince the Soviets the United States would defend California, it would be harder to convince them it would defend Seoul or Berlin. The effectiveness of deterrence, then, “often depends on attaching to particular areas some of the status of California.”²¹ One reason a state might want foreign military basing because it brings them an approximation of the protection from hostile invasion that the great power enjoys at home.

This conception of military access as protection runs through more recent work as well. Morrow (1991) models alliance formation as an "autonomy-security tradeoff" of alliance bargaining where weaker powers trade autonomy (sovereignty) through military basing in exchange for security from external threats.²² Lake (2009) conceives of deployed troops (and foreign military bases) as an indicator of security hierarchy. He assumes that the subordinate state has ceded authority over its security policy to the stronger state in exchange for protection, order, and the ability to divert its resources to

²¹ Thomas C. Schelling, *Arms and Influence*, Yale University Press, 1966, 56.

²² James D. Morrow, “Alliances and Asymmetry: An Alternative to the Capability Aggregation Model of Alliances,” *American Journal of Political Science* 35, no. 4 (November 1991): 904.

non-defense goals. He identifies three variables as likely contributing to a state's voluntary subordination: external threat, poverty, and democracy.²³ In all these conceptions of great power protection the security benefit that the host-nation receives from a foreign base is the increased confidence the sending-state will fight for them in the event that they are attacked.

Having a great power fight on one's behalf is not the only security benefit that foreign military bases are likely to confer. Hosting a foreign military base is also likely to improve the capacity of one's own military. A host-nation could receive this increase in military capacity through security cooperation programs that include foreign military sales and loans, access to advanced military technology, joint training and exercises, donation of excess material, or shared intelligence. Harkavy (1989) found a strong correlation for both the United States and the Soviet Union between the nations hosting their foreign basing and the recipients of their respective arms sales and security assistance programs.²⁴ Calder (2007) confirmed that this trend has continued to hold true for the US into the contemporary era.²⁵

Political Costs: Sovereignty and Legitimacy

If foreign military bases bring economic and security benefits, they also impose political penalties on host-nation regimes in the form of both sovereignty and legitimacy costs. The sovereignty costs to the host-nation regime stem from the loss of autonomy that is inherent to increasing dependence another political actor. The legitimacy costs are

²³ David A. Lake, *Hierarchy in International Relations* (Cornell University Press, 2009).

²⁴ Harkavy, *Bases Abroad*, ch. 10.

²⁵ Calder, 201-206.

audience costs when the national population reduces its respect for the regime because of the base and its spillover problems for which they hold the regime responsible.

The *sovereignty* cost of hosting a foreign military base is that the host-nation regime is constrained in its strategic autonomy. The price, and power, of the credible commitment device of a foreign military base is that it cannot be easily overthrown. A country which hosts a large contingent of foreign troops, and thus an implicit threat of military force, is not free to do whatever it wants. The sending-state has leverage over the host-nation with regard to its foreign policies. The presence of the military base makes it less likely that the host-nation will leave the alliance orbit of the sending-state and join a rival bloc, although US-Turkish relations are providing a real-time demonstration of the limits of this logic.

The presence of a foreign base also creates the potential that the host-nation could become entrapped in a broader conflict due to the sending-state. Hoopes (1958), Clarke & O'Connor (1993), and Heller & Lammerant (2009) all document that the fear of being pulled into a nuclear exchange between the United States and the Soviet Union was an evergreen argument of anti-base activists during the Cold War.²⁶

Foreign military bases also give sending-states the incentive and opportunity to become involved in the domestic politics of host-nations. Host-nation regimes are likely to receive pressure to remain aligned with the sending-state on both broader ideology as well as on the specific issue of continued foreign military presence. This pressure could

²⁶ Hoopes, Townsend. "Overseas Bases in American Strategy." *Foreign Affairs* 37, no. 1 (1958), 72; David Heller and Hans Lammerant, "U.S. Nuclear Weapons Bases in Europe," and Roland G. Simbulan "People's Movement Responses to Evolving U.S. Military Activities in the Philippines," in Lutz, Catherine, ed. *The Bases of Empire: The Global Struggle against U.S. Military Posts*. London: Pluto Press, 2009.

range from rhetorical support and funding for pro-base candidates to the outright overthrow of a non-compliant government. Simbulan (2009) accuses the United States of manipulating Filipino politics for American benefit while Calder (2007) argues that the United States has tended to support dictators when military bases were at stake.²⁷

In addition to this loss of sovereignty, host-nation regimes can pay audience costs in terms of *legitimacy* due to the presence of a foreign base. If the foreign base is perceived by the local population as not contributing to their national security, then they are likely to view the government that is allowing it as less legitimate. Max Weber defined a state at its most basic level as “a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly on the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory.”²⁸ Granting another state military access to its territory weakens the host-nation regime’s monopoly on force and can become a symbol of the impotence of the host-nation regime. symbolic of wounding national pride. Gerson (2009) testifies that many anti-basing groups point to the mere presence of a foreign base as an affront to national pride.²⁹

Furthermore, military bases can often generate negative externalities in terms of crime, pollution, and friction with the local society. Many anti-basing activists bristle at the immunity from local prosecution which Status of Forces Agreements provide foreign forces. Even if they are rare, high-profile crimes by foreign servicemembers can further

²⁷ Roland G. Simbulan “People’s Movement Responses to Evolving U.S. Military Activities in the Philippines,” in Lutz, Catherine, ed. *The Bases of Empire: The Global Struggle against U.S. Military Posts*. London: Pluto Press, 2009, 172; Calder, 116.

²⁸ Max Weber, “Politics as a Vocation,” in *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology*, ed. H.H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (New York: Oxford University Press, 1946).

²⁹ Gerson, Joseph. “U.S. Foreign Military Bases and Military Colonialism: Personal and Analytical Perspectives.” In *The Bases of Empire: The Global Struggle against U.S. Military Posts*, edited by Catherine Lutz. London: Pluto Press, 2009, 30.

galvanize local public opinion against foreign bases. The 1995 rape of a 12 year old Okinawan girl by US Marines triggered widespread protests and continues to plague the US-Japanese relationship.³⁰ In the Philippines, a US Marine who killed a local transgender woman in 2014 was convicted by a Philippine court but continues to be guarded by US forces on a Philippine military base at great cost and annoyance to the American relationship with its former colony. Holmes (2014), in a study of social unrest around military bases in Germany and Turkey, sees the willingness of host nation populations to tolerate foreign basing as a function of the legitimacy of protection against external threats and the amount of collateral local harm (criminal, environmental, militarist, etc.).³¹ Despite the theoretical “guns and butter benefits” of foreign assistance, if the national government is seen as unwilling or unable to fix these problems their legitimacy is likely to be reduced.

Thus far we have talked about the “host-nation” as a rational, unitary actor. This assumption is useful for general theorizing but betrays the reality of how basing politics often works. The “decision” of a host-nation is often really a compromise between domestic political groups or the result of the pulling and hauling of bureaucratic factions.³² Much of the basing-politics literature cracks open the unitary actor of the “host-nation” to consider the roles of different domestic groups.

³⁰ Horton, Alex. “Okinawa Has Been Eager to Expel U.S. Troops. A Murder-Suicide Is Pouring Fuel on Those Flames.” *Washington Post*, April 16, 2019. <https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2019/04/15/okinawa-has-been-eager-expel-us-troops-murder-suicide-is-pouring-fuel-those-flames/>; Author interview with MG (ret) Brett Williams, USAF, fmr. Commander, 363th Expeditionary Operations Group, Prince Sultan Air Base, Saudi Arabia and 18th Wing, Kadena, Japan, 3 June 2019.

³¹ Amy Austin Holmes, *Social Unrest and American Military Bases in Turkey and Germany since 1945* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014).

³² Allison, Graham T., and Philip Zelikow. *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis*. 2nd

Calder (2007) focuses on how change in a domestic political regime makes base closure more likely. He conceptualizes internal battles over basing as the national government arbitrating between local, progressive, anti-base groups and national, conservative, pro-base groups. Calder argues that regime shifts “sharply reconfigure the chessboard of host-nation domestic base politics, releasing latent, often unsuspected pressures, and inducing chronic domestic uncertainty.”³³ In this environment, new regimes seeking to establish their domestic legitimacy are likely to void or so change the terms of basing agreements as to make foreign military withdrawal probable.

Cooley (2008) also stresses the importance of regime transition in basing decisions. He conceptualizes the negotiation over basing agreements as a two-level game in which host-nation leaders use their domestic political positions to increase their bargaining leverage over the sending-state. He argues that the durability of the agreement is a function of the importance of the basing benefits (security, economic, and symbolic) to the host-nation and of the contractual credibility of the host-nation's political institutions. He posits that consolidated democracies are the most credible, then authoritarian regimes, and lastly transitioning democracies. He argues that this is because “democratizing polities are particularly prone to elite-induced populism, nationalism, and aggressive mobilization strategies for use as electoral issues. The topic of basing

ed. New York: Longman, 1999.

³³ Kent E. Calder, *Embattled Garrisons: Comparative Base Politics and American Globalism* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007)

agreements as an infringement of national sovereignty is an ideal issue for this type of election campaigning.”³⁴

Yeo (2011) argues that the effectiveness of anti-base movements depends on the strength of the elite security consensus and the anti-base movements' ability to mobilize and form ties with sympathetic elites. In his theory, a weak security consensus creates a "political opportunity structure" or "window of opportunity" through which activists can jump. Yeo's security consensus is focused on external threats and does not address internal security challenges.³⁵

Bitar (2016), in a study of US military bases in Latin America, argues that the United States has had difficulty opening bases in the region because the issue is “likely to become trapped in the political struggles between the host government and its domestic opposition.”³⁶ Unlike previous works, he better captures the flexibility of actual basing arrangements by distinguishing between formal bases and “quasibases” which lack a legal lease arrangement. In his conception, the presence of a base and whether it is a formal or quasibase depends on the distribution of benefits between the government and opposition groups.

A traditional security-based understanding of state motivation for granting foreign military access is that states balance against threats and that in hegemonic relationships

³⁴ Alexander Cooley, *Base Politics: Democratic Change and the U.S. Military Overseas* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2008).

³⁵ Andrew Yeo, *Activists, Alliances, and Anti-U.S. Base Protests*, Cambridge Studies in Contentious Politics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011).

³⁶ Bitar, Sebastian E. *US Military Bases, Quasi-Bases, and Domestic Politics in Latin America*. Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016.

weaker states trade sovereignty for protection.³⁷ This convincingly explains why a state like South Korea, facing an acute external threat, would host foreign military bases. But it does not explain internal threats. Extending logic of economic and security benefits to civil conflict implies that internal threats would generate host-nation willingness to allow foreign military bases. When faced with an internal threat, a regime is incentivized to increase its military capacity in order to maintain a monopoly on the use of violence in all its territory.³⁸ Granting access to a foreign power is one way to increase capacity since many basing agreements bring economic benefits, military aid, and access to foreign technology. While this is certainly true, it ignores the inherent domestic politics of civil conflict. In increasing its capacity to use force through cooperation with a foreign power, the state undermines its own monopoly on the use of force within its borders.

The extension of the logic of political legitimacy and sovereignty costs to internal threats leads to the conclusion that regimes facing civil conflict are less likely to grant or maintain foreign military access. Like transitioning regimes in Cooley (2008), embattled ones face domestic uncertainty and are likely to use basing issues to boost their national legitimacy.³⁹ This logic is made even more explicit in Gresh (2016).

Geoffrey Gresh's recent analysis of basing politics in Gulf Arab states is significant because his is the only study in the basing politics literature to draw a distinction between internal and external security threats. Through case studies of Saudi

³⁷ Stephen M. Walt, "Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power," *International Security* 9, no. 4 (1985): 3–43.

³⁸ James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, "Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War," *American Political Science Review* 97, no. 01 (February 2003): 75–90.

³⁹ Alexander Cooley, *Base Politics: Democratic Change and the U.S. Military Overseas* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2008).

Arabia, Oman, and Bahrain, Gresh observes that external threats made basing more likely, but internal threats made them less likely. When faced with domestic pressure and internal threats to regime survival, each state pressed the United States to reduce its basing presence. He attributes the causal mechanism to the regime's need to negate accusations that it is a puppet of a foreign power.⁴⁰ His work is important because it highlights the tradeoff in legitimacy that states face when accepting foreign military troops. Unfortunately, his conclusions, like most of the basing politics literature, are drawn from limited case studies of Cold War-era bases. Furthermore, it fails to explain cases, such as Mali, where states facing internal threats *do* allow foreign military access.

The literature on the politics of foreign military basing therefore is insufficient to explain the role of civil conflict. For many states in the developing world, their greatest security threats are not from external invasion, but internal division. Furthermore, US basing posture has shifted to emphasize dispersed, light footprint access in unstable regions plagued by civil conflict. Unfortunately, the scholarly literature on the politics of foreign military basing, derived from the empirical record of the Cold War, has failed to keep up. Although basing politics theories have identified several key variables (external threat level, economic need, regime type, etc.) that affect military access, these theories offer contradictory predictions of how civil conflict affects the likelihood of military access. Is a state facing internal rebellion likely to grant a foreign power military access in order to increase their military power, to the detriment of their already challenged legitimacy? Or are they likely to reject foreign overtures to demonstrate their

⁴⁰ Geoffrey F. Gresh, *Gulf Security and the U.S. Military: Regime Survival and the Politics of Basing* (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2016).

independence and nationalist credentials, but run the risk of military defeat at the hands of rebels? Current explanations are indeterminate on this issue and a new understanding of foreign military access and civil conflict is needed.

All of the cited basing politics books do admirable work exploring the internal dynamics of basing politics decisions within host-nations. Few of them, however, address how security conditions affect these decisions and none explicitly discuss the role of internal threats and civil conflict. To address this lack of theoretical expectation, in Chapter Four I propose and test a theory of civil conflict and foreign military basing.

1.3 Defining Military Bases

To begin an exploration of the politics of foreign military bases it is useful to have some basic shared understandings. This section will define foreign military bases and address the functions that military bases perform as well as establish a hierarchical typology of basing levels.

What is foreign military basing? To begin, it is a more narrow concept than “foreign military access,” which in addition to bases and facilities includes “aircraft overflight rights, port visit privileges (often not involving any permanent military presence by the user), and the use of offshore anchorages within sovereign maritime limits.”⁴¹ These temporary accesses are too fleeting to constitute a base. Foreign military basing is also a more robust concept than mere foreign “deployments” which refer only to the movement of personnel and equipment, but not the status of the operating location.

⁴¹ Harkavy, Robert E. *Great Power Competition for Overseas Bases: The Geopolitics of Access Diplomacy*. Elsevier, 2013, 14.

I define a foreign military base as a *foreign location* from which troops conduct *military operations* in the *sending-state interest*. I derive much of this definition from the way that the US military doctrine thinks about basing, but this definition is applicable to all great powers. I will now unpack each aspect of this definition and discuss other instances of military presence which should not be considered foreign military basing.

The first aspect of this definition distinguishes between “foreign” and “overseas” military bases. Although the term “overseas” connotes a separation from the homeland by water, it is often used to indicate any location that is not contiguous to the homeland. While these two terms are often used interchangeably, they are not necessarily the same. A “foreign” base may not be “overseas” and an “overseas” base may not be foreign. Several great powers have bases in “overseas” colonies, possessions, or territories over which they have sovereignty.⁴² Examples of these include US military bases in Guam, French bases in French Guiana, and British bases in Diego Garcia and Gibraltar. These are all “overseas” without being “foreign.” Similarly, the heavily-armed Russian exclave of Kaliningrad would also not rightly be considered a foreign base as it is a province of the Russian Federation, albeit a non-contiguous one. On the other hand, Soviet bases in Mongolia and Poland and US bases in Canada during the Cold War would still be considered “foreign” despite being contiguous with the sending-state homeland. Although there is significant overlap between “foreign” and “overseas” bases, in this project I focus on bases in sovereign foreign states in order to understand the political dynamics between sending-states and host-nation.

⁴² Harkavy, Robert E. *Bases Abroad: The Global Foreign Military Presence*. Oxford University Press, 1989, 21.

The second definitional aspect of a foreign military base is that it conducts *military operations*. This criterion rules out military members assigned to foreign embassies as guards, defense attaches, or defense cooperation officers, who have representative and advisory roles, but not an operational mission.⁴³ Additionally, many countries may have exchange or liaison officers serving with foreign militaries or attending foreign military schools. Some countries may even have whole units stationed and training in another country. The Republic of Singapore and German Air Forces have had training squadrons embedded with USAF units in Arizona, New Mexico, Idaho, and Texas for more than 20 years.⁴⁴ However, none of these examples should plausibly be considered instances of foreign military basing because they do not conduct *military operations*.

While the above operational distinctions are fairly intuitive, there are other instances of foreign military presence in which the operational status of the facility is less clear-cut. Robert Harkavy, in a seminal work on foreign military basing, outlines 10 types of foreign military presence based on the primary mission of the facility. This typology includes:

- 1) airfields
- 2) naval ports

⁴³ Shea, Col. Timothy. "Transforming Military Diplomacy." *Joint Forces Quarterly*, no. 38 (2005): 5.

⁴⁴ Forino, Lt Col John. "U.S., Singapore Partnership Standout." Luke Air Force Base, October 22, 2014. Accessed September 3, 2019. <https://www.luke.af.mil/News/Commentaries/Display/Article/641514/us-singapore-partnership-standout/>; Orban, MSgt Brian S. "Republic of Singapore Air Force Unit Activates." 366th Fighter Wing Public Affairs Office. Mountain Home Air Force Base, May 19, 2009. Accessed September 3, 2019. <http://www.mountainhome.af.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/309555/republic-of-singapore-air-force-unit-activates/>; "German Air Force Flying Training Center Factsheet." Holloman Air Force Base. Accessed September 3, 2019. <https://www.holloman.af.mil/About/Units/German-Air-Force/>.

- 3) ground force barracks
- 4) missile sites
- 5) space sites (non-communication satellites)
- 6) communication and control (C2) sites
- 7) intelligence and command sites (non-space based)
- 8) environmental monitoring sites (medical or meteorological)
- 9) research and testing facilities
- 10) logistical depots⁴⁵

I argue that only locations in the first four categories should definitely be considered military bases in the strictest sense of the term as these sites are inherently operational. Technical facilities such as space, C2, and intelligence sites or logistical depots could be considered bases if they include the stationing of foreign military personnel. However, the presence of a radar, satellite downlink, or prepositioned war material would not by itself constitute a military base. Similarly, neither environmental monitoring nor research sites should be considered military bases since these are not distinctly military functions, even if operated by military personnel. These functional distinctions matter because these different categories have different political effects.

The primary purpose of an operational base is the projection and presentation of lethal force. Politically, operational bases would likely be the most noticeable as they require the substantial and overt presence of foreign forces and equipment. The war-fighting purpose of these bases also make them potentially more threatening to the host

⁴⁵ Harkavy, *Bases Abroad*, 17.

government. While these bases could be politically costly in terms of host-nation legitimacy, they would also yield the greatest security benefit in terms of deterrence. Operational bases would also be more likely than other categories to generate host-nation backlash because they can be more easily tied to unpopular military operations. Turkey's restriction on US operations from its territory during the planning for Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003 is the most famous example.

Technical facilities' primary purpose is the collection and transmission of information. Although this function is vital to warfighting it is not the same as conducting military operations. The political costs and security benefits are theoretically much lower for a national government hosting a foreign technical site. The nature and purpose of such facilities is often opaque to an uninformed observer and it is easier for host-nations to conceal foreign presence at such sites.

The final three categories of environmental monitoring, weapons research, and logistics sites are primarily concerned with non-combat support functions. The foreign workforce associated with these types of bases are largely civilianized and pose less of a threat to host-nation sovereignty. Furthermore, these sites often rely on significant local labor and supply generating a high ratio of economic benefit to foreign military intrusion. Examples of such bases are Muscat International Airport and RAFO Thumrait in Oman on which the US has war reserve material storage, but little active presence.⁴⁶ While these facilities support combat, they are not fundamentally conducting *military operations*.

⁴⁶ Wallin, Matthew. "US Military Bases and Facilities in the Middle East: Fact Sheet." American Security Project, June 2018. <https://www.americansecurityproject.org/>, 6.

The third and final definitional aspect of foreign military basing is that foreign forces are explicitly advancing the *sending-state interest* in the deployment country. This criterion is most likely to be met when the base is a bilateral arrangement between a single sending-state and a host-nation. Applying this element to multinational operations is more complicated.

It seems reasonable that foreign forces participating on behalf of their home countries in a coalition or alliance operation would meet the definition of foreign basing even if they are performing conflict stabilization missions or the overall commander is from a third country. This is because those forces are explicitly operating in their interest of their home country. For instance, the presence of British forces in Helmand Province, Afghanistan or the German Bundeswehr base in Mazar-i-Sharif would both count as foreign military bases, despite the fact that the overall NATO International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) commander might be an American.

It is less clear whether foreign forces operating in United Nations (UN) peacekeeping missions such be considered as having a base in a country. It could be argued that peacekeeping forces are always operating in the sending-state interest, even if their interest is only to gain revenue and experience for their forces. However, this is not the same as advancing the foreign policy interests of the sending-state. More than 120 countries contribute military forces to current UN missions and in some cases these contributions represent large contingents. India and Pakistan each have more than 2,500 troops in the Democratic Republic of the Congo as part of the UN stabilization mission

there.⁴⁷ Yet, it does not seem like these contingents would give their sending-states the power projection or enemy deterrence abilities that a unilateral military base would. These peacekeeping forces are not acting on behalf of their home countries but are instead under the authority of the United Nations and pledge to uphold the principle of impartiality.

There are examples of where the impartiality principle is less clear-cut. Russian so-called “peacekeepers” in Georgia in 2008 claimed to be impartial but were in reality attempting to weaken Georgia and prevent them from joining NATO.⁴⁸ Less malevolently, many scholars have noted that China’s recent increased involvement in peacekeeping operations in Africa has enabled it to protect its expanding economic interests and burnish its reputation among developing countries. It may be that China will use peacekeeping missions as an alternative to more traditional military basing in ways that Western countries have not.⁴⁹

Despite these exceptions, in most cases the mere presence of peacekeeping forces should not be considered an indication of a foreign military base because they usually do not meet the criteria of operating in the foreign policy interests of the sending-state interest. Empirically, a broader definition that included UN peacekeeping forces as

⁴⁷ United Nations. “MONUSCO Fact Sheet.” United Nations Peacekeeping. Accessed May 24, 2019. <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/mission/monusco>.

⁴⁸ Allison, Roy. “Russia Resurgent? Moscow’s Campaign to ‘Coerce Georgia to Peace.’” *International Affairs* 84, no. 6 (November 1, 2008): 1145–71.

⁴⁹ Alden, Chris, Abiodun Alao, Zhang Chun, and Laura Barber. *China and Africa: Building Peace and Security Cooperation on the Continent*. Springer, 2017; Duggan, Niall. “The Expanding Role of Chinese Peacekeeping in Africa.” *Oxford Research Group* (blog), January 23, 2018. <https://www.oxfordresearchgroup.org.uk/blog/the-expanding-role-of-chinese-peacekeeping-in-africa>.; Kovrig, Michael. “China Expands Its Peace and Security Footprint in Africa.” Commentary. International Crisis Group, October 24, 2018. <https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/north-east-asia/china/china-expands-its-peace-and-security-footprint-africa>.

constituting foreign bases would make developing countries like Ethiopia, Bangladesh, Rwanda, and Nepal major foreign basing sending-states. Employing this broader definition of foreign military basing would not impact the results of the quantitative analyses in Chapters 3 and 4. These analyses are confined to US bases and since the United States contributes relatively few military forces to UN peacekeeping a definition of basing that included UN missions would not significantly change the US basing footprint.

There are multiple ways to draw the lines regarding what does and what does not constitute a foreign military base. However, in this project I define foreign military bases as locations in sovereign foreign states where sending-states forces conduct military operations in the interest and under the control of their home-countries.

1.4 Types of Foreign Bases

Having established what a foreign military base is and is not, it is useful to consider hierarchy among basing levels. Foreign military bases come in all shapes and sizes and cover a spectrum of political arrangements with the host country. How can one determine what is a high-level or low-level base? This section will overview the different ways that bases can be categorized and develop a hierarchical typology of foreign military basing.

The first and most obvious way to distinguish among military bases is according to size. This could be according to the amount of land covered, the number of foreign military forces assigned, or the number of buildings owned or leased. The challenge with land coverage is that some military activities require more space than others. For instance, White Sands Missile Range in New Mexico is the largest military installation in

the United States at 2.2 million acres but has relatively austere infrastructure and small military population.⁵⁰ As military personnel are a necessary component of military basing, one could use “troop numbers” as a proxy for base size. However, using personnel numbers as a sole measure is conceptually problematic as the actual phenomenon of interest is a location, not people. Moreover, many bases host rotational forces where there is a small permanent foreign cadre but visiting forces can reach the tens of thousands. As most public personnel data relies on a snapshot in time, using this measure runs the presenting an inaccurate picture depending on when the troop numbers are reported.

Another way to conceive of foreign military basing is according to the level of development and robustness of base infrastructure. The US Department of Defense uses the Plant Replacement Value (PRV) of all of a base’s facilities to distinguish among Large Sites, with a PRV greater than approximately \$2 billion, Medium Sites (PRV=\$1-2 billion), and Small Sites, with less than \$1 billion in PRV.⁵¹ This measure is useful but makes comparison difficult across states, as the PRV accounts for the local cost of labor. The same quality and quantity of facilities would be more expensive to replace in Japan than in the Philippines where the labor costs are much lower.

An alternative way to characterize foreign military bases is according to who has administrative control of facilities. This aspect is important because it speaks directly to

⁵⁰ White Sands Missile Range Public Affairs. *White Sands Missile Range Command Video*, 2016. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=g8LC107nNLU>.

⁵¹ Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Sustainment (ASD(Sustainment)), “Base Structure Report- Fiscal Year 2018 Baseline: A Summary of Real Property Inventory.” US Department of Defense, 2019, 18.

how much sovereignty the host nation is giving up. These arrangements can cover a spectrum from minimal to maximal host-nation control:

- 1) Foreign bases wholly administered and controlled by the sending-state
- 2) Joint foreign/host-nation bases
- 3) Bases that contain foreign controlled enclaves
- 4) Host-nation bases to which the sending-state has regular or repeated access
- 5) Host-nation bases to which foreign forces have access by invitation only⁵²

Moreover, these administrative arrangements can evolve for a given base over the course of time. For example, US bases in the Philippines were originally wholly controlled by Americans. After a base renegotiation in the 1970s, titular Philippine commanders were appointed over the bases. Although American forces were evicted in the 1990s (as detailed in Chapter 4), the United States and the Philippine government negotiated first visiting forces agreements and then an enhanced security cooperation agreement in 2014 meant to restore regular access to Philippine bases by the US military.

1.4.1 Basing Level Typology

To accurately capture the level of foreign military basing in a country requires a holistic assessment of personnel and infrastructure. The US military attempts to illustrate this multifaceted understanding of basing levels in its doctrinal documents. It establishes a hierarchy of basing locations that span from cooperative security locations (CSL) to forward operating sites (FOS) to main operating bases (MOB).⁵³ Different basing levels can generally be distinguished according to 1) the robustness and ownership of a base's

⁵² List adapted from Harkavy, *Bases Abroad*, 21.

⁵³ Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, "Joint Pub 5-0, Joint Planning- Appendix H: Posture Plans", 2017.

infrastructure as well as 2) the size and permanence of the forces the base supports. The boundaries between these categories are not exact and it is quite possible that there could be a small, austere base that is wholly owned and controlled by the sending-state or a large, permanent base in which the host-nation retains all ownership and sovereignty. However, it is generally true that troop size, infrastructure investment, and legal access rights all tend to be positively correlated. These base types are generally nested; anything a smaller base can do, the next larger base can also do, plus more. I illustrate where these general basing categories fall along the personnel and infrastructure spectrums in Figure 1 below.




Figure 1: Foreign Military Basing Levels

The most austere level of foreign military bases is the cooperative security location (CSL). In American doctrine, CSLs are characterized “by the *periodic* presence

of rotational US forces...” and “may feature a small permanent presence of assigned support personnel (military or contractor). CSLs typically consist of mostly HN [host-nation] infrastructure, and CSL real property is often not US-owned.”⁵⁴ An example of this level of base is CSL Comalapa in El Salvador on which the US owns only 14 buildings with a PRV of \$24.2 million and has fewer than 50 permanently assigned military forces.⁵⁵

The next level of foreign military bases, **forward operating sites (FOS)** are “characterized by the *sustained* presence of rotational US forces, with infrastructure and quality of life amenities consistent with that presence, capable of providing forward staging for operational missions and support to regional contingencies.” Sometimes referred to as forward operating locations, this level of basing consists mostly of US-owned real property and more permanently assigned forces. An example of a FOS is Camp Lemonnier in Djibouti, the largest and most robust US base in Africa which consists of nearly 1,400 American-owned buildings with a PRV of \$1.2 billion and more than 4,500 deployed troops.⁵⁶

The highest level of foreign military base, **main operating bases (MOB)** have permanently-assigned US forces, represent primary training and deployment locations for the US overseas, and consist of “robust infrastructure that typically includes C2, highly developed force protection measures, hardened facilities, and significant quality of life

⁵⁴ CJCS, JP 5-0, Joint Planning.

⁵⁵ ASD (Sustainment), “Base Structure Report- 2018”, 75; Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC), “Military and Civilian Personnel Location Report-September 2017,” DoD Personnel, Workforce Reports & Publications (US Department of Defense, 2017).

⁵⁶ Gen. Thomas Weldhauser, “USAFRICOM Posture Statement” (US Africa Command, March 2017); ASD (Sustainment), “Base Structure Report- 2018”, 72; DMDC, “Personnel Location Report-2017”.

amenities, often including family support facilities.”⁵⁷ Germany, which hosts several MOBs including Ramstein and Spangdahlem Air Bases, has almost 8,000 US-owned or leased buildings with a PRV of \$44.8 billion, 6,000+ acres of US-occupied land, and nearly 50,000 permanently assigned US forces.⁵⁸

US military joint planning doctrine distinguishes between “Contingency” and “Enduring” locations such as CSLs, FOSs, and MOBs. Contingency locations (CLs) are meant to be temporary facilities to support on-going operations, while enduring locations are those intended to last more than five years.¹ An example of a contingency location is Garoua in Cameroon, where a 200-member taskforce is providing intelligence and logistics support to the Cameroonian military fighting Boko Haram.¹

Despite these clear doctrinal categories, the distinction between contingency and enduring locations is often muddier in practice. There can be little qualitative difference between contingency and enduring locations within the first few years of establishment. According to one military commander in Africa, why the US called one site a contingency location while another was labeled a CSL, the lowest level of enduring location, “was always sort of a mystery.”⁵⁹ Doctrinally, the distinction is supposed to be dictated by the intended duration of the mission. However, due to the Clausewitzian fog and friction of war, an operation that is intended to be of short duration could easily drag on past initial expectations. In Africa, several locations (Chabelley, Djibouti; Manda Bay, Kenya; Libreville, Gabon) which the US initially established as contingency locations

⁵⁷ CJCS, JP 5-0, Joint Planning.

⁵⁸ ASD (Sustainment), “Base Structure Report- 2018”, 76; DMDC, “Personnel Location Report-2017”.

⁵⁹ Author interview with Col Shawn Cochran, USAF, fmr. Commander, 449th Expeditionary Operations Group, Camp Lemmonier, Djibouti, 31 May 2019.

evolved into enduring ones. Whether a particular site endures may be something that can only be known in retrospect. Because of this ambiguity, I count what the US government calls “contingency locations” as equivalent to CSLs.

Although these categories (CSL, FOS, and MOB) derive from American military doctrine, they are not exclusive to the United States, but can equally apply to other countries’ foreign military basing postures. British doctrine distinguishes between “main bases” and “tactical bases.” The French use similar terminology, describing their basing posture as “three forward operating bases (in Abu Dhabi, Abidjan and Djibouti) and two cooperation bases (Dakar and Libreville).”⁶⁰ The Russian base in Sevastopol could be considered a foreign MOB (at least when it belonged to Ukraine) as it was the headquarters and home-port of the Russian Black Sea Fleet with 28,000 Russian sailors assigned.

Admittedly, the categories in this typology are inexact. However, they provide a general framework that is useful when considering the political dynamics of foreign military bases. Different basing levels are likely to generate different political considerations for both the sending-state and the host-nation. Due to the cost of maintaining a large base, sending-states are likely to have highly satiable preferences for MOBs and concentrate them in regions of the most vital interest. Because CSLs require more minimal investment sending-states are more likely to tolerate redundancy and may, if able, seek low-level basing locations in multiple neighboring states. All else being equal, sending-states are also likely to seek to place MOBs in host-nations with similar

⁶⁰ French Commission on Defence and National Security. “French White Paper on Defence and National Security,” 2017.

levels of economic development and/or cultural and linguistic affinity. At least for the US military, if they are going to station troops alongside their civilian spouses and dependent children, they would prefer the host-nation have modern amenities and high levels of English usage.

Different basing levels are also likely to impact host-nation domestic politics in different ways. CSLs, with a small foreign footprint and the plausible deniability of national infrastructure, are easier to hide from the local populace and may generate lower legitimacy costs for host-nation governments. Higher level bases bring more benefits to the host nation; they have greater deterrent value with potential adversaries and introduce foreign capital into the local economy. They also generate greater negative effects in terms of pollution, traffic, local economic disruption, and potential for soldiers behaving badly. MOBs are also more likely to be targeted in a conflict which could cause more collateral damage to the surrounding local population. These larger bases are also more likely to generate host-nation concerns about entrapment and being dragged into a larger conflict with the sending-state's enemies.⁶¹ Higher level bases pose greater political risks for host-nation regimes, but also represent the potential for higher security and economic payoffs.

1.4.1 Interest Balance Typology

Having established sending-state motivations as well as the economic/security benefits and political costs to host-nations we can now apply these interests to categorizing bases. In addition to the typologies introduced earlier, we can also

⁶¹ Snyder, Glenn H. "The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics." *World Politics* 36, no. 4 (July 1984): 461–95.

categorize a foreign military base according to how the security interests of sending-state balances with the those of the host-nation. This categorization cuts across military forms (operational, technical, logistic), geopolitical function (power projection, deterrence, etc), and basing level (CSL, FOS, MOB). Pettyjohn conceptualizes two models of overseas basing, a mutual defense and transactional model.⁶² I broaden these models into the following security interest balance typology:

- 1) Mutual security benefit
- 2) Sending-state exclusive interest (host-nation neutral)
- 3) Non-consensual basing

The first category, mutual security benefit, would be any situation where the political purpose directly benefits the host-nation's security as much or more than the sending-state. This category would include cases where the foreign military base serves as a deterrent against either conventional or nuclear third-party aggression, provides assurance of allied commitment, or enables security cooperation. The host-nation would receive security benefits and though it may incur sovereignty costs, the government would not suffer a legitimacy penalty because its domestic audience would see it as serving their legitimate interest. Contemporary examples of this type of arrangement include US bases in South Korea or Poland where the local population fears an external threat. It would also include the Russian military base in Armenia which deters Azerbaijan from seeking to reclaim the breakaway region of Nagorno-Karabakh.

⁶² Pettyjohn, Stacie L. *U.S. Global Defense Posture, 1783/2011*. Santa Monica, California: RAND, 2012, 105.

To clarify, a base may serve different functional purposes for the sending-state and host-nation, but still be of mutual benefit. For example, the United States has established an Aegis Ashore ballistic missile defense battery in Romania. From the US perspective, the geopolitical purpose and anti-missile trajectory are designed to explicitly counter threats from Iran. From the Romanian perspective, the political benefit is less about the site's specific technical orientation and more about the general deterrence effect that US military presence has on Russia.⁶³

Not surprisingly, basing relationships in this category are likely to be relatively popular in the hosting country and easier for the host government to maintain. When the primary political purpose of foreign presence is to protect against external threats or improve the host nation military, it is easy for host nation governments to justify the infringement on national sovereignty.

What would motivate a sending-state to establish a foreign military base for the security benefit of its host? It is likely that the sending-state would also receive security benefits by gaining access to key geographic areas or proximity to adversary states. It could be that the sending state wants economic or political influence in the host-nation. It is also possible, as will be discussed in the country specific section to follow, that the base is part of a larger alliance system or order-building project. In these cases, the benefit that the sending-state receives may be less clear and directly related to the foreign military base.

⁶³ Author interview with the missile site commander.

The second category of interest balance is when the base's purpose is exclusively for the sending-state's interest and does not directly support the host-nation's security. Common forms in this category are bases that serve as technical intelligence sites for collection on a third-party, staging areas for combat operations outside of the hosting nation, or war reserve logistical storage sites. An example of a base in the sending-state exclusive benefit category is when the United States was flying remotely pilot aircraft (RPAs) out of the Indian Ocean island of the Seychelles to strike terrorist targets in East Africa. Similarly, American use of the Manas Transit Center in Kyrgyzstan to transport supplies into Afghanistan was primarily in the sending-state's interest. To be included in this category does not require the host-nation to be ambivalent about the sending-state's security interest. The Seychelles would probably prefer the elimination of Al Shabaab to their continued presence. Likewise, Kyrgyzstan would likely prefer a stable Afghanistan as a neighbor rather than it being a chaotic exporter of opium and terrorism. However, neither of these goals is acutely important to either country's security. In both of these cases, the primary motivation for the base is the United States' security interest, not the host-nation's benefit.

When a foreign military base is seen by the domestic audience as primarily in the sending-state's interest the domestic politics are much more fraught. The host government is more likely to be sensitive to sovereignty concerns as the foreign military presence more acutely impugns its legitimacy. In this situation, the host-nation government is more likely to be seen by their populace as puppet of the foreign power rather than an equal partner. In this situation host governments are likely to demand

greater economic compensation, request foreign forces reduce their public visibility, or require symbolic affirmations of national sovereignty.

The final category of interest balance is when the base is directly opposed to the interests of the host-nation. This category includes occupation forces, colonization, imperialism, or bases supporting a breakaway region. Examples of this type include French and British colonial bases in Africa, Soviet forces in Czechoslovakia after the 1968 Prague Spring, US bases in Guantanamo Bay, Russian bases in Georgia, and US occupation of Iraq from 2003-2005. This type of arrangement is, by definition, non-consensual and often detrimental to the interests of the host-nation. Bases in this category are likely to be resisted by their host-nation and the cost-benefit tradeoff outlined above does not apply. The theoretical arguments I make regarding host-nation motivation all depend on the assumption that basing arrangement require consent. I argue that this assumption is plausible as almost all modern basing arrangements, with some Russian exceptions, are consensual. Bases that are non-consensual are outside the scope conditions for the interest-balance theory I advance.

1.4.2 Are Foreign Bases Consensual?

Is it reasonable to assume that foreign bases are premised on mutual consent? For much of human history, controlling another population was the most common motivation for foreign military bases. Today, however this form of arrangement is much less common. The norm of national self-determination has near-universal acceptance in theory, even if it is imperfectly and unevenly implemented. The few contemporary exceptions prove the rule. In 2014, Russia annexed Crimea, home to its Black Sea Fleet, in order prevent losing access after the election of a pro-Western regime in Kiev. This

move was roundly condemned internationally and resulted in sanctions by the United States and others. To justify its actions, Russia claimed it was acting in response to Crimeans' right to self-determination. That Russia found it necessary to justify its actions in this way, rather than simply claiming the prerogative of a great power, proves the moral power of the self-determination norm. In fact, Crimeans did vote to secede in a referendum that, while internationally-suspect, did capture real ambivalence by a substantial proportion of Ukrainians toward their country's westward turn.

Another objection to the voluntariness of foreign basing on the left, is that the US invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan represent imperial domination by the United States.⁶⁴ It is true that in neither Afghanistan in 2001 nor Iraq in 2003 could US military forces be said to have been present with the consent of the host government. However, in both cases the United States quickly transitioned political control to national representatives and sought to hold popular elections. Once these new governments were elected, each state had the ability to withdraw consent and evict US forces, even if they would have been unlikely to do so. Although both governments were highly dependent on US financial and military support, they were not mere extensions of American will. In fact, the unwillingness of the Iraqi government to provide SOFA protections to foreign service-members led to the United States to withdraw most of its military forces in 2011. The current negotiations between the United States and the government of Iraq are testing the assumption of a consensual relationship. Despite the rejection of a continued US presence by the Iraqi parliament, the current American administration has indicated that it

⁶⁴ Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, *Multitude: War and Democracy in the Age of Empire* (New York: The Penguin Press, 2004).

intends to keep US forces in the country.⁶⁵ Whether this is just a negotiating tactic or a full rejection of Iraqi sovereignty remains to be seen.

Another common objection to the “voluntariness” of foreign military basing is that even if a sending-state does not directly conquer and occupy a host-nation, the power imbalance between a superpower and some smaller state is so great that the sending-state can simply achieve foreign military access through coercion. There are two refutations to this objection, one definitional and the other empirical.

