Lucian and the Atticists: A Barbarian at the Gates

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Dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of
the requirements for the degree of Doctor
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ABSTRACT

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Abstract

This dissertation investigates ancient language ideologies constructed by Greek and Latin writers of the second and third centuries CE, a loosely-connected movement now generally referred to the Second Sophistic. It focuses on Lucian of Samosata, a Syrian "barbarian" writer of satire and parody in Greek, and especially on his works that engage with language-oriented topics of contemporary relevance to his era. The term "language ideologies", as it is used in studies of sociolinguistics, refers to beliefs and practices about language as they function within the social context of a particular culture or set of cultures; prescriptive grammar, for example, is a broad and rather common example. The surge in Greek (and some Latin) literary output in the Second Sophistic led many writers, with Lucian an especially noteworthy example, to express a variety of ideologies regarding the form and use of language. A number of authors, including Lucian, practiced Atticism, the belief that the best literature would be created by reviving the Attic dialect of Classical Athens, language of Plato and Aristophanes. Others, however, disagree with the narrow and perhaps pretentious version of Greek this ideology produced; intriguingly Lucian was a member of this group as well. This study examines Lucian's complex and contradictory attitudes towards linguistic practices, focusing the works of his that address Atticism and other linguistic topics—such as the degree to which mastery of a language and its culture will allow one to identify with that culture. Here, too, Lucian portrays the relationship between linguistic practice and cultural identity in several different ways. Investigations into the linguistic views of other authors of the period help answer the question of which contemporary ideologies Lucian may be drawing on for his satire. This investigation concludes that Lucian's idiosyncratic and frequently self-contradictory treatment of language, especially as a social signifier, is an essential tool in creating a distinctive authorial position aggregated from his different personae. Through

ironic juxtaposition of contrasting linguistic models, Lucian destabilizes the relationships between language, learning, and cultural identity to create a self-representation that uniquely exists inside and outside—perhaps even beyond—the Greek intellectual culture of his time.

Dedication

I dedicate this study to my parents, for all of their careful explanations, gentle corrections, and entertaining dinnertime debates about usage and grammar that showed me what delight there is to be had in stepping back and thinking about the real meaning of our words.

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Acknowledgements

Many people contributed to my developing this project, whether directly or indirectly, and they are too numerous to name all of them here. In the space I do have, I should acknowledge the support and encouragement I have received from my advisor, William Johnson, who recommended Lucian as a Special Author PhD exam subject; clearly, I have not looked back since, though I may have looked around a bit wider. The lexicographic components of this study owe a great deal to the ancient lexicography and digital humanities workshop/seminar/class taught by Josh Sosin, which I joined just as I was preparing to defend my prospectus, and which proved invaluable in helping me figure out the shape of this project. In addition, it has been a pleasure to make the acquaintance of Markus Hafner during my last stages of work, and have the opportunity to discuss the ins and outs of Lucian with him over lunch and tea. Of course, I cannot overlook the other members of my committee, Janet Downie and Jed Atkins, who have contributed greatly to the project taking shape with their excellent, probing questions and wide-ranging expertise. For insight into how best to face the challenge of balancing teaching and research when one is enthusiastic about both, I should also thank Kristina Meinking, whose mentorship lent a fresh perspective on the work I did for this project and went a long way towards helping it reach this stage. Detailed feedback and editing from Prof. Elizabeth Clendinning of Wake Forest University, in addition to her ongoing encouragement and support, has been invaluable and this project would not have reached completion without her contributions. Finally, I need to recognize my graduate colleagues, especially those of my cohort, who have helped create a supportive and inquisitive intellectual climate in which this work took place.

1. Introduction

When Philostratus wrote *Lives of the Sophists* and assigned the name "Second Sophistic" to an assemblage of first- through third-century CE Greek rhetoricians, philosophers, and others, he created a narrative of Greek intellectual history whose key figures may well not have recognized the representations of themselves in Philostratus' text. Certainly Lucian of Samosata, an active and prolific author contemporaneous with many of these sophists, would not—because Philostratus does not mention him, and for that matter neither does any other contemporary.[1] Reception of Lucian was not always kind in later centuries,[2] nor did the Second Sophistic receive much positive attention, considered like Lucian's corpus to constitute degenerate rehashing of literary and philosophical tropes, well-trodden by superior authors centuries before.[3] Nevertheless, the concept of the Second Sophistic has found purchase among scholars of ancient literature, as a period characterized by various writers' efforts to revive, recreate, and promote an image of Greece reflecting that of (primarily) Athens in the fifth and fourth century BCE; Lucian has become a central figure in the conversation despite missing out on selection to Philostratus' hall of fame.[4] Starting with the monumental work of Bompaire (1958) and growing in prominence with each decade, [5] Lucian's works continue to draw in readers with their inventive fusion of Classical genres and bitingly humorous satires on charlatans and pseudo-intellectuals.

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[1] Galen of Pergamum may have made reference to him, but this is not a settled question. cf. Nutton (1972) 58-9, J. Hall (1981) 4-6.

[2] *Suda* Λ 683: … ἐν δὲ τῷ μέλλοντι κληρονόμος τοῦ αἰωνίου πυρὸς μετὰ τοῦ Σατανᾶ γενήσεται. (…but in the world to come, he will share in the eternal fire alongside Satan); slightly less (literally) damning evaluations come from Norden (1898) PP: an "Oriental without depth or character"; Helm (1906) 6-7: a "leichtfertigen Syrer" (frivolous Syrian) with no earnestness to his literary character. As late as Anderson (1976), Lucian has been thought of as technically polished and entertaining but lacking in serious contributions to the literary tradition.

[3] Rohde (1886, 1914: 310); Helm (1906); Whitmarsh (2005) 6.

[4] Bowersock (1969); Bowie (1974); Jones (1986); Anderson (1993); Gleason (1994); Swain (1996); Whitmarsh (2005); Hopkinson (2008); Olson (2006-9); Strobel (2011); Johnson and Richter (2017).

[5] Books published on Lucian from the time this project began include Bozia (2015); Acocella (2016); Baumbach and Möllendorff (2017); Deriu (2017); Hafner (2017).

Lucian comments on a wide assortment of recognizable topics and characters, and a few less recognizable ones—Homer, Socrates, the Olympian gods, lifestyles of Athens and Rome, the snake-puppet-god Glaucon, and an array of fantastical and warlike space aliens are just a small slice of the cast of characters for which Lucian's corpus has become known. The wide array of topics Lucian address and the variety in formats in which he composes provide a wealth of opportunities to explore the boundaries of genre, and consequently a sizeable portion of scholarship has followed in the footsteps of Bompaire's articulation of Lucianic *pastiche* and his balance between engagement with tradition and innovation for new audiences.[6]

1.1 Scope and Aims

Much of Lucian's writing deals with the complex ironies of existing in a Roman world as a Greek intellectual from Syria, an interlocking set of identities of which Lucian is conspicuously self-aware and which he explores from many angles. One of these angles is that of language, including the specific nature of the Attic Greek in which he primarily writes and the broader question of how language as a social practice intersects with ethnicity and culture. As a reviver and re-fashioner of Classical literature working more than half a millennium after the composition of the original models on which he draws, in his commentary on linguistic issues Lucian has considerable company among other writers of the Second Sophistic. Many works on grammar and usage survive from this period, that instruct readers how to write like an Attic Greek of ancient Athens or, alternatively, like a modern Greek intellectual in the Roman Empire; these works reveal a diverse set of beliefs about what good Greek looks and sounds like, including (for interest) the view of Galen that, while Attic may be important for an educated

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[6] Two recent examples include: ní Mheallaigh, K. *Reading Fiction with Lucian: Fakes, Freaks, and Hyperreality*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014; Futre Pinheiro, P., G. Schmeling, and E.P. Cueva (Eds.) *The Ancient Novel and the Frontiers of Genre*. Eelde: Barkhuis, 2014 (featuring several chapters on Lucian).

person to understand, it is unnecessary for one to learn to write or speak it—and that doing so could in fact impede one's development as a proficient physician. At the same time, another set of contemporary authors join Lucian in probing and satirizing the Second Sophistic interest in revival of ancient usage and establishment of language standards: Sextus Empiricus, Aulus Gellius, and Athenaeus (to name just a few) all find humor and edification in interrogating the claims of grammarians, philologists, and lexicographers of their time. Like Lucian, they also investigate the relationships between language usage, ethnicity, and cultural identity—occasionally with humor, but never without providing invaluable insight into ancient sociolinguistic thought.

This dissertation looks at Lucian and the wider intellectual movement around him to explore how the Syrian writer and his contemporaries viewed language and its role in creating the culture of the Second Sophistic. Recent developments in the study of language in the Greek and Roman worlds have greatly expanded the picture of linguistic practices in ancient societies, but ancient sociolinguistics remains an under-developed subject. [7] The scholarship to date focuses on reconstructing the historical picture by drawing extensively on documentary and epigraphic sources, illustrating effectively how complex and varied the reality of Greek and Latin usage truly was. However, such investigations rarely treat the sociolinguistic imaginaries[8] underlying literary texts or the ways that individual authors express their own views on language in society; they also largely bypass ancient theories of language which do not hold up to modern rigor. As this dissertation will argue, Lucian and other authors of the Second Sophistic make language and its

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[7] The work of J.N. Adams (especially 2003, 2007, 2013) is particularly noteworthy among sociolinguistic studies, though focused primarily on Latin. Tellingly, the recent volume *Ancient Greek Linguistics* edited by Felicia Logozzo and Paolo Poccetti (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2017) contains no sociolinguistic papers. Andrade (2013), to whose work this study owes a great deal, constructs a robust sociolinguistic narrative for the Near East that may come to represent a new direction in the field.

[8] i.e. the linguistic dimensions of social imaginaries; for a definition of the broader term, see Taylor (2003) 23-30.

social role a central topic in many of their works, and Lucian in particular uses linguistic topics as a basis for much of his humor. By focusing specifically on ancient theories and related social imaginaries, this study demonstrates the centrality of linguistic themes in Lucian's corpus, illustrates how these themes reflect and respond to contemporary discourses, and explains how Lucian's attitude towards language and its relationship to cultural identity is emblematic of his larger project. This investigation concludes that Lucian's idiosyncratic and frequently self-contradictory treatment of language, especially as a social signifier, is an essential tool in creating a distinctive authorial position aggregated from his different *personae*. Through ironic juxtaposition of contrasting linguistic models, Lucian destabilizes the relationships between language, learning, and cultural identity to create a self-representation that uniquely exists inside and outside—perhaps even beyond—the Greek intellectual culture of his time.

1.2 Sources and Scholarly Approaches

This dissertation will consider works of Lucian that deal with language, cultural identity, and the relationships between them, and discuss them alongside the writings of other authors contemporaneous to Lucian who treat on the same subjects. At the outset it, it should be stated that the analyses conducted in this study do not seek or presume intertextuality between Lucian and other authors. Instead by the comparison of these disparate texts this study will argue that Lucian and his contemporaries address similar (or the same) currents in the attitudes of Greek and Roman intellectuals towards language theory practice and their role in the representation of individual and group identity.

1.2.1 Lucian

Scholarly approaches to Lucian often have a biographical or historical aim, and not without good reason since several of Lucian's works purport to grant the reader insight into the

story of Lucian's life. The opening passage from the *Dream, or Life of Lucian*,[9] provides the reader (supposedly) with details of the author's younger days:

> Ἄρτι μὲν ἐπεπαύμην εἰς τὰ διδασκαλεῖα φοιτῶν ἤδη τὴν ἡλικίαν πρόσηβος ὤν, ὁ δὲ πατὴρ ἐσκοπεῖτο μετὰ τῶν φίλων ὅ τι καὶ διδάξαιτό με. τοῖς πλείστοις οὖν ἔδοξεν παιδεία μὲν καὶ πόνου πολλοῦ καὶ χρόνου μακροῦ καὶ δαπάνης οὐ μικρᾶς καὶ τύχης δεῖσθαι λαμπρᾶς, τὰ δ' ἡμέτερα μικρά τε εἶναι καὶ ταχεῖάν τινα τὴν ἐπικουρίαν ἀπαιτεῖν· εἰ δέ τινα τέχνην τῶν βαναύσων τούτων ἐκμάθοιμι, τὸ μὲν πρῶτον εὐθὺς ἂν αὐτὸς ἔχειν τὰ ἀρκοῦντα παρὰ τῆς τέχνης καὶ μηκέτ' οἰκόσιτος εἶναι τηλικοῦτος ὤν, οὐκ εἰς μακρὰν δὲ καὶ τὸν πατέρα εὐφρανεῖν ἀποφέρων ἀεὶ τὸ γιγνόμενον. (Luc. *Somn.*1)[10]
>
> I had scarcely finished attending school, and was already near manhood, when my father began to consider, together with his friends, to what end I should be taught. To most of them therefore it seemed that a liberal education (*paideia*) required much work, and a long time, and no small expense, and good luck, whereas our own fortunes were small and necessitated quick assistance. But if I were to master one of the artisanal trades, right away I myself would have what I needed thanks to my trade, and no longer be a home-feeder at my age but, after a short time, be supporting my father by regularly bringing in money.

This particular passage is explicitly autobiographical in appearance, and much of the rest of the work likewise gives the impression of providing numerous details about the author's early life. However, the *Somnium* is fundamentally artificial in character, due in no small part to its obvious thematic debt to the image of Heracles at the Crossroads attributed originally to Prodicus.[11] This myth appears throughout Lucian's corpus[12] and is frequently taken to indicate an affinity with Cynic philosophy, a school Lucian portrays in a positive light in several works.[13] Despite the transparently fictional inspiration behind it, some scholars still seek to look for the true autobiography behind the *Somnium*, as Jones does when he suggests that "although Lucian has evidently passed his experiences through a prism of literature, it does not follow that they are fiction"[14] and that "Lucian could have embroidered his memories of an actual dream to make

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[9] As with many titles in his corpus, this one cannot securely be regarded as Lucian's own.
[10] Greek cited from MacLeod (1974).
[11] Xen. *Mem*. 2.1.21–34; Hunter (2006).
[12] Especially *Somn., Pisc., Rhet. Prae.*
[13] *Vit. auct., Pisc.*
[14] Jones (1986) 9.

them more literary...the embellishment may be in part unconscious."[15] Several other works have also received biographicizing treatment,[16] especially those which feature characters (named or unnamed) whom Lucian or one of his *personae* treats as a real, contemporary figure such as Peregrinus, Nigrinus, the titular *Professor of Rhetoric*, or any number of historians from *How to Write History.*[17]

Other studies of Lucian have focused on the literary themes and attitudes presented throughout the corpus, viewing these characters – whether real or imaginary – as instantiations of different ideologies which Lucian seeks to praise or condemn. This approach rightly extends to Lucian's own authorial voices and to the *personae* whom he endows with attributes that connect them to his authorial voice. While certain biographical details are clear from the historical events he cites, his references to Syrian heritage, or his style of writing, any number of varied characterizations can be laid over this skeleton. The result is that the "Lucian" we read in a given work should by no means be taken as a realistic representation of the author himself, since the narrator and/or the protagonists of his various works can occupy Greek, Syrian, and even Roman cultural spaces. The work of Elsner (2001), Goldhill (2002), and Bozia (2015), among others, have illustrated these points effectively. Along similar lines, Hall (1981), Branham (1989) and Lightfoot (2002) point to Lucian's use of humor and cliché as a way of positioning himself at an indeterminate, flexibly removed distance from the views expressed in his works. Thus, as Richter (2017) suggests, it is neither the author Lucian nor the persona of "Lucian" whom scholars can most productively study, but rather the generic and linguistic ideologies expressed by the former through the latter.

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[15] Jones (1986) 10.
[16] Anderson (1976) frequently returns to this theme, for instance.
[17] Studies aimed at reconstructing the history of these figures and/or identifying the unnamed targets of Lucian's mocking invective include Jones (1972), Anderson (1978), Jones (1986) especially, and Russo (1997).

Since the primary aim of this dissertation is to outline the literary presentation of sociolinguistic ideologies in Lucian and other, roughly contemporary authors, its investigation will focus first on those works by Lucian and others in which explicit reference is made to such issues. Works furnishing the most readily apparent insight into Lucian's use of and attitudes towards language include the *Solecist*, *Lexiphanes* ("speech-flaunter"), *Professor of Rhetoric*, *Mistaken Critic*, and the *Consonants at Court*. Of these, the first three are richest in their exploration of Atticism, and are well represented in the scholarship. More biographicizing studies, like those described above, look to identify the historical figures behind these works (and the *Mistaken Critic*), however, more recent efforts look at the works and their characters—properly—as vehicles for expression of different linguistic philosophies. In particular, Weissenberger (1996) reads *Lexiphanes* effectively against the *Solecist*, and Zweimüller (2008) discusses the *Professor* in great detail, while Macleod (1956) is an early outlier in contextualizing the *Solecist* against Lucian's wider Atticizing practice.

Other works in which language is at issue, but makes a brief appearance in a wider context, include the *Double Indictment*, *On Salaried Posts in Great Houses* (the feature of a new study by Hafner, 2017), *Apology for a Slip of the Tongue in Greeting*, and *How to Write History*; all in this latter group also treat significantly on the sociolinguistic question of the relationship between language practice and cultural identity. A number of other Lucianic works that deal primarily with cultural identity and questions of Greekness, Romanness, barbarism, and the role of *paideia* in constructing the self—whether or not language is specifically at issue. This dissertation will consider *On the Syrian Goddess*, *Anacharsis* (and its prologue the *Scythian*), the autobiographical *Dream, or Life of Lucian*, and *Against the Ignorant Book-Collector*, all of which see Lucian explore the boundaries between Syrian and Greek and probe the relationship between education and social status. By and large, the scholarship on Lucian's linguistic features,

including Chabert (1897), Deferrari (1916), Bompaire (1958, 1994) and Casevitz (1994) catalogue technical and stylistic dimensions but do not comment extensively on the opinions expressed in commentary of the authorial *persona*. It is the aim of this dissertation, conversely, to focus on the latter subject and in order to do so successfully it will look outwards from Lucian to a range of authors who treat on related subjects.

1.2.2 Other Authors

Supporting and complementing the treatment of Lucian, a cast of roughly contemporary authors also lend their voices to this discussion. In the larger context of linguistic works of the Second Sophistic (discussed in greater detail below at 1.3.1), the lexicographer Phrynichus and his *Ecloga* or *Selection of Attic Words and Phrases* are the primary subject in the study of the revival and reconstruction of the Attic dialect as the language of Imperial Greek intellectuals. Alternative models to that of Phrynichus are found in authors such as Moeris, Pollux, and the anonymous "Antiatticist", whose works will round out the discussion of Phrynichus. Lexicography of the Second Sophistic is not a widely studied area, but even with its sporadic scholarly treatment there is nevertheless an active scholarly discourse into which the present study will enter. The edition and commentary of Eitel Fischer (1974) is the standard Phrynichus text, and his general outline of Phrynichus' career has supplanted that of Naechster (1908); the opportunities for prosopography are slim, however Bowersock (1969) and especially Avotins (1978) help to situate him in his contemporary context. Claudia Strobel's studies (2005, 2009, 2011) of Atticistic lexicography have contributed immensely to the conversation, comparing and

contrasting Phrynichus with other lexicographers (including those mentioned above).[18] As lexicography is only one of several topics included in this work, the present study cannot hope to match those of Strobel in their breadth or depth; it looks instead to create an ideological profile for Phrynichus that allows for dialogue between his works and those of authors in substantially different genres. Among those authors treating on language beyond lexicography, the Skeptic philosopher Sextus Empiricus is a key source owing to his detailed and humorous refutations of contemporary language theories in *Against the Grammarians*. In connection to his philosophy, the grammarians he has in view—such as Varro, Crates of Mallos, Apollonius Dyscolus, and more—will be considered briefly. On the subject of Sextus, philosophy of language, and the grammarians he targets, this dissertation owes a great deal to the scholarship of Donald Blank (1982, 1994, 1998, 2005) regarding the history of ancient linguistics.

Other authors and texts with whom this study deals in depth include Athenaeus, since a great number of passages from the *Deipnosophistae* or *Learned Banqueters*, especially those featuring the figure of Ulpian the "Syro-Atticist" (3.126f Olson) symposiarch, offer commentary on language usage and cultural affinity. Earlier studies (few as they are) of Athenaeus' sprawling work tended to treat it largely as a repository of quotations and *testimonia*, or alternatively as a conspicuously erudite cookbook;[19] a modern treatment along these lines is that of Jacob (2013), which makes insightful comparison between Athenaeus' work and hypertext as a tool for storing, organizing, and interlinking information. Most of the more recent scholarship has instead followed the line of inquiry (and chronology) of Baldwin (1976), shifting the focus from the subjects discussed by the banqueters to the contemporary social world of the framing device—the

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[18] I would like to thank Dr. Strobel for her willingness to exchange e-mail communications during the writing of this dissertation, as well as Lawrence Kim (Trinity University) and Greta Boers (Duke University Libraries) for their assistance in reaching out to her.
[19] Gulick (1927) ix, xv; Braund and Wilkins (2000) 3-4

bicultural setting of a Greek symposium held in Rome.[20] Examples of this line of inquiry feature heavily in the volume *Athenaeus and his World* (Braund and Wilkins, Eds. 2000), and especially relevant to this dissertation are the works of Braund, Sidwell, and Wilkins. The setting explored in such studies has considerable parallels to the world of Aulus Gellius, though, somewhat remarkably, works on each author seldom look for connections to the other. One of the aims of this dissertation—which may point the way towards future developments—is therefore to put the *Learned Banqueters* in dialogue with the *Attic Nights* of Aulus Gellius, which also includes numerous discussions, some at considerable length, of specific language issues in Latin and Greek. Gellius' work has seen an increase in interest among recent scholarship, much of it likely owing to Holford-Strevens' comprehensive treatments (1988, 2003). As a series of vignettes, the *Attic Nights* has resisted classification, but works such as those of Holford-Strevens, Astarita (1993), Swain (2004), Keulen (2009), and Howley (2018), which approach the work as an articulation of Gellius' cultural-linguistic philosophy, lend invaluable insight into the discussion of the present study. So too do works examining Gellius' language in depth, such as Marache (1957) or Garcea and Lomanito (2004), complicating the picture of how antiquarian a linguistic project the *Attic Nights* may actually be.

Within Gellius' text appear the characters of Fronto and Favorinus, who are represented as linguistic authorities in the *Attic Nights* (though not universally commended, especially Fronto) and whom this dissertation also considers authors on their own terms. Fronto's letters contain extensive commentary on language and culture, and while much of it is also discussed in connection with Gellius, this dissertation draws on the detailed studies of Champlin (1980) and Van den Hout (1999), among the relatively small bibliography on the author. In particular, their

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[20] Baldwin himself sees an early outlier in Dittenberger, W. "Athenaeus und sein Werk". *Apophoreton*, 1-28. Berlin: Weidmann, 1903 but notes that Dittenberger's approach was not picked up for some seven-plus decades.

treatment of Fronto's ethnic self-representation and his relationship with the Greek language opens up avenues of inquiry into the construction of Roman identity among North African elites, or at the very least into Fronto's particular version of such an identity. In Favorinus' case, since little of his work survives, much scholarship examines him through Gellius' lens as well as his entry in Philostratus. This dissertation also considers him in connection with the lexicographer Phrynichus, who mentions Favorinus many times but whose treatment of him has received scant scholarly attention. Nevertheless, in his "Corinthian" oration, which has survived, Favorinus makes sensational statements about his self-fashioning into a Greek orator from Gallo-Roman beginning. The interleaved identities of his paradoxical self-representation make him, therefore, a bi- or tri-lingual and -cultural figure and an invaluable subject for studies of ancient multilingualism and the relationship between linguistic practice and construction of identity; the most recent study to consider Favorinus in this light *outside* of Gellius is Rochette (2015). Favorinus and Fronto each provide a distinctive version of authorial self-representation through the creation of relationships to the ethnicities, cultures, and languages of Greece, Rome, and the wider world. In so doing, they offer useful counterpoints to Lucian's self-representation and expand the picture of the imagined connections between Greek culture and cultural identity.

1.2.3 Greek Culture and Cultural Identity

An investigation of of Greek versus Roman versus barbarian cultural and ethnic identities, whether from historical or literary evidence, is problematic for several reasons that all revolve around the difficulty of determining what is meant by the terms "culture", "ethnicity", and "identity". In social scholarship of the Roman Empire and the Second Sophistic in particular, Whitmarsh has defined the first of these as "a dynamic social system providing the structures that

enable and limit the construction of identity positions."[21] Andrade offers a similar definition, "a dynamic system of idioms that symbolize and mark social, ethnic, or institutional sameness or difference."[22] The structures or idioms to which these definitions refer include those discussed in Chapters One and Two, such as a facility with the vocabulary and grammatical elements characteristic of the Attic literary dialect along with the intimate knowledge of the sources from which this dialect derives that permits one to assert authority over it. Both definitions highlight the dynamic nature of "culture", a consideration which will guide the discussion of this chapter and the following one because, as these chapters will illustrate, the social positions denoted by "Greek", "Roman", or "Barbarian" are not fixed or universal (especially as the third is—on a basic level—the denial or absence of the first two), nor does the use of a given structure or idiom to signify one identity position preclude its being used to signify another as well.[23] In this view, "culture" is at its core a tool that a subject (such as an author) employs in order to project a given identity.

"Greek *culture*" can therefore be considered the set of "Classical"[24] idioms, symbols, practices, and especially language to which a scholar or scholars assign the label "Greek", whereas "Greek*ness*" is an identity created through the expression of this cultural toolset. In creating Greekness, or the distinct but intersecting category of Romanness, the authors discussed in these chapters interweave various idioms that they identify to their audience as signifiers of the identity at issue. However, distinguishing "Greekness" from "Greek culture" (or "Romanness" from "Roman culture") by positing the former as a situationally instantiated combination of elements belonging to the latter fails to recognize the interdependence of the two concepts. In

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[21] Whitmarsh (2001) 37.
[22] Andrade (2013) 4.
[23] Burstein (2003) 227-40.
[24] That is, defined by an arbitrary combination of antiquity and geography, such as the sketch of Phrynichus' criteria for *ἀρχαῖον/παλαιόν, Ἀττικόν,* and generally *δόκιμον* generated in Chapter Two.

fact, delimiting the components of "Greek culture" and attaching "Greek" signification to them is as much a situational act as asserting Greekness is: to claim a given identity in terms of its associated culture necessarily entails claiming that said culture can and should be deployed in service to the construction of this identity.

The two concepts, culture and identity (or "*x*-ness") are as such practically inseparable despite their clearly being distinguishable, as above. The concept of "ethnicity", on the other hand, is less closely tied into either of them even though it interacts with both whenever a subject assumes a position defined in terms of cultural identity. It can most obviously translate the Greek *ethnos* (as well as *phyle* or *genos*) but an effective working definition comes from Hall who uses "ethnicity" to refer to the location of putative common descent in ways determining social interaction.[25] Ethnicity as an identity can be assigned or it can be claimed, and the conceptual divisions between ethnicities change or are erased; some examples of evidence for this phenomenon in a Near Eastern context is discussed in Chapter Five. Nevertheless, ethnicity is not "performed", as the cultural component of identity is in this schema, but rather presumed within an existing framework; when one is assigned (or claims, i.e. self-assigns) an ethnicity according to whatever definition is in effect at the time of assignation, that ethnicity remains fixed. This distinction between cultural and ethnic identity is felt keenly in Lucian and perhaps more so in Favorinus, who, as the study in Chapter Four will argue, emphasizes Celtic (i.e. barbarian) ethnicity as a means of strengthening his claim to expertise in Greek culture and thus (in his rhetoric) Greekness.

The usage of ethnicity as a rhetorical tool by authors studied in this dissertation, however, also exposes the problems with the use of "identity" as a term of analysis.[26] One obvious

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[25] Hall (1997) 25-33.
[26] This discussion draws on Cooper and Brubaker (2005), especially pages 64-76.

shortcoming is the changing significance of "identity" in different collocations—self-identity, cultural identity, group identity, etc.; for example, a Second Sophistic character's self-identity as a *pepaideumenos* does not necessarily partake of a group identity of *pepaideumenoi* (and can in fact do the opposite, when assertion of one's own *paideia* entails denying its being possessed by others who claim it). The greater issue with the term, however, is the misleading connotation of reified abstractness or absoluteness it carries: to say (e.g.) that "Lucian claims a Greek identity" elides the fact that someone—the reader, for example—must actively identify Lucian as Greek while also identifying the signifiers of Greekness as such. Even when ethnic identity is conceived of as static—which in the works treated in this dissertation it is—the conception or creation of a static "identity" position is itself dynamic. This consideration is especially important in Lucian's case, since he does not speak with a single authorial voice but a combination of voices that he does not all clearly place into the same ethnic category, and moreover the ethnicity "Syrian" or "Assyrian" (or other) does not have the same significance in every text. In discussions on ethnicity, cultural idioms, and Greek or Roman (or barbarian) group-ness, this dissertation will use the term "identity" to refer specifically to the relationship represented between individuals, such as Fronto or a *persona* of Lucian, and a conceptual position, whether cultural or ethnic. In this sense, "Greekness" or "Greek identity" will therefore denote ownership by an individual of Greek cultural idioms; as shown in Chapter Three, the sarcastic appellation of "Hellene" directed at Lexiphanes mocks his failure to master the cultural idioms of Attic language and philosophical discourse and thus his failure to create the Greek identity he clearly craves.

A central challenge to be confronted in comparing the role of language in the constructions of Greekness and Romanness is the asymmetry between the two concepts.[27] In an important article on the subject of language and identity, Benjamin Stevens succinctly

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[27] Adams (2003b) 185; cf. Irvine and Gal (2000).

summarizes one accepted scholarly view of this asymmetric opposition: "The category of Roman, a civic category with cultural connotations, is not necessarily exclusive of the category of Greek, increasingly a cultural category independent of civic status."[28] This view has a certain measure of linguistic support: by the second century CE *ἑλληνισμός* and *ἑλληνίζω* are used both in the context of linguistic practice (speaking Greek)[29] and as a term for cultural identity (Greekness)[30], and while *Latinitas* is a well-attested term in reference to Latin linguistic practice[31] as well as legal rights,[32] there is little to no evidence for its use in reference to cultural practice. There is also no evidence of a word '*Romanitas'* for "Romanness" to complement it.[33] Legal documents from Greek-speaking Egypt further support this non-dichotomous view of Roman linguistic practice, as many of them only use official legal terms in Latin and are otherwise entirely in the language of the local population.[34] With regards to funerary monuments of Greek-speaking Romans, there is a clear tendency to use Latin in the formal biographical details and reserve Greek for (e.g.) a poetic epitaph.[35] Other official documents, such as military *diplomata*, are likewise in Latin because of their role in determining legal status. From this evidence, Latin seems only to take effect as a cultural signifier when it serves as part of a more formally articulated marking of Romanness,

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[28] Stevens (2006) 134.
[29] Ath. 9.367a, attesting a grammatical work by Seleucus titled *On Hellenism*.
[30] As in the Septuagint text of 2 Maccabees 4.13: ἦν δ' οὕτως ἀκμή τις Ἑλληνισμοῦ καὶ πρόσβασις ἀλλοφυλισμοῦ διὰ τὴν τοῦ ἀσεβοῦς καὶ οὐκ ἀρχιερέως Ἰάσωνος ὑπερβάλλουσαν ἀναγνείαν… (there was such an extreme of Hellenism and growth in foreign behaviors on account of the ungodly and unpriestly Jason's surpassing wickedness).
[31] *Rhet. Her.* 4.12.17: "latinitas est, quae sermonem purum conservat, ab omni vitio remotum. Vitia in sermone, quominus is latinus sit, duo possunt esse: soloecismus et barbarismus, etc.,"; Cic. *Att.* 7.3.10
[32] Suet. *Aug*. 47: "quasdam … merita erga populum Romanum allegantes latinitate vel civitate donavit."
[33] Kramer, J. *Die Sprachbezeichnungen Latinus und Romanus im Lateinischen und Romanischen.* Berlin: Erich Schmidt, 1998: 81-2. Adams (2003b) concludes that "Romanitas" is not a meaningful term to use in discussing Roman cultural identity.
[34] Adamik (2010); there is in fact no evidence of an official Latin language policy, even into the third century when Latin took on a more dominant role in Eastern Roman documents.
[35] The case of the sarcophagus of C. Valerius Papirianus (*CIGPann.* 3.91) is typical of the practice in late 2nd to early 3rd century monuments: the finished front side displays the name, rank, and legion of the deceased as well as the names and rank of his sons, bracketing a short Latin poem; the apparently unfinished back side contains no equivalent identifying information in Greek, and its Greek verse text is not a translation of the Latin.

with Greek having little official status. Given that the focus of the present study is on the specific ideologies of Greek and Latin authors regarding the relationship between language and an imagined cultural identity, rather than a factual legal one, the apparent asymmetry between Greek and Latin as social signifiers makes a comparison difficult. It is just this asymmetry, however, which the authors discussed in Chapters Four and Five (primarily Gellius and Lucian) recognize and reframe to assert their own views of Greek and/or Latin as signifiers of cultural identity and social status.

1.3 Methodology and Approach

1.3.1 Language Ideologies

This dissertation is fundamentally an investigation of *language ideologies*, and specifically those ideologies prominent in Second Sophistic writing on linguistic and grammatical subjects. The term itself suggests several interpretations, though the mainstream definitions tend to share certain characteristics. Michael Silverstein introduces the term as "sets of beliefs about language articulated by users as a rationalization or justification of perceived language structure and use."[36] Judith Irvine emphasizes the sociocultural context, giving as her definition "the cultural system of ideas about social and linguistic relationships, together with their loading of moral and political interests."[37] Alan Rumsey defines the concept in brief, generalizing terms: "shared bodies of commonsense notions about the nature of language in the world."[38] Paul Kroskrity, seeking a broad yet conservative definition, summarizes language ideologies simply as "beliefs, or feelings, about languages as used in their social worlds;" in his own and others'

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[36] Silverstein (1979) 193.
[37] Irvine (1989) 255.
[38] Rumsey (1990) 346.

definitions he draws attention to "a tension between emphasizing speakers' 'awareness,' as a form of agency, and foregrounding their 'embeddedness' in the social and cultural systems in which they are enveloped."[39] The former aspect of Kroskrity's analysis will be the primary focus of the present study. Since a scholar of the Second Sophistic cannot perform the kind of ethnographic, anthropological investigation that, for example, Kroskrity has undertaken on the ideology of linguistic purity among Tewa people of Arizona,[40] it is necessary to look at the way authors' discussion of language either explicitly articulates or otherwise reveals their language ideologies. The works of Lucian, Gellius, Phrynichus, Athenaeus, Pollux, and others cannot be taken to reflect the linguistic reality of the society in which they were produced but must instead be understood as deliberate and individual representations that contribute to an elitist, frequently abstracted discussion about language. The goal in Chapter Two, "Expertise and Usage", will be to examine the ways in which these different authors act as influencers and which ideologies underly their self-conscious attempts to construct or to correct certain attitudes about language in their community.

Perhaps the most recognizable opposition of language ideologies is that between *prescriptivism* and *descriptivism*, both terms being common in non-specialist discussions of language. The *Oxford Companion to the English Language* definition is typical:

> *Descriptivism* is an approach that proposes the objective and systematic description of language, in which investigators confine themselves to facts as they can be observed: particularly, the approach favored by mid-20c US linguists known as *descriptivists*. *Prescriptivism* is an approach, especially to grammar, that sets out rules for what is regarded as correct in language. In debates on language and education, enthusiasts for one side often use the label for the other side dismissively.[41]

The key disjunction between these two approaches is in one sense a matter of directionality—whether the correctness of a given usage in a natural language should be judged according to

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[39] Kroskrity (2004) 497-8.
[40] Kroskrity (1993).
[41] *OCEL* (1992) 286.

expert standards, or whether the existence of a usage indicates *a fortiori* that it is correct. In another sense, however, it is a question of whether one has any standard for correct usage at all—a descriptivist might reject the term "correct" and substitute "appropriate" instead, given that successful communication relies almost entirely on the context in which it is attempted.[42] In the current linguistic mainstream, prescriptivism is strongly dispreferred[43] and established reference works readily identify themselves as descriptivist.[44] Much of the discussion in Chapter Two will illustrate the efforts of different writers in the Second Sophistic and their predecessors to define expertise in language, establish authority, and prescribe usage. Phrynichus, a lexicographer of the mid-to-late second century CE whom that chapter will examine in detail, demonstrates an approach to Attic usage marked by a strong prescriptivist streak. However, as will be shown, such a prescriptivist tendency is far from universal among ancient writers on language; for example Sextus Empiricus, the Skeptic philosopher, conceptualizes Greek grammar (or perhaps more accurately a lack thereof) in a descriptivist manner.

1.3.2 Atticism and Other Ideologies

A major component of the discussion throughout this dissertation will be the ancient ideological opposition between Atticism and the other strain of idealized Greek, sometimes

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[42] Bakhtin (1986) 122: "A word (or in general any sign) is *interindividual*. Everything that is said, expressed, is located outside the soul of the speaker and does not belong only to him. The word cannot be assigned to a single speaker." As will be shown in this chapter, this concept predates Bakhtin by virtue of its being articulated clearly in the Skeptic treatises of Sextus Empiricus.

[43] As a recent example, Language Log contains much commentary aimed at dismantling the vestiges of prescriptivism in popular discourse, such as Pullum, G.K. (November 15, 2010) *Strictly Incompetent: pompous garbage from Simon Heffer*. Retrieved from http://languagelog.ldc.upenn.edu/nll/?p=2780

[44] @smarick. (2016, July 2) "@MerriamWebster The 'singular they' is an affront to grammar. Language rules are all that separate us from animals. We. Must. Stand. Firm." [Twitter Post] @MerriamWebster (2016, July 2) "@smarick then you're talking to the wrong dictionary—we're descriptivists. We follow language, language doesn't follow us ☺" [Twitter Post] Retrieved from https://twitter.com/merriamwebster/status/749248017954377728

referred to as Hellenism. The modern ideological opposition between prescriptivism and descriptivism can clarify the picture of this linguistic landscape, but the extent to which this modern terminology applies to ancient material varies considerably. The ancient grammatical theories of analogy and its opposite, anomaly, demonstrate potential downsides to using a modern framework in describing ancient phenomena. The discussion to follow will illustrate why these different conceptual axes are required to encompass concisely the range of approaches to Greek (as well as Latin) grammar and usage, and it will identify various authors who exemplify different combinations of these distinct ideological poles. By providing a map of this landscape, this chapter will offer a set of reference points around which to anchor the subsequent examination of the relationship between language and cultural identity, as well as the complexities of Lucian and other satirists' engagement with these issues.

Sextus is neither alone nor original in espousing views that can be considered descriptivist by modern standards, although he is arguably the most extreme in this position. No other linguistic philosophy offers a more sweeping rejection of grammatical authority than his *Against the Grammarians*, but several earlier and contemporary grammarians show similar preference for usage over grammatical rules in evaluating language standards. Likewise, while Phrynichus best exemplifies a purist—perhaps puritanical—extreme of prescriptivism in his construction of Attic, other grammarians of roughly the same era display similar ideologies in their own work. This section's discussion will offer an overview of Imperial Greek and Latin lexicographers' and grammarians' attitudes towards language that fall somewhere between the extreme positions of the Skepticism of Sextus Empiricus and the restrictive Atticism of Phrynichus. Like the works of Phrynichus, the textual history of many Second Sophistic writings on language and linguistics can be fragmented or dubious; as a result, certain authors' opinions can be characterized only in broad, impressionistic senses, and a limited range of conclusions can

be drawn from the evidence available. Nevertheless, highlighting some of the better-preserved and better-known authors of the era, this discussion will aim to illustrate the spectrum onto which the language ideologies of authors working outside the fields of grammar and lexicography, such as Lucian or Athenaeus, can be mapped.

It must nevertheless be remembered that this schema is a modern one, and while certain aspects of these and other authors' writings can be labeled as prescriptive or descriptive, the discussion of Chapter Two will also examine whether it is a useful schema to apply to ancient linguistic debates. In order to compare effectively the disparate viewpoints of a range of authors whose fundamental ideologies differ sharply, the terminology these authors employ requires some degree of reconciliation. The most obvious obstacle to obtaining a meaningful contrast between the different wings of the Second Sophistic language theorists lies in the difficulty of distinguishing "Atticism" (*ἀττικισμός*) from "Hellenism" (*ἑλληνισμός*). The latter term is applied to a broad array of Greek (and even Roman) cultural and historical features, but for the purposes of Second Sophistic linguistic inquiry it represents a specific ideology of grammaticality and correctness of speech. These two ideologies, Atticism and Hellenism, make up a distinct opposing schema within which different authors' approaches to Greek grammar can fit.

The earliest surviving discussion of Hellenism in its linguistic sense comes from Aristotle. In *Rhetoric* 3.5 1407a19, *τὸ ἑλληνίζειν* is introduced as *ἀρχὴ τῆς λέξεως* and consists of conjunctions (*συνδέσμοις*), appropriate words (*ἰδίοις ὀνόμασι*), avoiding ambiguity (*μὴ ἀμφιβόλοις*), correct grammatical genders (τὰ *γένη τῶν ὀνομάτων*), and agreement in number (*τῷ τὰ πολλὰ καὶ ὀλίγα καὶ ἓν ὀρθῶς ὀνομάζειν*). Likewise, the early Stoic philosopher Diogenes of Babylon identifies Hellenism as the foremost virtue of speech, and furthermore specifies that *ἑλληνισμὸς μὲν οὖν ἐστι φράσις ἀδιάπτωτος ἐν τῇ τεχνικῇ καὶ μὴ εἰκαίᾳ συνηθείᾳ* (Hellenism, now then, is idiom that is faultless in its expertise, and not by random usage; Diog. Laert. *VP* 7.59). In

general terms, earlier outlines of Hellenism seem to conceive of it as an ideal form of Greek defined by rules of usage, or more precisely as the expertise, *τεχνική*, consisting of the knowledge of these rules. Examples of *ἑλληνισμός* and *ἑλληνίζειν* from the era of the Second Sophistic tend to lean heavily on the ideals of expertise and purity. One such definition is found in the anonymous *De solecismo et barbarismo* (attributed to Aelius Herodianus, here called pseudo-Herodian): *ἑλληνισμὸς μὲν οὖν ἐστὶ λέξις ὑγιὴς καὶ ἀδιάστροφος ἢ λόγου μερῶν πλοκὴ κατάλληλος* (Hellenism is diction that is healthy and inerrant, or it is a congruent combination of parts of speech; 309.1 Nauck). Here the definition of Hellenism is further specified by a detailed outline of what Hellenism is not—namely barbarism, though solecism appears also to fall into this category. The two are similar but distinct: *βαρβαρισμὸς δέ ἐστι λέξις ἡμαρτημένη περὶ τὴν συνήθειαν. διαφέρει δὲ βαρβαρισμὸς σολοικισμοῦ, ὅτι ὁ μὲν σολοικισμὸς τὴν τάξιν βλάπτει τοῦ λόγου, ὁ δὲ βαρβαρισμὸς τῆς λέξεως* (barbarism is a word that is mistaken with regard to common usage. Barbarism differs from solecism, because whereas solecism damages the order of the discourse, barbarism damages the order of the word, 309.2 Nauck). This author eventually sums up the two terms, Hellenism and barbarism, thus: *ἐρωτηθείς τις τί ἐστιν ἑλληνισμός, ἔφη «τὸ πάσαις ταῖς διαλέκτοις ὀρθῶς χρῆσθαι». βαρβαρισμός ἐστιν ἁμάρτημα ἐν λόγῳ γινόμενον περὶ τὴν τῶν ἑλληνιζόντων συνήθειαν.* (When asked what Hellenism is, one would say "to employ all the dialects correctly". Barbarism is an error arising in speech with respect to the common usage of those who Hellenize, 311.3-4 Nauck) "All the dialects" here most plausibly refers to the five dialects—Attic, Ionic, Doric, Aeolic, and Koinê—that had become canonical by the second or third century CE.

This interpretation, along with the definition of barbarism as being contrary to what Hellenizers do, is consistent with contemporary definitions of "dialects" as equally valid subsets

of the same, unified language (e.g., Apoll. Dysc. *De const.* 96; Clem. Alex. *Stromateis* 1.142).[45] Whether mutual intelligibility is in fact a valid criterion for distinguishing between "dialects" and "languages" is a controversial question in contemporary sociolinguistics but this view of distinguishing the two via the criterion of mutual intelligibility does fit the Greek attitude toward these two concepts from the earliest stages of linguistic philosophy and ethnography.[46] More to the point, while Hellenism and barbarism are described in opposing and exclusive terms, some versions of Hellenism are at the same time markedly *inclusive* in their expansive encapsulation of several or indeed all of the different Greek dialects. Hellenism, it seems, can lie not only in the mastery of a single grammatical ruleset but sometimes also in the knowledge of several (five, perhaps more) rulesets and the complex and varied relationships between them.

One question to ask, then, is what might be meant by *τὸ πάσαις ταῖς διαλέκτοις ὀρθῶς χρῆσθαι* and whether ps.-Herodian might be suggesting, in a seemingly descriptivist manner like Sextus Empiricus on the subject of context and register (see discussion below), that language or dialect is only correct inasmuch as they are used appropriately based on an understanding of social context. In the literary tradition, however, virtually no attention is paid to Doric or even Aeolic except as curiosities—in drama, for instance, the occasional vocabulary word, or the requisite deference to Sappho and Alcaeus—whereas Attic, Ionic, and the Koinê have ample literary traditions behind them that are recognized in the Hellenistic theories. It is quite possible that the "correct usage" of Doric and Aeolic is simply the knowledge of how those dialects differ from the other three; there does not appear to be evidence for reviving either of them as a literary language. Conversely, because of the persistent influence of Herodotus, Hippocrates, and others, a reading knowledge of Ionic remains prerequisite for anyone with aspirations of literacy (at the

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[45]See Appendix A.1 for the relevant quotations.
[46] Morpurgo Davies (2002) 165-6; cf. Plato *Politicus* 262d for a Socratic critique of this perspective.

very least). The Ionic dialect also resurfaces periodically in the literary production of works such as Lucian's *De Syria dea,* as does the Homeric/Epic *Kunstsprache*. The disagreement between the Hellenists and the Atticists, as discussed below, hinges not on the recognition of dialects, but rather on the identification of the correct role for each dialect may—and specifically, whether any version of Koinê is by its nature disqualified from the literary conversation.

In contrast to Hellenism, the "Atticism" of the Second Sophistic is concerned with the reconstruction and transmission of one particular form of Greek. The Hellenists seek to identify and describe (or prescribe) the correct form of Greek as it exists in their contemporary world, while Atticism remains a fundamentally antiquarian approach to literary Greek despite its varied forms and goals. On this basis alone, however, it should not be considered the more inherently prescriptivist or authority-centered of the two mainstream approaches to Greek grammar, even though some of its most enthusiastic exponents (Phrynichus, e.g., and others discussed alongside him in Chapter Two) subscribe to an ideology that should indeed be called descriptivist. The unifying feature among Atticists is a shared goal of distinguishing the specifically Attic words and constructions from those either not found in the Attic of the fifth and fourth centuries BCE, or which are characteristic of other dialects. In its basic sense, Atticism involves drawing on a canon of Athenian authors and employing vocabulary and usage in accordance with their texts.[47] Despite the narrow view of Greek and the reliance on expertise inherent to the Atticizing movement, there are two major reasons why Atticism is not universally a prescriptive ideology. The first is that while *ἑλληνίζειν/ἑλληνισμός* refers from its first appearances (in extant writing) to

[47] O'Sullivan (1997) describes the canonization of the authors to whom Phrynichus (e.g.) looks for guidance.

a linguistic practice, *ἀττικίζειν/ἀττικισμός* is in its original sense a descriptor of cultural or political affiliation (Thuc. 3.65, e.g.)[48] and does not acquire linguistic denotation until later. [49]

Its usage in reference to deliberate linguistic revival comes later still; for example, the "Atticism" recommended by Dionysius of Halicarnassus (*De Lysia* 1.12, *De imitatione* fr. 31.5.1 U.-R.) comprises a set of stylistic guidelines (similar to those in the epitome of Phryn. *Prae. soph.*) rather than rules of grammar.[50] While Dionysius makes many pronouncements on style, he does not attempt to emulate—nor indeed does he fully understand—the Attic of the fifth-century writers with whom he engages, most notably that of Thucydides.[51] Because of this focus on style, as distinct from grammar, Roman rhetoricians apply the principles of stylistic Atticism to their Latin compositions and there appears to have been a robust debate among Romans on the relative merits of the rational and naturalistic Attic and the more baroque, so-called "Asian" (or "Asiatic") styles.[52] Just as a Latin oration can be delivered in the Attic style, the "Asian" nomenclature refers specifically to stylistic aspects and does not imply a more Ionic version of Greek.[53] Pollux of Naucratis, in his *Onomasticon*, lists Atticism in this sense (the only time he uses the term) among many other nouns one might use to describe an orator (Poll. *Onom*. 4.22)[54] So, while the

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[48] See Appendix A.2 for the full citation.
[49] Kim (2017) 43.
[50] Dihle (1977) 167; Swain (1996) 22; Wiater (2011) 15.
[51] de Jonge (2008) 268-72, on Dion. Hal. *Thuc*. 37. Dionysius accuses Thucydides of committing a grave solecism in the opening passages of the Melian Dialogue, breaking grammatical agreement (*τὴν ἀκολουθῖαν*) by using a pronoun, *αὐτοῦ*, that has no clear referent and is therefore meaningless. In fact, Dionysius misinterprets Thucydides' syntax, since he fails to notice that the *αὐτοῦ* in question refers to an articular infinitive in the previous clause.
[52] Wiater (2011) 63: neither the Attic nor Asian style of rhetoric ought to be considered more "natural", in the sense of resembling vernacular speech, than the other. Cf. Luzzatto, M.T. "L'oratoria, la retorica e la critica letteraria dalle origini ad Ermogene." In F. Montanari (Ed.) *Da Omero agli Alessandrini: problemi e figure della letteratura greca*. *Studi superiori NIS* 47 (1988): 207-256.
[53] Cicero, in the *Brutus*, assigns to Attic diction such qualities as *salubritatem* (wholesomeness, 51) and *subtilitate* (subtlety, 67), but also problematizes the blanket usage of the term at *Brut*. 285. He likewise complicates his definition of Asiatic diction at *Brut*. 325; cf. Bishop (2016). See Appendix A.2 for the full entries.
[54] See Appendix A.2.

Second Sophistic "Atticist" movement involves the debate on language standards as well as stylistic principles, the fact that "Atticism" also denotes a related but distinct rubric means that it also encompasses a range of opinions as to what is or is not truly "Attic" and, just as significantly for the present discussion, the contexts in which Attic is necessary or even appropriate.

The second reason to avoid calling the Atticism of the first through second centuries CE prescriptivist is that Phrynichus, as will be shown, is an outlier in the degree to which he prescribes Attic usage. Even his case, however, one can detect hints of a less prescriptive, more *descriptive* approach to Atticism. Other lexicographers of Attic are far less archaizing than Phrynichus, less dialectically purist, less authority-centered, and more interested in recording and transmitting Attic than in making specific or firm recommendations for usage. This point is especially true of the earliest scholars of Attic, such as the Hellenistic-era writers Aristophanes of Byzantium and Crates of Mallus—the latter being one of the main sources for grammatical analogy, discussed in following sections. In the first century CE the first recognizable lexica of Attic appear, such as the works of Pausanias, Irenaeus, and Aelius Dionysius. These works are aimed at helping a reader understand Attic vocabulary and offer no recommendations on usage or grammar for Attic composition.[55] Moreover, while Phrynichus' *Ecloga* blurs the lines between "Attic" and "Hellenic" speech, others maintain a consistent distinction between the two, and where Phrynichus posits Attic as the ideal form of Greek for conducting business,[56] Galen (e.g.) articulates a vision of a refined, non-Attic, technical language appropriate for medical treatises. In other words, while they do not take an ideological stance the earlier Atticists work towards different ends, in some ways potentially descriptivist albeit representing Attic vocabulary as filtered through their own interpretations. Phrynichus' *Ecloga* represents a later development and

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[55] Erbse (1950), Strobel (2011) 16-72, Kim (2017) 45.
[56] *Ecl*. Pr., 231, 357, 394 all in reference to Cornelianus' (evidently commendable) use of Attic.

is a product of an environment in which—as shown from his references to other authors—Atticism has become agonistic and has elevated lexical or grammatical knowledge to become a *τεχνική*, an expertise, alongside rhetoric itself.

The discussion of Chapter Two will identify major themes in the language ideologies of different members of the community of Second Sophistic writers, outline the central oppositions among those ideologies, and determine the relative positions of authors along the linguistic-ideological axes to provide a background for an in-depth case study on Lucian's corpus. Chapter Three will examine how these ideologies surface in Lucian's corpus, where he stages versions of the Atticist debates for humorous effect in a way that upstages the experts he may be targeting in his satire. Modern historical and comparative linguistic analyses, being derived directly or indirectly from philological study of ancient and modern languages, are naturally suited to addressing the kinds of etymological, morphological, and dialectical issues found in Greek and Latin lexicography and related works. Through such methods many ancient analyses of Greek and Latin can be shown to be largely or even wholly incorrect. However, by focusing on language ideologies and the communities in which they exist (or which they create) this study will strive to avoid the dismissiveness that characterizes the approach of early linguistic anthropology towards traditional attitudes about language. Instead, this study will examine the intellectual lenses through which various authors or groups of authors interpret and arrange Greek, Attic, and Latin evidence to arrive at the positions they construct in their writing, regardless of the historical linguistic validity of their explanations of etymology or dialectical variation. Several different ideologies, some related and others not, inform each author's selection and interpretation of evidence and are reflected in the surviving products of their scholarly program. The present work will move outwards from the evidence available and identify some of the distinctive characteristics of each work that can be used to describe the relevant aspects of the author's

ideology. This chapter will also demonstrate how different authors interpret material in the service of their own positioning within the intellectual community of practice.

1.3.3 Communities of Practice

Whatever the standard, expertise in Greek is conveyed by choices in pronunciation[57], vocabulary, morphology, syntax, and idiomatic usage that are recognized as distinctive markers of dialect or register and mark one as a *pepaideumenos* in communities constructed around language usage. Such a group might be called a *speech community*, described by Gumperz (1968) as "any human aggregate characterized by regular and frequent interaction by means of a shared body of verbal signs and set off from similar aggregates by significant differences in language usage."[58] This model has been adopted in sociolinguistic studies to account for variations within a single language or dialect by looking at the larger cultural signifiers of the language as markers of community membership. In the case of Second Sophistic Atticism, many of its users, as will be shown, acknowledge a distinction between Attic and the Greek that they speak, but they differ on the questions of what exactly this distinction entails and whether Attic is a subset of Greek or overlaps it instead. However, the speech community model exhibits several shortcomings as a theoretical approach to characterize the Atticists of the Second Sophistic. The most obvious consideration is the acknowledged, deliberate differentiation of Atticist (or even Hellenist) language use from the common usage, which some refer to specifically as "Koinê" but others refer to as the "language of the masses"[59] or similar.

The refined Greek of Second Sophistic writers—Atticizers or otherwise—does not necessarily reflect the Greek language ecosystem of the eras and regions in which they are

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[57] Vessalla (2018).
[58] Gumperz (1968) 66.
[59] Moeris' lexicon uses *κοινόν* to refer to vocabulary outside either the Attic or Hellenist register, whereas Phrynichus refers to *οἱ πολλοί* or *τὸ πλῆθος* in his *Ecloga*.

working. The other crucial characteristic of the Atticist project is its inherent artificiality; as will be shown, virtually all of the authors involved, to a greater or lesser degree, adduce literary evidence and argue on the basis of grammatical principles to demonstrate their qualifications to reconstruct this intellectual language. They do not endeavor to observe and record as many empirical datapoints as possible so as to accurately reflect the dialect or register they purport to study. Their real project is not so much to capture "Attic" (or "Hellenic") as accurately as possible,[60] but rather, as Chapter Two will demonstrate, to establish authority through the construction of a model—often an idiosyncratic one—that demonstrates sufficient expertise. By asserting expertise and claiming authority, these Second Sophistic thinkers jockey for positions among the intellectual, cultural, and indeed political elite of the Imperial Greek world who practice Greek learning, *paideia*, as a key component of constructing their identity. Their writings do not reflect the Greek of their day, but rather seek to offer their own personal definition of what they believe it should be. The deliberately produced, artificial nature of the language found in many of the sources of the period makes the speech community model less practical for studying the Second Sophistic. Furthermore, the Atticizing and/or Hellenizing scholarly community of the Roman Empire is defined not by geography or by ethnicity: it can be located in Rome or Alexandria just as easily as Athens, and comprises Greeks, Syrians, Gauls—indeed even Romans.