Robert Art (2003) distinguishes between coercive diplomacy, “forceful persuasion,” and diplomatic persuasion, which “utilize levers over a target, but these levers do not involve the threat or use of force.”⁶⁶ Most contemporary basing negotiations meet the latter definition. It should surprise no one that a sending-state might use the promise of direct rent payments, increased trade, foreign direct investment, economic aid, debt relief, security guarantees, arm sales, advance training, or favorable voting in international bodies to induce a potential host-nation to grant access. It is also not surprising that a more powerful state might threaten, explicitly or implicitly, to withdraw these inducements if access is not granted or maintained. A more powerful state could use its superior military strength to intimidate a weaker state into doing what the stronger state wants. However, coercion in the Schelling-esque sense of threatening military force to hurt a host-nation population is rare in basing relations. It is of course true that states are not equal in power, but the level of asymmetric horse-trading that characterizes

⁶⁵ Forgey, Quint. “Pompeo Sticks up for U.S. Presence as Iraq Votes to Eject Foreign Troops.” *POLITICO*, January 5, 2020. <https://www.politico.com/news/2020/01/05/mike-pompeo-iraq-iran-troops-093961>.

⁶⁶ Robert J. Art and Patrick M. Cronin, *The United States and Coercive Diplomacy*, Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2003, 7.

modern basing negotiations, at least for the United States, is a far cry from the Melian dialogue. Host-nations, even weak ones, retain significant agency and the ability to grant or not grant access.

The assertion that even weak states have the ability to consent or not consent to US military access is substantiated by the fact that since the 1960s, at least 18 states have evicted the United States from their foreign military bases.⁶⁷ Given that none of these states were anywhere near parity with the United States on traditional measures of economic, military, or political power, it is striking that in all cases the United States peacefully complied.

This introduction established a definition and working typology of basing levels to enable the analysis in the rest of this project. I also reviewed the literature on why great powers want foreign bases and why host-nations are willing to allow them. The next chapter will explore the former question more in depth as I overview the foreign basing networks of major powers and how these basing postures fit within their grand strategies.

⁶⁷ Pettyjohn, Stacie L., and Jennifer Kavanagh. *Access Granted: Political Challenges to the U.S. Overseas Military Presence, 1945-2014*. Research Report, RR-1339-AF: RAND Corporation, 2016, 61.

2. Major Powers and Foreign Military Bases

Most states do not have military bases in other countries. Foreign military bases can be expensive, politically troublesome, and are only really needed by states who envision a global role for themselves. Thus, they are tools confined to great powers: current, declining, and aspiring. Chapter One outlined some broad reasons why a state might want foreign bases. Foreign military bases help sending-states achieve power projection, deterrence, and assurance. It is for these reasons that sending-states might want foreign bases generally. The specific motivations for why powerful states establish, maintain, or close a particular foreign military base are highly conditional on their histories, grand strategies, and future ambitions.

This next chapter examines the current, historical, and future foreign basing postures of five major powers: Russia, the United Kingdom, France, China, and the United States. To get a sense of each state's specific motivations I also analyze how these basing footprints align with their grand strategies. There have been several defense policy studies by RAND that have analyzed the costs and benefits of US basing posture and its alternatives, but none of the studies address other major powers.⁶⁸ Harkavy does analyze the basing motivations of non-American powers, but his scope is limited mostly to Cold

⁶⁸ Pettyjohn, *U.S. Global Defense Posture, 1783/2011*; Lostumbo et al., "Overseas Basing of U.S. Military Forces: An Assessment of Relative Costs and Strategic Benefits"; Lynn E. Davis, ed., *U.S. Overseas Military Presence: What Are the Strategic Choices?* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2012).

War.⁶⁹ This chapter expands on Harkavy's foundation by tracing the arc of foreign basing competition into the 21st century.

First, there are several former imperial powers, Russia, France, and the United Kingdom, who have diminished in their international stature and ambition, but have retained a legacy framework of foreign bases. Next, the great emerging power of the 21st century, China, has started to lay the foundations for a network of foreign military bases. Finally, the country with the broadest foreign basing posture is, not surprisingly, the most powerful. For the last seventy-five years, the United States has maintained a global infrastructure of hundreds of bases in more than thirty countries. I conclude the chapter with several observations about sending-state motivation that I draw from the cases of the five major basing powers.

2.1 Russia

At one time, the Soviet Union had full-fledged military bases in 24 foreign countries and technical facilities access in at least a dozen more.⁷⁰ Today its successor state, the Russian Federation, has foreign military bases in seven countries, the majority of which are former Soviet republics. This basing posture reflects both the decline of Russia's status as a great power and the outlines of its current grand strategy. While at its height the Soviet empire had military bases in such far-flung locales as Angola, Cuba, and Vietnam, today the largest military presence Russia has deployed outside its near-

⁶⁹ Harkavy, *Great Power Competition for Overseas Bases*; Harkavy, *Strategic Basing and the Great Powers, 1200-2000*.

⁷⁰ Harkavy, Robert E. *Strategic Basing and the Great Powers*, Appendix IV.

abroad is in Syria, where it has maintained a naval facility at Tartus since 2006 and an air base in Latakia province as a consequence of its 2015 intervention in the Syrian civil war.⁷¹ As indicated in Table 1, most of Russia’s foreign military bases are in its immediate neighborhood. What is striking about this basing posture is the extent to which Russia maintains foreign bases without the consent of the host-nation. A number of Russia’s foreign military bases are in direct opposition to the host-nation. While these non-consensual bases are outside the scope conditions for the interest balance theory I propose, they nonetheless point to an important aspect of Russian grand strategy. While this basing by imposition model of basing network construction is relatively unique among current sending-states it is historically consistent with Soviet basing arrangements in Eastern Europe, the basis of which “was simply brute conquest and imperial control.”⁷²

Country	Basing Level	Host-Nation Consent
Ukraine (Crimea)*	MOB	No
Armenia	FOS	Yes
Moldova (Transnistria)	FOS	No
Tajikistan	FOS	Yes
Georgia (Abkhazia, South Ossetia)	FOS	No
Kyrgyzstan	CSL	Yes
Venezuela	CSL	Yes
Syria	CSL	Yes

Table 1: Current Russian Military Bases⁷³

⁷¹ De La Pedraja Toman, René. *The Russian Military Resurgence: Post-Soviet Decline and Rebuilding, 1992-2018*, McFarland & Company, Inc., Publishers, 2019, 288-289; Trenin, Dmitrii. *What Is Russia up to in the Middle East?* Polity, 2018, 48, 56, 68, 84.

⁷² Harkavy, *Strategic Basing and the Great Powers*, 130.

⁷³ Adapted from Klein, Margarete. “Russia’s Military Policy in the Post-Soviet Space. Aims, Instruments and Perspectives,” *SWP Research Paper 1*, German Institute for International and Security Affairs, January 2019, 15.

Historical Russian & Soviet Basing Posture

At the beginning of the Cold War the Soviet Union had little foreign military presence outside of the Warsaw Pact states it occupied in the immediate post-WWII aftermath. In contrast, the United States had surrounded the Soviet's Eurasian "heartland" with a "rimland" containment strategy of air and naval bases across Europe, the Middle East, and Asia.⁷⁴ Relying on a massive land army and its alliance with Communist China, the Soviets' power projection capability was limited throughout the 1950s.⁷⁵ The Sino-Soviet split in the 1960s presented Moscow with the threat of again facing a two-front war.⁷⁶ Decolonialization and the decline of traditional European influence in the Third World created opportunities for the Soviet military to break out of this strategic encirclement. In the late 1960s and 1970s the Soviets leveraged ideological affinities, colonial resentment, and arms transfers to gain basing access in Africa, Asia, and Latin America, particularly for technical command & control, communication, and intelligence sites.

The expansion of the Soviets' global reach did not come without cost; contemporary analyses placed the cost of the Soviet empire in 1980 at between 6.1% and 7.2% of GNP.⁷⁷ Furthermore, the Soviets became entangled in numerous proxy conflicts

⁷⁴ Harkavy, *Strategic Basing and the Great Powers*, 94.

⁷⁵ Harkavy, *Great Power Competition for Overseas Bases*, 154.

⁷⁶ De La Pedraja Toman, *The Russian Military Resurgence*, 15.

⁷⁷ Wolf, Charles. "The Costs of the Soviet Empire." *Science* 230, no. 4729 (November 29, 1985): 997–1002. Other works that assess the cost of Soviet empire are Bunce, Valerie. "The Empire Strikes Back: The Evolution of the Eastern Bloc from a Soviet Asset to a Soviet Liability." *International Organization* 39, no. 1, 1985, 1–46.

including in Angola, Eritrea, and Yemen.⁷⁸ The most expensive intervention was the Soviet Union's direct invasion of Afghanistan in which, by 1985, it had more than 100,000 troops deployed with an estimated cost around \$1.5 billion per year in addition to the economic embargo imposed by the Carter administration.⁷⁹ While there were many factors that contributed to the collapse of the Soviet Union, some scholars point to "imperial overstretch" and its accompanying diversion of resources to military production as a contributing cause.⁸⁰

The collapse of the Soviet Union led to a contraction of Russia's foreign base footprint back to the general confines of the former Soviet border. The collapse created significant confusion as to the loyalty and ownership of former Red Army military and equipment left in the now-independent states. Some military forces began to withdraw back to the territory of the Russian Federation, but the first Russian President, Boris Yeltsin did not even form a Russian national military until May 1992, as he held out hope for a combined army of the former union republics.⁸¹ Domestic instability quickly led to the return of Russian forces to the former Soviet space, first as peacekeepers in Georgia, Moldova, and Tajikistan and then under a collective defense treaty with the other nascent

⁷⁸ Sakwa, Richard. "The Soviet Collapse: Contradictions and Neo-Modernisation." *Journal of Eurasian Studies*, 20 Years after the Collapse of the Former Soviet Union, 4, no. 1 (January 1, 2013): 65–77; Mitrokhin, Vasili, and Christopher Andrew. *The World Was Going Our Way: The KGB and the Battle for the Third World*. New York: Basic Books, 2005.

⁷⁹ Wolf, Charles, Keith Crane, K. C. Yeh, Susan Anderson, and Edmund Brunner. "The Costs and Benefits of the Soviet Empire, 1981-1983." RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, CA, August 1986, 29; De La Pedraja Toman, 32; Westad, Odd Arne. *The Cold War: A World History*. London: Penguin Books, 2018, 321.

⁸⁰ Kennedy, Paul. *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000*. Vintage, 1989; Reynolds, David, "Science, Technology and the Cold War," Melvyn P. Leffler, Odd Arne Westad (Eds.), *The Cambridge History of the Cold War*, Endings, Vol. 3, Cambridge University Press, 2010, 399.

⁸¹ De La Pedraja Toman, *The Russian Military Resurgence*, 74.

republics in Central Asia and the Caucasus. Russia's military presence in Tajikistan was formalized with a basing agreement in 2004 but remains disputed in Georgia and Moldova as Russian troops support separatist forces in Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Transdniestria.⁸²

While Russia maintained a military foothold in its southern approaches, it was a different story on its western border, as Russian troops were forced to withdraw from their former Warsaw Pact allies in East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary, and the Baltic States only to see them join their US-led nemesis, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). To counterbalance NATO, Russia formed a Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) in 2002, though its effectiveness has been mixed. The CSTO did establish a multinational Collective Response Defense Force based in Kyrgyzstan, but has lost members as Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Uzbekistan all withdrew their membership.⁸³ The Russian foreign basing footprint outside of Eurasia shrunk even further as Russia closed its intelligence collection site in Lourdes, Cuba and its naval base in Cam Ranh Bay, Vietnam in 2002.⁸⁴

Russian Grand Strategy & Foreign Basing Posture

Russia's foreign military basing posture reflects both the aspirations and limitations of its broader grand strategy. Russia's grand strategic objective is to return to

⁸² Klein, "Russia's Military Policy in the Post-Soviet Space," 46.

⁸³ Ganguli, Sreemati. *Russia and the Central Asian Republics: Post-Soviet Engagements*. Maulana Abul Kalam Azad Institute of Asian Studies in association with KW Publishers, 2013, 61.

⁸⁴ Lachowski, Zdzislaw. "Foreign Military Bases in Eurasia." SIPRI Policy Paper. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute June, 2007, 44.

great power status and reestablish a multipolar international system.⁸⁵ Keir Giles provides a useful framework for understanding the motivations behind this goal are partly geopolitical, partly ideological, and partly cynical.⁸⁶ To achieve this goal, Russia has tried to minimize Western influence and carve out a “zone of privileged interest” in its near-abroad. It has also promoted the regional integration of Eurasia to provide an alternative to Western institutions. Finally, it has more recently sought influence in other parts of the world in order to gain leverage in a transactional relationship with the West. All of these lines of effort are reflected in Russia’s basing posture. Russia’s non-consensual bases in Moldova, Georgia, and Ukraine all serve to keep “frozen conflicts” in these former Soviet states unresolved and prevent those states from joining NATO. Russian bases in Armenia, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan are the tangible manifestations of Russia’s effort to militarily integrate these states through its NATO alternative, the CSTO. Russia’s military presence also incentivizes these states to join Russia’s other regional integration initiatives such as the Eurasian Economic Union and Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Russia’s intervention in Syria and subsequent retention of a

⁸⁵ Mankoff, Jeffrey. *Russian Foreign Policy: The Return of Great Power Politics*. 2nd ed. Lanham, Md. : Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2012; Klein, 7. Rumer, Eugene. “The Primakov (Not Gerasimov) Doctrine in Action.” *The Return of Global Russia: A Reassessment of the Kremlin’s International Agenda*. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, June 5, 2019.

⁸⁶ Giles, Keir. *Moscow Rules: What Drives Russia to Confront the West*, Insights: Critical Thinking on International Affairs. Washington, D.C.: London: Brookings Institution Press; Chatham House, The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 2019. Giles identifies several sources of Russian antipathy toward the West including the desire to create a buffer from invasion, the Russian self-conception as a Eurasian power above “normal” states, an Orthodox rejection of the West’s moral decadence, and a play by Putin to stoke domestic nationalism and distract from economic underperformance.

basing presence there represents Russia's rejection of US-backed popular revolutions as well as its return as an indispensable player in the Middle East.⁸⁷

Future Russian Foreign Basing Posture?

Going forward, Russia might seek to further expand its foreign military basing presence. A Russian analyst writing for a news organization sometimes seen as a propaganda outlet for the Kremlin argued that Russia could have bases in as many as 14 countries.⁸⁸ There is some evidence that Russia may be moving to expand its foreign military basing and general influence outside of Eurasia. In Africa, Russia recently reached an agreement to build a logistics center on the Red Sea in Eritrea and established a port access agreement with Sudan that the Sudanese hinted could lead to a permanent base.⁸⁹ Moreover, Russia has signed a military cooperation agreement with the Central African Republic and has, reportedly, supported the Haftar faction in Libya under the guise of Kremlin-backed private military corporations with arms.⁹⁰

Russian involvement in Latin America is even more robust. In 2018, Russia deployed military advisors to support the embattled Nicolas Maduro and opened a

⁸⁷ Trenin, *What is Russia up to in the Middle East?*, 48.

⁸⁸ Khubiyev, Ruslan. "14 Countries Can Become Bridgeheads for the Deployment of Russian Military Bases." Regnum, February 23, 2019. <https://regnum.ru/news/polit/2579274.html>

⁸⁹ Solomon, Salem. "Russia-Eritrea Relations Grow with Planned Logistics Center." Voice of America, September 2, 2018. <https://www.voanews.com/africa/russia-eritrea-relations-grow-planned-logistics-center>; Sputnik News, "Russia May Set Up Red Sea Naval Base After Deal on Port Calls - Senior Sudan MP," January 12, 2019. <https://sputniknews.com/military/201901121071422796-russia-naval-base/>.

⁹⁰ Kiselyova, Maria, and Tom Balmforth. "Russia to Sign Military Cooperation Accord with Central Africa..." Reuters, August 21, 2018. <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-centralafrica-accord/russia-to-sign-military-cooperation-accord-with-central-africa-republic-ifax-idUSKCN1L60R2>; Deutsche Welle. "Could Libya Be Russia's New Syria?", April 10, 2019. <https://www.dw.com/en/could-libya-be-russias-new-syria/a-48277255>.

helicopter training center in Venezuela.⁹¹ The next year Putin deployed the S-300 surface to air missile system along with Russian “trainers” to deter US intervention against Maduro.⁹² Elsewhere in the region, the Kremlin has established a satellite downlink station and counter-drug center, as well as gained naval port access in Nicaragua.⁹³ Russia has also signed a defense cooperation agreement with Bolivia and has hinted at reopening the Lourdes intelligence base in Cuba.⁹⁴

While Russia’s foreign basing footprint in Africa and Latin America is still relatively small compared to the vast Soviet basing network, these initial incursions may indicate that Putin has grander ambitions for more global Russian role. At the very least, by its mere presence in the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America Russia has made itself an important player in those regions whose interests must be considered.⁹⁵ Russia has also shown a willingness to acquire and retain foreign military bases through coercive means, especially in its near-abroad. This behavior may mean that the cost-benefit logic on the part of the host-nation I outline in Chapter Four only applies in areas of peripheral

⁹¹ Nechepurenko, Ivan. “Russia Seeks to Reopen Military Bases in Vietnam and Cuba.” The New York Times, October 7, 2016, sec. World. <https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/08/world/europe/russia-seeks-to-reopen-military-bases-in-vietnam-and-cuba.html>.; O’Connor, Tom. “Russia Opens Military Center in Venezuela, Defying U.S. Threats.” Newsweek, April 2, 2019. <https://www.newsweek.com/russia-venezuela-base-us-threat-1383691>.

⁹² Herbst, John, and Jason Marczak. “Russia’s Intervention in Venezuela: What’s at Stake?” Policy Brief. Atlantic Council, September 12, 2019. <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/russias-intervention-in-venezuela-whats-at-stake/>.

⁹³ Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. “Regional Deep Dive: Latin America - Global Russia.” Global Russia. Accessed September 18, 2019. <https://carnegieendowment.org/publications/interactive/global-russia/latinamerica>.

⁹⁴ “Russia, Bolivia Sign Agreement on Military Cooperation.” TASS Russian News Agency, September 6, 2016. <https://tass.com/defense/898143>.

⁹⁵ Galeotti, Mark. “Kremlin Strategy Doesn’t Need Winners, Just Players.” The Moscow Times, April 12, 2019. <https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2019/04/12/kremlin-strategy-doesnt-need-winners-just-players-a65207>.

Russian interest. When security interests are at stake that the Kremlin deems vital, Moscow seems while to grab a military foothold regardless of host-nation views.

2.2 United Kingdom

As an island nation, much of the United Kingdom's military basing posture is overseas, even if it is not fully foreign. Apart from basing in the Home Islands, the British military maintains Royal Air Force (RAF) bases in the historic peninsular fortress of Gibraltar on the tip of Spain, on Ascension Island and the Falkland Islands in the Atlantic, and in the Sovereign Base Area of Akrotiri on Cyprus as a gateway to the Middle East.⁹⁶ There is also a small contingent of British military personnel at Permanent Joint Operating Base Diego Garcia in the British Indian Ocean Territory, although most of the base is run by Americans.⁹⁷ Although these bases are technically not "foreign" military bases as they are all located on British territory, they can still be politically contentious. British presence in the Falklands has been understandably disputed by Argentina since the 1982 Falklands War.⁹⁸ The United Nations recently challenged British rule of Diego Garcia on behalf of the native inhabitants who were originally displaced during the Cold War.⁹⁹ Even Gibraltar has become an issue of dispute with Spain as the United

⁹⁶ British Royal Air Force. "Stations." RAF Live. Accessed September 19, 2019. <https://www.raf.mod.uk/>.

⁹⁷ Tossini, J. Vitor. "The British Indian Ocean Territory – An Unsinkable Aircraft Carrier in the Form of Diego Garcia." *UK Defence Journal* (blog), September 1, 2018. <https://ukdefencejournal.org.uk/the-british-indian-ocean-territory-an-unsinkable-aircraft-carrier-in-the-form-of-diego-garcia/>.

⁹⁸ Associated Press. "Falkland Islands: Argentina Protests to Brazil about RAF Using Its Airports." *The Guardian*. March 2, 2017, sec. UK news. <https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2017/mar/02/falkland-islands-brazil-allowed-raf-to-use-its-airports-says-argentina>.

⁹⁹ United Nations. "General Assembly Welcomes International Court of Justice Opinion on Chagos Archipelago, Adopts Text Calling for Mauritius' Complete Decolonization." Press Release, May 22, 2019. <https://www.un.org/press/en/2019/ga12146.doc.htm>.

Kingdom's planned withdrawal from the European Union has complicated the previously simple border arrangements between the two NATO allies.¹⁰⁰

While the above are all overseas sovereign bases, the United Kingdom also has a few traditional foreign military bases. In the post-Cold War era, the largest permanent British foreign military base has been in Germany. However, following the American lead in reducing forces in Europe, the 2010 Strategic Defense and Security Review directed the British military to withdraw its more than 15,000 troops from Germany and by 2020 only a bare bones presence will remain.¹⁰¹ In 2015, the Royal Navy re-opened a base in Bahrain, the HMS Juffair, its first permanent Middle East base in more than 40 years.¹⁰² This initial move to the Middle East was followed by the RAF and Royal Navy establishing an airbase and deep water port in Oman and a small refueling facility/logistics port in Singapore, which gives the United Kingdom power-projection capability into the Middle East and Asia respectively.¹⁰³ The British army has established several training centers throughout the Commonwealth of Nations, in which UK military units rotate for exercises and live-fire training. These training schools are staffed with

¹⁰⁰ Garcia, Joseph. "Gibraltar Will Never Accept Shared Sovereignty – Foreign Policy." *Foreign Policy* (blog), February 28, 2019. <https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/02/28/gibraltar-will-never-accept-shared-sovereignty-uk-spain-brexite/>.

¹⁰¹ Dempsey, Noel. "UK Defence Personnel Statistics." Briefing Paper. UK Parliament, May 16, 2019; British Army. "Germany." Deployments, Accessed September 20, 2019. <https://www.army.mod.uk/deployments/germany/>; US Ministry of Defence, and The Rt Hon Gavin Williamson, CBE MP. "UK to Maintain Military Presence in Germany." The Government of the United Kingdom, September 30, 2018. <https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-to-maintain-military-presence-in-germany>.

¹⁰² "UK Begins Work on New Mid-East Base." *BBC News*, November 1, 2015, sec. UK. <https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-34690895>.

¹⁰³ Tossini, J. Vitor. "The UK in Oman - A New Support Facility for the British Armed Forces." *UK Defence Journal* (blog), February 20, 2018. <https://ukdefencejournal.org.uk/the-uk-in-oman-a-new-support-facility-for-the-british-armed-forces/>; Author correspondence with fmr defense policy and strategic planner, UK Ministry of Defense, September 2019.

approximately 300-1,000 personnel and are located in central Canada, north of Nairobi, Kenya, and in Brunei, where in addition to the jungle training school, there also a garrison of Nepali Gurkhas to defend the Sultan.¹⁰⁴ In all, though, the United Kingdom's foreign basing posture is still relatively modest; this was not always the case.

Historical British Basing Posture

At one time, the British network of overseas bases was the most extensive in the world. The race to gain a global basing network began in the late 15th century as Britain competed with its successive rivals, Spain, Holland, and France for naval supremacy.¹⁰⁵ Bases were essential to protect national commerce from pirates and rivals, and as the Age of Sail gave way to the Age of Steam, foreign bases served as coaling stations and then as connection points for undersea telegraph cables. Strategically, these bases were especially vital for Britain, which as an insular power relied on international trade and naval power rather than land conquest as the continental powers of France or Germany did.¹⁰⁶ The degree of detachment from the continent of Europe afforded by their global network of bases allowed the British to act as an "offshore balancer" against aspiring regional hegemon. By 1914, their dominant global basing posture allowed the British to establish naval supremacy and "quickly clear the oceans outside of Europe of German surface vessels."¹⁰⁷ The United Kingdom retained or recovered this extensive basing posture over

¹⁰⁴ British Army. "Brunei," "Africa," "Canada", Army Deployments. Accessed September 19, 2019. <https://www.army.mod.uk/deployments/brunei/>.

¹⁰⁵ Harkavy, *Great Power Competition for Overseas Bases*, 46.

¹⁰⁶ Mearsheimer, John J. *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*. Updated edition. The Norton Series in World Politics. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2014, 236-237.

¹⁰⁷ Harkavy, *Great Power Competition for Overseas Bases*, 48.

the course of both world wars, but the cost and destruction of the wars combined with the irrepressible tide of anti-colonialism meant this network was politically and financially unsustainable.¹⁰⁸ After 1945 the UK basing network collapsed as British forces withdrew from India, Burma, and Palestine (1948), Libya, Greece, and Somaliland (1950), Sudan (1955), Jordan (1957), and Iraq (1958).¹⁰⁹ Amidst political protest, British bases in most of Egypt were closed in 1947 while a few garrisons were retained in the Suez Canal Zone until 1956. Upon the withdrawal of British forces, Egyptian President Nasser attempted to nationalize the Suez Canal Company. Britain, without consulting with the United States, invaded the Suez along with French and Israel forces.¹¹⁰

Although militarily successful, the operation was politically disastrous, as the American president Dwight Eisenhower rallied international support against the invasion, forcing British withdrawal and demonstrating conclusively that the predominance of power in the Atlantic relationship had shifted west. Britain's ability to maintain a global presence continued to decline until 1968 when Prime Minister Harold Wilson announced that the United Kingdom would withdraw its military forces "east of Suez," leading to the abandonment over the next decade of military positions in Singapore, Malaysia, Malta, the Maldives, the Seychelles, Bahrain, and Masirah Island.¹¹¹ This managed decline continued until the United Kingdom arrived at the basing posture it has today. Despite its

¹⁰⁸ Oliver, Tim. "Foreign Policy of Britain." In *Global Perspectives on Foreign Policy of Major Powers*, edited by Ajit M. Banerjee. New Delhi: Academic Foundation, 2016, 52.

¹⁰⁹ Harkavy, *Great Power Competition for Overseas Bases*, 124-125.

¹¹⁰ Garnett, Mark, Simon Mabon, and Robert Smith. *British Foreign Policy since 1945*. London ; New York: Routledge Taylor & Francis Group, 2018, 133-138.

¹¹¹ Pham, P. L. *Ending "East of Suez": The British Decision to Withdraw from Malaysia and Singapore 1964-1968*. Oxford University Press, 2010; Harkavy, *Great Power Competition for Overseas Bases*, 228.

diminished size, this basing network reflects the three primary strands of current British grand strategy regarding Europe, America, and the Commonwealth of Nations.

British Grand Strategy and Foreign Basing Posture

In 1962 Dean Acheson quipped, “Great Britain has lost an empire and has not yet found a role. The attempt to play a separate power role apart from Europe, a role based on a ‘special relationship’ with the US and on being the head of a ‘commonwealth’ which has no political structure, unity, or strength — this role is about played out.”¹¹² Acheson was right in his analysis, but wrong in his conclusion. These three themes, which were also put forth in Winston Churchill’s 1948 “three circles” speech, of : 1) being European, but not fully; 2) maintaining a unique Anglo-American bond with the leading Western power; and 3) maintaining a largely positive influence with its former colonies, were the dominant ways that Britain sought to accomplish its grand strategic objective of preserving its great power influence in the post-war era.¹¹³ Acheson was wrong that the United Kingdom had exhausted the potential value of balancing these possibly conflicting imperatives. By maintaining this grand strategic balance, the United Kingdom is a middle power that despite more than a half century of decline still “punches above its weight” as a not-quite-global power with a still-significant global role.¹¹⁴ All three of these grand strategic strands are reflected in current British foreign military basing posture.

¹¹² Quoted in Oliver, “Foreign Policy of Britain,” 62.

¹¹³ Sanders, David, and David Patrick Houghton. *Losing an Empire, Finding a Role: British Foreign Policy since 1945*. 2nd edition. Macmillan Education. London: Palgrave, 2017, 1.

¹¹⁴ Former UK Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd, quoted in Oliver, 51.

That the United Kingdom is a part of but also apart from Europe is evident in its foreign military basing. First, Britain is one of the only European states with bases outside of Europe, marking it as retaining aspirations that transcend the continent. Second, although 70% of the 13,500 UK Ministry of Defense (MOD) personnel assigned overseas are in Europe as of 2019, this allocation will drop after 2020 when the basing reduction in Germany is complete.¹¹⁵ The UK Minister of Defense Gavin Williamson has explained this shift not as abandoning Europe, but as “increasing our British points of presence across the world.”¹¹⁶ Finally, despite a traditional robust military presence in Europe, the United Kingdom’s participation in collective security has been primarily through the American-led NATO rather than the European Union’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). Despite possessing one of the strongest militaries in Europe, the United Kingdom has only contributed 2.3% of member state personnel across all CSDP missions.¹¹⁷

Similarly, British basing posture also speaks to the special closeness of the US-UK relationship. It is common to find large British military units at US foreign bases. The RAF deploys a group headquarters and support wing at Al Udeid air base in Qatar, has over 1,000 service-members in Afghanistan and has joined the NATO rotational

¹¹⁵ Defence Statistics (Tri-Service). “Location of All UK Regular Service and Civilian Personnel Annual Statistics: 2019.” Annual Locations Report. Government of the United Kingdom, April 1, 2019. <https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/location-of-all-uk-regular-service-and-civilian-personnel-annual-statistics-index>.

¹¹⁶ UK Ministry of Defence, and The Rt Hon Gavin Williamson, CBE MP. “UK to Maintain Military Presence in Germany.” The Government of the United Kingdom, September 30, 2018. <https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-to-maintain-military-presence-in-germany>.

¹¹⁷ The Institute for Government. “UK–EU Defence and Security Cooperation after Brexit.” Explainer-The Institute for Government, May 22, 2019.

Enhanced Forward Presence mission in the Baltics.¹¹⁸ The RAF even has an operational MQ-9 remotely piloted aircraft squadron conducting combat operations from Creech AFB, Nevada.¹¹⁹ Not only are British and American troops stationed together at many overseas facilities, but the primary reason the United Kingdom maintains some bases, such as Ascension Island and Diego Garcia, is for use by the Americans. Of Diego Garcia, one British Ministry of Defence official characterized British motivation in this way, “I see our enthusiasm to keep this going primarily to give something back to Uncle Sam!”¹²⁰

The Commonwealth strand is clearly evident in British basing posture. Of the British military stationed outside of Europe, 58% are in Commonwealth countries.¹²¹ Although they are only training centers, the location of the military schools in Canada, Kenya, and Brunei give the UK influence in those countries’ defense policies and keep alive historic ties. The UK logistics base and new regional defense staff in Singapore supports Britain’s contribution to the Five Powers Defense Arrangement with Australia, Malaysia, New Zealand, and Singapore, the premier collective security partnership of Commonwealth nations in Asia.

Future British Foreign Basing Posture?

Although the United Kingdom’s foreign military presence has declined from the heights of the British empire, there is some impetus in London to reenergize British

¹¹⁸ British Royal Air Force. “Stations.” RAF Live. Accessed September 19, 2019. <https://www.raf.mod.uk/>; British Army. “Afghanistan,” and “The Baltics,” Army Deployments. Accessed September 19, 2019. <https://www.army.mod.uk/deployments/afghanistan/>.

¹¹⁹ RAF Waddington Media Communications team. “39 Squadron.” Royal Air Force Live. Accessed September 3, 2019. <https://www.raf.mod.uk/>.

¹²⁰ Author correspondence with fmr. defense policy and strategic planner, UK Ministry of Defense, September 2019.

¹²¹ Defence Statistics, *Annual Location Report 2019*.

overseas basing strategy. Spurred by the Brexit “no” vote, former British PM Theresa May announced in 2016 an expanded internationalist role for the United Kingdom, dubbed “Global Britain.” This, together with the subsequent election of the more isolationist Trump administration, prompted some in British defense circles, including the current PM Boris Johnson, to call for a more activist British military to return “east of Suez.”¹²² The recent reestablishment or expansion of British presence in Oman and Bahrain also point to an increasingly globalist British military. Furthermore, in 2016 the Ministry of Defence stood up regional defense staffs in Dubai, Singapore, and Abuja, Nigeria, signaling a “greater focus for the UK’s Defence efforts in these regions.”¹²³ Some proposals call for a British “pivot to Asia” and establishing an Indo-Pacific fleet centered around the new *Queen Elizabeth*-class carrier.¹²⁴ Such a Pacific pivot could involve “sustained light-touch presence/security cooperation (defence engagement in UK parlance), with frequent frigate (or below) ship visits to the region, intermixed with pulses of high-end capability (such as carrier/deployments of F-35 or Big Wing ISR).”¹²⁵ In 2018 The British Defence Secretary suggested that the UK could not only expand its presence in Singapore and other bases in East Asia, but in the Caribbean as well.¹²⁶

¹²² Johnson MP, Foreign Secretary, Rt Hon Boris. “Britain Is Back East of Suez.” presented at the Manama Dialogue, Bahrain, December 9, 2016. <https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/foreign-secretary-speech-britain-is-back-east-of-suez>; Rogers, James. “‘Global Britain’ and the Future of the British Armed Forces.” Global Britain Programme. The Henry Jackson Society, 2017.

¹²³ Fallon MP, Rt Hon Sir Michael. “Britain Extends Global Defence Reach.” *Ministry of Defence*, December 12, 2016. <https://www.gov.uk/government/news/britain-extends-global-defence-reach>.

¹²⁴ Seely MP, Bob, and James Rogers. “Global Britain – A Twenty-First Century Vision.” Global Britain Programme. The Henry Jackson Society, February 2019.

¹²⁵ Author correspondence with fmr. defense policy and strategic planner, UK Ministry of Defense, September 2019.

¹²⁶ Chandler, Mark, and Andrew Woodcock. “UK ‘could Set-up New Military Bases to Become Global Player’ after Brexit.” *The Mirror*, December 30, 2018. <https://www.mirror.co.uk/news/uk-news/uk-could-set-up-far-13794297>.

However, there are many who doubt whether the United Kingdom has the means or incentives to adopt a truly global posture.¹²⁷ Such a strategy would be expensive and might entail significantly increasing defense spending from current levels of around 2% of GDP to more traditionally American levels of around 4%.¹²⁸ Whether this occurs will likely depend on how the United Kingdom manages its post-Brexit trading environment.

2.3 France

The French overseas basing posture is very similar to that of the United Kingdom's in that their military basing network is composed of three parts. First, both major powers have significant military forces stationed overseas in their own sovereign territories or departments. Second, both have established foreign military bases by agreement with other sovereign states, though often these are former colonies. Finally, as NATO members and American allies they both utilize US foreign basing access, often in the context of US-led coalitions.

As Figure 2 below indicates, France has significant military forces stationed in "Overseas France," its sovereign territories and departments outside the European continent, including Martinique, Guadeloupe, French Guiana, La Reunion, New Caledonia, and French Polynesia. In addition to the locations depicted on the map, the

¹²⁷ Glencross, Andrew, and David McCourt. "Living Up to a New Role in the World: The Challenges of 'Global Britain.'" *Orbis* 62, no. 4 (January 1, 2018): 582–97.

¹²⁸ Rayner, Gordon, and Con Coughlin. "Jeremy Hunt 'wants to Double Defence Spending' as He Calls on UK to Project More Hard Power." *The Telegraph*, May 13, 2019. <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/politics/2019/05/13/jeremy-hunt-wants-double-defence-spending-calls-uk-project-hard/>.

French Foreign Legion has a small detachment on the overseas department of Mayotte.¹²⁹ Although bases in these territories are not foreign military bases, per se, they are an important part of the French foreign basing posture as they “give France secure platforms for power projection all over the world, and the possibility to redeploy military assets in response to changes in the strategic situation.”¹³⁰




Figure 2: Current French Overseas Bases¹³¹

Beyond these sovereign forces, France has permanent FOS level bases in Djibouti, the UAE, and the Ivory Coast, and CSLs in Dakar, Senegal and Libreville,

¹²⁹ Foreign Legion. “Mayotte Foreign Legion Detachment.” Accessed September 27, 2019.

https://www.legion-etrangere.com/mdl/pages_dossier.php?id=61&titre=DLEM.

¹³⁰ French Commission on Defence and National Security. “Defence and National Security Strategic Review (DNSSR),” 2017,75.

¹³¹ Map from DNSSR-2017, 28.

Gabon.¹³² To support its Operation Barkhane counterterrorism mission in the African Sahel the French military has a headquarters base in N'Djamena, Chad a supporting detachment in Mali, a special operations base in Burkina Faso, and an intelligence site in Niger.¹³³ Together these bases make France the leading external military power in West Africa.

Additionally, France shares forward basing with the United States and other multinational forces for NATO and coalition missions. Dubbed Operation Chammal, French forces have been conducting airstrikes in Iraq and Syria since 2014 as part of the coalition to defeat ISIL.¹³⁴ Through NATO auspices, France has also deployed deterrent forces to Estonia and Lithuania as part of the Enhanced Forward Presence mission.¹³⁵ By putting together these three basing strands one can see that besides the United States, France has one of largest military footprints outside of its continental territory of any of the major powers. This is consistent with their historical basing strategy.

French Historical Basing Posture

Beginning in the Napoleonic era, France sought to compete with Great Britain for overseas basing and access, but never achieved the extent or breadth of the British basing

¹³² DNSSR- 2017, 74.

¹³³ Rieker, Pernille. *French Foreign Policy in a Changing World*. New York, NY: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2017, 54, 57; DNSSR- 2017, 22.

¹³⁴ Combined Joint Task Force Inherent Resolve. "France." Operation Inherent Resolve, 2019.

https://www.inherentresolve.mil/arabic_infographics/igphoto/2001470824/.

French Ministry of Defense. "Operation Chammal," 2019.

<https://www.defense.gouv.fr/english/operations/chammal/dossier-de-presentation/operation-chammal>.

¹³⁵ Permanent Representation of France to NATO. "French Troops Deployed in Estonia within the Framework of the Enhanced Forward Presence (EFP)." France NATO, April 2019.

<https://otan.delegfrance.org/French-troops-deployed-in-Estonia-within-the-framework-of-the-enhanced-Forward>.

network. The French colonial system, at its height in the interwar period, was geographically more concentrated than the British, which “lent a significantly different character to its basing network.” Concentrated in northern and western Africa and French Indochina and manned heavily by native colonial units, “France’s basing system was primarily intended for local defense of colonial possessions, with little potential for projection of power into contiguous areas. In areas far from France, there were only weak lines of communication tying the system together.”¹³⁶

After World War II, the French overseas basing network was buffeted by the same anti-colonial winds that were pulling apart the British empire. France’s humiliating defeat at Dien Bien Phu in 1954 and subsequent withdrawal from Indochina virtually eliminated French presence in Asia. The Algerian War of Independence (1954-62) was a searing experience that led to the fall of the French Fourth Republic in 1958. The 1956 Suez Crisis was a watershed event for its participants, France and Britain. While Britain perceived the futility of operating without the United States and thus subordinated its foreign policy to US leadership in order to maintain an Anglo-American special relationship, the French learned a different lesson and followed a divergent path. “As far as the French government was concerned, the main lesson to be learned from the Suez crisis was that Washington had ‘ditched’ its two main European allies.”¹³⁷ Upon Charles de Gaulle’s return to power in 1958, France would chart a more independent course as an

¹³⁶ Harkavy, *Great Power Competition for Overseas Bases*, 63.

¹³⁷ Bozo, Frédéric. *French Foreign Policy since 1945: An Introduction*. New York: Berghahn, 2016, 36.

equal power.¹³⁸ As the most dominant figure in French politics of the 20th century, de Gaulle refused to consign his country to the role of junior partner: “France is really only herself in the first rank...France cannot be France without grandeur.”¹³⁹ This drive for strategic autonomy and equality with the United States was fully manifested by 1966 when France had developed its own atomic weapons, withdrawn from the NATO military command structure, and expelled US and NATO forces from French territory.¹⁴⁰

In terms of basing, while Britain increasingly relied on and supplied basing for American power projection, the French maintained their own autonomous basing network. By 1960, most Francophone African countries had achieved independence, but despite losing colonial control, France, “propelled by the Gaullist nationalist ideology of ‘grandeur,’ made a more strenuous effort (than Britain) to hold on to some points of access, in Africa in particular.”¹⁴¹ These differing approaches were due in part to the divergent foreign policy vectors described above and in part due to differing approaches to colonialism. As one scholar wrote:

“While England had a colonial policy in Africa based on economic exploitation of Africa and the protection of the interests of the British settlers, France developed a cultural and political assimilation policy towards its colonial countries in Africa. The main goals of the French assimilation policy in Africa were to exploit Africa and to increase France’s international prestige... Importantly, While the British saw its colonies as foreign lands, the French saw them as a part of France.”¹⁴²

¹³⁸ Alarcón, Antonio V. Menéndez. *French and US Approaches to Foreign Policy*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan US, 2014, 17.

¹³⁹ Charles de Gaulle, 1954, quoted in Rieker, 17.

¹⁴⁰ Alarcón, *French and US Approaches to Foreign Policy* 16.

¹⁴¹ Harkavy, *Great Power Competition for Overseas Bases*, 229.

¹⁴² Sıradağ, Abdurrahim. “Understanding French Foreign and Security Policy towards Africa: Pragmatism or Altruism.” *Afro Eurasian Studies* 3, no. 1 (June 1, 2014): 101.

Compared to Britain, France incorporated more former colonial possessions into sovereign French territories and departments, effectively extending citizenship in exchange for access. This meant that despite the loss of Indochina and Algeria there was no “East of Suez” retreat for France, as it continued to retain significant economic, cultural, and military ties with its former colonies, especially in Francophone Africa.

French Grand Strategy and Foreign Military Bases

The grand strategy of post-war France has been animated by a drive to maintain a leading role on the international stage despite a decline in material power. De Gaulle rooted this ambition in the essence of French identity: “It is because we are no longer a great power that we need a grand policy; because if we do not have a grand policy, given that we are no longer a great power, we will no longer be anything at all.”¹⁴³ This Gaullist “certain idea of France” has created a kind of “French exceptionalism” which has guided all subsequent French leaders.¹⁴⁴ Historian Frédéric Bozo argues that France has sought to retain this status through two grand strategic avenues: European integration and a stable and balanced international order.¹⁴⁵ French foreign military basing is most relevant to the latter line of effort. By retaining basing platforms for global power projection, France retains strategic autonomy. This enables France to take a leading role in supporting US or NATO efforts, as it did in Libya in 2011, or pushing back against perceived US unilateral overreach, as it famously did in 2003.

¹⁴³ Bozo, *French Foreign Policy since 1945*, 1.

¹⁴⁴ Rieker, 15; Alarcón, 12.

¹⁴⁵ Bozo, 2;

France's military bases in Africa and the Middle East have given it a special influence on those regions. The French ambassador to the US called the Mediterranean-Africa-Middle East region France's "backyard."¹⁴⁶ That France views itself as having an especially important role in Africa is evidenced by the fact that it has "intervened militarily in Africa more than 50 times" since 1960.¹⁴⁷ The most recent Defence and National Security Strategic Review (the French equivalent of the US National Security Strategy) listed France's long-term defense commitments as 1) national territory, 2) the Sahel-Saharan region, 3) the Middle East, and 4) northeast Europe.¹⁴⁸ Much of the US basing network in Africa is in conjunction with French bases, and France has been one of the United States' leading security partners in countering terrorism in West Africa.¹⁴⁹

It is somewhat puzzling why France has not pursued European integration through foreign basing in continental Europe as the United Kingdom has. The French have lead integration through economic and political means and the European Union did not even establish a common defense policy until the Treaty of Maastricht in 1992. There are a number of plausible explanations. First, during the Cold War European states were reliant on NATO for collective defense, but after France withdrew from NATO's military command in 1966 French forces lacked an institutional mechanism for collective security. Second, even after the Cold War when momentum began to build toward EU

¹⁴⁶ François Bujon de l'Estang, 3 Feb 2000, US National War College, quoted in Sun, Degan, and Yahia Zoubir. "Sentry Box in the Backyard: Analysis of French Military Bases in Africa." *Journal of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies (in Asia)* 5, no. 3 (September 1, 2011): 86.

¹⁴⁷ Sıradağ, 119.

¹⁴⁸ NDSSR-2017, 20-23.

¹⁴⁹ Michel, Leo G. *Cross-Currents in French Defense and U.S. Interests*. Institute for National Strategic Studies, Strategic Perspectives 10. Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 2012, 27.

common defense forces the creation of an operational headquarters for common European forces “was heavily resisted by London and Washington, which saw this as an unnecessary duplication of NATO capacity.”¹⁵⁰ However, this lack of European focus may be changing for the French basing network in the 21st century.

Future French Basing Posture?

Moving into the future, it is reasonable to expect relative continuity in the French foreign military basing network. France has developed long-term economic and cultural ties with all of its basing partners, which should provide stability in those relationships. The continued threat of terrorism emanating from Francophone Africa and the Middle East gives France every reason to stay engaged in those regions.

The one region in which there may be growth in the French foreign basing is in Europe itself. If Brexit and the “Global Britain” strategy addressed above cause the United Kingdom to disengage from European common defense initiatives, and if American retrenchment advocates cause the United States to back away from its NATO security commitments, then France could take a greater lead in European security. French President Emmanuel Macron, in response to the Trump administration’s 2018 withdrawal from the 1987 Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty, warned that Europeans could not rely on the United States to defend them and should be protected by a “true, European

¹⁵⁰ Radley, James. “A Tale of Two Cultures: BREXIT and the Future of UK-European Security Cooperation.” MPhil Thesis, School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, Air University, 2017.

army.”¹⁵¹ France’s forward presence mission in the Baltics is an example of French commitment to the European project and could be just the beginning if other traditional security providers step away.

2.4 China

While the foreign military footprint of the United Kingdom and France are reflective of powers in decline, China’s burgeoning basing posture is indicative of its rising power status. In 2017, the Peoples’ Republic of China (PRC) officially opened its first foreign military base in Djibouti.¹⁵² Although only a logistical support facility, ostensibly for peacekeeping missions and anti-piracy operations around the Horn of Africa, the base hosts a company of People Liberation Army (PLA) Navy marines and could accept more robust deployments.¹⁵³ So far this base on the Gulf of Aden is China’s only full-fledged foreign military base, but there are several other examples of China’s forward military presence.

In addition to its first declared military base, China has extended its military reach in more ambiguous ways. Over the last decade, the PLA has built up seven artificial islands in the Spratly Islands in order to project power into the South China Sea.¹⁵⁴ These forward bases are meant to create “facts on the ground” to bolster Beijing’s sovereignty

¹⁵¹ “Macron Pushes for ‘True European Army.’” *BBC News*, November 6, 2018, sec. Europe. <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-46108633>.

¹⁵² US Office of Secretary of Defense (OSD), “Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2019.” Annual Report to Congress. US Department of Defense, May 2019, 16.

¹⁵³ US Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), “China Military Power: Modernizing a Force to Fight and Win.” Department of Defense, 2019. <http://www.dia.mil/Military-Power-Publications>, 29.

¹⁵⁴ Harris, Admiral Harry. US Pacific Command Posture Statement, § House Armed Services (2018), 11-12.

claims over various disputed islands. While these islands are not technically foreign military bases subject to the host-nation political calculations I outline in Chapter Four, they do represent an extension of Chinese power through legally dubious means.

Another example of Chinese foreign military presence is the standing deployment beginning in 2016 of a Peoples' Armed Police (PAP) detachment to Tajikistan to conduct joint patrols in the Wakhan Corridor. The PAP is a paramilitary law enforcement unit responsible for counterterrorism (as well as domestic repression) and this deployment is not intended so much for power projection as it is to ensure that Tajikistan remains a buffer to prevent instability from Afghanistan from spilling over into China's restive Xinjiang province.¹⁵⁵ Nonetheless, the deployment gives China influence in Central Asia and bolsters its economic and diplomatic initiatives through the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. The PRC use of quasi-military armed force represents a creative alternative to traditional foreign basing.

A final example of China's expanding military presence is its growing military contributions to UN peacekeeping missions. Starting in the 1990s, China began to increase its involvement in UN missions and expand its contributions from mostly medical and technical personnel to military deployments. Today China has an infantry unit in the peacekeeping mission in Mali and an infantry battalion in South Sudan.¹⁵⁶ All

¹⁵⁵ Kley, Dirk van der. "China's Security Activities in Tajikistan and Afghanistan's Wakhan Corridor." In *Securing the Belt and Road Initiative: China's Evolving Military Engagement Along the Silk Roads*. National Bureau of Asian Research, 2019, 84-86.

¹⁵⁶ Lei, Xue. "China's Development-Oriented Peacekeeping Strategy in Africa." In *China and Africa: Building Peace and Security Cooperation on the Continent*, edited by Chris Alden, Abiodun Alao, Zhang Chun, and Laura Barber. Springer, 2017.

told in 2017, China had more than 2,400 troops in seven peacekeeping missions in Africa.¹⁵⁷ Scholars have noted that China faces three threats in Africa: reputational risks from association with despotic governments, risks to its businesses interests from weak regulatory regimes, and threats to its citizens from unstable security environments; Beijing's growing security investment in Africa, of which peacekeeping is a key part, is meant to help alleviate those risks.¹⁵⁸ While the PLA base in Djibouti is a first for China, these other kinds of nuanced, quasi-military extensions of military power are more in keeping with a historic PRC approach to foreign basing.

Historical PRC Foreign Basing

For most of its history since the Chinese Communist victory in 1949, the PRC has foresworn foreign military bases. In the first few decades of the PRC under Mao Zedong, Chinese grand strategy was highly ideological and advocated “permanent revolution” both internally and externally.¹⁵⁹ Chinese foreign policy was guided by the Non-Aligned Movement's Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence—respect, non-aggression, equality, peaceful coexistence, and non-interference, which normatively proscribed deploying military forces beyond its borders.¹⁶⁰ Moreover, the PRC was both so weak and self-

¹⁵⁷ Duggan, Niall. “The Expanding Role of Chinese Peacekeeping in Africa.” *Oxford Research Group* (blog), January 23, 2018. <https://www.oxfordresearchgroup.org.uk/blog/the-expanding-role-of-chinese-peacekeeping-in-africa>.

¹⁵⁸ Alden, Chris, and Laura Barber. “Introduction: Seeking Security: China's Expanding Involvement in Security Cooperation in Africa.” In *China and Africa: Building Peace and Security Cooperation on the Continent*, edited by Abiodun Alao and Zhang Chun. Springer, 2017, 1-2.

¹⁵⁹ Zhao, Quansheng. “Changes and Continuities in Chinese Foreign Policy.” In *Global Perspectives on Foreign Policy of Major Powers*, edited by Ajit M. Banerjee. New Delhi: Academic Foundation, 2016, 118-119.

¹⁶⁰ Hoo, Tiang Boon, ed. *Chinese Foreign Policy under Xi*. Politics in Asia Series. London ; New York: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, 2017, 3; Panda, Ankit. “Reflecting on China's Five Principles, 60 Years Later.” *The Diplomat*, June 6, 2014. <https://thediplomat.com/2014/06/reflecting-on-chinas-five-principles-60-years-later/>.

isolated that foreign military bases were not plausible. With the ascension of Deng Xiaoping in the late 1970s, Chinese grand strategy became more pragmatic, but the Five Principles continued to guide China's peaceful modernization strategy. Under Deng in the 1990s, China's strategy to become a great power emphasized the "need for a stable and international environment supportive of China's economic development" and "restraint on the part of Chinese leaders in world politics in order to avoid onerous obligations and commitments that would hamper China's growth and development."¹⁶¹ Even as Deng's successors recognized the need to take more international responsibility, non-interference in other states' internal affairs remained a key Chinese foreign policy pillar as it rejected international meddling in its internal issues over Taiwan, Tibet, and Xinjiang.¹⁶²

Chinese Grand Strategy and Foreign Military Basing

Under Xi Jinping, Chinese grand strategy of peacefully rising has continued but has taken on a more activist tone. Xi's self-described "China Dream" is to achieve a "unified, powerful, and internationally respected China."¹⁶³ The "unified" aspect of this ambition has included greater assertiveness toward disputed territorial claims in the South China Sea. Another way Xi has sought great power status for China is through the One Belt, One Road initiative. Begun in 2013, the Belt and Road initiative consists of both a land and maritime component. The belt on land aims to connect China to Europe along a

¹⁶¹ Sutter, Robert G. *Chinese Foreign Relations: Power and Policy since the Cold War*. Fourth edition. Asia in World Politics. Lanham ; Boulder ; New York ; London: Rowman & Littlefield, 2016, 5.

¹⁶² Lahtinen, Anja. *China's Diplomacy and Economic Activities in Africa: Relations on the Move*. 1st edition. New York, NY: Springer International, 2018, 29.

¹⁶³ Sutter, 327.

new Silk Road through the Eurasian landmass while the maritime road aims for Europe through the South China Sea, Indian Ocean, and Red, Arabian, and Mediterranean Seas.¹⁶⁴ Since its original conception, One Belt, One Road has grown to include Africa and Latin America as well so that it covers around 125 countries, connecting 65% of the world's population and 40% of global GDP."¹⁶⁵ In practice, this initiative involves Chinese state-owned corporations investing in businesses along the route and constructing a transportation networks of roads, railways, ports, and telecommunication infrastructure. One Belt, One Road has globalized Chinese interests and created a grand strategic requirement for foreign military bases.

Although China continues to affirm the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence in its latest National Defense white paper, Beijing's interpretation of these principles appear to be evolving as their expanded economic interests have compelled the Chinese to develop a global military infrastructure.¹⁶⁶ This process began more than a decade ago as the PLA took on "new historic missions...created by globally expanding national interests and entanglements, pushing farther away from China's shores, broadening its strategic horizons, and enhancing its power-projection capabilities."¹⁶⁷ The natural

¹⁶⁴ Chan, Gerald. "China and Global Governance: Evolving Approaches." In *Chinese Foreign Policy under Xi*, edited by Tiang Boon Hoo. Politics in Asia Series. London ; New York: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, 2017, 164.

¹⁶⁵ Xue, Guifang (Julie). "The Potential Dual Use of Support Facilities in the Belt and Road Initiative." In *Securing the Belt and Road Initiative: China's Evolving Military Engagement Along the Silk Roads*, National Bureau of Asian Research, 2019, 49.

¹⁶⁶ People's Republic of China State Council Information Office of. *China's National Defense in the New Era*. 1st ed. Beijing, China: Foreign Languages Press Co. Ltd., 2019.

¹⁶⁷ Rolland, Nadege. "Securing the Belt and Road Initiative: China's Evolving Military Engagement Along the Silk Roads." Special Report. National Bureau of Asian Research, September 2019, 2.

culmination of this process came in 2017 when, despite declaiming against foreign military bases for decades, opened its base in Djibouti.

Future Chinese Basing Posture?

Although Djibouti is the only foreign country in which China has openly established an overt military base, it likely will not be the last. There has already been press reporting that China reached an agreement in 2019 with Phnom Penh to use a naval base in Cambodia, although China thus far denies it.¹⁶⁸ The US Defense Department predicts that “China will seek to establish additional military bases in countries with which it has a longstanding friendly relationship and similar strategic interests, such as Pakistan, and in which there is a precedent for hosting foreign militaries. China’s overseas military basing will be constrained by the willingness of potential host countries to support a PLA presence.”¹⁶⁹ If China is able to provide sufficient economic and security benefits the willingness of potential PLA host-countries may be greater than the US Department of Defense thinks.

China has both the motive and opportunity to expand its foreign basing footprint. Strategically, the purpose of such bases would be to protect overseas Chinese workers, ensure access to national resources and raw materials, and secure sea lines of communication. The opportunity to gain military access is likely to be greatly aided by the promise of further One Belt, One Road investments. Already infrastructure

¹⁶⁸ Heath, Timothy R. “The Ramifications of China’s Reported Naval Base in Cambodia.” *World Politics Review* (blog), August 5, 2019. <https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/28092/the-ramifications-of-china-s-reported-naval-base-in-cambodia>.

¹⁶⁹ OSD, Annual Report 2019, 16.

development projects could be used for military basing. Although these infrastructure projects are advertised as civilian, a number are “dual-use” with both commercial and military utility. China has deep-water port-construction projects in Mozambique, Tanzania, Kenya, Djibouti, Pakistan, the Maldives, Sri Lanka, and Myanmar that could be converted to PLA naval ports.¹⁷⁰




Figure 3: Chinese Arms Importers, 2002-2017¹⁷¹

It is not only infrastructure, but arms sales which could influence potential host-nation decisions. Basing scholar Robert Harkavy has found a historically positive correlation between arms sales and foreign basing.¹⁷² If that holds true for China, then at least some of the 65 countries who have received Chinese arms since 2002, as depicted in **Error! Reference source not found.** from the US Defense Intelligence Agency, are

¹⁷⁰ Xue, 51.

¹⁷¹ US DIA, “China Military Power,” 108.

¹⁷² Harkavy, *Bases Abroad*, 324.

likely to be willing to allow Chinese foreign bases. As China's military power grows and economic interests expand, it is natural and likely that their foreign military footprint will as well.

However, China may be redefining the character of foreign military basing. From its artificial islands to its peacekeeping forces to its port accesses by state owned corporations, China is gaining many of the benefits of foreign military bases without the political commitments which have traditionally accompanied US foreign bases. The US basing network has largely been built on mutual defense agreements that have entailed considerable American concern with the domestic politics of its host-nation allies. It is possible given China's non-interventionist doctrine that a future Chinese foreign basing network could be much more flexible and informal.

The not-fully-military character of much Chinese access could call into question the generalizability of the theory and conclusions I draw in Chapters Three and Four. Even though China may not need to formalize its basing network as the United States has done, the allocation of its foreign bases is likely to be guided by the same general imperatives and concerns as the United States. Chinese basing informality may also undercut the logic of legitimacy costs I propose in my theory of host-nation cost-benefit analysis in Chapter Four. However, this would only be true as long as China keep its military access latent; once this access is operationalized with PLA troops in foreign ports the dynamics of sovereignty and legitimacy loss would go into effect.

2.5 *The United States*

It is undebatable that the United States has the most extensive network of military bases in the world. In 2017 the US Department of Defense managed 514 foreign real property sites in 45 countries and had nearly 300,000 personnel located in 164 foreign countries.¹⁷³ Sometimes, these DOD personnel location numbers or base structure reports are used by critics of US foreign policy to claim that the United States has a vast sinister empire of bases.¹⁷⁴ However, these single dimensional measures can be misleading. The majority of these sites and personnel were largely concentrated in Germany, Japan, and South Korea, which together account for 77% of US military sites and the majority of US military troops stationed overseas.¹⁷⁵ Of the 164 countries with US troops cited above, more than one hundred states had fewer than 30 US military personnel within it.

¹⁷³ ASD (Sustainment), “Base Structure Report- 2018”, 7; DMDC, “Personnel Location Report-2017”.

¹⁷⁴ Johnson, Chalmers. “America’s Empire of Bases.” Global Policy Forum, January 2004.

<https://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/153/26119.html>;

“Stop Endless War.” United For Peace and Justice. Accessed September 5, 2019.

<http://www.unitedforpeace.org/stop-endless-war/>; Slater, Alice. “The US Has Military Bases in 80 Countries. All of Them Must Close.” *The Nation*, January 24, 2018. <https://www.thenation.com/article/the-us-has-military-bases-in-172-countries-all-of-them-must-close/>.

¹⁷⁵ ASD (Sustainment), “Base Structure Report- 2018”, 7; DMDC, “Personnel Location Report-2017”.




Figure 4: US Defense Personnel and Facilities Abroad, 2017

To grasp the actual extent of the US foreign basing network requires a combination of quantitative and qualitative sources and a clear definition of what a military base is. Employing the three-fold definition of a foreign base from Chapter 1 (*foreign location from which troops conduct military operations in the sending-state interest*), I estimate that the United States has active military bases in 52 countries, as of 2017. Although the lines between categories are not always clear, I count seven countries in which the level of basing meets the definition of a Main Operating Base (MOB), 13 with Forward Operating Sites (FOS), and 23 with Cooperative Security Locations (CSLs).

Historical Overview of US Basing and Relation to Grand Strategy

America acquired its first overseas bases beginning in 1898. Over a five-year period of imperial expansion, the McKinley and Roosevelt administrations annexed Hawaii and Samoa, took over Cuba, Puerto Rico, the Philippines, Wake Island, and Guam as a result of the Spanish-American War, and established control of the Panama Canal Zone.¹⁷⁶ These strategy of territorial expansion was accompanied by an attendant growth in forward military basing. Despite this initial foray into expeditionary military basing, the US military foreign basing footprint would remain small and largely confined to the Western Hemisphere until the eve of the Second World War.

After 1943 the US foreign basing network rapidly expanded until it reached its zenith in the 1950s with major military facilities in more than 50 foreign countries and territories.¹⁷⁷ That the United States would have a large forward basing footprint was driven by its grand strategy of containing Communism and the expansion of the Soviet Union. The extent of this footprint was largely the result of the operational needs of Strategic Air Command and the range limitations of its bomber aircraft.¹⁷⁸ Beginning in the late 1960s, the US foreign military basing network began to concentrate into fewer basing countries with more established alliance arrangements.¹⁷⁹ This shift was the result

¹⁷⁶ Naval History and Heritage Command. "Development of the Naval Establishment in Hawaii." US Navy and Hawaii- A Historical Summary, April 23, 2015. <http://public1.nhhcaws.local/research/library/online-reading-room/title-list-alphabetically/u/the-us-navy-and-hawaii-a-historical-summary/development-of-the-naval-establishment-in-hawaii.html>;

¹⁷⁷ Harkavy, *Great Power Competition for Overseas Bases*, 130-134.

¹⁷⁸ Hoopes, Townsend. "Overseas Bases in American Strategy." *Foreign Affairs* 37, no. 1 (1958): 69.

¹⁷⁹ Pettyjohn, Stacie L. *U.S. Global Defense Posture, 1783/2011*. Santa Monica, California: RAND, 2012, 61.

of multiple factors including decolonization and political backlash from the Vietnam War, which reduced the availability of foreign basing for the United States as well as the development of aerial refueling and intercontinental and submarine-launched ballistic missiles, which the reduced the need for such a far-flung posture.

The United States maintained this concentrated foreign basing posture until the end of the Cold War. In the 1990s, the United States began to close many of its large bases in Europe while establishing an expeditionary presence in the Middle East. This trend was accelerated in the second Bush administration which sought to transform the US global defense posture away from a reliance on heavily developed MOBs toward smaller, more flexible basing arrangements.¹⁸⁰ This “lily-pad” strategy relied on expeditionary forces rapidly deploying to more austere FOS and CSL- level bases. This trend toward smaller, but more basing countries is clearly evident in Figure 5 below.

¹⁸⁰ Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Feith, Douglas J. “Transforming the United States Global Defense Posture,” speech presented to the Center for Strategic and International Studies Washington, D.C., December 3, 2003; Principal Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, Ryan Henry. “Transforming the U.S. Global Defense Posture.” *Naval War College Review*, 2006; Krepinevich, Andrew, and Robert O. Work. “A New Global Defense Posture for the Second Transoceanic Era.” *Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, Washington DC*, 2007.




Figure 5: Nations Hosting US Military Bases by Basing Level

While this section provided a broad overview of the history US foreign military bases and its relationship to American grand strategy, the US foreign basing footprint is so extensive that one cannot really understand these shifts in posture without looking at changes at a more granular level. For this reason, I examine US military basing region-by-region so that we can see how these strategic actually played out and where the future of US military basing seems to be heading.¹⁸¹

¹⁸¹ In discussing regional basing, I follow the grouping of US combatant commands. This places Turkey and Israel in Europe while Egypt and Central Asia east to Pakistan in the Middle East.

2.5.1 US Bases in Europe

Europe hosts many of the US military's main operating bases abroad, specifically in Germany, Italy, Spain, and the United Kingdom, as well as important FOS-level bases in Belgium, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Turkey. Most of these bases were established after World War II as part of the strategy to contain the Soviet Union. After the end of the Cold War, the United States reduced its basing footprint in Europe considerably, cutting the number of personnel assigned in Europe by half and turning hundreds of installations back over to the German government.¹⁸²

Despite these basing reductions, the US military retained a significant remnant of bases in order to uphold its NATO commitments, deter the rise of a regional hegemony, and enable peacekeeping operations in the Balkans. As interstate war in Europe began to look increasingly implausible US forces in Europe began to take a more expeditionary role, a trend that was accelerated after 9/11. The prosperity and relative security of European bases replicated the family support structure and more stabilized tour lengths of stateside bases while also being located significantly closer to potential conflict areas in Africa and the Middle East. Thus, during the Global War on Terror, Europe came to be seen by the US military as a merely a staging area for onward operations. In the late 2000s the United States began to consider reducing basing in Europe even further as the perceived decline in the likelihood of European conflict combined with the financial pressures of the 2008 economic collapse and mounting costs from Iraq and Afghanistan.

¹⁸² Lostumbo, Michael J., Michael J. McNerney, Eric Peltz, Derek Eaton, David R. Frelinger, Victoria A. Greenfield, John Halliday, et al. "Overseas Basing of U.S. Military Forces: An Assessment of Relative Costs and Strategic Benefits." Research Report 201, RAND National Defense Research Institute, 2013, 9.

In 2004, the Pentagon had conducted a Global Defense Posture Review that recommended adjusting US presence “in Europe by shifting away from legacy Cold War structures,” and instead “developing the operational flexibility and diversity in options needed to contend with uncertainty in the ‘arc of instability’—the vast region from North Africa across the Middle East and South Asia to Southeast Asia.”¹⁸³ Admiral James Stavridis, the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe from 2009-2013, described the mood: “the overall zeitgeist was we were trying to close bases, and they (the Europeans) were fighting us tooth and nail.” Stavridis argues that for these European host-nations the bases were primarily “about the economics. They wanted the jobs and soldiers and sailors to be there.”¹⁸⁴ Nonetheless, the United States closed bases in Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom while opening CSLs in Africa and the Middle East.¹⁸⁵ According to Stavridis, “We were looking for ways to save money and downsize. In that era, we mistakenly believed that Russia was going to basically get out of the aggression business.”¹⁸⁶

Russia’s invasion of Georgia in 2008 and annexation of Crimea in 2014 has convinced American defense planners that the Kremlin is not “out of the aggression business” and a pacified Europe cannot be taken for granted. According to one senior American military official, Russia’s assertiveness in Georgia fundamentally changed the

¹⁸³ Principal Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, Ryan Henry. “Transforming the U.S. Global Defense Posture.” *Naval War College Review*, 2006, 19.

¹⁸⁴ Author Interview, June 2019.

¹⁸⁵ Pettyjohn, Stacie L. *U.S. Global Defense Posture, 1783/2011*. Santa Monica, California: RAND, 2012, 90.

¹⁸⁶ Author interview, June 2019.

security situation in Europe, even if many people in the United States did not start paying attention until the conflict in Ukraine.¹⁸⁷ The fear of a revanchist Russia has energized Eastern European states toward closer ties with the United States. In response, the United States opened CSLs in Romania, Poland, and Bulgaria, established a multinational airlift wing in Hungary, and started rotational deployments to Norway and the Baltics as part of Operation Atlantic Resolve.¹⁸⁸ Even under a Trump Administration known for skepticism of international commitments, the United States has maintained a robust presence in Eastern Europe.¹⁸⁹

2.5.2 US Bases in Asia

As indicated in **Error! Reference source not found.** above, the current preponderance of all US foreign military facilities and forces are in Asia. Japan and South Korea host the largest contingents of US forces in Asia, but the United States maintains several other bases in Asia. The American FOS in Singapore is “the foremost Southeast Asian location for in-region support facilities.”¹⁹⁰ Other important logistics bases in the Pacific include the British Overseas Territory of Diego Garcia where the US

¹⁸⁷ Author interview with MG (ret) Paul Schafer, USAF, Director, J5/8: Policy, Strategy, Partnering & Capabilities, US European Command, May 2019.

¹⁸⁸ “Allied Air Command | NATO Air Policing.” Accessed September 9, 2019. <https://ac.nato.int/page5931922/-nato-air-policing>; “Navy Region Europe, Africa, Central.” CNIC, Commander Navy Installations Command. Accessed September 9, 2019. <https://www.cnic.navy.mil/map.html>;

“Novo Selo Range Army Base in Novo Selo, Bulgaria.” *Military Bases* (blog). Accessed September 9, 2019. <https://militarybases.com/overseas/bulgaria/novo-selo/>.

¹⁸⁹ “Norway to Invite More U.S. Marines, for Longer and Closer to Russia.” *Reuters*, June 12, 2018. <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-norway-us-russia-idUSKBN1J8149>; Myers, Meghann. “It’s Not ‘Fort Trump,’ but a US Division Headquarters Heading to Poland.” *Military Times*, June 12, 2019. <https://www.militarytimes.com/news/your-military/2019/06/12/its-not-fort-trump-but-a-us-division-headquarters-heading-to-poland/>.


¹⁹⁰ *Ibid*, 118.

has maintained a FOS since the 1980s and a CSL-level air mobility hub at U-Tapao Air Base, Thailand.¹⁹¹ The United States has also manned a joint intelligence center in Australia since the 1960s, but has recently established a CSL in Darwin to host US Marine deployments.

US military basing in Asia began in the Philippines after the Spanish-American War at the turn of the 20th century. The Japanese and South Korean bases date back to World War II and the Korean War, respectively. During the Cold War, the primary purpose of US basing in Asia was to contain the threat of Communism emanating the Soviet Union and China. This logic led to the Vietnam War and a massive build-up of American forces in Asia until the early 1970s when US forces left South Vietnam and

¹⁹¹ Ladwig, Walter C., Andrew Erickson, and Justin D. Mikolay. "Diego Garcia and American Security in the Indian Ocean." In *Rebalancing the Force: Basing and Forward Presence in the Asia-Pacific*, edited by Carnes Lord and Andrew Erickson. Naval Institute Press, 2014, 141; Busbarat, Pongphisoot. "'Bamboo Swirling in the Wind': Thailand's Foreign Policy Imbalance between China and the United States." *Contemporary Southeast Asia* 38, no. 2 (2016): 247.


Thailand. Since the end of the Vietnam War, as



Source: DOD data compiled by Tim Kane, Hoover Institution

Figure 6 indicates, overall US military presence in the region has been relatively steady, however the specific location of these forces has varied and has been controversial at times.

U.S. Troop Deployments, 1950-2015



Source: DOD data compiled by Tim Kane, Hoover Institution

Figure 6: US Troops by Region¹⁹²

US military bases on the Japanese island of Okinawa have generated regular and significant domestic protests, but the United States has been able to maintain its Japanese bases.¹⁹³ In the case of the Philippines, the United States was not able to maintain basing access, as extensively documented in Chapter 5.¹⁹⁴ After the Philippine eviction in 1992, US presence in Asia remained relatively static as the focus of American foreign policy

¹⁹² Figure used with author's permission. From Kane, Tim. "The Decline of American Engagement: Patterns in US Troop Deployments." *Hoover Institution Economics Working Paper* 16101 (2016), 7.

¹⁹³ Yeo, Andrew. *Activists, Alliances, and Anti-U.S. Base Protests*. Cambridge Studies in Contentious Politics. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011; Kawato, Yuko. *Protests against U.S. Military Base Policy in Asia: Persuasion and Its Limits*. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2015; Kim, Claudia J., and Taylor C. Boas. "Activist Disconnect: Social Movements, Public Opinion, and U.S. Military Bases in East Asia." *Armed Forces & Society*, July 28, 2019.

¹⁹⁴ Pettyjohn, Stacie L., and Jennifer Kavanagh. *Access Granted: Political Challenges to the U.S. Overseas Military Presence, 1945-2014*. Research Report, RR-1339-AF. Santa Monica, Calif: RAND Corporation, 2016, 156.

shifted toward the Middle East. In this post-Cold War era, the grand strategic logic of US bases in Asia was to maintain regional stability and an open trading order in order to dissuade the rise of a competing regional hegemon.

The Obama administration's "pivot to Asia" signaled a renewed emphasis on US military presence in the region.¹⁹⁵ This strategic turn entailed the establishment of a rotational Marine force in Australia and a build-up of US military forces in Hawaii, Alaska, and Guam.¹⁹⁶ The pivot also saw a 2013 enhanced access agreement with the Philippines, although this agreement is currently endangered by tensions between the Trump and Duterte administrations. It is likely that the United States will continue to seek expanded military basing options in Asia. Many American planners presume that in a confrontation over Taiwan or the South China Sea, the People's Republic of China (PRC) will adopt an A2/AD or Anti-Access Area Denial strategy of using sea mines, anti-ship ballistic and cruise missiles, and advanced surface-to-air missiles batteries to prevent or delay US deployment of preponderant force. The fear is that China would then be able to present the United States with a *fait accompli* where the costs to dislodge PRC forces would deter US involvement. This potentiality makes US military access to east Asia, whether in the form of permanent bases, regular port calls, or frequent joint training and exercises, a key US military objective.

¹⁹⁵ Clinton, Hillary. "America's Pacific Century." *Foreign Policy*, November 2011; "Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense," January 2012. http://archive.defense.gov/news/Defense_Strategic_Guidance.pdf; Davidson, Janine. "The U.S. 'Pivot to Asia.'" *American Journal of Chinese Studies* 21 (2014): 77–82. US Department of Defense.

¹⁹⁶ Silove, Nina. "The Pivot before the Pivot: U.S. Strategy to Preserve the Power Balance in Asia." *International Security* 40, no. 4 (April 2016): 74.

2.5.3 US Bases in the Middle East

The Middle East contains the next largest allocation of US military forces. The US has important forward operating sites in Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, and Bahrain as well as CSLs in Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Iraq.¹⁹⁷ There are also still significant US military forces in Afghanistan and Syria, but these bases are best characterized as contingency locations, rather than enduring bases, despite the long duration of the conflicts. Because these are still active combat zones the determination of whether the US military will retain enduring basing locations will depend on future negotiations. US military basing in the Middle East differs from that of the Europe and Asia in two important ways: 1) despite the deployment of large numbers of forces, the United States owns little of the infrastructure and 2) most basing was established relatively recently.

If you measure a base by the number of assigned troops, Kuwait, Afghanistan, Bahrain, and Iraq all jump into the top ten largest basing countries. However, as indicated by the **Error! Reference source not found.** above, there is a disconnect between troops and infrastructure. In many Middle Eastern states, the United States has significant troop presence, but the facilities that house these forces do not show up on DOD real property inventories. Even when the US does have permanent basing rights the infrastructure tends to be host-nation-owned. Despite the significant numbers of troops in the region, these forces have generally been assigned on short-term deployments without family members; the US has never had a MOB in the Middle East. There are likely numerous reasons for

¹⁹⁷ Wallin, Matthew. "US Military Bases and Facilities in the Middle East: Fact Sheet." American Security Project, June 2018.

this asymmetry including the general anti-Americanism of the “Arab street,” mutual lack of cultural affinity, and US concerns about the safety of American dependents.¹⁹⁸

However, some of the distrust of robust US military bases by Middle Eastern regimes likely stems from the history of US engagement in the region which can be seen as largely self-serving. Unlike European or Asian military bases which are premised on mutual defense relationships, with only a few exceptions, US military presence has been generally viewed by the local population of most Middle Eastern states as predominately benefitting US security interests such as protecting oilfields or prosecuting the War on Terror.

The United States has only established a significant military presence in the Middle East in the last 20 years, as is evident from Figure 6 above. In the early Cold War, the United States maintained small basing facilities in Saudi Arabia and Iran and flew U-2 missions out of Pakistan, but largely relied on the UK to maintain Western presence in the region.¹⁹⁹ In the wake of British imperial decline, the United States took over former UK bases in Oman and Bahrain, but was evicted from Saudi Arabia (1962) and Pakistan (1969).²⁰⁰ In the late 1970s, the Carter administration recognized the need to protect

¹⁹⁸ Baxter, Kylie, and Shahram Akbarzadeh. *US Foreign Policy in the Middle East: The Roots of Anti-Americanism*. Routledge, 2012; Blaydes, Lisa, and Drew A. Linzer. “Elite Competition, Religiosity, and Anti-Americanism in the Islamic World.” *American Political Science Review* 106, no. 2 (2012): 225–243; Makdisi, Ussama. “‘Anti-Americanism’ in the Arab World: An Interpretation of a Brief History.” *The Journal of American History* 89, no. 2 (2002): 538–557; Parker, Richard B. “Anti-American Attitudes in the Arab World.” *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 497, no. 1 (1988): 46–57; Rubin, Barry. “The Real Roots of Arab Anti-Americanism.” *Foreign Aff.* 81 (2002): 73.

¹⁹⁹ Harkavy, Robert E. *Great Power Competition for Overseas Bases*, 114, 118, 136.

²⁰⁰ Pettyjohn, Stacie L., and Jennifer Kavanagh. *Access Granted: Political Challenges to the U.S. Overseas Military Presence, 1945-2014*. Research Report, RR-1339-AF. Santa Monica, Calif: RAND Corporation, 2016, 155-156

global energy supplies in the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean and created a Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force, but US efforts to increase its regional military access were only partially successful. In 1980 the United States was able to expand access in Oman and gain a contingency access agreement with Egypt at Ras Banas on the Red Sea, but its access was diminished in Bahrain in 1977 and completely lost in Iran in 1979, while talks to establish bases in Saudi Arabia and Pakistan were ultimately unsuccessful.²⁰¹ Overall, Cold War US military basing in the Middle East was “small and sporadic” as the United States mainly relied on aircraft carriers in the waters nearby instead of permanent military bases.”²⁰²

Large-scale US military basing in the region accelerated after the 1991 Gulf War as the United States retained residual forces in Kuwait and an air operations center in Saudi Arabia to manage the no-fly zones over Iraq, as well as established Fifth Fleet headquarters in Bahrain. After the 9/11 terrorist attacks and the American invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan, US military presence in the region diversified as US security interests shifted from containing Iraq to countering terrorism. In addition to major occupations of Iraq and Afghanistan, this policy led to the relocation of the theater air operations center from Saudi Arabia to Qatar and the establishment of forward operating sites in the United Arab Emirates, and briefly in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. After the

²⁰¹ Gresh, Geoffrey F. *Gulf Security and the U.S. Military: Regime Survival and the Politics of Basing*. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2016, 3; Harkavy, Robert E. *Great Power Competition for Overseas Bases*, 218; Wilson, George C. “Egypt Base Could Cost \$400 Million.” *Washington Post*, August 26, 1980.

²⁰² Sun, Degang. “The US Military Bases in the Gulf Cooperation Council States: Dynamics of Readjustment.” *Journal of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies (in Asia)* 4, no. 4 (December 1, 2010): 47.

United States withdrew most military forces from Iraq in 2011, the emergence of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in 2014 led to the return of a contingent of US forces to Al Asad Air Base in Iraq and the establishment of a CSL at Muwaffaq Salti Air Base in longtime US ally Jordan. Today the major threats against which the US is postured in the region included a reduced, but still dangerous ISIS & Al Qaeda terrorist groups and the Iranian triple threat of ballistic missiles, proxy groups like Hezbollah, and potential nuclear proliferation.²⁰³ Despite these persistent threats, US military presence in the Middle East has been cut in half in the last five years and may continue to decline depending on negotiations with the Taliban and barring a dramatic escalation with Iran.²⁰⁴

2.5.4 US Bases in Africa

US military basing presence in Africa is small, but contentious. USAFRICOM commanders have long maintained that the only enduring base in Africa is Camp Lemonnier, which is the largest and most robust US military location on the continent.²⁰⁵ These official statements, hinging on the definition of “base,” discount the roughly dozen cooperative security and contingency locations the US has established in Africa. As of 2018, the United States had CSLs in nine countries including Kenya, Uganda, Burkina Faso, Botswana, Chad, Senegal, Ghana, Gabon, and Niger and contingency locations in

²⁰³ Lead Inspector General for Operation Inherent Resolve. “Quarterly Report to the United States Congress | April 1, 2019 – June 30, 2019.” US Department of Defense, August 6, 2019.

²⁰⁴ Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC), “Military and Civilian Personnel Location Report-June 2019,” DoD Personnel, Workforce Reports & Publications (US Department of Defense, 2019). The US military had approximately 120,000 personnel in the Middle East in 2012. This number had dropped to 67,000 in 2017 and roughly 28,000 by summer of 2019.

²⁰⁵ USAFRICOM posture statements 2011-2018.

at least three more, Somalia, Cameroon, and Mali.²⁰⁶ In contrast to sensationalist reporting that these bases constitute a vast, shadowy form of neocolonialism, actual US military presence in Africa is still tiny.²⁰⁷ Many of the above locations amount to scarcely more than a few buildings and a runway with only intermittent presence by US military forces. With only 7,000 military personnel located in Africa, and approximately 4,000 of those stationed in Djibouti, that leaves roughly a brigade's worth of troops scattered across a continent about three times larger than the United States.²⁰⁸ The mission for most of these personnel is training and advising host-nation military forces.

Significant US military interest in Africa is also a relatively recent phenomenon. During the Cold War, the United States had Air Force bases in Morocco and Libya, a communications site in Ethiopia, and naval port access in Berbera, Somalia and Mombasa, Kenya, but Africa was always a region of peripheral interest as it was not even assigned as its own geographic command until 2008.²⁰⁹ In 1995 the DOD could declare, "America's security interests in Africa are very limited. At present we have no permanent or significant military presence anywhere in Africa: We have no bases; we station no

²⁰⁶ ASD (Sustainment), "Base Structure Report- 2018"; Kimmons, Sean. "Small Army Post Supports Counterterrorism Fight in Africa." *U.S. Army News Service*, December 13, 2017; Turse, Nick. "U.S. Military Says It Has a 'Light Footprint' in Africa. These Documents Show a Vast Network of Bases." *The Intercept* (blog), December 1, 2018; Weldhauser, Gen. Thomas. "USAFRICOM Posture Statement." US Africa Command, February 2019.

²⁰⁷ Turse, 2018; Keenan, Jeremy. *The Dying Sahara: US Imperialism and Terror in Africa*. London: Pluto Press, 2013; Trevithick, Joseph. "A Guide To The Pentagon's Shadowy Network Of Bases In Africa." *The Drive*, March 1, 2017. <http://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/8008/a-guide-to-the-pentagons-shadowy-network-of-bases-in-africa>.

²⁰⁸ Weldhauser, USAFRICOM Posture Statement, 2019; US Navy. "Camp Lemonnier, Djibouti." Commander, Naval Installations Command. Accessed September 16, 2019.