This study will, therefore, view the sources under consideration as part of *communities of practice*, a concept articulated originally by Lave & Wenger (1991) and adapted to sociolinguistics by Eckert & McConnell-Ginet (1992) by emphasizing the role of language as a primary method of social engagement, in communities that are themselves fundamentally a set of social engagements. The individual assertion of status in a community of practice, such as the

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[60] Swain (1996) 20: "This linguistic Atticism was never a perfect copy of Attic Greek (which, of course, had its own internal variations)".

rhetoricians of second-century Athens or the more general category of *pepaideumenoi* is made possible by social engagement through communally-defined idioms, such as vocabulary and usage differentiating Attic speech from non-Attic registers or dialects. Cultures and cultural identities, therefore, are broadly-defined communities of practice with smaller communities instantiated within them; Atticist rhetoricians in Imperial Athens are one example, as are the learned banqueters or the elite social groups depicted by Athenaeus and Gellius respectively. As the results will show, the elite intellectual status sought and demonstrated by Atticists and others relies not on wealth or ethnic-racial privilege but rather on tokens of learned authority, at least theoretically; depictions of elite social groups in Lucian and other authors frequently fail to live up to this ideal and need an expert to straighten them out, as Chapters Four and Five will illustrate. The negotiation of terms for such authority—or the rejection of linguistic authority outright, a deliberate signaling of non-membership—is the practice by which individuals define their relationships with this community. Because of the prestige granted to Attic or other literary varieties of Greek (as well as Latin), the evidence for the non-prestige varieties is scant, though as will become relevant in Chapter Five, group identities can and do form around the "covert prestige" of non-elite practices, linguistic or otherwise.[61]

1.4 Outline of Chapters

Chapter Two: "Expertise and Usage" identifies three axes of language ideology in Greek and Latin literature. The Prescriptivism-Descriptivism opposition is one axis; the other two are Analogy-Anomaly and Atticism-Hellenism. Atticism is the primary focus of this work and indeed of much scholarship on language in the Second Sophistic as nearly every author who comments

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[61] Eckert (1989), from whose work the term "community of practice" developed, is a classic example of this phenomenon, while Bucholtz (1999) develops the model further. The discussion in Chapter Five will consider both of these studies as a point of comparison to Lucian's own self-positioning in and against the Atticizing community.

on linguistic subjects mentions it. Here, Atticism refers to a preference for the language of 5th-4th century BCE Athenian literature as the preferred register for literary artistry. In practice, Atticism varies from one author to the next due to the arbitrary nature of the division between Classical and post-Classical literature. As this chapter demonstrates, the lexicographer Phrynichus is perhaps the narrowest, most antiquarian Atticist by his excluding as *ἄδοκιμος*—unacceptable—authors of the later 4th century BCE (such as Aristotle) and even usages from earlier authors such as Sophocles and Xenophon. Phrynichus appears to regard Attic as not simply a medium for certain kinds of literary projects but, instead, the sole acceptable model for written Greek. Some other authors, such as the anonymous "Antiatticist" or Herennius Philo, have a more flexible standard of acceptable usage that includes a larger body of sources but is still recognizably Attic.

Another group, which includes the physician Galen of Pergamum, advances a far less antiquarian and Athenocentric view of acceptable language. According to this ideology, broadly called Hellenism, clarity and precision, not attestation or purity of dialect, ought to be the standard for evaluating usage. The Prescriptivist-Descriptivist ideology complements this schema: while Phrynichus gives clear directives (speak like the ancients, not like Favorinus or Menander), the Antiatticist allows contemporary common usages alongside or instead of ancient ones, and other Attic lexicographers like Moeris and Pollux merely compile Attic usage to facilitate interpretation of Classical literature. Yet several Hellenist authors are Prescriptivists, and some (Herodian or Apollonius, e.g.) write from a Stoic view in which grammatical rules amount to universal moral imperatives. Among Descriptivists, conversely, Sextus Empiricus articulates an anti-dogmatic Skeptic ideology that, among other things, prefigures Saussure in recognizing arbitrary or conventional relationships between signifier and signified, celebrates code-switching, and serves to rebuke the Stoic Hellenists.

The third axis lies between Analogy and Anomaly, a binary opposition recognized in ancient discussions of language as early as the second century BCE and discussed by many authors of this later period. Analogy presupposes that language usage is naturally regular, that any irregularities are evidence of degradation that must be corrected. Anomalists believe the opposite—that irregularity is an inherent feature of any natural language. The Stoic linguists prefer Analogy as an orderly principle, while others such as Pollux consider analogized forms acceptable where their meaning is clear. Sextus Empiricus, conversely, strongly opposes Analogy because of his preference for observed over idealized usage, and in this aspect he and Phrynichus are closely aligned as Anomalists due to the latter's frequent deprecating of incorrectly analogized Attic forms. The chapter concludes with a comparison of different Second Sophistic authors in Latin and Greek that assigns them positions along the three axes discussed.

Chapter Three: "Lucian and the Problem of Atticism" addresses the treatment of Atticism and language standards in the works of Lucian named above, in §1.2.1. Lucian is demonstrably an Atticist, as his vocabulary, morphology, and syntax have been clearly identified as belonging to that literary dialect. This feature of his writing creates a singular tension, between the archaizing characteristics of Atticism and the innovative satirical pastiche in which Lucian engages. This chapter focuses on three works that discuss Atticism explicitly and illustrates how his perspective and his targets of mockery shift from one work to the other. By looking for different views on language within Lucian's corpus, including in these three works where the author adopts *personae* who seem to contradict each other, this chapter's argument shows how Lucian stages his own versions of contemporary language debates.

The dialogue *Solecist* appears initially to align Lucian with the strictest Atticists, such as Phrynichus, by presenting a character named "Lucianus" (Λουκιανός) who engages in a pedantic demonstration of his mastery over the fine points of Attic grammar. However, this homonymous

figure deprecates many of the usages and constructions found elsewhere in Lucian, suggesting that he is not a self-insert for the author but, possibly, a target of mockery himself. It concludes that this work is a bi-directional satire that targets both ignorance of Atticism and overzealous application of it. In a sense, this reading supports the notion of Lucian as a moderate in the Atticizing movement,[62] albeit tentatively given the need to reach through two or more layers of satire to attempt this determination. The next work under consideration is the *Lexiphanes*, or "Speech-flaunter" in reference to the title character's pretentious attempts at hyper-Atticism. This work illustrates how hyper- and pseudo-Atticism are complementary, reciprocal, perhaps even identical. It demonstrates the futility of learning Attic through lexicons and grammar treatises, as Lexiphanes has, and advances the notion that true expertise comes from deeper engagement with Classical literary works and the ideas they convey. The *Professor of Rhetoric* is the third key work featured in this chapter. Its title character is a successful orator, who claims to have achieved great success by taking shortcuts to an appearance of rhetorical mastery while those who earnestly devote their lives to learning good rhetoric have failed. In describing his method, the Professor explains how he exploits the perception of Attic as a high-status language to make his speech appear virtuosic with a thin veneer of Attic vocabulary scattered over it. This willful abuse of Attic (and Greek in general) caricatures the speech of certain unnamed orators of the time and is a satirical depiction of the deficiencies introduced into Attic as a result of its elevated social status.

This chapter concludes by illustrating how Lucian's engagement with Aristophanes, whose influence he explicitly acknowledges in (e.g.) the *Double Indictment*, includes adapting

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[62] "…composer of essays and dialogues, the majority satirical and witty, in relaxed and undemanding, moderately Atticizing Greek prose" cf. "Lucian." *The Oxford Classical Dictionary*: Oxford University Press, January 01, 2012. Oxford Reference. Date Accessed 25 Mar. 2019. http://www.oxfordreference.com.proxy.lib.duke.edu/view/10.1093/acref/9780199545568.001.0001/acref-9780199545568-e-3779

Aristophanic mockery of bad Attic practice. While the Atticizing language of lexicography draws heavily from Aristophanes, Lucian effectively wields his deeper appreciation of Old Comedy to enlist Aristophanes and his contemporaries as allies in mocking the Atticizers whose superficial reading practices serve only to mine Old Comedy for vocabulary. Other writers, such as those discussed in the previous chapter, engage in these debates amongst each other; Lucian, on the other hand, projects an image of having moved so far beyond them that his only hope for a serious linguistic argument is to create one himself and populate it with characters of his own invention.

Chapter Four: "Language, Culture, and Identity in the Ancient Sociolinguistic Imagination" looks to the wider Second Sophistic context to discuss how several Greek and Latin authors articulate views on the relationship between language and cultural identity. Authors like Gellius, Athenaeus, and Fronto engage in cross-linguistic discussions, and in the process reveal a complex range of possibilities regarding the relationship between Roman, Greek, and barbarian as reflected in language. The character Ulpian in Athenaeus' *Deipnosophists* is, on one level, a parody of the strict Atticists discussed in Chapter Two of this project. His function is more complex, however, because he is a Syrian (like Lucian) who incessantly tests the other Greek and Roman banqueters as a way of asserting his Atticist status. When he attempts to put a halt to the influx of Latin loanwords into the discussion, he and his allies are exposed as pseudo-Atticists in the mold of Lucian's Lexiphanes. The *Deipnosophists* devotes considerable attention to exploring the origins and use of words, invoking Roman, Syrian, and other non-Greek cultural references. Ulpian's insistence on purity, therefore, sets him apart from the main ideological thrust of the work, an idealized Greco-Roman intellectualism, and as a result the other banqueters nickname him "Syratticus".

In contrast, Aulus Gellius, as this chapter argues, deliberately blurs the lines between languages, cultures, and identities—not least because while the *Attic Nights* is supposedly inspired by living in Athens, most of it is clearly set in Rome. He is no great fan of the prescriptive grammarians, and even less of their aims to silo Greek and Latin literature and culture apart from each other. Several of the entries in this work highlight the ways Greek influences Latin and vice-versa, and his teacher Favorinus features heavily as a Socrates-like figure whose cultural position constantly shifts between Gaul, Rome, and Greece. Both Gellius and Athenaeus write with an Aeolist ideology as well, presuming that Latin has its origins in Greek and so knowledge of each language can answer complex questions about the other. Fronto, by contrast, is strongly prescriptive in his letters to Marcus Aurelius, advocating something like a Latinized version of the strict Atticism discussed in Chapter One. His ideal Latin is antiquarian, purified of all Greek loanwords and constructions; when he writes in Greek, conversely, he states his aim of preventing any Latin or other languages from influencing his Attic, and highlights his doubly alien nature as both Roman and Libyan as an excuse should he fail. In disclaiming Greek, Fronto seeks to avoid diluting his already precarious Roman identity, which is not a concern for Athenaeus or Gellius (for a variety of reasons). Where Gellius and Athenaeus advocate exploration of language interactions, Fronto guards against them whenever possible and advises others to do the same.

Chapter Five: "Lucian's Satire of Language and Culture" addresses the relationships between language and cultural identity laid out in Lucian's satires, both in his comments on others' use of language and in his fictionalized and veiled representations of himself. While few works of Lucian's acknowledge Rome and the Latin language, in *On Salaried Posts* Lucian takes his readers into the world of Greek intellectuals living in Rome. This portrait of the sophistic life is grim, and illustrates how the cultural supremacy of Greece is not as stable a proposition as it

seems; even where Greek culture is valued as a status symbol, its fundamental nature—and that of the people who transmit it—receives little respect. The social order in Rome is upended, Lucian warns, for in that city the more Greek one is, the more barbarian they may appear. In some works, especially the *Double Indictment* and *Mistaken Critic*, Lucian posits his mastery of Attic as a token of Greek expertise, even as he appears to question whether such expertise suffices to establish his Greek identity. Throughout his corpus, however, he tends not only to reveal but in fact to foreground his Syrian origins: in the *Double Indictment*, the protagonist is known only as "the Syrian orator", while in the *Mistaken Critic*, for instance, he explicitly refers to his "barbarian" background even as he defends the validity of his speech, and in *On the Syrian Goddess* (written in Ionic, not Attic) the narrator cites his Syrian ethnicity to lend credence to his account.

It is uncontroversial to state that ancient satirists do not usually adopt a single consistent perspective. This chapter argues, however, that this tendency plays into an overarching theme of Lucian's satire on language: the decoupling of cultural identity from linguistic practice. Lucian's work not only relies on expertise in Classical Greek language and literature, it makes that expertise itself into a recurrent theme. At the same time, his hybrid outside-inside perspectives—the one by birth, the other by expertise—create a fundamentally intractable relationship between the *personae* and the cultural signifiers they command. Furthermore, throughout his corpus Lucian's various personae also highlight and mock the futility of making such expertise an end unto itself as a critique of the way Atticists, whether a Phrynichus-type of a Favorinus, use their Attic expertise for signaling purposes to gain status. Whenever Lucian presents ostensibly programmatic statements, as with his claim in *Double Indictment* to have combined the two fairest genres of dialogue and comedy, he emphasizes both the novelty of his project and the legitimacy it earns by faithful engagement with the material he draws on. In so doing, he

highlights the authentically Greek and indeed ancient nature of this supposedly novel material, and consequently also illustrates how the boundaries between genres recognized in contemporary discourse are, in fact, anachronistic. The literary impression Lucian creates of himself is denied a Greek identity, but this character of the perpetual outsider transgressing boundaries (which others believe to be solid, but he knows better) is confident he will nevertheless defeat the other Atticizing sophists at their own game.

1.5 Conclusions: A Barbarian at the Gates

The dissertation ends with a discussion of the way Lucian's linguistic themes serve as the basis for his satire and stage representations of ideologies found in the works of other authors discussed in this study. Addressing the shifts in Lucian's satirical position, whether gatekeeping or mocking the gatekeeper, this discussion shows how he mediates his expressions of Atticist ideology through different characters that demonstrate the vacuity of establishing language standards and expertise for their own sake. The concluding section also explains how the staging of language debates in Lucian parallels that of Gellius and Athenaeus, and continues on to argue that such portrayals serve as much to articulate views of the relationship between language practice and cultural identity. It contrasts the worlds of Lucian with those of the other authors, specifically the ways his different *personae* use their language and broader *paideia* to interact with the different cultural identity positions present in them and describes how these interactions differ from other Second Sophistic representations. The work concludes that the overall theme of Lucian's engagement with language and culture is to decouple Atticizing *paideia* from the cultural position of Greekness, and create a distinctive authorial *persona*—or more accurately, set of *personae*—for whom an outsider identity need not bar entry into the Greek intellectual discourse.

2. Expertise and Usage in the Second Sophistic

This chapter will sketch out the linguistic-ideological landscape of the Second Sophistic by examining the different ways in which self-professed linguistic experts define correct usage of language. The definitions they construct for correct and incorrect usage rely on, and therefore allow us to examine, the language ideology underlying their works. The authors of the lexicons, grammatical treatises, and other works that create this linguistic landscape define themselves according to several different ideologies that oppose or agree with each other in complex ways. While several writers define themselves ideologically as "Atticists", they do not necessarily agree on what that label entails; conversely, other writers disagree with the Attic ideology and advance a contrasting vision for literary Greek yet, as this chapter will show, can find themselves in agreement with them anyway.

2.1 Phrynichus and Atticism

The Atticist lexicographer Phrynichus Arabius is regarded by many scholars of the Second Sophistic, and especially those who have published on Lucian, as a notoriously uncompromising and fastidious Atticist.[1] In some respects, this reputation is owed to a desire on the part of Lucian scholars to see specific contemporaneous individuals as the basis for various interlocutors or addressees whom Lucian makes the butt of his joking (or not so joking) harangues.[2] References, whether direct or oblique, to other writers of his day are rare in Lucian and attempts at prosopography in his corpus are perilous for many reasons. This issue will be dealt with in Chapter Three. From Phrynichus' own writing, however, it is clear that he was at

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[1] Jones (1986); Swain (1996) 53-55; Tribulato (2014).
[2] Helm (1927) 1748 and Baldwin (1961) suggest Phrynichus as one of Lucian's targets in the *Pseudologista,* to pick one example. Swain (1996) 53-55 discusses Phrynichus in relation to Lucian, though in this specific case he sees a different Sophist lying behind the literary target. Hawkins (2014) 221n.2 states a preference to interrogate literary themes, rather than specific targets; the present chapter will map out the aspects of these themes that relate to ideas about language standards in Lucian's time.

least Lucian's contemporary: the treatise on rhetorical style known as the *Praeparatio sophistica* has a preface dedicated explicitly to Commodus, and the dedicand of his Atticizing lexicon, Cornelianus, (discussed below) is said to have been appointed to his office by the *βασιλεῖς Ῥωμαίων* rather than the *βασιλεύς*.[3] Later sources such as the *Suda* (φ 764) and Photius (*Bib.* 158) provide additional details, including titles of inextant works by Phrynichus and their length, though they do not agree on whether he was born in Bithynia or instead had his training and early career there. Photius attests that he was in competition with Pollux (Polydeukes) for the chair of rhetoric in Athens—a competition which Pollux evidently won (Philostratus, *VS* 12)—although no direct evidence for such a rivalry exists within the works of either Phrynichus or Pollux.[4] The present section will focus primarily on the way his short Attic lexicon—known as the *Ecloga nominum et verborum Atticorum*—reveals its author's efforts to assert prescriptive authority in Attic grammar and usage. This work appears to have been written relatively late in Phrynichus' career—later than his longer, also extant *Praeparatio sophistica*[5]—and for this reason can be taken to represent a well-developed version of Phrynichus' judgments on the Attic dialect and its literary canon. As this chapter will demonstrate, the agenda of his prescriptivist lexicon entails nearly as much denigration of other Greek writers, both past and present,[6] as it does demonstration of Phrynichus' expertise in the Attic canon.

The *Ecloga* lays out a strict program of linguistic gate-keeping to establish the standard of Attic that Phrynichus evidently considers correct. The work contains approximately 420

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[3] Bowersock (1969) 55: these plural emperors are Marcus Aurelius and either Lucius Verus or Commodus; Avotins (1978) 191: the latter pair is more likely given the other evidence available elsewhere in Phrynichus, contemporary authors, and Philostratus

[4] Fischer (1974) 44-5 and Janiszewski et al. (2015), summarizing the arguments against Naechster (1908) whose work primarily concerns this supposed competition but, in the modern view, does not supply compelling evidence in support of its having taken place.

[5] Avotins (1978) 187-91; cf. Bowersock (1968) 54-5.

[6] But, as mentioned above, these writers conspicuously do not include Pollux.

entries,[7] transmitted by the manuscripts in an order without discernible logic behind it. In the past it has been theorized that the extant text of the *Ecloga*, like what survives of the *Praeparatio*, is an epitome of a longer original.[8] The current prevailing view, however, is that the received text is not abridged and that entries survive in essentially their original form if not the original order.[9] All of the entries in the *Ecloga* comment on words, word-forms, or phrases and prescribe the usage that best fits Phrynichus' standard for Attic Greek. The first impressions of what this standard comprises appear in the lexicon's epistolary preface,[10] in which he presents the work to follow as the end product of an assignment his patron Cornelianus[11] gave him to identify some of τῶν καλῶν καὶ δοκίμων ὀνομάτων (the refined and legitimate words). After the requisite flattery of Cornelianus' *paideia*, he inveigles against words *τὴν ἀρχαίαν διάλεξιν ταραττούσας καὶ πολλὴν αἰσχύνην ἐμβαλλούσας* (throwing the ancient speech into disarray and causing much embarrassment), making his antiquarian preferences clear from the start. He concludes that any reasonable person would prefer to speak *ἀρχαίως καὶ ἀκριβῶς* (in an ancient and precise fashion) rather than *νεοχμῶς*[12] *καὶ ἀμελῶς* (in a newfangled and careless one), and begins the rest of the work thus: *Ὅστις ἀρχαίως καὶ δοκίμως ἐθέλει διαλέγεσθαι, τάδε αὐτῷ φυλακτέα.* (Whoever wishes

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[7] The standard edition of Fischer (1974) has 424, though it also gives the 'q' variant with 422.
[8] See Naechster (1908) 11, for the original articulation of this theory.
[9] Fischer (1974) 37, "Die Ekloge ist nicht verkürzt", discusses the issue at some length. He draws attention to the greater frequency of longer, more discursive entries towards the end of the transmitted text, a feature unknown in other epitomes and quite unlike the "q" family of manuscripts that demonstrably do transmit an epitomized version of the *Ecloga*. While Fischer readily admits that the complete text of the work is most likely not available to be reconstructed from the extant manuscripts, he and more recent scholars (such as Strobel (2009) 137) agree that much of what does survive most likely represents Phrynichus' original version.
[10] See Appendix B.1 for the full text.
[11] i.e. Sulpicius Cornelianus, the *ab epistulis Graecis* to Marcus Aurelius and perhaps Commodus too. On the evidence of this letter, he also seems to have been an acquaintance of Phrynichus—or at least Phrynichus made it look that way. Marcus Cornelius Fronto, one of the subjects of Chapter Four, wrote a letter of recommendation in Attic (*Ad am.* 1.2) on behalf of Cornelianus to P. Aelius Apollonides; cf. Bowersock (1969) 54-5, Fischer (1974) 44-7, Champlin (1980) 29-30, Argyle (1989).
[12] Only attested in second century CE Atticizing prose; Strobel (2005) 99 suggests Phrynichus deliberately breaches protocol in using a word he knows to be novel as a meta-rhetorical trick (given its literal meaning) to highlight the severity of failing to adhere to ancient models.

to conduct discussion in an ancient and acceptable fashion ought to observe the following). Taken in its entirety, this preface introduces several terms that Phrynichus will employ throughout the *Ecloga* to characterize various Attic, pseudo-Attic, and non-Attic words, forms, and constructions. In order, they are *παιδεία, καλός, δόκιμος/δοκίμως, ἄδοκιμος, ἀρχαῖος/ἀρχαίως, ἀμαθία, ἀκριβῶς, νεοχμῶς, ἀμελῶς, αἰσχρός*. These words (along with their derivatives and synonyms) can be arranged into several opposed pairs that provide a rough sketch of Phrynichus' schema of Atticism. Usage can be good or bad (*καλός/αἰσχρός*), acceptable or unacceptable (*δόκιμος/ἄδοκιμος*, which applies both to words and the sources in which they are found), precise or careless (*ἀκριβῶς/ἀμελῶς*), ancient or novel (*ἀρχαῖος/νεοχμῶς*), and indicate education or ignorance (*παιδεία/ἀμαθία*).

The *δόκιμος/ἄδοκιμος* opposition is the central mechanic of Phrynichus' gatekeeping of Atticism, as will be shown. On an etymological level these terms have a partly descriptivist connotation that captures senses of noteworthiness, reputation, and approval, and they can apply both to usages and to the sources in which they are found. However, in this work this terminology is focalized through the author and his personal standards, not on a collective cultural approval or disapproval.[13] Furthermore, Phrynichus' other terminology unambiguously highlights the prescriptivist lens through which he views Attic usage. All of the terms listed above typify the voice of one who presumes to speak from a position of authority to cast judgment on a word's validity. As the closing sentence indicates, this authority comes from being sufficiently informed: mistakes, says Phrynichus, are not the product of willful decisions to choose shameful forms (*τὸ αἰσχρὸν τοῦ καλοῦ προτιθέναι*) but simply arise out of ignorance (*ἀμαθίαν*). To suggest (as Phrynichus does) that education will naturally lead one to employ language correctly is the defining characteristic of a prescriptivist, because it implies what Apollonius Dyscolus explicitly

[13] Dem. 35.29, for instance, where *δόκιμον ἀργύριον* refers specifically to legal tender.

states in his work (*Syntax* 1.13)[14]—that the language has an inherent rationality or correctness to its structure and usage[15] which one can and must uncover through study such as that which Phrynichus has undertaken, the nature of which study is revealed through an analysis of the work that follows.

These paired opposed terms, including their variant forms and derivatives, appear throughout the *Ecloga* in qualitative evaluation of different words, meanings, or collocations with the following frequency:[16]

Table 1: Prescriptivist Terminology from Preface, with total number of occurrences in the *Ecloga*, and number applied to usages or to sources.

Term	Total	Preface	Usages	Sources
ἀρχαῖος	83	5	19	64
νεοχμῶς	1	1	1	0
δόκιμος	50	2	32	18
ἄδοκιμος	38	1	38	0
καλός	5	2	2	0
αἰσχρός	3	1	1	0
ἀκριβής	3	1	1	0
ἀμελής	2	1	1	0
παιδεία	5	2	n/a	n/a
ἀμαθία	1	1	n/a	n/a

[14] Ἴσως τινὲς ἀπειρότερον ἀναστρέφοντες περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα τὰς ἰδίας ἀπειρίας παραμυθοῦνται, ὡς οὐ δέον περὶ τὰς τοιαύτας ζητήσεις καταγίνεσθαι, ὑπολαβόντες τὰ τοιαῦτα κατὰ τύχην τεθεματίσθαι· ἀλλὰ τούτοις γε προσγενήσεται ἐν τοῖς καθόλου μηδὲν ἐν τάξει παραλαμβάνειν μηδὲ παρὰ τάξιν τι ἡμαρτῆσθαι, ὅπερ πάντῃ ἠλίθιον· εἰ γὰρ ἐπὶ τινῶν δοίης, ἀνάγκη κἀπὶ πάντων δοῦναι.
Perhaps some people, less experienced in the field, console themselves for their ignorance with the idea that there is no need to spend time on such investigations, and assume that such things have been imposed by chance. But they will have to assume too that nothing is in order or wrong and out of order at the highest level (*ἐν τοῖς καθόλου*), which is in every way ridiculous: for, if you grant it in some cases, you must grant it in all. Atherton (1995) 462-3 (tr. Atherton)

[15]This view is shared by Rutherford (1881) viii: "Eliminate the innumerable and gross corruptions which transmission by the hand of copyists through a score of centuries necessarily entails, and the texts of Attic writers would present as few errors in syntax and in the forms of words as the best French classics." This concept of an underlying order to language should be distinguished from contemporary theories of Universal Grammar, which seek to derive generalized principles that describe the nature of human communication; examples of current approaches in this field include the Minimalist Program (Chomsky) or Optimality Theory (Prince and Smolensky).

[16] These numbers do not include occurrences of this vocabulary within quotations or within the definition of a word itself, but only where they are used to pronounce judgment on the validity of a word and/or its source.

Immediately apparent are the chief concern with identifying words, usages, and their sources as *δόκιμος* or ἀδόκιμος (acceptable/legitimate/reputable, or the opposite), and as *ἀρχαῖος* (ancient) or not. The close connection between antiquity and validity signals Phrynichus' prescriptivism; for Phrynichus antiquity signifies legitimacy in a word or phrase, for example *Ecl*. 61: "*Νοίδιον καὶ βοίδιον ἀρχαῖα καὶ δόκιμα, οὐχὶ νούδιον καὶ βούδιον.*"(*Noidion*—a little thought—and *boidion*—a calf—are ancient and legitimate, not *noudion* and *boudion*). The near-synonym *παλαιός* also appears with some frequency; this is a typical example from *Ecl.* 208:

> Παραβόλιον· ἀδόκιμον τοῦτο. τῷ μὲν οὖν ὀνόματι οὐ κέχρηνται οἱ παλαιοί, τῷ δὲ ῥήματι· φασὶ γὰρ οὕτω· "παραβάλλομαι τῇ ἐμαυτοῦ κεφαλῇ". ἐχρῆν οὖν κἀπὶ τούτων λέγειν "παραβάλλομαι ἀργυρίῳ".
>
> 'Parabolion' (account payment): This is illegitimate. Thus, the ancient writers did not use the noun, but the verb; for they say thus: "I put up my own head as collateral." Thus, they deemed it proper also in these cases to say, "I make a deposit in silver".

Many entries also contrast the usage of contemporary speakers, often referred to as *οἱ νῦν*, with that of ancient sources; they invariably deprecate the former, e.g. *Ecl.* 135:

> Θυμέλην· τοῦτο οἱ μὲν ἀρχαῖοι ἀντὶ τοῦ θυσίαν ἐτίθεσαν, οἱ δὲ νῦν ἐπὶ τοῦ τόπου ἐν τῷ θεάτρῳ, ἐφ' οὗ αὐληταὶ καὶ κιθαρῳδοὶ καὶ ἄλλοι τινὲς ἀγωνίζονται. σὺ μέντοι, ἔνθα μὲν τραγῳδοὶ καὶ κωμῳδοὶ ἀγωνίζονται, λογεῖον ἐρεῖς, ἔνθα δὲ οἱ αὐληταὶ καὶ οἱ χοροί, ὀρχήστραν· μὴ λέγε δὲ θυμέλην.
>
> 'Thymelen' (altar): the ancients use it for 'thysian', but people nowadays use it of the place in the theater upon which flute-players and citharists and some others compete. You, however, will say 'logeion' for the place where tragedians and comedians compete, and 'orchestran' for the place where flute-players and dancers compete; but do not say 'thymelen'.

A similar contrast is drawn between the ancient and popular usage; as with *οἱ νῦν, οἱ πολλοὶ* appear 22 times in Phrynichus in order to be compared (almost always unfavorably[17]) with the *ἀρχαῖοι*:[18]

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[17] Only one entry, *Ecl.* 253, appears to treat popular usage in a descriptive fashion:
Ὀνυχίζειν καὶ ἐξονυχίζειν· ταὐτὸ σημαίνει ἑκάτερα καὶ τίθεται ἐπὶ τοῦ ἀκριβολογεῖσθαι. τὸ δ' ἀπονυχίζειν τὸ τὰς ὑπεραυξήσεις τῶν ὀνύχων ἀφαιρεῖν σημαίνει. ἐπειδὴ δὲ ὁ πολὺς συρφετὸς λέγουσιν "ὀνύχισόν με" καὶ "ὠνυχισάμην", σημαινόμεθα τὰ ὀνόματα καί φαμεν ὅτι, εἰ μὲν ἐπὶ τοῦ τοὺς ὄνυχας ἀφαιρεῖν τίθησί τις, χρήσαιτο ἂν τῷ ἀπονυχίζειν, εἰ δ' ἐπὶ τοῦ ἀκριβολογεῖσθαι καὶ ἐξετάζειν ἀκριβῶς, τῷ ὀνυχίζειν χρήσαιτ' ἄν.

> Λόγιος· ὡς οἱ πολλοὶ λέγουσιν, ἐπὶ τοῦ δεινοῦ εἰπεῖν καὶ ὑψηλοῦ, οὐ τιθέασιν οἱ ἀρχαῖοι, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ τοῦ τὰ ἐν ἑκάστῳ ἔθνει ἐπιχώρια ἐξηγουμένου ἐμπείρως. (*Ecl*. 172)
>
> 'Logios' (versed in stories): The ancients do not apply it as the masses do, to someone clever and sublime at speaking, but rather to someone narrating as an expert the customs among each race.
>
> Ὄρθρος νῦν ἀκούω τῶν πολλῶν τιθέντων ἐπὶ τοῦ πρὸ ἡλίου ἀνίσχοντος χρόνου· οἱ δὲ ἀρχαῖοι ὄρθρον καὶ ὀρθρεύεσθαι τὸ πρὸ ἀρχομένης ἡμέρας, ἐν ᾧ ἔτι λύχνῳ δύναταί τις χρῆσθαι. ὃ τοίνυν οἱ πολλοὶ ἁμαρτάνοντες ὄρθρον λέγουσιν, τοῦθ' οἱ ἀρχαῖοι ἕω λέγουσιν.
>
> '*Orthros'* (daybreak): Nowadays I hear the masses applying it to the time before the sun rises; but the ancient sources [apply] *'orthron'* and *'orthreuesthai'* (to lie awake in the early dawn) to the [part] before the beginning of day, in which one can still make use of a lamp. Therefore, what the masses mistakenly call *'orthron'* the ancient sources call *'eo'* (dawn). (*Ecl*. 240)

Moreover, Phrynichus employs several other adjectives, in addition to those found in his preface such as *δόκιμος*, to evaluate various usages; some of the more common are listed here:

Table 2: Common qualitative terminology used in the *Ecloga* to evaluate usage or sources

Term	Total	Preface	Usages	Sources[19]
ἀρχαῖος	83	5	19	64
δόκιμος	50	2	32	18
ἁμαρτάνω[20]	30	0	10	20
ἀδόκιμος	38	1	38	0
οἱ πολλοί	22	0	0	22
ὀρθῶς[21]	18	0	11	7

'Onychizein' (to nit-pick) and 'exonychizein' (to pick out): Both denote the same thing and are applied to the act of speaking precisely. But 'aponychizein' (clip away) denotes the act of removing the overgrowth of the fingernails. And since the great mob say 'onychison me' (nit-pick at me) and 'onychisamen' (I nit-picked), we deduce the meaning of the words and we say that, if someone applies them to the act of clipping the nails, one would use 'aponychizein', but if to the act of speaking precisely and carefully scrutinizing, one would use 'onychizein'

[18] In one case, the usage of the ὄλιγοι is explicitly recommended: Χρεολυτῆσαι λέγει ὁ πολὺς λεώς, ἀλλ' οἱ ὀλίγοι καὶ Ἀττικοὶ τὰ χρέα διαλύσασθαι. ('Chreolytesai'—to reconcile debts): The great mob says this, but the elite and Attic say 'ta chrea dialysasthai').

[19] This category includes all references to people, even vague references such as "the orators" or "those who pronounce it this way".

[20] Incl. ἁμαρτία, ἁμάρτημα, etc.

ἀμαθής[22]	21	1	7	13
παλαιός	12	0	0	12
οἱ νῦν	12	0	0	12
βάρβαρος	7	0	7	0
σόλοικος	5	0	5	0
καλός	5	2	5	0

These two characteristics, the preference for antiquity over modernity and rejection of common usage in deriving linguistic authority, impart a generally prescriptivist flavor to Phrynichus' brand of Atticism. The various adjectives, most notably *δόκιμος*, serve a binary function by denoting an approval or disapproval on the part of the author towards a word, usage, or source; they are the labels that Phrynichus attaches to determine whether something should be admitted into Atticism or not. Perhaps the most plainly prescriptive aspect of the *Ecloga*, however, is Phrynichus' frequent usage of absolutist directives—prescriptions, one should say—to the reader regarding what he should or should not say:

Table 3: Reader directives from Phrynichus, *Ecloga*.

Term	Total	Usages	Sources
λέγε	112		
χρὴ λέγειν	48		
ἐρεῖς	29		
δέον	20	20	0
ῥητέον	12		
φάθι	11		
εἴπῃς	8		
λεκτέον	6	6	0
χρηστέον	3	3	0
πειστέον	3	0	3
παραίτου	3	3	0
παραιτήτεον	2	2	0
ἀκολουθητέον	1	0	1
διαγράπτεον	1	1	0

[21] Incl. comparative *ὀρθότερον*.
[22] Incl. ἀμαθία, ἀμαθῶς..

The author of this work has a clear sense of what is and is not valid Attic usage, demonstrated by the variety of unambiguous statements informing the reader of what one should or should not say in order to sound sufficiently Attic.

In order to obtain a clearer sense of what the key terms *ἀρχαῖος* and *δόκιμος* mean in application to the texts and authors that Phrynichus discusses, one should consider the sources that he uses. The following table ranks his most commonly used sources or groups of sources; around half of the sources that he uses receive only a single mention, as can be seen in the full table in Appendix B.2:

Table 4: Sources cited by name, genre, or other category in Phrynichus, *Ecloga*[23]

Author/Speaker/Genre	Entries	Accepts	Rejects
the ancients	64	*	*
Favorinus	16	0	16*
Menander	15	1(2*)	14
Athenians	14	14	0
Aristophanes	12	9	3*
Ionians	10	4*	6*
Demosthenes	9	8	1*
Plato	6	5	1
Thucydides	6	6	
Cratinus	6	4	2*
orators	5	1	4
Old Comedy	5	4	1*
Dorians	5	1*	4
Herodotus	4	0	4*
Stoics	4	0	4

Judging from the relative numbers of positive and negative mentions, the chronologically latest source or author whom Phrynichus considers reliably Attic is Demosthenes. Menander,

[23] Numbers with asterisk* are ambiguous as to whether they are positive or negative commentary on the sources in question—for instance, 411: *Αἰχμαλωτισθῆναι· τοῦθ' οὕτως ἀδόκιμον ὡς μηδὲ Μένανδρον αὐτῷ χρήσασθαι. διαλύων οὖν λέγε αἰχμάλωτον γενέσθαι.* (Aichmalotisthenai' (to be taken captive): This is so unacceptable that not even Menander would use it. So, eliminate it and say 'aichmaloton genesthai' (to become captive)).

born some 20 years before Demosthenes' death, is almost always deprecated for his usage of Greek, and on balance later and contemporary figures are to be followed only when they accord with more ancient sources. As Strobel (2005) observes, Phrynichus' canon is most characterized as consisting of 1) the three Athenian tragedians, 2) the ten Attic orators, 3) Plato, 4) Homer, and 5) a handful of comedians, but especially Aristophanes.[24] In general, then, *ἀρχαῖος* refers to sources no newer than the late fourth century BCE, writing in or around Athens—along with Homer, an exception discussed below.

It is worth noting at this stage that the question of Phrynichus' prescriptivism is complicated by the stated scope of his project. At *Ecl*. 235 he clarifies for the reader just which form of Greek he is seeking to study: ... *οὐ μὴν τῷ ὑφ' Ἡροδότου εἰρῆσθαι τὸ δόκιμον τῆς χρήσεως παρέχεται· οὐ γὰρ Ἰωνικῶν καὶ Δωρικῶν ἐξέτασίς ἐστιν ὀνομάτων, ἀλλ' Ἀττικῶν {ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ δόκιμον τῆς χρήσεως κρίνει}*[25]. (...of a truth, the legitimacy of the usage is not provided by its being said by Herodotus, for this is not an examination of Ionic and Doric words, but of Attic ones {just as the acceptability of the usage also determines}.) In some 49 entries the Attic or Atticistic nature of a word or usage is specifically highlighted. In a few cases, the explicit mention of Attic is used to make a dialectical distinction and identify the lexical entry with some other (i.e. non-Attic) variety of Greek. In some 26 entries[26] an insufficiently Atticistic headword is identified as not necessarily incorrect but rather as belonging to another dialect, as in the example of *Ecl.* 335:

> Γογγυσμὸς καὶ γογγύζειν· ταῦτα ἀδόκιμα μὲν οὐκ ἔστιν, Ἰακὰ δέ. Φωκυλίδην γὰρ οἶδα κεχρημένον αὐτῷ τὸν Μιλήσιον, ἄνδρα παλαιὸν σφόδρα (fr. 5 D.3)· "καὶ τόδε Φωκυλίδεω· χρή τοι τὸν ἑταῖρον ἑταίρῳ φροντίζειν, ἅσσ' ἂν περιγογγύζωσι πολῖται."

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[24] Strobel (2005) 146.
[25] In Fischer's ed. the {braces} indicate sections deemed inauthentic.
[26] *Ecl*. 62, 79, 101, 117, 156, 158, 164, 178, 189, 192, 211, 225, 235, 236*, 270, 272, 295, 305, 332, 335, 340, 354, 367, 383, 396*, 401, {423}, {424}. (*a writer is identified as Ionic, but his language is not specifically assigned to that dialect)

> ἀλλὰ τοῦτο μὲν Ἴωσιν ἀφείσθω, ἡμεῖς δὲ τονθρυσμὸν καὶ τονθρύζειν λέγωμεν ἢ νὴ Δία σὺν τῷ ο τονθορυσμὸν καὶ τονθορύζειν.
>
> '*Gongysmos'* (muttering) and *'gongyzein'* (to mutter): These are not illegitimate, but Ionic. For I know that Phocylides of Miletus, a very ancient man, has used it: "This is also [a word of] Phocylides; mark, a comrade ought to give thought to a comrade, whatever the citizens may mutter." But leave this for the Ionians and let us say *'tonthrysmon'* and *'tonthryzein'* or, by Zeus, *'tonthorysmon'* and *'tonthoryzein'* with the omicron.

Note that Phocylides' antiquity is foregrounded, a detail identifying *γογγυσμός* and *γογγύζειν* as attested ancient Ionic Greek terms and not Koinê or other modern corruptions. Though it is dismissed from the Attic lexicon, this dismissal comes not because it is illegitimate but rather because it is *inappropriate* to this work's Atticizing project.

As discussed in the introduction, the central feature of descriptivist analysis is the rejection of the labels "correct" and "incorrect" in favor of "appropriate" and "inappropriate". Taken together, the acknowledgment of other dialects, the recognition of their antiquity (especially for Ionic), and the distinction between dialectical variants and illegitimate words lend this work the appearance, at least in some respects, of a descriptivist project. In this view, Phrynichus' lexicon could be a report on the findings of a rigorous examination of fifth- and fourth-century Classical Athenian texts. The directive Phrynichus appears to have received, Cornelianus' command for him, *τὰς ἀδοκίμους τῶν φωνῶν ἀθροισθῆναι*, does indeed frame this work as a research project. Lending additional descriptivist flavor are a dozen entries[27] using a form of *εὑρίσκω* to show that the writer has observed certain usages in Attic texts, such as in *Ecl*. 14: *Ἀποτάσσομαί σοι ἔκφυλον πάνυ· χρὴ γὰρ λέγειν ἀσπάζομαί σε. οὕτω γὰρ καὶ οἱ ἀρχαῖοι εὑρίσκονται λέγοντες, ἐπειδὰν ἀπαλλάττωνται ἀλλήλων*. ('*Apotassomai soi'* (I bid you adieu) is altogether unnatural, for one must say *'aspazomai se'* (I take leave of you). For the ancients are also found speaking this way, whenever they depart from one another). Vocabulary referring to

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[27] *Ecl.* 14, 46, 123 (this one explicitly rejects ancient usage), 126, 145, 200, 232, 244, 248, 351, 355, 364. See Appendix B.3 for the full entries.

searches and discoveries could indeed suggest that Phrynichus is investigating and reporting on the corpus of Attic, rather than seeking to prescribe usage from an *a priori* model. If this is his project, then any imperatives directed at the reader to employ or reject a given term come from within such a framework and would not derive from a prescriptivist outlook that considers un-Attic forms to be illegitimate or corrupt Greek. Phrynichus, according to this interpretation, is not commenting on whether Greek words are "correct" or "incorrect" but instead on how appropriate or inappropriate they are to a specific linguistic context.

However, such a descriptivist interpretation of Phrynichus' project does not hold up in the face of further evidence from the *Ecloga*, for two principal reasons. The first is that, in many entries, the Attic form is regarded as the correct *Greek* form, meaning that Phrynichus approaches language questions from the perspective that evidence of a word's usage, even if it be widespread, does not guarantee its legitimacy.[28] While in *Ecl*. 235 Phrynichus specifies that an examination of Attic alone and not all Greek is his purview, elsewhere in the work he conflates the two – for example *Ecl.* 52, *Τάχιον' Ἕλληνες οὐ λέγουσιν, θᾶττον δέ.* (Greeks do not say *tachion*—'more fast'—but *thatton*—'quicker'). This entry will be discussed further below, but here one should note the geminate tau of *θᾶττον*, a distinctive dialectical feature of Attic, being used to characterize the speech of the *Ἕλληνες*—not the *Ἀττικοί*.[29] In fact, the comparative *τάχιον* appears in a number of Greek texts, including that of the self-consciously classicizing Dionysius of Halicarnassus.[30] Nevertheless, for reasons that+ will be explored later in this chapter it does not meet Phrynichus' standard for Greek, let alone Atticism. The criticism at *Ecl*. 246 is similar:

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[28] Dihle (1994) 55 suggests this blurring of lines between "good Greek" and "Attic" in Phrynichus indicates a "mission creep" of Attic moving from the realm of literary prose and rhetorical instruction into becoming, for Phrynichus and other sophists, the sole model for all written Greek.
[29] This group of *Ἕλληνες* should not be confused for *οἱ πολλοί*, however ethnically or culturally Greek the latter may be. It refers to the educated population of Greek-speakers who are careful about language usage—the audience for this work, presumably. This group is the one with which the "Hellenist" grammarians associate themselves, and it is likely the same as the users of "Hellenic" register in Moeris.
[30] Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rom.* 6.42, e.g.

Εὐστάθεια ἢ εὐσταθής· πόθεν καὶ ταῦτα εἰς τὴν τῶν Ἑλλήνων φωνὴν εἰσερρύη, ἀδοκιμώτατα ὄντα, φροντίδος ἄξιον. ἀλλὰ σὺ ἐμβρίθεια λέγε καὶ ἐμβριθής. (*Eustatheia*—steadfastness—or *eustathes*—steadfast: It is worth considering from where these too have forced their way into the speech of the Greeks, given that they are entirely illegitimate. But you should instead say *embritheia* and *embrithes.*) Likewise, in *Ecl*. 45 he identifies *εἶτε(ν)* and *ἔπειτε(ν)* as *ἐσχάτως βάρβαρα* but the earlier Atticist lexicographer Aelius Dionysius, in reference to the same pair of words, says *εἶτα καὶ ἔπειτα· Ἀττικά. τὸ δὲ εἶτεν καὶ ἔπειτεν Ἰακά. διὸ καὶ παρ' Ἡροδότῳ κεῖνται* (*'eita'* and *'epeita*': Attic, and '*eiten'* and '*epeiten'* are Ionic. For that reason, they are also attested in Herodotus; Ael. Dion. *Att. onom.* 25). Here, too, the interest in Greek dialectology present elsewhere appears to be missing, and the distinction of Attic from Ionic et al. receives no mention. Despite Phrynichus' emphasis on Atticism in certain entries, on balance he appears concerned as much with *Ἑλληνισμός* as with *Ἀττικισμός*—though his Hellenism universally prefers Attic to the detriment of other dialects.

This last criticism in the preceding paragraph may appear incongruous with Phrynichus' use of authority elsewhere, given that, for instance, the adjective *εὐσταθής* is found in Homer (*Il*. 18.374, *Od*. 20.258) and Phrynichus evidently regards Homer as an authority on Attic questions, as demonstrated in entry 324:

> Διδῴη καὶ διδῴης· τούτου τὸ εὐκτικὸν οὐδεὶς τῶν Ἀττικῶν εἶπε διὰ τοῦ ω, ἀλλὰ διὰ τῆς οι διφθόγγου. τεκμηριοῖ δὲ Ὅμηρος· ἐὰν μὲν γὰρ ὑποτακτικῶς χρῆται, διὰ τοῦ ω λέγει· "εἰ δέ κεν αὖ τοι δῴη κῦδος ἀρέσθαι" (Π 87 sq.), ἔστι γὰρ "ἐὰν δέ σοι δῷ ὁ Ζεύς"· εἰ δὲ εὐκτικῶς, οὕτως· "σοὶ δὲ θεοὶ τόσα δοῖεν, ὅσα φρεσὶ σῇσι μενοινᾷς" (ζ 180). ἐθαύμασα οὖν Ἀλεξάνδρου τοῦ Σύρου σοφιστοῦ δῴη καὶ διδῴη λέγοντος ἐπὶ εὐκτικοῦ.
>
> 'Didôiê' (one would give) and 'didôiês' (you would give): None of the Attic writers spoke the optative of this word with the omega, but rather with the omicron-iota diphthong. And Homer proves it, for whenever he uses it in the subjunctive, he says it with the omega: "ei de ken au toi / dôiê kydos aresthai" (and if he should give further honor to satisfy you), for there does exist "ean de soi dôi ho Zeus" (if ever Zeus gives it to you); but if in the optative, thus: "*soi de theoi tosa doien, hosa phresi sêisi menoinâis*" (and may the gods give to you whatever you desire in your heart.) So I marveled at the sophist Alexander the Syrian saying 'dôiê' and 'didôiê' for the optative.

Euripides employs the verbal derivative *εὐσταθέω*—but in the *Rhesus*, which (depending on its authorship) Phrynichus may not have known or may have considered spurious[31]. Conversely, the noun *εὐστάθεια* seems characteristic of the later writers[32] whom Phrynichus censures in this and many similar entries. Nevertheless the derivation of the noun from the adjective is transparent and it follows the pattern of well attested Classical forms such as *ἀκριβής/ἀκρίβεια*, so to characterize its appearance in Greek as *φροντίδος ἄξιον* is somewhat perplexing. His preference for *ἐμβριθής* is explained by its use in Aeschylus, Isocrates, Sophocles, and especially Plato[33]. While *ἐμβρίθεια* survives only in later Greek usage, this fact does not necessarily indicate a later provenance.

The second reason why interpreting Phrynichus as a descriptive Atticist fails is that Phrynichus also applies a prescriptive filter to the very fourth- and fifth-century Attic writers whose language supposedly forms the basis of Atticism. These writers are *δόκιμοι* but, every now and then, they say things that Phrynichus does not consider *δόκιμα*, with the result that a number of entries in the *Ecloga* explicitly reject words and phrases despite acknowledging their ancient provenance. By isolating this particular subset of entries—those in which a word is acknowledged as ancient but nevertheless considered invalid Attic—one can identify and analyze the rules that lie behind Phrynichus' personal vision for Attic Greek.

In one instance, Phrynichus censures Favorinus (discussed further below) for using the noun *σύμπτωμα* and claims he has no idea of Favorinus' source for it—yet cites Demosthenes as a witness to its usage in Attic rhetoric:

> Σύμπτωμα· πολλάκις εὗρον κείμενον παρὰ Φαβωρίνῳ ἐν τῷ Περὶ ἰδεῶν λόγῳ (fr. 25 Bar.)· πόθεν δὲ λαβὼν ἔθηκεν, οὐκ οἶδα. χρὴ οὖν συντυχίαν λέγειν ἢ λύσαντας οὕτω· "συνέπεσεν αὐτῷ τόδε γενέσθαι". Δημοσθένης μέντοι ἐν τῷ Κατὰ Διονυσοδώρου (56, 43) ἅπαξ εἴρηκε τοὔνομα. (*Ecl*. 218)

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[31] Eur. *Rhesus* 317.
[32] Plutarch has 16 occurrences, for instance, and its earliest potential attestation is in the Hippocratic Corpus.
[33] *Phaedo* 81c; *Cratylus* 407a; *Theaetetus* 144b; *Phaedrus* 246d, 252c.

> '*Symptoma'* (occurrence): I often found it attested in Favorinus in the speech *On Forms*; but from where he took it and used it, I do not know. So, one must say *syntychian* or, of disasters, "this happened to befall him". However, Demosthenes in *Against Dionysodorus* did say the word once.[34]

The apparent contradiction is puzzling because, on the one hand, Dem. 56 does indeed contain this word, and on the other hand, Phrynichus—who cannot reasonably be presumed to be unfamiliar with the works of Demosthenes—claims to have no idea where Favorinus learned it. There are two viable explanations for this apparent contradiction:[35] first that Demosthenes' usage of *σύμπτωμα* does not sanction that word because it is qualified by *ἅπαξ*, and/or second, that Demosthenes is somehow not a true Atticist, despite Phyrnichus' approbation of him elsewhere.[36] These could help address other entries in which the Greek of certain sources, who are elsewhere noted as *ἀρχαῖοι* or *δόκιμοι*, is discounted as unreliably Attic.[37] For example, elsewhere in the *Ecloga* Phrynichus clearly considers the usage of Old Comedy playwrights, like that of the Attic orators, a guide to proper Atticism[38] and he thus holds it in higher regard than Middle or New

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[34] Dem. 56.43: εἰ γὰρ ὡς ἀληθῶς ἀκούσιον τὸ συμβὰν ἐγένετο καὶ ἡ ναῦς ἐρράγη, τὸ μετὰ τοῦτ᾽ ἐπειδὴ ἐπεσκεύασαν τὴν ναῦν, οὐκ ἂν εἰς ἕτερα δήπου ἐμπόρια ἐμίσθωσαν αὐτήν, ἀλλ᾽ ὡς ὑμᾶς ἀπέστελλον, ἐπανορθούμενοι τὸ ἀκούσιον σύμπτωμα.
For if the accident truly occurred against their will, and the ship was wrecked, then afterwards when they repared the ship they would surely not have hired it out towards other ports, but would have sent it back to pay restitution to you for the involuntary accident (*symptoma*).

[35] A potential, speculative interpretation—that the MS has been corrupted and the final sentence is a later addition—does not merit serious consideration. It is true that interpolations have been identified in some entries (67, 235 Fischer, e.g.), and that the surviving texts contain a number of variants (see Fischer (1974) 3-34 for a complete outline), but no editor or critic has identified this *particular* entry among those with questionable authenticity. The "T" version of this entry, from an epitome of Phrynichus, does not illuminate the matter: Συντυχίαν λέγε, οὐ σύμπτωμα· ἢ οὕτω 'συνέπεσεν αὐτῷ τόδε γενέσθαι' (218 Fischer).

[36] Demosthenes is an authoritative source in seven other places: *Ecl*. 90, 176, 264, 286, 357, 373, 394; furthermore, in 231 Phrynichus mentions the spurious attribution of [Dem.] 59 by way of dissuading the reader from using that speech as evidence for *βασίλισσαν*, and in 396 Polemo's apparently erroneous collocation *κατ' ὄναρ* is censured for its usage on a statue of Demosthenes, as unworthy of the orator to which it was dedicated.

[37] Compare 206, Ἔφης· ἔστι μὲν παρὰ τοῖς ἀρχαίοις, ἀλλ' ὀλίγον. τὸ δὲ πλεῖον ἔφησθα. ('Ephes' (you said): It does exist in ancient sources, but seldom. And 'ephestha' is more common).

[38] Cf. e.g. the negative prescription in *Ecl*. 24: Ἀπελεύσομαι παντάπασι φυλάττου· οὔτε γὰρ οἱ δόκιμοι ῥήτορες οὔτε ἡ ἀρχαία κωμῳδία οὔτε Πλάτων κέχρηται τῇ φωνῇ· ἀντὶ δὲ αὐτοῦ τῷ ἄπειμι χρῶ καὶ τοῖς ὁμοιοειδέσιν ὡσαύτως.

Comedy.[39] However, he also at times deprecates terms found in Old Comedy, despite their early attestation. So, while at *Ecl.* 151 the comedic writer Theopompus[40] is cited to posit *κυνάριον* as an ancient, attested alternative to the preferred *κυνίδιον* (puppy),[41] a number of other entries specifically deprecate Old Comic usage. Crucially, in several of these cases Phrynichus explains his thought process in dismissing them from the pool of acceptable Attic terms:

> Ἀκεστὴς λέγουσιν οἱ παλαιοί, οὐκ ἠπητής. ἠπήσασθαι ἔστι μὲν ἅπαξ παρ' Ἀριστοφάνει ἐν Δαιταλεῦσι (fr. 227 K.), παίζοντι τὰς Ἡσιόδου Ὑποθήκας (fr. 284 M. – W.)· "καὶ κόσκινον ἠπήσασθαι"· σὺ δὲ λέγε ἀκέσασθαι τὸ ἱμάτιον. (*Ecl.* 64)
>
> 'Akestes' (mender) say the ancients, not 'epetes' (fixer). 'Epesasthai' (to fix) occurs once in Aristophanes, *Feasters*, when he is mocking the Counsels of Hesiod: "to fix even a sieve". But you must say 'to mend' (akesasthai), of one's cloak".
>
> Βρέχει ἐπὶ τοῦ ὕει· ἔν τινι κωμῳδίᾳ ἀρχαίᾳ προστιθεμένῃ Τηλεκλείδῃ τῷ κωμῳδῷ (fr. 54 K.) ἐστιν οὕτως εἰρημένον, ὅπερ, εἰ καὶ γνήσιον ἦν τὸ δρᾶμα, τῷ ἅπαξ εἰρῆσθαι ἐφυλαξάμεθ' ἄν. ὁπότε δὲ καὶ νόθον ἐστίν, παντελῶς ἀποδοκιμαστέον τοὔνομα. (*Ecl.* 255)
>
> 'Brechei' (it rains): For 'hyei' (it rains); in a certain Old Comedy attributed to Telekleides the comic it is spoken in this way, of which we would have been wary even if the play were genuine because there is only the single attestation. But given that the play is in fact spurious, the word should be considered utterly unacceptable.

'*Apeleusomai'* (I will depart): guard wholly against it; for neither the reputable orators nor Old Comedy nor Plato has used the word; in place of it use *'apeimi'* and likewise its corresponding [forms].
Compare the positive prescription in *Ecl*. 292: Κοχλιάριον· τοῦτο λίστρον Ἀριστοφάνης ὁ κωμῳδοποιὸς λέγει (fr. 809 K.)· καὶ σὺ δὲ οὕτως λέγε.
Kochliarion' (spoon): Aristophanes the comedian calls a shovel this, and you [must] also call it thus.

[39] Middle: Κορυδαλός· Εὐβούλου τοῦ κωμῳδοποιοῦ δρᾶμα (p. 182 K.) ἐπιγράφεται οὕτως· σὺ δὲ τοῖς περὶ Ἀριστοφάνην (e. g. Av. 472) πειθόμενος κορυδὸν λέγε τὸ ζῷον. (*Ecl.* 315)
'*Korydalos'* (lark): A play of Euboulos the comic writer is titled thus, but you must follow Aristophanes and call the animal a *'korydon'*.
New: Θέρμα· οὕτως ὁ Μένανδρος (Georg. 51 Koe.) διὰ τοῦ α, ἀλλ' οὔτε Θουκυδίδης οὔθ' ἡ ἀρχαία κωμῳδία οὔτε Πλάτων, θέρμη δέ (*Ecl.* 304).
'Therma' (heat): Thus Menander [says it] with the alpha, but neither Thucydides nor the Old Comedy nor Plato [does], but 'therme'.

[40] *PCG* 7.708.

[41] Κυνίδιον λέγε. Θεόπομπος δὲ ὁ κωμῳδὸς ἅπαξ που (fr. 90 K.) κυνάριον εἶπεν.
Kynidion (puppy): Say this. But Theopompus the comedian said *kynarion* once somewhere. cf. Phryn., *Prae. soph.* 84.22: *κυνάριον καὶ κυνίδιον· ἄμφω δόκιμα*. cf. Valente (2015) 54.

> Γελάσιμον· Στράττιν μέν φασι τὸν κωμῳδοποιὸν (fr. 73 K.) εἰρηκέναι τοὔνομα· ἀλλ' ἡμεῖς οὐ τοῖς ἅπαξ εἰρημένοις προσέχομεν τὸν νοῦν, ἀλλὰ τοῖς πολλάκις κεχρημένοις, κέχρηται δὲ τὸ γελοῖον. (*Ecl*. 403)
>
> 'Gelasimon' (laughable): They say that Strattis[42] the comedian said this word; but we do not give thought to words said a single time, but rather to those which have been used often, and *geloion* has been.

In fact, most of the occurrences of *ἅπαξ*[43] warn against, e.g., "seizing upon words that have been said a single time" (*τὰς ἅπαξ εἰρημένας λέξεις ἁρπάζειν, Ecl.* 402) or using an un-Attic word "even if it be attested somewhere once or twice" (*εἰ καὶ ἅπαξ που εἴη κείμενον ἢ δίς*, *Ecl*. 255.)[44] In this way Phrynichus can consider writers such as Demosthenes or Xenophon[45] to be *δόκιμοι* yet still deprecate individual usages from their works, on the basis that those usages are outliers and not representative of these authors' speech.