²⁰⁹ Mangi, Lutfullah. "US MILITARY BASES IN AFRICA." *Pakistan Horizon* 40, no. 2 (1987): 95–102; Zartman, I. William. "The Moroccan-American Base Negotiations." *Middle East Journal; Washington* 18, no. 1 (Winter 1964): 27–40.

combat forces; and we homeport no ships... ultimately we see very little traditional strategic interest in Africa.”²¹⁰ This apathy began to change with the 1998 US embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania and dramatically accelerated after 9/11.²¹¹ In 2002, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff announced the establishment of Joint Task Force—Horn of Africa to counter both terrorist and piracy threats emanating from ungoverned spaces in Somalia.²¹² As indicated in Figure 7 below, the United States steadily expanded the number of countries it had security agreements with, either in the form of status of forces agreement (SOFA), facility access agreements, or acquisition and cross-servicing agreements.²¹³

²¹⁰ Office of International Security Affairs. “U.S. Security Strategy for Sub-Saharan Africa.” US Department of Defense, August 1, 1995. <https://archive.defense.gov/Speeches/Speech.aspx?SpeechID=943>.

²¹¹ Brown, David E. “AFRICOM at 5 Years: The Maturation of a New U.S. Combatant Command.” The Letort Papers. Strategic Studies Institute and US Army War College Press, 2013.

²¹² Myers, Gen. Richard B., “Statement by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,” § US Senate Armed Services Committee (2003), <https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-108shrg87323/pdf/CHRG-108shrg87323.pdf>.

²¹³ Kavanagh, Jennifer. *U.S. Security-Related Agreements in Force since 1955: Introducing a New Database*. Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 2014. Data extended by Renanah Miles and Brian Blankenship, “Market for Access: Competition, Need, and the Prospects for Power Projection” (Unpublished, 2018).




Figure 7: US Access Agreements with African States

In 2006, US security focus expanded from East Africa to terrorist threats in northwest Africa and the Sahel.²¹⁴ These concerns derived from the affiliation with Al Qaeda of the long-time Algerian terrorist group, the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC), and its subsequent rebranding as Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb.²¹⁵ In recognition of this threat, the United States established the Trans-Saharan Counterterrorism Partnership.

²¹⁴ Jones, Gen. James L., “Statement by the Commander US European Command,” US Senate Armed Services Committee (2006).

²¹⁵ National Counterterrorism Center, “AL-QA’IDA IN THE LANDS OF THE ISLAMIC MAGHREB (AQIM),” Counterterrorism Guide, accessed September 18, 2018, <https://www.dni.gov/nctc/groups/aqim.html>.

Congressional testimony in 2006 also marked the first time that US military leaders highlighted piracy in the Gulf of Guinea as a major national security interest. The commander of US European Command, which was responsible for Africa at the time, remarked, “Africa currently provides over 15 percent of US oil imports and recent explorations in the Gulf of Guinea region indicate potential reserves that could account for 25–35 percent of US imports within the next decade.”²¹⁶ The subsequent affiliation of Boko Haram with Al Qaeda in 2010 and the Chibok schoolgirl kidnappings in 2014 increased US interest in the Lake Chad basin (Nigeria, Chad, Niger, and Cameroon) for counterterrorism efforts.²¹⁷

These security concerns drove the US military to expand its basing footprint in Africa, though this posture still consisted primarily of austere CSLs and contingency locations. Moving into the future, the dispersion of US basing in Africa may be slowing as US AFRICOM reported it had closed 5 CSLs in 2017 and the US posture seems to be consolidating around a smaller number of key security partners, such as Niger and Kenya, in which it can invest more heavily.²¹⁸

²¹⁶ Jones, Statement by the Commander US European Command.

²¹⁷ National Counterterrorism Center, “Boko Haram,” Counterterrorism Guide, accessed September 18, 2018, <https://www.dni.gov/nctc/groups/bokoharam.html>. Friend, Alice Hunt, and Jamie D Wise. “The Evolution of U.S. Defense Posture in North and West Africa.” *CSIS*, 2018, 9.

²¹⁸ Weldhauser, Gen. Thomas. “USAFRICOM 2017 Posture Statement.” US Africa Command, February 2017.




Figure 8: African States Hosting US Military Bases, 2000-2015

2.5.5 US Bases in Latin America

Like Africa, Latin America is a region in which the United States has a minimal military basing footprint. The largest base in the region is Guantanamo Bay, a nearly 30,000 acre piece of Cuban territory, which not only hosts the infamous enemy combatant detention facility, but also a deep-water US Naval Station which is the self-proclaimed “forward, ready, and irreplaceable U.S. sea power platform in the Caribbean.”²¹⁹ The other primary US military bases in the region are Joint Task Force

²¹⁹ ASD (Sustainment), “Base Structure Report- 2018”; US Navy. “Naval Station Guantanamo Bay.” Commander, Naval Installations Command. Accessed September 16, 2019. https://www.cnic.navy.mil/regions/cnrse/installations/ns_guantanamo_bay.html.

Bravo, a FOS at Soto Cano Air Base, Honduras and two CSLs in El Salvador and Aruba-Curacao. The dearth of US military bases in the region is due in part to the absence of peer competitor states and highly acute security threats, but also can be attributed to suspicion about US military involvement in the region that dates back to the Monroe Doctrine.²²⁰

After World War II, the US military presence in Latin America, organized under US Southern Command (SOUTHCOM), was focused on controlling access to the Panama Canal and supporting right-wing governments against Communist revolutionaries.²²¹ Toward these objectives, the largest United States military base in the region was Howard Air Force Base in Panama which was also the one-time site of the infamous School of the Americas for Latin American military officers, some of whom were subsequently charged with human rights abuses.²²² It was also during this time that Joint Task Bravo was established in Honduras to support US foreign internal defense missions throughout Central America. In the 1990s, US military forces in region shifted focus to countering transnational criminal networks that traffic drugs and people into the United States. In 1999 when basing negotiations between the US and Panama broke down, US military forces departed the country and the US airborne warning mission shifted to CSLs in El Salvador, Aruba, and Manta Air Base, Ecuador. US military access

²²⁰ Faller, Admiral Craig S. US Southern Command Posture Statement, § Senate Armed Services Committee (2019).

²²¹ US SOUTHCOM. "History of U.S. Southern Command." Accessed September 16, 2019. <https://www.southcom.mil/About/History/>.

²²² Poland, John Lindsay. "US Military Bases in Latin America and the Caribbean." In *The Bases of Empire: The Global Struggle Against U.S. Military Posts*, edited by Catherine Lutz. Washington Square, N.Y.: New York University Press, 2009; Gill, Lesley. *The School of the Americas: Military Training and Political Violence in the Americas*. Duke University Press, 2004.

to Manta lasted until 2008 when the election of the anti-American Rafael Correa doomed the US base in Ecuador.²²³ Interestingly, in keeping with the general US strategic turn to great power competition, the 2019 US SOUTHCOM posture statement identified “Six state actors (Russia, China, Iran, and their authoritarian allies in Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela)” as the foremost threats to US security in the region.

2.6 Lessons about Sending-State Motivation

The previous section outlined the historic, current, and speculative future basing postures of five major power states. What do these case studies teach us about the motivations of sending-states? I propose that there are five general observations we can draw about why foreign bases matter for major powers and international relations.

1. Declining powers use foreign bases to retain cultural and economic links to former empires.

The Russian, British, and French basing networks all align largely along linguistic and institutional integration patterns. Since the end of the Cold War, the bases which Russia has chosen to maintain are in Russian-speaking states, not the more culturally dissimilar Vietnam, Eritrea, or Cuba. More interestingly the states that voluntarily host Russian military bases have also been some of the most prolific adopters of the Kremlin’s various regional integration projects.

²²³ Author interviews with former US SOUTHCOM commander, Admiral James Stavridis and former US Naval Attache to Ecuador, Captain Terry Wichert.

Armenia, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan not only host Russian bases, but also belong to at least three Russian-led regional institutions.²²⁴ Although the direction of causality is unclear, there is a clear correlation between Russian foreign basing and regional institution building.

French and British basing networks are also largely confined to former Francophone and Anglophone colonies respectively. As earlier demonstrated, British bases work to support Commonwealth ties. French bases and their role in African security play a synergistic role with French economic interests. France is the second largest exporter to Africa and a supporter of the Franc Zone, a monetary union of largely Francophone Sub-Saharan states.²²⁵

2. *Revisionist powers can use foreign military bases to act as “spoilers” and gain leverage in other areas.*

Russia basing actions in Syria and Venezuela, and to a lesser extent in Africa, demonstrate a strategy of using foreign military bases to check Western, and particularly American, imposition of foreign policy preferences. These bases create “facts on the ground” which force Western policymakers to take Russian interests into account. Any American temptation toward imposing regime change in Damascus or Caracas has been significantly constrained by the presence of Russian forces.

²²⁴ Center for Security Studies. “Regional Organizations in the Post-Soviet Space.” *The CSS Blog Network* (blog), May 9, 2019. <https://isnblog.ethz.ch/tag/eurasian-union>.

²²⁵ French Ministry of Europe and Foreign Affairs. “Economic Relations between France and Africa.” and “Franc Zone.” France Diplomatie. Accessed December 11, 2019. <https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/country-files/africa/economic-relations-between-france-and-africa/>.

Furthermore, these bases have given Moscow leverage it can use to gain concessions in other foreign policy areas. Two top Russian foreign policy priorities are to reduce the American-led sanctions imposed over Ukraine and to prevent the eastward spread of NATO membership and basing. By making themselves an indispensable player in the resolution of the Syrian and Venezuelan conflicts, the Kremlin is now able to link their cooperation on those issues with concessions on sanctions and NATO.

3. Shared access to foreign bases is a valuable contribution to collective security and gives smaller powers increased influence with an allied superpower.

Although both Britain and France have independent reasons for maintaining their foreign basing network, one advantage their foreign bases bring is to complement the global reach of the American superpower. British bases on Ascension Island, Diego Garcia, and Akrotiri, Cyprus are all important links in the American global power projection network. Furthermore, British bases in Gibraltar, Brunei, Singapore, and Oman all provide accessible backup locations for nearby American bases in the vicinity of strategic maritime chokepoints. These assets further cement the US-British special relationship and give the UK unprecedented influence in US defense planning.

Similarly, US counterterrorism efforts in the Sahel and North Africa have been largely dependent on accommodation at the network of French bases throughout the region. Although defense spending as a percentage of GDP is often cited as the most important measure of an ally's contribution to collective defense, this figure does not capture the whole story. Shared access to foreign military bases is an overlooked but critical contribution that smaller powers can make

4. *The reasons a sending-state establishes a foreign base are not always the reasons it maintains it.*

Foreign bases are expensive propositions in which sending-states often make significant investments in the physical infrastructure and human capital of the host-nation. These sunk costs, together with an uncertain international environment, make sending-states reluctant to close foreign bases, even if the initial threat that prompted the base's establishment has disappeared. For example, Russia hung onto Soviet-era bases in Cuba and Vietnam well into the early 2000s until they became expensive to maintain.²²⁶ When a change in security threats diminish the need for a base, sending-states often reduce the scale of their presence while maintaining a foothold in the country to guard against future threats. Often new rationales are found to repurpose and justify existing installations.

The American presence in Europe is certainly an example of this path dependence. Dozens of US bases established in Germany to defend Western Europe from Soviet invasion were closed in the 1990s, but a remnant was retained and reoriented to stopping interethnic conflict in the Balkans and enabling "out of area" operations into the Middle East. Today these US installations in Europe have come full-circle are being revamped to protect NATO's easternmost members from Russian revanchism. It is not only US bases that exhibit this "stickiness". Both French and British bases in their former colonial possessions have transitioned from means of imperial control to outposts of soft

²²⁶ Wines, Michael. "Russia Closing 2 Major Posts For Snooping, One in Cuba." The New York Times, October 18, 2001, sec. World. <https://www.nytimes.com/2001/10/18/world/russia-closing-2-major-posts-for-snooping-one-in-cuba.html>.

power and security cooperation with their host-nations. Although great powers' basing postures are often internally reviewed, they are not easily reduced and tend to remain once created.

5. *A global foreign military basing network is a universal requirement for superpowers.*

The historical foreign policies of Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and the United States demonstrate that superpowers need foreign military bases to protect global economic interests, project power against global threats, and prevent global competing influences. Consequently, rising powers must establish a network of foreign military bases to achieve superpower status. They need these bases to project power against far-flung threats and protect their international economic interests. In cases of strategic rivalry, foreign military bases are markers of competing influence. Great Britain battled with Spain in the 17th century, Holland in the 18th century, and France in the 19th century for foreign military bases and their attendant control of adjacent trade markets.²²⁷ An important component of the US-Soviet rivalry of the late Cold War was their zero-sum competition for basing access in the Third World.

The assertion that global superpowers need and pursue foreign bases is not by itself earth-shattering. This superpower basing imperative, though, is relevant with regard to China. There has been evergreen debate for the last 20 years in foreign policy circles over the magnitude and nature of Chinese global ambitions. Some analysts suspect that China seeks to displace the United States as the world's leading superpower, while others

²²⁷ Harkavy, *Great Power Competition for Overseas Bases*, 45-47.

believe that the PRC has more modest ambitions toward internal stability and recognition as a regional power.²²⁸ The extent to which China pursues foreign military bases will be a key indicator of whether China is challenging the US-led global order. If the PRC seeks to turn its economic access from the One Belt One Road initiative into a global military basing network this would leave little doubt as to Beijing's grand ambitions.

6. *The character of a superpower's basing network reflects that states' unique approach to grand strategy.*

A state that aspires to superpower status and global influence requires a foreign basing network. However, while the need for a global basing network is universal, it seems that the character of a superpower's basing arrangements is unique to that state. The United States foreign basing network is built largely on mutual defense commitments and cooperative security tied with integrated economic arrangements. Russia has adopted a more heavy-handed bullying approach, while China seems to be building more transactional light-footprint model. Whether these differences in basing posture character are due to differences in culture, historical contingency, or strategic choice is an interesting area for future study. However, these differences are likely to have different political effects with host-nations.

Potential host-nations may respond differently to other interested sending-states than they would the United States. China-watchers have noted that Beijing has adopted a

²²⁸ Wang, Fei-Ling. *The China Order: Centralia, World Empire, and the Nature of Chinese Power*. SUNY Press, 2017; Fravel, M. Taylor, J. Stapleton Roy, Michael D. Swaine, Susan A. Thornton, and Ezra Vogel. "China Is Not an Enemy." *Washington Post*, July 3, 2019.; Steinberg, James, and Michael E. O'Hanlon. *Strategic Reassurance and Resolve: U.S.-China Relations in the Twenty-First Century*. Princeton University Press, 2014.

“peaceful coexistence” approach to foreign relations that emphasizes state sovereignty and non-interference in domestic affairs.²²⁹ This is appealing to “African leaders and political elites who have grown tired of the political ‘nanny’ from the West.”²³⁰ A Nigerian officer related to me how his government had turned to Russia to acquire unmanned aerial vehicles after being rebuffed by an Obama administration critical of the predominately Muslim country’s approach to LGBT rights. It may be that the sovereignty concerns I theorize as part of the tradeoff inherent with foreign military access may be less acute with sending-states who adopt a more hands-off approach to their host’s political and human rights records.

On the other hand, basing relationships with the United States are voluntary and consensual. Russia, through its actions in Georgia, Ukraine, and Moldova, has shown that it is willing to use force to maintain geopolitical influence and military access in a near-abroad state. This may mean that host-nations could be more wary about allowing a Russian military foothold in their sovereign territory than they would of a more liberal great power.

Furthermore, the United States may be unique in that its deeply-integrating, yet liberal-consensual approach to basing has endowed it with a staying power that may not hold for or sending-states. Despite its significant investment in the continent through the One Belt One Road initiative, Wang and Elliot characterize Beijing’s political and policy

²²⁹ Lahtinen, Anja. *China’s Diplomacy and Economic Activities in Africa: Relations on the Move*. 1st edition. New York, NY: Springer International, 2018, 25.

²³⁰ Wang, Fei-Ling, and Esi A. Elliot. “China in Africa: Presence, Perceptions and Prospects.” *Journal of Contemporary China* 23, no. 90 (November 2, 2014):1016, <https://doi.org/10.1080/10670564.2014.898888>.

influence in Africa as “largely reduced to gestures of goodwill and ad hoc deals.”²³¹ It may not be that host-nations are promised or can expect the broad economic and military benefits from hosting a Chinese base that have traditionally come from the United States. This could mean that the cost-benefit tradeoff I assume as underlying my theory of security conditions and foreign military access would work differently for China than it has for the United States.

This chapter outlined the foreign basing postures of five major powers and the general implications these postures have for understanding sending-state motivations. In the next two chapters, I attempt to further unpack sending-state motivation by exploring the correlates of US basing.

²³¹ Ibid, 1021.

3. American Grand Strategy and the Correlates of US Military Basing

Countries do not assign military bases at random. Great powers attempt to establish military bases for specific reasons. The preceding chapter explored qualitatively some of the specific reasons why specific great powers established specific bases in specific areas. I now analyze quantitatively the specific motivations of one great power in particular, the United States. I chose to focus on the United States because of the availability of data on the American foreign basing network. The United States has the most foreign military bases and is relatively transparent with information about its military. Choosing this approach necessarily limits the generalizability of my findings. As the sole superpower for most of the period of analysis, the United States' motivations are not necessarily the motivations of mid-level powers. However, this analysis is a useful first step in systematically exploring the motivations of great power basing behavior. As I also examine the changes in American correlates of basing as the United States moved from a bipolar international system to its unipolar moment, my findings may shed insight on the likely trajectory of rising powers such as China if it achieves superpower status.

In this chapter, I examine the state-level characteristics that are most closely associated with American overseas bases. There are a number of plausible, and not mutually exclusive, explanations for US basing posture motivation. Are US military bases established according to the security logic of encircling one's enemies? Alternatively, enduring geographic factors such as controlling strategic chokepoints could

explain US basing.¹ It could be that ideology is the best predictor of where a military base would be located. In this case, one might expect democracy or foreign policy affinity to be correlated with US bases. Perhaps it is economic factors that are most correlated with US military basing. If so, base selection could align with a liberal logic where trade follows the flag and US military bases protect a rules-based economic order?² Alternatively as some critical theorists allege, the United States could be seeking to establish bases in poorer countries that are more susceptible to US pressure or natural resource-rich states so that the United States can gain access to their energy resources. These correlates, while not definitive causes, point to general trends in what motivates the United States' foreign basing posture.

I also explore whether and how American basing motivations have changed over time. Daniel Drezner has characterized the epochs of American grand strategy broadly as “Isolationism” for the first 150 years, “Containment” from World War II to the end of the Cold War, and “Primacy” through the 1990s to current era.³ Given these changing grand strategies, it is probable that the correlates of US military basing are not static over time. While a military base is not easily removed or added, US basing posture has changed and the characteristics of the nations' hosting US bases has likely changed as well. To determine if there are differences across grand strategy eras, I explore separately the Cold

¹ Mahan, Alfred Thayer. *The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660-1783*. 12th edition, Little, Brown and Company, 1918, orig., 1890.

² Pollins, Brian M. “Does Trade Still Follow the Flag?” *The American Political Science Review* 83, no. 2 (June 1989): 465. Also, Ikenberry, *Liberal Leviathan* and *After Victory*.

³ Daniel Drezner, "Grand Strategy in a Fractured Marketplace of Ideas", presentation at Duke University, 14 November 2019.

War, post-Cold War, and Global War on Terror periods to discern whether US basing motivations are characterized by continuity or change.

3.1 Measuring US Foreign Basing

As discussed in the overview of the US basing posture, there are numerous ways that one could operationalize basing. For this analysis I use, from Chapter 1, the three-fold definition of “an *enduring location* from which *foreign troops conduct military operations* in the *sending-state interest*”⁴. Using data from US Department of Defense publicly available personnel data, base structure reports, theater posture briefing slides, federal contracting data, and news reports I hand-coded the presence of an American foreign military base for 150 countries from 1985 to 2015. I categorize this dependent variable of basing not only as a binary variable (0 = no foreign military base (FMB), 1 = FMB), but also as an ordinal variable. This variable ranges according to the hierarchical typology established in Chapter One. It is coded as 0 for no foreign military base, 1 for contingency location (CL), cooperative security location (CSL), and ISR/technical stations, 2 for forward operating site (FOS), and 3 for a main operating base (MOB). Using this definition and a country-level unit of analysis, I find across the sample the number of states in which the United States has had foreign military bases ranges from 25 to 55.⁴

⁴ My dataset only includes locations that are officially acknowledged sites of US military personnel and discoverable using publicly available data. It is possible that there classified locations that fall outside the scope of this study. However, this is not a major limitation for the arguments I am making. For sending-state motivation, a number of the strategic purposes of foreign basing (deterrence, coercion, assurance) rely on the foreign military presence being publicly known. From the host-nation side, a key theoretical mechanism I describe is the role of domestic audience costs. If a base is not publicly known, then it would

3.2 Theoretical Correlates of US Military Basing

In the last chapter, we saw that major powers seemed to establish foreign bases for an assortment of security, geographic, ideological, and economic reasons. In this section I ground these potential correlates of US foreign basing in extant theories of international relations and US grand strategy. Some of the theories I mine for potential correlates include realism, classical geopolitics, international liberalism, and dependency theory. I group these potential factors broadly into four categories: 1) security, 2) geography, 3) ideology, and 4) economics. Some of the potential correlates I consider are unique operationalizations of an international relations theory, but several independent variables cut across and could fit within several theoretical boxes. It is also likely that multiple of these factors affect US military basing.

3.2.1 Security

Most international relations theories acknowledge the importance of security calculations in state behavior. Of all major theoretical approaches, realism most elevates security as the preeminent driver of state behavior. Waltz posits that in an anarchic international system states must seek their own security and are primarily concerned about their position in the international system and power relative to other states.⁵ In this conception, a global super-power, like America, facing potential rising challengers would seek to prevent its eclipse by denying rivals the benefits of regional hegemony.

not trigger the audience costs I theorize.

⁵ Waltz, Kenneth Neal. *Theory of International Politics*. Reissued. Long Grove, Ill: Waveland Press, 2010, 105-107, 126.

Mearsheimer writes, “States that achieve regional hegemony (such as the United States) seek to prevent great powers in other regions from duplicating their feat.”⁶

Containment of the Soviet Union was the stated strategy of the United States during the Cold War. After the fall of the Soviet Union this primacy strategy was adapted to the post-Cold War era in the leaked 1992 Defense Planning Guidance, subsequently labeled the Wolfowitz Doctrine, which sought military preponderance through a combination of defense spending for technological superiority and regional stability to dissuade potential rivals.⁷ Therefore, it could be that despite the liberal rhetoric of American leaders, US grand strategy is really, in Peter Feaver’s words, a “velvet-covered iron fist” as US foreign basing patterns conform to realist imperatives to contain enemies and potential rivals.⁸

If US basing policy is motivated by security concerns, we should expect to find US foreign military bases in proximity to America’s main enemies. In order to operationalize the idea that US basing is driven by the goal of containing enemies I code a dummy variable for when the capital of a potential host-nation is within 1000 kilometers of an American enemy.⁹ To define US enemies, I consider both state and non-state actors. During the Cold War, US defense policy was focused on the threat from the

⁶ Mearsheimer, John J. *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*. Updated edition. The Norton Series in World Politics. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2014, 41.

⁷ US Department of Defense. “Defense Planning Guidance, FY 1994– 1999,” February 29, 1992. <https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/nukevault/ebb245/doc04.pdf>.

⁸ Fontaine, Richard, Kristin M Lord, Robert J Art, Richard K Betts, Peter Feaver, Kristin M Lord, and Anne-Marie Slaughter. “Grand Strategy for the Next Administration.” Center for New American Security, May 2012, 60.

⁹ This capital-to-capital distance is computed using method from Eugene Bennett, D. Scott, and Allan Stam. 2000. “EUGene: A Conceptual Manual.” *International Interactions* 26:179-204. It also includes other major cities for Russia.

global communism, so I code the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies as America's enemies. Although not as clearly aligned I also include the Communist states of China, North Korea, Vietnam, and Nicaragua as well as post-revolutionary Iran.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, America's threat environment became more ambiguous and diffuse. After 1990, I code potential US enemies as Russia, China, Iran, Iraq (1990-2003), and North Korea.¹⁰ The absence of a central threat from a clear peer rival meant that US grand strategy had to guard against a resurgent Russia and rising China as well as lesser antagonists in North Korea, Iraq, and Iran who sought to upset their regional balances of power through nuclear proliferation. Although the level of threat from these five states has changed over time, they represent the United States' enduring potential enemies in the post-Cold War era.

After September 11th, terrorism was an undeniably important threat and motivator for American foreign policy. For this reason, in addition to the five post-Cold War rival states, I also include proximity to transnational terrorism in country-years after 2001. Using Stanford's Mapping Militants Project, I identified states within which an active terrorist group affiliated with Al Qaeda or the Islamic State was based from 2000 to

¹⁰ It is true that the end of the Cold War changed the American relationship with both Russia and China as the United States sought publicly to engage and build cooperative relationships while encouraging democratic development within both states. Yet, as the leaked 1992 Defense Planning Guidance cited above noted the United States "must hedge against the possibility that democracy could fail." Despite significant areas of cooperation in this period, Russia with its large standing military and thousands of nuclear weapons continued to represent the greatest potential threat to the United States. Although the Clinton administration adopted an engagement strategy with China there were still significant tensions including the 1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis, the 1999 Belgrade embassy bombing, and the 2001 Hainan Island EP-3 incident.

2015.¹¹ For country years beginning in 2001, I limit this threat to Afghanistan, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Philippines, Indonesia, Bangladesh, and Morocco. As Al Qaeda spread and gained affiliations from other Islamist groups, I increase the number of terrorism-location states until a maximum of 19 in 2015.

The 1,000 km cutoff for proximity is a defensible, if debatable threshold.¹² For state adversaries it is the approximate combat radius of an F-16 fighter jet. Although the United States possesses aerial refueling capability and strategic bombers that operate from further distances, the ability to gain and maintain superiority is a doctrinal prerequisite for further US military operations. This makes access to friendly airfields within tactical range of potential enemies likely desirable to US military planners.¹³ For terrorist threats, 1,000 kilometers represents approximately 2 hours transit time for a remotely piloted aircraft which is the primary ISR and strike platform in US counterterrorism operations.

The resulting enemy proximity variable ranges from 0 to 2 where 1 equals proximity to either a rival state or terrorist threat and 2 equals proximity to both.

¹¹ I used terrorist groups as of 2014 to account for the potential time lag from a change in the security environment to a change in basing posture. Center for International Security and Cooperation. "Mapping Militants: Global Al Qaeda and Islamic State." Stanford Freeman Spogli Institute. Accessed October 14, 2019. https://cisac.fsi.stanford.edu/mappingmilitants#highlight_text_11651.

¹² I conducted a sensitive analysis of the main model using an 800 km threshold and a 1,200 km threshold. The resulting coefficients were all in the same direction and 83% were at the same level of statistical significance.

¹³ Close proximity of tactical airfields is currently necessary for regional warfare but not for strategic deterrence as intercontinental ballistic missiles and strategic bombers with global reach enable the United States to target any enemy from the continental United States. However, if this analysis were to be extended further back into the Cold War the limited range of Strategic Air Command bomber aircraft would make close proximity to enemies an even more acute need. See Hoopes, Townsend. "Overseas Bases in American Strategy." *Foreign Affairs* 37, no. 1 (1958): 69–82.

3.2.2 Geography

Another explanation for US grand strategy generally and American foreign basing posture more specifically is geography. While most international relations would acknowledge that geography matters, it is not overly clear what geography matters and why. Classical geopolitics provides a theoretical foundation for how geography could be relevant to US military basing posture. Like realism, classical geopolitics acknowledges the insecurity of an anarchic international system and the shifting balances of threat and power among great powers, but also emphasizes the importance of less varying geographic factors such as continental position and maritime access. One of the earliest geopolitical theorists was Alfred Thayer Mahan, whose *The Influence of Seapower on History* emphasized the importance of chokepoints for controlling sea lines of communication.¹⁴ The closeness of classical geopolitics to geographic determinism has precipitated its fall from favor in modern international relations scholarship, but a lack of academic popularity does not mean that it is not a good explanation for American basing behavior. It is plausible that regardless of the proximate explanations for American strategic decisions the underlying logic is guided by geographic concerns.

To test the relevance of geographic factors as a motivation for US foreign basing posture, I code a binary variable for maritime strategic chokepoints. This variable is based on whether the potential host-nation has a port within 1300 km of the nearest of eight strategic maritime chokepoints: the Strait of Hormuz, the Strait of Gibraltar, the

¹⁴ Mahan, A. T. *The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660-1783*. 5th ed. New York: Dover Publications, 1894.

Oresund Strait between Denmark and Sweden, the Bab-el-Mandeb, the Bosphorus (Turkish Straits), the Straits of Malacca, and the Panama and Suez Canals¹⁵. Coggin's "Maritime Piracy Data" which includes state capital and deep-water port distance to. According to transport geographers Jean-Paul Rodrigue and Theo Notteboom, these are the "most important strategic maritime passages in part because of the chokepoints they impose on global freight circulation and in part because of the economic activities and resources they grant more efficient access to."¹⁶ I chose 1300km because that is the approximate distance that a carrier battle group steaming at 30 knots can cover in a 24 hour period. I code landlocked countries as zeros even if they fall within the specified range because of the necessity of deep-water port access to project naval power.

3.2.3 Ideology

It could be that US basing posture is less directed toward containing threats or controlling geostrategic areas and more about upholding its post-World War II liberal world order. As G. John Ikenberry describes it, in the postwar chaos the United States began to construct a consent-based liberal hegemonic order in which it would provide public goods, including security, and accommodate lesser powers in exchange for

¹⁵ Chokepoint data for the Hormuz, the Bab-el-Mandeb, the Bosphorus Malacca, the Suez, and the Panama Canal from Coggins, Bridget L. (2012) "Global Patterns of Maritime Piracy, 2000-2009: Introducing a New Dataset" *Journal of Peace Research* 49:4 (July 2012), 605-617; Coggins, Bridget L., Xiaouu Ji, and Eric Stein (2018) "Maritime Piracy Data (MPD) Version 2.5 (2000-2016)"; ICC International Maritime Bureau (2000-2016) "Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships, Annual Report" Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia: IMB Piracy Reporting Centre (Far Eastern Regional Office). Distances for Oresund and Gibraltar Straits calculated with capital-to-capital distances for Morocco and Denmark in EUGene, Bennett and Stam.

¹⁶ Rodrigue, Jean-Paul, Claude Comtois, and Brian Slack. *The Geography of Transport Systems*. 4th edition. London ; New York: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, 2017.

leadership of the order and the absence of balancing.¹⁷ In this type of bargain, the stronger state trades short-term, substantive gains for long-term benefit through power conservation and institutional leadership.¹⁸ Basing arrangements where the host nation receives concrete and immediate security benefits while American benefits are more indirect and part of what Ikenberry calls a “milieu-based approach to grand strategy,” would fall in this category.¹⁹ In this conception, American military forces are most likely to be stationed in and provide protection for states that most fully embrace the US-led order and have aligned their foreign policies with the United States’. Additionally, given the liberal nature of this order American military forces are more likely to provide protection for states that share America’s purported values.

I operationalize this strategy using several measures. First, to measure the host-nation level of alignment with the US-led order, I use the absolute value of the difference in foreign policy ideal point between the United States and the potential host-nation. This measure is derived from United Nations voting by Bailey, et al and is preferable over other dyadic measures of foreign policy similarity such as S or Tau-B because it accounts not only for shared voting but also the substance of what is being voted on.²⁰ This measure of foreign policy similarity is a good indicator of satisfaction with and integration into the US-led liberal order .

¹⁷ Ikenberry, G. John. *Liberal Leviathan: The Origins, Crisis, and Transformation of the American World Order*. Reprint edition. Princeton University Press, 2012.

¹⁸ Ikenberry, G. John. *After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars*. Princeton Studies in International History and Politics. Princeton University Press, 2001, 57-58.

¹⁹ Ikenberry, *Liberal Leviathan*, 350.

²⁰ Bailey, Michael A., Anton Strezhnev, and Erik Voeten. "Estimating dynamic state preferences from United Nations voting data." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 61.2 (2017): 430-456.

Additionally, I utilize Polity IV data to capture the regime type of potential host-nations.²¹ Because America's hegemonic order is imbued with liberal values, if the United States is operating according to those values it could be more likely to station forces in fellow democracies. I therefore code a dummy variable for democracies when the potential host-nation's Polity score is 6 or higher.²²

3.2.4 Economics

Economic motivations compose the final basket of potential drivers of US foreign military basing. These economic variables could represent two contrasting stories of American basing behavior. In a narrative similar to the liberal order explanation above, US military basing could be seen as intended to protect an open free-market international system. In this telling, the flag and trade go together as American military bases protect American trading partners as they grow rich together. Based on this conception, we would expect US military bases to be located in countries with strong trade ties to the United States.

There is a more cynical view of US basing that draws intellectually from Marx's "focus on material structures and exploitative relations that in zero-sum fashion benefit some at the expense of many others."²³ According to *dependencia* theorists, "the connections between developing countries and wealthy countries are designed for the

²¹ Marshall, Monty G., Ted Robert Gurr, and Keith Jagers. 2015. "Polity IV Project: Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2018." 2018.

²² This cutoff follows the threshold value for democracy established by Marshall, Gurr, and Jagers, "Polity Project." Accessed December 4, 2019. <https://www.systemicpeace.org/polityproject.html>.

²³ Viotti, Paul R., and Mark V. Kauppi. *International Relations Theory*. 5th ed. Boston: Longman, 2012, 189.

benefit of the wealthy countries.”²⁴ Many writers critical of US foreign policy see foreign military bases as central to an imperialist American project. The American Friends Committee writes that US foreign bases “were constructed to make the United States a maritime power and to give U.S. corporations privileged access to regional markets, natural resources, and cheap labor.”²⁵ Many Marxist-influenced writers see US basing in the Middle East and Africa as primarily motivated by gaining access to oil.²⁶ In this telling, the United States would want bases in debt-ridden states that it could easily manipulate and exploit of their natural resources.

Empirically measuring economic dependence is not straightforward because it is a multidimensional concept.²⁷ However, there is a consensus among development scholars that international trade and external debt represent two important dimensions of dependence.²⁸ So, I include a variable for the natural log of a state’s total trade value (2015 \$ US millions) with the United States.²⁹ This measure speaks to whether the United States is motivated by trade relationships in its basing posture. However, it does not

²⁴ Joseph Grieco, John G. Ikenberry and Michael Mastanduno, *Introduction to International Relations: Enduring Questions and Contemporary Perspectives* Palgrave, 2015, 458.

²⁵ Gerson, Joseph, and Bruce Birchard. *The Sun Never Sets--: Confronting the Network of Foreign U.S. Military Bases*. South End Press, 1991, 4

²⁶ Keenan, Jeremy. *The Dying Sahara: US Imperialism and Terror in Africa*. London: Pluto Press, 2013; Johnson, Chalmers. “America’s Empire of Bases.” Global Policy Forum, January 2004. <https://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/153/26119.html>.

²⁷ Mahoney, James, and Diana Rodriguez-Franco. “Dependency Theory.” In *The Oxford Handbook of the Politics of Development*, edited by Carol Lancaster and Nicolas Van de Walle. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2018, 25.

²⁸ Huang, Jie, and Kazimierz M. Słomczyński. “The Dimensionality and Measurement of Economic Dependency: A Research Note.” *International Journal of Sociology* 33, no. 4 (December 2003): 82–98.

²⁹ Barbieri, Katherine and Omar M. G. Omar Keshk. 2016. Correlates of War Project Trade Data Set Codebook, Version 4.0. Online: <http://correlatesofwar.org>.
Barbieri, Katherine, Omar M. G. Keshk, and Brian Pollins. 2009. “TRADING DATA: Evaluating our Assumptions and Coding Rules.” *Conflict Management and Peace Science*. 26(5): 471-491.

characterize whether this motivation is malign or magnanimous as trade could represent either economic openness and integration or dependence and exploitation.

While trade with the United States could cut either way, examining host-nation indebtedness better distinguishes between benign and sinister American intentions. It is possible that states that are more indebted and thus more dependent on international creditors may be more easily manipulated by the United States given its influence in international institutions. This could make these indebted countries attractive basing targets for the United States. To capture dependency, I include a logged variable for the total external debt owed by the host-nation.³⁰ If the liberal trading order narrative is correct, we should see a negative correlation between this variable and US basing, while a positive correlation would give more credence to the imperialism thesis.

Finally, I include a measure of the natural log of each country's total value of oil and gas production in 2014 US dollars.³¹ Although the emergence of fracking or renewable energy technologies may enable long-term energy independence in the future, the US economy has been heavily dependent on oil and gas for much of the last 50 years. Since the annunciation of the Carter Doctrine in 1980, energy access has been an

³⁰ World Bank, "World Development Indicators," 2015. <http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators/wdi-2015>. Accessed on June 15, 2015 in the International Political Economy Data Resource through NewGene. Graham, Benjamin A. T., and Jacob R. Tucker. "The International Political Economy Data Resource." *The Review of International Organizations* 14, no. 1 (March 2019): 149–61. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11558-017-9285-0>.

³¹ Ross, Michael, and Paasha Mahdavi. "Oil and Gas Data, 1932-2014," September 24, 2015. <https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/ZTPW0Y>, Harvard Dataverse, V2.

important national interest for the United States. It is therefore conceivable that US basing posture could be motivated a desire to control oil and gas producing states.³²

3.3 Data & Models

The dataset is panel data ranging from 1983 to 2015 for 150 countries. My unit of analysis is country-year. I also scope the dataset to only countries in which the United States could plausibly station foreign military forces. So, I exclude the United States' avowed enemies listed above as well as Cuba, Libya (1983-2004), Venezuela (after 1999), and Yugoslavia/Serbia (1992-2000).³³ Furthermore, I exclude countries under US military occupation, such as Iraq (2003-2006) and Afghanistan (2001-2003) or where US bases operate without host-nation consent (Cuba). In models where the US foreign policy affinity score is included, I exclude states that do not have a vote in the UN (Kosovo, Taiwan, pre-2002 Switzerland, pre-1991 South Korea). One of the covariates, Strategic Chokepoint, varies only over country but is static over time. The rest of the covariates in the model vary across country-year. For all these time-variant factors, I lag each variable by two years in all model specifications in order to allow for the latency produced by the US government decision-making process to recognize changes in host-nations and

³² Although GDP per capita is a common control variable in international relations and is correlated with US basing, I do not include it out of fear of autocorrelation because it is also highly correlated with the other variables. Furthermore, it is less theoretically plausible that the United States would desire basing in a country simply based on the average level of wealth. For these reasons I think that measures of trading with the United States and indebtedness better capture potential economic motivations for US basing.

³³ I exclude these states for the specified time periods because their leaders were antagonist to the United States making the consensual granting of a US base implausible. I do not though include these states in the list of enemies that my drive US desire for proximate basing because those were neither aligned enough with the Soviets nor threatening enough on their own to warrant placing a base nearby.

negotiate changes in basing arrangements.³⁴ I also standardize and zeroize all the continuous variables in order to place them on comparable scales. The dependent and independent variables are distributed according to the below table.

Table 2: Summary Statistics for Correlates of US Basing

VARIABLES	(1) N	(2) mean	(3) sd	(4) min	(5) max
US Basing Level (CSL, FOS, MOB)	4,865	0.406	0.843	0	3
New Base, no base prior year	3,764	0.0130	0.113	0	1
US Foreign Military Base	4,865	0.226	0.418	0	1
Enemy Proximity	4,865	0.414	0.538	0	2
Chokepoint	4,865	0.452	0.498	0	1
Democracy	4,782	0.498	0.500	0	1
US For Pol Affinity	4,662	2.783	0.996	0	6.039
Trade w/ US	4,700	3.280	0.996	0	5.809
Oil & Gas Value	4,753	1.129	1.001	0	2.514
Debt	4,797	1.940	0.999	0	4.265

Lasso Model

To test the relevance of the various potential correlates above, I estimate several model specifications. First, I use a Lasso (least absolute shrinkage and selection operator) model which works by iteratively shrinking coefficients until some reduce to 0.³⁵ This method is useful for model selection by reducing non-significant variables. I fit both logit and linear regression models using partialing-out, double-selection, and cross-fit partialing-out estimators which Belloni et al. (2012), Belloni, Chernozhukov, and Hansen

³⁴ I also estimated the main model with four-year time lags, but the results were nearly identical.

³⁵ Tibshirani, Robert. "Regression Shrinkage and Selection Via the Lasso." *Journal of the Royal Statistical Society: Series B (Methodological)* 58, no. 1 (1996): 267–88. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.2517-6161.1996.tb02080.x>.

(2014), Belloni, Chernozhukov, and Wei (2016), and Chernozhukov et al. (2018) demonstrate “provide reliable inference for γ after using covariate selection to determine which covariates belong” in the model.³⁶ Democracy and oil & gas production were not retained across any of the model specifications, indicating that these variables are the least impactful on US military basing.

Linear Probability and Logit Models

Next I estimate both basic linear probability model and a logit model. I use the first for ease of interpretation and the second for greater confidence in the robustness of the estimators. For all models I cluster standard errors at the country level.