Other forms of criticism also employ qualifying language to explain Phrynichus' reasoning in deprecating the words of otherwise reputable writers. While Old Comedy, again, is generally a reliable source for Atticism, at *Ecl*. 371 Phrynichus deprecates Aristophanes' using *χρέος* (a need) rather than *χρέως· σὺ μέντοι τῇ σεαυτοῦ πολυμαθίᾳ τὸν Ἀριστοφάνην διὰ τοῦ ο ἐδείκνυες τὸ χρέος ... ἔοικε δὲ παρῳδηκὼς εἰρηκέναι, διόπερ οὐ χρηστέον αὐτῷ.* (You would, however, be exposing Aristophanes to your erudition, with the omicron ... But he seems to have said it in parody, for which reason one should not employ it.) He refers here to *Clouds* (30), but

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[42] *PCG* 7.623; Braund (2000) 151-8.
[43] Nine total uses: *Ecl*. 64, 93, 129, 151, 218, 255, 297, 402-3.
[44] A similar criterion expressed in *Ecl*. 206:
Ἔφης· ἔστι μὲν παρὰ τοῖς ἀρχαίοις, ἀλλ' ὀλίγον. τὸ δὲ πλεῖον ἔφησθα.
Ephes' (you said): It does exist in ancient sources, but seldom. And 'ephestha' is more common.
And also in *Ecl.* 354:
Παρεμβολὴ δεινῶς Μακεδονικόν, καίτοι ἐνῆν τῷ στρατοπέδῳ χρῆσθαι, πλείστῳ καὶ δοκίμῳ ὄντι.
Parembole (encampment): A terribly Macedonian word, for indeed one could have used 'stratopedon', given that it is very common and acceptable.
[45] *Ecl*. 93: Ἀκμὴν ἀντὶ τοῦ ἔτι· Ξενοφῶντα λέγουσιν ἅπαξ (An. 4, 3, 26) αὐτῷ κεχρῆσθαι, σὺ δὲ φυλάττου χρῆσθαι, λέγε δὲ ἔτι.
Akmen' (yet, still) for 'eti' (still, yet); they say that Xenophon employed it a single time, but you must beware of using it, and say 'eti'.

Aristophanes also uses the omicron spelling twice in *Acharnians* (454-5). Presumably, as in *Feasters* (above), Phrynichus supposes that Aristophanes has deliberately chosen *not* to represent the educated Attic of fifth-century Athenians, but rather the speech of the figures he is mocking. This example is complicated, however, by the fact that Aeschylus, Sophocles, Euripides, and Plato all prefer this form and the only Attic authors of similar vintage to use the omega variant are Demosthenes and Lysias. Change in register for artistic reasons appears elsewhere as a justification for dismissing words from the Attic lexicon, as when Menander is preferred to Sophocles in *Ecl*. 157:

> Λίβανον λέγε τὸ δένδρον, τὸ δὲ θυμιώμενον λιβανωτόν, εἰ καὶ διὰ τὴν ποιητικὴν λίβανον καὶ τοῦτο Σοφοκλῆς (fr. 961 N.2) λέγει. ἄμεινον δὲ Μένανδρος ἐν τῇ Σαμίᾳ (fr. 1 Koe., cf. p. 58A.) φησίν· "φέρε τὸν λιβανωτόν, σὺ δ' ἐπίθες τὸ πῦρ, Τρύφη".
>
> 'Libanon' (frankincense tree): Say this of the tree, but 'libanoton' when it is burned as incense, even if Sophocles also says 'libanon' of this in poetic usage. But Menander says it better in Samia: "bring me the 'libanoton' (frankincense), and you, Tryphe, put it on the fire".

This preference for the authority of New Comedy over Classical Tragedy comes despite a single usage of Sophocles sufficing to license another usage elsewhere[46], despite Sophocles being the dramatist most often mentioned in the *Ecloga*[47], and—perhaps most noteworthy—despite Phrynichus' frequent and harsh disparagement of Menander's Hellenism in almost every other mention of him.[48] So while Sophocles generally writes in Classical Attic (and is therefore a source for Second Sophistic Atticism) when he writes *διὰ τὴν ποιητικὴν* he shifts into another, non-Attic register. The task of identifying this register is complicated somewhat by the fact that

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[46] *Ecl*. 351: Πρόσφατον· καὶ περὶ τούτου πολλὴν διατριβὴν ἐποιησάμην ἐπισκοπούμενος, εἰ μόνον λέγεται πρόσφατος νεκρὸς καὶ μὴ πρόσφατον πρᾶγμα. εὑρίσκετο δὲ Σοφοκλῆς ἐν τῇ Ἀνδρομέδᾳ (fr. 124 N.2) τιθεὶς οὕτω· "μηδὲν φοβεῖσθαι προσφάτους ἐπιστολάς".
'Prosphaton' (recent): In regards to this to I have spent much time in considering whether only 'prosphatos nekros' (fresh corpse) is said, and not 'prosphaton pragma' (recent matter). But Sophocles was found in *Andromeda* to have used it thus: "in no way to fear recent letters".

[47] Strobel (2005) 146 .

[48] Menander is mentioned 18 times in the *Ecloga*: 157, 170, 243, 304, 341, 367, 390, 391, 392, 393, 394 (3 times), 397, 402, 408, 410, 411. Only 157 and 243 do not deprecate his usage, though 393 speaks approvingly of his comedy *Misogyne* except for the word *γῦρος*.

the Phrynichus citation is the only source for this fragment of Sophocles; however the distinction here appears to be that while the line with *λιβανωτόν* from *Samia* is in trimeter, the line containing *λίβανον* is not. In *Ecl.* 32 and 418[49] Phrynichus distinguishes between *ποιητικόν* and *πολιτικόν*, and in *Ecl.* 66[50] between *ποιηταὶ* and *τῶν δὲ καταλογάδην δοκίμων*, which supports the idea that the former can differ from both everyday speech and the appropriate Attic register Phrynichus is describing. Thus, by distinguishing between Attic and "poetic" usage (which may in some cases be largely a function of the meter) Phrynichus indicates to the reader that some parts of Sophocles may not be suited to use in Attic composition. Metrical considerations also lead him to dismiss Aristophanes' disyllabic *ἥρως* and prescribe the trisyllabic *ἥρωες*,[51] which indicates that metrical contours of even the nominally "conversational" trimeter can cause a word to deviate from its correct Attic prose form.

Further insight into Phrynichus' criteria and his process comes from a pair of entries on the word *βασίλισσα*. The first of these is *Ecl*. 197, towards the end of the first book or section: *Βασίλισσα οὐδεὶς τῶν ἀρχαίων εἶπεν, ἀλλὰ βασίλεια ἢ βασιλίς.* ('*Basilissa'* (queen, empress): None of the ancients said this, but rather '*basileia'* or '*basilis'*.) The other entry on this word appears at the beginning of the second book or section of the work, *Ecl*. 231:

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[49] *Ecl*. 32: Μεσονύκτιον ποιητικόν, οὐ πολιτικόν. ('Mesonyktion' (at midnight): Poetic, not ordinary). *Ecl*. 418: Ἀντικρύ· τοῦτο τοπικὸν καὶ ἐπιεικῶς ποιητικὸν ἄνευ τοῦ σ λεγόμενον, ὅθεν οἱ ἐπὶ τοῦ ἄντικρυς τιθέντες ἁμαρτάνουσιν. εἰ μέντοι τις προθείη τὴν πρόθεσιν τῷ ἀντικρύ καὶ εἴποι καταντικρύ, ὀρθῶς ἐρεῖ. (Antikry' (opposite): This when said in reference to place is usually poetic without the sigma, for which reason those who use it for 'antikrys' are in error. However, if one should add a prefix to 'antikry' and say 'katantikry,' he will speak correctly).

[50] *Ecl*. 66: Ἀρχῆθεν ποιηταὶ (e. g. Aesch. fr. 416 N.2 = 758 M.) λέγουσιν, τῶν δὲ καταλογάδην δοκίμων οὐδείς, ἀλλ' ἐξ ἀρχῆς. ('*Archethen'* (from beginning) the poets say, yet none of the legitimate prose writers says it, but *'ex arches'* (from beginning)).

[51] Phryn. *Ecl.* 129: Οἱ ἥρως οὐ λέγουσιν, ἀλλ' οἱ ἥρωες τρισυλλάβως· ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς αἰτιατικῆς δισυλλάβως τοὺς ἥρως. ἅπαξ Ἀριστοφάνης (fr. 304 K.) βιασθεὶς ὑπὸ τοῦ μέτρου οἱ ἥρως εἶπεν, τῷ δ' ἠναγκασμένῳ οὐ χρηστέον.
'Hoi heros' (the heroes) they do not say, but *'hoi heroes'* in three syllables; and in the accusative, *'tous heros'* in two syllables. A single time Aristophanes, compelled by the meter, said *'hoi heros'*, but one should not make use of the contracted form. (N.B. the *ἅπαξ* qualifying this pronunciation as an outlier).

> Βασίλισσαν· Ἀλκαῖόν φασι τὸν κωμῳδοποιὸν (fr. 6K.) καὶ Ἀριστοτέλην ἐν τοῖς Ὁμήρου ἀπορήμασιν (fr. 179 R.) εἰρηκέναι· σὺ δὲ βασιλικὸς ἐπιστολεὺς ἀποφανθεὶς ἀνάλογον τῇ σαυτοῦ παρασκευῇ γεννικώτατον ἡμῖν ἐκόμισας μάρτυρα τὸν συγγράψαντα τὸν Κατὰ Νεαίρας ([Dem.] 59, 74). ὃς διά τε τὰ ἄλλα ὑπωπτεύθη μὴ εἶναι Δημοσθένους καὶ διὰ τὰ τοιαῦτα τῶν ἀδοκίμων ὀνομάτων. τοῖς πλείοσιν οὖν πειθόμενοι βασίλειαν ἢ βασιλίδα λέγωμεν· οὕτω γὰρ ἂν διακρίνειν δόξαιμεν τό τε καλὸν καὶ τὸ αἰσχρόν.
>
> '*Basilissan'* (queen, empress): They say Alcaeus the comedian and Aristotle in the *Investigations on Homer* said this; but you, when you were announced as imperial secretary, brought something comparable to us as the most noble witness for your own preparation, the one who composed the *Against Neaira*, which for various other reasons was suspected not to be by Demosthenes, and on account of illegitimate words of this kind. So, let us obey the majority and say *'basileian'* and *'basilida'*; for thus we would seem to distinguish the good and the shameful.

So, while in some circumstances an ancient Attic word can be dismissed based on insufficient attestation, in other cases a word can be both ancient and well-attested but still not fall in line with Phrynichus' standards for Attic, due to some other aspect of its register. Conversely, later authors may on occasion write in a more Attic fashion than earlier authors, and their language can serve more reliably to guide a reader towards good Atticism. As Anderson (1993) frames this paradox somewhat tendentiously, "any author is Attic enough when it suits."[52] To this sentiment should be added the inverse – that there is perhaps no author so Attic that his usage will avoid all potential criticism, whether stated or not. It is plain then that, in this lexicon, usage is not always a reliable guide to Atticism or (often) Hellenism, but if neither antiquity nor canonicity automatically bestows legitimacy as well, there must be a model of Atticism underlying Phrynichus' work that is somehow both independent of and derived from Classical Athenian literature, an idealized grammar in which Attic writers participate to a greater or lesser degree in different places. Phrynichus has this model in mind when he conducts his *δοκιμασία* of the corpora to which he has access, and when he makes his prescriptions to Cornelianus. While the

[52] Anderson (1993) 92.

sample size of the *Ecloga* is too small for a full articulation of Phrynichus' particular version of Atticism, some of the principles underlying his prescriptivist model can be seen.

The most straightforward component of Phrynichus' Attic is a language ideology that equates antiquity with legitimacy. Whenever two forms of a word exist, or two words for the same thing, the one with the older attestations is preferred—albeit with the exceptions discussed above. Phrynichus does not, however, give his reader any cutoff date to divide ancient Attic from the later non-Attic dialect. Aristotle's language, for instance, is not sufficiently Attic for Phrynichus to use him as evidence[53], yet even Menander—in a pinch—can override Sophocles. The blurred line between ancient and later forms of the language most likely reflects awareness on Phrynichus' part that language change is gradual and, therefore, that one cannot draw a bright line between one stage of Attic and another. Even if a single event were identified as the motivating factor for language change, Phrynichus would not consider every instance of Athenian Greek after the death of Demosthenes to be un-Attic. The ultimate ancient source is Homer, and while his language is not Attic, Homeric usages are adduced (in entries 324 and 345) as evidence for Phrynichus' Attic against those in the current vernacular. Phrynichus appears to operate with a historical linguistic model in which the Homeric epics transmit something like the undifferentiated ur-Greek from which later forms descend, including Attic.[54] For Phrynichus, as

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[53] E.g. *Ecl.* 285: *Πρώτως· Ἀριστοτέλης (E. N. 1157a 30) καὶ Χρύσιππος λέγει, ἔστι δὲ διεφθαρμένον πάνυ τοὔνομα· λέγε οὖν πρῶτον.*
'*Prôtôs'* (firstly): Aristotle and Chrysippus say this, but the word is entirely debased. So say *'prôton'* (first). The other mention of Aristotle, *Ecl.* 231, deprecates his usage of *βασίλισσαν*. Likewise, Theophrastus is mentioned once at *Ecl*. 317, in a way that suggests a favorable attitude but with a specific usage deprecated: *Κεφαλοτομεῖν· ἀπόρριπτε τοὔνομα καὶ Θεόφραστον κεχρημένον αὐτῷ (Π. εὐδαιμονίας, cf. Antiatt. 104, 31), λέγε δὲ καρατομεῖν.* '*Kephalotomein'* (to behead): Toss out the word, even though Theophrastus has used it, and say *'keratomein'*.

[54] Such an ideology is suggested by some definitions for Hellenism offered, though not necessarily assented to, in the ps.-Aelius Herodianus text *De solecismo et barbarismo*: *ἔνιοι μὲν λέγουσιν ἑλληνισμὸν εἶναι τὸν ποιητήν, ἔνιοι δὲ τὴν κοινὴν διάλεκτον, ἥτις ἐγένετο συνελθόντων τῶν Ἑλλήνων εἰς Ἴλιον…* (some say that Homer is [the paradigm of] Hellenism, and some that it is the common dialect, that which came into being

for Aelius Aristides or Telephus of Pergamum (who wrote a work titled *Ὅτι μόνος ὁ Ὅμηρος τῶν ἀρχαίων ἑλληνίζει, That Homer alone of the ancients uses Greek*) or other contemporaries,[55] by reasoning *a fortiori* Homer is a—perhaps *the*—proto-Atticist writer.[56]

That being said, another ideological component of Phrynichus' Attic, though (as discussed above) one to which he does not strictly adhere, relies on a clear distinction between dialects of Greek. Some words are properly Ionic, or Doric, or even Macedonian; they do not belong in Attic writing and their presence is sufficient to de-Atticize a text. Phrynichus envisions dialectical boundaries as firmly fixed divisions, and believes that any violation of these boundaries results in an impure version of Greek.[57] This emphasis on purity pervades the *Ecloga*, though it is only clearly signposted twice—at *Ecl*. 41 when the noun *κράββατος* (pallet) is called *μιαρόν*, and at *Ecl.* 357 when Phrynichus flatters Cornelianus with the epithets as *καθαρὸς καὶ ἀρχαῖος ὢν ῥήτωρ*. In fact, an ideology of linguistic purity is so pervasive in Phrynichus and in other authors that it will receive a fuller exploration in the next chapter, but for the purposes of this discussion it deserves mention as a component of the overall program in the *Ecloga*.

Third, clarity of meaning is paramount. This aspect of Atticism is highlighted in the preface, when Phrynichus indicates that speaking *Ἀττικῶς* entails being *ἀκριβῶς* and precludes being *ἀμελῶς*, and though this terminology does not appear frequently in the *Ecloga*[58] an ideology of precision in use is certainly evident throughout. Phrynichus recommends Cornelianus use the most specific terminology available, regardless of the vernacular usage. He takes pains to

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when the Greeks assembled at Troy…; 310.1 Nauck). See above, section 2.2, for further discussion of Hellenism and its definitions.

[55] *Suda* s.v.

[56] Ael. Ar. *Or.* i.328; Moeris 198.6; Siebenborn (1976) 30-1; Silk (2009) 22

[57] Strobel (2009) 95.

[58] ἀμελῶς (Pr.); ἀμελεῖς (242); ἀκριβές (296); ἀκριβῶς (Pr., 253); Ἀττικὸς καὶ ἐπιμελὴς ἂν φαίνοιο (371); σαφῶς (243, 332)

restore what he considers to be the original meaning of words that have semantically drifted or broadened and looks for as close to a 1:1 ratio as possible between the words and the objects or concepts to which they can refer. Examples include *ἀνατέλλει* (rises) at *Ecl.* 96—used properly of the Sun, possibly the moon as well, but not the stars; or *πέπων* at *Ecl*. 226—in purest Attic only an adjective meaning "ripe" but apparently also used by less attentive speakers to refer to a cucumber. The word *ἀσπάραγος* features in the lengthy entry *Ecl.* 81—it apparently refers originally to one specific wild plant, but in vernacular usage has become a generic term for the edible shoots of plants, both wild and cultivated In similar vein, metonymic and metaphorical idioms are universally struck down—a lamp (*φανός, Ecl*. 37) must be called separately from the lamp-stand (*λυχνοῦχος*), and while wine may have either *τρύξ* (dregs) or *ὑποστάθμη* (lees), it must not have *ἰλύς* (silt), which only belongs in a river (*Ecl*. 49). These concerns are not original to Phrynichus, since Presocratic treatises by Prodicus (64A11, 16, D-K), most famously the *Cratylus* of Plato, and even Aulus Gellius' teacher Favorinus (*NA* 4.1.18-19; but see also below) deal with 'Correctness of Names' and emphasize correspondence between the name and nature of things.[59] The Stoic view of language, for which our chief source is Apollonius Dyscolus[60], similarly proceeds from the assumption that, like the alphabet, a natural syntactic order exists to be discovered, and in the semantic realm every name or sign naturally corresponds to a single thing and vice-versa. In this interpretation, any asymmetry between signs and objects arises from linguistic decay that obscures the natural order. The *Ecloga*, therefore, transmits the most focused version of this ancient preoccupation into the contemporary Attic debate to discourage innovation in words and phrases in favor of the correct application of words and forms of words that are, by Phrynichus' metric, ancient, precise, and therefore acceptable.

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[59] Blank (1998) 202.
[60] Blank (1982); Atherton (1995).

Phrynichus also employs morphological, etymological, and semantic reasoning to deprecate certain forms of words. This aspect is especially evident in entries dealing with adjectives, such as those that attach a superlative suffix to a word that already has superlative meaning. Examples of such deprecated forms include *τελευταταιότατον* (46), *ἐσχατώτατον* (105), *κορυφαιότατον* (213), and *κεφαλαιωδέστατον* (236); likewise, redundant comparative forms are assigned to the previously-discussed poetic register, as in this example:

> Εἰ ποιητὴς εἶπεν ἀμεινότερον, χαιρέτω· οὐδὲ γὰρ καλλιώτερον οὐδὲ κρεισσότερον ῥητέον· συγκριτικὸν γὰρ συγκριτικοῦ οὐ γίνεται. λέγε οὖν ἄμεινον. (*Ecl.* 106)
>
> If a poet said *'ameinoteron'* (more better), he is welcome to it; for neither *'kallioteron'* (more fairer) nor *'kreissoteron'* (more stronger) should be said, for the comparative of the comparative does not exist. So say *'ameinon'* (better).

A related but separate set of criticisms focus on rules of conjugation and declension, which concern morphology independent of meaning. This group includes verbs formed with improper stems, endings, and other perceived errors—an issue which will be addressed more fully in the discussion of analogy in sections 2.3 and 2.4 below[61]. Both classes of morphological prescription, however, speak to a language ideology in which form and meaning are both firmly set and neither can exist without the other.

The final and perhaps most significant aspect of Phrynichus' Attic model lies in what the author says about its relationship with the Greek spoken in his own time. As shown above, there is a clear division between the Attic of the *ἀρχαῖοι καὶ δόκιμοι* and the Greek spoken by *οἱ πολλοί/οἱ νῦν*, just as there is between Attic and other dialects or between Greek and the barbarian

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[61] *Ecl*. 322 is perhaps the most detailed example of this category:
Γαμῴη μὴ λέγε, ἀλλὰ γαμοίη διὰ τῆς οι, ὡς νοοίη φιλοίη· τὰ γὰρ τῆς πρώτης συζυγίας καὶ τρίτης τῶν περισπωμένων ῥημάτων εὐκτικὰ διὰ τῆς οι διφθόγγου λέγεται, οἷον τελοίη· τὰ δὲ τῆς δευτέρας διὰ τοῦ ω, οἷον νικῴη, γελῴην γελῴης γελῴη.
'*Gamôiê'* (one would wed): Do not say this, but *'gamoiê'* with the omicron-iota, like *'nooiê'* (one would think), *'filoiê'* (one would love); for the optatives of contract verbs of the first conjugation and the third are said with the omicron-iota dipththong, such as *'teloiê'* (one would complete), but those of the second [conjugation are said] with the omega, such as *'nikôiê* (one would win), *gelôiên*, *gelôiês*, *gelôiê'* (I would laugh, you would laugh, one would laugh).

languages. The contemporary vernacular, whether it is called *ἡ Κοινή* or *ἡ Ἑλληνική* or something else, is distinguished from proper Attic in all of the dimensions just laid out—it is imprecise, it assigns different meanings to words from their proper referents, its morphology is incorrect (either by a failure to follow paradigms or, more seriously, by the addition of redundant or nonsensical morphemes), and, most obviously, it does not reflect the language of Attic literature. A discussion of this crucial sociolinguistic dimension of the *Ecloga* requires drawing up a picture of the speech community from the clues available as to whom Phrynichus excludes from it and whom he includes.

2.1.2 The Community of Phrynichus

It is clear from the preface as well as other entries such as *Ecl*. 357 that Cornelianus is a Roman well educated in Greek. At the very least Phrynichus thought it appropriate to characterize him as such, given that education in Greek, and indeed Attic, is integral to his professional identity as *ab epistulis Graecis*.[62] Phrynichus addresses Cornelianus as an ally in the struggle to maintain Greek language standards, which includes efforts to ward off the influence of Menander in Attic usage. In fifteen entries, Phrynichus refers to Menander and censures him each time, most notably in *Ecl*. 394 where he asks for his help in quashing the latest tendency among some Greek elites towards manic enthusiasm for Menander.[63] Evidently, this Menander-mania has such a hold on *τὰ ἄκρα τῶν Ἑλλήνων* (the elites of the Greeks) that some of them, such as Gaianus of Smyrna and Balbus of Tralles, suffer under the delusion that Menander is the stylistic superior of Demosthenes. This impression of Menander's popularity is only a slight exaggeration, if even that, since there is considerable evidence that his plays were frequently performed in the Greek

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[62] For example, from *Ecl.* 357: *...ἐπανάγων εἰς τὸ ἀρχαῖον σχῆμα καὶ δόκιμον τὴν ῥητορικήν...ἐξελληνίζων καὶ ἐξαττικίζων τὸ βασιλικὸν δικαστήριον* (…[you were] directing your rhetoric towards the ancient and legitimate figure…thoroughly Hellenizing and Atticizing the Imperial court) See Appendix B.4 for the full context.
[63] See Appendix B.6.

provinces of the Empire during this period[64] and a sizeable corpus of visual artwork (such as that preserved at Pompeii) illustrates scenes from Menander and other New Comedy authors.[65] His popularity among Imperial audiences may have stemmed from his greater acceptability to Roman authorities, since his plays (and those of New Comedy generally) were written in post-Democratic Athens and focus on type-characters, ethics, and morality rather than political commentary like Old Comedy.[66] Whatever the original reason, Menandrian vocabulary formed the basis for a number of school texts[67] and his style, commended by the tyrant Demetrius of Phalerum (*On Style* §153) for its *χάρις* (grace) as opposed to the *γελοῖον* (humor) of Aristophanes, continued to be held up as a model for all manner of composition.[68]

Among contemporary writers Plutarch preferred Menander to Old Comedy, while Aristides—though not by any means as negative as Phrynichus—seems to have liked Aristophanes more than Menander.[69] Lucian, as discussed in the next chapter and in Chapter Five, draws heavily on both Old and New Comedy but goes to greater lengths to signal knowledge of and engagement with Aristophanes. Other lexicons, such as that of Moeris or the *Onomasticon* of Julius Pollux (discussed below), recommend vocabulary and forms from Menander to their readers but they do not universally consider his usages to be valid.[70] On the other hand, the Antiatticist defends a number of supposedly non-Attic usages with the very fact that they are attested in Menander—including *καταφαγᾶς* (having devoured, *Antiatt*. 105.20), a

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[64] Nervegna (2013) 63, 99-110.
[65] Nervegna (2013) 264-7.
[66] Hunter (2009) 85-7, summarized: "Aristophanes is the poet of the democratic rabble, Menander of the intelligent and morally right." For a fuller discussion of Aristophanes and politics, see Sidwell (2009).
[67] Cribiore (1996) 45-6.
[68] Karavas and Vix (2014) 194-7.
[69] Karavas and Vix (2014) 190.
[70] Tribulato (2014); Men. frr. 30, 66, 73, 399, 615, 617-18, 620-3, 625-8 from Pollux; Men. frr. 99, 118, 292, 361, 383, 424, 667, from Moeris. Moeris usually shows Menander's usage according with the *'Αττικοί*, however he criticizes Menander's language in Moer. α 133 and Pollux does as well in Poll. *On*. 1.79, 2.82, 3.29, 6.38, 6.161, 9.139.

word for which Phrynichus viciously excoriates Menander at *Ecl.* 402. Phrynichus' commitment to a negative account of Menander's vocabulary and usage makes him noticeably stricter than his contemporaries and most likely represents an attempt to undermine their authority; this is certainly true in the case of Gaianus and Balbus. Menander's popularity among the masses can by no means legitimize any of his usages, but this fact does not add new information since it is clear from Phrynichus' other remarks the language of the *hoi polloi* never constitutes good Attic. The educated elites ought to know better, though, and by describing this new fascination for Menander among them Phrynichus presents himself to Cornelianus as better than any of the other intellectuals he might consult.

The Menander fandom doubtless overlaps significantly with the crowd Phrynichus calls "pseudo-Atticists" (*ψευδαττικοί,* 45)[71] and "spuriously Atticizing" (*νόθως ἀττικίζοντες*, 54), who participate in the Attic intellectual culture but, in Phrynichus' view, make serious errors in their Atticism. Some of these may be Romans with Hellenophile inclinations, like Cornelianus, and others may be Greeks or Hellenized Easterners, like himself, but their use (or misuse) of the Attic language is what defines them. The member of this group most prominent in the *Ecloga* is Favorinus of Arelatum, the Gallo-Roman Academic discussed by Philostratus (*VS* 489-92) as being both sophist and philosopher but whom Phrynichus mentions (and dismisses) more often than even Menander.[72] By most accounts, including his own, Favorinus was something of an incongruity among the intellectual and political elites of Roman Greece. According to Philostratus, he liked to emphasize his triply paradoxical nature: a Gaul who declaimed in Greek, a eunuch reviled as an adulterer, and a Roman citizen who quarreled with an emperor and

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[71] This term is used by Eratosthenes in the Scholia on Aristophanes *Frogs* (1263) to refer to writers who would mine Aristophanes for rare words to use in their own compositions.
[72] Besides both of their uses of Greek being unacceptable (to Phrynichus), the two figures also have in common a non-conformist mode of gender representation; cf. Phaedrus 5.1 "*Demetrius rex et Menander poeta*" – Appendix B.6

survived (Philostratus, *VS* 489). The impression in Philostratus is of a charlatan whose capacity for showmanship far outstripped the intellectual integrity of his speechifications (*VS* 491-2);[73] the two complete speeches of his that survive accord generally with Philostratus' description.[74] Unsurprisingly Favorinus also draws the attention of Lucian in the *Eunuch* (7) and *Demonax* (12-13) as an object of mockery for the effeminate characteristics that disqualify him from the ranks of philosophy or good rhetoric. It is worth noting, in contrast, how frequently he is cited as an authoritative source by Gellius[75] (though not surprising—Gellius was a student of his), featuring in 27 different sections[76] and depicted as something of a Renaissance man with both breadth and depth of knowledge in many fields.[77] Given that one of Gellius' major objectives (to be explored in greater depth in the next chapter) is to demonstrate how Roman culture measures up to and can be harmonized with Greek, Favorinus is of great thematic value as a living example of a multi-cultural Roman Hellenist[78]. Furthermore, his Greek inspires some of Gellius' experiments with Latin style (*NA* 12.1.9, 14.1.9, e.g.), highlighting again Gellius' interest in translating between the two languages and cultures.[79]

Favorinus is a near-contemporary of Phrynichus, having passed away less than a generation before the writing of the *Ecloga*. Like that of the earlier writer Menander, Favorinus' Attic fails to conform to Phrynichus' model for the language. Phrynichus mentions these two

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[73] Not unlike the "professor of rhetoric" in Lucian's work of that name, discussed in Chapter Three. However, see Chapter Four for the full discussion of Favorinus' Greek expertise and rhetorical self-representation—his treatment in Gellius is extensive and suggests serious engagement on his part with questions of language standards and usage.
[74] Holford-Strevens (2017) 235: "Neither in [his two surviving] speeches nor in that on exile…is profundity of thought in evidence; ingenuity of argument is, particularly in the speech on Fortune, an example of the parodoxical praise in which Favorinus was said by Gellius to have excelled."
[75] Beall (2001) 87; Holford-Strevens (2003) 98-130; Johnson (2010) 102.
[76] *NA* i.3, 10, 15, 21; ii.1, 5, 12, 22, 26; iii.1, 3, 16, 19; iv.1, v.11, viii.2, 14; ix.8, 13; x.12; xi.5; xii.1; xiii.25; xiv.1, 2; xv.8; xvi.3; xvii.10, 12, 19; xviii.1, 7; xix.3; xx.1.
[77] Beall (2001) 91.
[78] Beall (2001) 93-5.
[79] Beall (2001) 99-100.

authors more than any other source, significantly more than other Hellenistic and Imperial authors. Favorinus appears in 16 entries (one more than Menander) and is even more harshly treated than the New Comic writer. Not only does Favorinus say things "badly" (*κακῶς*, 172), e.g., or "unsoundly" (*οὐχ ὑγιῶς*, 207), his alleged solecisms and barbarisms motivate Phrynichus to statements such as these:

> *Ecl.* 213: Κορυφαιότατον· ἐνεκαλυψάμην εὑρὼν παρὰ Φαβωρίνῳ…
> '*Koryphaiotaton'* (chief-most): I cringed upon finding this in Favorinus…
>
> *Ecl.* 217: Προαλῶς… ἀνιῶμαι δὲ ὅτι ἀνὴρ λόγου ἄξιος κέχρηται αὐτῷ Φαβωρῖνος (fr. 137 Bar.)…
> '*Proalos'* (prematurely)…. But I am distressed that Favorinus, a man worthy of mention, has employed it.
>
> *Ecl.* 228: Πλόκιον…. θαυμάζω οὖν ὡς ὁ πρῶτος τῶν Ἑλλήνων δόξας εἶναι Φαβωρῖνος ἐχρήσατο ἐν συγγράμματι ἐπιγραφομένῳ Περὶ τῆς Δημάδους σωφροσύνης.
> '*Plokion'* (complex)….So I am amazed that Favorinus, reputed to be foremost among the Greeks, used it in a treatise entitled *On the Wisdom of Demades*.

Perhaps most tellingly, Phrynichus portrays the earlier sophist not merely as one whose knowledge of Greek is deficient, but who also does not use ancient sources as well as he himself does. [80] This portrayal is epitomized in *Ecl.* 422, where he casts Favorinus' source into doubt by saying *ἐκτὸς εἰ μή ποθεν τοῦτο εἰς Φαβωρῖνον ἦλθεν, ὅθεν οὐδεὶς οἶδεν* (unless this came to Favorinus from some outside source that no one knows) and concludes with the line *ἡμεῖς οὖν ὡς οἱ ἀρχαῖοι, ἀλλὰ μὴ ὡς Φαβωρῖνος* (so let us speak like the ancients, but not like Favorinus.) Gellius' depiction largely agrees, though he portrays Favorinus as one who tempers archaism in Latin (*NA* 1.10.2) in a manner suggestive of none other than Demonax, whom Lucian portrays as no fan of Favorinus' pretensions to philosophy. Kim (2017) 50 characterizes Favorinus as a

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[80] The sole mention of Favorinus in the *Praeparatio sophistica*, de Borries (1911) 66, is consistent with his portrayal in the *Ecloga*: ἔδει (Aristoph. Lys. 798) καὶ ἔδομαι καὶ ἔδεται καὶ ἔδονται: οἱ μὲν ἀμαθεῖς φάγῃ λέγουσιν ἐπὶ τοῦ μέλλοντος. ὁ δὲ Φαβωρῖνος ἢ οὐκ ἐντυχὼν τῷ ἔδει ἢ ἀποστραφεὶς τὸν ἦχον, τῷ βρώσομαι ἐπὶ τοῦ μέλλοντος ἐχρήσατο. ἔδει οὖν καὶ ἐδόμεθα καὶ ἔδομαι καὶ ἔδεσθε καὶ ἔδονται καὶ ἐξέδεται.
Edei (You were eating) and *edomai* (I eat) and *edetai* (he eats) and *edontai* (they eat): while the ignorant say *'phagei'* (you gonna eat) for the future, Favorinus, either not having encountered the word *'edei'* or having changed the voice, employed the word *'brosomai'* (I will devour) for the future. So *'edei'* and *'edometha'* and *'edomai'* and *'edesthe'* and *'edontai'* and *'exedetai'*.

"positive" Atticist, whose work consisted of Attic vocabulary and expressions overlaid onto an essentially Koinê structure, with Phrynichus by comparison being a "negative" Atticist whose work consisted of stripping away the un-Attic elements of speech. But whatever Favorinus' version of Attic may have been, we are clearly meant to understand that it does not conform to the same rigorous standards that Phrynichus' does.

Favorinus' reputation in Greek intellectual circles appears to have been polarizing, based on Philostratus' description of him and other writers' references.[81] His political connections were considerable, and based on an anecdote in the *Historia Augusta* (*Hadr.* 15.12-13) they apparently stemmed from his reputation as an expert on Greek usage. It is therefore not difficult to see similarities between Favorinus and Phrynichus, given that the epistolary preface to the *Ecloga* suggests an attempt to negotiate a role for himself as official grammar expert within the Imperial apparatus in Athens—possibly as an editor or amanuensis for the *ab epistulis Graecis* Cornelianus. Both Philostratus and Gellius portray Favorinus as a self-deprecating and joking figure, a far cry from the self-serious lexicographer of the *Ecloga*. They also emphasize Favorinus' privileged social position, able to banter with the emperor Hadrian and remark on Hadrian's shortcomings as a Hellenist. Additionally, Gellius shows Favorinus to be an expert in Latin usage as well, and in the *Attic Nights* he seems to play a Socratic role, humorously exposing the ignorance of vainglorious grammarians as discussed at greater length in Chapter Four. Favorinus, like Menander, appears to have been immensely popular while he was alive and, on the evidence of how prominently Gellius features him in the *Attic Nights*, his influence continued to be felt afterwards. Phrynichus' disparagement suggests an attempt to use this writing project to demonstrate sufficient expertise to supplant the well known and highly regarded Favorinus (or his

[81] Holford-Strevens (2017) 234-5.

followers) and thereby cement his own reputation as a foremost expert on Attic grammar and rhetoric.

Taking the evidence above into account, the *Ecloga* is not truly—certainly not solely—a work intended for Cornelianus' benefit, nor is the preface simply a letter to Cornelianus as the commissioner of the work. Instead, the preface establishes (perhaps more accurately it presupposes) a connection to a powerful Roman minister.[82] Phrynichus does this in order to elevate the social status of his writing to a level where his expertise can form the basis for a new social-intellectual circle. The devotees of Favorinus and the Menander enthusiasts are explicitly envisioned as outside this circle, but Phrynichus also says a great deal about the community that he invites his reader to join by the way he constructs its linguistic profile. The evidence of the text offers some amount of context for this community. and one expedient way to gain insight into this community's language features is to look for the first-person plural, including the pronoun *ἡμεῖς*. By doing so, one finds a number of entries in which "we" are described (not prescribed) as speaking in the correct manner. A few of the most clear-cut examples are given here:

> Σημᾶναι ἐσήμαναν καὶ θερμᾶναι ἐθέρμαναν καὶ καθᾶραι ἐκάθαραν· καὶ ταῦτα παρὰ τὴν ἀρχαίαν χρῆσιν διὰ τοῦ α· λέγομεν δὲ διὰ τοῦ η σημῆναι, καθῆραι, θερμῆναι. (*Ecl*. 15)
> 'Semanai esemanan' (to signify, I signified) and *'thermanai ethermanan'* (to warm, I warmed) and 'katharai ekatharan' (to cleanse, I cleansed): these also [occur] in line with the ancient usage, with an alpha; but we say them with an eta, [i.e.] 'semenai, katherai, thermenai'.
>
> Θρίδακα Ἡρόδοτος (3, 32, 3) ἰάζων, ἡμεῖς δὲ θριδακίνην ὡς Ἀττικοί. (*Ecl.* 101)
> Thridaka' (lettuce): Herodotus, speaking Ionic; but we [say] 'thridakinen' like the Attic writers.
>
> Νίμμα ὁ πολὺς λέγει, ἡμεῖς δὲ ἀπόνιπτρον λέγομεν ὡς Ἀριστοφάνης (Ach. 616) καὶ οἱ ἀμφ' αὐτόν. (*Ecl*. 166)

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[82] Strobel (2005) 134 posits that the lexicographic/grammatical impulse in the second century CE represented an "attempt to re-establish a certain Greekness in their culture, a way of distinguishing themselves from the Romans"; she reiterates this point in Strobel (2009) 94, suggesting that the language of Athenian literature prior to the mid-4th century BCE invokes Athenian power of the 5th and 4th centuries as a conceptual opposite to the Roman power of the present. Nevertheless, it must not be overlooked that Phrynichus' attempts at a relationship with Roman politicians demonstrate how thoroughly reliant this Greek intellectual project is upon Roman institutions.

> ‘Nimma' (wash-water): The crowd says this, but we say 'aponiptron' (washoff), like Aristophanes and his crowd.
>
> Ῥοΐδιον διαιροῦντες λέγουσιν οἱ ἀμαθεῖς· ἡμεῖς δὲ ῥοίδιον.
> ‘Rhoïdion' (a small pomegranate): Ignorant people say it with a diaresis, but we say 'rhoidion'.

Other entries use the future indicative, the subjunctive, or another exhortation such as *ἡμῖν δὲ καλὸν χρῆσθαι τῷ Ἀττικῷ ὀνόματι* (it is good for us to employ the Attic word, *Ecl.* 223). In total, 22 entries of the *Ecloga* employ the first-person plural,[83] of which nine appear to present a description of this group's usage.[84] By using the first person plural indicative, Phrynichus' text presupposes the existence of or seeks to fashion a speech community that also includes Cornelianus (at least) and which is defined by its linguistic practice. The actual and idealized language of this community, which in the main seems already to be in line with Attic, is distinguished from that of people outside the community, i.e. those who practice Attic and/or Greek incorrectly as well as *οἱ πολλοί* and potentially (but not necessarily) *οἱ νῦν.* While Favorinus and Menander are deceased, by persistently attacking their usage he implicitly calls into question the Atticism of anyone Cornelianus may have heard commending them. Phrynichus advances a model for Attic language standards, if it were accepted by Cornelianus and others of the Imperial Court, would change the social function of various Greek usages as tokens of expertise within the elite Atticizing community of Athens. While Naechster may have speculated a rivalry between Phrynichus and Pollux too specific to find support in the available evidence, his restrictive and prescriptive version of Atticism makes the *Ecloga* an instrument for him to negotiate a prominent position for himself within this community—and as its representative to the Emperor.

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[83] *Ecl.* 15, 101, 165, 167, 170, 190, 222, 223, 231, 248, 253, 255, 270, 286, 293, 294, 332, 335, 357, 375, 403, 422
[84] *Ecl.* 15, 101?, 165, 167, 170, 190, 223?, 253?, 403?

2.1.3 Atticism Beyond Prescriptivism

The second-century lexicon known as the *Antiatticist* furnishes the most obvious case study for descriptivism in the pursuit of Attic lexicography. As previously discussed, the work employs a generally prescriptive model for Attic. It also contains many polemic entries representing scholarly one-upmanship to establish authority by citing additional examples. Yet in spite of both of these observations, much of the work appears to have in mind a different model of Greek that permits more expressions from contemporary speech into literary Attic. In γ 30, for example, the author appears to point to everyday usage as justification for a broader range of meaning than other scholars may have admitted: *γεύεσθαι· οὐ μόνον ἐπὶ τοῦ ἐσθίειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ ὀσφραίνεσθαι, ὡς ἐν τῷ βίῳ 'γεύεται μύρων'. Εὐριπίδης Κύκλωπι* (155) (*geuesthai*: not only for 'to eat', but also for 'to smell', as [one would say] in daily life[85], 'he smells (*geuetai*) the perfumes'. Euripides, *Cyclops.*) The Antiatticist's entry σ 6 uses similar language, *στρηνιᾶν· καθ'οὗ ὁ βίος τάσσει Δίφιλος* (fr. 133) ('*strenian'*—to run riot—Diphilos uses it just as common speech has it)[86]. This entry opposes Phrynichus' *Ecl.* 358 on the same word, *Στρηνιᾶν· τούτῳ ἐχρήσαντο οἱ τῆς νέας κωμῳδίας ποιηταί (e. g. Antiphan. fr. 82 K.), ᾧ οὐδ' ἂν μανείς τις χρήσαιτο, παρὸν λέγειν τρυφᾶν.* ('*strenian'* (to run riot): The poets of New Comedy used this, which even one driven mad would not use, given that it is possible to say *'tryphan'* (wax wanton).)[87] These examples demonstrate primarily how the Antiatticist's range of acceptable "Attic" sources is broader than that of Phrynichus, given that it relies on sources (like New Comedy) that Phrynichus deprecates as un-Attic, and do not in themselves do much to showcase a descriptivist attitude towards Greek usage.

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[85] For the interpretation of *ὁ βίος/ἐν τῷ βίῳ* as referring to common linguistic usage, see Valente (2015) 48, and Meineke, A. *Fragmenta comicorum Graecorum*. Berlin: Reimer, 1857, who defines it as "communis loquendi usus" (429).
[86] Note also that the Koinê -σσ- is preferred to the distinctly Attic -ττ- .
[87] Valente (2015) 234.

Other entries in the Antiatticist, however, appear to rely on everyday usage without recourse to earlier literary examples, in a descriptive manner not dissimilar to that of Sextus Empiricus. This preference for new expression is especially in evidence in the entry on *γενέσια*, about which Phrynichus (75) says *οὐκ ὀρθῶς τίθεται ἐπὶ τῆς γενεθλίου ἡμέρας* (it is not correctly applied to the day of birth), but the author of the Antiatticist rhetorically asks the following question:

> γενέσια· οὔσης τε ἑορτῆς {τῆς} δημοτελοῦς Ἀθήναις, Βοηδρομιῶνος πέμπτῃ, Γενέσια καλουμένης, καθότι φησὶ Φιλόχορος (*FGrHist* 328 F 168) καὶ Σόλων ἐν τοῖς ἄξοσι (fr. 84), καὶ τῆς τοῦ ὀνόματος χρήσεως οὔσης Ἑλληνικῆς, τί κωλύει μὴ μόνον ἐπὶ τῆς δημοτελοῦς ἑορτῆς, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς ἰδίας ἑκάστου τάσσεσθαι; (Ant. γ 5)
>
> *genesia* (birthday): Since there is a public festival in Athens, on the fifth of Boedromion, called the 'Genesia' (festival of the birth of ancestors), as Philochorus says, and Solon in the *Axones*, and given that the usage of the name is Hellenic, what then prevents one from applying the term not only to the public festival, but also to the personal birthday of an individual?

Along similar lines, the Antiatticist appeals to broader and more common usage—*συνηθεία*, as in Sextus—as evidence of a broader semantic range for the verb *κρούειν*:

> κρούειν· κατὰ τοῦ ῥάπισαι ἠρέμα μόνον οἴονται τίθεσθαι αὐτό, ὡς ὅταν εἴπῃ Ὑπερείδης (fr. 232 S. = 201 J.)· «καὶ τῷ σκέλει με ἠρέμα ἔκρουσεν». ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς συνηθείας κατὰ τοῦ κόψαι τὴν θύραν τάσσεται· καὶ κατὰ τοῦ κακεμφάτου ἐν τῇ συνήθειᾳ τὸ κροῦσαι κεῖται ἀντὶ τοῦ συγγενέσθαι. (Ant. κ 15)
>
> *krouein* (to knock): they suppose it to be applied only to the act of striking with a stick, as Hyperides whenever he said it: "and he barely struck me with his staff". But in common usage it is used as for knocking on a door; also, in common usage 'to bang' (*krousai*) is used, in a vulgar sense, for having intercourse.

Phrynichus (148), conversely, says *ἴσως μέν που παραβεβίασται ἡ χρῆσις, ἄμεινον δὲ τὸ κόπτειν τὴν θύραν* (perhaps the usage has survived somewhere, but '*koptein*—to knock—on the door' is better.) In general usage, it appears that *γενέσια* and *κρούειν* have acquired broader semantic ranges that overlap with those of *γενέθλιον* and *κόπτειν*, respectively, and the *Antiatticist* gives no indication that this overlap might be problematic. This acceptance of broadening definitions through usage helps illustrate the programmatic difference between the *Antiatticist* and

Phrynichus' *Ecloga*: as discussed in 2.2.1, one of the central pillars in Phrynichus' construction of Attic is the preservation of meanings he considers to be "original", whereas the *Antiatticist* considers Attic usage valid both in its original ancient sense and in more novel applications.

Whereas Phrynichus considers the vernacular to carry little weight in matters of Atticism, and deprecates New Comedy (especially Menander, as shown above), the *Antiatticist* appears to consider them both as valid sources. Furthermore, the *Antiatticist* appears at least in part to be written as a response, if not to Phrynichus specifically, to the restrictively prescriptivist school of Attic lexicography of which Phrynichus is an enthusiastic advocate. Phrynichus in turn (or perhaps simultaneously) is responding either to the *Antiatticist* or to another lexicographer of similar vintage and outlook.[88] Of the 61 parallel entries shared by the *Ecloga* and the *Antiatticist*, 34 of them show clear disagreements regarding the legitimacy of a word or phrase, 19 have the *Antiatticist* reporting without apparent comment on the opinion of the grammarians and lexicographers, and the writer concurs with Phrynichus in only 8 instances. Clearly their opinions differ starkly, and in a sense, each author is writing "at", though not "to", the other. The effort on the part of the author of the Antiatticist to offer additional interpretations and usages sets his work up in clear opposition to that of Phrynichus (or one like him). The consistent willingness on the part of the *Antiatticist* to license words and meanings with customary usage, rather than depend the grammatical authority of lexicographers or their literary sources, serves as the most compelling evidence that the *Antiatticist* lexicon is written with an underlying ideology that in modern terminology must be considered descriptivist.

Another, perhaps even less prescriptive work is that of the lexicographer Moeris, known as *Atticista* and usually held to be contemporary with Phrynichus; this work may (in some

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[88] Fischer (1974) 40-41; Valente (2015) 52-5.

scholarly views) have used him as a source[89], but it resembles much more the earlier generations of Attic lexicographers than it does the *Ecloga* of Phrynichus. The vast majority of Moeris's entries follow the paradigm set by the first: *ἄγαμαι Ὑπερβόλου Ἀττικοί· ἄγαμαι Ὑπέρβολον Ἕλληνες* (the Attics say, 'I am in awe of Hyperbolus,' the Hellenes, 'I am amazed at Hyperbolus', Moer. *Att.* α 1.) That is, the entries identify the Attic term, contrast it with the "Hellenic", and do not prescribe except by the implied context of being a resource for sophists looking to compose in Attic. Other entries offer definitions or distinguish between similar words that have become conflated in Hellenic usage, such as *ὁμόσε ἅμα ὁμόθεν τόπου δηλωτικά· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἅμα ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ δηλοῖ, τὸ δὲ ὁμόσε εἰς τὸ αὐτό, τὸ δὲ ὁμόθεν ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ* (*homose, hama, homothen*, indications of place: for *hama* indicates 'in the same place', *homose* 'into the same place', and *homothen,* 'from the same place', ο 2.) But many entries also discuss a third register or dialect, *κοινόν*, that is distinct from both Hellenic and Attic usage despite some overlap among the three:[90]

> ποῖ Ἀττικοί· ποῦ κοινόν. (π 49)
> *poi* (whither) say the Attics; *pou* (where) is common.

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[89] Heimannsfeld (1911) 50 contends that there can be no doubt Phrynichus was a source for Moeris, a point which Fischer (1974) 43 disputes but Hansen (1998) 37-40 supports; in Hansen's view, Moeris was familiar with both of the surviving works of Phrynichus and points to several parallels—for example: Moer. θ 18 θᾶττον· τάχιον, Moer τ 7 τάχιον οὐ λέγεται παρ' Ἀττικοῖς ἀλλὰ θᾶττον. cf. Phryn. *Ecl*. 52 τάχιον Ἕλληνες οὐ λέγουσιν, θᾶττον δέ. Note again that while Moeris identifies the irregular form as specifically Attic, Phrynichus conflates it with Greek generally.
Moer. δ 31 διέφθορεν Ἀττικοί· διέφθαρκεν Ἕλληνες. cf. Phryn. *PS* 63.4 διέφθορεν· οὐ τὸ διέφθαρται τοῦτο σημαίνει. διὸ καὶ ἁμαρτάνουσιν οἱ λέγοντες '[οὐ] διέφθορεν ὁ παῖς', δέον διέφθαρται. τὸ δὲ διέφθορε τὸ διέφθαρκε σημαίνει. In this case, Phrynichus appears to be translating into Hellenic from Attic, for the reader's benefit. Lucian in the *Soloecista* makes a joke at the expense of one who is unaware of this word's proper Attic usage.

[90] *κοινόν* is used by Moeris 38 times to identify a word as belonging to "common" Greek usage; it is used twice to describe a word as being shared by multiple distinct dialects: *διωκάθειν κοινὸν Δωριέων Ἰώνων Ἀττικῶν• διώκειν Ἕλληνες.* (δ 6: *diokathein* (give chase) common to Dorians, Ionians, Attics; *diokein* (chase) say the Hellenes). and *ὧδε κοινὸν Ἰώνων καὶ Ἀττικῶν· οὕτως Ἕλληνες.* (ω 15: *hode* (thus) common to Ionians and Attics; *houtos* (thusly) say the Hellenes). It is used a single time in different format, α 151: *ἄμυναν ἡ κοινὴ συνήθεια· λέγει δὲ τῶν Ἀττικῶν οὐδείς.* (*amunan*—ward off—is the common usage; none of the Attics says it). Swain (1996) 52 considers "common" to mean "the language of the lower end of the linguistic continuum of educated/semi-educated speakers".

> Οἰδίπουν Ἀττικοί· Οἰδίπουν καὶ Ἕλληνες· Οἰδίποδα κοινόν. (ο 19)
> *Oidipoun* (Oedipus) say the Attics; *Oidipoun* say the Hellenes as well; *Oidipoda* is common.[91]
>
> ἄθλιος Ἀττικοί· ἀτυχής ἑλληνικὸν καὶ κοινόν. (α 96)
> *athlios* (miserable) say the Attics; *atyches* (misfortunate) is Hellenic and common.
>
> ἐξίλλειν Ἀττικοί· ἐξείργειν Ἕλληνες· ἐκβάλλειν κοινόν. (ε 21)
> *exillein* (disentangle) say the Attics; *exeirgein* (drive away) say the Hellenes; *ekballein* (cast out) is common.
>
> λέμμα ἀντὶ τοῦ λέπισμα Ἕλληνες· λέπος κοινόν. (λ 32)[92]
> *lemma* (rind) say the Hellenes, for *lepisma* (peel); *lepos* is common.

By implication, one who consults Moeris in order to compose in Attic Greek will discard the Hellenic or common words when they differ from Attic, even though the headwords tend generally to be those in Attic usage suggest a work better suited for reading Attic than writing in it. Nonetheless it is a highly practical reference given that its alphabetized entries follow the same general format, with few variations, and they lack the distracting commentary produced by Phrynichus' personal agenda.[93] The overall tone of Moeris' lexicon is therefore a curatorial one: [94] it collects and catalogues Attic and other vocabulary without explicity prescribing any one register, and without deprecating the usage of any person or group.[95]

The *Onomasticon* of Pollux is the result of curation on a much grander scale, although its format and organizing principles differ substantially. Like the list of rhetorical descriptors from Poll. 4.22 (footnoted above), most of Pollux's entries assemble a wide range of related terms that

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[91] The common usage exhibits morphological analogy, a subject of much debate in grammatical treatises; see section 2.4 below for a discussion of this issue.
[92] This entry does not mention the Attic word explicitly, but the reader is to understand that it is *λέπισμα*.
[93] Strobel (2005) 152.
[94] Swain (1996) 52: "It is no surprise to find a form Moeris labels 'common' found in literary authors of quality. Rule books like his were necessary precisely because the rules were not and could not be definitively formulated. With his inconsistencies and mistakes in Attic he is a good example of how the atticists' desire to be perfect could quite easily go wrong. A problem inherent in all such attempts at codification is the conflict with the goal of possessing a naturally faultless Greek. Moeris and the othersrepresent a process of negotiation between the ideological imperative to atticize and the cultural conditions of the real world which made rule books necessary."
[95] Strobel (2005) 151: the only entries in which he does offer criticism are 195, 23; 200, 18; 202, 25; 210, 17; 212, 5; 213, 15.

are not necessarily synonymous—not even close, in some cases. He is not concerned with providing any fine distinctions between terms the way Phrynichus or Apollonius is; for instance, 4.13 and 4.14 list various words referring to deficiencies in knowledge and wisdom without any apparent organizational principle or semantic distinctions. In another case he treats the adjectives *φαῦλος* and *φλαῦρος* as interchangeable synonyms. [96] Pollux's goal is the assemblage of as many Attic words and phrases as possible, and he tasks (or trusts) his reader to know their meanings without his telling them.

Another contemporary lexicographer, Herennius Philo, provides a useful contrast to Pollux's grab-bag assemblage of vocabulary. In this particular case, for instance, Herennius makes his reader fully aware that these words, despite their general similarities, do not mean the same thing and must not be used as though they did:

> φλαῦρον καὶ φαῦλον διαφέρει. φλαῦρον μὲν γάρ ἐστι τὸ μικρὸν καὶ κοῦφον κακόν, φαῦλον δὲ τὸ μέγα, [ὡς καὶ ἐν ἄλλοις παρεδηλώσαμεν.] (Heren. Phil. *De adfinium verborum differentia* 23 [= *De diversis verborum significationibus* 180])
>
> *phlauron* and *phaulon* differ. For while *phlauron* is a small and slight evil, *phaulon* is a big one, as we have also clarified elsewhere.

Like Herennius, the epitomized Phrynichus of the *Praeparatio sophistica* is also careful to distinguish *φαῦλον* from the near-synonymous *ἄκομψον*.[97] But while Herennius shows

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[96] Poll. *Onom.* 12: τὰ δ' ἐναντία κακία, πονηρία, μοχθηρία, **φαυλότης—φλαυρότης** δὲ σκληρόν—, σκαιότης, ἀπαιδευσία, πανουργία, ἀμαθία, μισολογία, (13) ἄνοια, ἀφροσύνη, ἀσυνεσία, ἀξυνεσία, ἀκολασία, ἀκρασία, ἀσέλγεια, ἀνανδρία, θρασύτης, δειλία, ἀρρωστία, ἀδικία, ἀδικοπραγία, ἀνοσιότης, ἀγνωμοσύνη, ἀνεπιείκεια, μικροψυχία—ἡ γὰρ μικρογνωμοσύνη δυσχερὲς πρὸς τὴν ἀκοήν—, ἀσέβεια, δυσσέβεια, μισανθρωπία, ἀπανθρωπία, μικροφροσύνη, μικροπρέπεια. καὶ τὰ ὀνόματα κακός, πονηρός, μοχθηρός, ἡμιμόχθηρος, **φαῦλος, φλαῦρος**, σκαιός, ἀπαίδευτος, ἄσοφος, (14) εἰ καὶ μὴ ἔστιν ἡ ἀσοφία, πανοῦργος, ἀμαθής, μισολόγος, ἄνους, ἀνόητος, ἀλόγιστος, εἰ καὶ τὴν ἀλογιστίαν οὐ προσετέον, ἄφρων, ἀξύνετος, ἀσύνετος, ἀκρατής, ἀσελγής, ἀκόλαστος, ἄνανδρος, θρασύς, δειλός, ἄρρωστος, ἄδικος, ἀνόσιος, ἀγνώμων, ἀνεπιεικής, μικρόψυχος, ἀσεβής, δυσσεβής, μισάνθρωπος, μικρόφρων, ὀλιγόφρων, ἢ κατὰ Ξενοφῶντα(?) μικροπρεπής. καὶ τὰ ἐπιρρήματα μοχθηρῶς, **φαύλως, φλαύρως**· τὸ γὰρ πονηρῶς εὐτελές, σκαιῶς δὲ καὶ ἀπαιδεύτως, ἀσόφως, πανούργως, ἀμαθῶς, μισολόγως, ἀνοήτως, ἀλογίστως, ἀφρόνως· μικροφρόνως γὰρ καὶ ὀλιγοφρόνως ἀτοπώτερα, κάλλιον δὲ μικροπρεπῶς.

[97] Phryn. *PS* 39 ἄκομψον καὶ φαῦλον (Eurip. fr. 473): οἷον κομψίας καὶ πανουργίας ἀπηλλαγμένον καὶ ἁπλοῦν. κομψὸν γὰρ τὸν πανοῦργον, οἷον κόπτοντά τινα καὶ ὀχληρόν, φαῦλον δὲ τὸν ἁπλοῦν.

prescriptive tendencies in his project dedicated to distinguishing between words that the Greek authors of his day may (apparently) have conflated, he diverges sharply from Phrynichus in that his most frequently cited source is Homer and his range of sources is far more diverse than the Atticists.[98] While Pollux's *Onomasticon* represents a broad curation of specifically Attic terminology, Herennius makes specific prescriptions about a broader Hellenistic version of the language. As a result, Pollux demonstrates that interest in Attic does not entail a prescriptive program of mandating usage, and Herennius suggests the corollary to be true.

2.2 Sextus Empiricus: Radical Descriptivism

The works of Phrynichus, and of other lexicographers to a lesser degree, articulate a prescriptive model of language based on certain assumptions about the way language works. Because they rely on a model of language with *a priori* standards for spelling (and/or pronunciation), morphology, syntax, and semantics, they encounter frequent hurdles in the form of exceptions to their prescribed usages. As discussed above, Phrynichus gives clues to the reasoning behind validation or rejection of words and phrases, but in so doing he accumulates a cumbersome and complex set of rules that appear at several points to contradict each other. This agglomeration of standards and measures is characteristic of prescriptivism, as already established. Conversely, a descriptivist approach to language requires no such standard for the linguistic matter encountered, and instead the rules of language develop in into a reflection of whatever linguistic data are assembled.

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[98] Strobel (2005) 153; in fact, it resembles much more the bibliography of Athenaeus.

2.2.1 Sextus Against the Grammarians and the Hellenists

Nowhere is this principle more evident than in Sextus Empiricus *Adversus Mathematicos I*, also known as *Adversus Grammaticos* (*Against the Grammarians*). This is the first in a series of books that propose to dismantle the dogmatic schools of grammar, rhetoric, geometry, arithmetic, astrology, and music by applying Skeptic principles to undermine the expertise of prominent figures in their respective fields. Dated to the late second century CE,[99] this text is very much contemporary to the lexicography projects discussed above. While Phrynichus asserts his grammatical expertise by citing evidence—if idiosyncratically—and pointing out deficiencies in the usage of other authors, Sextus' treatise rejects the notion of grammatical expertise, indeed of grammar itself. Sextus writes as a radical Pyrrhonian Skeptic, from a position diametrically opposed to the certainty with which the lexicographers make their pronouncements. As Blank (1998) emphasizes, Sextus does not position himself as a rival authority on language[100] in the way that (e.g.) Phrynichus discredits Favorinus or grammarians such as Theon. In other words, Sextus does not advance an alternative dogma or an anti-dogma but instead seeks to demonstrate that no dogmatic approach will accurately describe language.

Sextus' philosophical approach to language is ultimately predicated on the arbitrariness of signs or names, a notion first raised at 36-8 in the introduction to work:

> ὁ δὲ λόγος ἤτοι σημαίνει ἢ οὐ σημαίνει. καὶ μηδὲν μὲν σημαίνων οὐδὲ διδάσκαλός τινός ἐστι, σημαίνων δὲ ἤτοι φύσει τι σημαίνει ἢ θέσει. καὶ φύσει μὲν οὐ σημαίνει διὰ τὸ μὴ πάντας πάντων ἀκούειν, Ἕλληνας βαρβάρων καὶ βαρβάρους Ἑλλήνων ἢ Ἕλληνας Ἑλλήνων ἢ βαρβάρους βαρβάρων· θέσει δὲ εἴπερ σημαίνει, δῆλον ὡς οἱ μὲν προκατειληφότες τὰ καθ' ὧν αἱ λέξεις κεῖνται καὶ ἀντιλήψονται τούτων, οὐ τὸ ἀγνοούμενον ἐξ αὐτῶν διδασκόμενοι, τὸ δ' ὅπερ ᾔδεισαν ἀνανεούμενοι, οἱ δὲ χρήζοντες τῆς τῶν ἀγνοουμένων μαθήσεως οὐκέτι.
>
> However, speech either signifies or it does not. And if it signifies nothing it will not be a teacher of anything either, but if it signifies it signifies something either by nature or by imposition. And it does not signify by nature since not all peoples understand all

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[99] Blank (1998) xv.
[100] Blank (1998) *passim.*

> others—Greeks do not understand barbarians nor barbarians Greeks, nor do Greeks understand all Greeks or barbarians all barbarians. But if it signifies by imposition, it is clear that those who have already understood the things for which the words stand will also apprehend them, not by being taught by the words that which was unknown to them but rather by renewing just what they already know, while those who need learning of what is unknown to them will not apprehend them.

This discussion picks up a line of semantic and semiotic inquiry begun in Plato's dialogue on the correctness of names (*περὶ ὀρθοτήτος ὀνομάτων*), the *Cratylus*. By Sextus' time this avenue of inquiry has led to the view, shared by Epicurean and Stoic philosophers of langage, that names (or more properly, signifiers) arise as a result of natural phenomena. The distinction between the two schools' approach to signification is essentially that the Epicureans consider words (i.e. word-sounds) to be random, natural occurrences over which a systematic framework—language—is constructed, whereas the Stoics assign essential, rational knowledge and agency to the name-givers of various peoples and languages.[101] In the Stoic view, an inherent connection exists between the name of a thing and its fundamental nature, the names of things offer cataleptic impressions (impressions which lead people to apprehend their nature), and therefore the components of a particular word—the gender of a noun, or its pronunciation or morphology—are essential and necessary. The Stoic position that names derive meaning or form, such as masculine or feminine gender, by nature leads the grammarians to prescribe certain usages and deprecate others on the basis of an assumed *a priori* natural law of language.

Sextus has this Stoic model of natural signification in his sights throughout the work, and at *AG* 142-53 (the section titled *Περὶ ὀνομάτων*) he engages more deeply with the *φύσει/θέσει* dichotomy. After paraphrasing the Epicurean and Stoic views (142-4), he restates the argument from the introduction (145-6, cf. 36-8) and expands it to offer a clear contrast between nature and imposition, thing and name:

> πάλιν γὰρ φήσομεν ὅτι τὸ φύσει κινοῦν ἡμᾶς ὁμοίως πάντας κινεῖ, καὶ οὐχ οὓς μὲν

[101] Blank (1998) 177-8.

> οὕτως οὓς δὲ ἐναντίως· οἷον φύσει τὸ πῦρ ἀλεαίνει, βαρβάρους Ἕλληνας ἰδιώτας ἐμπείρους, καὶ οὐχ Ἕλληνας μὲν ἀλεαίνει βαρβάρους δὲ ψύχει· καὶ ἡ χιὼν φύσει ψύχει, καὶ οὐ τινὰς μὲν ψύχει τινὰς δὲ θερμαίνει. ὥστε τὸ φύσει κινοῦν ὁμοίως τοὺς ἀπαραποδίστους ἔχοντας τὰς αἰσθήσεις κινεῖ. τὰ δὲ αὐτὰ ὀνόματα οὐ πᾶσίν ἐστι τὰ αὐτά, ἀλλὰ τοῖς μὲν ἀρρενικὰ τοῖς δὲ θηλυκὰ τοῖς δὲ οὐδέτερα· οἷον Ἀθηναῖοι μὲν τὴν στάμνον λέγουσι θηλυκῶς, Πελοποννήσιοι δὲ τὸν στάμνον ἀρρενικῶς, καὶ οἱ μὲν τὴν θόλον οἱ δὲ τὸν θόλον, καὶ οἱ μὲν τὴν βῶλον οἱ δὲ τὸν βῶλον, καὶ οὐ διὰ τοῦτο οὗτοι ἢ ἐκεῖνοι λέγονται ἁμαρτάνειν· ἕκαστος γάρ, ὡς τεθεμάτικεν, οὕτω χρῆται.
>
> We shall again respond that what moves us by nature moves all in the same way and not some in one way and others in the opposite way. For example, fire warms by nature—barbarians, Greeks, laymen, and experts—it does not warm Greeks but cool barbarians; and snow cools by nature—it does not cool some people and warm others. So what moves by nature moves in the same manner all whose senses are not impeded. Yet the same names are not the same for all, but are masculine for some, feminine for others, and for others neuter. For example, the Athenians say that *stamnos* ('jar') is feminine, the Peloponnesians that it is masculine; some use *tholos* ('rotunda') as feminine, others as masculine; some use *bōlos* ('clod') as feminine, others as masculine. Neither one group nor the other can be said to be in error on this count, for each one uses the word as it has imposed it. (*AG* 148-9)

As Sextus concludes in 153, since natural signification does not exist, and all names or signs (in this case words and especially nouns) derive their meaning by the imposition of convention, therefore no grammatical expertise exists apart from "the non-expert and simple observance of usage" (*ἡ ἄτεχνος καὶ ἀφελὴς τῆς συνηθείας παρατήρησις*).[102] Intriguingly, this line of reasoning more closely resembles a prefiguration of Ferdinand de Saussure's structuralist linguistics than it does the theories of meaning and reference contemporary to Sextus' time, which were largely produced by the Stoic philosophers.[103]

By putting the ultimate focus on conventional usage (*συνηθεία*) and eliminating the idea of a natural order to language, Sextus creates his language ideology in line with his other Skeptic criticisms of expertise. He also aligns himself broadly with the Epicurean school of language philosophy that, among other things, forms the basis for Varro's discussion of Latin. The *De*

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[102] Note that Sextus may be using a two-termination adjective of the feminine second declension to reinforce, via a play on words, the unreliability of prescriptions regarding the gender of nouns.
[103] In his third surviving work, the *Outline of Pyrhonnism* (*Πυρρώνειοι ὑποτυπώσεις*), Sextus takes a more moderate position that appears to waver between a naturalistic view, like that of the Epicureans, and the emphasis on arbitrary convention found in *Adv. gram.*; cf. Spinelli (1991) 62.

Lingua Latina will be discussed at greater length in section 2.4 below; while Varro is ultimately noncommittal[104] in his exploration of language ideology and philosophy, Sextus' view of language is a radically descriptivist one, positioned nearly opposite to Phrynichus and other gatekeepers of Greek. That Sextus proposes a descriptivist approach to analyzing language can be most clearly seen in the discussion from *AM* 1.176-240, the section entitled *Εἰ ἔστι τις τέχνη περὶ ἑλληνισμοῦ* (*Whether there exists an expertise of Hellenism*). "Hellenism", as discussed in the introduction, is similar to but distinct from the broader form of Atticism, such as that in the *Antiatticist*, placing diminished emphasis on antiquity and dialectical purity but still prescribing normative rules of usage. Sextus describes this prescriptivist form of Hellenism as *ἐστι κεχωρισμένος τῆς κοινῆς ἡμῶν συνηθείας καὶ κατὰ γραμματικὴν ἀναλογίαν δοκεῖ προκόπτειν* (it is divorced from our common usage and seems to proceed according to grammatical analogy[105], 176). Grammatical analogy is discussed in 2.3, and as will be shown does not neatly fit into the opposition between prescriptivism and descriptivism. In the context of this discussion, however, it fills a similar role given that the other sense of "Hellenism" is characterized *κατὰ τὴν ἑκάστου τῶν Ἑλλήνων συνήθειαν ἐκ παραπλασμοῦ καὶ τῆς ἐν ταῖς ὁμιλίαις παρατηρήσεως ἀναγόμενος* (it accords with the usage of each of the Greeks and advances by assimilation and observation in conversation, 176). The crucial, indeed programmatic word here is *συνήθεια*, which Sextus uses in the conclusion to the opening paragraph:

> διόπερ εἰ οἱ γραμματικοὶ ὑπισχνοῦνται τέχνην τινὰ τὴν καλουμένην ἀναλογίαν παραδώσειν, δι' ἧς κατ' ἐκεῖνον ἡμᾶς τὸν ἑλληνισμὸν ἀναγκάζουσι διαλέγεσθαι, ὑποδεικτέον ὅτι ἀσύστατός ἐστιν αὕτη ἡ τέχνη, δεῖ δὲ τοὺς ὀρθῶς βουλομένους διαλέγεσθαι τῇ ἀτέχνῳ καὶ ἀφελεῖ κατὰ τὸν βίον καὶ τῇ κατὰ τὴν κοινὴν τῶν πολλῶν συνήθειαν παρατηρήσει προσανέχειν. (179)
>
> Hence, if grammarians promise to transmit some kind of expertise which they call 'analogy' and through which they force us to speak according to the former kind of Hellenism, we must show that this expertise is incoherent, and those who want to speak

[104] His work in question is also incomplete, it should be noted.
[105] All translations of Sextus Empiricus taken from Blank (1998).

> correctly must attend to the non-expert, simple observation which is appropriate to everyday life and in accordance with the common usage of the majority.

The word *συνήθεια* appears 86 times in *AG* and seven times in the other books combined,[106] demonstrating how central the observation of usage is to Sextus' philosophy of language. Even more significantly, Sextus demonstrates that usage is also the key component of the analogy-derived prescriptions made by grammatical experts. Taking as a test case the infinitive form of *χράομαι*, and the question of whether it ought to be said as *χρῆσθαι* or *χρᾶσθαι*, Sextus frames the analogists' answer as *κτῆσις*:*κτᾶσθαι*::*χρῆσις*:*χρᾶσθαι* (197). However, he then relates what happens when this answer is interrogated:

> ἀλλ' εἰ ἐπακολουθῶν τις αὐτοῖς πύθοιτο 'αὐτὸ δὲ τοῦτο τὸ κτᾶσθαι ὅτι ὀρθῶς εἴρηται, ἀφ' οὗ καὶ τὸ χρᾶσθαι ἀποδείκνυμεν, πόθεν ἴσμεν;' φήσουσιν ὅτι ἐν τῇ συνηθείᾳ λέγεται. τοῦτο δὲ λέγοντες δώσουσι τὸ τῇ συνηθείᾳ δεῖν ὡς κριτηρίῳ προσέχειν, ἀλλὰ μὴ τῇ ἀναλογίᾳ. (*AM* 1.198)
>
> But if one should follow up and inquire of them, "And from what source do we know that it is correct to say *ktasthai,* from which we prove that *chrasthai* is correct as well?" they will say that it is said in customary usage. But in saying this they will grant the necessity of relying on usage as the criterion, not analogy.

Thus by their own admission, says Sextus, the analogists' prescribed form *χρᾶσθαι* cannot be called correct without evidence of usage in order to verify it.[107] Far from serving as a guide for usage, analogy in fact proceeds from it. Sextus' line of reasoning leads one to conclude that the activities of those who profess to prescribe usage through grammatical expertise are merely descriptivist observations after all.

This kind of logic game is characteristic of the radical Skeptic position that Sextus takes in *Against the Grammarians*. In like manner, at 210-211, Sextus demonstrates that the

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[106] By comparison, Phrynichus *Ecloga* has only one instance, in entry 340: *Ἔδέετο, ἐπλέετο· Ἰακὰ ταῦτα. ἡ δὲ Ἀττικὴ συνήθεια συναιρεῖ, ἐδεῖτο ἐπλεῖτο.* ('Edeeto, epleeto'—it was needed, a journey was sailed—these are Ionic. But the Attic usage contracts, 'edeito, epleito').

[107] While it is reasonably well attested, the more common is in fact χρῆσθαι—which is also the form Sextus uses in foreshadowing his conclusion, *ἀναγκασθήσονται χρῆσθαι μὲν τῇ συνηθείᾳ παραπέμπειν δὲ τὴν ἀναλογίαν* (they will be forced to rely on usage and send analogy packing, *A*G 196).

grammarians' terms "barbarism" and "solecism" are meaningless, supplying these conventional definitions:[108]

> ὁριζόμενοι γὰρ τόν τε βαρβαρισμὸν καὶ τὸν σολοικισμόν φασι 'βαρβαρισμός ἐστι παράπτωσις ἐν ἁπλῇ λέξει παρὰ τὴν κοινὴν συνήθειαν' καὶ 'σολοικισμός ἐστι παράπτωσις ἀσυνήθης κατὰ τὴν ὅλην σύνταξιν καὶ ἀνακόλουθος'. (210)
>
> For they define barbarism and solecism by saying that 'barbarism is a mistake against accustomed usage in a single word', [109] and 'solecism is an unaccustomed and incongruent mistake in the whole construction'.[110]

Sextus points out here that "barbarism" and "solecism" are meaningless terms, by means of a Skeptic logic trick focusing on *ἁπλῇ* and *ὅλην* in which he conflates the part and the whole and ultimately concludes that neither the part (the word) nor the whole (the construction) can be definitively proven to exist. But the more substantive objections raised include the following points:

213-4 Grammaticality, if defined as the absence of solecism or barbarism, is not a reliable indicator of good Greek; *οὗτος*, e.g., is a legitimate word in a recognizable form, but still cannot be uttered in reference to a woman.[111]

215 A number of sentences in Greek are solecisms, such as *Ἀθῆναι καλὴ πόλις Ὀρέστης καλὴ τραγῳδία, ἡ βουλὴ οἱ ἑξακόσιοι*. (Athens [f.pl.] is a beautiful city [f.sg.], Orestes [m.sg.] is a fine tragedy [f.sg.], the council [f.sg.] is the six hundred [m.pl.]) Their existence in common usage, however, means that their grammaticality depends on usage and not syntax.

217 Verbs derived from nouns along regular morphological patterns do not derive their meaning regularly; *ἀντικνημιάζειν*, e.g., means 'to strike in the shin' yet *γαστρίζειν* means not 'to strike in the belly' but rather 'to gorge oneself.' The meaning is imbued by usage and cannot be easily predicted from the morphemes.

221-7 So-called "universal rules" (*καθολικά…θεωρήματα*), e.g. one prescribing *–οῦς* as the genitive for all words with nominative *-ής*, are not in fact universal; writing such grammatical rules based on the notion that "a universal rule proceeds from the majority

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[108] Blank (1998) 232-4 illustrates that these definitions are typical of the grammatical philosophies current in Sextus' time, and therefore do not constitute a strawman argument on Sextus' part.

[109] i.e. it is a matter of vocabulary.

[110] i.e. an error in syntax and/or morphology; cf. Quintilian 1.5.36-8 who identifies solecisms as morphosyntactic errors by explain that a solecism can technically consist of a single word, but only when it contains two or more morphemes combined in an illegitimate fashion.

[111] The observation of 213-4 seems to prefigure Chomksy's famously grammatical but nonsensical example sentence, "Colorless green ideas sleep furiously."(Chomsky, N. *Syntactic Structures*. Berlin: Mouton & Co., 1957).

> of cases" (*ἐκ πλειόνων ἐστὶ τὸ καθολικὸν παράπηγμα*) is intellectually dishonest and deceptive.

As can be readily seen, Sextus repeatedly emphasizes the superiority of real-world experience (*ἐμπειρία*) and usage (*συνήθεια*) to expertise (*τέχνη*), rejecting prescriptions in favor of observations. He returns to this point at 236-40 to refute a charge commonly leveled against usage by the grammarians, *ἐπεὶ ἐγκαλοῦσιν ὡς ἀνωμάλῳ καὶ πολυειδεῖ τῇ συνηθείᾳ, καὶ ἡμεῖς ἀπὸ τῆς αὐτῆς ἀφορμῆς αὐτοῖς ἐγκαλέσομεν* (when they charge common usage with being inconsistent and various, we too shall charge them from the same starting point, 236). Sextus adduces some apparently similar pairs of words such as Ἄρης:Χάρης::Ἄρεως:Χάρητος and βοῶν:σαρῶν::βοῶντος:σαροῦντος, which in reality have different stems and follow different paradigms, as evidence that dissimilarity (or more properly anomaly, discussed below) is the rule rather than the exception. Observation of usage, rather than a generative system of rules for declension, is the fundamental principle of morphology in Sextus' view.

The most markedly descriptivist dimension of Sextus' commentary on Hellenism emerges at the points where he rejects outright the ideology of correctness in language. Phrynichus, as shown above, frequently links *δόκιμον* to *ἀρχαῖον* when determining whether a word is correct or not; at *AG* 202 Sextus relates the earlier (second century BCE) Alexandrian grammatical doctrine of Ptolemy Pindarion, which has a similar ideological underpinning:

> ἀναλογία, φασίν, ὁμολογουμένως ἐκ τῆς συνηθείας ὁρμᾶται· ἔστι γὰρ ὁμοίου τε καὶ ἀνομοίου θεωρία, τὸ δὲ ὅμοιον καὶ ἀνόμοιον ἐκ τῆς δεδοκιμασμένης λαμβάνεται συνηθείας, δεδοκιμασμένη δὲ καὶ ἀρχαιοτάτη ἐστὶν ἡ Ὁμήρου ποίησις· ποίημα γὰρ οὐδὲν πρεσβύτερον ἧκεν εἰς ἡμᾶς τῆς ἐκείνου ποιήσεως· διαλεξόμεθα ἄρα τῇ Ὁμήρου κατακολουθοῦντες συνηθείᾳ.
>
> 'Analogy', they say, 'is agreed to proceed from usage, for it is a study of the similar and the dissimilar, but the similar and dissimilar is grasped from approved (*δεδοκιμασμένης*) usage, and that which is approved and most ancient (*ἀρχαιοτάτη*) is the poetry of Homer, for no poem older than his has come down to us. Thus we shall follow in our speech the usage of Homer.'

Note that the Alexandrians (if Sextus' paraphrase is accurate) use the same terminology as Phrynichus, *δεδοκιμασμένης* and *ἀρχαιοτάτη*. In response to this position, Sextus points out (*AG* 204) that Homeric usage may not actually be the oldest and adds (*AG* 206) that it is for the most part laughably incongruous if used to communicate in contemporary contexts. Most crucially, however, he raises the objection (*AG* 208) that Homer did not look back to the past for its vocabulary and syntax, but that his Greek instead reflects the contemporary usage of his time and place.[112] The implication is that by imitating and emulating ancient authorities to create rules for usage and grammar, Pindarion (and prescriptivists like him, such as Phrynichus) actually distances himself from the spirit of the ancient authors because his linguistic methodology is fundamentally different from theirs.

In keeping with his Skeptic framework, Sextus asserts that the only correct usage is that which is characteristic of the time and place of the writing or speech act. He therefore rejects criteria like *δόκιμον* and *ἀρχαῖον* altogether in favor of *ἡ κοινὴ συνήθεια*, a phrase which occurs 20 times in *Against the Grammarians*. He develops this notion further at 229-235, reminding the reader that "common usage" is heavily dependent on context (232) and, in effect, pointing out to his reader the common instances of code-switching that occur in daily life when one deals with laborers, merchants, professionals such as physicians, and intellectuals like the philosophically-inclined elites for whom this book appears to be intended. Here Sextus articulates quite concisely and accurately what linguists now call *diglossia*—that is, the coexistence of two (or more) registers of speech with differing levels of prestige attached to them.[113] Consequently, Sextus rejects the ideology of "correct" usage in favor of whatever is "appropriate" (*πρέπον*) to a particular linguistic context, in effect describing the phenomenon of code-switching: *δεξιῶς οὖν*

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[112] This view clearly does not accord with the mainstream of modern Homeric scholarship but is characteristic of the unitarian Homeric scholarship of Aristarchus, who was a teacher of Pindarion.
[113] Kim (2017) 46-7; cf. Romaine (2000) 46-9, 243-5.

ἑκάστῃ περιστάσει τὸ πρέπον ἀποδιδόντες δόξομεν ἀμέμπτως ἑλληνίζειν (So, by providing the appropriate word for every situation[114], we shall seem to speak faultless Greek; *AG* 235). For Sextus, Greek and even the barbarian languages cannot be correct or incorrect; language can only be determined at the moment of usage[115] to be appropriate or inappropriate.

2.2.2 Hellenist Grammarians and Prescriptivism

Sextus considers dialectical variations unproblematic and reminds his readers that "faultless Greek" is entirely dependent on its context. By some definitions, such as that of ps.-Herodian, Sextus is effectively a Hellenist by ideology—though he argues exhaustively against the notion that Hellenism is something about which one can have expertise. Conversely, the commitment of an author like Herennius Philo to combating semantic slippage, combined with his lack of interest in selecting a canon of authors from a single Greek literary tradition or time period, illustrates the potential for prescriptivism to surface within a Hellenizing lexicographic-grammatical work. Several varieties of Greek, not only Attic, possess a high level of prestige within their respective spheres and are therefore also the vehicle for members of an intellectual community of practice to demonstrate the depth of their linguistic knowledge and assert commensurate status. As laid out in §2.1, common definitions for "Hellenism" do not display the emphasis on antiquity and dialectical purism that characterizes Phrynichus' version of Atticism. Nevertheless, grammatical treatises and lexica that fall outside the Atticist movement frequently exhibit prescriptivist tendencies at least as severe as those found in Phrynichus or any other writer. As discussed earlier, Herennius Philo is one example, and the slightly earlier Apollonius

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[114] Blank renders *πρέπον* as "right" but it is better translated as "appropriate". It is also entirely absent from the extant text of Phrynichus' works.
[115] cf. *AM* 11.188, where Sextus reemphasizes that practical results are the only standard by which any so-called expert discipline is judged.

Dyscolus (c. 80-160 CE) postulates arguably the most prescriptivist vision of Greek grammar proceeding from the same Stoic theories about language which Sextus Empiricus attacks.

Apollonius considers language, Greek in particular, to possess a natural order analogous to that of the alphabet.[116] Apollonius makes rules-based expertise the basis on which to evaluate language, and he is not modest about his own place in the hierarchy of grammarians:

> Πῶς οὖν οὐ γελοῖοι καὶ οἱ ἀφορισάμενοι ὡς Δωριεῖς οὐ περισπῶσι τοὺς ὑποτακτικοὺς μέλλοντας, καὶ οἱ ἐπιζητήσαντες κατὰ τί οὐ περισπῶσιν …ἧς εἰ μὴ μεταλάβοιεν οἱ ἐντελέστερον τῶν λόγων κατακούοντες, δυσπειθέστερον ἀναστρέφουσιν. (*De constructione* 3.141)
>
> The people who specify that the Dorians don't form contracted future subjunctives, then, and investigate the question why they don't are plain silly. […] And if those who listen to the complete argument refuse to share this opinion [of mine] they are behaving extremely stubbornly.[117]

What makes Apollonius' brand of prescriptive grammar different from that of (e.g.) Phrynichus is his constant appeal to grammatical rules derived from theory and the lesser status accorded to ancient sources and real-world usage:

> Καθάπερ οὖν πάμπολλός ἐστιν ἡ εὐχρηστία τῆς κατὰ τὸν Ἑλληνισμὸν παραδόσεως, κατορθοῦσα μὲν τὴν τῶν ποιημάτων ἀνάγνωσιν τήν τε ἀνὰ χεῖρα ὁμιλίαν, καὶ ἔτι ἐπικρίνουσα τὴν παρὰ τοῖς ἀρχαίοις θέσιν τῶν ὀνομάτων, τὸν αὐτὸν δὴ τρόπον καὶ ἡ προκειμένη ζήτησις τῆς καταλληλότητος τὰ ὁπωσδήποτε διαπεσόντα ἐν λόγῳ κατορθώσει. (*De constructione* 1.60)
>
> Just as the literary tradition possesses great usefulness both for correcting the texts of poems and the usage of everyday speech, and also for determining the application of words among classical authors, in the same way our present investigation of grammaticality will also provide a rational correction for all sorts of errors.
>
> Ἐγὼ μέντοι οὐχ ὑπολαμβάνω ἐν τῷ καθόλου τὸ τοιοῦτον ἀληθὲς εἶναι, πιστούμενος οὐκ ἐκ ποιητικῶν παραθέσεων, εἴγε τῇ ποιητικῇ συντάξει ἐφεῖται καὶ λείπειν καὶ πλεονάζειν, ἐκ μέντοι τῆς κοινῆς φράσεως ἁπάσης καὶ τῆς τῶν συγγραφέων ἀκριβοῦς συνθέσεως καὶ τὸ μεῖζον ἐκ δυνάμεως τῆς τοῦ λόγου, ἣν καὶ δέον ἐστὶ παραθέσθαι τῶν ἄλλων συντάξεων προδήλων οὐσῶν. (*De constructione* 2.49)
>
> I rely not merely on poetical citations, because poetic constructions can be either elliptical or pleonastic, but on common everyday usage, the practice of the best prose-writers, and, most of all, on the force of theory which must be applied even about constructions which are not in the slightest doubt.

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[116] *Syntax* 2.3-3.2

[117] Translations of Apollonius Dyscolus come from Householder (1981).

As Allan (2010) 102 points out, by separating real-world usage (whether literary or spoken) from the theoretical syntactic system he posits, Apollonius articulates the distinction Chomsky would later make between linguistic competence (the systematic understanding of native speakers) and linguistic performance (the usage of language in communication).[118] His emphasis on the former and relegation of the latter, and more importantly his proposed goal of creating a ruleset against which to judge empirical data on language, demonstrate his approach to Greek to be a prescriptivist one. But again, unlike the Atticists, Apollonius appeals not to antiquity or the prestige of his literary sources for deriving rules for Greek usage, but rather to a Stoic sense of natural order as the highest authority on which to base his grammatical judgments. Of course, by taking pains to emphasize how he has performed the most rigorous investigation into this natural order and constructed the most complete theoretical framework for Greek grammar, he establishes himself as a *de facto* authority for others to follow.

Galen of Pergamum, most famous for his medical writings, articulates a Hellenist theory of language from a different set of principles. An interest in grammar is certainly to be expected in Galen, given his persistent preference to rank medicine among the liberal *λογικαὶ τέχναι* and himself among the *πεπαιδεύμενοι,*[119] and considering his own work in philosophy—a field not entirely distinct from medicine, according to Galen. His linguistic output is known to have included lexica of both Attic prose and comedy, and some works on comic usage, though none of these has survived in any form.[120] His interest in Attic must have been profound, however,

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[118] Chomsky, N. *Aspects of the Theory of Syntax*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1965; cf. Householder (1981) 17: "Apollonius Dyscolus was the inventor of the abstract base." In fact Apollonius astutely identifies a number of other linguistic phenomena that appear in modern theoretical treatments of syntax and semantics. For instance, he advances the notion of a "disposition" (*διάθεσις*, sometimes further specified as *διάθεσις ψυχική/τῆς ψυξῆς*) underlying each verbal mood; Householder identifies this with the modern idea of illocutionary force.
[119] Johnson (2010) 76-77; Mattern (2017) 373-4.
[120] Fichtner (2015).

considering that his prose lexicon ran to 48 books in length. Yet in spite of Galen's thorough knowledge and admiration of ancient sources (*παλαιοί, ἀρχαῖοι*),[121] his own preferred and recommended version of Greek was an anti-antiquarian, anti-Atticist one that resembled the common language of everyday communication of his own time.[122]

To be sure, Galen aims at precision of reference much like Phrynichus or Apollonius—after all, any ambiguity in transmitting medical knowledge can be literally fatal—and he insists that his readers share this same attentiveness though he is much more liberal than Apollonius and the prescriptive lexicographers on the question of specific word-choice.[123] However, he accuses the Atticists of using their ancient expertise to seek fame rather than to advance practical applications of language:

> Οὐ τοῖς ἀττικίζειν τῇ φωνῇ προῃρημένοις γράφεται ταῦτα...ἀλλ' ἰατροῖς μὲν μάλιστα, μὴ πάνυ τι φροντίζουσιν ἀττικίσεων, ἤδη δὲ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις, ὅσοι ζῶσιν ὡς λογικὰ ζῷα, πρὸ τιμῆς καὶ δόξης καὶ πλούτου καὶ δυνάμεως πολιτικῆς ἐπιμελεῖσθαι προῃρημένοις σώματος καὶ ψυχῆς. οὗτοι γὰρ εὖ οἶδ' ὅτι τὴν μὲν τῶν Ἀθηναίων φωνὴν οὐδὲν ἡγοῦνται τιμιωτέραν εἶναι φύσει τῆς τῶν ἄλλων ἀνθρώπων, ὑγίειαν δὲ σώματος ἀξιολογώτατόν τι πρᾶγμα εἶναι νομίζουσι τῷ κατὰ φύσιν βιοῦν ἐσπουδακότι. τούτοις οὖν εἰδὼς ὠφελιμώτερον ἔσεσθαι τὸν σαφέστερον λόγον, ἃ γιγνώσκουσιν ὀνόματα γράφω, κἂν μὴ τοῖς παλαιοῖς Ἕλλησιν ᾖ συνήθη. (*De alimentorum facultatibus* 584)[124]
>
> These things are not written for those have who chosen to Atticize in their speech…but especially for physicians, who do not give much thought to Atticisms, and indeed for others who also live as logical beings, and have chosen to give care to body and soul **rather than seeking glory and fame and wealth and political pow**er. For **these ones, I know well, deem the speech of the Athenians to be no more inherently prestigious than that of other peoples**, but they consider bodily health to be the most worthwhile matter there is by virtue of its having made great contribution to living in accordance with nature. **Since I know that, for these people, the clearer word (*logos*) will be the more useful one, I write the names (*onomata*) that they know, even if they be not common usage (*synēthē*) among the ancient Hellenes.**

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[121] *De differentia pulsuum* viii.687.8, e.g.
[122] Swain (1996) 59.
[123] Pearcy (1983) 261; Hankinson (1994) 171-8; Johnson (2010) 83-4.
[124] This specific passage explains his reasons for calling mulberries by the common term *συκάμινα* rather than the Attic *μόρα* (cf. Poll. 6.46: *συκάμινα· ταῦτα δὲ καὶ μόρα Αἰσχύλος ὠνόμακεν*) but is hard not to read as a general statement on linguistic philosophy.

His readers, the intellectual community that appreciates the value of medicine alongside philosophy, do not care that a word is somehow invalid because its utterer died a century too late. Conversely, he regards Stoic theories of logic, rhetoric, and language as being of little practical value, in spite of his physician's affinity for working from first principles. [125] In turn, among the Atticists, Phrynichus does not much care for the way physicians use Greek;[126] likewise while Sextus considers the language of physicians acceptable as long as it is confined to medical spheres, he accuses them of overstepping their bounds in prescribing not just treatments but ways of speaking[127]—perhaps not an unfounded accusation, in view of some other remarks Galen makes about Greek usage.[128] Indeed, in the proem to *De methodo medicina* Galen deliberately blurs the line between doctors and other intellectuals as part of his overall project of advocating elite status for medical professionals.[129] It is not a stretch to imagine his linguistic guidelines as part of this extension of medical sensibilities into the broader intellectual sphere, to the chagrin of

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[125] Pearcy (1983) 263-8; that Galen does not represent Stoicism accurately or fully, in order to more effectively downgrade Stoic rhetorical philosophy, indicates that in spite of his having studied it in detail he has little interest in engaging substantively with Stoic arguments.
[126] *Ecl*. 18: Ἀνεῖναι ἐλαίῳ ἢ ὄξει ἢ ἄλλῳ τινὶ λέγουσιν οἱ ἰατροὶ πάνυ ἀμαθῶς· δεῖ γὰρ διεῖναι λέγειν.
'Aneinai' (to relax): The doctors say this with oil, or vinegar, or something else, altogether ignorantly; for they ought to say *'dieinai'* (dilute).
Ecl. 131: Διεφθορὸς αἷμα· τῶν ἀμαθῶν τινες ἰατρῶν λέγουσιν οὕτω σολοικίζοντες, δέον λέγειν διεφθαρμένον αἷμα· τὸ γὰρ διέφθορε διέφθειρεν.
'Diephthoros' (corrupt) blood. Some of the uneducated doctors say it thus, solecizing, when it is necessary to say *'diepthermenon haima'*; for the [word is] *'diepthore*, *dieptheiren'*.
Ecl. 190: Κατασχάσαι· ἰατροὶ μὲν τούτῳ χρώμενοι ἔχουσιν ἀπολογίαν ὡς ὄντος παρὰ τοῖς ἀρχαίοις τοῦ ἔσχων καὶ ἔσχαζον {καὶ ἐκέντουν}· ἀλλὰ κατανύξαι ἡμεῖς λέγομεν.
'Kataschasai' (to slit open): Doctors who use this have a defense, given that 'eschon' and 'eschazon' (I was/they were slitting open) exist in the ancient sources; but we say 'katanyxai'.
Ecl. 388: Ἑξάπηχυ καὶ ἑξαέτης· καὶ ἐντεῦθεν ἀφαιρήσεις τὸ α, ἕξπηχυ καὶ ἑξέτης καὶ ἕξπλευρον. τοῦτο γὰρ καὶ οἱ ἰατροὶ ἐπανορθοῦνται, ἕξπλεθρον λέγοντες καὶ οὐχ ἑξάπλεθρον.
Hexapechu' (six cubits long) and 'hexaetes' (six years old): Also here you will remove the alpha, 'hexpechu' and 'hexetes' and 'hexpleuron' (six-sided). For even the physicians correct themselves on this, saying 'hexplethron' (six hundred feet long) and not 'hexaplethron'.
[127] *AG* 85-87, 255-258.
[128] For instance, *In Hippocratis prognosticum* iii.307-8: ὅτι μὲν οὖν οὕτω χρῶνται τοῖς ὀνόμασιν οἱ Ἕλληνες οὐκ ἰατροῖς μόνον ἐπίστασθαι χρήσιμον, ἀλλὰ κἀκείνοις, ὅσοις τῇ τέχνῃ προσήκει τὸ ἑλληνίζειν.
So therefore it is not useful just for doctors to know that the Greeks use names in this way, but also for all those in whose art (*technē*) it is fitting to speak good Greek *(Hellenizein*).
[129] Johnson (2010) 76-7.

other prescriptivists (whose see themselves as gatekeepers of the intellectual community) as well as the less strict Atticists and others (like Sextus) who are more interested in language as it is, not as they think it ought to be.

In essence Galen is arguing as a prescriptivist for an anti-Atticizing version of Hellenism, not a version of Greek that specifically excises Attic influence but rather a rationalized and harmonized version of its most widespread form. In Galen, one can see the nugget of the Hellenist/Atticist opposition: the latter group seeks to revive—to some extent—an ancient form of Greek that, at least among their group, is agreed upon as the best mode for differentiating their intellectual register from that of the masses,[130] whereas the former group aims at defining the correct form of Greek as it exists in their time. For Galen, as for any physician who aspires to intellectual attainment, a singular focus on Attic would be self-defeating given the vast corpus of non-Attic medical literature (such as the Ionic of Hippocrates) to which second century CE medical work responds.

2.3 Latinity as an Ideology

Orthogonal to the axis of Hellenism and Atticism in Greek is the issue of *Latinitas* or Latinity, a subject which merits at least a brief discussion in this ideological schema. In short, the ideal of Latinity parallels those of Hellenism and Atticism in that it represents an effort on the part of Roman intellectuals to identify and define the correct version of Latin for intellectual enterprises, especially with regards to vocabulary and diction.[131] Aside from the relatively distant relationship between Latin and Greek (when compared with the ancient understanding of this relationship—on which subject see the discussion of "Aeolism" in the following chapter), the most obvious difference between Latinity and Hellenism/Atticism lies in the far greater degree of

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[130] Horrocks (1997) 86.
[131] Bloomer (2017) 68.

homogeneity in Latin than in Greek. In spite of there being approximately forty Italic and other languages spoken during the spread of Roman power over the Italian peninsula,[132] no relative of Latin survived as a literary medium.[133] Moreover, in spite of the ethnolinguistic efforts of Claudius to preserve the Etruscan language,[134] it was not a subject for discussion among the writers of the Second Sophistic.[135] As is evident in the discussion above, Greek intellectuals—even purist Atticizers like Phrynichus—recognize the legitimacy of multiple Greek dialects, and writers like Lucian undertake literary projects in more than one of them. No Roman author explores the dialectical and linguistic continuum of Latin in this way, and the preference to efface the differences whenever possible in favor of a single standardized version,[136] combined with the

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[132] Adams (2007) 37.
[133] Milnor (2014) 18-19: evidence from Pompeian graffiti suggests the widespread use of Oscan before and during the siege of the city by Sulla's forces, but even taking into account the evidence from Adams (2003) 146 of an "antiquarian resurgence", the extremely small number of surviving Oscan inscriptions after the second century BCE, contrasted with the vast amounts of Latin text, indicates that the Oscan language did not leave a literary legacy—Ennius' pride in his Oscan heritage notwithstanding.
[134] Suetonius, *Claudius* 42.2.
[135] There is only one mention of possible Etruscanism in Gellius, *NA* 11.7: "Hic," inquit, "eques Romanus apludam edit et flocces bibit." Aspexerunt omnes qui aderant alius alium, primo tristiores turbato et requirente voltu, quidnam illud utriusque verbi foret; post deinde, **quasi nescio quid Tusce aut Gallice dixisset**, universi riserunt. Legerat autem ille "apludam" veteres rusticos frumenti furfurem dixisse idque a Plauto in comoedia, si ea Plauti est, quae Astraha inscripta est, positum esse. Item "flocces" audierat prisca voce significare vini faecem e vinaceis expressam, sicuti fraces ex oleis, idque aput Caecilium in Polumenis legerat, eaque sibi duo verba ad orationum ornamenta servaverat.

"This Roman knight," said he, "eats *apluda* and drinks *flocces*." All who were present looked at one another, at first somewhat seriously, with a disturbed and inquiring aspect, wondering what in the world the two words meant; then presently they all burst into a laugh, as if he had said something in Etruscan or Gallic. Now that man had read that the farmers of ancient days called the chaff of grain *apluda*, and that the word was used by Plautus in the comedy entitled *Astraba*, if that play be the work of Plautus. He had also heard that *flocces* in the early language meant the lees of wine pressed from the skins of grapes, corresponding to the dregs of oil from olives. This he had read in the *Polumeni* of Caecilius, and he had saved up those two words as ornaments for his speeches. (tr. Rolfe)
[136] Garcea (2012) 8-10 sees this tendency in Caesar *De analogia*, where the proliferation of dialects in mid-first-century CE Rome is conceived of as a *διαστροφή* that must be restored (by works such as Caesar's) into alignment with the *δεδοκιμασμένη συνήθεια* such as that of the Scipios.

lack of obvious regional variance from one author to the next, suggests a unitary linguistic model as the end-goal of the Latinist writers.[137]

The implication of this disjunction between the Greek and Latin enterprises is that there is far less likelihood of "Latinitizing" authors' agreeing that different versions of Latin can be equally valid. If one is to believe Gellius (*NA* 2.25), in the Second Sophistic there are fundamental disagreements as to which theoretical basis ought to be used for judging proper Latin, but both sides of this debate between "analogy" and "anomaly"(see section 2.4, below) have the same language in view. Whereas Varro in his first century BCE treatise on the Latin language looks to uncover or explain potential opacities in the Latin of his day,[138] by ca. 100 CE the Latin grammarians, lexicographers, and teachers of rhetoric are making recommendations about Latin grammar and usage quite similar to those in Hellenist and Atticist sources. Some aim at isolating and preserving the Latin of Varro's day (which was also that of Cicero) as the ideal model for Latin, while others take a less antiquarian and more pragmatic approach to crafting the perfect Latin text.

In the Latin linguistic tradition, one prominent author exhibits an attitude towards *latinitas* that could accurately be called descriptivist. The rhetorician Quintilian, in the first book of his *Institutio oratoria*—dating to approximately a century before Sextus and Phrynichus—lays out a schema for language (more precisely "discourse," *sermo*") that is typical of some Roman approaches to analyzing Latin[139]:

> Sermo constat ratione[140] vetustate auctoritate consuetudine. Rationem praestat praecipue analogia, nonnumquam etymologia. Vetera maiestas quaedam et, ut sic dixerim, religio commendat. Auctoritas ab oratoribus vel historicis peti solet (nam poetas metri necessitas

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[137] Adams (2007) xv: "No reader of Cicero and Martial, however attentive and learned, could possibly tell from their Latin that the one came from Arpinum in the Volscian territory and the other from Spain".
[138] Bloomer (2017) 76.
[139] Matthews (1994) 58.
[140] Morin (2001) 189 suggests that *ratio* in this sense represents the process for determining the relationship between the underlying natural structure and its surface form.

> excusat, nisi si quando nihil impediente in utroque modulatione pedum alterum malunt, qualia sunt "imo de stirpe recisum" et "aeriae quo congessere palumbes" et "silice in nuda" et similia): cum summorum in eloquentia virorum iudicium pro ratione, et vel error honestus est magnos duces sequentibus. Consuetudo vero certissima loquendi magistra, utendumque plane sermone, ut nummo, cui publica forma est. Omnia tamen haec exigunt acre iudicium, analogia praecipue: quam proxime ex Graeco transferentes in Latinum proportionem vocaverunt. (Quin. *Inst*. 1.6.1-4)
>
> Discourse comprises regularity, antiquity, authority, and usage. Analogy is principally responsible for regularity, but etymology as well. Dignity and, as I might say, superstition recommend certain ancient things. Authority tends to be sought from orators or historians (for the necessity of meter excuses poets, except if when, with the meter offering no obstacle in either one they prefer the second, as in *imo de stirpe recisum* and *aeriae quo congressere palumbes* and *silice in nuda* and the like): when the judgment in the speech of the most lofty men is taken as a rule, even an error is honorable for those who follow after great leaders. However, usage is the surest teacher of speaking, and surely one ought to make use of discourse as of a coin with a public stamp. Nevertheless, all of these require discriminating judgment, especially analogy, which those who translate most literally from Greek to Latin have called *proportio*.

In acknowledging the role antiquity plays in creating linguistic rules, Quintilian sounds something like Phrynichus here, especially with the connection between *vetera* and *maiestas* that recalls the *ἀρχαῖος καὶ δόκιμος* collocation from the *Ecloga*. He also notes, like Phrynichus, that the exigencies of poetry dilute its usefulness as a guide to usage.

Nevertheless, though Quintilian is no Skeptic and does not aim, as Sextus does, at deconstructing all bases of grammatical authority—*auctoritas* is, after all, one of his components of language—he too calls usage (*consuetudo*) the "surest teacher of speaking" (*certissima loquendi magistra*), and asserts that in using *auctoritas* as a guide one is merely following the usage of prominent speakers, relying on their reputation rather than their grammaticality to authorize the usage. Later, at 1.6.16, he lays out a rubric that Sextus will echo: *non ratione nititur sed exemplo, nec lex est loquendi sed observatio, ut ipsam analogian nulla res alia fecerit quam consuetudo* ([discourse] does not rely upon regularity but example, and there is no law of speaking but the observation, as nothing other than usage has created analogy itself.) But perhaps the most descriptivist sentiment in Quintilian is this: *mihi non invenuste dici videtur aliud esse Latine, aliud grammatice loqui* (it seems to me not unattractive to say that it is one thing to speak

in Latin, and another to speak grammatically, *Inst*. 1.6.27.) Even though perhaps two of the four components—*ratio* and *vetustas*—carry a prescriptivist connotation, they are (as in Sextus) governed or indeed discounted by observation of usage. Much later in the work he specifically cites authorities who support the use of everyday Latin as the basis for eloquent rhetoric, in a manner not dissimilar to Sextus Empiricus:

> …adhuc quidam[141] nullam esse naturalism putant eloquentiam, nisi quae sit cotidiano sermoni simillima, quo cum amicis, coniugis, liberis, servis loquamur, contento promere animi voluntatem nihilque arcessiti et elaborati requirente. (*Inst.* 12.10.40)
>
> ...still, some believe that no eloquence is natural, except that which is most like daily speech, by which we converse with friends, spouses, children, and slaves, which is sufficient to express the mind's intention and needs nothing forced and painstaking.

Latin is nothing more or less than what Latin-speakers speak, not an assemblage of rules worked out by grammarians or lexicographers—he even recommends his students embrace neologism and create new vocabulary by analogy, where appropriate in their orations (*Inst.* 8.3.34-5). Good Latin, which for Quintilian means Latin that is rhetorically compelling, does not rely on expertise with obscure and archaic vocabulary or complexities of syntax but instead consists of the effective deployment of recognizable and common terminology and sentiment.

In marked contrast to Quintilian's relatively relaxed stance towards antiquity and regularity, two generations later Fronto—both as a prominent character in the *Attic Nights* of Gellius and as represented by other authors, including himself—appears on the scene as a Latinist with a sharply archaizing, prescriptive vision of Latinity. Gellius' version of Fronto appears five

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[141] Garcea (2012) 120 connects this reference to Caesar as quoted by Cicero (after he calls Caesar the one who *de ratione Latine loquendi accuratissime scripserit*) in Cic. *Brut*. 253: ac si, ut cogitate praeclare eloqui possent, nonnulli studio et usu elaboraverunt—cuius te paene principem copiae atque inventorem bene de nomine ac dignitate populi Romani meritum esse existumare debemus—hunc facilem et cotidianum novisse sermonem nunc pro relicto esse habendum?

And if, to the task of giving brilliant expression to their thought, some have devoted study and practice—and we must recognize that you have deserved well of the name and prestige of the Roman people as almost the pioneer and inventor of this resource—yet are we now to consider that the knowledge of this easy and everyday speech may be neglected? (tr. Garcea).

times, and in each scene Fronto essentially argues two things: one, that Latin is a robust language on its own without the need for Greek loanwords, and two, that the answers to any questions about Latin can be found in the authors of no less than a century and a half earlier. Fronto advocates for the richness of Latin vocabulary (*NA* 2.26, citing Ennius, Pacuvius, and Nigidius); he explains the language of an older historical work (*NA* 13.29, discoursing on Quadrigarius); he debates the validity of certain plural forms (*NA* 19.8, citing Caesar, Plautus, Ennius, and Varro[142]); he asserts the legitimacy of an expression improperly considered vulgar (*NA* 19.10, with Cato, Varro, and Ennius to support); he argues for a native Latin term instead of the Greek that has made its way into Roman speech (*NA* 19.13, crediting Helvius Cinna). The Fronto we see in Gellius is only slightly at odds with the overall picture readers get of Gellius himself, though he is just one figure (and by no means the most prominent) of the wide array that appear in the work.[143] Fronto shares Gellius' preference for *auctoritas* over other considerations, in marked contrast to the Stoics like Apollonius (who write from first principles), but on the balance Fronto in Gellius seems slightly more interested in preserving the most archaic Latin possible than Gellius himself is.[144]

In the letters of Fronto to Marcus Aurelius and others in the Imperial circle, Fronto comes across as more of a purist than in Gellius. This discrepancy may arise because his representation in Gellius is notionally derived from Gellius' own experiences in his company. When Fronto represents himself in correspondence, he makes clear how painstaking his Latin is

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[142] Holford-Strevens (1986) 117 notes that Varro is in fact the most frequently cited source in the *NA*, being quoted 80 times and mentioned 70 more times, and speculates that he is likely the source of numerous uncited ideas and phrases as well.
[143] Bloomer (2017) 248 warns that "Aulus Gellius's construction of the narrative and of the character serve primarily the purposes of the author of the *Attic Nights* and cannot be considered as an exact reflection of reality."
[144] Holford-Strevens (1986) 130-2.

and how attentive Marcus must be in his own writing. His reason for recommending a high level of care in writing is clear:

> Tamen est in aliis artibus ubi interdum delitescas et peritus paulisper habeare quod nescias. In verbis vero eligendis conlocandisque ilico dilucet, nec verba dare diu quis potest, quin se ipse indicet verborum ignarum esse, eaque male probare et temere existimare, et inscie contrectare, neque modum neque pondus verbi internosse. (*Ad M. Caesarem et invicem, iv. 3, Naber p.61)*
>
> Yet in other arts it is possible, sometimes, to escape exposure, and for a man to be deemed, for a period, proficient in that wherein he is an ignoramus. But in the choice and arrangement of words he is detected instantly, nor can anyone make a pretence with words for long without himself betraying that he is ignorant of them, that his judgment of them is incorrect, his estimate of them haphazard, his handling of them unskilful, and that he can distinguish neither their propriety nor their force.[145]

The authors Fronto specifically commends as role models for the future Emperor, on the basis that they have "surrendered themselves to that toil, pursuit, and hazard of seeking out words with especial diligence" (*periculum verba industriosius quaerendi sese commisere, Ad M. Caesarem* iv.3.2) include Cato, Sallust, Plautus, Ennius, Coelius, Naevius, Lucretius, Accius, Caecilius, Laberius, Pomponius, Atta, Sisenna, Lucilius. Cicero, notably, does not merit inclusion in this group because his vocabulary does not include enough obscure or archaic vocabulary.[146] His reasoning here is somewhat circular, however, because if good Latin is to be judged by how much it resembles ancient writers then it is not especially meaningful to commend those ancient writers for meeting this standard.

Alongside the authority lent by antiquity, an exacting precision in usage is also a central feature of Fronto's prescriptions. The right words must be selected for every context, even when their literal meanings appear not to differ except for the context in which they are to be applied,[147]

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[145] All Fronto translations Haines (1919).

[146] …*insperata atque inopinata verba, quae non nisi cum studio atque cura atque vigilia atque multa veterum carmina memoria indagantur* (words…that are unexpected and unlooked for, such as are not to be hunted out save with study and care and watchfulness and the treasuring up of old poems in the memory, *Ad M. Caesarem* iv.3.3)

[147] Nolim igitur te ignorare syllabae unius discrimen quantum refereat. Os colluere dicam, pavimentum autem in balneis pelluere, non colluere; lacrimis vero genas lavere dicam, non pelluere neque colluere,

and Fronto maintains that this insistence on *mots justes* is no mere contrivance but a truly essential component of elevated discourse.[148] He is so dedicated to this principle, in fact, that he writes a letter to Marcus consisting of just a single request: *Miserere, unum verbum de oratione ablega, et quaeso ne umquam utaris: dictione pro oratione.* (I beg your pardon, banish one verb from your speech, and I ask that you never use it: "diction" for "oration"; *Ad M. Caes* v.3) This letter makes plain what has been observed already with other writers, namely that expertise and authority in matters of grammar and usage entitles one—within the context of the grammatical-rhetorical community of practice—to superior status. While Fronto addresses Marcus as *dominus*, the future emperor addresses him in turn as *magister*; in this context, the latter is the superior rank.

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vestimenta autem lavare, non lavere; sudorum porro et pulverem abluere, non lavare; sed maculam elegantius eluere quam abluere. Si quid vero magis haeserit nec sine aliquo detrimento exigi possit, Plautino verbo elavere dicam. (*Ad M. Caesarem* iv.3.4)

I should be loth, therefore, for you not to know the immense difference made by one syllable. I should say *Os colluere*, but *in balneis pavimentum pelluere*, not *colluere*; I should, however, say *lacrimis genas lavere*, not *pelluere* or *colluere*; but *vestimenta lavare*, not *lavere*; again, *sudorem et pulverem abluere*, not *lavare*; but is more elegant to say *maculam eluere* than *abluere*; if, however, the stain had soaked in and could not be taken out without some damage, I should use the Plautine word *elavere*.

[148][. . . .] molliantur atque ita efficacius sine ulla ad animos offensione audientium penetrent. Haec sunt profecto quae tu putes obliqua et insincera at anxia et verae amicitiae minime accommodata. At ego sine istis omnem orationem absurdam et agrestem et inconditam, denique inertem atque inutilem puto. Neque magis oratoribus arbitror necessaria eiusmodi artificia quam philosophis. In ea re non oratorum domesticis, quod dicitur, testimoniiis utar, sed philosophorum eminintissimis, poetarum vestustissimis excellentissimisque, vitae denique cotidiano usu atque cultu artium omnium experimentis. (*Ad M. Caes.* iii.15.1)

[. . . .] be softened and so more effectually without any friction enter into the minds of hearers. And these are actually the things which *you* think *crooked* and *insincere* and *labored and by no means reconcilable with true friendship!* But *I* think all speech without these conventions rude and rustic and incongruous, in a word, inartistic and inept. Nor, in my opinion, can philosophers dispense with such artifices any more than orators. In support of my contention I will adduce not "family" evidence, as the phrase is, from oratory, but I will call uipon the most outstanding philosophers, the most ancient and excellent poets, in fact, the everyday practice and usage of life and the experience of all the arts.

At the same time, Fronto exhibits a self-conscious anxiety not to let himself be caught in a mistake, especially when writing in Greek to Marcus' mother Domitia Lucilla. He ends this letter (*Epist. Graecae* 1, Naber p.239) with the following plea for forgiveness in advance: *εἴ τι τῶν ὀνομάτων ἐν ταῖς ἐπιστολαῖς ταύταις εἴη ἄκυρον ἢ βάρβαρον ἢ ἄλλως ἀδόκιμον ἢ μὴ πάνυ Ἀττικόν, ἀλλὰ ... ε .. τοῦ ὀνόματος σ' ἀξιῶ τήν γε διάνοιανσκοπεῖν αὐτὴν καθ' αὑτήν· οἶσθα γὰρ ὅτι ἐν αὐτοῖς ὀνόμασιν καὶ αὐτῇ διαλέκτῳ διατρίβω.* (If any word in this letter be obsolete or barbarous, or in any other way unauthorized, or not entirely Attic, but …e… look not at that, but only, I beseech you, at the intrinsic meaning of the word, for you know that I do spend time on exact words or exact idiom.) Some crucial terminology, such as *ἄκυρον, βάρβαρον, ἀδόκιμον, μὴ πάνυ Ἀττικόν*, parallels the language used by Phrynichus and other lexicographers of a more prescriptivist cast, a fact unsurprising given the other features of Fronto's work discussed above; by using them, Fronto forestalls any criticism that might be leveled at his Greek.[149] Furthermore, by presenting himself as a barbarian he removes himself from both the Roman and the Greek cultural spheres—in effect, creating a third position specific to himself (at least within the framework of this chain of correspondence) from which he might presume to expound on language as a neutral observer.[150]

This exploration into the spectrum of Latinity will end here, to keep the present discussion—primarily Greek in focus—to a manageable length. It should however be sufficient to illustrate that, while the dialectical issues of the Atticist/Hellenist opposition are absent from

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[149] In actuality, when he writes Greek he is not especially *ἀναττικός*, and any barbarisms or solecisms that do occur are rare; cf. Norden (1915) 364. Fronto's disclaimer here severs primarily to show the requisite deference to an elite addressee, as well as to benefit his construction of an unambiguous Roman identity; see Chapter Four for the fuller discussion of this topic regarding this specific letter.