Table 3: Correlates of US Foreign Military Bases, Full Sample (1983-2015)

VARIABLES	(1) LPM	(2) Logit
Enemy Proximity = 1	0.103** (0.0472)	0.101** (0.0429)
Enemy Proximity = 2	0.214** (0.108)	0.194** (0.0890)
Democracy = 1	-0.0457 (0.0434)	-0.0352 (0.0447)
Chokepoint = 1	0.0904* (0.0538)	0.0947** (0.0473)
US For Pol Affinity	0.0489* (0.0272)	0.0317 (0.0229)
Oil & Gas Value	-0.0240 (0.0305)	-0.0146 (0.0290)
Trade w/ US	0.124*** (0.0317)	0.128*** (0.0290)
Debt	-0.0630** (0.0271)	-0.0504** (0.0242)

³⁶ Drukker, David, and Di Liu. “Using the Lasso for Inference in High-Dimensional Models.” *The Stata Blog* (blog), September 9, 2019. <https://blog.stata.com/2019/09/09/using-the-lasso-for-inference-in-high-dimensional-models/>.

Observations 4,533 4,533

Standard errors in parentheses
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

In these models, trade with the United States is the most reliable predictor of a military base. The likelihood of a state hosting an American base increase by 12% for each one standard deviation increase in trade. Importantly this result does not indicate the direction of causality, but only that trade and basing go together. In addition to trade, enemy proximity is also an important variable. The coefficient on this variable indicates that if a country is proximate to either a state rival or terrorist group hostile to the United States, the probability of hosting a base increase by 10%; if it is proximate to both types of threat the chance of a base increases by 21%. The results of this model offer mixed support for the importance of strategic chokepoints as it is only statistically significant with 95% confidence in one of the model specifications. Interestingly, the negative relationship between indebtedness and basing belies the expectations of the critical theory argument that the United States prefers basing in dependent debtors who would be more malleable to American demands.




Figure 9 below displays the average marginal effects of the variables in each model specification. To check the robustness of these results for drawing conclusions about US basing motivations I consider a few alternative definitions of US basing.




Figure 9: Average Marginal Effects of Correlates on US Basing

Alternative Dependent Variables

As I have discussed previously there are multiple defensible ways to operationalize a foreign military base. For this reason, I also consider alternative operationalizations of the dependent variable including new bases and different sized bases.

The first alternative dependent variable I consider is the establishment of a new base. Although military basing postures do change over time, they are relatively “sticky” and path-dependent on a year-to-year basis. This creates a concern for autocorrelation when conducting time-series analysis. To help mitigate this I clustered the standard errors at the country level for this and all other models. Furthermore, I also consider a model specification where the outcome variable is the establishment of a new base. This essentially drops all country-year observations in which a US base existed in the previous year. Because of the scope of my dataset this measures only those bases opened after 1981. I estimated this new dependent variable using both linear probability and logit models. None of the coefficients in the linear probability model were significant so I only display the results of the logit model below.

In addition to new basing as a dependent variable, it is also useful to consider different levels of foreign basing. A major military complex like Ramstein Air Base has different strategic rationale than a dusty hangar in Entebbe, Uganda. The United States likely has different motivations for maintaining major bases than it does for light footprint facilities. For this reason, I run models with an ordinal dependent variable according on basing level, a binary dependent variable indicating the presence of at least a Forward Operating Site (FOS)-level base, and one with a dummy variable for a Main Operating Base in order to see if motivations are different for different sized bases

Table 4: Correlates of US Foreign Bases, Alternative DV, Logit Models

VARIABLES	(1) New Bases	(2) Ordered Logit	(3) FOS+	(4) MOB
Enemy Proximity = 1	0.825**	0.807**	0.273	1.214*

	(0.386)	(0.341)	(0.470)	(0.716)
Enemy Proximity = 2	1.690**	1.008**	0.488	-0.651
	(0.679)	(0.449)	(0.626)	(1.144)
Democracy = 1	-0.0800	-0.188	-0.120	0.648
	(0.418)	(0.344)	(0.473)	(0.965)
Chokepoint = 1	0.390	0.722*	1.681***	0.873
	(0.334)	(0.409)	(0.627)	(0.802)
US For Pol Affinity	0.231	0.316	0.240	0.862*
	(0.193)	(0.214)	(0.289)	(0.523)
Oil & Gas Value	0.136	-0.157	-0.413	-0.0379
	(0.204)	(0.215)	(0.295)	(0.436)
Trade w/ US	0.103	1.134***	1.346***	2.274***
	(0.197)	(0.255)	(0.351)	(0.519)
Debt	0.223	-0.389*	-0.671*	0.600
	(0.185)	(0.211)	(0.364)	(0.668)
/cut1		6.006***		
		(1.278)		
/cut2		6.926***		
		(1.269)		
/cut3		8.120***		
		(1.240)		
Constant	-6.431***		-7.325***	-17.64***
	(0.974)		(1.968)	(3.907)
Observations	3,530	4,533	4,533	4,533

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

This specification of new basing as the outcome variable is a much tougher test of statistical significance for each potential correlate as both the “treated” observations and total number of observations are reduced. In this specification, only proximity to either terrorists and rival states reaches a high level of statistical significance. Trade with the United States and proximity to chokepoints are no longer correlated. This change is likely due to the fact that in this specification long-time liberal allies such as Germany, South Korea, and Japan are dropped from the sample. This model specification captures primarily the growth of smaller, CSL-level bases.

The results of the higher basing level models are consistent with the main model although in general, the correlates of higher-level basing are less statistically significant because MOB and FOS are rarer. The majority of countries hosting a US military base have only a facility below the FOS level. Trade with the United States and enemy proximity are consistently significant and positive correlated with basing. The strong association between strategic chokepoints and Forward Operating Sites is likely due to the characteristics of the bases most useful for exercising power projection. Controlling maritime access is best done from air and naval bases which tend to be middle sized, as opposed to large land bases.

In sum, this analysis across multiple model specifications indicates that proximity to enemy threats, proximity to maritime chokepoints, and protection of major US trading partners are significant and robust correlates of US foreign basing. These results provide support for the intuitive linkage between US military basing and security threats. It is also consistent with a motivation for maintaining a liberal trading order and geostrategic motivations of controlling vital sea lanes. I do not find support for more sinister motivations of capturing energy resources or exploiting weak countries. I also do not find support for more noble motivations of supporting fellow democracies. While

it is also useful to consider changes in US basing posture over time. To address the temporal dimensions of US basing I now divide my sample into Cold War, 1990s, and post-9/11 eras to see if and how basing motivations change in different eras of grand strategy.

3.3.1 US Foreign Basing and Eras of American Grand Strategy

The limitation of seeking a generalized motivation for US foreign military basing across a more than 30-year period is that it could obscure changes in grand strategy. For this reason, I now explore the correlates of US foreign military basing in different eras. The first column is a late Cold War from 1983 to 1989, the second column focuses on the “Long 90s” era from 1990 to 2001. The last column models a sample of the years in the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) from 2002-2015.

Table 5: Correlates of US Foreign Bases Across Foreign Policy Eras

VARIABLES	(1) Cold War	(2) 1990s	(3) GWOT
Enemy Proximity = 1	0.419 (0.581)	0.388 (0.517)	0.888*** (0.322)
Enemy Proximity = 2			1.272** (0.518)
Democracy = 1	-0.719 (0.620)	-0.239 (0.442)	-0.286 (0.492)
Chokepoint = 1	0.800 (0.617)	1.161** (0.524)	0.751** (0.367)
US For Pol Affinity	0.916** (0.459)	0.275 (0.279)	0.0757 (0.212)
Oil & Gas Value	-0.251 (0.397)	-0.186 (0.313)	-0.0593 (0.225)
Trade w/ US	1.565*** (0.571)	1.369*** (0.316)	0.753*** (0.251)
Debt	-0.531 (0.362)	-0.765** (0.337)	-0.240 (0.192)
Constant	-9.064*** (2.468)	-6.381*** (1.619)	-4.187*** (1.187)
Observations	833	1,623	2,217

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Given that American grand strategy during the Cold War was centered around the containment of the Soviet Union one would expect that proximity to enemies would be the driving factor for US foreign bases. However, proximity to America's main enemies is not borne out as a significant correlate of US military basing in this late Cold War era. This finding does not necessarily mean that security motivations were irrelevant, it simply means that proximity to the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact was insufficient to distinguish between basing and non-basing states. Many of the North African and Middle Eastern states which were proximate to America's Communist adversaries had previously hosted Strategic Air Command bases early in the Cold War, but changing technological requirements and the nationalistic waves of decolonization had compelled the United States by the 1980s to consolidate its foreign footprint to reliably Western-aligned states.

Instead, foreign policy affinity is the strongest and most consistent predictor of American basing behavior. This ideological alignment makes sense given the polarity of the international system during this period. Combined with the significant correlation between basing and US trade, the importance of foreign policy affinity is consistent with Ikenberry's theory of an "internal order" among the liberal Western nations. As the Cold War ended, though, the cohesion of this internal order began to break down.

In the 1990s, the strongest determinant of US basing shifted from shared voting with the United States to shared trade. This change likely reflects both the reduction of US basing in Europe as well as the reduced foreign policy cohesion between the United States and its traditional allies with the loss of the uniting threat of Communism. The increased significance of maritime chokepoints is due to the expansion of basing in the

Middle East (where the Suez Canal, Hormuz Strait, and Bab el Mandeb are located) following the 1991 Gulf War. The lack of significance on the enemy proximity variable reflects the general muddiness of this period as to where the United States' greatest threats lay.

If the 1990s were an era of strategic uncertainty, the events of September 11, 2001 provided unfortunate clarity. In this period, a security focus emerged as one of the strongest correlates of US basing posture. This change is most certainly driven by the expansion of smaller bases used for counterterrorism and security cooperation. Proximity to either a terrorist group or an adversarial state increases the likelihood of hosting a US base by nearly 14%; proximity to both increases it by 24%. Interestingly, foreign policy alignment was no longer a statistically significant correlate of US military basing. Such a finding is consistent with the narrative that the American reaction to the terrorist threat was to adopt a more transactional approach in which the United States established. High levels of US trade remained significant a predictor of US basing as the United States maintained a significant basing presence in the Middle East and with traditional trade partners. In an alternative model (not shown) using bases larger than a FOS as the dependent variable the geographic and economic correlates that were important in the 1990s remained the only significant predictors through 2015. This indicates that while the United States may have established many small or temporary bases in response to the terrorist threat its long term overseas military infrastructure was not fundamentally changed by this non-state threat.

Overall, as
Figure 10 below indicates, there have been some shifts in the correlates of US

military basing over the last 30 years. Alignment with US foreign policy was the strongest predictor of US basing in the late Cold War. Beginning in the 1990s, proximity to strategic maritime chokepoints became a significant correlate of basing posture as US forces began to focus on the Middle East. After 9/11, new and smaller bases were established according to their proximity to threats, especially terrorist threats. Despite these changes over time there a few general conclusions about the United States' consistent motivations for foreign basing.




Figure 10: Correlates of US Basing by Foreign Policy Era

3.4 Conclusion

What general conclusions can we draw about the United States' motivations for foreign bases? A security motivation is clearly an important factor in base placement

although basing does not vary along with changes in the threat environment as much as one might expect. That is because bases are fairly sticky and path-dependent. They may be established for security reasons but continue on for a variety of domestic political reasons that I explore in Chapter Four. As can be seen from the model limited to the establishment of new bases, only threat considerations were statistically significant. This supports the argument that at least at their initiation, US foreign bases are largely driven by security motivations.

Table 6: Summary of Findings; Correlates of US Basing

	LASSO	Main Model	New Base	Base Ordinal	FOS	MOB	Cold War	1990s	GWOT
Enemy Proximity	X	+	+	+					+
Democracy									
Chokepoint	X	+			+			+	+
US For. Policy Affinity	X						+		
Oil & Gas Value									
Trade with the US	X	+		+	+	+	+	+	+
Debt	X	-						-	

The Lasso model does not indicate direction of effect only significant impact on outcome variable. Signs indicate direction of effect for coefficients statistically significant above 95% confidence level.

There also appears to be evidence to support the idea that US basing posture is motivated by long term geostrategic considerations. While the variable representing strategic maritime chokepoints was not significant in all the models that is likely due to the fact that more than half the observations in the dataset were coded as proximate to a chokepoint. This means that while the US may be motivated to control these key pieces

of geography, it has many opportunities to do it. It is perhaps more telling that the United States has maintained at least a Forward Operating Site-level base in close proximity to all of the strategic chokepoints identified above since the early 2000s.

While this analysis finds support for security and geographic motivations, the role of economic factors is more ambiguous. There is a clear connection between US foreign basing and US trade. While this analysis does not disentangle which aspect comes first it is evident that the United States protects those it trades with and trades with those it protects. The more clearly critical economic motivations are not supported. The production of oil and gas by a host-nation does not seem to have much impact on the placement of US bases, however bases are correlated with maritime strategic chokepoints through which much of the world's hydrocarbons flow. Furthermore, the effects of host-nation debt, to the extent that they are relevant to basing, run counter to the expectations of the dependency theory school. The less indebted a state is the more likely they are to host a US base and, on average, those countries who host US bases are on wealthier than those who do not.

There is also little support for the argument that ideological motivations guide the US basing network. The host-nation being a democracy is not related to the presence of a base in any of the models. Based on this it seems that regime type is epiphenomenal to US basing posture. Even general foreign policy alignment is only statistically significant in the small Cold War sample.

In all the US foreign basing network in the period since the late Cold War to today seems to be most motivated by trade, threats, and strategic geography. This 30-year

timeframe is admittedly a limited one in the scope of grand strategy. Nonetheless, it covers several important eras in foreign policy and changes in America's role in the world. During this time the United States went from being one pole in a conflictual bipolar system to an unchallenged unipolar superpower to now an emerging international environment of multipolar competition. Throughout this period, the United States basing posture shows it to be neither a malevolent exploiter of dependent states nor a champion of freedom. The US network of foreign bases is a benign, if self-interested empire.

4. Host-Nation Motivations: Security Conditions and Foreign Military Access

This dissertation has so far defined and categorized foreign military bases and explored what motivates sending-states to establish them. Next we turn to what motivates host-nations to allow them. In Chapter One, I showed how, when it comes to foreign bases, potential host-nations must balance “guns and butter versus votes”. The calculation for regimes contemplating allowing a foreign military access is a tradeoff between economic & security benefits and legitimacy & sovereignty costs. In the literature review in Chapter One, I showed that the basing politics literature has undertheorized the role of a host-nation’s security condition in affecting this tradeoff. We have a clear understanding of the role of external threats, but do not know how internal threats and civil conflict are likely to impact a host-nation’s decision regarding foreign military access¹.

4.2 Security Conditions and Foreign Military Access

As demonstrated by the extant literature on basing politics, external threats make it more likely that a state will grant foreign military access. However, it is unclear how

¹ So far in this dissertation I have focused on “foreign military basing” which is the realized presence of foreign troops in another country. In this section, I employ the broader concept of “foreign military access” which includes not only actualized foreign basing, but also the latent potential for basing established through international legal agreements. I adopt this broader concept for the chapters on host-nation motivation for empirical reasons. This more inclusive definition allows me to detect variation by the host-nation in granting access that may not have been turned into an actual base by the sending-state for operational or financial reasons. The same political cost- security benefit tradeoffs apply for the host-nation across the spectrum of access from the most basic Status of Forces Agreement to the most robust Main Operating Base.

internal threats affect this foreign basing as regimes in civil conflict are faced with a tradeoff between domestic political costs and military/economic benefits. I propose that how they resolve that dilemma depends on their security situation. This argument is illustrated in Table 7 below,

Table 7: Security Conditions and Foreign Military Access

		<u>Internal Threat</u>	
		Yes	No
<u>External Threat</u>	Yes	<p>“Overdetermined” Military Access: Increase</p>	<p>“Outward Focus” Military Access: Increase</p>
	No		<p>“Benign” Military Access: Decrease</p>
		<u>Intensity of Conflict</u>	
		Low	High
<u>Disputed Issue</u>	Separatist	<p>“Revolution Brewing” Military Access: Decrease</p>	<p>“Battle for the Capital” Military Access: Continue or Weakly Increase</p>
	Revolutionary	<p>“Pesky and Peripheral” Military Access: Determined by other factors</p>	<p>“Bloody Breakaway” Military Access: Strongly Increase</p>

Level 1: Internal and External Conflict

As indicated by the first row of the first two-by-two table, when an external threat exists, we should expect a host nation to increase foreign military access. This is in line with traditional security explanations. In the absence of any security threats, as indicated in the bottom left corner, a state is likely to be inclined to reduce foreign military access, barring large economic inducements by the sending country. More interesting and unexplained in the literature on foreign military basing, is what happens when internal threats predominate a potential host nation’s security outlook.

Level 2: Conflict Intensity and Disputed Issue

This scenario of a permissive external environment, but conflictual internal politics is the focus of my argument and is illustrated in the second, subset table which illustrates the intersection between the two factors of *conflict intensity* and *disputed issue*.

Intensity, in the literature on civil wars, is conceived of as the level of violence in a conflict and is normally measured in battle deaths.² While this is a useful post hoc operationalization for scholars, regimes currently mired in civil conflict must consider the future intensity of the conflict. This is not only because there will be a political price to pay for more battle deaths, but also because higher intensity conflict requires a greater allocation of state resources to military capacity. Therefore, the greater the *intensity* of a civil conflict, the more the regime needs to increase its military capacity. When a regime faces a low level of fighting intensity, it has less need to increase its military capacity, as it can rely on its existing armed forces.

There are several ways a regime could try to increase military capacity. In the classic “guns versus butter” tradeoff, they could shift resources from domestic spending to military spending. This may be problematic in the context of a civil conflict as it diverts resources from the regime’s core domestic constituencies. Another strategy a regime could adopt is to allow foreign military access to their territory. These foreign military forces may serve as direct combatants or may simply bring more economic

² T. David Mason and Sara McLaughlin Mitchell, eds., *What Do We Know about Civil Wars?* (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, 2016).

resources, military training, or new technology. If the only requirement for embattled regimes were military capacity, then, as security-based theories predict, civil conflict would tend to increase foreign military access.

However, in civil conflicts it is not only military capacity that matters, but also regime legitimacy. Civil wars are, at their heart, armed disputes over who has the right to rule, or in the Weberian definition, a “monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force.”³ These disputes can be either national or regional in extent. When the *disputed issue* is control of the whole nation, the civil conflict is a *revolutionary* type. This situation occurs when a regime faces an armed challenger who seeks to overthrow the government and gain control of the entire state. When the disputed issue is control of a section of territory, this is a *separatist* conflict. In most cases, this involves an armed minority group seeking autonomy or independence for a breakaway region. Depending on the disputed issues, embattled regimes trade off legitimacy and military capacity differently.

Separatist conflicts, at the national level, are more a military than political challenge, and the regime is likely to value increased military capacity over increased legitimacy. This is because while the incumbent regime’s legitimacy may be contested locally in the breakaway region, it retains the monopoly on legitimacy nationally. The separatist rebels are the ones seeking to destroy the national ideal as currently conceived. Furthermore, separatist conflicts tend to involve an ethnic or religious minority pitted

³ Max Weber, “Politics as a Vocation,” in *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology*, ed. H.H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (New York: Oxford University Press, 1946).

against a dominant group. This allows the regime to represent the rebel groups as “other” than full members of the nation. Because of these dynamics, regimes facing separatist threats tend to need military capacity more than national legitimacy. Because regimes in separatist conflicts can privilege military capacity over legitimacy, they are more likely to allow foreign military access. In this way, they can increase their military capacity without diverting resources from their core political constituencies—which would undermine their support among the population—to fight in peripheral areas.

However, in revolutionary conflicts, the regime may need to gain political legitimacy as much or more than it needs increased military capacity. In these conflicts, the rebels are likely to have a presence in the national heartland and support among the majority population groups. The regime, therefore, needs to maintain its national legitimacy while addressing the military challenge. Thus, at low conflict levels, regimes facing revolutionary threats are likely to value legitimacy more than military capacity and therefore be less willing to grant foreign military access. Because granting military access is inherently a trade-off between sovereignty and protection, the presence of foreign military forces allows insurgents to question the legitimacy of the incumbent’s monopoly of violence. The presence of foreign military forces diminishes the Hobbesian social contract in which fealty is traded to the sovereign government in exchange for protection. Similar to the “curse of aid” or “resource curse,” foreign military forces may make, or at least appear to make, the hosting regime more beholden to the foreign power propping it up than to the people of the nation it claims to represent. This perception puts pressure on the hosting regime to reduce foreign military access. At higher conflict intensity levels,

though, the regime's need for increased military capacity surpasses its need for legitimacy merely in order to avoid military defeat and ensure physical survival.

The intersection between the two factors of conflict intensity and disputed issue produces four ideal types of civil conflict situations.

The first type, which I term "**Revolution Brewing**," is represented in the top left-hand box. In this situation, host nations face internal threats where the issue in dispute is control of the government and the level of conflict is still low. Because the regime has sufficient military capacity to deal with the current level of military threat, the regime's greatest need is to increase its political legitimacy. In this situation it is more likely that foreign military access will be decreased in order for the regime to demonstrate its independence and defuse political criticism.

In the opposite corner are "**Blood Breakaway**" conflicts involving separatist demands and high levels of conflict. Regimes in this situation do not face the same legitimacy constraints as revolutionary types since the issue in dispute is not control of the national government. Therefore, they are more likely to increase military access in order to increase their military capacity. States with this type of conflict should see the highest levels of foreign military access.

Conflicts in the other two corners are less strongly determined regarding foreign military access. "**Pesky and Peripheral**" conflicts involve separatist rebellions where the level of conflict intensity is still low. Assuming the state has a base level of military capacity, the regime is not in dire need of either legitimacy or military capacity. If the regime was risk-adverse, it is plausible that it may try to increase its military capacity as

it is unconstrained by legitimacy concerns in order to hedge against unexpected changes in conflict intensity. This could lead to increased foreign military access; however, it is just as likely that other factors would drive regime decisions in another direction.

Regimes in “**Battle for the Capital**” conflicts are facing intense revolutionary threats and desperately need to increase both political legitimacy and military capacity. Although regimes in this situation are being pulled in opposite directions, I think they are most likely to resolve this dilemma in favor of military capacity. While allowing access to foreign military forces may have long-term political costs, regimes facing the loss of physical survival are likely to value material capabilities over ideational values. From Lincoln’s suspension of *habeas corpus* in the American Civil War to the Communist Party’s crushing of protestors in Tiananmen Square, there is a long empirical record of leaders choosing physical security over abstract values. Given this tradeoff, this scenario is likely to produce some increase in military access.

The above theory outlines the logic of how security conditions affect foreign access in an intuitive way. When a regime most needs military power it is more likely to allow foreign access; when it most needs political legitimacy, the regime is likely to reduce foreign access. From this theoretical argument flow several testable hypotheses.

H₁: States facing external threats are more likely to allow foreign military access than regimes not facing external threats.

H₂: States facing low intensity revolutionary insurgencies, “Revolutions Brewing,” are more likely to reduce or deny foreign military access than states not facing this type of insurgency.

H₃: States facing high intensity separatist conflicts, “Bloody Breakaways”, should be more likely to grant or preserve foreign military access than states not facing this type of insurgency.

4.3 Empirical Test

Data Scope

I test these hypotheses using a dataset of 183 countries from 1985 to 2015. My unit of analysis is country-year. Because the theory I test is premised on host-nations’ ability to grant or deny military access I scoped the dataset to exclude political entities who are not fully sovereign. This exclusion includes US or UN dependencies, territories, and protectorates. I also exclude US military-occupied states until the formation of sovereign governments (Afghanistan 2001-2004 and Iraq 2003-2006).⁴ Finally, I also exclude the United States’ avowed enemies as it is not plausible that they would willingly allow US military bases under any circumstances. In this way I exclude Cuba, China, USSR/Russia, North Korea, Iran, the Warsaw Pact states prior to 1991, Iraq from 1990 to the fall of Saddam Hussein, Libya (1985-2004), Venezuela (post-1999) and Serbia from 1992 to the fall of Slobodan Milosevic.

4.3.1 Dependent Variable

The main dependent variable for this study, foreign military access, can be difficult to define. What best constitutes access? Is it the series of legal agreements and

⁴ Although it is debatable how fully sovereign these governments were, I consider Iraq as having a sovereign government after the formation of a coalition government under Nouri al-Maliki in 2006 and Afghanistan as being sovereign after the election of Hamid Karzai in 2004.

treaties between a host nation and foreign power? Or is it the actual people and facilities on the ground?

In order to capture these two important but distinct aspects of access, I combine *de jure* and *de facto* measures of access. The *de jure* access variable captures the international legal framework to which the United States and the host nation have agreed. Because these agreements may or may not be fully implemented, this variable represents a latent, but more permanent measure of military access. The *de facto* access variable captures the level of actual US access in a host nation represented by construction and operational activity as indicated in federal contracting data. While this variable represents a realized measure of access, it is a less formalized one. These operations may only be for a short duration or may be publicly unacknowledged by one or both sides.

First, I create a *de jure* access variable. This variable is an additive index that ranges from zero to three based on the presence or absence in a given country-year of three types of bilateral international agreements. These agreements may be formally ratified treaties but are more likely to consist of executive agreements or exchanges of diplomatic notes.

The first type of agreement is a Status of Forces Agreement or SOFA. SOFAs “define the legal status of US Department of Defense (DoD) personnel, activities, and property in the territory of another nation and set forth rights and responsibilities between the United States and the host government.”⁵ SOFAs are important for access because

⁵ US State Department: International Security Advisory Board, “Report on Status of Forces Agreements” (US State Department, January 16, 2015), <https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/236456.pdf>.

they protect basic due process rights for defense personnel and help to resolve disputes if incidents occur. While the United States does not have SOFAs with every state in which it conducts military operations, US policy is “that US Defense personnel should not be sent to foreign countries unless sufficient status safeguards are assured.”⁶ While the United States may conclude other bilateral agreements regarding DOD personnel, such as Rome Treaty (International Criminal Court) Article 98 non-surrender agreements, SOFAs are the most common and comprehensive vehicle for clarifying protections of US military personnel. Furthermore, they often serve as the baseline legal minimum for access to a country. It is rare that the United States will conclude another form of access agreement unless a SOFA is already in place.

The second type of agreement I consider is an Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA). “The ACSA provides a mechanism to acquire, on a reciprocal basis, logistic support, supplies, and services between the parties to the agreement, usually on a cash basis, replacement-in-kind, or an equal value exchange.”⁷ The flexibility of these agreements allow the United States to prearrange logistical orders such as fuel, billeting, transportation, or food resupply, which “lends itself to be implemented during combined exercises, contingencies, peacekeeping operations and humanitarian assistance efforts.”⁸ ACSAs are a good indicator of military access because they both represent a

⁶ US State Department: International Security Advisory Board.

⁷ Jeffrey Palmer, “Legal Impediments to USAFRICOM Operationalization,” *Joint Forces Quarterly*, no. 51 (2008): 8.

⁸ USAFRICOM, “Acquisition & Cross Servicing Agreements- ACSAs,” accessed August 14, 2018, https://www.acq.osd.mil/dpap/ccap/cc/corhb/Files/ACSAs/AFRICOM_Resources_ACSA_Training_Slides.pptx.

regularization of military interaction as well as set the conditions for increased US military interaction.

The final type of international agreement I consider is a facility access agreement. In these agreements the host nation formally guarantees the United States access to certain facilities, often a port or airfield, for a certain amount of time. These agreements are the rarest, as they represent the greatest surrender of sovereignty to a foreign power. For example, there are only two African states, Ghana and Djibouti, with whom the United States have such an agreement in the post 9/11 era.

For the *de facto* I employ the ordinal level of basing variable from Chapter Three. This variable of foreign basing uses the three-fold definition of “an *enduring location* from which *foreign troops conduct military operations* in the *sending-state interest*”. To create this variable, I hand-coded the presence of an American foreign military base for 150 countries from 1985 to 2015 using data from US Department of Defense publicly available personnel data, base structure reports, theater posture briefing slides, federal contracting data, and news reports. This ordinal variable ranges according to the hierarchical typology established in Chapter One. It is coded as 0 for no foreign military base, 1 for contingency location (CL), cooperative security location (CSL), and ISR/technical stations, 2 for forward operating site (FOS), and 3 for a main operating base (MOB).

The final step I employed in operationalizing foreign military access was to create an access index variable for foreign military access by combining the *de jure* and *de facto* measures.

Access index = Factor [de jure (SOFA, ACSA, facility) +de facto (CSL, FOS, MOB)]

I employed factor analysis using the principal component factor method. I then used an orthogonal varimax rotation to produce a new access index variable that ranges across 16 unique values from 0 for no access to 2.85 for the highest level of access.

4.3.2 Independent Variables

External Threats

The literature on foreign military basing makes clear that the perception of an external threat is a factor that often influences states to grant foreign military access. I test this assertion in Hypothesis One as well control for the role external threats in the subsequent tests for the effects of internal threats. Operationalizing external threats, however, can be tricky as interstate war has become relatively rare in the last half century. While this is good news for mankind it poses some challenges for social scientists. While the occurrence for interstate war may be rare, the threat of war is still salient for states, particularly among interstate rivals. So, to operationalize for external threat I use a measure that counts the number of enduring rivalries a state is involved in. Thompson argues that there are two main approaches used by scholars in determining interstate rivalries.⁹ One, exemplified by Klein, Goertz, & Diehl, takes a conflict density approach based on the number of militarized interstate disputes.¹⁰ The other seen in Thompson takes a more qualitative historical approach to determine who decisionmakers claimed to

⁹ Thompson, William R. "Trends in the Analysis of Interstate Rivalries." In *Emerging Trends in the Social and Behavioral Sciences*, 1–14 Wiley Online Library, 2015.

¹⁰ Klein, James, Gary Goertz, and Paul Diehl. (2006) The New Rivalry Dataset: Procedures and Patterns. *Journal of Peace Research* 43(4):331–348.

be their adversaries.¹¹ In this study I adopt Thompson’s categorizations of interstate rivalry as empirically captured in Rooney.¹² In the model testing Hypothesis One I collapse this variable into a binary variable indicating the whether the potential host nation was in a rivalry for that year. When I use rivalry as a control variable I specify it as a count variable of the number of rivalries a state was engaged in.

Internal Threats

To operationalize the main phenomena of interest, separatist and revolutionary conflicts, I created two variables using the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset, version 19.1.¹³ This dataset defines conflict as “a contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths in a calendar year.”¹⁴ I distinguished between the two types of civil conflict by creating dummy variables for *separatist conflict* and *revolutionary conflict* based on the UCDP coded incompatibility of “Territory” and “Government” respectively.

¹¹ Thompson, William, and David Dreyer. (2011) *The Handbook of Interstate Rivalries, 1494–2010*. Washington, DC: CQ Press.

¹² Rooney, Bryan. “Sources of Leader Support and Interstate Rivalry.” *International Interactions* 44, no. 5 (September 3, 2018): 969–83. Rooney’s data are scoped only to 2010 so the rivalry dataset to 2015. I considered all rivalries in operation in 2010 to have endured through 2015 with the exception of those in which there was a clear resolution of the rivalry as indicated by a peace agreement listed in the United Nations’ “UN Peace Agreements Database.” United Nations Peacemaker. Accessed January 15, 2020. https://peacemaker.un.org/document-search?keys=&field_padate_value%5Bvalue%5D%5Bdate%5D=&field_pacountry_tid=&field_paconflict_tid%5B%5D=2. I did not, however, account for rivalries which may have begun between 2010 and 2013.

¹³ Pettersson, Therese; Stina Högbladh & Magnus Öberg, “Organized violence, 1989-2018 and peace agreements,” *Journal of Peace Research* 56(4), 2019; Gleditsch, Nils Petter, Peter Wallensteen, Mikael Eriksson, Margareta Sollenberg, and Håvard Strand, “Armed Conflict 1946-2001: A New Dataset,” *Journal of Peace Research* 39(5), 2002.

¹⁴ Pettersson, Therese, “UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset Codebook v 19.1”, 2019, <https://ucdp.uu.se/downloads/>

The UCDP dataset distinguishes between conflicts with more than 1,000 battle deaths in a given year (High Intensity) and those with less than 1,000 (Low Intensity). I then combined the conflict-type indicators with these measurements of intensity to create four binary variables that align with the four quadrants of the military access and civil conflict typology. “Revolution Brewing” is represented by the variable *Rev_Low*, “Battle for the Capital” by *Rev_High*, “Pesky and Peripheral” by *Sep_Low* and “Bloody Breakaway” by *Sep_High*.

Interaction Variable

US Basing Desires

The theory of security conditions and foreign military access that I have proposed so far focuses exclusively on the decisions of the potential host nation. This is only half of the story. For foreign military access to be realized, there must also be a desire to gain access by the potential sending country. This simple intuition is represented in Table 2 below.

Table 8: When Foreign Military Access Happens

Sending-State: Desire to Send		Host-Nation: Desire to Host	
		Yes	No
Yes		Foreign Military Access	No Access
No		No Access	No Access

The conditions in Table 8 above are idealized and binary; the reality is that the willingness to host or send falls on a spectrum. Furthermore, decisions to establish or withdraw a base are often subject to inertia, bureaucratic politics, and idiosyncratic distortions. Nonetheless, the role of sending-state willingness needs to be accounted for. Toward this end, I interact the independent security condition variables above with a variable representing the United States' plausible desire for access. Based on the analysis of US basing motivation conducted in Chapter Three, three aspects stand out as useful in capturing US basing desire: proximity to US threats, proximity to strategic maritime chokepoints, and level of trade between the United States and the host-nation. I create a weighted index using three variables: Enemy Proximity, Chokepoint Proximity, and total trade with the United States.¹⁵ I standardized each variable to place them on comparable scales. Then I created a weighted index using the coefficients from my analysis in Chapter Three on motivations for US basing.

$$US \text{ Basing Desire} = [0.16 \times \text{Proximity to US enemy} + 0.09 \times \text{Proximity to strategic chokepoint} + 0.12 \times \text{Trade with US}]$$

This weighted index produces a continuous variable ranging from 0 to 1.38 for the highest level of desirability. As a plausibility check the top five countries on this desirability index are Saudi Arabia, Israel, the UAE, Turkey, and Iraq while the bottom five are Tuvalu, Bhutan, Equatorial Guinea, Cambodia, and Vanuatu.

¹⁵ See Chapter 3, Theoretical Correlates of US Military Basing, 110 for a full explanation of each variable.

4.3.3 Control Variables

Conflict Propensity

Although I specify the independent variables to capture the level of intensity in a given year, it is possible that regimes could anticipate conflict and then allow foreign military access in order to prevent or dampen the potential conflict. In the case of successful pre-emption, higher intensity conflict would not actually be observed. This unobservability creates a situation where military access would not correlate with higher intensity conflict, as it would in the absence of strategic preemption, because the presence of foreign military forces prevented the rebels from escalating intensity. This biases the data away from finding a significant difference in access between cases of civil conflict and civil peace and actually makes a harder test for my theory.

Nonetheless, I control for this strategic preemption by accounting for structural factors which the literature on civil wars has found to benefit rebel groups and increase conflict intensity. Lacina (2006) and Balcells and Kalyvas (2014) find that democratic incumbents reduce conflict intensity.¹⁶ To control for democracy, I created a democracy dummy from the *polity2* variable in the Polity IV dataset, supplemented by Gibney and Wood's Political Terror Scale based on US State Department assessments.¹⁷ Balch-

¹⁶ Bethany Lacina, "Explaining the Severity of Civil Wars," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 50, no. 2 (April 2006): 276–89, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002705284828>; Laia Balcells and Stathis Kalyvas, "Does Warfare Matter? Severity, Duration, and Outcomes of Civil Wars," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 58, no. 8 (2014).

¹⁷ Monty Marshall, Ted Robert Gurr, and Keith Jagers, "POLITYTM IV PROJECT Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2016, Dataset Version 2016" (Center for Systemic Peace, 2017), www.systemicpeace.org; Gibney, Mark, Linda Cornett, Reed Wood, Peter Haschke, Daniel Arnon, and Attilio Pisanò. 2017. The Political Terror Scale 1976-2016, <http://www.politicalterror scale.org/>

Lindsay and Enterlin (2000), Regan (2002), and Balch-Lindsay, Enterline, and Joyce (2008) all find that rebel support by third-party actors increased the duration and thus the intensity of conflict.¹⁸ I thus included a variable for external rebel support drawn from UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict dataset.¹⁹

Other Controls

It is also reasonable that a state might be driven primarily by economic need to grant military access. Some scholars see this as a form of rent-seeking where states trade military access for direct payments, foreign aid, or preferential trade arrangements (Clarke and O'Connor, 1993; Miles and Blankenship, 2018). To control for this, I include a variable for logged gross domestic product per capita.

Thus far I have talked about the host-nations and sending-states as if the United States was the only possible source of military and economic assistance. In reality, potential host-nations are likely to seek assistance from other great powers. To account for these alternative benefit sources, I also include a control variable for adversary defense cooperation agreements (DCA). Derived from Kinne's Defense Cooperation Agreement dataset I code a dummy variable if a potential host-nation has a DCA with Russia/USSR, China, North Korea, or Iran. In total, 50 countries in the sample had a DCA with one of these adversary states during the time scope.

¹⁸ Dylan Balch-Lindsay and Andrew J. Enterline, "Killing Time: The World Politics of Civil War Duration, 1820–1992," *International Studies Quarterly* 44, no. 4 (2000): 615–642; Patrick M. Regan, "Third-Party Interventions and the Duration of Intrastate Conflicts," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 46, no. 1 (February 2002): 55–73, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002702046001004>; Dylan Balch-Lindsay, Andrew J. Enterline, and Kyle A. Joyce, "Third-Party Intervention and the Civil War Process," *Journal of Peace Research* 45, no. 3 (May 1, 2008): 345–63, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343308088815>.

¹⁹ Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP), Centre for the Study of Civil Wars, and International Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO), "UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset Codebook, Version 18.1."

I also include a variable to control for spillover effects from neighboring states. Phillips (2015) finds that civil conflict increases military spending in neighboring developing states when that conflict extends to a shared border.²⁰ It is plausible that a similar logic might cause regime leaders to view neighboring conflict as a potential spillover threat and increase military access preemptively. To account for this, I include a dummy variable from Phillips for when a neighbor state was involved in a civil conflict that year.²¹

Finally, for the external conflict model I include two temporal controls to account for the effect of different eras of foreign policy.²² I include dummy variables for the Cold War for observations in 1985-1990 and for the Global War on Terror from 2001- 2015. A summary table of the control variables is below.

Table 9: Security Conditions & Basing Access Control Variables

VARIABLES	(1) N	(2) mean	(3) sd	(4) min	(5) max
External Threat	5,219	0.452	0.916	0	6
Ext. Support for Rebels	5,219	0.00613	0.0781	0	1
Rival DCA	5,219	0.101	0.302	0	1
GDP/cap	5,203	8.251	1.533	4.749	11.62
Democracy	5,219	0.567	0.495	0	1
Cold War	5,219	0.171	0.377	0	1
War on Terror	5,219	0.474	0.499	0	1

²⁰ Brian J. Phillips, “Civil War, Spillover and Neighbors’ Military Spending,” *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 32, no. 4 (September 1, 2015): 425–42, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0738894214530853>. Phillips.

²¹ I do not include a control for the presence of a neighboring US base control. It was not a significant correlate of US military access in the Africa subset. Furthermore, although the US basing appetite is ultimately satiable the US military also values redundancy and would likely prioritize redundant bases in regions where it has strategic interests.

²² These foreign policy era variables are not included in the fixed effects models as temporal variation is already accounted for by a series of year dummy variables.

4.3.4 Models

In all the models below, I interact a binary security condition variable with a continuous variable for US basing desire. I lag both of these terms by one year to account for the likely delay between a change in the security condition and when a new access arrangement could be negotiated. Consistent with sound statistical practice, I also include the constitutive terms of the interaction, but it is the coefficient on the interaction between the security condition and American basing desires which is most relevant for testing the specified hypotheses. This is because this term demonstrates the effect of various security situations on foreign basing conditional on when access is most likely to actually occur. The coefficient on the security condition variable represents the marginal effect of that condition when US desire for basing is zero.

To test the first hypothesis, that states facing external threats are likely to have greater US military access than states not facing these threats, I estimate an ordinary least squares models in which I interact a binary variable of whether the potential host-nation was involved in a rivalry with the level of US basing desire for that host-nation. Because the data is panel data, I cluster standard errors at the country level to account for autocorrelation.

External Threat Model

$$y_{access} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 X_{ext_threat} + \beta_2 X_{US_desire} + \beta_3 X_{ext_threat*US_desire} + \beta_i X_{controls_i} + u$$


Table 10: Regression Table of Basing Access and External Threats

VARIABLES	(1) External
Ext. Threat x US Desire = L,	0.536** (0.261)
External Threat = L,	-0.171 (0.121)
US Basing Desire = L,	0.454*** (0.141)
GDP/cap	0.0368 (0.0298)
NATO	1.395*** (0.146)
Democracy	0.0434 (0.0736)
Cold War	-0.0809*** (0.0284)
War on Terror	0.153*** (0.0354)
Constant	-0.305 (0.200)
Observations	4,826
R-squared	0.558

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

As can be seen from Table 10 above, the interaction between external threat and US basing desire has a substantive and statistically significant effect on basing access. However, the constitutive term that represent the marginal effect of external threats when the United States do not desire basing is not statistically significant. This conditionality on US desire is reflected in Figure 11 where external threat significantly impacts foreign access only when US desire for a base is high.