[150] Fleury (2017) 251. The broader ramifications of the cultural identity issues raised in this letter, however, are far more complex and will be the subject of discussion in the following chapter. It should nevertheless be mentioned that Fronto de-Hellenizes and de-Romanizes himself in a manner quite similar to several works of Lucian (especially *Pseudologista* and *Bis Accusatus*) that also deal with the relationship between language and identity.

Latinist ideologies, there is nonetheless considerable overlap with the variation in Greek views regarding the relative weight that should be accorded to elite expertise versus observed usage. In general terms, one strain of Latinity emphasizes the pre-Augustan literary tradition and looks to ancient attestation rather than theoretical first principles,[151] while another (represented here by Quintilian) focuses on a pragmatic base—essentially, an opposition between descriptivist and prescriptivist Latin.

2.4 Analogy and Anomaly

The preceding discussion illustrates where certain Second Sophistic views of language can be regarded as prescriptive or descriptive, as well as places where such terms may not accurately describe the ideology being considered. While this analysis may accurately distinguish between different language ideologies regarding the question of authority versus usage, it remains a modern schema that does not reflect the terms ancient lexicographers, grammarians, and others used to articulate their own views of language.

As mentioned by Sextus Empiricus at several points, the terms used historically to refer to competing language ideologies are "analogy" (*ἀναλογία*) and "anomaly" (*ἀνωμαλία*). These terms are glossed succinctly in Latin by Gellius:

> In Latino sermone, sicut in Graeco, alii *analogian* sequendam putaverunt, alii *anomalian*. *Analogia* est similium similis declinatio, quam quidam Latine "proportionem" vocant. *Anomalia* est inaequalitas declinationum consuetudinem sequens.
>
> In Latin speech, just as in Greek, some have supposed that "analogy" ought to be followed, others "anomaly." "Analogy" is the similar morphology of similar things, which some call "proportion" in Latin. "Anomaly" is the dissimilarity of morphology, following customary usage. (*NA* 2.25)

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[151] Gellius also falls into this camp when he engages with the particularities of Latin; cf. Holford-Strevens (1988) 127: "Gellius appeals to the uncorrupted language in use before Augustus." In the fuller discussion, 127-140, Holford-Strevens argues that Gellius is not attempting to revive Latin usage of two centuries prior nor defy that of his own time; instead, Gellius believes antiquity to be authoritative and to provide the most reliable information for the correct interpretation of obscure words and expressions. Chapter Four addresses these ideological components in the social world constructed for the *Attic Nights*.

Gellius goes on to relate (*NA* 2.25.4) how the Alexandrian Aristarchus and the Pergamene Crates of Mallos used to debate on Greek grammar from analogist and anomalist positions, respectively.[152] Gellius' reference has been assumed to indicate a larger second-century BCE argument between Alexandrian analogists and Pergamene anomalists, with Aristarchus and Crates the respective chief exponents of these views.[153] Sextus Empiricus' description—roughly contemporary to Gellius—of the views of Ptolemy Pindarion, Aristarchus' student, offer a similar impression of the Alexandrian school.[154]

This interpretation has led to a theory that Gellius is accessing these grammarians via Varro's *De lingua Latina*, one of the earliest works to apply Hellenistic grammar to Latin and one of Gellius' main sources.[155] Earlier scholarship on Varro has presumed him to draw on Crates for book 8, which advocates anomaly, and Aristarchus for book 9, which advocates analogy;[156] both writers are mentioned several times by Varro (8.63-5, 68-9; 9.1, 31, 52). However, the argument of *De lingua Latina* book 8 opposes the ideology of grammatical expertise entirely, on the basis that Crates and Aristarchus have both claimed expertise but, by failing to reach agreement regarding the nature of that expertise, cast its existence into doubt. Thus, as D.L. Blank argues, Varro's anomalist model is not Crates but more plausibly an empiricist and possible Epicurean author in whose work both Crates and Aristarchus appear as advocates of analogy yet have opposing views on its application.[157] Varro himself adopts a moderate position for his model

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[152] Pfeiffer (1968) 210-33 (on Aristarchus) and 234-5.
[153] Matthews (1994) 61.
[154] Conversely, due to the Stoics' emphasis on natural origins of languages (and specifically names) they regarded analogy as evidence of the inherent connection between *σημαίνων*, *λεκτόν*, and *σημαινόμενον*. For them, anomaly demonstrates linguistic (and intellectual) decay over time; Siebenborn (1976) 98, Blank (1998) 178
[155] Holford-Strevens (1988) 117.
[156] Fehling (1956-7).
[157] Blank (1982) 305, 62-5; (2005), 236.

of Latin grammar, incorporating both anomaly and analogy;[158] the radical anomalist voice of *De lingua Latina* 8 is in fact more consistent with the Epicureans (Cic. *Acad. Post.* 1.5) and prefigures the later Skeptic writing of Sextus Empiricus (see above, 2.2.2, and below).[159]

From this evidence, anomaly at first appears to correspond with descriptivism, and analogy to be an ancient version of prescriptivism. Caesar's earlier *De Analogia*, from the extant testimonia and fragments at least, offers a prescriptive take on Latin—his preference for giving Greek names their own Latin declension (*Calypsonem*, by analogy with *Iunonem*) is cited by Quintilian (*Inst*. 1.5.63), who recommends against following his example.[160] In that work and elsewhere, Caesar also advocates for a regularized fourth declension in which no case endings include an *-i* (Gellius, *NA* 4.16-8-9), and his wishes appear to have been followed by those who wished to curry favor with him.[161] Varro, by contrast (*DLL* 10.74) advises balancing analogy with the *communis consuetudo* of the speakers, including the acceptance of multiple valid forms if necessary. And in clear opposition to Caesar, Quintilian (*Inst.* 1.6.27) cites the ample attestation of forms with and without *-i* as evidence for the futility of prescribing by analogy. Conversely, Sextus Empiricus' arguments against analogy all come from a radically descriptivist perspective, and he uses the shortcomings of analogy to illustrate how various claims of expertise in

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[158] e.g. *De lingua Latina* 9.1: Sed ii qui in loquendo partim sequi iubent nos consuetudinem partim rationem, non tam discrepant, quod consuetudo et analogia coniunctiores sunt inter se quam iei credunt, quod est nata ex quadam consuetudine analogia et ex hac consuetudine item anomalia. Quare quod consuetudo ex dissimilibus et similibus verbis eorumque declinationibus constat, neque anomalia neque analogia est repudianda (...).
But those who on one side direct us to follow usage (*consuetudo*) in speaking and on the other regularity (*rationem*) do not differ so much, because usage and analogy are more closely connected to each other than those people believe, because analogy arises from a particular usage, and from this same usage anomaly as well. For this reason, since usage consists of dissimilar and similar words and their forms (*declinationibus*), neither anomaly nor analogy ought to be dismissed (...).
[159] Blank (1998) xxxiv-xl.
[160] Garcea (2012) 235-6 characterizes Caesar as taking a "purist and deliberately archaizing approach", in contrast to Cicero (*Att.* 7.3.10) and Varro (*DLL* 8.72) where various analogized Greek forms are commented on but dismissed in favor of customary usage.
[161] Garcea (2012) 227 concludes as much from the correspondence of Calvus, who employs a set of forms with Caesar different from those he uses elsewhere.

language—the assertion of authority to prescribe usage according to the rules of analogy—fail utterly to separate themselves from a fundamental reliance on empirical observation. He is an anomalist, in that he believes language is defined by customary usage (*consuetudo* in Latin, *συνηθεία* in Greek) and rejects the prescriptivist ideology that language derives from—and fundamentally consists of—logically organized rules. To an anomalist, an exception to a rule demonstrates that rule to be illusive, and in this view analogy is at best an assemblage of particular patterns arising from usage.[162]

Yet in spite of this apparent similarity between the two sets of ideologies, Gellius' definition suggests that the opposition between analogy and anomaly does not align neatly with that between prescriptivism and descriptivism. As in other *NA* entries, Gellius provides Latin glosses for the Greek, but for *anomalia* he actually provides two Latin equivalents: both the direct translation *inaequalitas* and the separate but equally crucial *consuetudinem*. As mentioned above, this Latin word is used elsewhere[163] to translate Greek *συνηθεία*, the customary usage around which a descriptivist approach to language centers. This asymmetry in Gellius' gloss provides a clue suggesting that these are two separate (if related) ideological debates; anomaly should not be assimilated to descriptivism, nor should analogy and prescriptivism be conflated. As the next sections will demonstrate, different writers rely upon anomaly to advance views that are diametrically opposed within the modern prescriptivist/descriptivist framework

2.4.1 Anomaly: Sextus and Phrynichus Aligned

Sextus Empiricus arguably places the opposition of analogy and anomaly at the center of his discussion of grammar. Analogy is mentioned 39 times in the first book of *Adversus*

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[162] This is the modern sense in which the term "analogy" is used in contemporary historical linguistics; see Hock (1991) 166-189, focusing on "leveling," a subset of analogy leading in most instances to regularization of morphemes—a phenomenon well known to ancient authors, as will be illustrated in the following sections.
[163] Over 70 times in *DLL* 8-10, for instance.

mathematicos[164] and is consistently either subordinated to or overruled by empirical observation of Greek usage. Sextus avoids overusing the word *ἀνωμαλία* itself (it occurs only five times) most likely because, as mentioned earlier, this work is aimed at deconstructing the dogma of grammatical expertise through a demonstration of analogy's shortcomings, rather than constructing a new dogma centered on anomaly. The key to Sextus' descriptivist refutation of analogy lies in the passage discussed above, *AM* 1.197-8, in which he argues that the derivation of *χρᾶσθαι* by analogy proceeds from and can only be judged by the observation of usage. To reject usage on the basis of analogy is, he protests, tantamount to rejecting usage on the basis of usage, which results in the untenable proposition that the evidence for a word, phrase, or construction is simultaneously both reliable and unreliable (*τὸ αὐτὸ πιστὸν ἅμα καὶ ἄπιστον ποιοῦσιν*, *AM* 1.201).

Conversely, Sextus adduces numerous examples of uncontroversial, anomalous usages to dismantle prescriptive grammar. These examples may be as simple as the names of famous cities[165] and other frequently-used words.[166] He is not, as Blank (1998) *ad loc.* is careful to point out, attempting to use anomaly as a structural principle of language—Varro is the only linguist to propose such a theory[167]—but rather using the ample set of anomalous forms and usages adduced in *AM* 1.176-240 to illustrate that a linguistic theory guided by observation of usage (descriptivism, in other words) will necessarily dispose of analogy. If Sextus is to be believed, the Atticist and Hellenist writers of the second century used analogy in order to derive Attic forms

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[164] ἀναλογία: 37 times; ἀναλογικός: 2.
[165] *AG* 154: Ἀθῆναι γὰρ λέγονται πληθυντικῶς ἡ μία πόλις καὶ Πλαταιαί, καὶ πάλιν Θήβη ἑνικῶς καὶ Θῆβαι πληθυντικῶς, καὶ Μυκήνη καὶ Μυκῆναι. (For Athens, a single city, is said in the plural, and Plataeae, and again Thebe in the singular and Thebes in the plural, and Mycene and Mycenae).
[166] *AG* 239: ἄρχων γὰρ λέγεται καὶ ὀνοματικῶς καὶ ὁ τὴν ἀρχὴν διέπων· ἀλλ' Ἄρχωνος μὲν γίνεται κατὰ πλάγιον πτῶσιν τὸ ὀνοματικόν, ἄρχοντος δὲ τὸ μετοχικόν. (For *archon* is said both as a name and as the one who holds power; but in an oblique case the name becomes *Archonos* and the common noun *archontos*.)
[167] Blank (1994) 152-4.

with which to combat the perceived irregularity of contemporary speech. In the observation of Browning (1983), "Atticising writers continuously fail in their purpose…they admit Koinê forms censured by the grammarians—this is too common to call for illustration—or they overcompensate and produce false Atticisms, hypercorrect forms which never existed in classical Attic."[168] Some "monstrosities" of this kind that Browning collects include *ῥίν* as the nominative for 'nose' (instead of *ῥίς*), by analogy from *ῥινός*; *συνεωρτάζομεν* as the imperfect of *συνεορτάζω,* by analogy from *ἑώρακα*; or the aorist participle *οἰσάμενος,* by analogy from the future *οἴσομαι.* As is universally the case with hypercorrection, these forms are employed in order to position one's speech or writing in the "prestige" dialect in a diglossic linguistic environment, to consciously differentiate it from the everyday (i.e. Koinê usage.

But where Sextus may point to faulty analogy in support of a descriptivist position, the scholarly grammarians and lexicographers like Phrynichus give over a significant portion of their lexica to correcting such errors of hyperanalogized Attic. Phrynichus, *Ecloga* 240 demonstrates this tendency with the third declension noun ἡ ναῦς:

> 'Αἱ νῆες' ἐρεῖς, οὐχ 'αἱ ναῦς'· σόλοικον γάρ. ἥμαρτε μέντοι Φαβωρῖνος (fr. 135 Bar.), Πολέμων (p. 14, 26 Hink) καὶ Σύλλας αἱ ναῦς εἰπόντες. 'τὰς νῆας' οὐκ ἐρεῖς, ἀλλὰ 'τὰς ναῦς'. Λολλιανὸς δὲ ὁ σοφιστὴς ἀκούσας παρά τινος, ὅτι οὐ χρὴ 'αἱ ναῦς' λέγειν, ἀλλὰ 'αἱ νῆες', ᾠήθη δεῖν λέγειν καὶ τὴν αἰτιατικὴν ὁμοίως, 'τὰς νῆας'. οὐκ ἔχει δὲ οὕτως, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ μὲν τῆς εὐθείας δισυλλάβως, ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς αἰτιατικῆς μονοσυλλάβως.
>
> '*Hai nēes'* (the ships) you will say, not *'hai naus'*, for it is a solecism. However, Favorinus was in error, and Polemon and Sulla, when they said *'hai naus'*. *'Tas nēas'* (the ships) you will not say, but *'tas naus'*. And Lollianus the sophist, upon hearing it from someone that one should not say *'hai naus'* but *'hai nēes'*, supposed that he ought to say the accusative likewise, *'tas nēas'*. But it does not work this way, but rather disyllabically for the nominative and monosyllabically for the accusative.

Ecloga entry 45 is comparable, *Υἱέως οἱ ψευδαττικοί φασιν οἰόμενοι ὅμοιον εἶναι τῷ Θησέως καὶ τῷ Πηλέως.* ('*Hyieôs'* (of a son) the pseudo-Atticists say, believing it to be similar to 'Theseôs'(of Theseus) and 'Peleôs' (of Peleus)), Phrynichus uses the same verb (*οἰόμενοι*, cf. *ᾠήθη*) to indicate

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[168] Browning (1983) 47.

conjecture or supposition on the part of the pseudo-Atticists. These entries highlight erroneous forms that arise from incomplete understanding of the patterns of sound change, though Phrynichus shows no awareness of Greek historical linguistics here. Rather than try to write a phonological rule he instead asserts that the erroneous forms are solecisms, forms created through analogy by latter-day writers without ancient attestation to justify them. Knowing the anomalous ancient forms, rather than the linguistic principles, is the criterion for good Atticism.

Phrynichus also makes more explicit appeals to real-world usage. Some entries are straightforward rejections of a regularized form in favor of the older, irregular form, as in *Ecl*. 52: *'Τάχιον' Ἕλληνες οὐ λέγουσιν, 'θᾶττον' δέ.* (Greeks do not say *tachion*—more fast[169]—but *thatton*—quicker.)[170] Other entries warn against the misapplication of an otherwise productive morpheme, such as the semantically redundant adjectives mentioned earlier, *τελευταταιότατον* (46), *ἐσχατώτατον* (105), *ἀμεινότερον/καλλιώτερον/κρεισσότερον* (106), *κορυφαιότατον* (213), and *κεφαλαιωδέστατον* (236). Entry 46 is especially noteworthy here, because Phrynichus points out that the use of *τελευταταιότατον* is an *ἁμάρτημα τῶν περὶ παιδείαν δοκούντων τευτάζειν* and describes that these people who appear to care about *paideia* are conjecturing this form by analogy from what they read in the *ἀρχαῖοι*. Atticism-by-analogy gives a veneer of education, but someone who really knows Attic (like Phrynichus, or his readers) will know better, and will use ancient sources correctly.

Yet another attack on analogy takes the form of a more protracted discussion on the subject of Attic usage:

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[169] In spite of Phrynichus' blanket term *Ἕλληνες*, Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rom*. 6.42 and Diod. 20.6 both have this form. Its surviving occurrences are approximately one-quarter those of Phrynichus' preferred θᾶττον, and the two adverbs coexist in several authors, such as Menander—whose Greek, as has been shown, Phrynichus does not much like.

[170] Entry 246, the rejection of *εὐστάθεια* in favor of *ἐμβρίθεια* discussed above, presumably follows this pattern as well.

> Κακοδαιμονεῖν· οὕτως οἱ νόθως ἀττικίζοντες, Ἀθηναῖοι γὰρ διὰ τοῦ α κακοδαιμονᾶν λέγουσιν. καὶ θαυμάσαι ἄν τις, πῶς εὐδαιμονεῖν μὲν λέγουσιν, οὐκέτι δὲ κακοδαιμονεῖν, ἀλλὰ κακοδαιμονᾶν, καὶ πῶς εὐδαιμονοῦσι μὲν λέγουσιν, οὐκέτι δὲ κακοδαιμονοῦσιν, ἀλλὰ κακοδαιμονῶσιν. (Phryn. *Ecl.* 54)
>
> *'Kakodaimonein'* (be bad-spirited): Thus say those who Atticize spuriously, for Athenians say *'kakodaimonan'* with the alpha. And one would wonder, how do they say *'eudaimonein'* (be good-spirited) on the one hand, and yet on the other hand not *'kakodaimonein'* but *'kakodaimonan'*, and how do they say *'eudaimonousi'* (they are good-spirited) on the one hand, and yet on the other hand not *'kakodaimonousin'* (they are bad-spirited), but *'kakodaimonōsin'*.

His disapproval of the analogized forms here is clear from the adverb *νόθως*, but he acknowledges how strange—indeed, anomalous—the forms actually found in Attic may seem to be. Unlike the Stoics, Phrynichus does not see this oddity as evidence of linguistic decay that has destroyed the natural parallels between words. On the other hand, contrary to the Epicureans and Skeptics (like Sextus), he frames the existence of these anomalous forms as evidence for the necessity of grammatical expertise, rather than a potential refutation of it.

On at least one occasion, Sextus Empiricus, who as shown above exhibits unambiguously descriptivist attitudes towards Hellenism, takes the same side as Phrynichus in their joint opposition to the misuse of *γαστρίζειν*:

> εἴπερ γὰρ τοῦ ὁμοίου θεωρητικοὶ καθεστήκασιν, ἐπεὶ τῷ εἰς ἀντικνήμιον τύπτεσθαι ἀνάλογόν ἐστι τὸ εἰς τὴν ῥῖνα τύπτεσθαι καὶ τὸ εἰς τὴν γαστέρα, λέγεται δὲ τὸ πρῶτον 'ἀντικνημιάζειν', ἀναλόγως καὶ τὸ '*γαστρίζειν'* ἢ 'μυκτηρίζειν' ...· τὸ δὲ αὐτὸ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ 'ἱππάζεσθαι' καὶ 'κατακρημνίζεσθαι' καὶ 'ἡλιάζεσθαι' ὑποδεικτέον. οὐ λέγομεν δὲ ταῦτα διὰ τὸ παρὰ τὴν κοινὴν εἶναι συνήθειαν... (*AG* 217)
>
> For, if [grammarians] have indeed set themselves up as theorists of similarity, then since being hit by someone in the nose or the stomach is analogous to being hit in the shin and the latter is called *ἀντικνημιάζειν*, by analogy [they would have to say] *γαστρίζειν* ('gorge oneself') and *μυκτηρίζειν* ('sniff at snobbily') [with a similar meaning] too ...; and the same must be pointed out in the case of *ἱππάζεσθαι* ('drive a chariot'), *κατακρημνίζεσθαι* ('throw from a precipice'), and *ἡλιάζεσθαι* ('bask in the sun'). Yet we do not say these words [in these senses] because they are contrary to common usage. (tr. Blank (1998) 44)
>
> Γαστρίζειν ἐπὶ τοῦ ἐμπίπλασθαι λέγουσιν Ἀθηναῖοι, οὐκ ἐπὶ τοῦ τὴν γαστέρα τύπτειν. {μήποτε δὲ καὶ ὡς οἱ πολλοὶ λέγουσιν χρῶνται οἱ ἀρχαῖοι καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ τὴν γαστέρα τύπτειν.} (Phryn. *Ecl.* 67)[171]

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[171] Note that MS q adds *ἴσως δὲ καὶ τοῦτ' ἂν σημαίνοι*, "but perhaps it could also denote this".

> ‘Gastrizein' (eat oneself full): Athenians say this in application to becoming full, not to the act of striking the belly. {But perhaps the ancients also use it as the masses say, also in application to the act of striking the belly}.

Pollux, on the other hand, considers both usages of *γαστρίζειν* to be valid:

> Pol. *Onom*. 2.175: γαστρίζειν οὐ μόνον τὸ χορτάζειν λέγουσιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ πλήττειν εἰς τὴν γαστέρα, ὡς Ἀριστοφάνης ἐν Ἱππεῦσιν. (Poll. *Onom*. 2.175)
>
> ‘Gastrizein’ they do not only say for the act of feeding, but also for the act of striking in the stomach, as Aristophanes does in *Knights*.[172]

Elsewhere in the *Ecloga*, Phrynichus views Aristophanes and other Old Comic writers as authorities on Attic usage,[173] which makes his disagreement with Pollux (or his failure to mention this attestation of the word) striking. As discussed above, however, Phrynichus also deprecates Aristophanes’ usage in at least two places,[174] suggesting that if he is aware that *γαστρίζειν* had the analogized meaning in Old Comedy—which given his selection of sources (see the earlier discussion) he most likely is—then he may not consider this attestation in Aristophanes sufficient for sanctioning its usage. Given that this meaning is derived by analogy, perhaps Phrynichus is

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[172] Πα. ὦ πόλις καὶ δῆμ’, ὑφ’ οἵων θηρίων γαστρίζομαι. (Ar. *Eq*. 273)
Paphlagonian: O city, O people – I am battered in the belly by such beasts.

Δη. παῖ’ αὐτὸν ἀνδρειότατα, καὶ/γάστριζε καὶ τοῖς ἐντέροις/καὶ τοῖς κόλοις, / χὤπως κολᾷ τὸν ἄνδρα. (Ar. *Eq*. 452)
Demos: Strike him most boldly, and batter him in the belly with the entrails and intestines, to punish him.
[173] e.g. *Ecl*. 114, 165, 232, 292, 294, 315, 346, 400, 402
[174] Phryn. *Ecl.* 129: Οἱ ἥρως οὐ λέγουσιν, ἀλλ' οἱ ἥρωες τρισυλλάβως· ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς αἰτιατικῆς δισυλλάβως τοὺς ἥρως. ἅπαξ Ἀριστοφάνης (fr. 304 K.) βιασθεὶς ὑπὸ τοῦ μέτρου οἱ ἥρως εἶπεν, τῷ δ' ἠναγκασμένῳ οὐ χρηστέον.
Hoi heros' (the heroes) they do not say, but *'hoi heroes'* in three syllables; and in application to the accusative, *'tous heros'* in two syllables. A single time Aristophanes, compelled by the meter, said *'hoi heros'*, but one should not make use of the contracted form.

Phryn. *Ecl*. 371: Χρέως· Ἀττικὸς ἂν φαίνοιο καὶ ἐπιμελής, εἰ διὰ τοῦ ω μεγάλου χρέως λέγεις. σὺ μέντοι τῇ σεαυτοῦ πολυμαθίᾳ τὸν Ἀριστοφάνην διὰ τοῦ ο ἐδείκνυες τὸ χρέος ἐν ταῖς {ἑτέραις} Νεφέλαις (Nub. vs. 30) εἰπόντα “ἀτὰρ τί χρέος ἔβα με μετὰ τὸν Πασίαν;”. ἔοικε δὲ παρῳδηκὼς εἰρηκέναι, διόπερ οὐ χρηστέον αὐτῷ.
Chreôs' (need): You would seem Attic and attentive if you say 'chreôs' with an omega. You would, however, be exposing Aristophanes to your erudition, as he says 'chreos' with an omicron in {the second} *Clouds*: "Yet for what reason (*ti chreos*) did you accompany me after Pasia?" But he seems to have spoken erroneously, for which reason one should not consult him.

not dismissing Aristophanes out of hand but considers him to have misapplied analogy in these passages. Alternatively, the passage in which it occurs may, like *Clouds* 30 (cf. *Ecl.* 271), meet Phrynichus' criteria for the *παρῳδηκὼς* register of Attic, in which view Aristophanes intentionally misuses the word in humorous contrast to the "good" Attic he uses elsewhere.

This lexicographic example demonstrates clearly the reliance upon anomaly to establish grammatical expertise. Conversely, in Sextus Empiricus' work, as in the empiricist and Epicurean writers from whom Varro's anti-analogist may derive, anomaly is held up as evidence that attainment of grammatical expertise is an illusive goal. In other words, anomaly is adduced in service to a prescriptivist agenda by Phrynichus, but Empiricus and many others use it to strengthen their own descriptivist position. For this reason, it is vital to an understanding of ancient sociolinguistic attitudes that a modern framework not be mapped too closely onto an ancient one, and that both perspectives be considered in analyzing Second Sophistic language ideologies.

2.5 Conclusions: Multiple Ideological Axes

This chapter has analyzed Second Sophistic language ideologies along three axes. The first of these uses the readily accessible, modern terminology of descriptivism and prescriptivism to categorize various authors by the relative weight they attach to expert knowledge or observed usage. The second axis contrasts the Hellenizing and Atticizing approaches to Greek, which are distinguished by their reliance on ancient attestation and degree of preference for dialectical purity—a subject to be discussed at greater length in the next chapter. Romans writing on linguistic issues in Latin may differ in the former respect, but there is no evidence for different dialects of Latin receiving attention in the debate about Latinity. The third axis along which the writers under discussion can be arrayed uses the ancient terminology of analogy and anomaly, the former view considering irregularities to be errors in usage, form, or construction and the latter

regarding them as inherent and necessary to any natural language. The adoption of this schema makes it possible to show clearly how various Second Sophistic lexicographers, grammarians, philosophers, and others who write on language and linguistics share partial affinities with each other even when their theories of language differ radically.

These three axes are not always orthogonal to each other, nor does every author remain at a fixed point along any of them. This second issue is especially true in the case of the descriptive/prescriptive binary, because these are not terms in which ancient authors necessarily thought; as a result, the ideology of an author like Phrynichus can appear to move from one position to the next without any actual change from the author's perspective. Both the analogist and anomalist approaches to grammar and usage can be identified with either prescriptivist or descriptivist ones: for example, if prescriptivism is the determination of correct usage from higher authority, then analogy also descends from a higher, universal authority through which all language usage is inherently logical. Therefore, rather than insist upon a rigid organizational scheme to position individual authors along different ideological axes, it will suffice for the present discussion to restate that Second Sophistic approaches to lexicography and grammar cover a wide ideological spectrum, and that individual authors with individual agendas are as likely as not to make their ideology fit their extra-linguistic goals.

As previously stated, the Hellenist/Atticist axis does not always apply to Latin authors (for whom dialectical variance was a virtual non-issue) but it should also be mentioned that some of the Greek authors present in this chapter, such as Sextus Empiricus, also give little or no attention to the matter. Sextus takes aim at the Hellenists throughout *AG*, but never advances anything resembling an Atticist viewpoint. Because of his distinctive, non-dogmatic approach to the philosophy of language he and others like him should perhaps be considered neutral in this dimension. The same can be said of writers like Pollux, who because of the vast scope of his

collection might be called an anomalist (he does not provide rules, but instead a huge volume of individual examples), but whose project does not ultimately hinge on this issue.

The development of this analytic schema for Second Sophistic language ideologies will provide crucial points of reference for the exploration of the Lucianic corpus in the chapters to come. As discussed in the introduction, Lucian's engagement with linguistic issues differs categorically from that of his contemporaries and predecessors because of his satiric programme and its concomitant, frequent shifts in tone and perspective—such as the (allegedly) illicit blending of comedy and rhetoric with which he is charged in the *Double Indictment*. By establishing these linguistic-ideological datapoints, this examination enables the study of Lucian's varying satirical perspective to relate to specific figures (or aspects of them) rather than using overly broad strokes that do not offer sufficient context for meaningful discussion of Lucian's engagement with sociolinguistic issues. An effective study of works in which Lucian (and others like him) adopts a stance that evokes a particular ideology from the contemporary landscape, whether to satirize a different one or to engage in bi-directional satire, will benefit greatly from having on hand specific exemplars and their associated intellectual baggage. The next chapter will illustrate how Lucian interrogates the competing Attic and other ideologies of his day with his toolset of ironic satire and pastiche and show how the views expressed by his various (and often incompatible) *personae* can paint a picture of the overall linguistic-ideological bent of Lucian's corpus.

3. Lucian and the Challenge of Atticism

A particular tension characterizes Lucian of Samosata's body of work when viewed in the context of the Atticizing movement of the second century CE. It is uncontroversial to describe Lucian himself as an Atticist given that questions regarding his vocabulary, morphology, and syntax have long been resolved;[1] with the exception of just two of his works (*On the Syrian Goddess* and *The True History*), the vocabulary and morphology he employs mark his language as almost entirely Attic. Rather, the tension inherent in Lucian's Atticism arises between the antiquarian and even nostalgic motives that underpin this linguistic practice, as discussed in the preceding chapter, and the themes of innovation and creation that surface in so much of Lucian's writing. At various points—frequently at moments of Lucian's rehabilitation in the scholarly sphere—Lucian's language has been called a "moderate Attic"[2], that is to say a register that balances the need to imitate the ancient works he uses to craft his satire with the freedom to innovate and reinterpret. In this view, Lucian's language finds the balanced middle in the Second Sophistic language debates outlined in the previous discussion.

A significant portion of Lucian's corpus engages in this language debate head-on, and in so doing creates a satire that revolves around language ideologies contemporary to his time. While Lucian does not cite specific examples of his contemporaries' deficient Attic the way Phrynichus does, or name failed Atticizers after historical persons as Athenaeus prefers to, his works nevertheless clearly have in sight the same types of people and modes of thinking targeted (or alternately represented) by these and other second- and third-century writers. But where Phrynichus, Moeris, the Antiatticist, Apollonius, Herodian, and even Sextus Empiricus lay out a program of linguistic philosophy arguing for their point of view, Lucian shifts both his target and

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[1] Chabert (1897) and DeFerrari (1916) are two comprehensive treatments of the subject.
[2] Chabert (1897) 225-6; Kim (2017) 44.

his vantage point from one work to the next—or indeed within a single work. He exploits the potential of multiple ideologies for providing sources of satirical humor, and mocks opposing sides in the debate without a particular need to articulate a consistent viewpoint. This chapter will discuss three of Lucian's works that engage most directly in satirizing linguistic ideologies. The examination that follows will demonstrate how Lucian's perspective can appear to shift from one work to the next without undermining his larger satirical program. In his humorous treatment of language, Lucian creates innovative riffs on contemporary trends while maintaining continuity with the literary tradition from which he draws.

3.1 The Solecist

The *Solecist*, also called the *Pseudosophist*, provides a good starting point for a discussion of Lucian's approaches to Atticism. It is arguably the most straightforward depiction of Atticism, at least on the surface, because it most strongly resembles the point-for-point criticisms of invalid usage found in Phrynichus or the Antiatticist. Like many of Lucian's works, it is a comic reworking of the Platonic dialogue, featuring two characters: a speaker named "Lucianus", who does the majority of the talking, and an interlocutor called only "Sophist". The framing conceit is that Lucianus has heard of this Sophist's claims of being *ὁ γνῶναι τὸν σολοικίζοντα δεινὸς οὗτος καὶ φυλάξασθαι μὴ σολοικίσαι δυνατός* (the one clever at recognizing him who solecizes, and capable of guarding against committing solecism, *Sol.* 1).[3] Whether being able to recognize solecisms entails the capacity to avoid making them oneself is a question begged by this way of framing the discussion, a fallacy that Lucianus exposes immediately. But in any case the "Solecist" to which the title refers is in fact Lucianus, for he proceeds to reveal the gaps in the Sophist's knowledge by introducing deliberate (if subtle) errors into his speech and

[3] All translations in this chapter are original, except where otherwise noted.

pounces on the Sophist when he fails to note them. The Sophist himself does not get enough opportunities to talk for him to utter any solecisms, instead serving the function of a Platonic interlocutor whose lines merely punctuate long passages from Lucianus. The longest of these passages is not in *propria voce* but instead is a series of riddles and apophthegms quoting the (probably fictive) Socrates of Mopsus,[4] whom Lucianus claims as a teacher of his. Ending on an aporetic note (*νῦν δὲ διαλύσωμεν τὸν διάλογον*—but now let us end the dialogue, *Sol*. 12) the dialogue delivers no direct, unified message beyond demonstrating the Sophist's initial claim of expertise to be false.

While the *Solecist* does not directly state an opinion on language, at least not in terms as clear as those in the *Lexiphanes* or *Mistaken Critic*, it nevertheless offers a multilayered satire of expertise, authority, and usage. "Lucianus" is presented as an expert who is here to give the upstart Sophist a dressing-down, but he himself is as much the object of ridicule as the Sophist—perhaps even more so, as this discussion will show. Horrocks (1997, 82) includes this work among several that satirize the excesses of Attic pedantry (others of which will follow later in the present chapter), but in fact this work more than any other (the *Mistaken Critic* comes close) presents the most direct, or at least the most thinly-veiled, critique of second century Attic experts, whom Lucianus represents.

The particular solecisms that Lucianus highlights are the reason he, perhaps more than his interlocutor, should be understood as the true target of the satire. The selection at hand gives the most valuable insight into how to read this work in the context of Lucian's other texts, and in the contemporary landscape. They also make up the point of greatest controversy in the relatively

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[4] MacLeod (1967) 17; "Mopsus" is the name of a seer in Hesiod (*Shield,* 181), and of a supposedly historical figure (FGrH 765 F17 = Athenaeus 8.346e [8.37 Kaibel]), thus the name of the city or region in Cilicia from which this "Socrates" supposedly comes; neither of the personages nor the location is of any great historical significance, by Lucian's time at least.

sparse body of scholarship on this work. The crux of the issue, which complicates the task of identifying the target of Lucian's mockery, is that many of the errors in syntax, usage, and/or morphology that Lucianus censures—and censures the Sophist for failing to recognize—are in fact constructions Lucian the author employs in other works, some 23 in total.[5] The preponderance of usages criticized here but written into Lucianic works elsewhere was taken as early as Reitz[6] to signify nothing more or less than a *reductio ad absurdum* from Lucian, making "Lucianus" the most fussy of grammatical purists, who can find a sliver of a solecism in virtually any sentence. This explanation has somewhat curiously struggled to find purchase, and for a considerable length of time the *Solecist* has, primarily on the basis of the discrepancy between the recommendations from"Lucianus" and Lucian's writing but also due to certain aesthetic criteria,[7] been dismissed as pseudo-Lucianic.[8]

The *Solecist* has received some attention from scholars looking to resolve this apparent discrepancy and arguing for the work's legitimacy in the corpus. The most thorough of these studies is one by M. D. MacLeod[9] focusing on the construction of *ἄν* with the future.[10] Such a construction occurs first at *Sol*. 2, *οὐ γὰρ ἐθέλεις ἕπεσθαι, συνήσων ἄν, εἴπερ ἐθελήσειας* (for you are not willing to follow, but if you should be willing, you would comprehend), and again at *Sol*. 8, *οἶμαι γάρ σε κἂν νῦν δυνήσεσθαι τοσούτων γε ἐπακούσαντα τῶν ἑξῆς λεγομένων* (for I think you would also be able to [recognize solecisms], after hearing so many of them uttered in a row).

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[5] See the table in appendix C.1 for the full account, cross-referenced with other Lucian works.
[6] Reitz-Hemsterhuys (1706) edition.
[7] Hall (1981) 306-7.
[8] Croiset (1882) 43; Hall (1981) 298-307; Swain (1996) 49 accepts this conclusion, but considers it "encouraging" because it suggests a wider assortment of satires mocking Atticism—perhaps even mocking Lucian himself—in the period contemporary to Lucian, Pollux, Phrynichus, et al.
[9] MacLeod (1956) 102, 106: he accepts the work as by Lucian, and rejects the tendency of earlier editors to apply the apparent proscription in *Solecist* to emend *ἄν* + future out of their texts even where MS authority for it is strong.
[10] Zingg (2017) highlights this exact construction in the canonical Attic orator Isocrates, making its censure in the *Solecist* all the more striking.

Lucianus chides the Sophist for failing to catch the mistake, yet *ἄν* and various future verbs appear together in numerous other works of Lucian.[11] Having dismissed the possibility that the work is not authentic, MacLeod offers four potential solutions:[12]

> i. Lucianus is an unironic representation of the author, who has changed his views on Attic between writing earlier pieces and the *Solecist*.
>
> ii. Lucian tailors Lucianus to match the tastes of the intended audience, the educated elite who delight in Attic minutiae, and suppresses his own views.
>
> iii. Lucianus is an ironic caricature of the Attic purists, a *reductio ad absurdum* whose prescriptive Atticism is not, in fact, recommended by the work if read correctly.
>
> iv. "The *Solecist* is, in my opinion, a spiteful attack of Lucian on some particular enemy…so far from recognizing solecisms when committed by others, he is guilty of them himself. In his bitterness, Lucian has lost all sense of proportion and is furthermore guilty of outrageous hypocrisy."[13]

Weissenberger distills MacLeod's four possible interpretations into two, that a) Lucianus accurately reflects Lucian's opinions—requiring a biographical argument that this is a later work—or b) that Lucianus is ironically homonymous with the author, and the reader recognizes the irony.[14] He dismisses MacLeod's supposition of a personal attack, only in part due to the tenuous basis for such interpretations in an author with so little independent biographic information. In his view—which is, on a close comparison with the *Rhetorum praeceptor* and especially the *Mistaken Critic*, essentially correct—Lucianus speaks with an overtly patient, instructing tone rather than a hostile one. The Sophist seems like a younger man, a student who has learned some Attic and is enthusiastic about the subject, rather than a genuine rival to Lucianus—no one who misses the obvious blunders could be.

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[11] *Phalaris* II 10; *Downward Journey* 20; *Fisher* 29; *Anacharsis* 17, 25, 31; *Homeland* 8; *The Hall* 19; MacLeod additionally cites *Zeus Rants* 32, *Ass* 26, *Charon* 14, *Prometheus* 15, and *Runaways* 5 as examples where the particle occurs with the future but not in a construction comparable to the *Solecist* passages.
[12] MacLeod (1956) 106-110.
[13] MacLeod (1956) 109.
[14] Weissenberger (1996) 61-2.

Ultimately, Weissenberger concludes that the *Solecist* cannot serve to illuminate the real linguistic ideology of the author himself.[15] In this view, the *Solecist* demonstrates Lucian's knowledge of this kind of Atticist observation—the kind exemplified, perhaps, by Phrynichus—and allows him to comment on it, but determining where Lucian himself stands is a vain enterprise. However, as discussed in the introduction, the focus in the present study lies less on the personages involved than on the linguistic ideologies at issue. One can therefore suspend judgment on the authenticity of the *Solecist* or the views contained therein in order to examine more effectively the way different strains of Atticism might be positioned against one another within the work. The tension between the valid censure of some expressions that are dubious at best, such as *ἀρτιγενειόυς* (*Sol.* 2, evidently a conflation of *ἀρτιγενεῖς* and *ἀρτιγεννήτους*) or *χρᾶσθαι* (*Sol.* 7, for *χρῆσθαι*), and the specious quibbling about others that have ample ancient attestation is the sticking point that prevents Hall from accepting the work as Lucianic or, indeed, as good satire.[16] But this tension, this lack of precise boundaries between valid and invalid Attic usage, actually serves to activate the satirical targeting of Lucianus and Socrates. It has been demonstrated that some Atticist grammarians see it as their essential function to determine where to draw the line between valid and invalid, *δόκιμος* and *ἀδόκιμος*. With this consideration in mind, the indiscriminate dismissal of false Attic and true alike can readily be understood as a

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[15] Weissenberger (1996) 66: "Aus der Art dieser 'Fehler' auf wirkliche Überzeugungen Lukians in Fragen des Sprachgebrauchs zu schliessen ist daher ein ziemlich müssiges Unterfangen, denn: Was von dem pedantischen und allzu sehr von seinen Kenntnissen überzeugten Sophisten als Fehler erkannt bzw. nicht erkannt werden soll, muss lediglich bei Leuten seines Schlages, nicht unbedingt bei Lukian als solcher gelten." (To draw conclusions about Lucian's true convictions on the subject of linguistic usage, on the basis of these 'mistakes', is therefore a rather foolish endeavor because what should be recognized, or not recognized, as a mistake by a pedant who is overly convinced of his own knowledge of sophistry, must register only with people of his own kind, and not necessarily Lucian as such.)

[16] Hall (1981) 302, 207; Hall sides with Harmon's conjecture that the Solecist is a work by some otherwise unknown grammarian in Egypt, inspired by Lucian (hence the name "Loukianos") but without Lucian's flair for satirical wit. Hall also assigns the work to a lesser imitator because of how difficult it is to pin down the position of the authorial voice—but for satirical texts such fuzziness of perspective is a feature, not a bug.

caricature of the Atticist grammarians' tendency to reach ever further in their quest to establish authority by setting increasingly restrictive bounds on their definition of "Attic".[17]

The *Solecist* reveals this satirical program gradually, presenting the reader one immediate and obvious target before slowly bending back around. Any reader who knows Lucian—or indeed, Plato—can immediately anticipate that, when the pseudo-Sophist lays claim to being *ὁ γνῶναι τὸν σολοικίζοντα δεινὸς*, he will receive a severe skewering from Lucianus. And so, Lucianus immediately commits a solecism (*ἀρτί* with a future verb, *Sol.* 1)[18] so blatant that the pseudo-Sophist, failing to notice it, instantly loses all credibility. This setup is, however, so utterly conventional (indeed cliché)[19] that moderately experienced consumers of satire will from the very beginning find themselves waiting for the other shoe to drop. Such inherent tension between the surface reading and the satirical subtext makes for a blurry picture that the reader looks to have resolved as the dialogue progresses. Hall, building on Bompaire,[20] speculates that the *Solecist*, like the *Judgment of the Vowels*, may be "a game…without any satiric intent" in which "Lucian challenges his audience, as much as his opponent, to see if they can spot what is being criticised".[21] In her view, the audience will initially receive clearly signposted examples (see above) but be weaned off of Lucian's guidance in order to puzzle out the problems (or lack thereof) with subsequent examples. But the work need not be one or the other—it can be both a satire on pedantry and a game challenging the reader to spot not the solecisms, but the places where the overzealous grammarian, lexicographer, or language ideology transgresses against the pragmatics of good Greek. The readers are invited to join in on this game too, for a reader of

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[17] Vessalla (2018) 365.
[18] The full line is *Ἴθι νῦν ἐμοῦ λαβοῦ σολοικίζοντος, ἄρτι δὲ σολοικιῶ.* (Come now, catch me when I solecize—and I will proceed to do so lately.)
[19] Hall (1981) 306 calls it "insipid," not inaccurately.
[20] Bompaire (1954) 142 n.2: Lucian is so pedantic in *Solecist* that it seems "il oublit qu'il s'agit d'un jeu", i.e. he is too earnest to be making a satirical play on the opponent figure.
[21] Hall (1981) 305.

Lucian (ancient or modern) who considers themselves well-educated in Attic Greek can hardly help but feel the opening challenge of Lucianus directed at them. It is precisely this potential for immersing the audience within the scene that makes Lucian's later undercutting of its basic premise so effective.

As previously mentioned, most of the criticisms of bad grammar and usage are presented as a set of authoritative apopthegmata attributed to one Socrates of Mopsus.[22] The introduction of this third figure is significant because it marks a possible inflection point at which Lucianus ceases to be the deliverer of the author's mocking tone and becomes an ironic target for it. In fact, the manner in which Lucianus introduces the stories about this Socrates figure is itself a failure on Lucianus' part, because it comes as a non sequitur that disrupts the flow of the dialogue and serves only to allow Lucianus to hold forth at even greater length. Such an abrupt break into anecdote indicates, in the Classical Attic dialogues upon which this work is based, that the speaker is disingenuous or otherwise lacking in dialectic skill. One famous example of this phenomenon comes from Thrasymachus in Plato's *Republic*, who, when clearly shown to be wrong in his arguments about Justice, tries to change the subject by bringing up Socrates' wet-nurse as a talking point.[23] Socrates of Mopsus is also not particularly witty, even though he strongly resembles the cynic philosopher Demonax in Lucian's work of the same name. Some of his comments are exceptionally clever in their wordplay, but (for example) his response to the un-Attic form *χρᾶσθαι* is simply "*ψευδαττικὸν τὸ ῥῆμα*" ("that's a pseudo-Attic word", 7)—not nearly on the level of Demonax, and more like Thrasymachus than the other, more famous Socrates. Lucianus' reverence for him, which is made clear from the start, appears more and more

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[22] *Sol.* 5: *Κἀγὼ μὲν οὕτως. Σωκράτης δὲ ὁ ἀπὸ Μόψου, ᾧ συνεγενόμην ἐν Αἰγύπτῳ, τὰ τοιαῦτα ἔλεγεν ἀνεπαχθῶς καὶ οὐκ ἤλεγχε τὸν ἁμαρτάνοντα.*; *Sol.* 7*: ταῦτα μὲν τὰ Σωκράτεια.*

[23] P. *Rep.* 242a: *Ἐπειδὴ οὖν ἐνταῦθα ἦμεν τοῦ λόγου καὶ πᾶσι καταφανὲς ἦν ὅτι ὁ τοῦ δικαίου λόγος εἰς τοὐναντίον περιειστήκει, ὁ Θρασύμαχος ἀντὶ τοῦ ἀποκρίνεσθαι, Εἰπέ μοι, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, τίτθη σοι ἔστιν;*

misplaced as the stories about him become less and less impressive, and Socrates of Mopsus—most likely a fictional character, named after the all-but-deified intellectual paragon but the toponym of an obscure town in Cilicia—seems like a pale imitation of other, better thinkers. Socrates of Mopsus' credibility is further undermined by the relatively larger number of usages he identifies as solecisms but which appear elsewhere in Lucian's corpus; about half of those listed in Appendix D.1 come from the "Sokrateia" anecdotes. Several of the mistakes in the Socrates digression (including some used elsewhere by Lucian) are supported by Phrynichus[24] and at least one can be found in Pollux[25], so what Lucianus has learned from Socrates appears in line—tellingly so—with the recommendations of contemporary lexicographers and grammarians but not necessarily with Lucian the author's own preferences.

In fact Lucianus is for the most part clearly aligned with the strictest of the prescriptive Atticists and Socrates of Mopsus is plainly portrayed as a member of that crowd who, at least in part, shaped Lucianus' understanding of what is or is not a solecism. Lucian demonstrates his thorough familiarity with this wing of Atticism through everything his homonymous persona says, and Lucianus is so closely aligned with Phrynichus et al. that, while there is no indication his creator actually used Phrynichus or any other specific lexicon in composing the work, [26] it is nevertheless obvious he has the same ideology in mind. The *Solecist*, therefore, allows Lucian—in the thinly-veiled persona of Lucianus—to display exhaustive knowledge of the minutiae of Attic grammar, up to and including Atticist teachings that discount authentic Classical Athenian

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[24] §5: πηνίκα cf. *Ecl.* 30, 237; μεῖραξ cf. *Ecl*. 183; κορυφαιότατος cf. *Ecl*. 213; ἐξ ἐπιπολῆς cf. *Ecl*. 98, *PS* 66; συντάττομαι with the dative cf. ἀποτάσσομαι, *Ecl*. 14; συγκρίνομαι cf. *Ecl.* 123, 243, *PS* 1; §6: καρῆναι cf. *Ecl*. 292; προκόπτω cf. *Ecl.* 58; §7: ἔκτοτε cf. *Ecl*. 29; βράδιον cf. *Ecl*. 52, 71, 264; ἵπτασθαι cf. *Ecl.* 297

[25] §5: πατριώτης cf. Poll. *Onom*. 3.54: οἱ δὲ βάρβαροι ἀλλήλους οὐ πολίτας ἀλλὰ πατριώτας λέγουσιν. Ἄρχιππος δὲ καὶ συστρατιώτας καὶ ξυμπατριώτας ἔφη. Πλάτων μέντοι ἐν τοῖς Νόμοις καὶ ἐπὶ Ἑλλήνων τὸ πατριῶται εἴρηκεν. τὸ δ' ἐναντίον ξένος, ἀλλοδαπός, ἀλλότριος, ἀλλοεθνής, ἀλλόφυλος, ἀλλόδημος, ἀλλόγλωσσος, ἐπηλύτης, ὀθνεῖος· ποιητικώτερον, Πλάτων δ' αὐτῷ κέχρηται.

[26] Though at least 22 of the solecisms in this work are specifically addressed in Phrynichus' *Ecloga* and/or *Praeparatio Sophistica*.

usages.[27] In the previous chapter, the examination of Phrynichus' model for Atticism showed how he feels comfortable discarding usages from Demosthenes, Sophocles, and other unquestionably authentic Attic authors; Lucianus and Socrates are clearly cast from the same mold. In the broader context of Lucian's corpus, there is evidence to suggest the author does not align himself with that crowd. Yet Lucian never lets the pseudo-Sophist off the hook, and the strict model of Atticism from which Lucianus operates in the *Solecist* is essential to demonstrating his interlocutor's failure to live up to the standards of the school with which he has apparently aligned himself. If Lucian were to be accused of failing to grasp the subtle details of Atticism as defined by his most pedantic contemporaries, this work would certainly serve to rebut that charge. The real significance of this work, however, most likely lies in the dual-directional nature of Lucian's satire. He certainly does mock those like the pseudo-Sophist with both gaping lacunae and sublime confidence in their knowledge of Attic, and the other works under discussion in this chapter reinforce this group as one of Lucian's main targets. Yet at the same time Lucian—much more subtly—undermines the larger project of competitive and captious Atticism. Because he has it both ways, the *Solecist* demonstrates Lucian's willingness to position himself between, alongside, and against different ideologies. The discussion in the subsequent sections will demonstrate further the complexities of his relationship with Atticism, both as a target to mock and an ideal to uphold.

3.2 Lexiphanes

In the *Lexiphanes* or "Speech-Flaunter", Lucian—in the person of Lycinus—encounters an acquaintance eager to show off a new *Symposium* of his own composition. Lycinus allows him

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[27] The use of ἑαυτῶν for ἡμῶν αὐτῶν, for example, is Thucydidean; he also employs the verb προκόπτω. As mentioned above, βαρεῖν is transitive in Plato and Socrates of Mopsus wrongly condemns it; νῦν δή (§9) with the future tense is deprecated here but found in Plato as well. Demosthenes uses μαντεύομαι in the sense that is condemned here.

to read it out, and soon realizes what a mistake he has made: the work is so dense with archaism,[28] obscure vocabulary, jarring neologisms,[29] and tortured circumlocutions[30]--as well as numerous *hapax legomena*[31]—that he eventually interrupts this recitation, able to bear no more of this ridiculous hyper-Atticist's drivel. The work takes a surreal turn when a third figure, the physician Sopolis, enters the dialogue in its final act to treat the afflicted Lexiphanes with a drug or potion that purges his most egregious Atticisms. The drug also promises to make him receptive to ongoing therapy, which Lycinus describes as a straightforward and sober program of holistic literary education. By reading the true classics of Attic literature—that is to say, Plato and Thucydides alongside the rest of the well-known canon[32]—rather than the recent sophistic treatises, Lexiphanes will learn how to write proper Attic and speak in a manner acceptable to Lucian and other intellectuals whose company Lexiphanes seeks. The overall thrust of the dialogue seems to be that Lucian—via Lycinus, who occupies a position of intellectual authority in the scenario—believes Atticism does not, *contra* Lexiphanes' impression, lie in assembling unusual words and deploying as many of them as possible in a single exchange. Rather, Atticism requires a nuanced understanding of the underlying principles from which the Classical Attic authors originally wrote. The "Lexiphanes" character, who may stand in for a sophist or rhetor who has earned Lucian's particular ire, parodies bad contemporary Atticizing literature that

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[28] *ἦ δ'ὃς* ('quoth he' vel sim.) is Lexiphanes' preferred way to mark a quotation, for instance.
[29] *ἀντισυμποσιάζω* ('invite to a dinner party in return' or perhaps 'write an alternative *Symposium*') is the word he uses in §1 to describe the new text he wishes to present to Lycinus.
[30] Lexiphanes does not do his hair with a comb (*κτείς*) but rather with "the toothed groom-tool" (*τῇ ὀδοντωτῇ ξύστρᾳ*, §5).
[31] These receive ample treatment in Bompaire (1954) 629, Schwartz (1965) 121-2, Baldwin (1973) 50-53, and most fully Casevitz (1994) 78-86, whose work is the main source for the discussion to follow.
[32] Bompaire (1954) 144: The vague references to "orators" and "great poets" suggest "des catalogues dont le content est connu, bref des canons" (catalogues of which the content is known [to the reader], i.e. the canons). In Bompaire's view the literary canon intended here can be deduced from the rest of Lucian's corpus, or indeed from the assumption of a relatively close correspondence between Lucian's list of canonical authors and that of his readers.

misses the essential point of Plato (or other authors)[33] and results from a chronic deficiency of *paideia*.[34]

Most scholarship on Lucian generally supports this basic reading of the work. However, a substantial amount of literature focuses on the task of identifying some contemporary rival as the inspiration for the title character. Baldwin asserts that the "identity of Lexiphanes is a relevant problem that cannot be shirked"[35], and the widespread speculation in this regard suggests many other scholars share this conviction. He himself believes Lexiphanes is most likely a representation of Ulpian of Tyre, senior—the father of the famous Jurist, and the namesake of the symposiarch of Athenaeus' *Deipnosophists* characterized primarily (as discussed in Chapter Four) by his prescriptive, pedantic, but frequently lacunose Atticist ideology.[36] Herodian, Pollux, and Phrynichus are also popular candidates;[37] to pick a single intertextual example, Lexiphanes employs the word *τήτινον* at the beginning of the dialogue (*Lex.* 1) and it appears in the writings of all three (Herod. *Partitiones* 133.8; Poll. 6.73; Phryn. *PS* 72, 113). Phrynichus even labels it *ἀττικώτερον* (not just "Attic" but "more Attic"). However, as discussed in the previous chapter, the historical picture of these figures, and especially of Pollux and Phrynichus, has frequently been over-determined by Naechster's speculative study.[38] C.P. Jones, conversely, sees Lexiphanes as representing Philagrus of Cilicia—a sophist known only from Philostratus—by interpreting the line *ἀγρόνδε ᾠχόμην ψύττα κατατείνας· οἶσθα δὲ ὡς φίλαγρός εἰμι* ("I was heading to the countryside straightaways—you know how country-fond [*philagros*] I am", *Lex.* 3) as a

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[33] Robinson (1979) 23, e.g.—Lexiphanes' recitation is "a comic reduction of Plato's dialogue to all its extraneous details."
[34] Bompaire (1954) 129: "Paideia reste pour lui source de toutes joies et de toutes vertus," cf. *Lex.* 23.
[35] Baldwin (1973) 37.
[36] Baldwin (1976) 35.
[37] Ranke (1831) 27 sees Herodian as the target; Richard (1886) 48 casts Pollux in the role; Swain (1996) 55 suggests that "Phrynichus would resemble Lucian in being a non-Greek speaker by birth who had to learn the rules through hard work", however, Strobel (2011) 90 suggests that his line of argument is overly speculative and perhaps not productive at any rate.
[38] Fischer (1974).

mock-*sphragis* for Lucian to identify his target.[39] Jones' interest is largely prosopographical, for he employs this speculative conclusion to enlist *Lexiphanes* (and Lucian's biography by extension) in enhancing the historical picture of the fairly obscure Philagrus.[40] But even Graham Anderson, who is concerned throughout his various works on Lucian with the historical-biographical context of the literary corpus, considers Lexiphanes a type-character. He notes that "one could go on adding candidates" indefinitely and concludes that, in creating the figure of Lexiphanes, Lucian has assimilated various historical personages without necessarily intending any one of them to be the real target.[41] Weissenberger adds to the discussion by pointing out the lack of any extant second-century *Symposium* that could be targeted by this caricature.[42] It is reasonable to speculate that contemporary stylists may have composed their own Platonic dialogues (in *Double Indictment* and *You're a Prometheus in Words*, Lucian himself appears to take pride in using dialogue as a component of literary innovation), but this speculation does not license the use of *Lexiphanes* to represent Lucian's views on any specific contemporary.

The strongest studies investigate the relationship between this text, other works of Lucian, and different strains of Atticism and anti-Atticism contemporary to the dialogue. This mode of inquiry is not new, but interpretive approaches have differed. For example, while Croiset (1882, 258) and Sakalis (1979, 13) consider this work a less interesting treatment on the same theme as the *Rhetorum praeceptor*, Chabert (1897, 72) conversely views it as "l'expression pairfaite des idées de Lucien sur l'atticisme, telles qu'elles apparaissent dans son oeuvre entire."[43] Baldwin, in spite of his desire to seek the historical figure(s) behind the title character,

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[39] Jones (1972) 476-7.
[40] A more probable explanation for this *hapax* is that offered by Casevitz (1994) 79: "C'est dans la bouche d'un personnage si typique de l'extrême 'urbanité' que le mot résonne comiquement." (It is in the mouth of a character so typified by his extreme 'urbanity' that the word resonates comically.)
[41] Anderson (1976) 69.
[42] Weissenberger (1996) 71.
[43] Chabert (1897) 72: The perfect expression of Lucian's ideas on Atticism, such as they appear in his overall corpus.

summarizes the real target as "one of the linguistic foibles of the second century, the mania for obscure and archaic Attic diction."[44] A significant portion of Athenaeus' *Deipnosophistae* plays on this same theme,[45] though in that work the obnoxious hyper-Atticist—and his circle—is named after a historical contemporary. It is tempting to suppose that Lexiphanes might be the same Ulpian of Tyre or Pompeianus of Philadelphia to whom Athenaeus ascribes a similar obsession with Atticism; the comparison is especially apt given that the latter employs some of the same hyper-Attic jargon[46] as Lexiphanes and is called by a humorous neologism, *ὀνοματοθήρας* (wordhunter) that resembles "Lexiphanes" in meaning. Much more likely, however, is the possibility that Lucian and Athenaeus have a group or even a type in mind and not a specific individual.[47] Whoever their historical inspirations, common ideological strain exists connecting Lexiphanes the "speech-flaunter" with the speech-hunters in Athenaeus, who are mocked (albeit more gently) throughout the work. His Ulpian, Pompeianus, and others need not be any less a caricature than Lucian's Lexiphanes, despite his not being assigned an allegorical pseudonym.

The relationships between the different ideologies in play here—rather than those between Lucian and other authors—make up the real satirical target. The clearest evidence for

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[44] Baldwin (1973) 36.
[45] In the form of the "Ulpianean sophists" such as Pompeianus, mentioned at 2.97c, 3.98c, and following; see ch. 3 for an extended discussion of these characters and their role in Athenaeus.
[46] *ἰπνολέβης*, e.g., attested only in Ath. 3.98c (=3.54 K.) and Luc. *Lex.* 8.
[47] Harmon (1936) 291: "The Atticists so tempered zeal with discretion that nothing comparable to the extravagances of Lexiphanes is to be found outside of the pages of Athenaeus…where Cynulcus takes Ulpian to task for just this sort of thing, adverts upon Pompeianus of Philadelphia as a bird of the same feather, and implies a wider circle by alluding to 'the Ulpianean sophists.' This is certainly the group to which our man [Lexiphanes] belonged…. Seiler's contention that Lexiphanes is Pompeianus is highly probably but not wholly certain because it is impossible to fix the extent to which the vocabulary of the 'Ulpianeans' was common stock." Weissenberger (1996) 71 reasserts this view.

this interpretation comes at *Lex.* 13-14, which appears to depict the way Atticizers practice their art:[48]

> "… μετὰ δὲ τὸν ποτὸν συνυθλήσομεν οἷα καὶ ἅττ' ἐώθαμεν· οὐ γὰρ ἄκαιρον δήπουθεν ἐν οἴνῳ φλύειν." "Ἐπαινῶ τοῦτο," ἦν δ' ἐγώ, "καὶ γὰρ ὅτιπερ ὀφελός ἐσμεν τῆς ἀττικίσεως ἄκρον." "Εὖ λέγεις," ἦ δ' ὃς ὁ Καλλικλῆς· "τὸ γὰρ ἐρεσχηλεῖν ἀλλήλους συχνάκις λάλης θηγάνη γίγνεται."
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> [Callicles:] "…and after the bever, we shall converse on such and whatsoever we are wont; for doubtless it is not inopportune to babble over wine." "I cherish it," quoth I, "for we are that very tip of the flower of Atticism." "You say well," quoth he, did Callicles, "For to quiz one another without cease is the whetstone of loquacity."

Here Lucian has the two characters, Lexiphanes and his partner in crime Callicles, offer a definition of Atticism (or more precisely, its *ὄφελος ἀκρόν*)—it seems to consist of an agonistic back-and-forth, the act of which is not specifically depicted in Lexiphanes' reading but which evidently induces a degree of self-satisfaction just to think about. That Lucian portrays a hyper-Atticist not merely smugly reflecting on his own Atticist practice but actually quoting himself doing so is clearly a satirical caricature. He is ludicrously lacking in self-awareness throughout the work, and he therefore represents a strain of Atticism that is equally lacking. Robinson (1979, 23) describes the "Symposium" quoted at length in the dialogue as "a comic reduction of Plato's [*Symposium*] to all its extraneous details." Indeed, Lexiphanes' work is "Platonic" only inasmuch as he has mined Plato for vocabulary--or just mined lexical works based on Plato, given the implication at *Lex.* 22-3 that he has read only recent Sophistic writings and not looked at Plato, Thucydides, et al. Whatever its sources, the final product of his literary endeavor is a philosophical dialogue containing no philosophy; he ought simply to have written a lexicon given that the dialogue format is merely a framing device for the slew of obscure vocabulary.[49]

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[48] A clear parallel, discussed in the following chapter, is the character Ulpian of Tyre in Athenaeus; in particular, his habit of testing others' knowledge by asking *κεῖται ἢ οὐ κεῖται* seems like what is meant by *τὸ γὰρ ἐρεσχηλεῖν ἀλλήλους συχνάκις.*

[49] Croiset (1882) 260; Hall (1981) 281-2 points out the organizational similarity of Lexiphanes' vocabulary to that of Pollux's *Onomasticon*: "there are groups of words relating to vegetables (2), various foods , and

Thus where the *Solecist* seems to make fun of pseudo-Atticism, the scholarly view of the *Lexiphanes* is that here Lucian has hyper-Atticism in his sights.[50] This representation of hyper-Atticism entails a pursuit of vocabulary and usage as an end unto itself, rather than as a means to reading, interpreting, and creating philosophical and rhetorical works. Lucian depicts this problematic ideology through concentrated doses of obscure and unusual vocabulary, with a marked preference for Old Comedy sources[51] (not unlike contemporary lexicography). Yet as Lycinus summarizes in the final passage of the work, Lexiphanes is not truly hyper-Attic anyway:

> Τὸ δὲ πάντων καταγελαστότατον ἐκεῖνό ἐστιν, ὅτι ὑπεράττικος εἶναι ἀξιῶν καὶ τὴν φωνὴν εἰς τὸ ἀρχαιότατον ἀπηκριβωμένος τοιαῦτα ἔνια, μᾶλλον δὲ τὰ πλεῖστα, ἐγκαταμιγνύεις τοῖς λόγοις ἃ μηδὲ παῖς ἄρτι μανθάνων ἀγνοήσειεν ἄν·
>
> And the most laughable thing of all is the fact that, while supposing yourself to be hyper-Attic and honing some certain aspects regarding your speech into the most archaic shape, for the most part you blend into your speeches things which not even a boy just beginning school would fail to know. (Luc. *Lex*. 25)

Despite his ostensible aim of sounding like Plato, Lexiphanes has only succeeded in inserting a hodgepodge of Attic vocabulary into an otherwise mundane Greek idiom. His speech, as mentioned earlier, is also rife with *hapax* neologisms—at least 34 in number, according to Casevitz's study.[52] Many of these are compounds, such as *συγχειροπονήσας* ('to join in doing manual labor', §2) or *χειμοθνής* ('dead from the storm', §14) but others are derivatives like the backformation *λάλη* (§14, from *λαλέω*, apparently in place of the genuine *λαλιά*) and novel (or simply incorrect) applications of words like *ἄδικος* (§9, used here to mean 'with legal proceedings suspended' despite its commonly accepted meaning being 'unjust'). His use of

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shopkeepers (3), eye disorders (4), wrestling and gymnastic terms (5), hair-styles (5), more food (5-6), various drinking cups (7), words describing a reprobate (10 and 12), nautical terms (15), and so forth."

[50] Bompaire (1958) 483, Robinson (1979) 22, Sakalis (1979) 18, Weissenberger (1996) 72.

[51] Bompaire (1958) 635.

[52] Casevitz (1994) divides these into three groups, comprising compounds, derivatives, and (ineptly) transferred meaning; for the full list, see Appendix C.2.

words no ancient Athenian ever spoke, or in senses they would never have employed them, suggests he feels he has mastered the Attic idiom to completely that he is comfortable crafting new words, as he imagines a Classical Attic speaker might have done. He likewise appears supremely confident deploying authentic vocabulary in inauthentic senses. But according to Lycinus, Lexiphanes' Attic speech is in addition riddled with syntactically improper constructs: *οἷον τὸ ἵπτατο καὶ τὸ ἀπαντώμενος καὶ τὸ καθεσθείς, οὐδὲ μετοικικὰ τῆς Ἀθηναίων φωνῆς* (such as *hiptato* [he flied] and *apantomenos* [moved-ing] and *katestheis* [sitted], not at all proper to the speech of Athenians; Lycinus, §25). The supposedly spurious *ἵπταμαι* also surfaces in the *Solecist*, when Socrates of Mopsus is quoted mocking one who utters it.[53] While well-attested in contemporary usage, that verb is vastly dispreferred to its cognate *πέτεσθαι* in fifth- and early fourth-century Attic writing.

Furthermore, as noted above Lexiphanes' language is marked by idiosyncratic usages that result in double entendres and malapropisms—using *συμφοραί* (6) to mean "contributions" (it is more readily understood as "disasters") and calling his "unused" clothing *ἄχρηστα* (9; the word in fact means "useless"). He is also alleged (again in §25) to have used χιτώνιον, something like "camisole", to refer to a man's garment and called male slaves δουλάρια, despite both terms being associated with women or girls. Elsewhere the work is full of examples of Lexiphanes saying something quite different from what he means, as in §2 when he seems to be priding himself on having secured help to fulfil the vital duty of interring a deceased man and uses the word συντυμβωρυχήσας, which more accurately means "having joined in grave-robbing" (cf. τυμβωρύχος, Ar. Ran. 1149), or in §9 where Lexiphanes writes his character Megalonymus saying "And upon learning that the magistrate was available to be seen, taking my priceless fine

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[53] Luc. *Sol.* 7: *ἵπτασθαι δὲ ἐπὶ τοῦ πέτεσθαι πολλῶν λεγόντων, Ὅτι μὲν ἀπὸ τῆς πτήσεως τὸ ὄνομα, σαφῶς ἴσμεν.* (And when many people were saying *iptasthai* to mean *petesthai* [to fly], he said "That the word has something to do with 'flight' we can clearly tell.")

robes and unworn boots I set myself out." But the text, *πυθόμενος δὲ ὅτι ὁ στρατηγὸς ὀπτός ἐστιν, λαβὼν ἄχρηστα ἱμάτια εὐήτρια καὶ ἀφόρητα ὑποδήματα ἐξέφησα ἐμαυτόν*, means in proper Attic that the magistrate was grilled (ὀπτός), Megalonymus' robes were worthless (ἄχρηστα), and his shoes unbearable (ἀφόρητα). Athenaeus 97e and 98a mocks Ulpian and Pompeianus with the exact same misapplications of Attic terms, reinforcing the connection between those characters and Lexiphanes.[54] In short, Lexiphanes aspires to hyper-Atticism but fails on two fronts—both falling short of the "*ὀφελός τῆς ἀττικίσεως ἄκρον*" and failing to recognize the inherent absurdity of his backwards literary endeavor.[55] Whereas in the *Solecist* both the pseudo-Sophist's abysmal knowledge of Attic and Lucianus' overweaning pedantry are the target of mockery, in the *Lexiphanes* the title figure's doubly-deficient pretensions to writing like Plato make him a laughingstock both coming and going.

As a complement to the caricature of Atticism and Atticists in this work, when the physician Sopolis enters the picture to cure Lexiphanes' malady of the tongue, the question of Sopolis' anti-Atticist medication merits consideration as a metaphor for the language ideology. His name "City-Saver"[56] is a sufficiently plausible epithet for physicians, though one theory suggests that this name is used here specifically to demonstrate the curative (or preventative) benefits of well-ordered linguistic usage for civic life.[57] Regardless of the meaning of this allegorical figure's appellation, the volume of commentary on the subject of Attic vocabulary and usage by Galen alone (including numerous lost works on lexicography and grammar[58]) suggests that he at least was an active participant in the philological debates that inspired the *Lexiphanes*.

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[54] See the note on Casevitz (1994) above, and Appendix C.2, for a complete list of similar *hapax* mishaps.
[55] As Casevitz (1994) 83 suggests, his "hyper-Atticism" should be understood not as "highly Attic" but rather as having gone so far in the direction of Atticism as to have come around the other side.
[56] This version is far more common than the fuller form Σωσίπολις, which is attested in Aristophanes' Acharnians but few other places.
[57] This concern is clearly in evidence in Phrynichus' preface to Cornelianus, for example.
[58] Fichtner (2015).

Certainly, Galen's portrait of the ideal physician—summarized in part by the title of one work, *That the Best Physician Is a Philosopher*—envisions the medical profession as one engaged in high-level intellectual debates.[59] In fact on the basis of the works attributed to him a number of readers have imagined Sopolis to represent Galen himself[60]. Somewhat curiously, Anderson (1976, 71n41) believes that Galen's anti-Atticist remarks would have been anathema to Lucian, disqualifying Galen from being the basis for this doctor—yet Sopolis, who administers a decidedly anti-Attic potion, is clearly a friend and ally of Lycinus.[61] At the same time, the historical Galen's considerable interest in Attic vocabulary suggests that he was never dogmatically anti-Atticist to begin with. As with Lexiphanes, Sopolis is probably best imagined as representing a certain ideological strain (but of anti-Atticism, in his case) that is evidently germane to Lucian's project. Galen's own comments opposing hyper-Atticist writing[62] emphasize the obstacles it presents to the kind of clear and unambiguous communication required in medical training. In like manner, in *Lexiphanes*, the language found in the "Symposium" appears to be creating a similar impediment to clear expression of sophistic or philosophical ideas. Furthermore, while Sopolis may not explicitly commend the Attic prose of Plato and Thucydides as models for good Greek, as Lycinus does, as far as Lycinus is concerned the treatment Sopolis administers will make Lexiphanes more receptive to a nuanced appreciation of ancient Attic rather than inoculating him from it. While "Sopolis" need not necessarily be an analogue for Galen himself, if the medicament he delivers represents the curative effects of a more critical

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[59] Johnson (2010) 75-80.
[60] Baldwin (1973), Swain (1996).
[61] Sopolis refers at §21 to a number of Lexiphanes' hyper-Attic usages for which he himself was not present in this dialogue, implying that the characters' relationship extends beyond this dialogue into the fictional world in which it is set.
[62] *De alimentorum facultatibus* 584, e.g.; Swain (1996) 59; cf. Phryn. *Ecl*. 18 criticizing contemporary medical usage.

approach to Atticism, then this fictional doctor appears at least to belong to the same camp as the well-known historical physician.

The company that Lexiphanes keeps also adds to the character of the Atticism this work is intended to lampoon. At *Lex*. 9, he and Callicles are joined in the bath by three other (uninvited) figures: the litigious Megalonymus, the freedman (or perhaps ex-convict or prisoner-of-war) now goldsmith Chaereas,[63] and the Eudemus the fighter.[64] None of these characters would seem to belong in elite or even polite company, given their undistinguished backgrounds in *βαναυσία*, yet they converse in the same dense Attic that Lexiphanes himself employs. One explanation for this incongruity between low-class characters and high-register language is that Lucian has made Lexiphanes a deficient writer who does not command Greek prose well enough to distinguish characters by different varieties of the language. Another explanation could be that the incessant hyper-Atticism of all the characters in this ersatz "Symposium" is intended to assimilate Lexiphanes and Callicles to these working-class characters. Despite their Attic speech pattern, they have not distinguished themselves from *hoi polloi* who can apparently affect similar speech just as easily.

A third interpretation emerges from a more direct engagement with the sources Lexiphanes (and Lucian, generally) employs to generate the "Attic" dialect at issue in this dialogue. One can resolve the striking and perhaps problematic scene of these low-class, banaustic characters speaking the dense Attic of Lexiphanes' imagination by considering that the *Lexiphanes* is specifically meant to evoke Old Comedy scenes of self-important pseudo-intellectuals, like the residents of Socrates' Phrontisterion in the *Clouds*, and simple-minded, clueless everymen such as Strepsiades in *Clouds* or Dicaeopolis in the *Acharnians*. As mentioned

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[63] He is *κατὰ νώτου ποικίλος*—in other words, his back has multi-colored scars from repeated whippings. cf. Harmon (1962) 305.
[64] He is *ὠτοκάταξις*, "broken-eared" i.e. with cauliflower ears from boxing and/or wrestling.

above, a great deal of the Attic vocabulary employed in this work comes from Aristophanes. This preference for Old Comedy sources parallels the interest of contemporary lexicographers, as discussed in the previous chapter, and thus helps *Lexiphanes* to work as a parody of Atticist pedantry. The combination of Old Comedy vocabulary and buffoonish, arguably comic characters creates the impression that, whereas Lexiphanes may have set out to write a Platonic dialogue, he has in fact written himself into an Aristophanic farce. At any rate, he certainly sounds much more like Aristophanes' version of Socrates than like Plato's. The names of the characters who appear in Lucian's work reinforce this connection with Old Comedy, because "Lexiphanes" (Λεξιφάνης), "Lycinus" (Λυκῖνος), and "Sopolis" (Σώπολις) each—and, obviously, assembled together—echo the names of the canonical Old Comedy trio of Aristophanes (Ἀριστοφάνης), Cratinus (Κρατῖνος), and Eupolis (Εὔπολις). Lucian's decision to name his characters in this way amounts to nothing less than a (thinly) veiled citation of Old Comedy as inspiration for this work and indicates that the *Lexiphanes* relies on Old Comedy for more than just its selection of vocabulary. This strain of interpretation requires a fuller discussion to properly explore the possibilities it raises, and a later section of this chapter will investigate it in depth.

The overall impression we get from the *Lexiphanes* is that Atticized language is not clearly necessary–and obviously insufficient, on its own—for the creation and maintenance of intellectual discourse, just as the form of a work entitled *Symposium* suggests a level of philosophical content that the reader never actually sees. Likewise, the problems with Lexiphanes' language demonstrate his failure to engage with Greek literature, his eagerness to jump headlong into lengthy composition without developing any expertise beyond an array of Attic words and phrases which he has learned without knowing their original context. As mentioned above, previous scholarship on the *Lexiphanes* suggests that Lucian drew the title character's vocabulary from one or more contemporary Attic lexica. It is likely that he drew

further inspiration from them as well, either mocking the overall lexicographic projects of his predecessors and contemporaries or recognizing the comic possibilities of a pseudo-intellectual whose only training in Attic literature comes secondhand via their works. Lexiphanes himself may not represent a real person, but as an allegorical figure he offers a sense of one possible, comic future resulting from the rise of lexicography and grammatology as ends unto themselves rather than as ancillary fields to the understanding and creation of sophistic literary works. This work also offers a valuable counterpoint to the *Solecist*, because while in that piece both pseudo- and hyper-Atticist forms of Greek are being mocked, in the *Lexiphanes* Lucian explores the ways in which the two are complementary, reciprocal, and even identical. Lucian's vision of what real Attic Greek expertise ought to look like is explicitly articulated only in brief outline by Lycinus at the very end, but the entire work functions as a negative example to suggest that the right way to read and write Greek lies in doing everything that Lexiphanes does not. The use of a negative example to convey Attic ideology figures even more prominently into the next work under consideration, where an entire philosophy of bad Atticism is laid out; in the case of *Lexiphanes*, however, the hapless title figure is so ignorant of good Atticism that he has no basis yet from which to work out any systematic approach. He simply throws words at the page in the hope that they will stick.

3.3 The Professor of Rhetoric

In the *Professor of Rhetoric* (*Rhetorum praeceptor* or *RP*), a third kind of supposedly deficient Attic ideology comes into Lucian's sights. The *Solecist* targets both the under- and over-specification of Attic rules, and the *Lexiphanes* takes aim at misguided, uninformed hyper-Atticism; the *RP*, conversely, has in view an ideology of willful pseudo-Atticism that is more harshly and ironically condemned than either of the other two. In outlining his rhetorical program, the titular professor makes a number of suggestions about clothing, footwear, affect, and other

non-verbal techniques to assist in the performance of speeches. It is understood, therefore, that rhetoric is a type of public performance reliant on many skills besides the command of language it nominally encompasses. The present study will concern itself only with the components of rhetorical instruction that articulate a language ideology, as these will provide the most relevant comparisons with the other Lucianic works. Among the many points of divergence that distinguish the ideology at play in this work from those of *Lex.* and *Sol*., the most determinative is the way the lazy rhetorician articulates the relationship between himself, his audience, and both sides' knowledge of Attic usage. At *RP* 15, for example, the professor recommends the following to his prospective pupil: *Κόμιζε τοίνυν τὸ μέγιστον μὲν τὴν ἀμαθίαν, εἶτα θράσος, ἐπὶ τούτοις δὲ τόλμαν καὶ ἀναισχυντίαν* (Well then, preserve ignorance first and foremost, then confidence, and to these add boldness and shamelessness). The fourth point is picked up at *RP* 17: *ἂν σολοικίσῃς δὲ ἢ βαρβαρίσῃς, ἓν ἔστω φάρμακον ἡ ἀναισχυντία* (and should you commit a solecism or a barbarism, let your one remedy be shamelessness), but the proposed rhetorical project relies most heavily on ignorance. This aspect is clarified at several points, including just before in §17:

> *μέτει δὲ ἀπόρρητα*[65] *καὶ ξένα ῥήματα, σπανιάκις ὑπὸ τῶν πάλαι εἰρημένα, καὶ ταῦτα συμφορήσας ἀποτόξευε προχειριζόμενος εἰς τοὺς προσομιλοῦντας.*[66] *οὕτω γάρ σε ὁ λεὼς ὁ πολὺς ἀποβλέψονται καὶ θαυμαστὸν ὑπολήψονται καὶ τὴν παιδείαν ὑπὲρ αὐτούς …*
>
> Dredge up unspoken and strange words, seldom uttered by the ancients, and when you have gathered these keep them at hand to let loose at the assembled masses. For in this way the great crowd will look on in awe and consider you to be wondrous and beyond them in your education…

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[65] This word can also mean "unspeakable", a punning double entendre, or "secret", in the sense of initiating the addressee into a sort of rhetoricians' mystery cult; cf. Zweimüller (2008) 309. In addition, it is speciously homophonous with *ἀπορέω/ἀπορία*, a connection suggested by the explicitly stated intent of using these words to confuse an audience.

[66] Zweimüller (2008) 325: when this word is used in Plato it has a markedly derogatory connotation, which highlights the contemptuous attitude on the Professor's part towards his audience.

The irony of a sophistic text's recommending a student to focus on ignorance is obvious enough, but such advice should not be dismissed as too outlandish to be real—it is a caricature based, presumably, on Lucian's own perception of the kind of rhetorical training this work satirizes.

Historical practices in rhetorical training may indeed lie behind this satiric representation, as Raffaella Cribiore has suggested.[67] The traditional view of rhetoric is of a discipline that requires many years to master, embodied in the famous *chreia*—attributed to Isocrates and others[68]—asserting that the roots of education are bitter, but its fruits are sweet.[69] Evidence from Libanius, Hermogenes, and other Imperial Greek rhetoricians, however, suggests some training methods that in a certain light amount to expedient short-cuts without the intellectual rigor of traditional rhetorical training.[70] Whereas the real-life inspirations for this figure (whoever they may be—see the discussion below) may have presented themselves as serious educators, the *RP* reimagines the Professor saying about his own program what his historical detractors (Lucian naturally among them) must have said about the kind of teaching he provided. This work, Craig Gibson has observed, represents therefore an inversion of the established *chreia* and is in essence a satire of the rhetorical *progymnasmata* devoted to creating arguments based upon that saying.[71] The advice is not for one to acquire real education (*παιδεία*), but instead to give the impression—

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[67] Cribiore (2007) 71..

[68] *Ὁ Ἰσοκράτης ἔφησε τῆς παιδείας τὴν μὲν ῥίζαν εἶναι πικρὰν, τὸν δὲ καρπὸν γλυκύν.* (Libanius, *Progymnasmata* 3.3); variants include *Δημοσθένης τὴν μὲν ῥίζαν τῆς παιδείας ἔφη εἶναι πικράν, τοὺς δὲ καρποὺς γλυκεῖς* (Antonius Melissae), *Τῆς παιδείας ἔφη [ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης] τὰς μὲν ῥίζας εἶναι πικράς, τὸν δὲ καρπὸν γλυκύν*. (Diog. Laert. *Vit. phil*. 5.18)

[69] Raina (2001) 104-5 also observes that a similar assertion from Hesiod, *Op*. 289-92, is belied by Hesiod's own claims to inspiration from the Muses that make him sound more like the *techne*-less Ion (of Plato's dialogue) than a skilled verbal artist. Baldwin (1973) 26n25 also suggests Favorinus (discussed below) is assimilated to Ion in *Symposium* 40, for similar reasons.

[70] Cribiore (2007) 79-83.

[71] Gibson (2012) 92-3: "Lucian seems to have begun by asking, 'What would the exact opposite of the recommended rhetorical education look like?' … [he] inverts the *chreia*'s of Hesiod, Epicharmus, and Homer. He makes the proponents of the short road argue that Hesiod and Epicharmus are wrong about the causal connection between hard work and success; that Hesiod is a hypocrite who did not take his own advice; and that a Homeric tag about unworked land nevertheless producing bountiful yields is a good motto for the aspiring rhetor."

δόξα[72]—of education to an audience that lacks it.[73] Because this impression is conveyed primarily through Atticism, it is worth taking the time to dissect the features of the Atticist ideology being caricatured here.

First, this version of Atticism relies primarily on vocabulary, described at *RP* 16:

> …πεντεκαίδεκα ἢ οὐ πλείω γε τῶν εἴκοσιν Ἀττικὰ ὀνόματα ἐκλέξας ποθὲν ἀκριβῶς ἐκμελετήσας, πρόχειρα ἐπ' ἄκρας τῆς γλώττης ἔχε—τὸ ἄττα καὶ κᾷτα καὶ μῶν καὶ ἀμηγέπη καὶ λῷστε καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα, —καὶ ἐν ἅπαντι λόγῳ καθάπερ τι ἥδυσμα ἐπίπαττε αὐτῶν.
>
> …pick out fifteen or at most twenty Attic words from whatever source, memorize them thoroughly, and keep them ready on the tip if your tongue—'whichsoever' and 'thennext' and 'prithee' and 'somewhat' and 'sirrah' and the like—and sprinkle them in every speech just like a seasoning.

The specific vocabulary recommended has ample attestation in even the most narrowly defined Attic canon[74], but the manner of using them receives no attention. There is no indication given that Attic Greek could be distinguished by its grammatical constructions, idioms, or logical structures.[75] Such things would, presumably, require too much actual learning to master for them to fall within the purview of the course in rhetoric being described here. In fact this caricature of Atticism is, in its second respect, marked by a disregard for any sort of organized construction or diction, with the advice *μελέτω δὲ μηδὲν τῶν ἄλλων, εἰ ἀνόμοια τούτοις καὶ ἀσύμφυλα καὶ ἀπῳδά* (but give no heed to the other [words], if they are dissimilar to these and incompatible and unharmonious, *RP* 16). Third, great emphasis is placed on the usage of rare words, described as *ἀπόρρητα καὶ ξένα ῥήματα, σπανιάκις ὑπὸ τῶν πάλαι εἰρημένα* (unspoken and strange words, seldom uttered by those in former times; *RP* 17).

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[72] A word with positive, negative, and neutral connotations in Lucian but quite clearly set up as the antithesis to genuine excellence in this work; cf. Raina (2008).
[73] Whitmarsh (2005) 45: this approach to rhetoric is "calculated, but fundamentally ignorant and pretentious".
[74] Authors that even Phrynichus unreservedly holds as *dokimoi*—such as Aristophanes (ἄττα: 8, κᾷτα: 37, μῶν: 36, ἀμηγέπη: 1, λῷστε: 0) or Plato (ἄττα: 129, κᾷτα: 3, μῶν: 87, ἀμηγέπη: 0, λῷστε: 5).
[75] As distinct from the various solecisms in the *Solecist*, where the syntax is at issue much more than the vocabulary.

This last point would seem to mark a clear break from the lexicographic tradition, for both the narrow definition of Atticism seen in Phrynichus and its broader form in the Antiatticist rely on consistent attestation. Phrynichus, it should be remembered, was not content to consider a word valid Attic simply on the basis of its usage by Demosthenes or Sophocles if it occurred only once or only in a poetic passage. Likewise, when the Antiatticist argues on behalf of words and expressions that Phrynichus and others dismiss he does so by adducing further evidence of their usage. Even more egregiously out of line with sound practice, however, is this fourth piece of advice: *ἐνίοτε δὲ καὶ αὐτὸς ποίει καινὰ καὶ ἀλλόκοτα ὀνόματα καὶ νομοθέτει τὸν μὲν ἑρμηνεῦσαι δεινὸν "εὔλεξιν" καλεῖν, τὸν συνετὸν "σοφόνουν," τὸν ὀρχηστὴν δὲ "χειρίσοφον."* (And sometimes you should even craft fresh and unusual words and apply them to call one who is clever at interpretation *eulexis* [well-speeched], one who is insightful *sophonoun* [wiseminded], and a dancer *cheirisophon* [handwise], *RP* 17). Quintilian may have approved of judicious neologism by analogy provided the meaning was transparent to an average listener, but *ἀλλόκοτα ὀνόματα* do not lend themselves to clear argumentation. Moreover, as shown in the previous chapter the overwhelming preference among prescriptive, descriptive, Atticist, and Hellenist sources alike is for words supported by evidence of actual usage—be it ancient or current, Athenian or Pan-Hellenic.[76] Finally, the fifth characteristic of the Professor's pseudo-Attic ideology is its callous anti-antiquarian and anti-literary preference: *ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀναγίγνωσκε τὰ παλαιὰ μὲν μὴ σύ γε, μηδὲ εἴ τι ὁ λῆρος Ἰσοκράτης ἢ ὁ χαρίτων ἄμοιρος Δημοσθένης ἢ ὁ ψυχρὸς Πλάτων, ἀλλὰ τοὺς τῶν ὀλίγον πρὸ ἡμῶν λόγους καὶ ἅς φασι ταύτας μελέτας* (But also, do not study the ancients at all—not that trifling Isocrates nor that graceless Demosthenes nor that frigid

[76] Lexiphanes, it should be remembered, is guilty of both crimes, e.g. §24: *ῥῆμα ἔκφυλον εὕρῃς ἢ αὐτὸς πλασάμενος*

Plato—but rather study the speeches of those a little before our time, and those which they call exercises [*meletas*], *RP* 17).

To summarize: The Professor recommends a version of Attic marked by distinctive, rare, obscure, or even made-up vocabulary, with no regard for how the words fit together logically or tonally, and inspired not by fifth- and fourth-century BCE Athenian literature but first- and second century CE school-texts. He also advises giving speeches in this pseudo-Attic register to crowds whom the rhetor knows to be ignorant in Attic language and style, and if ever caught using deficient Attic, to be shameless in directing accusations of ignorance back at their accusers. The Professor's brand of Attic displays certain parallels with that of the hapless Lexiphanes: preference for rare, obscure, vocabulary and the repetition thereof without regard for context; freedom to employ neologisms (even, or especially, when constructed on unsound analogy); ignorance of the ancient literature from which the prestige of Attic speech comes; reliance on the approval of an audience ignorant of good linguistic practice.[77] Such points of similarity have led others to consider this piece a reworking of the same basic theme.[78]

However the two works differ noticeably in two key respects: whereas Lexiphanes speaks the way he writes, the Professor in *RP*—with the exception of his opening "*Μῶν σε, ὦγαθέ*" (*RP* 13)—does not speak in the pseudo-Attic rhetorical style he proposes to teach the addressee of the work.[79] In a related fashion, Lexiphanes' speech attaches great or indeed excessive prestige to

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[77] cf. *Lex.* 17: ὑπὸ μὲν τῶν ἀνοήτων ἐπαινούμενον ἀγνοούντων ἃ πάσχεις, ὑπὸ δὲ τῶν πεπαιδευμένων εἰκότως
ἐλεούμενον (…[you are] on the one hand praised by senseless audiences who do not know what you suffer from, but on the other hand are rightly pitied by educated ones). Zweimüller (2008) 312: "…die attischen Vokabeln wie Schlagwörter wirken, die den ungebildeteren Zuhörern die Rede sofort als attisch ausweisen" (the Attic vocabulary works as key-words, which to the uneducated audience of the speech pass for Attic language).
[78] Croiset (1882) 258; Sakalis (1979) 13.
[79] Zweimüller (2008) 315: So befolgt er die Regeln des Attizismus gegen aussen, sozusagen im Ernstfall, wo sie dem Ansehen nützlich sind, im 'privaten' Gespräch mit seinem Schüler aber--dass wir sein Schauspiel mitverfolgen, ist ihm ja nicht bewusst--braucht er seine Tricks nicht anzuwenden und kann auf

antiquity—as Lycinus says, *ἡμᾶς τοὺς νῦν προσομιλοῦντας καταλιπὼν πρὸ χιλίων ἐτῶν ἡμῖν διαλέγεται* (he leaves us, his interlocutors, behind and speaks to us from a thousand years ago, §20)[80]—in spite of his failure to engage meaningfully with the ancient literature itself. In contrast, as mentioned above the Professor has little use for it and the author's obvious esteem for ancient sources makes the professor all the more unlikeable for his disregard.[81] This fundamental distinction between similarly-themed works underscores the difference in ideology between the two targets of satire. While both the Professor and Lexiphanes advocate forms of Atticism that Lucian's audience is meant to understand are deficient, the latter has dived so deeply into enthusiastically misguided hyper-Atticism that he can, so to speak, no longer see the forest for the trees. In contrast the former has cynically kept his distance and expended the absolute minimum effort needed to acquire a veneer of Atticism—and even then, only in performance[82]—while having no interest in creating authentic Attic rhetorical works. In short Lexiphanes crams as many obscure, archaic, Baroque-sounding words as he possibly can into both his text and his everyday speech, while the Professor advocates employing as few as are necessary to lend an Attic flavor to a speech that ultimately relies for the most part on the nonverbal aspects of its performance.[83]

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den besonders attizisierenden Klang der Sprache verzichten. (So he adheres to the rules of Atticism on the outside in cases of emergency, so to speak, where his reputation is at stake, but in private conversation with his student—he is not aware that we [readers] are watching—he does not need to employ his 'tricks' and can abandon the markedly Atticizing tone of speech).

[80] The *Demonax* features a similar remark at §26: ἑνὶ γοῦν ἐρωτηθέντι ὑπ' αὐτοῦ λόγον τινὰ καὶ ὑπεραττικῶς ἀποκριθέντι, Ἐγὼ μέν σε,ἔφη, ὦ ἑταῖρε, νῦν ἠρώτησα, σὺ δέ μοι ὡς ἐπ' Ἀγαμέμνονος ἀποκρίνῃ. (In any case, to one who was asked a question by him and answered in a hyper-Attic fashion, [Demonax] said "I asked you just now, friend, but you reply to me as if in the time of Agamemnon.") Gellius' representation of Favorinus also features a noticeable anti-antiquarian streak, at *NA* 1.10: *tu…proinde quasi cum matre Evandri nunc loquere, sermone abhinc multis annis iam desito uteris* (you talk now just as if with Evander's mother, you employ speech now fallen out of use lo these many years).

[81] Raina (2001) 108-9.

[82] He is in other words the kind of orator whom German scholarship labels a *Konzertredner*—a concert-orator, who puts on a show as entertainment for an audience. cf. Branham (1989) 3.

[83] Hall (1981) 286n49.

The *Rhetorum Praeceptor* has, like the *Solecist* and *Lexiphanes*, invited readers to imagine not merely the school(s) of rhetoric but the specific person Lucian may have in mind in creating this caricature of a sophist-rhetor. Lucian bestows the Professor with a tantalizing set of biographical details, which suggest he may have in mind a specific person rather than a generic type.[84] These details include the background on his family at §11 and his *cursus vitae* at §24, for example, neither of which are provided to Lexiphanes. A number of possible contemporaries have emerged, with Julius Pollux the leading candidate owing to the Professor's reference at §24 to the name he has made for himself through rhetoric: *πρῶτον μὲν οὐκέτι Ποθεινὸς ὀνομάζομαι, ἀλλ' ἤδη τοῖς Διὸς καὶ Λήδας παισὶν ὁμώνυμος γεγένημαι.* (first and foremost I am no longer called 'desirous', but have now taken on the same name as the offspring of Zeus and Leda).[85] Appealing on its face, this interpretation faces criticism in more recent scholarship[86] for a number of reasons: the straightforward observation that *τοῖς Διὸς καὶ Λήδας παισὶν* could refer to someone named "Castor" just as easily as it could to the second-century lexicographer and rhetorician from Naucratis;[87] the more involved philological conclusion that the usages mocked in *RP* are not present in Pollux's *Onomasticon*;[88] the speculative nature of Pollux's reconstructed relationships

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[84] Russo (1997) 212.
[85] Russo (1997) 213n9; cf. Croiset (1899), Wright (1921), Schmid (1924), Bompaire (1958), Jones (1972), Rothe (1989), Follet (1994).
[86] Weissenberger (1997) 42-3, who despite his focus on *Lexiphanes* addresses this work as part of the larger discussion on identification of contemporary figures in Lucian.
[87] Hemsterhuys (1706) identifies this problem in his early edition of the text and notes that Horace (i.a.) associates himself with the Dioscuri as well—it is a literary convention that need not be any kind of hidden naming of Lucian's enemy; see also the discussion above on *φίλαγρος* in the *Lexiphanes*.
[88] Russo (1997) 22.

with contemporaries;[89] the point that the Professor's biography in the *RP* directly contradicts known facts of Julius Pollux's life[90].

This prosopographical argument makes the least compelling case, given Lucian's practice—his default—of blending together multiple characters, narratives, images, and other elements. The same issue arises when addressing other historical analogues suggested by events in the Professor's life story, such as Apuleius' silver-tongued seduction of a wealthy widow in the *Apology* and a comparable act at *RP* 24-5.[91] The sequence of events is different in Apuleius (he used his rhetorical skill to secure the marriage, while the Professor became a rhetor only after he married) and Giuseppe Russo argues that this discrepancy should invalidate the comparison[92]. However, it is entirely conceivable for Lucian to have changed a few crucial details in creating this fictionalized version, especially in the interests of creating plausible deniability when attacking an influential contemporary figure. Russo himself suggests that the Professor may represent Hadrian of Tyre (whom Jones identifies as Lucian's target in *Mistaken Critic*, a view Russo accepts), and if any prosopographical investigation must be given credence it is probably this one. Russo points to some aspects of Hadrian's speech, related by Philostratus, that resemble the deficient rhetoric and language lampooned in *RP*: his dense, rapid speech that was difficult for audiences to follow (*VS* 90.23, cf. *RP* 20), his willingness to sacrifice logical structure for the sake of dazzling impact (*VS* 94.24, cf. *RP* 18), or his being known for his remarkable gait (*βάδισμα*) and voice (*φθέγμα*).[93] He also points out that while Pollux's great success came after

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[89] As discussed in the previous chapter, the influential work of Naechster (1908) has for the most part been overturned by later work on Pollux, Phrynichus, and their contemporaries; cf. Fischer (1974), Tribulato (2014), Janiszewski et al. (2015).
[90] Julius Pollux was the son of a well-known orator, in contrast to the Professor's father who lives in obscure poverty; Pollux also did not attain his greatest fame until shortly after Lucian's time, in the reign of Commodus.
[91] Gil (1982).
[92] Russo (1997) 214-5.
[93] Russo (1997) 217.

Lucian's time, when Commodus appointed him chair of rhetoric at Athens, Hadrian was most likely the leading figure in Athenian rhetorical circles during the phase of Lucian's career preceding his move to Egypt.[94] If Lucian's satiric goal here is to beat back against the undeserved reputation of pseudointellectuals and show why they do not deserve the title "sophist"—which it nearly always is—then a current celebrity would be a much more suitable target than a potential future star like Pollux.

The above discussions nevertheless beg the question by assuming that the Professor must be a contemporary figure who could have read the work and felt Lucian's profound insult. Maude Gleason observes that Lucian's characterization of the Professor could be retrojected onto Favorinus but dismisses as anachronistic the possibility that Lucian has Favorinus in mind, given that Favorinus' dates place him into an earlier generation.[95] Favorinus appears in several places in Lucian's corpus, and while none of the references amounts to more than an offhanded remark[96] they are not, as some studies imply[97], limited to jokes about his sexually ambiguous features. Lucian does not present Favorinus in a positive light but the few mentions he receives have as much to do with his fame (*εὐδοκιμήσας*) and his lack of authentic expertise as it does with his laughable appearance or affect. Furthermore, Lucian was indeed—for a time at least—a contemporary of Favorinus, given that the latter died c. 150 CE when Lucian was in his thirties and already active in his career.[98] Finally, the considerable attention that Phrynichus devotes to

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[94] Russo (1997) 220-1.
[95] Gleason (1995) 129.
[96] Luc. *Eun*. 7: *τις Ἀκαδημαϊκὸς εὐνοῦχος ἐκ Κελτῶν ὀλίγον πρὸ ἡμῶν εὐδοκιμήσας ἐν τοῖς Ἕλλησιν*. (A certain eunuch Academic of the Celts, who achieved fame a bit before our time). Also *Dem*. 12, where Demonax remarks that he is qualified to censure Favorinus' compositions because he is «Ἄνθρωπος...οὐκ εὐαπάτητα ἔχων τὰ ὦτα» (A man possessing ears that are not easily deceived) and has the philosophical chops that Favorinus lacks; and *Dem*. 13: «Γελοῖόν μοι εἶναι ἔδοξεν, εἰ σὺ ἀπὸ τοῦ πώγωνος ἀχιοῖς κρίνεσθαι τοὺς φιλοσοφοῦντας αὐτὸς πώγωνα οὐκ ἔχων.» (It seemed risible to me that you should think it suitable to judge philosophers by their bears when you yourself have none.)
[97] Baldwin (1973) 11..
[98] *ibid.*

Favorinus' speech (as discussed in the previous chapter and below) along with Favorinus' role as arguably the main character of the Attic Nights (discussed in the next chapter) indicates that, though he may have passed away more than a generation before, Favorinus was still relevant in Antonine literary circles. As a result, one may indeed take seriously the possibility that the title character is based in part at least on Favorinus—either the man himself, or the style of rhetoric for which he and his imitators were known.

Gleason's study of Favorinus does not employ Phrynichus as a source, and this omission is striking in view of the attention Favorinus receives in his *Ecloga*. In fact, the impression of Favorinus obtained from Phrynichus strongly resembles the Professor of *RP*: he employs Attic words in incorrect senses (*Ecl*. 209), he analogizes forms freely and incorrectly (*Ecl*. 140), his syntax is suspect (*Ecl*. 207) as is his morphology (*Ecl*. 213), he does not use authentic Attic references but instead a much more recent form of the language (*Ecl*. 172, 422)[99] and merely peppers his speech with occasional Atticisms.[100] Each of these features aligns with a recommendation made by the Professor in *RP* and taken together they make the linguistic profile of Favorinus' speeches strongly resemble those of Lucian's character. Likewise, Philostratus' descriptions of Favorinus and his manner of delivering speeches evoke the Professor in many key respects, first and foremost that he "constructed his speech carelessly, but in a learned and pleasing manner" (*Ἥρμοσται δὲ τὴν γλῶτταν ἀνειμένως μέν, σοφῶς δὲ καὶ ποτίμως*, *VS* 491). Philostratus also highlights his theatrical presentation that relied on gestures and movements, his

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[99] A favorable representation of the same preference appears at Gell. *NA*. 1.10 *"tu…proinde quasi cum matre Evandri nunc loquere, sermone abhinc multis annis iam desito uteris*" (you…are talking now just as though with the mother of Evander, you employ speech out of use lo these many years).
[100] Kim (2017) 49, as mentioned earlier, refers to this practice of overlaying an Attic veneer onto a contemporary version of the language as "positive Atticism" in contrast to Phrynichus' "negative" program of excising words and usages from other dialects or later periods.

tendency to dazzle audiences rather than engage them intellectually, and above all the remarkable anecdote that his speeches were frequently enjoyed by those who knew no Greek:[101]

> Διαλεγομένου δὲ αὐτοῦ κατὰ τὴν Ῥώμην μεστὰ ἦν σπουδῆς πάντα, καὶ γὰρ δὴ καὶ ὅσοι τῆς Ἑλλήνων φωνῆς ἀξύνετοι ἦσαν, οὐδὲ τούτοις ἀφ᾽ ἡδονῆς ἡ ἀκρόασις ἦν, ἀλλὰ κἀκείνους ἔθελγε τῇ τε ἠχῇ τοῦ φθέγματος καὶ τῷ σημαίνοντι τοῦ βλέμματος καὶ τῷ ῥυθμῷ τῆς γλώττης. ἔθελγε δὲ αὐτοὺς τοῦ λόγου καὶ τὸ ἐπὶ πᾶσιν, ὃ ἐκεῖνοι μὲν ᾠδὴν ἐκάλουν, ἐγὼ δὲ φιλοτιμίαν, ἐπειδὴ τοῖς ἀποδεδειγμένοις ἐφυμνεῖται. (*VS* 491-2)
>
> And when he gave speeches at Rome, there was universal interest in them, for indeed even those who were ignorant of the language of the Greeks had no less enjoyable an experience listening, rather he would charm them too by the sound of his voice and by the expression of his face and the rhythm of his speech. And he would also charm them with the epilogue of his speech, which they used to call the "Ode" but I consider to be showboating, when one sings on after the arguments have been proven logically.

While the Professor of Rhetoric need not represent Favorinus specifically, Favorinus is as likely a candidate as any other to be the archetype of which the Professor is a biting caricature.

Lucian's real accomplishment in writing the *Rhetorum Praeceptor* is to lay out a linguistic ideology objectionable to virtually every ancient author with an opinion on the subject. It is certainly true that some of the ancient lexicographers (Moeris or Pollux, e.g.) assemble words without offering much guidance as to their usage. One could, therefore, use the *Onomasticon* to compose a work in line with the Professor's recommendations by picking a few words under each subject heading and inserting them (however inaccurately) as synonyms for mundane Hellenistic terms.[102] Those authors whose sole aim is to assemble vocabulary for preservation may therefore offer fewer clues as to what their relationship with this work might be—but that is not to say that the absence of a clear dogma might make an author receptive to the Professor's treatment of Greek. Even the most radically Skeptic approach to language, such as that outlined by Sextus Empiricus, would never license a usage of language that produced such purposefully opaque and anti-pragmatic expressions. The Epicurean reply to the Professor would be similar, given that he

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[101] A feature Philostratus, *VS* 488 and 589 also assigns to the speeches of Hadrian of Tyre.
[102] Weissenberger (1996) 74.

recommends words with no empirical basis for their application. Conversely, the rationalizing Stoic grammarians would no doubt retch at the recommendation to discard fundamental rules and principles for the sake of expediency. Perhaps most obviously, the exponents of antiquarian ideology—whether the extremists caricatured by Athenaeus in the form of Ulpian, or the more moderate group epitomized by the Antiatticist—could never support the willful disregard for ancient sources or the arbitrary coinage of new vocabulary (let alone deliberate misrepresentation of its provenance).

In his anti-intellectual, even nihilist construction of Greek rhetoric, the Professor represents a perversion of any and all approaches to philosophy of language. As with Lexiphanes, the Professor is a negative example who points the way towards Lucian's positive vision of Attic rhetoric—as long as one does the opposite of everything he recommends, that is. Because of its universal unacceptability the Professor's ideology can be construed as an absurdly reductive representation or cynically dark mirror of any real one, and by that same token, while numerous historical figures supply plausible real-world models for this character, the *Professor of Rhetoric* can readily be pointed at several different targets. Ultimately the Professor is the perfect *alazon* owing to his total self-awareness, a feature sorely lacking in Lexiphanes or the Pseudo-Sophist of the *Solecist*. His character, for all that prosopographic studies of this work can find historical parallels to him, draws from an established literary type reaching as far back as Old Comedy. As discussed above in regard to the *Lexiphanes*, the Old Comedy plays of Aristophanes and his contemporaries supply a great deal of the Attic vocabulary for Second Sophistic lexicographers, but Lucian puts Old Comic themes and characters to work in more thoroughly engaging and innovative ways than those contemporaries who mostly rely on them to lend an Attic flavor to their language. It is time, therefore, to address this subject more fully and explore how the

Professor, Lexiphanes, and other language users (or abusers) fit into Lucian's adaptation of the Classical literary tradition.

3.4 Old Comedy and Language Play in Lucian

In the discussion of 3.3 on *Lexiphanes,* several points of contact with Aristophanes and Old comedy emerge, and here they will receive a fuller treatment in dialogue with other works of Lucian as well. The case for an Old Comedic and potentially Aristophanic model behind *Lexiphanes* finds support in analyses of the distinctive vocabulary the title character employs. While Lexiphanes purposes to create a Platonic symposium and cast himself as an intellectual, the plurality of the words he uses to mark his speech as hyper-Atticized appears to derive from Old Comedy.[103] Bompaire remarks that this genre preserves, better than others, a range of both concrete and rare vocabulary no longer in use in the post-Classical period—hence Lexiphanes' apparent preference for Old Comedy words and phrases.[104] Of these, the majority are found in Aristophanes , and several are found only in that corpus—though this Aristophanic impression is likely to result more from the bias created by a lack of extant plays by (e.g.) Eupolis, Cratinus, et al. available to twenty-first century scholarship than from an intention to foreground Aristophanes at the expense of his contemporaries.[105] Plutarch, for example, shows an obvious preference for

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[103] Even his obtuse neologisms, such as *ἀρτιγραφής, δελφινίζειν τὸ ψυχοβραφές κάρα, θερμοτραγέω, κρυψιμετρός, ῥησιμετρεῖν*, etc. are analogized off of Old Comedy vocabulary; cf. Bompaire (1958) 634-6, Hall (1981) 283.

[104] Bompaire (1958) 634: "Enfin la catégorie la plus abondante est celle des emprunts à la comédie, dont les textes offraient, mieux conservés que dans d'autres genres, tout un vocabulaire à la fois concret et rare, le plus souvent disparu depuis l'epoque classique."

[105] There is evidence that Cratinus and Eupolis were known from complete texts and extended excerpts, rather than the fragments transmitted by lexica vel sim., into the period under discussion. Bowie (2007) 33 summarizes the general state of Old Comedy thus: "educated Greeks…were aware what Old Comedy was, knew that Aristophanes, along with Cratinus and Eupolis, was one of its major exponents, and had read enough, whether in complete texts or anthologies, to quote, to refer to, and to recognize the titles of plays and lines from all of them." Furthermore, Old Comedy's twenty-first century state of preservation implies Aristophanes' universally accepted primacy, but at least one quote from Macrobius (*notus est omnibus Eupolis*; *Sat.* 7.5.8) would seem to imply that he assumed Eupolis was the more popular.

Aristophanes by his omission of any reference to the other two famous authors, but this preference is exceptional[106] and not clearly shared by Lucian. Whether or not the *Lexiphanes* is intended to evoke Aristophanes especifically or Old Comedy more broadly, apart from a handful of distinctly Platonic affectations, such as *ἦ δ' ὅς/ ἦν δ'ἐγώ* and *ἄττα*, more of Lexiphanes' key words (as identified by Bompaire) occur in Aristophanes than in other major dramatists or in Plato.[107]

A small but robust collection of studies has addressed the evidence for Aristophanic influence on Lucian, who makes no secret of his debt to comedy and is perhaps uniquely free among Imperial authors in thoroughly acknowledging it.[108] He refers to his project, or at least the version he represents in *You're a Prometheus in Words* (5), as *τὸ ἐκ δυοῖν τοῖν καλλίστοιν συγκεῖσθαι, διαλόγου καὶ κωμῳδίας* (being composed of the two fairest [genres], dialogue and comedy), for example, and *True History* 1.25 contains an extended if oblique reference to Aristophanes *Clouds*. In *Against the Uneducated Book-Collector*, Lucian remarks on the inclusion of Aristophanes and Eupolis in the title character's library and then challenges his knowledge of their works. In *Double Indictment*, Lucian adapts a quotation from Aristophanes *Clouds* (and the name of his play) when Dialogue describes itself as follows: *με σεμνὸν τέως ὄντα καὶ θεῶν τε πέρι καὶ φύσεως καὶ τῆς τῶν ὅλων περιόδου σκοπούμενον, ὑψηλὸν ἄνω που τῶν νεφῶν ἀεροβατοῦντα* (me, serious as I was thus far, and making consideration about the gods and nature and the passage of the universe, walking high aloft somewhere among the clouds, 33).[109] By making Dialogue—who claims Lucian has defiled it by combining it with Comedy—speak

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[106] Marshall (2016) 133.
[107] See Appendix C.3 for a table of these usages and their sources.
[108] This suggestion comes from Hawkins and Marshall (2016) 15, in reference to *Prometheus in Words* 5, *True History* 1.25 (citing Aristophanes *Clouds*).
[109] cf. Ar. *Clouds* 225, 1503: *ἀεροβατῶ καὶ περιφρονῶ τὸν ἥλιον*, spoken first by Socrates when he is introduced, then echoed by Strepsiades during his climactic act of arson to demolish the Phrontisterion.

words that immediately recall an Old Comedic work of some six hundred years earlier, Lucian demonstrates how fully intermingled the two genres actually are.[110]

The most important aspect of Old Comedy in Lucian is the way Lucian goes out of his way to redefine the Attic canon against which his own work is to be read—more specifically, to redefine it with Aristophanes and comedy as coequal to Plato and other core elements. The previous chapter's discussion of Phrynichus' *Ecloga* highlighted that work's frequent, disparaging references to Menander and the perceived decline in genuine Attic usage resulting from his popularity in the second century. In their lexica, Phrynichus and other strict Atticists make Aristophanes a key source while sidelining Menander, though Phrynichus (as discussed in Chapter Two) is most emphatic in his practice. Lucian, in contrast, can hardly be said to reject Menander (or other New Comedy) in the way that Phrynichus evidently does—many of his works show clear New Comedy influences, including specific connections to extant works of Menander. A handful of quotations from him, either direct or oblique, appear throughout Lucian's corpus,[111] and Lucian refers to him as part of the literary pantheon in *The Mistaken Critic* (4) and *Alexander or the False Prophet* (34). Furthermore, the *Dialogues of the Courtesans* are fundamentally Menandrian in their subject matter and in the characters who appear in them, providing a clear example of Lucian's reuse of type-characters and scenarios found throughout Menander's plays.[112] Lucian is hardly the only one to use Menander in his literary projects, since other Imperial Greek authors, most notably Plutarch, engage with Menander as part of serious intellectual discussion. Menander was arguably *the* model comic for the elite Greek intellectual community in the Empire, and in fact his name was frequently attached to quotations originally

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[110] Tosello (2016) 61-2. See discussion in Chapter 5 regarding the fuller implications of Dialogue's inadvertent paraphrase of Aristophanes.
[111] *Zeus Rants* 53, from *Epitrepontes; On Salaried Posts* 35, from the lost *Plokion*; *The Ass* 45, from the lost *Hierea*; cf. Karavas and Vix (2014) 188-9.
[112] Karavas and Vix (2014) 189, summarizing Legrand (1907, 1908).

from Euripides.[113] In characteristically Satiric fashion, Lucian's works (especially *On Dance*) also draw inspiration from later Greek and Roman mime, which make up a significant portion of Imperial popular culture and the relatively low status of which readily provides a humorous contrast with his more lofty subjects. But while Menander is not absent from Lucian, he figures less prominently by far than the Old Comedy authors and Aristophanes in particular. The references to Aristophanes and other Old Comedy writers gives the impression, as Tosello puts it, of a deliberate attempt on Lucian's part to "riabilitare la commedia agli occhi dei *pepaideumenoi* e per spiegare l'influenza comica sulla sua opera."[114]

Rosen shares this essential view and points to *Against the Ignorant Book-Collector* as the work best expressing Lucian's regard for Old Comedy as the superior genre, when he interrogates the titular ignoramus thus: *τὸν δὲ Ἀριστοφάνην καὶ τὸν Εὔπολιν ὑποδέδυκας; ἀνέγνως καὶ τοὺς Βάπτας, τὸ δρᾶμα ὅλον; εἶτ' οὐδέν σου τἀκεῖ καθίκετο, οὐδ' ἠρυθρίασας γνωρίσας αὐτά;* (…have you dived into Aristophanes and Eupolis? Did you read the *Baptai*, the entire play? Or did it not affect you at all, did you not blush when you grasped it?)[115] This passage, Rosen argues, shows that it is one thing to read (ἀναγιγνώσκω) a play and another entirely to understand (γνωρίζω) it.[116] The disjunction between these two modes of consuming literature is of course the mechanism upon which the humor of *Lexiphanes* relies, though in that work it is even more conspicuous owing to the ironic contrast between Lexiphanes' extensive knowledge of Attic vocabulary and his intellectually pointless deployment of it. Whereas Phrynichus may have championed Aristophanes as a source of authentic Attic usage and takes great pains to advise

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[113] Theon, *Progymnasmata* 4 e.g. cf. Nervegna (2013) 211-20; Tosello (2016) 56.
[114] Tosello (2016) 66: "…to rehabilitate [Aristophanes'] comedy in the eyes of the [educated elite] and to explain the influence of comedy on his body of work."
[115] Johnson (2010) 167n19: "This last is a dig: the *Baptai* was a comedy that evidently described orgiastic cult in lewd terms (cf. Juvenal 2.91 and scholia ad loc.: see PCG V, s.v. Eupolis, Βάπται, esp. test. ii, p. 331f.)." Presumably anyone who had actually read the *Baptai* would have had a strong reaction to it and display a reaction again when Lucian brings it up.
[116] Rosen (2016) 141-2.

against the kinds of mistakes satirized in *Lexiphanes*, this is not enough for Lucian. Not content to let Aristophanes and company function as repositories for vocabulary, Lucian pushes past the Old Comedic reputation for lewdness (the *Baptai* being the clearest reference) and personal attacks, and employs them as a source for authentic and continuously relevant cultural criticism.[117]

The goal of the present discussion, therefore, should be to identify instances of Aristophanic cultural criticism that engage specifically with the subject of linguistic practice, and which can be plausibly cited in connection with Lucian's satires of the Atticism debates of the Second Sophistic. Two suitable candidates emerge—the vacuous sophistry of Socrates and his "Thinkery" caricatured in *Clouds*, and the bickering between the shades of Aeschylus and Euripides depicted in *Frogs*. The most concentrated set of examples from *Clouds* occurs in the passage of 657-693:

Σω.	ἀλλ' ἕτερα δεῖ σε πρότερα τούτου μανθάνειν,	
	τῶν τετραπόδων ἅττ' ἐστὶν ὀρθῶς ἄρρενα.	
Στ.	ἀλλ' οἶδ' ἔγωγε τἄρρεν', εἰ μὴ μαίνομαι·	(660)
	κριός, τράγος, ταῦρος, κύων, ἀλεκτρυών.	
Σω.	ὁρᾷς ἃ πάσχεις; τήν τε θήλειαν καλεῖς	
	ἀλεκτρυόνα κατὰ ταὐτὸ καὶ τὸν ἄρρενα.	
Στ.	πῶς δή, φέρε;	
Σω.	πῶς; ἀλεκτρυὼν κἀλεκτρυών.	(664)
Στ.	νὴ τὸν Ποσειδῶ. νῦν δὲ πῶς με χρὴ καλεῖν;	
		(665)
Σω.	ἀλεκτρύαιναν, τὸν δ' ἕτερον ἀλέκτορα.	
Στ.	ἀλεκτρύαιναν; εὖ γε, νὴ τὸν Ἀέρα·	
	ὥστ' ἀντὶ τούτου τοῦ διδάγματος μόνου	
	διαλφιτώσω σου κύκλῳ τὴν κάρδοπον.	
Σω.	ἰδοὺ μάλ' αὖθις, τοῦθ' ἕτερον· τὴν κάρδοπον	(670)
	ἄρρενα καλεῖς θήλειαν οὖσαν.	
Στ.	τῷ τρόπῳ;	
		(671)
	ἄρρενα καλῶ 'γὼ κάρδοπον;	(672)
Σω.	μάλιστά γε,	(672)
	ὥσπερ γε καὶ Κλεώνυμον.	(673)

[117] Branham (1989) 14-17 discusses the continuity between Lucian and Aristophanes in a general sense, namely that Aristophanes' works themselves re-use established characters, plots, and imagery to create new comic products; for Lucian to do the same with Aristophanes is therefore a faithful treatment of the earlier author; Branham also discusses (32-4) the way "Old Comedy agonistic and forensic structures" help outline works such as *The Fisherman* and *The Double Indictment*.