**Figure 11: Average Marginal Effects of External Threats
Conditional on US Desire for Basing**

As a robustness check, I tested the hypothesis with alternative dependent variables of a basing dummy and a basing level ordinal variable. The direction and statistical significance on the main interaction were robust to all these model specifications. These results provide support for Hypothesis One, that states facing external threats are more likely to grant foreign military access than states that do not. Although this result is robust, it is not groundbreaking; the hypothesis is fairly intuitive. The more complicated question is the effect of internal threats on foreign military access.

Civil Conflict- Fixed Effect Models

To test for the effect of internal threats, I employ country and year fixed effects models. Unlike in the external threat model where the rivalries are fairly durable across time for a country, internal conflict is more time-variant and so using country-level fixed effects allows me to consider the effect of this conflict variable while accounting the individual characteristics of each country. I also control for time effects using year fixed effects. As Chapter One and Three demonstrated, the number of and motivations for US foreign bases has changed over the last 30 years and this model specification allows me to take this variation into account.²³ In all of the below models I continue to cluster standard errors at the country level to mitigate autocorrelation.

In order to test the second and third hypotheses (that low intensity, revolutionary conflict is likely to reduce foreign military access while high intensity, separatist conflict is likely to increase it) I first need to explore the effects of internal conflict generally. To do this I model internal conflict and then break this category down into revolutionary and separatist subcategories before adding in variations in intensity. To create the fixed effects, I include binary variables for $i-1$ countries and $t-1$ years as indicated in the model equations below.

Internal Threat Model²⁴

$$y_{access_{it}} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 X_{int\ conflict * US_desire_{it}} + \beta_2 X_{int\ conflict_{it}} + \beta_3 X_{US\ desire_{it}} + \beta_k X_{controls_{k,it}} + \gamma_{2:i} E_{c_{code}_{2:i}} + \delta_{2:t} T_{year_{2:t}} + u_{it}$$

²³ I conducted the Breusch-Pagan Lagrange multiplier test, which indicated it may be appropriate to account for individual heterogeneity using a fixed or random effects model. I then conducted the Hausman test, which indicated that a fixed effects model would be preferable over a random effects model.

²⁴ Where i is equal to the number of countries and t is the number of years.

Revolutionary Threat Model

$$y_{access_{it}} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 X_{rev\ conflict * US_desire_{it}} + \beta_2 X_{rev\ conflict_{it}} + \beta_3 X_{US\ desire_{it}} \\ + \beta_4 X_{sep\ conflict} + \beta_k X_{controls_{k,it}} + \gamma_{2:i} E_{ccode_{2:i}} + \delta_{2:t} T_{year_{2:t}} + u_{it}$$

Separatist Threat Model

$$y_{access_{it}} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 X_{sep\ conflict * US_desire_{it}} + \beta_2 X_{sep\ conflict_{it}} + \beta_3 X_{US\ desire_{it}} \\ + \beta_4 X_{rev\ conflict} + \beta_k X_{controls_{k,it}} + \gamma_{2:i} E_{ccode_{2:i}} + \delta_{2:t} T_{year_{2:t}} + u_{it}$$

Table 11: Regression Table of Types of Civil Conflict & Basing Access

VARIABLES	(1) Internal	(2) Revolutionary	(3) Separatist
Int. Conf x US Desire = L,	-0.0117 (0.158)		
Rev. Conf x US Desire = L,		-0.173 (0.162)	
Sep. Conf x US Desire = L,			-0.00691 (0.218)
Internal Conflict = L,	-0.0141 (0.0817)		
Revolutionary Conflict = L,		0.0181 (0.0953)	-0.0724 (0.0438)
Separatist Conflict = L,		0.0863 (0.0533)	0.0872 (0.129)
US Basing Desire = L,	0.351** (0.139)	0.383*** (0.136)	0.354** (0.141)
Democracy	0.0910* (0.0509)	0.0902* (0.0505)	0.0907* (0.0507)
Ext. Support for Rebels	0.131*** (0.0357)	0.150*** (0.0412)	0.156*** (0.0448)
GDP/cap	-0.0195 (0.0639)	-0.0205 (0.0643)	-0.0211 (0.0634)
External Threat	-0.0409 (0.0392)	-0.0416 (0.0388)	-0.0411 (0.0389)
Rival DCA	0.0247 (0.0371)	0.0296 (0.0371)	0.0288 (0.0369)
Constant	0.317 (0.495)	0.303 (0.499)	0.323 (0.488)

Observations	4,826	4,826	4,826
R-squared	0.262	0.266	0.265
Number of ccode	177	177	177

As displayed in Table 11, all three models of internal conflict are indeterminate. Neither civil conflict generally nor the subsets of revolutionary and separatist conflict have a statistically significant effect on foreign basing. This ambiguity points to the need for a more finely grained models of civil conflict.

Because Hypotheses Two and Three both include expectations for the effects of conflict intensity, I specify models to test for these specific security conditions. I fit a model with interactions between US basing desire and both the presence of a low intensity revolutionary conflict, Revolution Brewing, and a high intensity revolutionary conflict, Battle for Capital. I also test an interactive model between US desire and high intensity separatist conflict, Bloody Breakaway and low intensity separatist conflict, Pesky and Peripheral.

Revolutionary Intensity Model

$$y_{access_{it}} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 X_{rev_low*US_desire_{it}} + \beta_2 X_{rev_low_{it}} + \beta_3 X_{rev_hi*US_desire_{it}} + \beta_4 X_{rev_hi_{it}} + \beta_5 X_{US_desire_{it}} + \beta_6 X_{sep_conflict_{it}} + \beta_k X_{controls_{k,it}} + \gamma_{2:i} E_{ccode_{2:i}} + \delta_{2:t} T_{year_{2:t}} + u_{it}$$

Separatist Intensity Model

$$y_{access_{it}} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 X_{sep_low*US_desire_{it}} + \beta_2 X_{sep_low_{it}} + \beta_3 X_{sep_hi*US_desire_{it}} + \beta_4 X_{sep_hi_{it}} + \beta_5 X_{US_desire_{it}} + \beta_6 X_{rev_conflict_{it}} + \beta_k X_{controls_{k,it}} + \gamma_{2:i} E_{ccode_{2:i}} + \delta_{2:t} T_{year_{2:t}} + u_{it}$$

Table 12: Regression Table of Civil Conflict Intensity & Basing Access

VARIABLES	(1) H2	(2) H3
Rev. Brewing x US Desire = L,	-0.259** (0.129)	
Revolution Brewing = L,	0.0550 (0.0771)	
Capital Battle x US Desire = L,	0.0474 (0.316)	
Battle for the Capital = L,	-0.0792 (0.184)	
Bloody Breakaway x US Desire = L,		0.552* (0.290)
Pesky, Peripheral x US Desire = L,		-0.0445 (0.218)
Bloody Breakaway = L,		-0.385* (0.222)
Pesky and Peripheral = L,		0.108 (0.133)
US Basing Desire = L,	0.384*** (0.135)	0.351** (0.142)
Separatist Conflict = L,	0.0816 (0.0534)	

Democracy	0.0867*	0.0909*
	(0.0514)	(0.0507)
Ext. Support for Rebels	0.154***	0.145***
	(0.0447)	(0.0469)
GDP/cap	-0.0185	-0.0211
	(0.0645)	(0.0634)
External Threat	-0.0407	-0.0397
	(0.0388)	(0.0384)
Rival DCA	0.0309	0.0272
	(0.0371)	(0.0371)
Revolutionary Conflict = L,		-0.0651
		(0.0430)
Constant	0.287	0.325
	(0.500)	(0.488)
Observations	4,826	4,826
R-squared	0.267	0.266
Number of ccode	177	177

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

The results of both models are consistent with the theoretical expectations of this paper. The interaction between low intensity revolutionary conflict and US basing desire is statistically significant and in the expected negative direction. This finding supports Hypothesis Two that a state in the Revolution Brewing security condition is less likely to increase foreign military access. As the intensity level increases into a Battle for the Capital scenario, military necessity begins to compete with legitimacy concerns and there is no longer a clear empirical difference between states with high-intensity revolutionary conflicts and all other states. Figure 12, below, demonstrates the opposing tendencies of revolutionary conflicts at different intensity levels.




Figure 12: Effects of Low and High Intensity Revolutionary Threats Conditional on US Desire for Basing

While the revolutionary intensity model demonstrates strong support for Hypothesis Two, the separatist intensity model also provides more limited evidence for Hypothesis Three. High intensity separatist conflict, conditional on US basing desire, increases the probability of US military access by more than 50%. This is consistent with Hypothesis Three that a Bloody Breakaway security condition makes foreign military access more likely. However, the impact of this finding is tempered by the fact that the coefficient on the interaction was only statistically significant at the 90% confidence level. The lack of statistical leverage of this variable may be explained by the rarity of separatist conflicts; only 1% of observations had high intensity separatist conflicts.

Consistent with the theoretical expectations of Table 7: Security Conditions and Foreign Military Access, the statistical impact of Pesky and Peripheral conflicts is indeterminate.




Figure 13: Effects of Low and High Intensity Separatist Threats Conditional on US Desire for Basing

The findings for Hypothesis Two are robust to multiple model specifications. This Revolutionary Brewing consistently has a negative and statistically significant correlation with US military basing using both OLS and ordered logit non-fixed effects models, with year fixed effects are removed, and in a logit model with alternative dummy dependent variable. However, the support for Hypothesis Three is less strong. The findings from the separatist intensity model are not robust to other model specifications as the coefficient on the Bloody Breakaway and US desire interactive term is in the expected direction but fails to reach statistical significance in any of the robustness check models.

4.3.5 Conclusion

Overall, this chapter has demonstrated the need for a better understanding of how a potential host-nation's security conditions, particularly from internal threats, affect its willingness to permit foreign military access. I offer a novel theory of security conditions and foreign military access which combines international and domestic political factors to explain basing politics. This chapter also makes a contribution in that it is the first to test for the effects of security conditions and foreign basing empirically and to do so by combining legal and actual measures of military access. One limitation of this study is that it does not account for foreign basing by other major powers. I attempted to mitigate this shortfall by controlling for defense cooperation agreements by US enemies, but this measure surely does not tell the whole story. Although some countries, like Djibouti and Kyrgyzstan, have hosted multiple foreign powers in general foreign basing is mutually exclusive between great power rivals. Furthermore, foreign basing by a great power's close allies partially obviate the need for its own bases. For example, the British base in Cyprus mitigates an American need for basing in this strategic location because the United Kingdom shares access with American forces. Therefore, improvement of this analysis would extend the coding of foreign military access to the major powers overviewed in Chapter One.

The empirical results support traditional intuitions that external threats to a state increase the chances of hosting a foreign military base. This analysis also showed that there is a substantive difference in the effects of separatist and revolutionary on foreign

basing. Regimes facing Revolution Brewing scenarios where the need for legitimacy is most acute are most likely to reduce foreign military access.

There is some evidence supporting the idea that high intensity separatist conflicts are more likely to increase foreign basing, but these findings are less robust. This ambiguity may be due to the relative empirical rarity of separatist conflict. These tepid findings may also point to a need for a theoretical refinement. Separatist conflicts, even high intensity ones, may just be less important to host-nations. Logically, it seems that the stakes are lower for host-nation rulers. If one loses a separatist conflict it may be damaging but is recoverable and the ruler could stay in power. For an incumbent regime a revolution is an existential crisis. The example of Omar al-Bashir is instructive here. He lost the Second Sudanese Civil War leading the separation of South Sudan in 2005 but remained in power for 14 more years until falling in a military coup. A prioritization between civil conflict types also is evident in the Philippine case. As detailed in Chapter Five, the Philippine government has faced regular revolutionary and separatist threats for more than forty years. However, the Philippine military has always viewed the Communist revolutionary threat as more dangerous than the Moro separatists even when the Communist's strength was relatively weak. In sum, a host-nation's security condition matters when it comes to foreign military basing, but external and revolutionary threats seem to matter most.

5. The Philippines: A Within-Case Comparison

Driving north out of Quezon City, the crush of metropolitan Manila traffic and densely packed shopping malls opens up into the plains of central Luzon. As the miles of storage warehouses lining the main highway give way to flooded fields dotted with *carabao*, an alien presence appears in the Pampanganian provincial countryside. Air Force City, the repurposed remnants of the former Clark US Air Force Base, is a civil engineering anomaly in the chaos of the Philippines. Whereas the streets of Manila meander haphazardly, the thoroughfares of Air Force City are gridded out with military precision and uncharacteristically clear signage. The buildings retain the painted corrugated metal roofs that you find at Nellis AFB, Nevada or Goodfellow AFB, Texas. Unlike anywhere in Manila, drivers generally follow the traffic laws and drive one-to-a-lane as if the phantoms of US military police are still on patrol after a quarter century of desertion. Even the name, Clark, has a strikingly foreign ring on the road signs for the Subic-Clark-Tarlac Expressway.

As much as it contrasts with its setting, Clark Air Base also stands as symbol of unfulfilled potential. Since the US military withdrew in 1992, the Philippine government has sought to repurpose the base as Clark Global City. Despite inheriting what was once the largest overseas US military base in the world, including two 10,000+ foot runways, this charter city has yet to attract the international business development that many Filipinos had hoped. This missed opportunity embodies the general US-Philippine relationship. Erstwhile allies against Japanese imperialism and the specter of

Communism, the US-Philippine security relationship was undermined by the failed basing negotiations of the 1990s and the ruins of Clark stand out like the scars of an old family feud. Foregoing a decade of potential military assistance, the Philippine armed forces atrophied to the point where it could not stand up to an increasingly aggressive China. Facing growing encroachment on territorial rights in the South China Sea, the question now looms large for the Philippine government: what if they had retained their close defense ties with the United States? The story of how and why those ties unraveled is an excellent illustration of the inherent political tensions of foreign military basing.

In this chapter, I examine the Philippines from 1965 to today to trace how changes in the intensity and type of internal threat related to changes in US basing access. In accordance with the theory laid out in Chapter Four, I expect that when the Philippine government experiences external threats or internal separatist threats they are more likely to increase foreign military basing access in order to gain security benefits. However, when faced with a low-intensity revolutionary threat, a “Revolution Brewing” situation, they would be more likely to reduce foreign military access due to legitimacy concerns. An intensification of this revolutionary threat, what I call a “Battle for the Capital”, would see a continuation or slight increase in access. In addition, I also search for other indications that the changes in the dependent variable, foreign military access, were affected by in the independent variable, security conditions, in the way I theorize. I follow the decision-making process by looking at changes in public rhetoric, foreign policy, approval rates, domestic spending, and foreign aid.

5.1 Methodology

While cross-national quantitative tests provide support for the generalizability of a theory, they do not necessarily illuminate the causal mechanisms that bring about the change in the dependent variable. It is in this regard that qualitative case studies can be especially useful. In addition to the expected change in the main dependent variable (access) we should observe other phenomena consistent with the theorized causal process. These observable implications provide credence that the theorized process is actually happening. These attendant phenomena will be most observable where the theory predicts the strongest effects. George and Bennett recommend that “cases where variables covary as expected but are at extremely high or low values may help uncover causal mechanisms.”¹ In the relationship between civil conflict and foreign military access, the most extreme effects will be found in conditions of low-intensity revolutionary conflict and high-intensity separatist conflict. By choosing to examine cases in which low-intensity revolutionary conflict led to a decrease in pre-existing access and cases in which external threat led to new access, I run the danger of being charged with “selecting on the DV.” Instead of using the extreme value method, it is reasonable to ask why I did not choose cases where the outcome ran contrary to my predictions. The reason is that I could not find any such cases. Although they are theoretically possible (my theory is only probabilistic) and would be interesting to explore, I could not find any clear empirical examples of where a country mired in low-intensity revolutionary conflict granted a

¹George, Alexander and Andrew Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*, MIT Press, 2005, 75.

foreign military new basing rights or an existing host-nation terminated foreign military access after the emergence of an external threat. Although there is more ambiguity among edge cases, at the extreme values of the independent variable I cannot find any disconfirming examples (although if the Philippines does actually withdraw from its Visiting Forces Agreement with the United States as current President Duterte has threatened this would be such an example). This in and of itself provides support for the theory I propose.

In addition to considering which values of the independent variable produce the most observable implications, we must also consider the dependent variable, foreign basing access. My theory predicts that the occurrence of low-intensity revolutionary conflict makes it less likely that a state will grant foreign access. When this conflict occurs in the absence of pre-existing foreign access it is difficult to know if the theory is operating since there is nothing to observe externally. Without detailed insider accounts from both the would-be sending-state and potential host-nation there is no observable evidence that a request for foreign basing access was ever considered. Therefore, the best cases to observe the effects of low-intensity revolutionary conflict are countries in which foreign military access predates the onset of civil conflict. The process by which low-intensity revolutionary conflict results in decreased access is illustrated below.




Figure 14: Process Tracing of Revolution Brewing and Military Access

As the figure above illustrates, there are observable implications at each step of the theorized process. First, if my argument is correct, criticism of the foreign military presence should be found in rebel propaganda or dissent from the opposition. If there is no record that this is part of the opposition’s grievances, the situation does not support my theory that there is a legitimacy cost to the regime for allowing foreign military access. Second, we should also observe that, when faced with a brewing revolution, a regime should recognize the need to increase its popular legitimacy in both domestic and foreign policy. Domestically, it should increase its provision of public goods. This might come by prioritizing domestic over military spending or it might involve some other populist program. In foreign policy, the regime should seek to dispel criticisms that it is a puppet of the foreign power by taking symbolic, independent stances. Third, the decision to reduce foreign military access should be accompanied by nationalistic public rhetoric by the regime. If the foreign military access level declines without the regime claiming credit for increasing national sovereignty, this would indicate that the basing decision is epiphenomenal to the civil conflict. Finally, my theory presumes that regimes reduce

access in order to increase legitimacy. Therefore, the decision to close a foreign military base should be accompanied by an increase in government approval ratings.

5.2.1 Why the Philippines?

Notwithstanding the concerns above about case selection there is good reason to choose the Philippines to test the relationship between civil conflict and foreign military access. First, it has experienced significant within-case variation on both the independent and dependent variables. In the last fifty years, the Philippines has seen both revolutionary and separatist civil conflicts and has both ejected the US military and invited it back in. Secondly, it has also experienced changes in its external environment as the geopolitical tension of the Cold War gave way to the relative peace of the 1990s. This period was followed by the rise of global Islamic extremism, and now the Philippines is facing the prospect of a risen and increasingly assertive China. This variation in both internal and external security conditions creates a unique opportunity for within-case comparison. By examining the same country at different time periods, we can hold constant the potentially confounding factors of culture, geography, and historical background. We can thus divide up the Philippine case into four sub-cases:

- 1) 1965-79: The rise of the Communist Party of Philippines (CPP) and its militant wing, the New People's Army (NPA), as a low-level revolutionary threat coincided with President Marcos' demands for a renegotiated treaty and reduced US military access.
- 2) 1979-1983: The CPP-NPA grew to a significant military threat which shifted the Marcos regime's priorities from legitimacy to security, resulting in base

negotiations that maintained the status quo.

- 3) 1986-1992: With the security lull brought about by the end of the Cold War and decline of the CPP threat, the Aquino regime again renegotiated the basing agreement to reduce US military access, ultimately leading to the full withdrawal of American forces.
- 4) 1995-2013: An increasingly assertive China reminded the Philippines of the deterrent value of US military presence. This led to the signing of a Visiting Forces Agreement in 1998, with the return of US access to Subic Bay and other Philippine basing facilities in a 2013 Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA).

Is there evidence that security conditions impact foreign military basing in the way that I describe? In addition to fitting the expected input and output variables of my model, this case study is in line with other observable implications that illuminate the causal processes at play. The story of US military presence in the Philippines provides support for the explanation I advance, as the negotiating behavior of both the Marcos and Aquino regimes shifted with changes in the strength of the Communist insurgency. Early in his rule Marcos reduced US access consistent with my expectations of a “Revolution Brewing” type but maintained the access status quo as would be expected of a “Battle for the Capital” scenario. When Corazon Aquino inherited this scenario, she also maintained the existing access level, despite campaign promises not to. Finally, as the threat intensity level dropped, the US military was ejected from the Philippines consistent with the observable implications of the “Revolution Brewing” situation. Then after the emergence

of a credible external threat from China, the US and the Philippines concluded an EDCA in 2013 that restored US military access to many of the same facilities it withdrew from in 1992.

A within-case analysis of the Philippines is also compelling because it represents a least-likely case for the theorized mechanisms to work. Philippine economic dependence on the US made base closure a risky proposition. By 1988, “the bases employed seventy thousand Filipinos, more than the nation’s ten leading corporations combined, contributing more than a billion dollars a year in revenues, double the total amount of foreign investment in the country.”² A declassified CIA estimate, however, put the US bases’ employment around 40,000 and overall economic impact closer to \$500 million or 1.5% of the national income.³ Regardless of the exact figures, US military presence was incredibly important to the Philippine economy. Moreover, in domestic surveys, a majority of Filipinos held a favorable view of the United States and supported a continued US presence. These factors would have provided resistance to the closure of the US bases in 1992. Similarly, the legacy of US colonialism and the rift in the relationship caused by acrimonious basing negotiations made the return of US forces unlikely. The value of this least-likely case is if the theory I propose bears out under these conditions then it is likely to hold in many other contexts.

² Karnow, Stanle. *In Our Image: America’s Empire in the Philippines*. 1st ed. New York: Random House, 1989, 23.

³ Central Intelligence Agency. “The Philippines: Exploring Views on the US Military Bases.” Declassified Memorandum approved for release 2012/02/10, August 24, 1987.
<https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP90T00114R000200970003-8.pdf>.

The evidentiary basis on which my analysis relies draws heavily on secondary sources including Stanley Karnow's Pulitzer Prize-winning history of US-Philippine relations and Col. Bill Berry's exhaustive account of basing negotiations in the Philippines.⁴ I supplement this background material with archival research from declassified CIA documents and official Philippine records. These sources allowed me to ascertain both the perspective of the United States government and the public position of the Philippine government. In order to determine the actual views of key actors within the Philippine government during the time of the case study, I traveled to Manila to conduct a series of interviews with Philippine officials and academics. Most significantly, I interviewed Teodoro "Teddy Boy" Locsin, Jr, the current Philippine Secretary of Foreign Affairs and former speechwriter and political advisor to President Corazon Aquino. To balance his pro-American, conservative view, I interviewed Francisco Nemenzo, a Marxist political scientist and former president of the University of the Philippines-Diliman (UP). UP, the most elite university in the nation, was at the epicenter of the First Quarter Storm student protest that led to Marcos' declaration of martial law in YEAR? as well as Aquino's People Power revolution and the anti-base movement. Nemenzo, a leading socialist thinker, also served as an informal political advisor to President Aquino; his interview represented the views of the Philippine Left. Because Aquino also faced a major political challenge and several coups from ultra-right officers who came out of the Reform the Armed Forces Movement (RAM) within Armed Forces

⁴ William E. Berry, Jr. *U.S. Bases in the Philippines : The Evolution of the Special Relationship*. Westview Special Studies on East Asia. Boulder, Colo. : Westview Press, 1989. Also Henry William Brands, *Bound to Empire: The United States and the Philippines*, Oxford University Press, 1992.

of the Philippines (AFP), I interviewed a former RAM officer who was a Philippine Military Academy classmate of several of the coup-plotters. Finally, to understand the ongoing US-Philippine security relationship, I met with several US embassy officials and Philippine foreign policy scholars.

5.2 Prelude: The History of US Military Bases in the Philippines

The US-Philippine relationship is one of the most complex and surprising bonds in international politics. The Philippines was one of the few true colonies of the United States, yet it is one of the most pro-American countries in the world today. As one of the spoils of the Spanish-American War, the Philippines received neither the immediate independence of Cuba nor statehood like Hawaii or even US citizenship like Puerto Rico. Although the McKinley administration extended its war with Spain into the Philippines with little thought for the eventual purpose and status of the territory, the US involvement and final annexation was motivated by equal parts commercial interest, geopolitical concern, and racialized idealism. Commercially, the Philippines was seen as a key access point for trade with China as part of Secretary of State John Hay's Open-Door policy. Geostrategically, the United States was interested in the Philippines as a naval refueling station and was concerned that the vacuum left by Spain would provoke expansion by another power, principally France, Germany, or Japan. Finally, the McKinley administration was genuinely motivated by the concept of the "white man's burden," a phrase coined by Rudyard Kipling in an 1899 poem exhorting the US to imperialism in

the Philippines.⁵ This notion, which combined American exceptionalism, cultural paternalism, and Christian evangelicalism, saw the Filipinos as unfit for self-government and Americans as duty-bound to govern and civilize them. While claiming that he had never wanted the Philippines, McKinley justified the annexation because “there was nothing left for us to do but to take them all, and to educate the Filipinos, and uplift and civilize and Christianize them, and by God’s grace do the very best we could by them, as our fellow-men for whom Christ also died.”⁶ In a uniquely American colonialism, US colonial governors sought, through a policy of “Benevolent Assimilation,” to Americanize their “little brown brothers” with universal English education and construction of republican political institutions with the early goal of eventual independence.

The American colonial enterprise in the Philippines was never a clear-cut story of greedy foreign oppression resisted by brave nationalists. There were strong anti-imperialist voices in the United States who resisted foreign expansion for both noble reasons (the constitutional principle of self-determination) and less noble motives (preserving American racial purity). Similarly, there were some upper-class Philippine *illustrados* who welcomed American tutelage over and against the disorder and political division that would likely accompany immediate self-rule. This impulse in Philippine

⁵ Rudyard Kipling, “The White Man’s Burden: The United States & The Philippine Islands, 1899.” *Rudyard Kipling’s Verse: Definitive Edition* (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1929) accessed at *History Matters: The U.S. Survey Course on the Web* <http://historymatters.gmu.edu/d/5478/>

⁶ General James Rusling, “Interview with President William McKinley,” *The Christian Advocate* 22 January 1903, 17. Reprinted in Daniel Schirmer and Stephen Roskamm Shalom, eds., *The Philippines Reader* (Boston: South End Press, 1987), 22–23 accessed at *History Matters: The U.S. Survey Course on the Web* <http://historymatters.gmu.edu/d/5575/>

politics is attested to by the continued existence of a pro-US statehood movement, a candidate of which won 4% of the vote in the 1981 presidential election.⁷ In total, the US-Philippine relationship is one of ambivalent asymmetry. Throughout history, US attitudes toward the Philippines have alternated between patronizing interference and benign neglect. Filipinos, on the other hand, are simultaneously attracted to American culture and the benefits of association while desirous of an independent national identity and political autonomy. The tension of this unequal yoking heavily influences US-Philippine security relations.

Since Commodore Dewey sank the Spanish fleet in Manila Bay in 1898, US military power has been intertwined with American political involvement in the Philippines. In fact, the first government the United States established in the Philippines was an occupational authority under a series of military commanders, including General Arthur MacArthur, the famed Douglas' father. Even after the appointment of a civil governor, William Howard Taft, in 1903, the civil administration continued to be overseen by the Bureau of Insular Affairs, a part of the US War Department. US military bases were central to American colonial rule from the very beginning. Initially, American military forces came to push out the Spanish, who offered little resistance, but they soon found themselves facing an independence movement led by Emilio Aguinaldo, a Philippine nationalist revolutionary who had previously allied with the United States. A little-remembered war in the United States today, the Philippine-American War saw the

⁷ Bustos, Loren, and Vanessa Cabacungan. "Timeline: Efforts to Make the Philippines a US State." *Rappler*, April 23, 2014. <http://www.rappler.com/newsbreak/iq/56124-timeline-ph-us-state-annexation>.

deployment of more than 70,000 US forces with a loss of more than 7,000 casualties and a cost of \$600 million.⁸ The war was most notable for its brutality; as in future guerrilla conflicts, the difficulty of gathering intelligence led US forces to adopt “the water cure,” a forerunner to the notorious waterboarding techniques of the modern era.⁹ Atrocities and barbarism were attributed to both sides, ultimately resulting in the deaths of as many as 200,000 Filipino civilians.

After Aguinaldo’s capture, then-President Theodore Roosevelt declared an official end to hostilities in 1902, but the US military stayed to quell sporadic rebel outbreaks, most notably a separatist movement by Islamic Moros in Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago. As early as 1904, the US Navy began constructing a naval base at Olongapo on Subic Bay.¹⁰ The US Army garrison, organized as the Philippine Department after 1913, was headquartered in Manila with most of the command stationed around the main Philippine island of Luzon.¹¹ In 1920, an airstrip and handful of hangers near the parade ground of Camp Stotsenburg was christened Clark Field.¹² The United States military had come to stay.

As the Philippines gradually moved toward independence it did so under the dual-edged sword of the US military. At each step in the process, from the 1902 establishment of a Philippine Assembly to the 1916 Philippine Autonomy Act, which created a directly

⁸ Karnow, *In Our Image*, 194.

⁹ Brands, *Bound to Empire*, 55.

¹⁰ Brands, *Bound to Empire*, 84.

¹¹ Morton, Louis. *The Fall of the Philippines*. 2nd ed. The United States Army in World War II. U.S. Army Center of Military History, originally published 1953, 21.

¹² Clark Museum, Mabalacat, Philippines.

elected senate and called for eventual independence as a US goal, to the final drafting of a Constitution in 1935, Philippine leaders were torn between nationalist calls for full Philippine sovereignty and the threat of internal chaos or fear of external invasion occasioned by the rise of Japan. During the Commonwealth years, a ten-year transitional period before the Philippines was to receive full independence, a native president was elected, and a Philippine Army was established. The unequal relationship was evident even in these new institutions as Commonwealth President Manuel Quezon appointed his long-time friend and recently retired US Army Chief of Staff Douglas MacArthur as the commander of the Philippine Army. To defend against Japanese invasion, MacArthur envisioned a 10,000 man active army with 400,000 reserve militia forces although the actual strength of the Philippine Army only approached a third of that number.¹³ In addition to MacArthur's Commonwealth forces, the US Army Philippine Department numbered just over 22,000 regular soldiers, more than half of which were Filipino scouts.¹⁴ The distinction between Philippine and US forces was further blurred when, in response to Japan's invasion of French Indochina in July 1941, MacArthur was recalled to active duty and placed in charge of the combined United States Armed Forces in the Far East (USAFFE). Fears about Tokyo's intentions were confirmed and the Philippine drive toward independence was interrupted when, on 8 December 1941, Japanese Zeros began to circle over Clark Field.

¹³ Karnow, *In Our Image*, 272, 276.

¹⁴ Bailey, Jennifer. "Philippine Islands The U.S. Army Campaigns of World War II." U.S. Army Center of Military History, October 3, 2003. <https://history.army.mil/brochures/pi/PI.htm>.

Over the course of the next four years, US-Philippine military ties would be further cemented through the shared suffering of defeat and the joint, if unequal, exultation of victory. In a six-month long struggle, American and Filipino soldiers would endure together the occupation of Manila, the death march from Bataan, and the siege and surrender of the island fortress of Corregidor. When MacArthur made good on his “I will return” promise by wading ashore at Leyte, he was accompanied by Sergio Osmena, president of the Commonwealth government in exile. As allied US and Philippine forces drove out the Japanese from the southern islands and then Luzon, they formed an uneasy and uneven partnership with the leftist Hukbalahap partisans who had resisted and harassed the Japanese occupation forces. Philippine liberation from the Japanese in 1945 was followed by formal independence one year later, although it was still a dependent independence. The elected president of the newly sovereign nation, Manuel Roxas, was MacArthur’s handpicked choice; even the date set for independence, 4 July 1946, was quintessentially American. This dependency would take its clearest form in the 1947 basing agreement in which Roxas, fearing a complete US withdrawal, granted the United States ninety-nine year leases for Clark Field and Subic Bay as well as complete legal jurisdiction not only over American service-members, but even Filipinos working on the bases.

5.3 The 1947 Military Basing Agreement: Dependent Independence

From a strict application of the security conditions and foreign military access theory, one might expect the newly independent Philippines to expel its former colonial masters. With Japan defeated and China embroiled in Civil War, the Philippines did not

face an acute external threat. The main internal threat came from the low-level threat of a Hukbalahap rebellion. The theoretical expectation then is that the Philippines would reduce foreign access.

However, a key assumption of my theory is that the host-nation government is sovereign and independent. Despite being formally independent, the new Philippine government ruled over a country devastated by war and still heavily dependent on US recovery aid.¹⁵ Furthermore, the newly formed Armed Forces of the Philippine was heavily integrated with the American army; its first commander had been the retired Gen. Douglas MacArthur. Moreover, as America was, and still is, wildly popular among average Filipinos, there were numerous factors pushing the Philippines toward retaining US bases and compliance with US foreign policy wishes.

Unfortunately, the price of this compliance was social unrest. American restoration of the pre-war landed elite, many of whom, like Roxas, collaborated openly with the Japanese, generated widespread resentment and sparked a rebellion by the Hukbalahap. This rebellion was “a serious military threat to the Philippine Republic”.¹⁶ Theoretically, this pushed the Philippines into a “Battle for the Capital” scenario cementing the need for US military assistance. Although the Huks were mostly peasants trying to gain land reform, not orthodox Bolsheviks taking orders from the Kremlin, the

¹⁵ Stromseth, Jonathan. “Unequal Allies: Negotiations over U.S. Bases in the Philippines.” *Journal of International Affairs* 43, no. 1 (Summer/Fall 89 1989), 164.

¹⁶ Mitchell, Edward. “The Huk Rebellion in the Philippines: An Econometric Study.” Memorandum. RAND National Defense Research Institute Santa Monica United States, 1969. https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_memoranda/RM5757.html.

rebellion was viewed in Washington as a part of the global fight against Communism under the Truman Doctrine.

To combat this threat, the US engineered the election of Ramon Magsaysay, a pro-American candidate acting under the tutelage of US Air Force officer and CIA operative Edward Lansdale. Magsaysay was ultimately successful in dismantling the Huk rebellion by 1953, but his presidency also set the precedent of blatant CIA involvement in Philippine politics as well as the electoral benefits of being the American candidate. Karnow writes that, though this designation would be ruinous elsewhere in Asia, “in the Philippines at the time, to be called an ‘Amboy’—‘America’s boy’— was a halo.”¹⁷ There were dissenting voices to American influence. As early as the 1940s, nationalists such as Claro Recto, senator, jurist, and drafter of the Philippine Constitution, railed against US military bases, in particular, and Washington’s influence, in general.

Nonetheless, then, as today, being affiliated with the United States could be a real political asset in Manila. Whether it comes to universities, consumer goods, movies, basketball, and even citizenship, Filipinos tend to view all things American as inherently better. Yet there also seems to be a latent suspicion by America’s former colonial subjects that their affection is largely one-sided.

This tension for the Philippines is played out on the national level as well. The US-Philippine partnership is, from the perspective of Philippine leaders, a tradeoff between the security and economic benefits of American partnership and the domestic legitimacy costs of the asymmetric relationship. The asymmetry stems from how US

¹⁷ Karnow, *In Our Image*, 353.

interest has waxed and waned over time; America has never cared as much about the Philippines as Filipinos care about America. Karnow puts it well: “Like the poor relatives of a rich *compadre*, they have assumed U.S. support to be their due. Yet, out of national pride they have resented American interference in their affairs. Thus, they have charged the United States with showing them either too little or too much attention.”¹⁸ When I interviewed Teodoro “Teddy Boy” Locsin, the foreign secretary of the supposedly anti-American Rodrigo Duterte, he proudly trumpeted his CIA connections and his goal of revitalizing the US-Philippine relationship. However, he also complained of several incidents, from a US helicopter contract channeled through a Polish supplier to a meeting at Mar-a-Lago instead of Washington, that he felt indicated that the Americans were embarrassed of too close an association with the Duterte administration and its poor human rights record.¹⁹ This tension in the relationship between the costs and benefits of American friendship were evident all the way back to the dilemmas facing Ferdinand Marcos.

5.4 The 1979 MBA: Revolutionary Threat & Reduced US Access

In this period from the late 1960s to late 1980s the Philippine government faced a low intensity but growing revolutionary Communist insurgency which falls squarely in the ideal-type category of Revolution Brewing. My theory would expect that that legitimacy pressures facing Philippine government would outweigh military necessity there would be a decrease in foreign military access. This expected outcome is largely

¹⁸ Karnow, *In Our Image*, 325.

¹⁹ Author interview, 25 July 2019.

what came about as President Marcos used the military basing agreement (MBA) negotiations with the United States to champion Philippine sovereignty to rally elite support and undermine populist critiques of the Communist revolutionaries. Moreover, this period also demonstrates other observable implications of the suggested causal process: critique of foreign military access by opposition groups, the regime's turn toward domestic populism and foreign policy independence, and the use of nationalism as a public justification for the access reduction.

The beginning of the end of the US military presence in the Philippines started, ironically, with the rise to power of the vocally pro-American Ferdinand Marcos in 1965. Marcos had risen to US attention as a junior legislator by giving a speech calling for greater cooperation with the United States. Within the first year of assuming the presidency, Marcos paid a state visit to Washington and agreed to send two thousand troops to assist America in Vietnam.²⁰ He also hosted a summit of non-Communist Asian countries in Manila that, while producing nothing of substance, served as a symbol that “allowed American officials to continue to portray their struggle in Vietnam as the latest expression of the ideals of collective security.”²¹ America had its “man in Manila,” but like many allies, Marcos would prove to be less controllable than Washington hoped. Unfortunately, while Marcos' dependence on American support created leverage for the United States, it also created domestic legitimacy problems for the Philippine president. Despite his erstwhile pro-American support, when Marcos began to question the value of

²⁰ Brands, *Bound to Empire*, 283.

²¹ *Ibid.*

the US bases in 1975, he was being buffeted by nationalistic cross-breezes and growing revolutionary threat.

Consistent with the global trend of decolonization and anti-imperialism, the winds of change had begun to blow in the Philippines. Although skepticism toward the role of the United States grew across various left wing and student groups, it took its most virulent form in the radical nationalism of the Communist Party of Philippines (CPP) and its militant wing, the New People's Army (NPA). Founded in 1968 with only 60 fighters and 35 rifles, the CPP-NPA was a Maoist-inspired movement that advocated a people's democratic revolution as the solution to the Philippine's three major problems, which it viewed as US imperialism, bureaucratic capitalism, and feudalism.²² In the spirit of the 1950s Huk rebellion, the CPP-NPA focused on mobilizing the rural peasantry in the countryside through the assassination of government officials, bourgeoisie land owners, and other "enemies of the people." Although the killings reached more than one hundred per year in several provinces, "the peasant uprising the CPP hoped for did not materialize."²³ In 1970, the CPP-NPA took advantage of the student protests and leftist demonstrations known as the First Quarter Storm to gain members and momentum. A year later, the group carried out its most high-profile attack by lobbing grenades at a Liberal Party rally in Manila, killing nine and wounding ninety-five people.²⁴

²² International Crisis Group, "The Communist Insurgency in the Philippines Tactics and Talks," Asia Report, 2011; International Crisis Group.

²³ Brands, *Bound to Empire*, 291.

²⁴ Stanford University Mapping Militants Project, "Communist Party of the Philippines–New People's Army | Mapping Militant Organizations," Mapping Militant Organizations, accessed November 15, 2018, <http://web.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/groups/view/149> .

In response, Marcos immediately suspended the writ of habeas corpus and, in 1972, imposed martial law. Although the US Central Intelligence Agency assessed that the CPP-NPA was “unlikely to become a serious threat to the Marcos government in the foreseeable future,”²⁵ Marcos used the Communist threat as an excuse to stay in power and brutally stifle all political opposition while enriching himself and his family through blatant corruption. Martial law forced the CPP-NPA underground after a number of its leaders were arrested, including the group’s founder.²⁶ At the same time, these heavy-handed tactics kept the communist revolution at a simmer by alienating increasingly wider segments of the Philippine population and setting the stage for a revolutionary resurgence after martial law was lifted in 1981.

The introduction of martial law also introduced a new threat, the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), which formed in 1972. According to Stanford’s Mapping Militants project, the MNLF “is an Islamic separatist organization based in the southern Philippines that seeks autonomy for Filipino Muslims, called Moros.”²⁷ Through the 1970s, MNLF fighters launched several attacks against government targets, actually overrunning Marawi City and Jolo until the Philippine military were able to recapture the cities. Although the MNLF remained a threat until the 1996 Final Peace Agreement, the Philippine government always viewed the Communists as the bigger threat. This was due

²⁵ Central Intelligence Agency. “Martial Law in the Philippines: The Road Ahead.” Declassified Memorandum. Office of National Estimates, November 29, 1972. <https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/document/cia-rdp85t00875r002000120029-1>.

²⁶ International Crisis Group, “The Communist Insurgency in the Philippines Tactics and Talks.”

²⁷ Stanford University Mapping Militants Project. “Philippines | Mapping Militant Organizations.” Accessed November 15, 2018. <http://web.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/maps/view/philippines>.

partly to geography; the Moros were concentrated in Mindanao, Sulu, and Basilan provinces where the inaccessibility of the Southern Philippines render it highly remote from the central government. As an example, one must travel more than 1,500 kilometers of poor roads and island ferries to reach Jolo from Manila. The government's focus on communism was also due to the political marginalization of Filipino Muslims; Moros only constituted about 5% of the Philippine population. Finally, the international political context incentivized the Philippine government to prioritize the Communist threat in solidarity with its American ally. In all, this meant that during the Cold War, the Moro separatist movement remained "Pesky and Peripheral" and the internal security conditions that mattered most concerned the Communist revolutionaries.

During this same period, Marcos was also engaged in negotiations with United States over American bases in the Philippines.²⁸ Spanning multiple US presidential administrations, Marcos dragged out the negotiations until he finally signed a formal military basing agreement in 1979. The 1979 agreement between the United States and the Philippines significantly decreased the level of US military access in the country. First, the agreement required the leasing period to be renegotiated every five years until the original treaty termination date of 1991. This provided further extortion opportunities for Marcos and introduced more uncertainty into the US strategic posture. Second, the agreement emphasized Philippine sovereignty over all territory, appointed a Philippine base commander to head every facility, and, in an unprecedented change, made the

²⁸ Santos, Soliman M., Paz Verdades M. Santos, Octavio A. Dinampo, and Diana Rodriguez. *Primed and Purposeful: Armed Groups and Human Security Efforts in the Philippines*. Geneva: Small Arms Survey, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, 2010, 21.

Philippine armed forces exclusively responsible for all perimeter security.²⁹ These changes significantly reduced the US military's freedom of action on the bases. Finally, in terms of actual access, the United States ceded back to the Philippines 92% of the original 130,000 acres at Clark Air Base and 60% of the 62,000 acres at Subic Bay.³⁰ This change was significant given that the US military presence in the Philippines at the time was the fifth largest in the world and the third largest in Asia.³¹

At first glance this sub-case might not seem to support the theory I previously laid out, because we would expect to see a decrease in the presence of foreign troops during a "Revolution Brewing" civil conflict, but a detailed assessment of the terms of the 1979 basing agreement clearly reveals that foreign military access did decrease. Furthermore, there were several other observable implications consistent with my theory of foreign military access and civil conflict.

As indicated in Figure 14, in order to infer that the civil conflict was related to the change in foreign military access, we should observe anti-basing grievances as part of the opposition's rhetoric and propaganda. That is certainly the case here. The NPA's founding manifesto claimed, "the basic condition of the Philippines today is that of a semi-colonial and semi-feudal country, dominated by the US imperialists, the comprador bourgeoisie, the land-lords, and the bureaucrat capitalists. These vested interests mercilessly exploit

²⁹ Cooley, *Base Politics*, 72.

³⁰ Cooley, *Base Politics*, 72.

³¹ Kane, Tim. "Global U.S. Troop Deployment Dataset, 1950-2005." Center for Data Analysis, The Heritage Foundation, March 1, 2006. <http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2006/05/global-us-troop-deployment-1950-2005>.

the broad masses of the people.”³² Although the anti-Americanism of the Communists was based on broader political and economic factors, US military bases were a tangible symbol of the unequal relationship between America and its former colony. The phrase “US-Marcos Dictatorship,” used by political dissidents and left-wing activists, even became accepted shorthand by Philippine conservatives for the illegitimate fusion of the Marcos regime and American military presence.

If Marcos had lost legitimacy through the opposition’s attacks on his dependence on US military support, did he recognize this loss and seek mitigate it? Yes, although the situation was not so simple that Marcos could prioritize “butter” over “guns” and shift government spending away from defense as might be expected with a democratic regime. Selectorate theory, as proposed by Bueno de Mesquita, et al, argues that leaders stay in power by distributing goods to their winning coalition, the subset of the population whose support is essential to stay in power.³³ For Marcos, the Armed Forces of Philippines was a vital part of his winning coalition and indispensable for maintaining the decade-long martial law. However, to address domestic legitimacy concerns, Marcos made a tepid effort at reform. He launched the New Society program in 1972, the most sweeping land reform program to date, which broke up the power of the landed elite in the provinces. He also pledged to streamline government and stamp out corruption, although that initiative amounted to little in the end.³⁴ As one CIA report opined during the initiation of martial

³² Brands, *Bound to Empire*, 288.

³³ De Mesquita, Bruce Bueno, Alastair Smith, James D. Morrow, and Randolph M. Siverson. *The Logic of Political Survival*. MIT Press, 2005.

³⁴ Brands, *Bound to Empire*, 300.

law, “Marcos, however, must be careful to tread a careful line - accomplishing enough to prevent the reemergence of cynicism and serious disillusionment on the part of the populace as a whole without appearing to threaten the vested interests of the wealthy.”³⁵ Although he walked this line for more than a decade, Marcos became trapped in a vicious circle. To maintain political office, Marcos instituted martial law with the support of the military and right-wing oligarchs. This made him dependent on these groups and US military support at the same time that it undermined his popular support and attracted unwanted attention from the US regarding his administration’s violation of human rights.

In foreign policy, Marcos sought a balance between maintaining unwavering US support while projecting an image of standing up for Philippine sovereignty. He did this primarily by dragging out basing agreement negotiations and publicly highlighting base-related accidents.³⁶ Marcos also cozied up to Moscow, visited Beijing in 1975 to normalize relations, and encouraged members of his government to denounce US bases as symbols of neocolonialism. The epitome of Marcos’ impudence came in 1978 when he signed a nonaggression, non-subversion pact with Communist Vietnam.³⁷ Marcos’ actions played to multiple audiences, simultaneously disheartening the Maoist cadres in the countryside, bolstering his reputation among Filipino nationalists, and demonstrating to Washington that he might be willing to walk away from their protection. In both his domestic and foreign policy, Marcos clearly sought to make up for the loss of legitimacy stemming from his dependence on America.

³⁵ Central Intelligence Agency. “Martial Law in the Philippines: The Road Ahead,” 8.

³⁶ Cooley, *Base Politics*, 71.

³⁷ Brands, *Bound to Empire*, 310.

Consistent with the expectations of the hypothesized process depicted in Figure 1, there is clear evidence that Marcos publicly explained the 1979 basing agreement as an enhancement of Philippine sovereignty. In addition to substantive fights over operational access and military assistance amounts, the Marcos government fought hard during the negotiations for symbolic changes such as flying the Philippine flag in front of the bases and appointing Philippine base commanders, which Marcos pointed to as evidence of regained sovereignty.³⁸ In an address to the national legislature just days after signing, Marcos trumpeted the sovereignty provisions of the agreement. Titled “The Final Liberation,” Marcos speech claimed that “Where in the past, we were in doubt as to who ruled these bases within our borders, today there is no question that our people and our country are sovereign. I know what it means when you see your flag flying over that base.”³⁹ Marcos justified the continued American presence in terms of the historic level of promised aid and proclaimed that the agreement “completes the liberation of the Philippines.”⁴⁰ These statements indicate that Marcos was cognizant of and motivated by the nationalist legitimacy problem presented by the American military presence.

An alternative story to the one I propose is that Marcos’ public posturing and statements about national sovereignty were really intended to extract greater compensation payments from the Americans. In this telling, Marcos was just playing a two-level game where his domestic political constraints strengthened his negotiating hand

³⁸ Berry, *U.S. Bases in the Philippines*, 242.

³⁹ Ferdinand Marcos, “The Final Liberation” (Quezon City: Batasang Pambansa, January 15, 1979), <https://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/1979/01/15/report-of-president-marcos-to-the-batasang-pambansa/> .

⁴⁰ Ibid.

on the international stage.⁴¹ While gaining greater rents from American largess was likely part of Marcos' goal, it clearly was not the only one. In 1976, Marcos personally rejected a tentative agreement that would have paid an unprecedented \$1 billion in aid over five years, double the compensation that the US and Philippines eventually agreed upon in 1979.⁴² While this smaller final compensation may be explained as a simple miscalculation on Marcos' part as to the willingness of the United States to pay for access, a strictly rent-seeking explanation does not account for all of the symbolic sovereignty concessions that Marcos won in the bargaining. If Marcos' only goal was to maximize base compensation it is illogical that he would have demanded a reduction in the territory in which the US could operate as well as Philippine base commanders and exclusively Filipino guards for public-facing base security.

It is more difficult to assess whether the change in foreign military access had the hypothesized effect of increasing the Marcos regime's legitimacy. As martial law was still in place, there was no independent press, let alone public opinion polling. Marcos's own actions, though, seem to indicate that he thought the concessions that he had wrought from the Americans increased his legitimacy. Although he was not constitutionally required to submit the basing agreement to the national legislature, "he was motivated to make a major address before the legislature both to address the criticisms directed at the amendment...and to ensure that widespread coverage of his views on the amendment

⁴¹ Putnam, Robert D. "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games." *International Organization* 42, no. 3 (1988).

⁴² Cooley, *Base Politics*, 71.

were presented in the local press.”⁴³ Marcos also continued to brag publicly about his defense of Philippine sovereignty, even citing the negotiations as one of the regime’s accomplishments in his 1981 speech lifting martial law.⁴⁴ Overall, the numerous observable implications documented above indicate that the Communist insurgency simmering beneath the placid surface of martial law contributed to the pressure on the Marcos regime to reduce American military access. Soon, though, this brewing revolution would boil over into full-fledged rebellion, with dramatic consequences for the Marcos regime.

5.5 The 1983 Extension: Increasing Intensity & Continued US Access

The period from the 1979 basing agreement to the extension agreement in 1983 saw an increase in the intensity of Communist threat. In terms of the ideal type categories I established in Chapter Four, this means that the Philippines had moved from a “Revolution Brewing” to a “Battle for the Capital” security condition. The theoretical expectation then is that we should see an increase or at least continuity of foreign military access. An observable implication of this theoretical process is that the negotiations should be as quick and quiet as possible to maximize military assistance while reducing public scrutiny. Consistent with these expectations US military basing was maintained and the basing negotiations were concluded much more swiftly and amicably than previous negotiations.

⁴³ Berry, *U.S. Bases in the Philippines*, 244.

⁴⁴ Marcos, Ferdinand. “Encounter with Destiny.” Speech Accompanying the Termination of Martial Law, January 17, 1981. <https://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/1981/01/17/speech-of-president-marcos-during-the-termination-of-martial-law/>.

Though Marcos' heavy-handed tactics sought to quell the communist threat, they actually only increased it. As historian H.W. Brands writes, "From its founding in 1969 until the summer of 1972 the NPA had caused the government trouble, but not enough to genuinely threaten its overthrow. In outlawing dissent Marcos became the NPA's most effective recruiting officer."⁴⁵ The CPP-NPA membership was on a dramatic rise in the early 1980s to reach a peak of more than 25,000 fighters.⁴⁶

Whereas in 1972, the NPA only had a presence in a few provinces by the mid-1980s they had spread across the archipelago, had enough strength to form battalions in Samar and Northern Luzon and had even infiltrated the traditional Muslim province of Mindanao.⁴⁷ Most significantly, martial law had the perverse consequence of giving the CPP-NPA a foothold in the cities as antipathy toward Marcos united university students, labor unions, and even faithful Catholics.⁴⁸ At the peak of the conflict in 1985, more than 1,200 Philippine military and police were being killed annually. While the Philippine government may not have been literally battling for the capital, clearly faced a high intensity, revolutionary conflict that would fall in the "Battle for the Capital" category. This impacted the Marcos government as it re-entered basing renewal negotiations with the Reagan administration.

⁴⁵ Brands, *Bound to Empire*, 303.

⁴⁶ CPP-NPA strength derived from Santos et al., *Primed and Purposeful*, 24. Coup data from Favide Fact-Finding Commission. "The Final Report of the Fact-Finding Commission." Official Gazette of the Republic of the Philippines. Makati City, PI: Government of the Philippines, October 3, 1990. <https://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/1990/10/03/the-final-report-of-the-fact-finding-commission-october-1990/>.

⁴⁷ International Crisis Group, "The Communist Insurgency in the Philippines Tactics and Talks," 4.

⁴⁸ Brands, *Bound to Empire*, 303.

In stark contrast to the interminable basing negotiations of the 1970s that drug on for years, the 1983 talks were concluded in less than two months. This new agreement maintained the sovereignty provisions of the 1979 deal along with a “best effort” pledge by the Reagan administration to secure an increased aid package of almost \$900 million.⁴⁹ While this largesse undoubtedly sped up negotiations, Marcos had rejected an even larger offer from Kissinger almost a decade earlier. The more threatening internal security environment undoubtedly motivated both the beleaguered Marcos and virulently anti-Communist Reagan to prolong US military presence. In stark contrast to the self-congratulatory stance 1979, Marcos publicly downplayed the 1983 extension. I can find no mention of American bases in his 1984 State of the Nation address or in any other major presidential addresses from 1983 and 1984.⁵⁰ Consistent with my theoretical expectations, both administrations prioritized security over legitimacy and continued US military access. Also consistent with the expected observable implications, they did so with speed and little public fanfare. While this outcome may seem overdetermined by Marcos’ long history as a US client, US-Philippine relations in the Aquino era provides a harder test of this theory.

⁴⁹ Cooley, *Base Politics*, 73.

⁵⁰ Marcos, Ferdinand. “Nineteenth State of the Nation Address.” Official Gazette of the Republic of the Philippines, July 23, 1984. <https://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/1984/07/23/ferdinand-e-marcos-nineteenth-state-of-the-nation-address-july-23-1984/>. Textual analysis of eight available speeches from the Official Gazette of the Philippines <https://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/section/speeches/page/5/?tag=ferdinand-e-marcos%2F>

5.6 The 1988 "Open Options" Policy and the Dual Revolutionary Threat

The period from 1986 to 1988 provides a strong test for the theory I propose. The incoming president had a public anti-basing position and without considering the security threat one might conclude that US basing access was in danger. However, the Philippines continued to face a robust Communist revolutionary threat as well as right wing coup attempts. Consistent with my theory and in spite of counterpressure within her coalition the new president maintained American military basing.

The election of the liberal Corazon Aquino in 1986 marked a major turning point in Philippine democratic development and relations with the United States. Aquino, the widow of a popular senator assassinated after returning from exile in America in 1983, swept into office on a wave of "People Power" that had been building up during a decade of Marcos' authoritarianism. Opposition to the US bases was one of the motivating factors uniting the dissident movement that brought Aquino into power. Ridding the Philippines of US military bases and charting an independent foreign policy was a central goal in the stated policy agenda of the National Democratic Front, the above-ground political organization of the CPP.⁵¹ While the anti-basing movement had previously predominated only in the radical fringe of Philippine politics, by the time of Aquino's election the brazen collusion between an unscrupulous US foreign policy and the venally brutal Marcos regime had moved the issue to the mainstream.⁵² This placed great pressure on Aquino to distance herself from all aspects of the Marcos regime. Prior to

⁵¹ Yeo, "The Politics of Overseas Military Bases," 46.

⁵² Brands, *Bound to Empire*, 340.

her election, Aquino herself had signed an opposition statement calling for the withdrawal of US bases.⁵³ The CIA worried in the run-up to the election about how she would rule, as she had “adopted a foreign policy platform that leaves in doubt the future of US military facilities.”⁵⁴ Her popular movement, sometimes called the “EDSA revolution” after the central Manila highway which her supporters filled in protest, united very disparate elements of Filipino politics. Her coalition included leftists, liberal bourgeoisie, conservative landed elites, and even the reformist RAM officers within the Armed Forces of Philippines (AFP). These factions were united only around their opposition to Marcos. Aquino, a political novice with no legislative record, provided a conveniently blank slate upon which each group could project their own aspirations.

Though Aquino rode into office on a wave of popular legitimacy and international goodwill, she was soon forced to make real policy choices. The first major decision concerned drafting a new constitution in 1986. Despite the advice of some of her advisors that she should control the drafting process for her own political gain, Aquino appointed an independent Constitutional Commission representing a wide political spectrum.⁵⁵ A consequence of this high-minded decision was that anti-base activists were able to insert two poison-pill provisions for US military access—first, declaring the Philippines a nuclear-weapons-free-zone, and second, banning foreign military bases after 1991.⁵⁶

⁵³ This statement was called the Hong Kong Declaration and, according to Nemenzo, was signed by all the presidential aspirants within the opposition. Author interview, 2019.

⁵⁴ Central Intelligence Agency, “THE SNAP ELECTION IN THE PHILIPPINES: WHAT IF THE OPPOSITION WINS?” (Sanitized Copy Approved for Release, February 4, 1986), <https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/document/cia-rdp86t01017r000605640001-9>.

⁵⁵ Author interview with Teodoro Locsin, July 2019.

⁵⁶ Berry, *U.S. Bases in the Philippines*, 286.

Despite her earlier base opposition and the structural constraints imposed by the new constitution, Aquino's abandoning her clear anti-basing position for the 1988 "Open Options" policy that included a three-year access extension and left open the possibility of continued US access past the 1991 agreement termination date.⁵⁷ While this policy turnabout was likely influenced by pressure from *illustardo* elites who benefited from US presence, it also clearly aligned with my theoretical expectations of the security situation. In the face of continued "Battle for the Capital" security threats, Aquino chose to continue foreign military access despite countervailing pressure from the left wing of her coalition. These high-intensity revolutionary threats stemmed from both the continued danger of the CPP-NPA and the rise of right-wing radical coup-plotters.

Communist fighting strength climaxed in the post-EDSA period. Popular frustration with the venality and incompetence of the Marcos regime combined with the reduced repression of the fledgling Aquino government allowed the Communist movement to reach the apex of its power. Although Aquino embarked on a new strategy that addressed the underlying political and socio-economic causes of the conflict, these reforms took time to show an effect. In 1986, she offered a ceasefire, released a number of Marcos-era political prisoners, and began the first peace negotiations.⁵⁸ While this policy would eventually undercut the Communists' appeal, in the meantime, the CPP-NPA remained an acute threat for which the Philippines needed US military assistance.

⁵⁷ Peter B Payoyo, "CONVERSION POSSIBILITIES UNDER THE OPEN OPTIONS POLICY," *World Bulletin: Bulletin of the International Studies of the Philippines* 6, no. 6 (1990): 49.; Elaine Sciolino, "U.S. and Philippines Sign Pact on Bases," *The New York Times*, October 18, 1988, sec. World, <https://www.nytimes.com/1988/10/18/world/us-and-philippines-sign-pact-on-bases.html>.

⁵⁸ Karnow, *In Our Image*, 435.

In addition to the continued Communist threat, the Aquino regime faced another existential threat in the form of right-wing military coups. Although this contest over the right to rule is not what I was originally thinking when defining the “Battle for Capital” ideal-type the underlying mechanism works the same. In a traditional high-intensity revolutionary scenario foreign military access is maintained or increased because the rebel military threat strong enough relative to the national army that military assistance is more important than legitimacy loss. In the case of an attempted coup the revolutionaries are the national army which threaten the unarmed civilian government. The makes the civilian regime’s need for external military assistance even more dire than in the standard high-intensity revolution.

In the case of the Philippines, Aquino’s attempts to accommodate and undermine the Communist revolutionaries made her vulnerable to charges of being soft on Communism and provoked a threat from the right. One former reform movement officer reported to me that there was wide-spread belief in the AFP that the Aquinos were in league with the Communists.⁵⁹ Ninoy Aquino had acted as an emissary for the government to the original Huk leader, Luis Taruc, in 1954.⁶⁰ Equally galling for the conservative military establishment, Aquino was seen as bringing into the government many of the socialists who had supported her People Power revolution. According to Locsin, “Ms. Aquino's closest advisors were nationalists, leftists, those are the ones who really fought Marcos.”⁶¹

⁵⁹ Author interview with Napoleon Concepcion, July 2019.

⁶⁰ Karnow, *In Our Image*, 354.

⁶¹ Author interview, July 2019.

Prompted by this fear of socialist influence, former Reform of the Armed Forces Movement (RAM) officers, led by a charismatic Special Forces officer Gregorio “Gringo” Honasan, launched five armed coups against Aquino in her first two years in office.⁶² Although these were quickly put down, the most serious with the assistance of the US military, they demonstrated how vulnerable Aquino would be if she radically changed the Philippines’ security relationships. Locsin explained that he advised Aquino to maintain close ties with the United States because “the army has an instinctive fear of the United States.” He claimed, “I’m wrapping her in the American flag because that’s the only way we can keep her safe from the Army.”⁶³ When the Bush administration responded to the December 1989 coup with a US F-4 Phantom flyover of rebel camps, this underscored the perception of Aquino as an American “creation” and was derided by opposition nationalists as “naked American coercive intervention in Philippine internal affairs.”⁶⁴

As predicted by my theory, both the Communist and right-wing threats pushed Aquino to maintain US military access. A rupture of the military relationship with the United States would not only have weakened Corazon Aquino’s negotiating position with the rebels and weakened the counterinsurgency fight but would have given even more ammunition to her critics on the right. However, as the threat environment began to change, so did Aquino’s calculus.

⁶² Brands, *Bound to Empire*, 338.

⁶³ Author interview, July 2019.

⁶⁴ Brands, *Bound to Empire*, 338-39.

5.7 The 1991 Post-Cold War Peace and the End of US Military Bases

The period leading up to the expulsion of US forces fits with the expectations of the theory I propose, although not perfectly. The Philippine's external security was pacific with the end of the Cold War and the Communist threat had receded to a low intensity conflict. Theoretical this security situation should lead to a decrease in foreign military access, which it did. However, there was a preference divergence between the executive and legislative branches of the Philippine government. While the Philippine senate rejected an extension of the basing treaty and sought to reduce US access, President Aquino campaigned to keep US bases for at least 10 more years. This difference may be explained by the fact that while the Communist insurgent no longer posed a strong threat to the nation and its democratic *form* of government, the continued threat of military coups posed enough of a threat to Aquino as the *head* of government that she saw the necessity of maintaining US support.

Although the 1988 agreement did not make any final decisions on the long-term presence of US forces, it did buy Aquino time to assess the changing security situation. By the time base negotiations resumed in 1990, the security situation had shifted dramatically. CPP-NPA strength was half what it had been at the height of the conflict. Aquino's conciliatory approaches had undercut the legitimacy of CPP grievances and separated more moderate leftists from the group. The CPP founder, Jose Maria Sison, had fled for exile in the Netherlands and CPP-backed parties had participated unsuccessfully in the 1987 elections. When the cease-fire and peace negotiations fell apart, Aquino had launched a "gradual constriction" counterinsurgency campaign that so severely depleted

the CPP-NPA's ranks that they scrapped the "strategic counter-offensive" program and retreated back into "protracted peoples' war."⁶⁵ Popular perceptions of the Communist threat were also on the decline. A public opinion survey in September 1989 found that the percentage of Filipinos who thought the Communist insurgency was a threat had dropped 12 points since February.⁶⁶ Although the CPP-NPA never had strong links with the Soviets, the end of the Cold War and collapse of the Soviet Union demoralized Communist subversives and called into question the long-term attractiveness of their political program.

More broadly, the strategic climate had changed. The end of the Cold War inspired hope that large-scale military conflict was becoming less likely and that the Philippines could enjoy a "peace dividend" in terms of decreased reliance on the United States. Locsin summed up the mood at the time: "Of course the argument was we already won the Cold War and there was no need to (keep the US bases.)"⁶⁷ Philippine security scholar Renato Cruz De Castro argues that Manila's defense planners "did not see an external threat to the country for next five years" and "faced no external enemies or threats."⁶⁸ Chinese leaders had only just begun to digest the lessons of the American military's performance in Desert Storm which would propel their own major military modernization and pushback against the US-led regional security order in Asia.⁶⁹ Overall,

⁶⁵ Santos et al., *Primed and Purposeful*, 436.

⁶⁶ Yeo, Andrew. *Activists, Alliances, and Anti-U.S. Base Protests*. Cambridge Studies in Contentious Politics. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011, 46.

⁶⁷ Author interview, July 2019.

⁶⁸ De Castro, Renato Cruz. "Special Relations and Alliance Politics in Philippine-U.S. Security Relations, 1990-2002." *Asian Perspective* 27, no. 1 (2003): 144.

⁶⁹ US Defense Intelligence Agency. "China Military Power: Modernizing a Force to Fight and Win." Department of Defense, 2019. <http://www.dia.mil/Military-Power-Publications>.

by 1991, the perception in Manila was that the Philippines faced a benign external environment and both the Communist insurgency and reactionary military groups had simmered down to a low revolutionary brew.

The revolutionary threat from the ultra-right had also stalemated but had not gone away. After the last coup in 1989 had been put down, the coup leaders were forced underground. While the coups failed because they lacked broader political support, these elements still constituted a threat.⁷⁰ Although they disagreed on most everything else, both of her former advisors Locsin and Nemenzo agreed that President Aquino viewed the far-right as a bigger threat than the Communists. According to Nemenzo, “from the point of view of Mrs. Aquino, I think she was so scared of the RAM. The radical wing of the RAM. She was mortally scared of Honasan.”⁷¹ While they may not have seemed a high intensity revolutionary threat to an objective observer, the view from the presidential palace was that right-wing military plotters still posed a “Battle for the Capital” threat to the Aquino presidency.

The declining intensity of the revolutionary threat exacerbated Aquino’s political legitimacy concerns while the continued fear of right-wing coups made her reliant on US military support. This tension led Aquino to sign in August 1991 the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Security with the United States. Seeking to balance legitimacy and military challenges, the treaty called for the gradual withdrawal of US forces from the

⁷⁰ Max Lane, “The Philippines 1990: Political Stalemate and Persisting Instability,” *Southeast Asian Affairs*, 1991, 226.

⁷¹ Author interview, July 2019.

Philippines over the next ten years while maintaining US aid.⁷² In a stunning assertion of nationalism, this compromise agreement was rejected by the Philippine Senate. Although Aquino considered taking the issue to a national referendum, she eventually admitted defeat. By 1992, for the first time since MacArthur had waded ashore on Leyte, there were no US military forces in the Philippines.

Not only was President Aquino affected by perceptions of legitimacy in negotiating the agreement, but the Senate was also motivated to vote it down by legitimacy concerns tied to the Communist insurgency. Senator Wigberto “Bobby” Tanada was a key legislative figure in the defeat of the base agreement and was the main connection between the anti-base movement and the Senate.⁷³ In 1990, Tanada had spearheaded a campaign for political negotiations with the CPP-NPA.⁷⁴ To accomplish this goal, he would need to unite left and center political organizations. The issue of US military bases represented just such a bridging issue that could increase his standing and undercut the Communist negotiating position.

In order for the anti-basing movement to be effective it needed to move the basing issue from being an elite concern to one the mass populace cared about. Nemenzo credits Sen. Joseph “Erap” Estrada with mobilizing popular support against the bases.⁷⁵ Estrada was a former action movie star, a Philippine Chuck Norris, who upon his election to the Senate sought a national issue platform. Like Ronald Reagan, he used his ability to

⁷² Cooley, *Base Politics*, 82.

⁷³ Yeo, “The Politics of Overseas Military Bases,” 56.

⁷⁴ Lane, “THE Philippines 1990,” 238.

⁷⁵ Author interview, July 2019.

communicate theoretical ideas in common language to mobilize nationalistic sentiment. This popular mobilization was key in changing the Senate dynamics from the three senators who opposed the 1979 basing agreement to the twelve who voted down the 1991 agreement. Exploiting the window of opportunity created by the lack of a clear external or internal security threat, the anti-base movement was able to influence Philippine senators who had been newly empowered by Aquino's constitutional reform.⁷⁶

Clearly, this case supports the theory of foreign military access and civil conflict that I propose. The variation in the dependent and independent variables corresponds with my theory, as US military access was reduced alongside a declining level of revolutionary threat. We also observe other indications of the theorized process. There is evidence in both critics' statements and Aquino's actions that continued US presence imposed a legitimacy cost for the Philippine president. Regaining sovereignty was a major rhetorical justification for the reduction of military access. Finally, although the Aquino government did not gain a legitimacy boost from the US withdrawal of forces, the opposition senators did.

In accordance with the first observable implication of the process depicted in Figure 1, the American military presence was a key part of the critique against Aquino. US military support during the coups allowed liberal opposition leaders to paint her as an American puppet. Nemenzo stated that though many people supported Aquino during the EDSA revolution because they thought she was progressive, by 1990 she had lost the

⁷⁶ Yeo, "The Politics of Overseas Military Bases," 62.

support of the nationalist left because of her concessions to the Americans.⁷⁷ One contemporary political analyst commented prior to the final Senate vote, “The Senate's, and therefore the liberals', greatest success has been on the question of the U.S. bases in the Philippines.”⁷⁸

As theoretically expected, Aquino’s need to bolster her legitimacy as separate from the United States was evident in her policy actions. Despite hostility from the military, the Aquino government prioritized “butter” over “guns” and reduced military expenditures as illustrated in Figure 15.




Figure 15 Philippine Military Expenditure⁷⁹

Aquino also demonstrated her independence in more subtle ways. She refused to see the US Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney during his tour in early 1990, a snub that

⁷⁷ Author interview, July 2019.

⁷⁸ Lane, “The Philippines 1990,”230.

⁷⁹ Data derived from Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, “Military Expenditure Database”, Yearbook: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security, accessed 12 February 2020.

rankled Washington but boosted her popularity in Manila.⁸⁰ Most fundamentally, Aquino ushered through a new constitution. Among its provisions were the prohibition of US nuclear weapons in the Philippines and the requirement for explicit Senate ratification of any military basing agreement that extended US presence beyond 1991. While the creation of this 5th Philippine republic explicitly marked the end of the Marcos era, it also fundamentally transformed the institutional context for base negotiations in ways that would soon escape Aquino's control.

When the Philippine Senate rejected the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Security with the United States it did so for explicitly nationalistic reasons. Senate President Jovito Salonga proclaimed that this “may well be the day when we in this Senate found the soul, the true spirit of this nation because we mustered the courage and the will to declare the end of foreign military presence in the Philippines.”⁸¹ Sen. Juan Ponce Enrile, a former defense minister under Marcos, called the treaty "an insult to our race." He added, "I cannot live with a treaty that assumes that without 8,000 servicemen and some passing warships, we shall fall flat on our faces. I cannot believe that the vitality of this country will be extinguished when the last bargirl in Olongapo turns off the light in the last cabaret."⁸² Even President Aquino's brother-in-law, himself a senator, explained that the United States needed to understand “that the lack or absence of

⁸⁰ Stanley Karnow, “Cory Aquino's Downhill Slide,” *The New York Times*, August 19, 1990, sec. Magazine, <https://www.nytimes.com/1990/08/19/magazine/cory-aquino-s-downhill-slide.html> .

⁸¹ Yeo, “The Politics of Overseas Military Bases,” 35.

⁸² William Branigan, “Base Treaty Rejected by Philippines,” *Washington Post*, September 17, 1991, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1991/09/17/base-treaty-rejected-by-philippines/e90c9f09-9de3-4b1c-94ec-116ff06c63cf/>.

authentic sovereignty on our part translates into a very real incapacity to stand on our own feet, a palpable inability to grow up, a political adolescence perpetually tied to the purse strings of America, a crippling dependence, an anachronistic colonial and Cold War mentality."⁸³

The final observable implication of my theorized process is that leaders in benign contexts or facing revolutionary threats who reduce foreign military access should see an increase in legitimacy. In the case of Corazon Aquino, the evidence is ambivalent. Because she was term-limited for the 1992 election, Aquino did not face an electoral test. However, the candidate she endorsed, Fidel Ramos, did win the election, though with the lowest plurality in Philippine history.⁸⁴ Unfortunately, the victory of a designated successor is a very imprecise gauge. Using the measure that most intuitively maps to legitimacy, public opinion approval ratings, Aquino does not fare well. Despite achieving a record high +72 early in her career, by the end of her term her approval rating had dropped to the lowest of her career at +7.⁸⁵ Because a majority of Filipinos supported the continuation of US presence past 1991, it is difficult to distinguish whether Aquino's drop in approval was a result of her compromise agreement or her failure to get it passed in the Senate. On the whole, there is not strong evidence that Aquino gained a legitimacy benefit from opposing the bases.

⁸³ Ibid.

⁸⁴ Philip Shenon, "Aquino Endorses Ex-Army Chief in Vote," *The New York Times*, January 26, 1992, sec. World, <https://www.nytimes.com/1992/01/26/world/aquino-endorses-ex-army-chief-in-vote.html>.

⁸⁵ Social Weather Station surveys as depicted "INFOGRAPHIC: Liked Mother, Well-Liked Son: Aquino and Aquino According to Surveys," GMA News Online, accessed December 6, 2018, <https://www.gmanetwork.com/news/story/527498/news/nation/infographic-liked-mother-well-liked-son-aquino-and-aquino-according-to-surveys/>.

Although Aquino did not see an increase in legitimacy, there is evidence that other Philippine political actors did. Approval of the Senate as an institution increased by more than 35 percentage points after the treaty rejection, according to public opinion surveys.⁸⁶ Furthermore, Wigberto Tanada, as the leader of the “Magnificent 12” senators who voted against the continuation of US military bases, rode his popularity among the Left to become Senate Minority Leader and president of the Liberal Party. Most tellingly, Joseph Estrada was able to translate his popular mobilization on the basing issue into election as Vice President in 1992 and President in 1998.

The argument I advance predicts that states facing high-intensity revolutionary conflicts, “Battles for the Capital,” should maintain foreign military access while states involved in “Revolution Brewing” conflicts should be induced to reduce foreign military access. These hypotheses are borne out in the four Philippine sub-cases spanning the Marcos and Aquino presidencies, as changes in access coincided with changes in conflict. Furthermore, there is strong evidence of other observable indicators that these regimes faced a legitimacy-security tradeoff. The advantage of the four Philippine sub-cases is that they allow within-case and hold constant many country level factors which could potentially affect the outcome of foreign basing. Nonetheless, there are likely other factors other than just security concerns that impacted the US base closure as I discuss below.

⁸⁶ Social Weather Station, “Third Quarter 2017 Social Weather Report.”

5.7.1 Alternative Explanations and Other Factors

The story I have laid out so far with regard to US bases in the Philippines focuses on how variation in security conditions affected Manila's calculation of the benefits and legitimacy costs of foreign bases. There are, however, two alternative explanations for the loss of US military access. While these accounts are not completely at odds with the narrative that I advance, they do emphasize the importance of other causal factors. The first explanation is that the United States simply lost interest in bases. The second is that the Philippine government miscalculated and overreached in their quest to maximize rent extraction. I will explore each of these partial truths and show how they are still compatible with the theory I advance.

The end of the Cold War brought about many changes for American grand strategy, not least of which was a re-evaluation of overseas military bases. Generally, the decline of intense military competition with the Soviet Union called into question the value of US military bases around the globe. Specifically, the 1990 withdrawal of Soviet naval forces from Cam Rahn Bay in Vietnam created the possibility that the United States might similarly reduce its presence in Southeast Asia. Furthermore, Clark Field was no longer as vital as it had been during much of the Cold War when US Strategic Air Command relied primarily on manned bombers for nuclear deterrence. These bombers, with limited range, required forward staging points to credibly threaten the eastern approaches to the Soviet Union and China. The advent of intercontinental ballistic missiles as well as the development of aerial refueling, which could theoretically extend a bomber's range indefinitely, made forward arming and refueling sites such as Clark less

important. It is also true that in 1990 the US and Singapore had signed a Memorandum of Understanding allowing US military forces access to Singapore's facilities.⁸⁷

This changing international environment was further exacerbated when Mount Pinatubo erupted, blanketing first Clark Field and then, less severely, Subic Bay with ash. After the explosion, US Defense Secretary Dick Cheney admitted that "we shall take into consideration the damage that has been done to these facilities and whether we can afford to pay, in terms of repairing these facilities and the cost in terms of our obligations to the Philippines should we continue to use them."⁸⁸ De Castro argued that "the eruption forced the Pentagon to assess the cost of repairing the two bases and consider whether the United States would have any use for these facilities."⁸⁹

All of these factors might lead one to wrongly conclude that the United States government did not want to continue to maintain bases in the Philippines. Despite the end of the Cold War, the military bases in the Philippines retained significant grand strategic value for the United States. While the specific threat of the Soviet Union had waned, the United States was developing a post-Cold War grand strategy of unilateral internationalism. Most fully explicated in the leaked 1992 Defense Planning Guidance subsequently labeled the Wolfowitz Doctrine, this strategic concept sought military preponderance through a combination of defense spending for technological superiority

⁸⁷ Kuok, Lynn. "The U.S.-Singapore Partnership: A Critical Element of U.S. Engagement and Stability in the Asia-Pacific." *Order from Chaos: Asian Alliances Working Papers*. Brookings Institution, 2016, 5.

⁸⁸ Gaillard, Jean-Christophe, Ilan Kelman, and Ma Florina Orillos. "US-Philippines Military Relations After the Mt Pinatubo Eruption in 1991: A Disaster Diplomacy Perspective." *European Journal of East Asian Studies* 8, no. 2 (November 1, 2009): 335.

⁸⁹ De Castro, "Special Relations and Alliance Politics in Philippine-U.S. Security Relations, 1990-2002," 155.

and maintaining peace and stability in regions of potential rivals.⁹⁰ Dubbed the “velvet-covered iron fist” by grand strategy scholar Peter Feaver, the American plan was to provide collective security while so outpacing other militaries that potential challengers would be dissuaded from even attempting to rival American military power.⁹¹ Overseas military facilities have played an indispensable operationally and symbolic role in achieving this goal.

For China and the nations of Southeast Asia, the US bases in the Philippines symbolized the continued American role in the Pacific, while they were regarded by the oil-importing Japanese as “indispensable to the security of their sea lanes to the Indian Ocean and the Middle East.”⁹² During a Congressional hearing, Acting Deputy Secretary of Defense for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, RADM (select) M.A. McDevitt, was asked whether the end of the Cold War had reduced US need for bases in the Philippines. McDevitt commented that while it would allow for some marginal reduction in deployed personnel, “we do consider it absolutely essential that we maintain a presence in East Asia because we believe we are, and will remain, a Pacific and Asian power. The tyranny of time and distance imposed by the Pacific Ocean, require a forward deployed presence if we want to remain engaged in East Asia. And the mosaic of our base structure in Japan, Korea, and the Philippines contributes to that.”⁹³

⁹⁰ US Department of Defense. “Defense Planning Guidance, FY 1994– 1999,” February 29, 1992.

⁹¹ Fontaine, Richard, Kristin M Lord, Robert J Art, Richard K Betts, Peter Feaver, Kristin M Lord, and Anne-Marie Slaughter. “Grand Strategy for the Next Administration.” Center for New American Security, May 2012, 60.

⁹² Karnow, *In Our Image*, 23.

⁹³ McDevitt, Rear Admiral (select) M.A. “Developments in the Philippines,” hearing before the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, 101st United States Congress, 2nd Session (1990).

Although Singapore could serve as an alternative port, the densely urban city-state could not replicate the combination of sealift and airlift capabilities that the Philippines provided. Karnow argues that the US Navy “cherished Subic Bay for its enormous storage facilities as well as its loyal, skilled, and relatively inexpensive Filipino labor force, many of whose fathers and grandfathers had worked there before them, and to relocate the base would have been costly.”⁹⁴

Furthermore, the damage to the bases caused by Mount Pinatubo, though severe, was recoverable. According to Locsin, despite estimates that it might take 20 years to recover, both Clark Field and Subic Bay “was cleaned up a year later.”⁹⁵ A study by the Yale School of Forestry and Environmental Studies found that, by 1998, the “Clark Special Economic Zone (CSEZ) is one of the most vibrant economic centers in the Philippines. A former U.S. air base, the CSEZ has been transformed into a successful industrial park with some 200 companies and is the catalyst for regional development.”⁹⁶ It seems clear that the bases could certainly have been made operational again.

While it is true that geo-strategic and geological changes had reduced the value of bases in the Philippines to the United States, the US still desired to maintain those bases. The view from Washington, as expressed by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, was that the bases, while “not vital,” were still

⁹⁴ Karnow, *In Our Image*, 23.

⁹⁵ Author interview, July 2019

⁹⁶ Bennett, Elizabeth B., Erin L. Heitkamp, Robert J. Klee, and Peter Price-Thomas. *Clark Special Economic Zone: Finding Linkages in an Existing Industrial Estate*, 1998.

“extremely desirable” and that learning to live without the bases would be “a difficult and costly undertaking.”⁹⁷

Linked with decreased US desire is the second alternative explanation—that Manila simply over-reached. In this telling, the Filipinos misperceived the change in US valuation of the bases and demanded too much compensation.⁹⁸ When the final base agreement reached by US negotiator Richard Armitage and Philippine Foreign Secretary Raul Manglapus reduced US economic assistance down to \$203 million per year from an initial request of \$825 million, the Philippine Senate may have risked the gambit of rejecting the treaty in the hope of more favorable terms. Attempts to renegotiate were met by a cold shoulder from Washington, especially the grudge-holding US Defense Secretary Dick Cheney, where the view was that the ungrateful Filipinos were not interested in true security partnership, but only rent extraction. According to this explanation, it is not security conditions that are doing the causal work, but the greed of the Philippine government.

While it is likely true that both the US and Philippine sides misperceived each other’s position, this does not negate the role of internal and external threats. Rent extraction and over asking for economic and military assistance has been a constant in basing negotiations between the United States and the Philippines. What changed between 1988 and 1991 was the level of threat. While volcanic explosions, economic

⁹⁷ Ford, Carl W. “The Philippine Bases Treaty,” Hearing before the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, 102nd United States Congress, 1st Session (1992).