Στ. πῶς δή; φράσον. (673)
Σω. ταὐτὸν δύναταί σοι κάρδοπος Κλεωνύμῳ. (674)
Στ. ἀλλ', ὦγάθ', οὐδ' ἦν κάρδοπος Κλεωνύμῳ, (675)
ἀλλ' ἐν θυείᾳ στρογγύλῃ γ' ἀνεμάττετο.
ἀτὰρ τὸ λοιπὸν πῶς με χρὴ καλεῖν;
Σω. ὅπως; (677)
τὴν καρδόπην, ὥσπερ καλεῖς τὴν Σωστράτην. (678)
Στ. τὴν καρδόπην, θήλειαν;
Σω. ὀρθῶς γὰρ λέγεις. (679)
Στ. ἐκεῖνο δ' ἦν ἂν "καρδόπη Κλεωνύμῃ". (680)
Σω. ἔτι δέ γε περὶ τῶν ὀνομάτων μαθεῖν σε δεῖ,
ἅττ' ἄρρεν' ἐστίν, ἅττα δ' αὐτῶν θήλεα.
Στ. ἀλλ' οἶδ' ἔγωγ' ἃ θήλε' ἐστίν.
Σω. εἰπὲ δή. (683)
Στ. Λύσιλλα, Φίλιννα, Κλειταγόρα, Δημητρία. (684)
Σω. ἄρρενα δὲ ποῖα τῶν ὀνομάτων; (685)
Στ. μυρία. (685)
Φιλόξενος, Μελησίας, Ἀμυνίας. (686)
Σω. ἀλλ' ὦ πόνηρε, ταῦτά γ' ἔστ' οὐκ ἄρρενα.
Στ. οὐκ ἄρρεν' ὑμῖν ἐστιν;
Σω. οὐδαμῶς γ', ἐπεὶ (688)
πῶς ἂν καλέσειας ἐντυχὼν Ἀμυνίᾳ; (689)
Στ. ὅπως ἄν; ὠδί· "δεῦρο δεῦρ', Ἀμυνία". (690)
Σω. ὁρᾷς; γυναῖκα τὴν Ἀμυνίαν καλεῖς.
Στ. οὔκουν δικαίως, ἥτις οὐ στρατεύεται;
ἀτὰρ τί ταῦθ' ἃ πάντες ἴσμεν μανθάνω;

So. But you must learn some other matters first:
As, what are males among the quadrupeds.
St. I should be mad indeed not to know that. 660
The Ram, the Bull, the Goat, the Dog, the Fowl.
So. Ah! there you are! there's a mistake at once!
You call the male and female fowl the same [*alektryōn*]
St. How! tell me how.
So. Why fowl and fowl of course.
St. That's true though! what shall I say in future? 665
So. Call one a fowless [*alektryaina*] and the other a fowl.
St. A fowless? Good! Bravo! Bravo! by Air.
Now for that one bright piece of information
I'll give you a barley bumper in your trough.
So. Look there, a fresh mistake; you called it trough, 670
Masculine [*kardopon*] when it's feminine.
St. How, pray?
How did I make it masculine?
So. Why "trough",
Just like "Cleonymus".
St. I don't quite catch it.
So. Why "trough" [*kardopos*], "Cleonymus" [*Kleōnymos*], both masculine.
St. Ah, but Cleonymus has got no trough, 675
His bread is kneaded in a round mortar:
Still, what must I say in future?
So. What! why call it
A "troughess" [*kardopē*], female, just as one says "an actress" [*Sōstratē*].

St. A “troughess”, female?
So. That’s the way to call it.
St. O “troughess” then and Miss Cleonymus. 680
So. Still you must learn some more about these names;
Which are the names of men and which of women.
St. Oh, I know which are women.
So. Well, repeat some.
St. Lysilla, Philinna, Cleitagora, Demetria.
So. Now tell me some men’s names.
St. Oh yes, ten thousand! 685
Philoxenos, Melesias, Amynias.
So. Hold! I said men’s names: these are women’s names.
St. No, no, they’re men’s.
So. They are *not* men’s, for how
Would you address Amynias if you met him?
St. How? somehow thus: “Here, here, Amynia!” 690
So. Amynia! a woman’s name, you see.
St. And rightly too; a sneak who shirks all service!
But all know this: let’s pass to something else.[118]

In this passage, Socrates manipulates Attic vocabulary to create false equivalencies through deliberately mis-applied analogy. One example includes his creation of a neologism *ἀλεκτρύαινα*, “fowless” (666), as a supposed feminine complement to *ἀλεκτρυών* (661).[119] Another such example is Socrates’ implication that a second-declension noun (*κάρδοπος*, 674) must be masculine because proper nouns in *-ος* are given to men, for instance, or that the vocative *Ἀμυνία* (689) must belong to a woman because it ends in a long alpha. At the same time this passage also illustrates perhaps the central aspect of Strepsiades’ character “as a person with a mind not merely pragmatic but anti-conceptual”, to use Peter Green’s description.[120] Other passages of the play see Strepsiades utterly stumped by metaphor or indeed any kind of figurative language[121], but this passage specifically highlights his inability to conceive of parts of his own language (i.e. Attic) in abstract fashion. Most obviously, Strepsiades seems not to grasp the distinction between

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[118] Tr. adapted from B. B. Rogers (1930) 327-31.
[119] cf. Phryn. *Ecl.* 200: *Ἀλεκτορίς· εὑρίσκεται καὶ ἐν τραγῳδίᾳ καὶ ἐν κωμῳδίᾳ, λέγε δὲ ἀλεκτρυὼν καὶ ἐπὶ θήλεος καὶ ἐπὶ ἄρρενος ὡς οἱ παλαιοί.* (‘*Alektoris’* (hen): It is found both in tragedy and in comedy, but you say, *'alektryon'* (rooster) for both feminine and masculine, as the ancients do.)
[120] Green (1979) 17.
[121] He assumes the Academics’ study of *τὰ κατὰ γῆς* (188-90) to mean truffle-hunting, and he envisages Socrates’ new rhetorical devices, *καινὰς μηχανάς*, as a kind of siege engine (487-81); cf. Green (1979) 19.

a noun's grammatical gender and the sex of its referent, which is the basis for Socrates' trickery. Since a kneading-trough is neither male nor female, he does not understand Socrates' meaning in recommending a feminine noun (670-1); then, when Socrates makes a comparison (673) to Cleonymus (previously mentioned at 353 and 400) he immediately thinks of the man himself and not the second declension proper noun *Κλεώνυμος*. Likewise, he misses the point of lines 690-1, thinking of Amynias' unmanly desertion instead of the feminine sound of the vocative "Amynia". Strepsiades lives in a world of concrete things and persons rather than the abstract subjects in which Socrates professes expertise, and Aristophanes exploits the innately humorous disconnect between these two fundamentally opposed worldviews.

Lucian's *Lexiphanes* leverages a similarly jarring juxtaposition between the title character's lofty vocabulary and the asinine contents of his writings, as summed up by Lycinus at §24:

> οὐ πρότερον τὰς διανοίας τῶν λέξεων προπαρεσκευασμένος ἔπειτα κατακοσμεῖς τοῖς ῥήμασιν καὶ τοῖς ὀνόμασιν, ἀλλὰ ἤν που ῥῆμα ἔκφυλον εὕρῃς ἢ αὐτὸς πλασάμενος οἰηθῇς εἶναι καλόν, τούτῳ ζητεῖς διάνοιαν ἐφαρμόσαι καὶ ζημίαν ἡγῇ, ἂν μὴ παραβύσῃς αὐτό που, κἂν τῷ λεγομένῳ μηδ' ἀναγκαῖον ᾖ.
>
> You do not first lay out the underlying thought of your speeches and then array it with verbs and nouns, but rather whenever you find a strange verb somewhere—or fabricate one yourself which you fancy—you seek to fit the thought to it and consider it a grave loss if you should ever be unable to cram it in somewhere, even when there may be no need for it to be said.

Like Strepsiades he lacks the capacity for philosophical *διάνοια*, and thus his words and thoughts barely cling together (if at all) throughout his writing and his speech. This deficiency is especially in evidence when Lexiphanes makes double entendres stemming from idiosyncratic usage or mistaken etymologies of various words.[122] But the more generally significant manner in which Lexiphanes recalls Strepsiades or another comic dullard is in the profound inanity of the work on display, his ersatz *Symposium*. As mentioned earlier, this piece is a Platonic-style

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[122] Weissenberger (1996) 73.

dialogue that is, ironically, free of any philosophical or intellectual content. Attic vocabulary applied, overapplied, and misapplied to mundane activities and objects represents the extent of his engagement with Plato. Consequently, his focus on the extra-philosophical details of Platonic dialogues makes him sound much more like Strepsiades than Socrates—in spite of his aspirations to filling the role of the latter. Likewise, Lexiphanes has absorbed a great deal of the vocabulary from Aristophanes but is familiar with none of the content. For Lucian's readers (or at least those ideal readers who will share his enthusiasm for Old Comedy) the irony is too delicious to miss: Lexiphanes uses Aristophanic words with abandon, but is more like an Aristophanic character himself—oblivious to the fact that he has written himself into a comic scene with himself as the butt of the joke.

In his empty pretensions to Attic expertise, Lexiphanes also resembles to a certain extent the ineffectual *alazones* of Socrates' "thinkery". The Aristophanic Socrates is (along with his entourage) quite clearly an object of mockery throughout the *Clouds*, arguably to an even greater degree than Strepsiades. In this particular passage, Aristophanes writes Socrates' deliberate deceptions regarding the Attic dialect as a caricature of the Sophists of his time. The Lucianic works in the present discussion feature characters who, while part of a program to satirize second century CE intellectuals, can trace their origins back to this Aristophanic version of Socrates. In the *Clouds* the abuse Socrates inflicts on the Attic language revolves around the mis- and overapplication of analogy, which continues to be a persistent and pervasive issue based on the censure from Lucian's contemporaries of such diverse ideological stripes as Sextus Empiricus, Galen, and Phrynichus. Furthermore, the stichomythic and specious pedantry with which Socrates bombards Strepsiades is recalled by both Lucianus and the quotes from Socrates of Mopsus in the

Solecist.[123] Most significantly, his portrayal as a supposedly educated intellectual putting one over on a listener who lacks the discernment to catch him out makes Aristophanes' Socrates strongly resemble not the clueless Lexiphanes, but instead the title figure of the *Professor of Rhetoric*. Much as that Lucianic character applies words in new, fictive senses—and deliberately so—the Aristophanic version of Socrates goes so far as to gaslight Strepsiades' own usage of Greek. A farmer certainly knows the difference between a hen and a rooster (Ar. *Nu*. 661-6), but his experience with animal husbandry has not prepared him for this sophisticated yet simultaneously inane brand of intellectualism. Both Socrates and the Professor are portrayed as shrewd individuals who know (or ought to know) that they are tricking their audiences and taking advantage of their ignorance. They also both represent contemporary figures or schools of thought who have, to the authors' chagrin, taken control of the intellectual discourse and maneuvered it down paths of dubious morality. Whereas in Plato, Socrates demonstrates that various individuals do not know what they think they do, Aristophanes' version of him dislodges real, practical knowledge by bamboozling naïve interlocutors with circuitous nonsense; if one reads the title figure of *RP* as representing Favorinus, then Gellius (whose Socratean version of Favorinus is discussed in the next chapter) and Lucian parallel Plato and Aristophanes neatly.

Strepsiades is out of place in the Thinkery, however the figure of the good-hearted and honest farmer (who nevertheless speaks perfect Attic—which by necessity he does) is an established type-character in Aristophanes.[124] The contrast between Strepsiades and Socrates is one of education, perhaps, but not necessarily of wisdom—if anything, the language lesson discussed above shows Strepsiades becoming *less* wise the more Socrates "teaches" him about grammar, losing his grip on reality as Socrates takes away his commonsense (and fundamentally

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[123] Luc. *Sol*. 1-4, in particular, resembles both a Platonic dialogue and Old Comedy *stichomythia*.
[124] Ehrenberg (1943).

accurate) beliefs about language as a tool for interacting with the world. Lexiphanes embodies aspects of both characters, because his central role is to show the disastrous (but funny) results of misdirected efforts in search of *paideia*. By leaping headfirst into the study of grammar and vocabulary without acquiring first the moral and intellectual framework, he therefore replaces whatever innate wisdom he may have had with a jumbled heap of knowledge that is intended to mark him as a *pepaideumenos* but in reality does the opposite. An interesting comparison comes in the form of a figure from Lucian's own time (more or less), a slave of Herodes Atticus named Heracles. This Heracles was supposedly an amusing novelty for Herodes and his friends (including Favorinus) because of the pure Attic he spoke. As Philostratus tells it, Heracles' admirable language skills were not a product of urbanity but rather his rusticity—living in the countryside he was never exposed to the hustle and bustle of Athens with its many immigrants speaking different languages.[125] The setting for *Lexiphanes* is presumably a city of the East, where education is readily obtained but may be of dubious quality; by retreating—whether literally to the interior of Attica, or metaphorically to the reliably Attic world of Classical literature—Lexiphanes can remove the crusted-over pseudo-Atticisms from his speech and learn to speak properly.

The other play of Aristophanes to prefigure Lucian's comedy of language usage is the *Frogs*, specifically the back-and-forth between the shades of Euripides and Aeschylus that comprises approximately 300 lines after the midpoint of the work. Leaving aside the greater than five-century gap between them, Euripides' opening lines sound precisely like the language bandied about among Imperial Greek rhetors: *οὐκ ἂν μεθείμην τοῦ θρόνου, μὴ νουθέτει·/κρείττων γὰρ εἶναί φημι τούτου τὴν τέχνην.* (I shall not let go of the chair, don't presume to give me advice! For I declare that I am greater than he at my art; Ar. *Ran*. 830-1). The nature of Euripides'

[125] Philostratus, *VS* 490; Kim (2010).

charges against Aeschylus reinforces the connection with Lucian's linguistic satire, for in attempting to prove him an *ἀλαζών* (909) he adduces *δείν' ἄττα μορμορωπά, ἄγνωτα τοῖς θεωμένοις* (some terrible monsters, unknown to his audiences, 926-7) and says of Aeschylus *σαφὲς δ' ἂν εἶπεν οὐδὲ ἕν*—(he could utter not a single intelligible word, 928). The real Euripides demonstrates concern with *τὸ σαφές*, such as in the dialogue between Menelaus and Orestes in *Orestes*:

> Με. τί χρῆμα πάσχεις; τίς σ' ἀπόλλυσιν νόσος; (395)
> Ορ. ἡ σύνεσις, ὅτι σύνοιδα δείν' εἰργασμένος. @1
> Με. πῶς φῆις; σοφόν τοι τὸ σαφές, οὐ τὸ μὴ σαφές.
> Ορ. λύπη μάλιστά γ' ἡ διαφθείρουσά με ...
> Με. δεινὴ γὰρ ἡ θεός, ἀλλ' ὅμως ἰάσιμος.
>
> Me. What are you suffering? What illness wracks you?
> Or. Comprehension, that I comprehend the horrible things I've wrought.
> Me. How do you mean? Surely wisdom lies in clarity, not in obscurity.
> Or. It is a great grief indeed that destroys me…
> Me. For the goddess is terrible, yet nevertheless can be appeased. (Eur. *Or*. 395-9)

This exchange illustrates well how Euripides' tragic plots do not hinge as significantly on a disaster brought about by *anagnorisis*, in contrast most obviously to Sophocles' *Oedipus Tyrannus*, but instead have their characters push through towards a tidier resolution. This focus on an abstracted idea of clarity surfaces as well throughout Plato and subsequent authors, and in *Lexiphanes* it is personified through the directive Lycinus gives to the titular character: *μάλιστα δὲ Χάρισι καὶ Σαφηνείᾳ θῦε, ὧν πάμπολυ λίαν νῦν ἀπελέλειψο* (and especially make offering to the Graces and to Clarity[126], from whom you are at present altogether quite removed; Luc. *Lex*. 23).

Euripides in *Frogs* articulates his own philosophy of style and language as a counterpoint to Aeschylus, in a manner that again prefigures aspects of the *Lexiphanes* and other Lucianic works discussed here:

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[126] *σαφήνεια* predates Plato but figures relatively heavily in the Platonic corpus; some 14 occurrences are found there, which are not matched until Dionysius of Halicarnassus but are far surpassed by Galen's 97 surviving usages.

οὐχ ἱππαλεκτρυόνας μὰ Δί᾽ οὐδὲ τραγελάφους, ἅπερ σύ,
ἂν τοῖσι παραπετάσμασιν τοῖς Μηδικοῖς γράφουσιν·
ἀλλ᾽ ὡς παρέλαβον τὴν τέχνην παρὰ σοῦ τὸ πρῶτον εὐθὺς
οἰδοῦσαν ὑπὸ κομπασμάτων καὶ ῥημάτων ἐπαχθῶν,
ἴσχνανα μὲν πρώτιστον αὐτὴν καὶ τὸ βάρος ἀφεῖλον
ἐπυλλίοις καὶ περιπάτοις καὶ τευτλίοισι λευκοῖς,
χυλὸν διδοὺς στωμυλμάτων ἀπὸ βιβλίων ἀπηθῶν·
εἶτ᾽ ἀνέτρεφον μονῳδίαις Κηφισοφῶντα μειγνύς.

I did not, by Zeus, [write about] griffins and goatstags, like you,
which they embroider on Persian tapestries;
but as soon as I first received the art from you,
bloated with bombast and burdensome verbiage,
straightaway I slimmed it, and lightened its load
by versicles and strolls-about and white beets,
bestowing the juice of chatterers distilled from books;
then I nourished it by mixing Cephisophon with its songs. (Ar. *Ran*. 937-46)

Three elements seen in the previous chapter's discussion of Imperial-era language ideologies, beyond the general concern with clarity and intelligibility, emerge in this passage. The first is the notion of linguistic purity, emphasized by Euripides' dismissal of "griffins and goatstags" as suitable perhaps for Persian weavers but not for Athenian writers; Aeschylus' language, as characterized here, has been infiltrated by imagery from other cultures and other media. Another proto-Lucianic touch is the objection to *ῥημάτων ἐπαχθῶν,* a term which could describe Lexiphanes' dense hyper-atticism as well as the rapid razzle-dazzle rhetoric of the Professor of Rhetoric.[127] Euripides objects here (as elsewhere) to the weightiness of Aeschylus' Greek, though ultimately Aristophanes (in the form of Dionysus) will vindicate Aeschylus on the basis of his more serious, practical content. Finally, and perhaps most Lucianic, is the reference in lines 945-6 to Euripides' creative reworking of pieces from both earlier and contemporary generations of authors. The value assigned throughout the Lucianic corpus to innovation in literature playing upon familiar tropes and characters suggests that Lucian would identify with Euripides in *Frogs*

[127] See also lines 960-3: ξυνειδότες γὰρ οὗτοι/ ἤλεγχον ἄν μου τὴν τέχνην· ἀλλ᾽ οὐκ ἐκομπολάκουν/ ἀπὸ τοῦ φρονεῖν ἀποσπάσας, οὐδ᾽ ἐξέπληττον αὐτούς,/ Κύκνους ποιῶν καὶ Μέμνονας κωδωνοφαλαροπώλους. (…for these audience-members, being informed about the subject, could have exposed my art; but I never blustered at them and distracted them from their thinking, nor did I used to shock them by portraying Cycnuses and Memnons with jinglebells on their horses' cheekplates).

much more than with Aeschylus. Perhaps more important, this passage demonstrates Aristophanes' interest in addressing the tension between creative innovation and established tradition, no doubt one of many reasons why Lucian owes a debt to Aristophanes—and why he is happy to acknowledge that debt.

In the *Frogs*, Aristophanes makes Aeschylus the winner and not Euripides. This apparent disjunction between Lucian and the Old Comedian who inspired him so greatly may be readily explained by the radically different contexts (political, cultural, literary) in which Aristophanes and Lucian are writing. Other parts of the exchange between Aeschylus and Euripides in *Frogs*, however, make Aristophanes sound like a different class of Second Sophistic writers:

Αι.	"Ἑρμῆ χθόνιε, πατρῷ' ἐποπτεύων κράτη,	(1126)
	σωτὴρ γενοῦ μοι σύμμαχός τ' αἰτουμένῳ.	
	ἥκω γὰρ εἰς γῆν τήνδε καὶ κατέρχομαι."	
	…	
Ευ.	δὶς ταὐτὸν ἡμῖν εἶπεν ὁ σοφὸς Αἰσχύλος.	
Δι.	πῶς δίς;	(1155)
Ευ.	σκόπει τὸ ῥῆμ'· ἐγὼ δέ σοι φράσω.	
	"ἥκω γὰρ εἰς γῆν," φησί, "καὶ κατέρχομαι·"	
	"ἥκω" δὲ ταὐτόν ἐστι τῷ "κατέρχομαι".	
Δι.	νὴ τὸν Δί', ὥσπερ γ' εἴ τις εἴποι γείτονι,	
	"χρῆσον σὺ μάκτραν, εἰ δὲ βούλει, κάρδοπον."	
Αι.	οὐ δῆτα τοῦτό γ', ὦ κατεστωμυλμένε	(1160)
	ἄνθρωπε, ταῦτ' ἔστ', ἀλλ' ἄριστ' ἐπῶν ἔχον.	
Δι.	πῶς δή; δίδαξον γάρ με καθ' ὅτι δὴ λέγεις;	
Αι.	'ἐλθεῖν' μὲν εἰς γῆν ἔσθ' ὅτῳ μετῇ πάτρας·	
	χωρὶς γὰρ ἄλλης συμφορᾶς ἐλήλυθεν·	
	φεύγων δ' ἀνὴρ 'ἥκει' τε καὶ 'κατέρχεται'.	(1165)

Ae.	"Under-dwelling Hermes, watching over paternal domains,
	become a savior and an ally to be, I pray you.
	For I have come back to this land and make my return."
	…
Eu.	The wise Aeschylus has told us the same thing twice.
Di.	How so, twice?
Eu.	Look at the verb: for I will tell you.
	"For I have come back to the land", he says, "and make my return."
Di.	By Zeus, it's as if one were to ask a neighbor,
	"lend me a kneading-trough, or if you prefer, a trough for kneading."
Ae.	That's not it at all, you blabbering
	idiot—I was using precisely the right words.
Di.	How's that? Would you educate me on what basis you say so?
Ae.	"To make a return" to a land applies to anyone who belongs to a country;
	for he makes a return there without any other ill consequence.

But an exiled man both "comes back" and "makes a return". (Ar. *Ran*. 1126-8, 1154-65)

Euripides here sounds somewhat like Galen, complaining of opaque Atticisms;[128] Aeschylus, conversely, responds with something that might be an entry from Phrynichus or Herodian due to the fine distinction it draws between two apparent synonyms. The clarification of *κλύειν* vs *ἀκοῦσαι* (1173-6) further drives home the point that Euripides' Greek lacks the precision of Aeschylus. His rebuttals are pedantic, one might even say Sophistic, but Aeschylus nevertheless wins the day, retains the chair (though he has Sophocles warm it for him), and is named protector of the city—much the same role that Hadrian of Tyre or Julius Pollux would be cast in and to which Phrynichus may have aspired. The *Frogs*, therefore, fictionally depicts an agonistic engagement with language that substantially resembles that being worked out historically in the Second Century CE, the later contest often taking place over the battleground of Aristophanes' vocabulary itself. When satirizing the various shortcomings of his Atticist contemporaries, Lucian had already received a comedic model from one of his most influential sources.

Without a substantial extant corpus, Eupolis necessarily receives vastly reduced scholarly attention in connection with Lucian. Lucian does, however, acknowledge his influence explicitly in the *Double Indictment*, and throughout the Lucianic corpus Eupolis receives only one fewer mention in total than Aristophanes.[129] Presumably there are many more oblique references through Lucian's works, comparable to those which can be traced to Aristophanes, and circling back to the *Lexiphanes* one can identify a potential example. "Sopolis" may be an allegorical name, but according to the *Suda* (ε 3657) the name "Sosipolis" also belongs to the father of Eupolis and is more than likely a reference to the playwright.[130] Furthermore, since the effect of

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[128] As in *De alimentorum facultatibus* 584, for instance; see previous chapter, §2.3.4.
[129] In contrast to Cratinus, who is not mentioned directly at all in Lucian's surviving works.
[130] Sidwell (2009) 190; Storey (2016) 180n33 alternatively suggests "son of the city-saver" as a self-applied epithet of Eupolis, based on the claims of civic virtue made by Old Comedy writers. In addition, [ps.-]Herodian, *On the Declension of Nouns* 3.1-2 lists "Sopolis" as an example of a masculine third declension

Sopolis' draught on Lexiphanes is to cause him to vomit forth his overwrought vocabulary, the scene also evokes an Old Comedy image that may have originated in Eupolis, in a fragment of his *Chrysoun Genos* that appears to depict a literal regurgitation. As Sidwell suggests, this scene is adapted later into the metaphorical acts of juridical vomiting at Aristophanes' *Acharnians* 6 and *Knights* 1148[131], while the humorous treatment by a doctor (whether a true expert physician or a quack *ἀλαζών*) likely has Old Comedy origins as well.[132] *Lexiphanes'* version is both literal (like the Eupolis fragment) and metaphorical (as in Aristophanes), a typically Lucianic fusion that evokes multiple literary predecessors towards a novel purpose. In this case, the image illustrates Lucian's deft manipulation of an Old Comedic trope via Lexiphanes' oblivious bumbling through Attic vocabulary towards a comic circumstance of his own.

As stated earlier, Lucianic characters seldom if ever allow for direct comparisons with historical figures. It is therefore paramount that when reading *Lexiphanes* or other works for insights into the linguistic-ideological attitude of Lucian's authorial voice one not seek a 1:1 correspondence between the different figures involved. This consideration must be kept in spite of the similarity noted above between the names of the character's in Lucian's dialogue and the canonical trio of Attic Old Comedy playwrights. The correspondance is so clear as to preclude its being a coincidence, but it need not identify each character directly with an Old Comedy writer. The title character's linguistic ineptitude is anything but emblematic of Lucian's attitude towards Aristophanes, whereas the absence of any explicit nod to Cratinus from Lucian's surviving corpus combined with the heavily fragmented state of Cratinus' suriviving works makes his relationship

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name: ἐὰν δὲ ἀρσενικοῦ μόνου γένους γένηται, ἢ ἀρσενικοῦ καὶ θηλυκοῦ, διὰ τοῦ δος κλίνεται. ἀρσενικοῦ μὲν μόνου γένους οἷον ὁ Σώπολις τοῦ Σωπόλιδος (ἔστι δὲ ὄνομα κύριον κωμικοῦ).

[131] Sidwell (2009) 190.

[132] Storey (2016) 176.

to the figure of Lycinus challenging to extrapolate. As a result, while Sopolis creates a handful of Eupolidean reminiscences, it is not necessary that he specifically represent him any more than that he stand in for Galen or another historical physician.

As the introduction to this section discussed, the modern survival of Aristophanes at the expense of Eupolis and Cratinus has more likely than not given Lucian's corpus (in all aspects) a more Aristophanic flavoring than it had in its original contemporary context. In the absence of comparable amounts of Old Comedy text from other authors, this discussion has had to restrict itself to identifying connections with Aristophanes alone. However, if one assumes that Lucian maintained similar levels of engagement with Eupolis, Cratinus and other Old Comedy authors then the overall picture need not change. If the *Lexiphanes*, *Solecist, Professor of Rhetoric, You're a Prometheus in Words, Double Indictment,* and others share the connections they make to extant works of Aristophanes with plays by other Old Comedic writers, then the preceding discussion can be extended to include them as well. Conversely if Lucian is in fact, like Plutarch, specifically looking towards Aristophanes and making only fleeting reference to Eupolis (while omitting Cratinus entirely), then it could well be the case that Aristophanes' treatment of language in the works discussed played a key role in Lucian's use of him as a source of inspiration. In either case, the scenes of Old Comedy that treat linguistic expertise and authority represent a major component of Lucian's adaptation of Attic comedy overall, as well as Lucian's humorous treatment of linguistic topics. In the *Clouds*, Socrates' elaborate use of language does give rise to piercing and profound insight, but instead confounds and muddles basic and quotidian matters; likewise, both playwrights in *Frogs* accuse each other of squandering their platform of drama to play pointless word-games. The second century Atticists may have drilled deeply into the vocabulary and syntax of Old Comedy, but the very works in which they claim expertise make fun of the same kind of authority over language that they assert. By drawing out the comic

imagery of an author (or authors) whom the lexicographers and grammarians of Lucian's time used to bolster their own reputation, Lucian in effect allows Aristophanes—and likely others—to join him in mocking the pedants and charlatans of his own time.

3.5 Conclusions: Humorous Rigor

From the preceding discussion, one can draw a number of conclusions about Lucian's representation of his stance on Atticism and related issues. However, as anticipated not all these conclusions contribute to a coherent set of language ideologies, and Lucian's authorial voice can be aligned with or against many different contemporary figures of those discussed in the previous chapter. "Lucianus" in the *Solecist,* for example, could serve to mock the pedantic tone of a Phrynichus-type who (as Phrynichus does) disregards authentic ancient Athenian texts as un-Attic, suggesting Lucian views the nitpicking of grammarians and lexicographers as a misguided waste of time. Conversely, Lexiphanes' mis-analogized Atticisms and the inconsistent, specious language of the Professor of Rhetoric resemble strongly the rhetorical sins that Phrynichus' *Ecloga* and *Praeparatio sophistica* seek to stamp out. In like manner, while Lucian shares with Sextus Empiricus and the Epicurean linguists a disdain for artificial or obscure hyper-Atticism, his language is steeped in the verbiage of centuries past and best suited to an audience intimately familiar with Old Comedy. He is free to take multiple sides and pit them against each other, without undermining the foundation of classical language and literature around which his satiric program revolves.

Lucian does not, in other words, attack the ideology of Atticism, the elitism of an intellectual audience, or the premises of expertise and authority. Instead his satiric targets represent various failed efforts towards mastery of Greek and illustrate humorously the ways in which misguided Atticizing projects undermine themselves and their underlying principles. Lexiphanes aims at a rich Atticism that becomes so dense as to render his speech practically

opaque, his attempts at being hyper-Attic resulting in a work and an affect that are anything but. The pseudo-sophist of the *Solecist* is eager to jump into the competitive world of Attic sophism so as to showcase his expertise, but achieves the opposite result; conversely, Lucianus and his teacher Socrates cling to a version of Atticism so strict as to discount not only currently accepted usage, but authentic ancient usage as well. The Professor of Rhetoric exploits the current trend towards Atticizing rhetoric, even as he dispenses advice that—were everyone to follow it—would bring that trend to a crashing halt within a generation.

It would be inaccurate to describe the overall impression of Lucian's ideology as a "moderate" Atticism, however, because his works that deal with the subject are detailed and rely on the knowledge of an elevated Attic register. The jokes in *Lexiphanes*, for example, require one to understand both the original Attic meaning and the (naively) intended meaning of dozens of words that are, for the most part, not in current Greek usage. Other works, such as *Judgment of the Vowels* (*Lis consonantium*), require similarly extensive knowledge for their humor to function. To the extent that any satiric program can be labeled "dogmatic", Lucian's ideology vis-à-vis latter-day Atticism has two principal components. The first of these is the observation discussed above, that an effective latter-day Atticizing project requires substantive engagement with the primary sources from which it draws inspiration. For Lucian, such engagement serves not merely to ascertain authentic usages for the vocabulary and constructions that mark it as "Atticist", but also to discover subject matter (cf. the preceding discussion on Old Comedy) from which a new literary project can be constructed. The second point that one can extrapolate from Lucian's commentary is that the Atticizing intellectual movement of his time, even when fully and faithfully engaged in dialogue with Classical authors and their language, remains a fundamentally different beast.

This fundamental difference stems from the tension between imitation and innovation outlined in the introduction to this chapter. Lucian's humorous meta-commentary on Atticism and those who practice it, himself included, relies on this tension to illustrate that a successful Atticist project is not merely a matter of displaying what words and phrases one knows. Thus, if Lucian advocates any philosophy of Atticism it is not "moderate" but indeed "rigorous" and even "ambitious", in the sense that the Attic language must both be understood in its original context and effectively deployed in its new setting. Chabert summarized Lucian's Atticism by saying "il ne créa pas le monde, mais il la suivit avec une conviction réfléchie" and "sans l'atticisme, Lucien n'aurait pas été Lucien, mais sans Lucien peut-être, l'atticisme n'eût pas produit les fruits dont la langue lui est à jamais redevable."[133] Plato, Aristophanes, Demosthenes, et al. did not satisfy themselves with compiling guides to grammar and vocabulary or rattling off *hapax legomena* and neologisms, and neither will Lucian.

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[133] Chabert (1897) 31: "he did not create the world [of Atticism], but he followed it with a determined conviction."; 234: "without Atticism, Lucian would not have been Lucian; but without Lucian, perhaps, Atticism would not have produced the fruits for which the language is forever indebted to him."

4. Language, Culture, and Identity in the Ancient Sociolinguistic Imagination

In the works discussed in the previous chapter, Lucian stages linguistic debates as a means of commenting on different versions of Atticist ideology and extracting the humor to be mined from the discrepancies between ideals, ideologies, and practice. Other contemporary writers stage comparable debates, and this chapter will consider the representations of such debates over Greek and Latin usage as created by Athenaeus, Fronto, and Aulus Gellius. In contrast to the investigation of Chapter Two, this study will illustrate the use of these debates as literary themes in service to a larger commentary on ideology and practice. In staging debates on language, the authors discussed in this chapter create characters or *personae* who take different positions and claim expertise in support of their positions. In his letters to Marcus Aurelius and others Fronto is concerned primarily with his own self-representation, though as will be shown this focus does not mean that he is represented in the same manner always; conversely, Athenaeus and Gellius are absent from their works except as narrators and they instead frame their discussions of language, literature, history, culture, and other topics in a series of vignettes acted out by a diverse cast of characters. These characters sometimes bear resemblances (even if only in name) to historical figures, a tendency especially pronounced in Gellius' *Attic Nights*. In that work a character based on (and named after) Fronto appears alongside the more prominent and flamboyant Favorinus—a teacher of Gellius, and the same Gallo-Roman Greek orator whose Attic (or lack thereof) the lexicographer Phrynichus finds so objectionable (as discussed in Chapter Two). Conversely, several of the dinner guests in Athenaeus' *Deipnosophists* or *Learned Banqueters* are fastidious Atticizers whose insistence on attestation and rejection of anything they deem non-Attic suggests an affinity with the strictest prescriptive ideologies of Phrynichus himself, while sharing the names of other historical figures. However historical, fictional, or

autobiographical the character, each speaks with a distinctive voice and expresses a distinctive ideology or set of ideologies.

These different ideologies reach the audience in the voice of a specific character (or character type) to whom the writer assigns, in greater or lesser number, a set of distinguishing characteristics beyond solely their ideological position. A given character's linguistic attitudes or practice should be understood in relation to the identity the author has constructed for them, and therefore each character has the potential to represent a commentary—on the part of the author, that is—on the relationship between language usage and various identity positions. With this consideration in mind, the study of Athenaeus, Fronto, and Gellius in the current chapter illustrates how each author articulates their own ideologies about the ways in which language use determines, reveals, or otherwise connects with ethnicity, culture, social status, and combinations thereof. More than a representation of each author's ideologies surrounding language standards and the proper basis for expertise, the works under consideration here offer models—several different models in each author, in fact—for language as an idiom signifying group membership (or non-membership) in a culturally-demarcated community of practice. Linguistic practice is just one of many different idioms contributing to the construction of a cultural identity in the ancient world (and continue to do so in the modern world), which means that the present study will provide only a partial insight into what a Roman or Greek identity may have historically comprised.[134] Even this partial insight is valuable for understanding both the works of the authors in focus here and those of Lucian, a corpus defined by its engagement with the literary and linguistic practices of other authors but also—perhaps more so—by its positioning of different *personae* in relation to the Greek culture and cultural identity of the Second Sophistic. Athenaeus,

[134] Hall (1997) presents the most comprehensive treatment of the subject to date.

Fronto, and Gellius have a great deal to say on this subject themselves, and the discussion that follows will make the case for them as Lucian's foils or allies.

4.1 Athenaeus, Ulpian, and the Folly of Purism

The *Deipnosophists* (or *Learned Banqueters*) of Athenaeus defies genre categorization and is so expansive in its scope—a "Brobdingnagian compilation"[135] of 15 books[136]--that the present study can only focus on a small sliver of the work. Athenaeus' project has been variously described as "the oldest cookery-book that has come down to us"[137], "a document for the student of Imperial Rome, above all for those engaged in the analysis of the Second Sophistic in the Rome of the Antonines and Severans"[138], "a sophisticated imitation of the various learned disciplines it draws upon—etymology, lexicography, philology, ethnography, cultural history, literary studies."[139] The sprawling text depicts, explores, and indeed celebrates a multilingual form of intellectualism that is conducted in Attic Greek but looks outward to the rest of the Greco-Roman world.[140] The interactions between languages, Greek and Latin in particular, and the effects of these interactions permeate the *Deipnosophists* as a persistent theme, and through various characters and their differing perspectives Athenaeus comments on this phenomenon. In doing so, he lays out opposing ideas about linguistic purity and its relationship with Greekness. This section will examine a few interactions that foreground this subject.

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[135] This exuberant characterization from Baldwin (1976) 21.
[136] The prevailing view for some time was that Athenaeus' work originally consisted of 30 books, which were excerpted and epitomized before reaching their extant state; cf. Kaibel (1887) xxi-xl. However, this interpretation of the work's structure is likely inaccurate, as Rodriguez-Noriega Guillén (2000) has shown. It is an extensive work at either length.
[137] Gulick (1927) ix.
[138] Baldwin (1976) 42.
[139] Jacob (2000) 86.
[140] Baldwin (1976) 23 makes this comparison: "As in the case of Dio Cassius, whose knowledge of Latin appears to have extended beyond his Roman source material to the poetry of Virgil, Athenaeus clearly concedes the reality and health of bilingualism and biculturalism."

Ulpian of Tyre—perhaps based on the father of the Roman jurist of the same name[141]—appears in the *Deipnosophists* in order to represent the most puritanical pole of Atticism. He is a caricature, in a word, showing what an Atticizing lexicographer or grammarian might be like if the authorial voice found in his works were chosen as symposiarch. This much is immediately clear from the introduction, when the epitomator relates that all who knew him called him by the nickname *Κειτούκειτος*, "Attested-or-not".[142] As a preview of the text to follow, such an unflattering description alerts the reader that neither Ulpian nor his ideas about language will receive a particularly sympathetic treatment, and indeed the self-serious Ulpian is the butt of many jokes in the *Deipnosophists*. Throughout the work he raises the question of attestation in order to test the knowledge of the other banqueters, and in so doing reveals ideology of Atticism quite in line with the strictest lexicographers—Phrynichus and Ulpian agree on some usage,[143] and Ulpian echoes other lexicographers as well.[144] The epitomized preface hardly overstates the

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[141] Earlier scholarship assumed this character represented the jurist himself, and on this basis, the *Deipnosophists* was dated to the 220s CE; cf. Gulick ix-xiii. Since Baldwin (1976) 30-34 reviewed the myriad problems with this association, the consensus has shifted to date the work to ca. 190 CE instead as Dittenberger (1903) initially suggested.

[142] [Ath.] 1.d …*Οὐλπιανὸς ὁ Τύριος, ὃς διὰ τὰς συνεχεῖς ζητήσεις, ἃς ἀνὰ πᾶσαν ὥραν ποιεῖται ἐν ταῖς ἀγυιαῖς, περιπάτοις, βιβλιοπωλείοις, βαλανείοις, ἔσχεν ὄνομα τοῦ κυρίου διασημότερον Κειτούκειτος. οὗτος ὁ ἀνὴρ νόμον εἶχεν ἴδιον μηδενὸς ἀποτρώγειν πρὶν εἰπεῖν 'κεῖται ἢ οὐ κεῖται;'* (…Ulpian of Tyre, who through his ceaseless inquiries, which he used to make at all hours of the day in the streets, sidewalks, bookstores, and bath-houses, had a nickname more descriptive than his real one—*Keitoukeitos*. He had a distinctive custom of never taking a bite of anything before saying "is it attested or not?")

[143] *μέθυσος* (1.1d), e.g. cf. Phryn. *Ecl*. 122.

[144] [=3.82 K.]: καὶ ὁ Οὐλπιανὸς ἔφη· 'ὁ δ' ἀπελεύθερος παρὰ τίνι κεῖται;' εἰπόντος δέ τινος καὶ δρᾶμα ἐπιγράφεσθαι Φρυνίχου Ἀπελευθέρους, Μένανδρον δ' ἐν Ῥαπιζομένῃ καὶ ἀπελευθέραν εἰρηκέναι καὶ ἐπισυνάπτοντος ... πάλιν ἔφη· 'τίνι δὲ διαφέρει ἐξελευθέρου;' ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ἔδοξε κατὰ τὸ παρὸν ἀναβαλέσθαι. (and Ulpian said, "In what source is *apeleutheros* [freedman] attested?" And when someone said that a drama of Phrynichus was titled *Apeleutheroi*, and that Menander in *The Beaten Girl* also called [someone] *apeleuthera* and added […] [Ulpian] again said, "And how does it differ from *exeleutheros*?" cf. Ptol. Gramm. *On differences of vocabulary* 394.3 (= Her. Phil. *De div. sig. verb.* E 67, = Ammon. *De adf. voc. dif.* 65.1): ἐξελεύθερος καὶ ἀπελεύθερος διαφέρει. ἐξελευθέρους μὲν γὰρ λέγουσι τοὺς διὰ χρέος προσθέτους τοῖς δανεισταῖς γενομένους, ἔπειτα ἀπολυθέντας, εἶτα ἐλευθερωθέντας· ἀπελευθέρους δὲ συνήθως τοὺς ἐκ δούλ[ου] ἐλευθερωμένους, ὥς φησι Τρύφων ἐν πέμπτῳ Περὶ Ἑλληνισμοῦ. (*Exeleutheros* and *apeleutheros* differ. For whereas *exeleutheroi* they call those who, having been handed over (in servitude) to creditors on account of debt, are later released and are therefore "freed", traditionally they call *apeleutheroi* those who obtain freedom from having been a slave, as Trypho [says] in the fifth book of *On*

case—there are nine occasions where he puts a question to the other guests in exactly the manner it describes[145]–and he appears to relish in showing off his knowledge regardless of whether the other guests express a desire to hear it, as in this example:

> **πρόπομα**. τούτου, φησί, περιενεχθέντος ὁ τῶν δείπνων ταμίας Οὐλπιανὸς ἔφη, εἰ κεῖται παρά τινι τὸ πρόπομα οὕτω καλούμενον ὡς νῦν ἡμεῖς φαμεν. καὶ ζητούντων πάντων 'αὐτός, ἔφη, ἐγὼ ἐρῶ. Φύλαρχος ὁ Ἀθηναῖος ἢ Ναυκρατίτης ἐν οἷς ὁ λόγος ἐστὶν αὐτῷ περὶ Ζηλᾶ τοῦ Βιθυνῶν βασιλέως, ὃς ἐπὶ ξένια καλέσας τοὺς τῶν Γαλατῶν ἡγεμόνας ἐπιβουλεύσας αὐτοῖς καὶ αὐτὸς διεφθάρη, φησὶν οὕτως, εἰ μνήμης εὐτυχῶ· 'πρόπομά τι πρὸ τοῦ δείπνου περιεφέρετο, καθὼς εἰώθει τὸ πρῶτον.' καὶ ταῦτ' εἰπὼν ὁ Οὐλπιανὸς ᾔτει πιεῖν [ἐν] ψυκτῆρι, ἀρέσκειν ἑαυτὸν φάσκων διὰ τὸ ἑτοίμως ἀπεμνημονευκέναι. (Ath. 2.58c [=2.51 K.])
>
> **'Propoma' (aperitif)**. When this, says [Athenaeus], had been carried around the table the dinner-director Ulpian asked whether *propoma*, as we say it now, was attested anywhere thus called. And while everyone was searching for an example, he said "I'll tell you myself. Phylarchus, an Athenian or Naucratean—he has the word in his passage about Zela the king of the Bithynians, who, after inviting the chieftains of the Galatians to be his guests, plotted against them but was then killed himself—says it this way, if I recall correctly: 'a *propoma* was being circulated before the banquet, as was the custom at first.'" And upon saying these words, Ulpian asked to drink from a cooler, saying that he was pleased to have remembered it readily.

Within the interpretive framework discussed in Chapters One and Two—and taking into consideration the caveat that he is a fictional character whose representation is mediated through Athenaeus—this Ulpian is a strict Atticist. However, given his apparent willingness to accept anything attested, he straddles the line between descriptivist and prescriptivist. His enthusiasm for attestations will prove his undoing, a cause for both humor at his expense and serious reflection on the nature of the Attic language. This section will discuss the way Athenaeus (in the voice of other banqueters) uses Ulpian's insistence upon unadulterated Atticism to challenge the ideology of linguistic purity.

Hellenism). By comparison Pollux (3.83), in typical fashion, does not explain the differences between them but does supply several attested verbal and adjectival derivatives.

[145] 2.58b, 3.96f, 3.115b, 3.125b, 3.125d, 9.366a, 9.380d, 9.385b, 10.445c

4.1.1 Anti-Atticism, or, Anti-Ulpianism

Despite appearances, the *Deipnosophists* is not a straightforward treatise expounding the virtues of well-researched Attic vocabulary, and Ulpian's devotion to attestation and fondness for showing off his knowledge of vocabulary does not go over well with some guests. Athenaeus exposes the ignorance—or, at best, narrow-mindedness—of his views during the prolonged conflict that arises when Ulpian raises the ire of Cynulcus (real name Theodorus, cf. 15.669e), the Cynic banqueter introduced in 1.1d. This episode (previewed at 1.1e) begins with Ulpian's inquiry at 3.96f: *μήτρα ἑξῆς ἐπεισηνέχθη ... εἰς ἣν ἀποβλέψας ὁ Οὐλπιανὸς 'ἄγε δή, ἔφη, ἄνδρες φίλοι, παρὰ τίνι κεῖται ἡ μήτρα;* (For the next dish a *mêtra* [swine-womb] was brought in … and casting a glance towards it, Ulpian said, "Come now, dear friends, in what source is *mêtra* attested?") A confrontation becomes inevitable, though, when Ulpian appends this remark:

> τοῖς δὲ κυνικοῖς τοῦτο παρακελεύομαι σιωπᾶν κεχορτασμένοις ἀφειδῶς, πλὴν εἰ μὴ[146] καὶ τῶν σιαγόνων καὶ τῶν κεφαλῶν κατατρῶξαι βούλονται καὶ τὰ ὀστᾶ, ὧν οὐδεὶς φθόνος αὐτοῖς ἀπολαύειν ὡς κυσί· τοῦτο γάρ εἰσι καὶ εὔχονται καλεῖσθαι. "νόμος δὲ λείψαν' ἐκβάλλειν κυσίν,"ἐν Κρήσσαις ὁ Εὐριπίδης ἔφη.
>
> And to the Cynics, who have been fed unsparingly, I enjoin that they keep quiet unless they wish to eat off the jawbones and skulls and the bones, which no one will begrudge their enjoying—dogs that they are. For this is what they are, and they take pride in being thusly called. "It's custom to cast dregs to the dogs", says Euripides in *Cretan Women*.

He continues this tirade against Cynics by claiming they are unable to enjoy food and drink without descending into dancing and other revelries (3.97a-c), quite unlike the *καλοὶ καὶ ἀγαθοὶ πεπαιδεύμενοι* for whose benefit the Roman patron Larensius is putting on this symposium. This preemptive put-down of Cynics shows Ulpian playing the role of cultural gatekeeper, much as he does in his *κεῖται ἢ οὐ κεῖται* challenges, with the overall message being that the Cynics have nothing of value to contribute to such a refined discussion and that Cynulcus is lucky to be allowed to share their food.

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[146] N.B. that Luc. *Sol.* 7 deprecates this compound conjunction as un-Attic.

What follows is tantamount to a shouting-match, albeit one that keeps more or less within the formal framework of other digressions in Athenaeus. This exchange, from 3.89e to 3.122d, is key to understanding Athenaeus' commentary on Atticism and the ideology of linguistic purity in general, because it represents a clash of two opposing viewpoints where both sides have an active agent arguing on their behalf. Other works discussed in the previous chapters of this study—Lucian, Phrynichus, Sextus Empiricus, et al.—show the author, or one of their personae, attacking a figure who is either effectively absent (like the pseudo-Sophist in the *Solecist*) or completely absent (like Favorinus in the *Ecloga*). Having built up Ulpian's character from the beginning to be an insufferable pedant, Athenaeus now unleashes the Cynic—with gratifying results for the reader:

> …οὐδὲν ἄλλο σὺ οἶσθα, οὐ λόγους διεξοδικοὺς εἰπεῖν, οὐχ ἱστορίας μνησθῆναι, οὐ τῆς ἐν λόγοις χάριτος ἀπάρξασθαί ποτε, ἀλλὰ τὸν χρόνον ἅπαντα περὶ ταῦτα κατετρίβης ζητῶν, κεῖται, οὐ κεῖται; εἴρηται, οὐκ εἴρηται; ἐξονυχίζεις τε πάντα τὰ προσπίπτοντα τοῖς συνδιαλεγομένοις τὰς ἀκάνθας συνάγων, 'ὡς ἀν' ἐχινόποδας καὶ ἀνὰ τρηχεῖαν ὄνωνιν' ἀεὶ διατρίβων, ἀνθέων τῶν ἡδίστων μηδὲν συναθροίζων. (3.97d [= 3.52 K.])
>
> …you know nothing else, not how to utter discursive speeches, not how to recall history, not ever how to present grace in your speeches, but spend all your time inquiring about things whether they are 'attested or not? was it uttered or not?' and you scratch away at everything that arises when people are holding a discussion, always wasting your time in plucking all of the thorns, 'just as amid urchin's foot and rough rest-harrow', and gathering none of the sweetest flowers.

Following in the footsteps of Lycinus in the *Lexiphanes*, Cynulcus demonstrates his Atticist superiority to Ulpian and his crowd in a manner strongly reminiscent of Lucian's work. He quotes Ulpian using three of Lexiphanes' malapropisms: *εἰπών 'παῖ Λεῦκε, δός μοι τὸν ἄχρηστον φαινόλην.' εἰς βαλανεῖον δέ ποτε πορευόμενος οὐκ ἔφης πρὸς τὸν πυνθανόμενον 'ποῖ δή;' 'ἀπολούμενος, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἐπείγομαι;'* ([you said] 'Leukos, boy, give me my useless (*achreston*) cloak'. And once, when you were going to the bathhouse, didn't you respond the person who asked you 'where are you going?' [by saying] 'I am, I say (*ên d'egô*), headed for destruction

(*apoloumenos*); 3.97e [= 3.52 K.]).[147] Pompeianus, presumably a friend or associate of Ulpian's, evidently speaks in a similarly pseudo-Attic manner as reported at 3.98a: *'Στρομβιχίδη,' ἔφη, 'κόμιζέ μοι ἐπὶ τὸ γυμνάσιον τὰς βλαύτας τὰς ἀφορήτους καὶ τὴν ἐφεστρίδα τὴν ἄχρηστον. ἐγὼ γὰρ ὑποδησάμενος τὸν πώγωνα προσαγορεύσω τοὺς ἑταίρους· ὀπτὸς γάρ ἐστί μοι Λάριχος.* ('Strombichides,' he said, 'take my unbearable (*aphorêtous*) slippers and my useless (*achreston*) mantle to the gymnasium for me. For I shall first lace up my beard and then go to address my comrades, for I have Larichos to roast (*optos*).')[148] Cynulcus, like Lycinus (and Sopolis), lists a slew of other Atticisms and pseudo-Atticisms he has heard from Pompeianus, such as *ἄδικος ἡ τῆτες ἡμέρα*[149] and *ἀνυπόστατος,*[150] to dismantle utterly the edifice of Attic expertise Pompeianus, Ulpian, and the "Ulpianean sophists" have erected around themselves.

This treatment of deficient Greek practice, however, soon takes a sharp turn away from the kind of criticism described above, which is so clearly of a piece with Lucian's *Lexiphanes* that

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[147] *ἄχρηστον* (meaning "useless" but intended by the speaker to mean "unused") cf. Luc. *Lex*. 9; *ἀπολούμενος* (a mis-analogized Attic future of *ἀπολούομαι* that produces instead a form of *ἀπόλλυμι*) cf. Luc. *Lex.* 2; *ἦν δ' ἐγώ* (a Platonic phrase overused by Atticizers to the point of absurdity) cf. Luc. *Lex. passim* and the table in Appendix C.2 and discussion in Chapter Three.

[148] *ἀφορήτους* (meaning "unbearable" but intended by the speaker to mean "unworn") cf. Luc. *Lex*. 2; *ἄχρηστον* (see above; later at 3.98c he is alleged to have used the same word to mean something entirely different, namely to describe to a man who went to see the Oracle at Delphi but received no *χρησμός*); *ὑποδησάμενος* (properly applied to shoes, not hair) cf. Luc. *Lex.* 5; *ὀπτὸς* (mis-analyzed as related to *ὄψομαι*, intended to mean "I have to see Larichos") cf. Luc. *Lex*. 9. *ὀπτὸς* is also the subject of a deliberate pun at 8.NN [= 8.20 K.]: *τὸν Λᾶσόν φησι τὸν ὠμὸν ἰχθὺν ὀπτὸν εἶναι φάσκειν. θαυμαζόντων δὲ πολλῶν ἐπιχειρεῖν λέγοντα ὡς ὃ ἔστιν ἀκοῦσαι τοῦτό ἐστιν ἀκουστὸν καὶ ὃ ἔστιν νοῆσαι τοῦτό ἐστιν νοητόν· ὡσαύτως οὖν καὶ ὃ ἔστιν ἰδεῖν τοῦτ' εἶναι ὀπτόν· ὥστ' ἐπειδὴ τὸν ἰχθὺν ἦν ἰδεῖν, ὀπτὸν αὐτὸν εἶναι.* He says that Lasus proclaimed the raw fish to be *opton*. And when everyone stood amazed, he explained that something which one can hear is *akouston* and something which one can know is *noeton*, so also in like manner that which one can see is *opton*, such that when it was possible to see the fish, it was *opton*). Plainly, Lasus' expertise and delight in language is on display and the audience (in the anecdote about him, in the symposium hearing the anecdote, and reading the text) is meant to laugh with and not at him—in sharp contrast to the pretentious ignorance of Pompeianus.

[149] cf. Luc. *Lex*. 1 where *τήτινον* is used, a derivative of *τῆτες*, apparently a correct usage but a markedly Atticist one, and Luc. *Lex.* 9 where *ἄδικος* is, as here, used to denote "with legal business suspended" but in the accepted usage it means "unjust".

[150] This word had changed meaning radically by Athenaeus' time, and in contemporary or more recent sources it means "baseless" or "unsupportable"; in its Classical Attic sense however, as in Plato *Laws* 686b, it means "invincible" *vel sim*., clearly the sense intended here in reference to Roman power.