⁹⁸ Fleck, Janice. “The 1990-91 U.S.-Philippine Base Negotiations: Killing the American Goose.” National War College, 1994.

assistance demands, and even conflicting personalities acted as proximate causes for the breakdown in the US-Philippine defense relationship, the underlying cause was the slack in the Philippine security situation. Just as Waltz theorized that “wars occur because there is nothing to prevent them,” the Philippine Senate devalued the US defense relationship and caved to the voices of the anti-base movement because there was no security imperative demanding them to act otherwise. As Locsin said of the Philippine mood regarding the bases, “it just went to hell. Nobody cared in the end.”⁹⁹ The benign external environment and low intensity revolutionary threat meant that nationalistic legitimacy, not increasing security, became the most important value for Philippine decision-makers.

5.8 The 1998 VFA: The Return Great Power Conflict...and GI Joe

The immediate aftermath of the withdrawal of US troops saw a nadir in the US-Philippine “special relationship.” Locsin claims that relations with the first Bush administration were soured not only by the acrimonious end of the basing negotiation, but also by the Aquino administration’s refusal to support allied efforts in Operation Desert Storm due to concerns about backlash against Filipino guest workers in Arab countries.¹⁰⁰ Despite retaining the 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty, the once robust US-Philippine defense relationship dwindled to an annual military exercise, Balikatan, and a periodic Mutual

⁹⁹ Author interview, July 2019.

¹⁰⁰ Author interview, July 2019.

Defense Board meeting.¹⁰¹ As one security analyst put it, the “once-strong” and “once-special” Philippine-American partnership had become “essentially moribund.”¹⁰²

The waning of relations with the United States had deleterious effects on the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) as it lost an estimated \$200 million in foreign military financing from the US government.¹⁰³ The Philippine Air Force, which relied heavily on the US military logistics system for fuel and spare parts, “had by 2001 become the weakest air force in the region with its meager fleet of aircraft left over from the Vietnam War.”¹⁰⁴ A weak economy, a lack of external funding, and a decrease in joint training opportunities meant that Philippine military readiness, at least for state-level conflicts, plummeted.¹⁰⁵ During this period, the United States did provide the Philippines with some excess defense supply vessels and small patrol boats, but these could hardly compete with the military modernization effort under way across the South China Sea.

Philippine military weakness and the reduction of US military presence created a power vacuum in Southeast Asia and provided an easy opportunity for Chinese expansionism. Beijing’s intentions began to worry Manila when they discovered Chinese military construction on Mischief Reef in 1995. Ownership of this atoll, which lies 250

¹⁰¹ De Castro, Renato Cruz. “The Revitalized Philippine-U.S. Security Relations: A Ghost from the Cold War or an Alliance for the 21st Century?” *Asian Survey* 43, no. 6 (November 2003): 975.

¹⁰² Banlaoi, Rommel C. *Philippine Security in the Age of Terror: National, Regional, and Global Challenges in the Post-9/11 World*. Boca Raton, Fla.: CRC Press, 2010, 165.

¹⁰³ Carter, Rocky L. “Current State of the U.S.-Philippines Alliance.” Strategy Research Project. US Army War College, March 24, 2011, 3.

¹⁰⁴ Lohman, Walter, and Renato Cruz De Castro. “Getting the Philippines Air Force Flying Again: The Role of the U.S.-Philippines Alliance.” Background. Heritage Foundation, 2012, 3.

¹⁰⁵ Avila, Ava Patricia C., and Justin Goldman. “Philippine-US Relations: The Relevance of an Evolving Alliance.” *Bandung: Journal of the Global South* 2, no. 1 (September 29, 2015): 6.

km from the Philippines, is disputed among the People’s Republic of China (PRC), Taiwan, the Philippines, and Vietnam. Philippine security analyst De Castro writes, “Thus, Manila found a militarily strong and irredentist China literally knocking on its door. This led Philippine defense officials and security experts to consider Chinese expansion in the South China Sea as the main long-term security threat to their country.”¹⁰⁶ Philippine officials recognized that the absence of US naval presence had invited Chinese encroachment. According to Loosin, “Then even a minimum of American presence would have prevented the Chinese from daring to move.”¹⁰⁷ Chinese assertiveness provided momentum for the Visiting Forces Agreement signed between the United States and Philippines in 1998.

The US-Philippine security relationship was also given a major boost by the George W. Bush administration’s Global War on Terror. While the threat of China inspired Manila to pursue closer defense cooperation, it was the linkage between the Philippine’s longtime Muslim insurgency and the emerging threat from Al Qaeda that re-engaged Washington’s interest. The Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) broke off from the main Moro separatist organization, MNLF, in 1991 and “gained recognition by turning to violence, engaging in bombings, kidnapping, assassinations, and other attacks with a special focus on Christians and foreigners. The ASG also targeted the Philippine military, consistent with the organization’s professed goal of resisting the Philippine government

¹⁰⁶ De Castro, “The Revitalized Philippine-U.S. Security Relations,” 977.

¹⁰⁷ Author Interview, July 2019.

and establishing an independent Moro state.”¹⁰⁸ In the early 2000s, ASG conducted several high-profile kidnappings of Western tourists, including three Americans. In response, the US and Philippine governments reached an agreement to deploy 1,300 US Special Operations advisors in 2002 to assist the AFP in the Southern Philippines.¹⁰⁹ The advise-and-assist mission, Operation Enduring Freedom—Philippines, reached a steady-state force of approximately 600 US troops and would officially end in 2015 when the assistance mission was transitioned to the SOF coordination element in the US Embassy.

Increased counterterrorism cooperation also resulted in broader US military assistance. As indicated in Figure 16, US military assistance to the Philippines increased dramatically after 2001. Not only did security assistance increase, but development aid from USAID almost doubled by 2007, with most funds directed toward Mindanao.¹¹⁰ All of these factors point toward an increasingly restored US-Philippine security relationship.




Figure 16: US Security Assistance to the Philippines, 2000-2015¹¹¹

¹⁰⁸ Mapping Militant Organizations. “Abu Sayyaf Group”. Stanford University. Last modified August 2018. <https://cisac.fsi.stanford.edu/mappingmilitants/profiles/abu-sayyaf-group>

¹⁰⁹ Robinson, Linda, Patrick Johnston, and Gillian Oak. *U.S. Special Operations Forces in the Philippines, 2001--2014*. RAND Corporation, 2016, xv.

¹¹⁰ Robinson, et al, 19.

¹¹¹ Data from Security Assistance Monitor, “US Security Aid”, accessed 22 Aug 2018, <https://securityassistance.org/data/program/military/Philippines/2000/2015/all/Global//>

Unfortunately, Islamic terrorism was not the only internal threat the Philippine government continued to face. In the “longest running Maoist insurgency in the world,” the Communist NPA continues to wage a low-level insurgency throughout the Philippine countryside.¹¹² The Philippine Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence estimated the Communist strength as holding steady between 6,000 and 11,000 fighters from 1993 to 2008.¹¹³ Similarly, the Communists have maintained a steady level of activity with 300-500 incidents per year. Comparatively the southern separatist insurgency has greatly varied with annual incidents fluctuating to nearly 1,000 in some years and less than 100 in others.¹¹⁴ It is for these reasons, as well as perhaps the Cold War environment in which today’s AFP generals came of age, that the Communist insurgency continues to be viewed as the greatest internal threat by the Armed Forces of the Philippines.¹¹⁵

In 2009, the PRC submitted to the United Nations a map of the “nine-dash line” asserting sovereignty over most of the South China Sea, including Philippine claims in the Spratly Islands.¹¹⁶ The Philippine government formally protested and began to shift its security focus even more from combatting internal threats to defending its territorial claims. This strategic shift to dissuade Chinese adventurism, codified in the 2010 national security policy of the newly elected Aquino III administration,¹¹⁷ rested on two major

¹¹² Santos, et al, 17.

¹¹³ Cited in Banlaoi, 12.

¹¹⁴ Incidents include ambushes, raids, harassment, disarming, landmines, killing, kidnapping, robberies, bombing, sabotage, and arson. Santos, et al, 28.

¹¹⁵ Author interview with US embassy officials, July 2019.

¹¹⁶ Gao, Zhiguo, and Bing Bing Jia. “The Nine-Dash Line in the South China Sea: History, Status, and Implications.” *American Journal of International Law* 107, no. 1 (January 2013): 106.

¹¹⁷ President Benigno Aquino III, “2011-2016 National Security Policy: Securing the Gains of Democracy,” Government of the Philippines, 2010.

defense policy thrusts, modernizing the actual capability of the Philippine military and strengthening the deterrent commitment of the United States.¹¹⁸

Both of these goals would be advanced by increased security cooperation with America and especially the presence of US forces, since the “United States does not explicitly state whether Philippine-claimed disputed territory falls under the provisions of the (1951) mutual defense treaty.”¹¹⁹ As De Castro argues, the Philippines Armed Forces’ “territorial defense build-up simply augments the deterrence provided by U.S. forward deployment and bilateral alliances in East Asia.... In the final analysis, the Philippines’ territorial defense posture is predicated on U.S. assertion of its position as the dominant naval power in the Pacific. Whether the U.S. forces will assist the Philippines or not in an armed confrontation depends on whether they have access to facilities near the South China Sea from which they could respond in a timely manner.”¹²⁰ Philippine officials first proposed an increased American military presence in 2012, a position that was given increased urgency by that summer’s standoff with the Chinese Peoples’ Liberation Army Navy over the Scarborough Shoal, and by August 2013 the countries were engaged in negotiations on a rotational U.S. force presence.¹²¹

In 2014, the United States and the Philippines signed the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement, the most robust security cooperation agreement between the two

118 De Castro, Renato Cruz. “The 21st Century Philippine-US Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA): The Philippines’ Policy in Facilitating the Obama Administration’s Strategic Pivot to Asia,” *Korean Journal of Defense Analysis* 26 (December 1, 2014): 427–46.

119 Albert, Eleanor. “The U.S.-Philippines Defense Alliance,” Backgrounder (Council on Foreign Relations, October 21, 2016), <https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/us-philippines-defense-alliance> .

120 De Castro, “The 21st Century Philippine-US EDCA,” 434.

121 De Castro, “The 21st Century Philippine-US EDCA,” 438.

countries since the eviction of permanent American forces in 1991. Although it does not bring back the permanent stationing of US troops in exclusive American bases, it does expand the scope of the 1951 US-Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty by allowing rotating US forces access to at least five Philippine owned bases: Subic Bay, Cubi Point, Clark Air Base, Oyster Bay, Brooke's Point, and the Batanes Islands.¹²² Furthermore, the agreement allows for US prepositioning of material and supplies as well as infrastructure upgrades.¹²³

Although the EDCA agreement is a significant milestone in US-Philippines relations, how does it conform to the theoretical expectations I lay out? There were three major security threats operating in the Philippines over this period. There was the increasing external threat from China which would suggest greater US military access. There was also a continued low-level revolutionary threat from the Communists which would put pressure on the Philippine government to reduce access. Finally, there was the generally low-level separatist threat that would occasionally flare up in bursts of high-profile violence. Theoretically, I would expect this separatist threat to be mildly conducive to greater access, though the southern insurgency seems to rank last behind the Communist and Chinese threat in Philippine minds.

¹²² Ankit Panda, "US-Philippines Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement Bolsters 'Pivot to Asia,'" *The Diplomat*, April 29, 2014, <https://thediplomat.com/2014/04/us-philippines-enhanced-defense-cooperation-agreement-bolsters-pivot-to-asia/>.

¹²³ Carl Thayer, "Analyzing the US-Philippines Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement," *The Diplomat*, May 4, 2014, <https://thediplomat.com/2014/05/analyzing-the-us-philippines-enhanced-defense-cooperation-agreement/>.

The outcome in terms of US foreign military access is generally in line with my theoretical expectation. As the external threat increased, US basing access also increased, but this trend was tempered by the effect of the revolutionary insurgency. The VFA and EDCA are only limited access agreements; they do not allow permanent foreign military access. There has been no move to amend the Philippine constitution to allow permanent foreign bases and there is a sense among Philippine politicians that this would still be politically untenable. The separatist insurgency justified the deployment of US SOF forces but seems to have little connection with the broader basing issue. If my theory is correct, permanent US military access would likely require a resolution to the Communist insurgency or a much more acute Chinese threat. If the Philippine security situation changed in either of these ways, I would predict that the Philippine government would be more amenable to increased US military access.

5.9 Epilogue

Epilogue

The election in 2016 of current Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte on a platform of an “independent foreign policy” and opposition to the EDCA show the limits of the revitalized US-Philippine relationship as well potentially the explanatory power of my theory.¹²⁴ Duterte has generated considerable popular appeal with his brash independence and pivot toward China. Duterte’s anti-Americanism seems to be deep-

¹²⁴ Germelina Lacorte, “Duterte: Scrap VFA, EDCA If These Will Trample upon PH Justice System,” *Philippine Daily Inquirer*, October 22, 2014, <http://globalnation.inquirer.net/113197/duterte-scrap-vfa-edca-if-these-will-trample-upon-ph-justice-system/#ixzz3uJnQWrv4>.

seated stemming possibly from his alleged childhood abuse by an American priest or from recent American criticism of his human rights abuses.¹²⁵ Whatever the cause, tension between the Duterte administration and the United States came to head in an early 2020 dispute over American visa denials of Philippine officials associated with Duterte's controversial policy of extrajudicial killings of drug dealers and criminals. In February 2020, Duterte submitted a notice of termination to the United States of the Visiting Forces Agreement giving both sides 180 days to renegotiate a new agreement.¹²⁶

Despite this dramatic step there are still several legal, political, and strategic obstacles to ending the VFA. There is currently debate in Manila over whether the president has the authority to unilaterally terminate the agreement and the Philippine Senate has asked the Supreme Court to weigh in on whether Duterte must seek their concurrence.¹²⁷ Politically, the United States is much popular than China in the Philippines where a recent survey found that 88% of Filipinos worried about China's growing regional influence.¹²⁸ The agreement is also popular with Philippine military elites. US military assistance was indispensable to Philippine operations when retaking Marawi City from ISIS in 2017 and provided the distinctly pro-American AFP leadership

¹²⁵ Kurlantzick, Joshua. "Is Duterte Trying to End the U.S.-Philippines Alliance?" *World Politics Review*, February 21, 2020. <https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/28549/us-philippines-relations-take-a-hit-as-duterte-axes-a-key-military-pact>.

¹²⁶ Yeo, Andrew. "President Duterte Wants to Scrap a Philippines-U.S. Military Agreement. This Could Mean Trouble." *The Washington Post*, February 13, 2020. <https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2020/02/13/president-duterte-wants-scrap-philippines-us-military-agreement-this-could-mean-trouble/>.

¹²⁷ Buan, Lian. "Senate Asks Supreme Court: Order Duterte to Seek Our Concurrence on VFA Scrapping." *Rappler*, March 10, 2020. <https://www.rappler.com/nation/253848-senators-petition-supreme-court-duterte-scrapping-vfa>.

¹²⁸ "The State of Southeast Asia: 2020 Survey Report." ASEAN Studies Centre at the ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute, January 16, 2020. <https://www.iseas.edu.sg/>, 18.

with evidence of the value of US security cooperation.¹²⁹ There is even division with the Duterte administration over the balancing between China and the United States.

Philippine Foreign Secretary Locsin noted that appeasement of Beijing has not brought the material concessions some have hoped for and despite the non-threatening image the Chinese try to project to the United States, “they’re really crude and hamfisted ... with us, it’s always in your face.”¹³⁰ Strategically, if the VFA were to be indefinitely terminated it would significantly damage the ability of the American military to train and cooperate with the Philippine Armed Forces and may endanger the more foundational 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty. The termination of the VFA would be tantamount to Manila conceding victory to China over its claims to disputed South China Sea islands.

What does Duterte’s termination of the VFA mean for our understanding of the politics of foreign bases? It could mean that security conditions do not mean as much for basing access as I would have you believe. By my theoretical expectation, the external threat from China should pressure the Philippine government to maintain or expand US military access (especially given the popularity of America in the Philippines). My theory could be wrong and Duterte could be charting an independent course regardless of his security situation.

However, there are some other possible explanations. Duterte’s move could be simply a negotiating ploy to extract concessions from the United States. It could be that

¹²⁹ Morales, Neil Jerome, and Simon Lewis. “U.S. Joins Battle as Philippines Takes Losses in Besieged City.” *Reuters*. June 10, 2017. <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-philippines-militants-idUSKBN19107I>; Author interviews with US embassy personnel, 2019.

¹³⁰ Author interview, 2019.

he fully intends to retain US military access to counterbalance China. Host-nations holding basing access hostage is a time-tested strategy for bargaining leverage.

It could also be Duterte that is not ignoring security threats but is reorienting his threat horizon. It could be that instead of joining the United States in balancing China in the region Duterte aims to switch sides and bandwagon with the ascendant regional power. In this telling, the Philippines would not be shunning foreign military protection but just changing its protector.

A final possibility is that Duterte is idiosyncratically anti-American and the VFA termination represents a short-term deviation from an otherwise pro-American Philippine trajectory. Duterte is term-limited in the 2022 elections and a new Philippine president could negotiate a new US military access agreement. There remains strong support for the alliance in popular and elite Philippine circles as expressed in the sentiment from Locsin who said, “I hope that the US comes across because it’s a pity. It’s a revived alliance. It’s crying to be born.”¹³¹ If any of these alternative scenarios play out it would provide evidence of the continued importance of security conditions in determining foreign military access.

5.10 Conclusion

What conclusions can we draw from the story of US military bases in the Philippines? First as **Error! Reference source not found.** below demonstrates, there is a clear relationship between revolutionary threats and foreign military basing access. The

¹³¹ Author interview, 2019.

Philippine government's need to burnish its nationalist credentials was undoubtedly a factor in basing negotiations. When revolutionary threats were militarily weak, the Philippine government prioritized legitimacy over security, and forced nationalistic concessions. When the revolutionary threat, from either the Communists or the military, became acute, Manila prioritized the security benefits of the US relationship. In terms of both words and actions, nationalist legitimacy was the connecting mechanism between internal threats and military basing.

The second, more tenuous, conclusion I reach is that revolutionary threats seem to be more salient for regimes than separatist threats. This is true in the Philippine case. Regardless of the intensity of the fighting in Mindanao or Sulu, Philippine leaders seem to regard the Communists (or the RAM) as bigger threats. Logically, this may have to do with proximity; the Moro threat was literally a remote one. It may also have to do with stakes involved. Loss of territorial integrity, while important, is not as severe a consequence as the loss of a political system with its likely attendant loss of position, property, and even life.

My final conclusion is that external threats may be fundamentally more important than internal ones. Through the mid-1990s and 2000s, the Communist threat remained relatively constant, yet there were changes in foreign military access. Variation in the intensity of the separatist insurgency also do not seem to correspond to changes in basing access. The security variable that most clearly aligns with basing changes is the Chinese external threat. As the Chinese began to more aggressively encroach on Philippine claims in the South China Sea, the Philippine government explicitly sought greater US military

presence. This hierarchy of threat also intuitively makes sense. The PRC and its large military are capable of much more damage than any guerrilla or even terrorist group.

Although this Philippine case study provided useful variation on both the dependent and independent variables, some specific characteristics of the Philippines may mean that its lessons are not universally generalizable. First, its status as a former US colony makes the Philippines unique among American basing allies. The long relationship and cultural ties not only make the Philippines a hard test for my theory as basing here is likely to be particularly sticky, but also make it unlike many of the more temporary and transactional basing that the United States established in Africa and the Middle East in more recent years. Furthermore, the prevalent pro-American sentiment in the Philippines contrasts with the often-reflexive anti-Americanism of Latin America making the application of the security conditions and foreign access theory more difficult in the Western Hemisphere. The US-Philippine relationship is actually more analogous to French or British relationships with their former colonies and may shed more light on their foreign basing networks.

A second challenge of universalizing from the Philippine case is the country's external threat situation. Regardless of the internal security dynamics, the United States remains the Philippines main protection against Chinese aggrandizement in the South China Sea. This makes the Philippine case a good analog for other East Asian and even Eastern European states. The lessons of the Philippine case may not however travel as well to African states where internal threats predominate over external ones and there is competition from multiple great powers to gain access and provide military assistance.

6. Conclusion

The politics behind establishing and allowing foreign military bases is puzzling behavior for scholars with real-world consequences for policy practitioners. This dissertation has sought to explore the politics of basing from both sending-state and host-nation perspectives. First, I established a definition of foreign military basing as a *foreign location* from which troops conduct *military operations* in the *sending-state interest*. I then created an ideal typology of foreign basing levels that accounted for force size and the permanence, robustness, and ownership of base infrastructure. Next, I outlined the broad motivations and tradeoffs for both sending-states and host-nations. For sending-states, foreign bases are a necessary means to project power, exert influence, and protect interests on a global scale. Potential host-nations face a fundamental tradeoff between the economic and security benefits of allowing a foreign base with the associated sovereignty and domestic legitimacy costs. In Chapter Two, I explored how the basing postures of great powers are shaped by and reveal their ostensible grand strategies. I found that foreign basing is increasingly an area of great power competition for the United States' main rivals in Russia and China. In Chapter Three, I identified the most salient driving factors of the American basing posture through empirical analysis. I found that a nation's level of trade with the United States was the most consistent correlate of US basing. I also found that proximity to enemy threats were the most significant predictors of whether a new base was established.

In Chapter 4, I turned to host-nation motivation and proposed an original theory of security conditions and foreign military access. I theorize that a host-nation's decision

regarding foreign basing access are shaped, in part, by whether it faces an internal or external threat, whether the internal threat is revolutionary or separatist, as well as the intensity of that threat. The theory generates several testable hypotheses. I expect, first, that states facing external threats or experiencing high-intensity separatist conflicts, which I dub “Bloody Breakaways,” should be most likely to increase or maintain foreign military access while states involved in low-intensity revolutionary (“Revolution Brewing”) conflicts will be likely to reduce foreign military access. Quantitative testing yields significant support for the notion that external threats increase access and that Revolution Brewing conflicts decrease access. The evidence for the effect of Bloody Breakaways is less robust.

I next test the theory qualitatively through a series of within-case comparisons of US basing in the Philippines. I find that changes in the intensity of the revolutionary threat align with the expected shifts in US access, but that the separatist conflict in the Philippines does not seem to have a strong impact on US presence compared to external or revolutionary threats. Although the empirical tests are not an unambiguous triumph for the proposed theory, I can confidently conclude that the source, type, and intensity of security threat all affect host-nations’ calculations regarding foreign military access.

These findings make important contributions to academic debates about both grand strategy and basing politics. The study has limitations, which I outline in the following section, yet most of these shortcomings can be addressed in extensions and further study. Moreover, my findings have significant policy relevance and strategic implications for managing relationships with allies and competition with rivals.

6.1 Academic Contribution

The politics of foreign military basing is an underexplored area of scholarship that sits at the intersection of international relations and comparative politics. Current explanations from international relations tend to emphasize external dynamics to the exclusion of internal security concerns. The basing politics from comparative politics tends to emphasize domestic politics while ignoring security threats both internal and external. This dissertation bridges this gap by integrating external systemic pressures and internal conflict in its explanation of the willingness of states to host foreign military forces. Furthermore, it makes an important theoretical contribution by drawing a novel distinction between separatist and revolutionary conflicts. This dissertation also improves upon extant scholarship on these subjects, which is principally qualitative, by testing its original theory both quantitatively and qualitatively.

This dissertation also makes a contribution to debates about American grand strategy. A regular discussion within this area of study is the extent to which this grand strategy is best characterized by continuity or change.¹ Chapter Three, the correlates of US basing, demonstrates that American grand strategic behavior over the last 30 years demonstrates a high degree of continuity, at least with regard to its foreign basing network. While this period is a limited timeframe in grand strategic terms, it also saw two

¹ Dueck, Colin. *Reluctant Crusaders: Power, Culture, and Change in American Grand Strategy*. Princeton University Press, 2008; Miller, Benjamin. "Explaining Changes in U.S. Grand Strategy: 9/11, the Rise of Offensive Liberalism, and the War in Iraq." *Security Studies* 19, no. 1 (February 26, 2010): 26–65. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09636410903546426>; Brands, Hal, *American Grand Strategy and the Liberal Order: Continuity, Change, and Options for the Future*. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2016. <https://www.rand.org/pubs/perspectives/PE209.html>; Porter, Patrick. "Why America's Grand Strategy Has Not Changed: Power, Habit, and the U.S. Foreign Policy Establishment." *International Security* 42, no. 04 (May 2018): 9–46. https://doi.org/10.1162/isec_a_00311.

momentous events in American foreign policy: the end of the Cold War and the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. That the US basing network has remained largely intact across these epochal events speaks to an underlying continuity in American grand strategy. While some specific basing locations have changed, the US basing network has broadly followed US trading patterns and American enemies.

A further contribution of this dissertation is its empirics. I compiled an original panel dataset of US military access in 183 countries for the last 30 years. This dataset not only includes whether a state hosted a US base in a given country-year, but also the level of US base and extent of legal access protection. Most basing-politics literature up to this point has been qualitative and focused on a few specific basing cases. This dataset has enabled me to empirically test, for the first time, the factors most closely associated with US basing as the effect of host-nation security conditions on the likelihood of granting foreign military access. This novel data will also allow further quantitative exploration of the politics of foreign basing as well as the inclusion of a reliable control for US basing in other empirical work.

Finally, this dissertation has begun an exploration of the basing politics of non-American major powers. The basing politics literature has so far focused almost exclusively on US foreign military bases. Robert Harkavy's 1982, 1989, and 2007 books are notable exceptions, but these are largely focused on the 20th century and do not capture the emerging great power competition for overseas basing among the United

States, Russia, and China². In Chapter Two, I make an initial narrative exploration of this competition for foreign access which would provide valuable background knowledge for security scholars interested in an on-the-ground manifestation of great power rivalry.

6.2 Limitations & Extensions

This dissertation has several significant limitations some of which can be extended and improved on in future work. The main limitations derive from this project's scope, modeling approach, and the measurement and variance of the outcome variable, foreign military basing.

The theoretical claims of this dissertation are not necessarily limited to the contemporary period, but the quantitative empirical analysis is scoped to the last 30 years. Although I take a longer historical view in the Chapter Five case study of the Philippines, for data availability reasons I limited the remainder of the empirical research to the contemporary period. I also set the scope conditions of the empirical work to US foreign military bases. There are good reasons for this approach. The United States has the most extensive foreign basing network and therefore offers the largest sample size. It is also relatively open and transparent with information about its military. Even so, my own affiliation with the US military presented me with interview access to military commanders and policymakers that would likely not be available to other researchers.

² Harkavy, Robert E. *Great Power Competition for Overseas Bases: The Geopolitics of Access Diplomacy*. Pergamon, 1982; ———. *Bases Abroad: The Global Foreign Military Presence*. Oxford University Press, 1989; ———. *Strategic Basing and the Great Powers, 1200-2000*. London ; New York: Routledge, 2007.

These scope conditions have some drawbacks for the general applicability of the findings. Although the analysis does include the tail-end of the late Cold War, by this time the Soviet Union was already an empire in decline. Therefore, most of the analysis occurs in a unipolar international system where the United States and its allies are the only “buyers” of foreign basing access. As Chapter Two shows, the future of foreign basing is likely to look like a more competitive marketplace with multiple states seeking basing access. Although I account for alternative sources of external military assistance by controlling for rival defense cooperation agreements, the conclusions of Chapter Four may be complicated by the addition of other potential sending-states.

The United States’ behavior may not be representative of other great powers. America’s “exceptionalism” could imply that the United States does not act like other great powers. However, the broadest generalization of the US basing posture, that it has bases *in* its trading allies and *near* its enemies, would seem likely to hold for other superpowers. One conclusion of Chapter Two is that while the need for a foreign basing network is universal for aspiring superpowers, the character of that network seems to be unique to the superpower state. This means that potential host-nations may respond differently to requests for access from other states than they do from the United States.

These limitations point to the value of deepening the analysis on the foreign basing footprints of other major powers. A natural extension of this project would be to expand the country-year dataset backward to the 1940s and to code the dependent variable of basing access to include other major powers. This would not only capture the beginning of the American basing network but would allow side-by-side analysis of the

correlates of each pole in the bipolar Cold War world. Such an approach would allow a better accounting of the strategic dynamics of military basing. To develop a year by year coding of the Soviet basing network would likely require some archival research and Russian-language translation, but the Soviet foreign basing network is an underexplored subject ripe for further research.

Another useful extension would be to explore Russian and Chinese competition for foreign bases and why these states seem to approach foreign basing differently than the United States. When I began the research for this dissertation, I intended the section on the basing footprints of major powers to be merely a descriptive overview to give the reader examples of foreign basing and context for later chapters. As I researched the growing Russian and Chinese efforts to gain military access around the world, I concluded that these states were competing with the United States for basing access and that each state had developed a unique approach to constructing its foreign basing network. Whether these differences in basing strategy are a result of culture & values, historical path dependence, or strategic choice could be a fruitful area of future research.

Another limitation of this project is in the modeling approach I chose. I examine each side of basing politics (the sending-state and host-nation) separately. This assumes a decision-theoretic model as each side considers the static costs and benefits of foreign basing. This approach allows me to isolate and simplify the decisions that sending-states and host-nations must make. However, the reality is that basing politics is actually a strategic interaction. The choices of the sending-state are dependent on the choices of the host-nation and vice-versa. A useful extension of this project would be to a game-

theoretic model. Such an extension could consider the dynamic interaction of both sides to offer a more accurate (though more complicated) picture of reality.

Another limitation of this dissertation is introduced by the nature of and how I chose to measure the outcome variable of foreign military basing. As mentioned previously, a military base is often expensive to open and costly to close and thus is a “sticky” phenomenon. The presence of a base in one year is highly path dependent on whether a base existed the previous year. This characteristic of basing means that there is often little variation in a state’s basing posture from one year to a next. The reasons why a state may have opened a base may not be the reasons it maintains it. A sending-state is likely to try to adapt the purposes of its existing basing infrastructure to meet changing security requirements rather than change the locations of its bases. As an inherently conservative institution, the military would generally prefer to retain basing access it does not need rather than scramble to establish a base when its requirements change.

Similarly, host-nations face a path-dependence when it comes to foreign bases in their territory. A host-nation that expels a foreign base can reasonably expect costs and repercussions from the sending-state beyond the direct foregone economic and security benefits. The preference of a host-nation leader may be challenged by other branches of the government or by bureaucratic actors, such as the host-nation military. Even if the host-nation speaks with a single voice it often takes time for a sending-state to relocate all its personnel and material.

All of these issues pose challenges for the country-year empirical approach I adopt. In both Chapter Three and Four, I attempt to discern the effects of different inputs

by measuring changes in the outcome of foreign basing. This approach assumes that a decisionmaker's perceptions of the international environment are reliably translated into change in a timely manner. To allow for the latency of bureaucratic processes I do lag my variables by two years, but even this assumes a uniform latency.

Another problem with my measurement approach is that for most analyses I use a binary variable for each country-year according to the presence of a base. Even the more nuanced alternative dependent variables I employ only code each country-year according to the highest level of basing presence. This scheme missing internal changes within each host-nation. For example, through my entire dataset Germany is coded at the highest level of "3-Main Operating Base" due to the continuous presence of Ramstein AB. This coding masks significant changes in the 1990s in which the US military closed many smaller bases in Germany while maintaining at least on MOB.

All these downsides of the measurement of foreign bases imply that my research design likely misses some variation in the dependent variable. This missing variation makes for a harder test and so the fact that I find statistically significant correlation provides support for an underlying relationship.

6.3 Policy Implications and Recommendations

The politics of foreign military access is important not only for academic theory but has significant policy relevance. Two potential lessons for US policymakers stand out: 1) recognize and account for the real domestic political pressures of host-nation regimes and 2) expect and prepare for a contest with emerging powers over basing access.

A good illustration of the first lesson can be found in the early 2020 American strike against Iranian Major General Qasem Soleimani. While there were certainly valid operational and strategic reasons why the United States would want to eliminate the Quds Force leader, doing so at the Baghdad airport was a clear violation of Iraqi sovereignty and created real domestic legitimacy problems for the Iraqi government. According to the security conditions and foreign military access theory I propose, it is not at all surprising that the Iraqi parliament subsequently voted to expel US forces.³ Although the US government views Iran as a threat to the region, the leaders in Baghdad do not share the American sense of alarm. Furthermore the “Battle for the Capital” threat that ISIS posed in 2014 had been reduced, largely through the efforts of US and coalition forces, to a low-intensity “Revolution Brewing” level by 2019. These changed security conditions meant that the Iraqi government had a reduced need for military assistance while it needed to increase its domestic legitimacy, as evidenced by the mass anti-corruption protests that took place across Iraq in fall 2019.⁴ When Iraq’s former occupier, the United States, launched a unilateral attack on Iraqi soil it seems to have been the straw that broke the camel’s back. It may be that the tactical victory of removing Soleimani from the battlefield would be worth the strategic cost of losing basing in Iraq, but the implication of my theory is that this loss of access was foreseeable in advance.

³ Lucey, Isabel Coles and Catherine. “Trump Pushes Iraq, Threatens Sanctions After Vote to Expel U.S. Troops.” *Wall Street Journal*, January 6, 2020, sec. World. <https://www.wsj.com/articles/iraqi-parliament-votes-in-favor-of-expelling-u-s-troops-11578236473>.

⁴ Rubin, Alissa. “Iraq in Worst Political Crisis in Years as Death Toll Mounts From Protests - The New York Times.” *The New York Times*, December 24, 2019. <https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/21/world/middleeast/Iraq-protests-Iran.html>.

The second policy lesson that can be gleaned from this dissertation is that American policymakers should expect competition from Russia and China for basing access and must take proactive steps to maintain the American basing network. Another recent news item well illustrates this policy implication. After months of bickering with the United States over the arrest of an opposition lawmaker, in early 2020 Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte filed a termination of the Visiting Forces Agreement which gives a legal basis for temporary US military forces to conduct exercises and training with the Philippine Armed Forces. In response, President Trump expressed little concern about the potential loss of a longtime ally.⁵ The Philippines is like many small Asian states in that it is geostrategically caught between the United States and China. It relies on the United States for security but is increasingly economically dependent on China. From my interviews with Philippine officials it is clear that though the United States is the ally of choice, if host-nations come to view American assurances as untrustworthy they will turn to China or even Russia. If the United States wants to maintain its network of foreign bases in the face of rival competition it will need to make allied assurance a priority. But why is maintaining a basing network important?

Gaining and maintaining military access to key regions of the world has been vital to American grand strategy since the end of World War II. Especially since the end of the Cold War, the United States has sought military preponderance by maintaining peace and

⁵ Aspinwall, Nick. "Duterte Terminates U.S. Defense Pact, Pleasing Trump but Few Others." *Foreign Policy* (blog). Accessed February 18, 2020. <https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/02/14/vfa-philippines-china-duterte-terminates-us-defense-pact-trump/>.

stability in regions of potential rivals in order to dissuade those powers from building militaries to deal with those problems and thus rival our own power. If the United States continues to consider maintaining regional stability and a rules-based order as desirable grand strategic ends, then ready military access to potential conflict zones is a necessary means. A predominant concern of US military planners is that a potential adversary could prevent US access to an operational theater in the event of a crisis. A robust foreign basing network is key to overcoming this challenge.

In addition to regional stability, military access is key to the United States' global counterterrorism strategy. As US operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have declined, the locus of radical jihadist organizations has disbursed and spread outside of the Middle East and Central Asia. Al Qaeda and Islamic State affiliated movements have emerged in North Africa, Southeast Asia, the Horn of Africa, and even sub-Saharan Africa. To counter this threat, the United States through its Special Operations Command (SOCOM) has developed partnerships with countries in each of those regions in order to pressure and contain these groups. Whether for special operations direct action raids, remotely piloted airstrikes, or operating by, with, and through host nation security forces this counterterrorism strategy requires access in a broad swath of developing countries, often in the form of small footprint forward operating bases. Understanding how civil conflicts affect the willingness of states to allow foreign military access will be vital to competently implementing the regional stability and counterterrorism pillars of American grand strategy.

To operationally achieve its strategic goals, the United States requires military facilities in dozens of countries scattered across the globe. While these bases may be physically secured by the United States' preeminent military might, they are politically vulnerable. Because United States military access is contingent on host nation consent, the establishment and continuance of these "embattled garrisons", as basing politics scholar Kent Calder termed them, are dependent on the internal politics of the host nation.⁶ They are also vulnerable to attrition and encroachment by rival powers if allied relationships are mismanaged or taken for granted. If US policymakers desire to maintain American preeminence in foreign basing it will require careful consideration of the domestic and international politics of foreign military basing.

The politics of foreign military basing is an understudied area of security scholarship and policy relevant aspect of grand strategy. Understanding why, how, and where great powers establish foreign military basing shed light on broader questions of order and strategy in international relations. Assessing what tradeoffs host-nations make in allowing foreign military bases and how their security conditions affect these tradeoffs is a useful contribution to comparative politics. As recent events in Iraq and the Philippines show, the politics of foreign basing will have continued relevance in foreign affairs for the foreseeable future.

⁶ Kent E. Calder, *Embattled Garrisons: Comparative Base Politics and American Globalism* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007).

Appendix A: Selected Interviews

- 1) Lt Col David Stevenson, USAF, fmr. Commander, 39th Communications Squadron, Incirlik AB, Turkey, 17 May 2019.
- 2) CAPT Andrew Carlson, USN, fmr. Commanding Officer, US Aegis Ashore Missile Defense System, Deveselu, Romania, 18 May 2019.
- 3) Lt Col Michael Povilus, USAF, fmr. Chief, Social/Cultural Branch Theater Security Cooperation, Manas AB, Kyrgyzstan, 22 May 2019.
- 4) MG (ret) Paul Schafer, USAF, Director, J5/8: Policy, Strategy, Partnering & Capabilities, US European Command, 24 May 2019.
- 5) Lt Col USAF, fmr. exchange pilot with Emirati Air Force, Abu Dhabi, UAE, 28 May 2019
- 6) Col Shawn Cochran, USAF, fmr. Commander, 449th Expeditionary Operations Group, Camp Lemmonier, Djibouti, 31 May 2019.
- 7) MG (ret) Brett Williams, USAF, fmr. Commander, 363th Expeditionary Operations Group, Prince Sultan Air Base, Saudi Arabia and 18th Wing, Kadena, Japan, 3 June 2019.
- 8) Col (ret) Mark Grotelueschen, USAF, fmr. Commander, 380th Expeditionary Maintenance Operations Squadron, Al Dhafra, UAE, 7 June 2019.
- 9) Adm (ret) James Stavridis, USN, fmr. Commander, USSOUTHCOM and Supreme Allied Commander USEUCOM/NATO, 12 June 2019.
- 10) Kevin O'Keefe, Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary & Director, Office of Security Assistance Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, U.S. Department of State, 13 June 2019.
- 11) BG (ret) Blaine Holt, USAF, fmr. Commander, 376 Wing, Manas AB, Kyrgyzstan, 14 June 2019.
- 12) Col Curtis Velasquez, USAF, Senior Military Advisor/Chief of Staff, Security Negotiations and Agreements, U.S. Department of State, 19 June 2019.
- 13) Rear Adm (ret) Mark Montgomery, USN, fmr. Deputy Director, Plans, Policy, and Strategy, USEUCOM, 19 June 2019.
- 14) CAPT (ret) Terry Wichert, USN, fmr. Defense Attache, US Embassy- Quito Ecuador, 10 July 2019.
- 15) Teodoro "Teddy Boy" Locsin Jr., Secretary of Foreign Affairs and fmr. speechwriter/political advisor to President Corazon Aquino, Manila, Philippines, 26 July 2019.
- 16) Napoleon Concepcion, fmr. Armed Forces of Philippines reform movement/rebel officer, 28 July 2019.
- 17) Lt Col Timothy Rolling, USAF, Asst. Air Attache, US Embassy- Manila, 29 July 2019.
- 18) MAJ Pete Caretto, USA, Team Leader, INDOPACOM Augmentation Team, US Embassy- Manila, 29 July 2019.
- 19) Gary Applegarth, Political-Military External Affairs Unit Chief, US Embassy- Manila, 29 July 2019.
- 20) Christopher Farlow, Political Officer, US Embassy- Manila, 29 July 2019.

- 21) LCDR S. Patrick Panjeti, USN, Joint US Military Assistance Group, US Embassy-Manila, 29 July 2019.
- 22) Francisco Nemenzo, President Emeritus and Professor of Political Science, Founding Chairman, BISIG (Union of Filipino Socialists), University of the Philippines, 30 July 2019.
- 23) Renato Cruz De Castro, Professor, International Studies Department, De La Salle University, Manila, 1 Aug 2019.
- 24) Julian Advincula, retired Philippine naval officer, Manila, 1 Aug 2019.
- 25) Janine Davidson, fm. US deputy assistant secretary of defense for plans and undersecretary of the Navy, 12 Aug 2019.
- 26) Wg Cmdr RAF, defense policy and strategy planner, UK Ministry of Defense, (via email) September 2019.
- 27) Veteran Air Marshal (ret) M. Matheswaran, Indian Air Force, deputy chief of integrated defense staff, Indian Ministry of Defense, (via email) 30 Sep 2019.

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Biography

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