Pompeianus has been conjectured as the historical inspiration for Lucian's character or vice-versa.[151] Cynulcus takes aim at a different facet of the Ulpianean ideology, which does not appear in Lucian or in (e.g.) Phrynichus: the rejection of Latin loanwords in Atticizing Greek usage. In 3.98c [= 3.53 K.] he describes the Ulpianean sophists as *οἱ καὶ τὸ μιλιάριον καλούμενον ὑπὸ Ῥωμαίων, τὸ εἰς [τοῦ] θερμοῦ ὕδατος κατεργασίαν κατασκευαζόμενον, ἰπνολέβητα ὀνομάζοντες, πολλῶν ὀνομάτων ποιηταὶ καὶ πολλοῖς παρασάγγαις ὑπερδραμόντες τὸν Σικελιώτην Διονύσιον* (those who name that which is called *miliarium* by the Romans—the thing constructed for the production of hot water—an *ipnolebes*, being crafters of many words and outstripping Dionysius the Sicilian by many miles.) The word *ἰπνολέβης* is otherwise attested only in *Lexiphanes* and appears to mean "steamer" or "smokepot". The more significant feature of this description, however, is that Cynulcus mocks this circle of would-be Attic purists for their refusal to use a word of Latin origin (*miliarium*, presumably a name in reference to this apparatus' being shaped like a mile-marker) and instead adopting, or even inventing, this obscure Greek term. He makes the point that, by rejecting a common loanword, they make their Atticized speech much less intelligible than if they simply employed a word in general usage. Moreover, he makes this point by expressing the metaphorical lengths of their ludicrous pedantry in terms of a common Persian loanword, *παρασάγγαις*[152]. Clearly Cynulcus, who has just made the case for himself as a superior knower of Attic—in that he argues for the non-existence of "Atticism" per se—is comfortable using foreign terms in the natural flow of speech.

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[151]Baldwin (1976) 35; Hall (1981) 288-9. Whether Lexiphanes represents a specific person is, as discussed in the previous chapter, by no means a settled matter; it is however difficult to imagine that Lexiphanes is not intended to target the same group of which Pompeianus and Ulpian are members. See also Jones (1986) 103-4, speculating that Athenaeus read the *Lexiphanes* and based his depiction of the "Ulpianean sophists" on Lucian's character; this theory makes much more sense with a later dating of Athenaeus, but with a ca. 190 CE date it is less likely that Lucian is a source for Athenaeus (or vice-versa) than it is that they both draw on common contemporary or recent references.

[152] Translated above as "miles", and attested in Euripides, Sophocles, Herodotus, and especially Xenophon from the Classical Attic period; in the second and third centuries CE, it is found in Lucian, Arrian, Aristides, Plutarch, Galen, and three other times in Athenaeus.

4.1.2 Loanwords and Latinisms

The comfort with loanwords demonstrated by Cynulcus and others provokes another outburst later on, and Athenaeus gives Cynulcus the opportunity to expound upon the subject in defiance of Ulpian:

> ἐπὶ τούτοις λεχθεῖσιν ὁ Κύνουλκος πιεῖν ᾔτησε δηκόκταν, δεῖν λέγων ἁλμυροὺς λόγους γλυκέσιν ἀποκλύζεσθαι νάμασι. πρὸς ὃν ὁ Οὐλπιανὸς σχετλιάσας καὶ τύψας τῇ χειρὶ τὸ προσκεφάλαιον ἔφη 'μέχρι πότε βαρβαρίζοντες οὐ παύσεσθε; ἢ ἕως ἂν καταλιπὼν τὸ συμπόσιον οἴχωμαι, πέττειν ὑμῶν τοὺς λόγους οὐ δυνάμενος;' (3.121f [= 3.94 K.])
>
> After these things had been said, Cynulcus asked for some *decocta* to drink, saying that he needed to wash away salty words with sweet waters. In response, Ulpian flew into a rage and striking his forehead with his hand said 'When will you cease committing barbarisms? Will it not be until I should abandon this symposium and go on my way, unable to stomach these words of yours?'

The Latin *decocta*, a cold drink attributed to Nero, is responsible for provoking Ulpian's ire when he accuses Cynulcus of barbarizing his speech with this foreign term.[153] But Cynulcus is ready to refute this charge, and subsequently launches into a discussion that calls into question the entire ideology upon which Ulpian's use of Attic Greek appears to be premised.[154] He excuses his slippage into Latin by citing to the length of his stay in imperial Rome (*Ῥώμῃ τῇ βασιλούσῃ*, 3.121f) as the culprit. No wonder the occasional *decocta* has boiled over into Cynulcus' Greek, since he has been using the local language habitually (*ἐπιχωρίῳ κέχρημαι κατὰ τὴν συνήθειαν φωνῇ*).

It is worth considering this remark in view of two comments on Rome in the first book of the *Deipnosophists*. The first is this statement at 1.3c [= 1.4 K.], attributed to Athenaeus: *καὶ ἐπὶ τὰς ἑστιάσεις δὲ παρακαλῶν πατρίδα, φησί, τὴν Ῥώμην πᾶσιν ἀποφαίνει*. (And by inviting them to

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[153] Dubuisson (1984).

[154] In contrast with the cook at 9.376d [= 9.19 K.], who as a disinterested party will not press the issue: ἰσίκια γὰρ 'ὀνομάζειν αἰδοῦμαι' τὸν Οὐλπιανόν, καίπερ αὐτὸν εἰδὼς ἡδέως αὐτοῖς χρώμενον. πλὴν ὁ ἐμός γε συγγραφεὺς Πάξαμος τῶν ἰσικίων μέμνηται. καὶ οὔ μοι φροντὶς Ἀττικῶν χρήσεων. For I am ashamed to name *isikia* [= Latin *insicia*, 'mincemeat'] in Ulpian's presence, though I know he likes eating them. Besides, a writer I like, Paxamus, mentions *isikia*. Also, I don't care about Attic usage.

the banquests, [Athenaeus] says, [Larensius] made Rome appear as a homeland for all of them).[155] The second comes shortly after, at at 1.20 [=1.36 K.]: *οὐκ ἄν τις σκοποῦ πόρρω τοξεύων λέγοι τὴν Ῥώμην πόλιν ἐπιτομὴν τῆς οἰκουμένης· ἐν ᾗ συνιδεῖν ἔστιν οὕτως πάσας τὰς πόλεις ἱδρυμένας…* (one would not be far off in saying that the city of Rome is an epitome of the inhabited world, in which it is possible to behold all cities settled thus…). Athenaeus' work is clearly situated in a cosmopolitan Rome where all Greek intellectuals, as far as their host is concerned, are welcome to make themselves at home. Yet from Ulpian's perspective, even the slightest Latinism creeping into Cynulcus' speech is enough to confirm every disparaging remark about him and (one might presume, from the plural *βαρβαρίζοντες*) all other Cynics. In the Roman context of the work, therefore, Ulpian's hostility towards Latin seriously diminishes his own status. Ulpian is only appointed symposiarch because Larensius, a Roman who recognizes and celebrates the opportunities created by the presence of so many Greek intellectuals in Rome, allows him to. On one hand, therefore, this exchange reveals Ulpian's inability or unwillingness to recognize that the contemporary resurgence of interest in Atticism has come about in no small part because of Roman support. On the other hand, Cynulcus' response shows Athenaeus bringing two different language ideologies into direct conflict. Ulpian considers Attic tinged with Latin to be barbarism because it offends against his ideas regarding purity; Cynulcus, however, exposes the intellectual dishonesty inherent to this idea of what is or is not "pure" Attic:

> καὶ γὰρ παρὰ τοῖς ἀρχαίοις ποιηταῖς καὶ συγγραφεῦσι τοῖς σφόδρα ἑλληνίζουσιν ἔστιν εὑρεῖν καὶ Περσικὰ ὀνόματα κείμενα διὰ τὴν τῆς χρήσεως συνήθειαν, ὡς τοὺς παρασάγγας καὶ τοὺς ἀστάνδας ἢ ἀγγάρους καὶ τὴν σχοῖνον ἢ τὸν σχοῖνον· μέτρον δ' ἐστὶ τοῦτο ὁδοῦ μέχρι νῦν οὕτως παρὰ πολλοῖς καλούμενον. μακεδονίζοντάς τ' οἶδα πολλοὺς τῶν Ἀττικῶν διὰ τὴν ἐπιμιξίαν. (3.122a [=3.94 K.])

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[155] Compare Larensius' attitude with (e.g.) that of Umbricius in Juvenal, *Sat.* 3.59-60:
…non possum ferre, Quirites,/Graecam urbem. quamvis quota portio faecis Achaei?
…I cannot, o Quirites, abide/ a Greek city. Yet how many of these dregs are Achaean?
On the subject of racist attitudes (like that of Umbricius) towards ethnically Syrian Greek-speakers, see the discussion of Juvenal in the next chapter.

> For even among the ancient poets and historians, who Hellenize all too well, it is possible to find Persian words attested (*keimena*) too on account of their custom in usage, such as *parasangai* and *astandai* and *angaroi* and *schoinos* in feminine or masculine; and this last is a measure of distance, referred to in this way in many sources up to the present day. And I know many Attic writers who Macedonize, due to their dealings with them.[156]

If Ulpian, like Phrynichus and other more prescriptive Atticists, considers the antiquity of a source as evidence of its validity then he must acknowledge that loanwords are by no means a new phenomenon in Attic or any other Greek literature. Moreover, the fact that his earlier reference to *parasangai* went unremarked upon reveals Ulpian's own unreflective prior acceptance of this Persian loanword and others by implication.

Ulpian's shaky grasp of what is or is not "pure" Greek is highlighted later on by his false suggestion, at 8.362 [= 8.63 K.] that someone else has used an illegitimate Latin derivative to describe a boisterous celebration (*αὐλῶν τε βόμβος καὶ κυμβάλων ἦχος ἔτι τε τυμπάνων κτύπος μετὰ ᾠδῆς ἅμα γινόμενος*) taking place outside the symposium. Myrtilus (whose expertise he has questioned before[157]) then corrects him:

> καί τινος εἰπόντος ὅτι βαλλίζουσιν οἱ κατὰ τὴν πόλιν ἅπαντες τῇ θεῷ, 'ὦ λῷστε'[158], ὁ Οὐλπιανὸς γελάσας ἔφη, 'καὶ τίς Ἑλλήνων τοῦτο βαλλισμὸν ἐκάλεσεν, δέον εἰρηκέναι κωμάζουσιν ἢ χορεύουσιν ἤ τι ἄλλο τῶν εἰρημένων. σὺ δὲ ἡμῖν ἐκ τῆς Συβούρας ὄνομα πριάμενος "ἀπώλεσας τὸν οἶνον ἐπιχέας ὕδωρ"[159].' καὶ ὁ Μυρτίλος ἔφη· 'ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ Ἑλληνικώτερον ἀποδείξω σοι τὸ ὄνομα, ὦ φίλε Ἐπιτίμαιε. …. Ἐπίχαρμος, ὦ θαυμασιώτατε, ἐν τοῖς Θεαροῖς μέμνηται τοῦ βαλλισμοῦ, καὶ οὐ μακράν ἐστι τῆς Σικελίας[160] ἡ Ἰταλία. ἐν οὖν τῷ δράματι οἱ θεωροὶ καθορῶντες τὰ ἐν Πυθοῖ ἀναθήματα καὶ περὶ ἑκάστου λέγοντές φασι καὶ τάδε·
>
> λέβητες χάλκιοι,
> κρατῆρες, ὀδελοί. τοῖς γα μὰν ὑπωδέλοις
> και †λωτε† βαλλιζόντες †σιοσσον† χρῆμα
> εἴη.†

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[156] Compare this last remark with Phrynichus' censure of Macedonisms in *Ecl.* 354 and 383.
[157] cf. 3.83b [= 3.25 K.] where Ulpian accuses Myrtilus of sending everyone on a wild goats' chase with a spurious attestation of the word *κιτρίον*.
[158] Recall that this phrase is remarked upon in Lucian, *Lexiphanes* and *Professor of Rhetoric*, as a pretentious hyper-Atticism used by the title characters to affect Attic speech without a firm grasp of the dialect.
[159] Aristias, *TrGF* 9 F 4 [= p. 563 N].
[160] Sicily (possibly but not definitively Syracuse) being the birthplace of Epicharmus and the area where he was active as a playwright in the late 6th/early 5th century BCE.

> And when someone said that everyone throughout the city was *ballizousin* (singing and dancing about) to the god, Ulpian laughed and said "Sirrah—pray tell, who among the Greeks called this '*ballismos*'? You ought to have said *komazousin* or *cheoreuousin* or some other one of the expressions actually uttered. But by fetching us a word out of the Subura, you have 'ruined our wine by pouring water in'." And Myrtilus said, "But I will show you that the word is, in fact, quite Greek, o Nitpicker … Epicharmus has mentioned the word *ballismos*, you most wonderful fellow, in his *Sacred Envoys*, and Sicily is no great distance from Italy. And in the drama, as the envoys are beholding the offerings at Delphi and talking about each one, they also say the following:
>
> brazen basins,
> kraters, spits. And indeed, on the spit-supports
> also [corrupt] dancing about (*ballizontes*) [corrupt] wealth
> might be

Myrtilus then goes on to adduce usages in Sophron and Alexis as further evidence in support of his own Greek and against Ulpian's, further cementing the Hellenism of *βαλλίζω/βαλλισμός*. These two exchanges clearly show Ulpian to be a deficient practitioner of Atticism and/or Hellenism, albeit in slightly different ways. Myrtilus exposes Ulpian's failure to distinguish between Greek and non-Greek but does so within the same framework as Ulpian—antiquity means validity, and Ulpian falls short by his own standards. Cynulcus, in contrast, seems to reject Ulpian's standards of Greek entirely by asserting that words of diverse origin have become acceptably Greek as a matter of convention, just as this group of Greek-speakers are made to feel at home among Romans.

Cynulcus undercuts his message of inclusion, however, with further digs at Ulpian and his Syrian heritage. At 3.126a [= 100 K.] the diners receive "flat cakes of milk, breadcrumbs, and honey, which Romans call *libum*" (*πλακοῦς ἐκ γάλακτος ἰτρίων τε καὶ μέλιτος, ὃν Ῥωμαῖοι λίβον καλοῦσι*). At the sight of them, Cynulcus mocks Ulpian's refusal to use conventional Latin loan-words by saying "eat your fill, Ulpian, of your ancestral *chthorodlapson*, which has never been written in any ancient source, by Demeter, except I suppose in those historians of Phoenicia, your fellow citizens Sanchouniathon and Mochos." ('*ἐμπίπλασο, Οὐλπιανέ, χθωροδλαψου πατρίου, ὃς παρ' οὐδενὶ τῶν παλαιῶν μὰ τὴν Δήμητρα γέγραπται πλὴν εἰ μὴ ἄρα παρὰ τοῖς τὰ Φοινικικὰ*

συγγεγραφόσι Σαγχουνιάθωνι καὶ Μώχῳ, τοῖς σοῖς πολίταις[161].'). This cutting and indeed racist remark si shows Cynulcus' unwillingness to grant Ulpian status as a Hellene after his misguided attempts to enforce Greek linguistic purity. If Ulpian refuses to use Latin words, then perhaps they should simply use the terminology of his native Aramaic? Of course, the standards by which Ulpian fails as an Atticist are his own, not Cynulcus', but nonetheless he twists the knife further in calling Ulpian *καλέ μου Συραττικέ* (3.126f [= 3.100 K.]) shortly thereafter. Cynulcus' use of this term ensures that Ulpian's misguided approach to Greek, including his insistence that others conform to his standards, will serve to remind all present of his barbarian heritage. His overly aggressive Atticist agenda has, therefore, prevented him from claiming Greekness on the basis of his linguistic expertise—which, as Athenaeus has written it, has been deficient all along.

4.2 Fronto and the Edges of Romanness

This section will discuss Fronto's self-positioning in relationship to the Latin and Greek languages, first drawing on the evidence from his own writing and then returning to Gellius to contrast the representation of Fronto in the *Attic Nights* with the impression elsewhere. Fronto can be labeled a prescriptivist first and foremost, based on comments such as that in *Ep. ad M. Caes.* 5.3: *Miserere, unum verbum de oratione ablega et quaeso, ne umquam eo utaris: 'dictionem' pro 'orationem'* (Please, remove one word from your speech and, I beg you, use it no longer: 'diction' for 'oration'.). Marcus replies (*ad M. Caes.* 5.4) by saying *Cras me de hoc verbo tibi, si admonueris, defendam* (Tomorrow, if you remind me, I shall defend my usage of this word to you.) The future emperor's usage is not without support, as (for instance) Cicero uses it several

[161] The use of *polites* in reference to Syrians is especially salient, given that non-Greek barbarians by definition do not belong to a *polis* but rather a *patria*; Cynulcus' use of the term is therefore ironic. Cf. Lucian, *Solecist* 5 where Socrates of Mopsus jokes that someone who calls a fellow-citizen *patriotes* must be a barbarian. Compare also with *Lexiphanes*, where Lycinus mentions that Lexiphanes' other Syrian friends call him "the Hellene".

times in *De Oratore*[162], but it should be remembered that Fronto does not consider Cicero a consistently good guide to Latin vocabulary, despite his general admiration for the man:[163]

> Eum ego arbitror usquequaque verbis pulcherrimis elocutum et ante omnis alios oratores ad ea quae ostentare vellet, ornanda magnificum fuisse. Verum is mihi videtur a quaerendis scrupulosius verbis procul afuisse vel magnitudine animi vel fuga laboris vel fiducia non quaerenti etiam sibi quaevix aliis quaerentibus subvenirent, praesti adfutura. (*Ad M. Caes.* 4.3.3)[164]
>
> I deem him to have spoken in every circumstance with the most beautiful words, and to have been magnificent and above all other orators at embellishing the things he wanted to show forth. However, he seems to me to have been quite far off from searching out words carefully, whether from greatness of mind or avoidance of effort or confidence that whatever would scarcely come to others who searched for it would be readily at hand for himself.

Those writers he does regard as reliable models worthy of imitation are, by comparison, those who have taken special care in seeking out the right *insperata atque inopinata verba* (unexpected or unlooked for words)[165] and whom he counts as *veterum scriptorum*.[166] The correct usage of words is, for Fronto, the key to good speech and effective rhetoric.[167] Like Phrynichus, Fronto advances a prescriptivist ideology guided by archaism and he exhibits this Latin archaizing tendency perhaps most clearly of any Latin author.[168] As a consequence, he also firmly opposes neologism: *Verbum aliquod adquiras non fictum aperte (nam id quidem absurdum est), sed usurpatum concinnius aut congrentius aut accommodatius.* (You should obtain some other word, not a clearly made-up one—for that is indeed absurd—but one seized upon quite harmoniously,

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[162] Cic. *De Or.* 1.22, 52, 64, 108, 152, 157; 2.269.
[163] Marache (1952) 169-70.
[164] This letter is a general admonishment to Marcus that he has been careless in his usage, as made clear in §7.
[165] See discussion of Fronto's *Latinitas* in Chapter Two – the list from *Ad M. Caes*. 4.3.2 includes Cato, Sallust, Ennius, Coelius, Naevius, Lucretius, Accius, Caecilius, Laberius, Novius, Pomponius, Atta, Sisenna, and Lucilius, the last five of them recommended *particulatim* (in specific cases).
[166] This collocation appears in *Ad M. Caes* 1.7.2 and 4.3.2; other references to *vetus* usage or *veteres* writers/orators are found at *Ad M. Caes.* 2.2.3, 3.17.3, 4.3.3; *Ad Ant. Imp*. 3.1.2, 3.1.11; *Ad Ver. Imp*. 2.9, 2.13, 2.19 (2); *Ad Amicos* 1.1, 1.20; Marcus uses the term only once in reference to usage, at *Ad M. Caes.* 2.6.1.
[167] Marache (1952) 139: "Le mot est l'instrument artistique par excellence…. Le choix des mots est une opération bien à part, bien distincte de l'invention des arguments et du sujet."
[168] Marache (1952) 150-179.

or fittingly, or suitably. *Ad Anton. de orat.* 13).[169] It is worth remarking that Fronto's recommendation to use rare and unusual words has a near-echo in Lucian, *RP* 16 where the Professor instructs the reader to add *ἀπόρρητα καὶ ξένα ῥήματα, σπανιάκις ὑπὸ τῶν πάλαι εἰρημένα* (unspoken and strange words, seldom uttered by the ancients); it is possible therefore that Fronto in *Ad M. Caes.* 4.3 taps into the same strain of rhetoric that Lucian satirizes in his own work. The great difference between Fronto and the Professor, of course, is that Fronto advises careful and harmonious usage that will impress an elite audience while the Professor assumes that the average lay listener will be too dazzled by Attic vocabulary to notice if one's speech fails to hang together.

The archaizing tendency constitutes a major component of Fronto's prescriptive philosophy of language. It acts in support of another ideological dimension, that of Latin linguistic purity. In fact, as the rest of this section will show, Fronto's purist approach to Latinity is the true central principle around which his commentary revolves. Marcus Aurelius went as far as to say, on the subject of Fronto's purist language, *de elegantia quid dicam, nisi te Latine loqui, nos ceteros neque Graece neque Latine.* (*Ad Anton. Imp.* 1.4.2: as regards elegance, what may I say but that *you* speak Latin, while the rest of us speak neither Greek nor Latin). For Fronto, the ideal Latin must be free of Greek influence and allowed to stand on its own. Only this version of the language can effectively signal the *Latinitas* that he considers essential to his own practice of Romanness and his role as both Roman magistrate and master of rhetoric. It is tempting to view his ideologies surrounding the question of proper literary Latin as a transference of the Atticist

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[169]It is worth mentioning that Quintilian, who as discussed in Chapter Two endorsed the judicious creation of neologism, had presaged this archaizing tendency at *Inst.* 2.5.21: *Duo autem genera maxime cauenda pueris puto: unum, ne quis eos antiquitatis nimium admirator in Gracchorum Catonisque et aliorum similium lectione durescere uelit; fient enim horridi atque ieiuni…* (However, I there are two kinds of things for schoolboys to avoid the most: one, that none of them, in their reading of the Gracchi and Cato and others of similar vintage, wish to ossify into being an excessive admirer of antiquity; for they will become unpolished and lacking…). Quintilian's other concern, naturally enough, is that one become too enamored of recent literature and lose contact with ancient models.

position exemplified by Phrynichus onto Latin, with the effect of making Fronto's purist stance a reactionary one in the face of widespread interest in Greek (including in his pupil Marcus). This explanation is plausible, but Fronto need not have directly adapted the Atticist approach, given the role of expertise as the sole currency in any community of practice—whatever its language.[170]

4.2.1 Fronto and Greek, Crossing the Boundary

Greek vocabulary and references to Greek sources are not uncommon in Fronto's extant writing. Even in the absence of any surviving Greek text, one would have to assume Fronto's familiarity with Greek language and literature, and indeed with the Atticism of the Second Sophistic, because every piece of biographical evidence regarding Fronto and his career indicates that he was in frequent contact with members of the Hellenophone Roman elite classes.[171] Six of the letters between Fronto and Marcus Aurelius[172] refer to Herodes Atticus, for instance, and *Ad M. Caes*. 3.3 suggests Fronto knew or knew of Herodes well enough from their legal interactions[173] to have formed a strong opinion about him—Herodes is *iste Herodes*, Fronto claims not to have known of his friendship with Marcus, and he calls him G*raeculum et indoctum*. That being said, in *Ad M. Caes*. 1.6 Marcus advises Fronto to send Herodes a letter of condolence following the death of his infant, which Fronto writes (*Ad M. Caes.* 2.1) in Herodes'

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[170] Marache (1952) 119: "Si la solution qu'il a cherchée pour résoudre le problème littéraire latin est analogue à celle qu'avaient choisie les atticistes, c'est un peu parce que l'atticisme de langue et le pédantisme qu'il se trouvait satisfaire ont marqué le milieu dans lequel vivait Fronton." (If the solution that he sought out to resolve the Latin literary problem is analogous to that which the Atticists chose, it is in some small measure because linguistic Atticism, and the pedantry that it satisfied, marked the environment in which Fronto lived.)

[171] Norden (1898) 362: Fronto, der Hauptvertreter des lateinischen Archaismus, der begeisterte Verehrer der ältesten Litteratur, der erbitterte Feind des Neoterikers Seneca, war mit den hervorragendsten griechischen Atticisten eng befreundet: mit Herodes Atticus war er, obwohl er einmal in einem Prozefs sein Gegner war, sehr vertraut; Polemon wurde von M. Aurel in einem Brief an Fronto citiert, er hörte ihn deklamieren. (Fronto, the chief representative of Latin archaism, the spirited admirer of the oldest literature, the bitter enemy of the Neoteric Seneca, was a close friend of the most eminent Greek Atticists; he was well acquainted with Herodes Atticus, despite being his opponent once in a trial; Polemon was cited in a letter from M. Aurelius to Fronto, he heard him give a speech.)

[172] *Ad M. Caes*. 1.6 (from Marcus), 3.3, 3.4, 4.2 (from Marcus), *Ad Ant. Imp*. 3.4, *Ad Ver. Imp*. 1.8.

[173] As opposing counsels in the case of one Demostratus, Fronto having been on the *pro Demostrato* side.

Attic (or at least Atticizing) Greek. Fronto, however, always has in sight a clear division between Greek and Latin language and literature. Like Gellius, who counted him among his teachers, Fronto writes in Latin that freely admits the odd Greek term, expression, or quotation. This similarity notwithstanding, where Gellius for the most part regards Greek (whether in Attic or any other form) as one component of his overarching vision of Roman intellectualism, Fronto considers Greek pursuits separate from—and to some extent irreconcilable with—his own Latinist project.

As a result, Fronto distances himself from Greek even when he uses the language himself, drawing attention to the fact that when he writes in Greek he is using a language not his own, and he uses Greek in manner that is unmistakably marked, specifically as a tool to negotiate the highly charged social context in which his letters exist. Technical usage of Greek tends to be clearly framed as such, for example *Ad M. Caes.* 3.16: *Quo ex homine nata inversa oratio videtur, quam Graece εἰρωνείαν appellant.* (From which man [= Socrates] the practice of 'opposite speech' appears to have originated, which in Greek they call *irony*.)[174] In other cases, Fronto conspicuously distances himself from Greek, as in *Ad M. Caes.* 2.11:[175]

> Encomiographos istic audimus, Graecos scilicet, sed miros mortales, ut ego, qui a Graeca litteratura tantum absum, quantum a terra Graecia mons Caelius meus abest, tamen me sperem illis conparatum etiam Theopompum aequiparare posse; nam hunc audio apud Graecos disertissimum natum esse. Igitur paene me Opicum animantem ad Graecam scripturam perpulerunt "homines", ut Caecilius ait, "incolumi scientia".
>
> In that place we have heard praise-writers, Greek ones to be sure, but astonishing men, such that I, one who is as far from Greek literature as my Mount Caelius is from the land of Greece, nevertheless still wish that Theopompus could compare me with those men; for I hear this man is the most learned among the Greeks. Therefore, they have nearly driven me, living as a barbarian though I am, towards Greek literature—those "men with unimpaired knowledge," as Caecilius said.

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[174] See Appendix D.1 for additional examples of this practice.
[175] Less verbose is the simple contrast drawn at *Ad Ant. de eloq*. 5: nihil de Graeco in nostram linguam pariter convertendum. This chapter (somewhat lacunose) is discussed further below.

Marcus, in contrast, often interweaves Greek into his Latin prose without marking it, as in *Ad M. Caes.* 2.10: *Polemona ante hoc triduum declamantem audivimus, ἵνα τι καὶ περὶ ἀνθρώπων λαλήσωμεν* (Three days ago I heard Polemo giving a speech, *that we may also say something about men*) or *Ad Ant. Imp.* 2.2.2 *Tum demum ἐγὼ θαρσήσω τοῖς βεβουλευμένοις, cum fuerint ab illo comprobata.* (Then at least *I shall have confidence in those who have taken counsel*, since [those things] will have been confirmed by him.) Marcus appears to be engaging in true code-switching, with his Greek and Latin part of the same expressive act; the brief intrusions of Greek into Fronto's writing, in contrast, is not code-switching but a metalinguistic practice that invoking Fronto and Marcus' shared educational training and their technical understanding of style.[176]

Fronto's Greek letters, at least those which he represents as written by his own hand,[177] do however constitute a true example of code-switching on his part but, even as such, they do not signify a cultural alignment with Greece. Instead, Fronto's Greek writings are a practical tool for negotiating the complex social dynamics of the circles in which he travels. The clearest example of this phenomenon is *Ad Amicos* 1.2,[178] a letter of recommendation to P. Aelius Apollonides[179] on behalf of Sulpicius Cornelianus[180] that is written in Greek because it must serve in a Hellenophone setting. As discussed in the introduction to this chapter, Roman Imperial documents in the Greek East tend to be in Greek, and this brief letter follows that pattern. In

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[176] Swain (2004) 27.
[177] In contrast to the statement at *Ad Ant. Pium.* 8.1: *Alexandriam ad familiares meos scripsi, ut Athenas festinarent ibique me opperirentur, iisque Graecarum epistularum curam doctissimis viris detuli.* (I have written to Alexandria to my acquaintances, for them to hasten to Athens and await me there, and I have assigned the care for Greek letters to those most learned men.)
[178] Swain (2004) 21.
[179] The *ab epistulis Graecis* at the time; cf. Eck, W. "P. Aelius Apollonides, ab epistulis graecis, und ein Brief des Cornelius Fronto." *ZPE* 91 (1992): 193-6.
[180] This individual is in all likelihood the same Cornelianus who became *ab epistulis Graecis* under Commodus and to whom Phrynichus addresses his *Ecloga*. cf. Fischer (1974) 44-7, Champlin (1980) 29-30.

contrast, *Ep. addit.* 4 and 5, the letters in Greek between Fronto and Appian, represent a slightly different case that is not as clearly pragmatic. Appian's Latin, one must assume from the career he had in Rome,[181] was beyond reproach; Fronto would certainly have been understood perfectly had he written in that language. Moreover, Fronto's relatively higher social status would have enabled him to use Latin as the language for their interaction, if he should so choose. Why, therefore, does he write to Appian in Greek? As Swain suggests, the reason may be found in Plutarch *On Losing Face* (*Περὶ δυσωπίας*): [182] in an autocratic regime, a social superior such as Fronto must constantly negotiate his own status or risk having it devalued by those above him. Writing in Greek and *not* Latin, Fronto asserts his superior status much as he asserts the superior status of Rome to Athens:

> οὐδὲ γὰρ οὐδ᾽ ἐκεῖνό σ᾽ ἀγνοεῖν οἶμαι, ὡς αἱ πλεῖσταί γε τῶν εὐδοξοτάτων καὶ εὐνομουμένων πόλεων οὐκ ἐδέξαντο τὰ μεγάλα δῶρα · ὥσπερ ἡ Ρωμαίων πόλις πολλὰ πολλάκις παρὰ πλείστων πεμπόμενα οὐ προσήκατο, ἡ δὲ τῶν ᾽Αθηναίων βαρύτερα τῶν προσηκόντων ἐκλέγουσα, οὐ πάνυ τι ὤνατο. (*Ep. addit.* 5.2)
>
> For I do not suppose that you are at all unaware that the majority of the most glorious and well-governed cities did not accept great gifts; thus the city of the Romans often did not accept many gifts sent by a great many peoples, while the city of the Athenians, taking in heavier gifts than was fitting, did not by any means benefit thereby.

The thinly-veiled implication here is that Fronto *could* switch the discourse into Latin, but instead he is so assured of his superior status that he has no need to assert it. Moreover, Fronto is a Roman whose Latin is assumed; by sticking to Greek he effectively denies Appian his Roman identity and thus weakens his position in their dispute. His letter to Herodes Atticus (*M. Caes.* 2.1), offering condolences for the sudden death of Herodes' infant child, is similar. Whether

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[181] Appian, *Hist. Rom.* pr. 62: τίς δὲ ὢν ταῦτα συνέγραψα, πολλοὶ μὲν ἴσασι καὶ αὐτὸς προέφηνα, σαφέστερον δ'εἰπεῖν, Ἀππιανὸς Ἀλεξανδρεύς, ἐς τὰ πρῶτα ἥκων ἐν τῇ πατρίδι καὶ δίκαις ἐν Ῥώμῃ συναγορεύσας ἐπὶ τῶν βασιλέων, μέχρι με σφῶν ἐπιτροπεύειν ἠξίωσαν. (Who I am who have written these things, many people know and I myself have explained; but to speak more plainly, I am Appian of Alexandria, who, having reached the foremost ranks in my homeland, and taken part in suits in Rome before the emperors, until they deemed me worthy of being their procurator.)

[182] Swain (2004) 25

Fronto's sympathy is genuine or simply a performance of his duty to Marcus, writing in Herodes' preferred Greek is an effective means of demonstrating his sincerity in performing it.[183] At the same time, Herodes is of relatively higher status in the Imperial circle, so Fronto may not have had the social wherewithal to write in Latin. But neither party can have lost sight of the larger context in which this letter was written, namely, the request from Marcus that Fronto write this letter of consolation (*M. Caes.* 1.6.10). Fronto is only writing this letter because of his own personal connection to the emperor, and thus the act of writing it—even if it defers to Herodes in choice of language—reinforces this connection.

This complex process of negotiating status and identity through language makes another appearance in *Ad Ver. Imp.* 1.12, a bilingual letter that concludes with a note in Greek to Charilas, one of Verus' freedmen: *ad libertum vestrum Charilam perscripsi his, si recte memini, verbis: "οἶσθ' εἰ σήμερον εὔκαιρόν ἐστιν ἀφικέσθαι με πρὸς αὐτούς; σύ μοι δήλωσον ὡς ἀνὴρ εὔφρων κἀμοὶ φίλος· καινὰ ὅσ' ἐπίστελλε."* (…to your freedman Charilas I have written in these words, if I remember correctly: "*Do you know if tomorrow will be an opportune time for me to come to them? Tell me, as you are a sensible man and dear to me; write as many new letters [as you can]."*) One can interpret this language choice in three ways. The first of these is to assume that, since Charilas' first language is likely Greek while Verus' is Latin, Fronto will be more confident that his message will be understood if he simply addresses Charilas in Greek. Another way to understand the letter is to consider that, as an Imperial freedman, Charilas is perhaps higher-status than Fronto and, therefore, Fronto defers to him by writing in Charilas' first language rather than making him read Latin. The third interpretation, which incorporates the previous two, is to conclude that, by writing the note to Charilas in Greek, Fronto is in fact deferring to *Verus'* (unambiguously) higher status. It may be taboo to address an imperative in Latin to the Emperor

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[183] Champlin (1980) 50, 105, 107.

himself—and note that he does not say *refer ei haec verba* (vel sim.)—but appropriate to direct one to a freedman. More significantly, though, by switching into Greek Fronto relieves Charilas of the need to read a language other than his own, and Verus of the task of translating (or having translated) the request from Latin into Greek. Moreover, the linguistic division of the letter symbolizes the gulf in status between Verus, whose position as supreme Roman is realized through Latinity, and his Greek freedman.

Two sets of letters remain to discuss, and they are the most polished and literary (and extensive) of Fronto's extant Greek writings. They also display, arguably, the most complex constructions of literary identity on Fronto's part, and the choice of linguistic medium plays a significant role in this aspect of them. The first of these sets contains the letters of affection between Marcus and Fronto, *Addit*. 7 & 8, the former in Latin from Marcus and the latter the Greek letter from Fronto to which *Addit.*7 replies. This pair of letters is set up by a third which appears to precede it, *Ad M. Caes.* 3.9, in which the newly-minted Caesar says he looks forward to reading the Greek text that Fronto has said him: *Graece nescio quid ais te conpegisse, quod ut aeque pauca a te scripta placeat tibi. Tune es, qui me nuper concastigas quorsum Graece scriberem? Mihi vero nunc potissimum Graece scribendum est.* (*Ad M. Caes.* 3.9.2: You say that you have composed something in Greek, which pleases like few pieces of your writing. Aren't you the one who lately castigates me for writing in Greek? Truly, I am now more obligated than ever to write in Greek.) It is intriguing that Fronto, who seems to dislike exchanging Greek letters with his pupil, should write such an extensive Greek text to him. The nature of this letter, however, suggests what Fronto's reasons for doing so may have been, since it is a treatise on love[184] that draws heavily on Lysias and Plato (i.e. Socrates) from Plato's *Phaedrus*; Fronto

[184] Van den Hout (1999) 560-1 considers it to be in jest; Swain (2004) 21 calls this reading "an inadequate dismissal".

explicitly acknowledges as much, and offers it up as a third component of the Platonic discussion: *Ὦ φίλε παῖ,*[185] *τρίτον δή σοι τοῦτο περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν ἐπιστέλλω, τὸ μὲν πρῶτον διὰ Λυσίου τοῦ Κεφάλου, δεύτερον δὲ διὰ Πλάτωνος τοῦ σοφοῦ, τὸ δὲ δὴ τρίτον διὰ τοῦδε τοῦ ξένου ἀνδρός, τὴν μὲν φωνὴν ὀλίγου δεῖν βαρβάρου, τὴν δὲ γνώμην, ὡς ἐγῷμαι, οὐ πάνυ ἀξυνέτου.* (*Addit*. 8: Dear boy, I write to you this third[186] [treatise] on the same [subjects], the first one by Lysias son of Kephalos, the second by the wise Plato, and the third by this foreign man, not far short of barbarous in speech, I might suppose, [but] not entirely witless in his judgment.) Note how strongly he distances himself from the Platonic model, emphasizing his un-Greekness in both place of origin (*ξένου*) and speech (*φωνὴν…βαρβάρου*) in spite of his obvious in-depth engagement with it.

A full discussion of this letter's philosophical import lies beyond the scope of this study; in general terms it problematizes the affection between master and pupil, and as a difficult subject it is best suited to a specially marked linguistic register. For a letter between two Latin speakers nothing could be more marked than writing the entire text in Greek, an act which places the discussion into a different conceptual realm sufficiently removed from regular interactions as to make it less problematic for Fronto to have written. The use of Greek serves this role precisely *because* of the Roman identity that Fronto and (*a fortiori*) Marcus both claim,[187] an identity which Fronto reinforces by calling himself a barbarian and a foreigner in this field. Nevertheless, in his Latin reply (*Addit.* 7) Marcus says of Fronto's composition: *Ceterum quod ad sensuum densitatem, quod ad inventiones argutiarum, quod ad aemulationis tuae felicitatem adtinet, nolo*

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[185] cf. Pl. *Phaedrus* 227a: *ὦ φίλε Φαῖδρε…*; *Λυσίου τοῦ Κεφάλου* ibid.
[186] Van den Hout (1999) 561 is of the opinion that Fronto has written two previous letters, analyzing the comments of Lysias and Plato on the subject of love, and that this third letter is a synthetic analysis (*conpegisse* rendered by Van den Hout, *contra* the TLL entry, as "have composed from various parts" or "have patched together" rather than simply "composed") that leads into some of Fronto's own, original thoughts.
[187] Swain (2004) 21: "This has nothing to do with 'bilingualism' as such; it is a very Roman matter."

quicquam dicere te multo placentis illos sibi et provocantis Atticos antevenisse, ac tamen nequeo quin dicam. (Anyway, as far as it regards the abundance of ideas, the crafting of lively imagery, the success of your imitation, I do not at all wish to say that you have far surpassed those challenging and self-satisfied Attics, and yet nevertheless I cannot help but say it.) He also inverts the relationship around which Fronto's discourse is written, for while Fronto refers throughout his letter to some *ἐραστής* rival to himself as *μὴ ἐρῶν*, in Marcus' reply he refers to *himself* as *erasten tuum* and places himself in the role of Socrates to Fronto's Phaedrus: *Illud equidem non temere adiuravero: Si quis iste re vera Phaeder fuit, si umquam is a Socrate afuit, non magis Socraten Phaedri desiderio quam me per istos dies ('dies' dico? 'menses', inquam) tui adspectus cupidine arsisse.* (*Addit*. 7.3: I can truly affirm, without rashness, that if there truly was a Phaedrus, if he was ever apart from Socrates, Socrates did not burn with a greater desire for Phaedrus than I have done through those days—days, did I say? I mean months!). Despite Marcus' youth, in Latin letters he must unambiguously be the *dominus*.

The letters Fronto writes in Greek to Marcus Aurelius' mother Domitia Lucilla (*Ad M. Caes*. 2.3 and 2.15), display similarly complex negotiations of cultural identity and social status. Fronto keeps her in mind in many of his letters to Marcus and vice-versa,[188] yet only two are addressed directly to her and both are in Greek. The second of these letters is the more straightforward, full of effusive flattery[189] to the great woman to help excuse Fronto's absence at

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[188] The phrases *dominam saluta*, *domina mea te salutat*, and variations on them appear some 57 times in the corpus of letters.

[189] Especially at *M. Caes.* 2.15.2: πολλαὶ δ᾽ ἂν καὶ ἄλλαι γυναικῶν τάξεις γένοιντο τῶν σοὶ μέρους τινὸς ἐπαίνου καὶ ἀρετῆς μετεχουσῶν, σοῦ μὲν ἁπάσας τὰς γυναικὶ πρεπούσας ἀρετὰς καὶ ἐπιστήμας κεκτημένης καὶ ἐπισταμένης, ὥσπερ ἡ Ἀθηνᾶ τέχνας ἁπάσας κέκτηταί τε καὶ ἐπίσταται, τῶν ἄλλων δὲ γυναικῶν ἐπὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς μέρος ἑκάστης ἐπισταμένης καὶ κατὰ τοῦτο ἐπαινουμένης, οἷος ὁ τῶν Μουσῶν ἔπαινος ἐκ μιᾶς τέχνης καὶ καθ᾽ ἑκάστην διῃρημένος. Many others would be there as the ranks of women who partake in some share of your praise and virtue, since you possess and master all those virtues and accomplishments befitting a woman, just as Athena possesses and masters every skill, while among women there belongs to each one of them some share of virtue, and she is praised for this, just as the praise of the Muses is sung to each one for a single art.

her birthday celebration. Cratia, whose relationship to Lucilla is described in *Ad M. Caes.* 2.13 as her *clienta*,[190] will be attending instead. The use of Greek is in itself an act of flattery, too, since it highlights Lucilla's own high degree of education,[191] and Fronto further flatters her high level of culture by deprecating his own.[192] He does so with Marcus in *Ad M. Caes*. 2.2.8: *Epistulam matri tuae scripsi quae mea inpudentia est Graece* (I have written a letter to your mother, which in my foolishness is in Greek), and asks if Marcus might correct it before passing it on.[193] Fronto does the same with Lucilla in *Caes.* 2.3.8, but at much greater length:

> εἴ τι τῶν ὀνομάτων ἐν ταῖς ἐπιστολαῖς ταύταις εἴη ἄκυρον ἢ βάρβαρον ἢ ἄλλως ἀδόκιμον ἢ μὴ πάνυ Ἀττικόν, ἀμελεῖν μὲν τοῦ ὀνόματος σ᾽ ἀξιῶ τήν δὲ διάνοιαν σκοπεῖν αὐτὴν καθ᾽ αὑτήν· οἶσθα γὰρ ὅτι ἐν αὐτοῖς ὀνόμασιν καὶ αὐτῇ διαλέκτῳ διατρίβω. καὶ γὰρ τὸν Σκύθην ἐκεῖνον τὸν Ἀνάχαρσιν οὐ πάνυ τι ἀττικίσαι φασίν, ἐπαινεθῆναι δ᾽ ἐκ τῆς διανοίας καὶ τῶν ἐνθυμημάτων. παραβαλῶ δὴ ἐμαυτὸν Ἀναχάρσιδι οὐ μὰ Δία κατὰ τὴν σοφίαν ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὸ βάρβαρος ὁμοίως εἶναι. ἦν γὰρ ὁ μὲν Σκύθης τῶν νομάδων Σκυθῶν, ἐγὼ δὲ Λίβυς τῶν Λιβύων τῶν νομάδων. κοινὸν δὴ τὸ νέμεσθαι ἐμοί τε καὶ Ἀναχάρσιδι· κοινὸν οὖν ἔσται καὶ τὸ βληχᾶσθαι νεμομένοις, ὅπως ἄν τις βληχήσηται. οὕτως μὲν δὴ καὶ τὸ βαρβαρίζειν τῷ βληχᾶσθαι προσῄκασα. οὐκοῦν παύσομαι μηδὲν ἕτερον γράφων ἀλλὰ εἰκόνας.
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> If any of the words in these letters should be obsolete, barbaric, otherwise illegitimate, or not fully Attic, I beg you to overlook the word and consider the meaning in and of itself; for you know that I spend my time on words and idiom. And indeed they say that that famous Scythian, Anacharsis, did not Atticize but was praised for his sentiments and conceptions. I will therefore compare myself to Anacharsis, not by Zeus in wisdom but by virtue of being likewise a barbarian. For where he was a Scythian of the Scythian nomads, I am a Libyan of the Libyan nomads. Thus I and Anacharsis may be pastured alike, may bleat alike as we graze, just as one may bleat. Thus have I likened barbarism to bleating. So I will stop writing nothing except similes.

This concluding effort at *captatio benevolentiae* represents Fronto's most dramatic distancing of himself from the Greek language and, hyperbolically, from civilization itself. Elsewhere he calls himself a "barbarian" (*barbarus, opicus*) but the usage is ambiguous; here, he is not only un-

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[190] Champlin (1980) 109.
[191] Kaimio (1979) 249-50.
[192] Swain (2004) 23.
[193] For the full relevant quotations from both letters, see Appendix D.2.

Greek but un-Roman, a nomad.[194] While the real Fronto came from a privileged background with relatively high status in Roman society,[195] he was nevertheless a provincial and, in this letter, he stretches "provincial" into "nomadic" to emphasize how much closer Lucilla is to the center of power at Rome than he. He is not an Atticist per se, but he recognizes the social signification of Atticism (especially in the Imperial court) and thus assigns a high level of competency to the Atticizers (Lucilla, e.g.) whose favorable treatment he seeks.[196] A certain tension, that between provincial and imperial, underlies all interactions between Africa and Rome[197], but here Fronto seeks to diffuse this tension (and thus any between himself and Lucilla) by drawing so much attention to it that one might suspect him of irony in his expression of self-abasement. This admission of barbarian heritage is recognizable to all involved as a literary (not literal) positioning, but it serves Fronto's larger project of using language to continue negotiating a Roman identity for himself. There was no equivalent for North Africans to the pride that someone like Herodes takes in his Hellenic background;[198] as far as the Romans were concerned there were only two languages that mattered, and neither of them was Punic.[199] By showing some measure of embarrassment in his African heritage here, while heavily disclaiming Attic Greek even as he writes in it, Fronto's self-representation gravitates towards a Roman linguistic pole.[200] Knowledge of Greek is a sign of elite status among Romans, but Fronto—who is perhaps better

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[194] *Ad. M. Caes.* 2.11, which is fragmentary, has Fronto recalling his father's use of the Punic name for a certain tree, *catachanna*.
[195] Champlin (1980) 8 calls him a "scion of the educated and Romanized political elite"; in current cultural studies, such uncritical use of the term "Romanized" is avoided, however, though Champlin does not problematize this term or schema as scholars in the twenty-first century prefer to, he nevertheless does discuss the political and linguistic implications for Fronto's upbringing provided by the evidence for his family's history and status. At the very least, he seems to have been a third-generation Roman citizen.
[196] van den Hout (1999) 59-60: Fronto had ample opportunity to learn Attic, but an obvious reason not to emphasize his training here.
[197] Champlin (1980) 10.
[198] Champlin (1980) 16-18.
[199] Garcea and Lomanto (2004) 44ff., Rochette (1995).
[200] Kaimio (1979) 247 suggests that Greek and Latin were roughly coequal in North Africa, based on Apuleius' comments on the subject (*Apol.* 98).

connected in the Greek East than in his native Numidia—takes great pains to avoid the impression that his knowledge of Greek has aligned him with Greek culture.

Some mention must also be made of Fronto's relationship with philosophy, given that his star pupil Marcus Aurelius is best known for his philosophical interests. In simple terms, Fronto shows a clear dislike for philosophy and is dismayed that Marcus has devoted himself to philosophical pursuits when, in Fronto's view, his efforts would be better expended mastering oratory. *De eloquentia* conveys this sentiment most clearly, concluding (*Ad Ant. de eloq.* 5.4) with a caricature of philosophical instruction that emphasizes what a stultifying use of time Fronto believes it to be:

> Enimvero ad philosophos librum legas; magistro interpretanti tacitus adtendas; intellexisse adnuas; aliis legentibus ipse plerumque dormites; audias τὶ τὸ πρῶτον; τὶ τὸ δεύτερον; diu multumque numerari; εἰ ἡμέρα ἐστίν, φῶς ἐστὶ fenestris patentibus laborari. Securus inde abeas, cui nihil per noctem meditandum aut conscribendum, nihil magistro recitandum, nihil pronuntiandum, nulla verbi indagatio, nullus synonymi ornatus, nihil de Graeco in nostram linguam pariter convertendum.
>
> To be sure, you would read a book to philosophers; you would sit quietly while your master expounded; you would nod to show your understanding; when others were reading, you would mostly be sleeping; you would hear *"What is the first premise? What is the second?"* repeated at great length, and the point *"If it is day, there is light*" belabored with windows wide open. Then you would leave there, without a care, with nothing for you to think about or write about at night, nothing to recite to your master, nothing to declaim, no research of any word, no elaboration of any synonym, nothing to translate from Greek into our language.

The message here is that excellent linguistic understanding, and thus true learning, does not come from philosophy but from rhetoric. By comparison, when Fronto recommends Cornelianus to Apollonides (*Ad Amicos* 1.2), he praises Cornelianus by calling him *ἀγαθῷ ἀνδρὶ κἀμοὶ φίλῳ καὶ λογίῳ καὶ οὐ φιλοσόφῳ.* (a good man, dear to me, eloquent,[201] and not a philosopher). Philosophy in the second century CE is overwhelmingly the domain of the Greeks, and Roman philosophers are simply Romans who do Greek philosophy (like Favorinus) and often

[201] It should be mentioned that Phrynichus condemns this sense of *λόγιος* as a vulgar usage, but it is the most likely translation here for Fronto's meaning.

practice it in Athens rather than Rome.[202] Fronto was not ignorant of philosophy by any means—his discourse on love makes this much quite clear—but his engagement with Greek philosophers (much like his treatment of Greek historians, rhetors, and Homer) serves his rhetorical lessons and is often superficial.[203] Because of the close relationship between philosophy and the Greek language, one could easily interpret Marcus' gentle mockery of Fronto writing *Graece* (after admonishing him for doing so), along with Marcus' statement that he has determined from now on to write *Graece*, in a different sense: *Graece scribere* may have meant not just "to write in Greek" but "to write on philosophy."[204] Fronto's persistent "othering" of Greek in his discourse, and the corresponding alignment with Latin, is the central component of his ongoing efforts to maintain his status as a Roman rhetorician, someone qualified to move in the elite political circles in which he is active. Marcus Aurelius is a Roman—perhaps more accurately *the* Roman—regardless of which language he writes in or which intellectual domain he chooses to inhabit. His status will never be called into question. But given Fronto's provincial background, in his case a Roman cultural and political identity is not necessarily a given. Thus, for Fronto at least, using Latin to the general exclusion of Greek serves to align him with oratory against philosophy, with Rome instead of Athens.

4.2.2 Latinity as Identity

From both Fronto's extant writings and Gellius' depiction of him one can observe the persistent goal of appearing, as Champlin puts it, "a paragon of Latinity."[205] Fronto's construction of Latinity, whether in his writing or Gellius, derives principally from the precise and purposeful

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[202] Champlin (1980) 57.
[203] Marache (1952) 118; Marache notes, for example, that Fronto cites Plato's judgment on Lysias in the *Phaedrus*, but seems to ignore the fact that the dialogue shows the defeat of rhetoric at the hands of philosophy.
[204] Kaimio (1979) 247.
[205] Champlin (1980) 58.

selection of distinctive vocabulary, used in Latin texts of sufficient antiquity to establish their legitimacy. Much of his writing is given over to elucidating the standards by which the appropriate register for literature (especially rhetoric) is to be judged, and these standards are the foundation of his advice on oratory. In order to speak well in Latin, one must first understand what Latin is. What Fronto achieves, or wishes himself and others to achieve, by speaking well in Latin—as opposed to Greek—is not always as apparent. One objective, as can be deduced from the nature of the texts that make up the majority of his extant writing, is certainly to obtain and secure his reputation as one whose expertise the Emperors will continue to seek (or accept even when unsought) and to maintain the relationship thereby created. As his political career would suggest, Fronto was successful in this goal. The role (real or imagined) of Latinity in clearing Fronto's way to power, however, should also be balanced against the less obvious objectives of the enterprise, specifically the ways in which he negotiates his own relationship to the Latin and Greek languages and what this relationship says about the cultural identity he projects for himself.

To be a Roman magistrate, let alone a consular one, required Fronto to outgrow his provincial origins and make Rome the primary point of reference for his professional self. This aspect of his political career stands in marked contrast to Favorinus, who elided his own involvement in Roman politics and religion (and numerous other cultural affairs, if Gellius is any indication) by committing as fully as possible to a Hellenized professional identity.[206] Favorinus, like Fronto, was a wealthy provincial from outside the Greek East, but he self-identified as a philosopher with few (or no) aspirations to political office. As discussed above, Fronto was uninterested in philosophy and regarded it a distraction from the more useful pursuit of rhetoric or sophism (*Ad Ant. de eloq.* 13, e.g.). In this regard he was not unlike Lucian. The close association

[206] Philostratus, *VS* 490.

between philosophy and Greekness, to the exclusion of Romanness, was part of Favorinus' case for *immunitas*. Herodes, conversely, succeeded in a Roman political career while embracing Greekness, but Fronto could never have done so: while Herodes was Greek by birth, Fronto's Greek (fluent as it may have been) came from school and was, conceptually if not in practice, his third language. It is one thing to speak, read, and write Greek and to understand Greek references—as Fronto frequently does in his writing—but wholly another to practice an intellectual career in Greek. He is no Atticist, though he writes in Atticized Greek; rather his Attic practice follows the prevailing norms of the time and represents a neutral (at best) stance towards Greek language debates.[207] Had Fronto pursued a Greek-language trajectory, it might have gone one of two ways: either he would have looked like Favorinus in the *Attic Nights*, with a masterful command of Latin in his personal practice but no Latin career, or he would have bypassed Latin entirely to enter into the world of Greek intellectualism. This version of Fronto might have been an African-Numidian equivalent to Lucian but for the fact that, inasmuch as any biographical details of either man can be ascertained, Fronto's family background was such that Latin was a fact of life from his first steps. So Fronto was most likely always going to have been labeled a Roman, much like Favorinus who never fully abandoned his Roman status and was, at least in some circles, never fully accorded a Hellenic identity.

Given that Fronto's status as Roman was taken partially for granted yet still somewhat unstable, his ideology of Latinity should be read as a career-defining project of self-realization as a *Roman* Roman, not merely an African-Roman. For Fronto Latin was indeed integral to his construction of a Roman self-identity, nearly to the exclusion of Greek; the way he discusses and employs Greek usage in his correspondence with the Antonines makes the relative importance of

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[207] Marache (1952) 119: "L'atticisme est une mode alors souveraine en Grèce; quand Fronton fait du grec, il atticise naturellement."

both languages plain. Though Herodes had the dual identities of Greek and Roman, the former was unconditional; for Fronto, a Roman identity was conditional to begin with, and any dilution (in the form of Greek) threatened this identity. His archaizing, purist model of good Latin is a metonym for the Roman status he claims for himself as magistrate and Imperial confidante. It therefore served Fronto's role as evangelist for Latinity to efface the true influence of Greek learning on his work, with the result that our impression of him likely does not display the full extent of this influence.[208] Marcus as the Emperor (or Emperor-to-be) can speak Latin however he wishes[209] and philosophize to his heart's content, since his status as Roman is (by definition) assured beyond all doubt. If, on the other hand, Fronto, coming from the stock of minor local nobility, is to succeed in the lofty political circles in which he traveled, then he must argue for a pure strain of Latinity and Roman intellectualism in which he can consistently demonstrate his expertise to uphold the value of his Roman cultural and political capital.

4.3 Bilingual Romanness in Gellius

The *Attic Nights* exists unmistakeably in the same world as Fronto's letters, and not merely because Fronto is a character in Gellius' work. While Gellius does not travel in the lofty circles that Fronto does, he—or more accurately, his work—also exists in an elite Roman social context populated by intellectuals with a great degree of education and, crucially, considerable

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[208] Marache (1952) 119; Champlin (1980) 58.
[209] *Ad M. Caes.* 4.3.6: Haud sciam, an quis roget: Nam quis me prohibet vestimenta lavere potius quam lavare, sudorem lavare potius quam abluere dicere? Tibi vero nemo in ea re intercedere aut modificare iure ullo poterit, qui sis liberis prognatus et equitum censum praetervehare et in senatu sententiam rogere; nos vero, qui doctorum auribus servituti serviendae nosmet dedimus, necesse est tenuia quoque ista et minuta summa cum cura persequaremur.

I would not know at all whether someone asks: "For who restrains me from saying 'to wesh my clothes' rather than 'to wash', 'to wash sweat' rather than 'to wipe off'? Certainly, in that matter no one will be able to get in your way or have any right to change your usage, you who are born of free parents and surpass the rank of knights and are asked your opinion in the senate; those of us among the learned, however, who have given ourselves over to upholding service to ears of the learned, it is also necessary to examine those subtle and minute points with the greatest care.

knowledge of and comfort with Greek language and literature. The *Attic Nights* (abbreviated *NA*, for *Noctes Atticae*) also resembles the *Learned Banqueters* of Athenaeus, viewed from the opposite perspective: in Athenaeus the primary characters are Greek intellectuals, who periodically glance outside their Atticizing symposium to take in its cosmopolitan Roman backdrop, whereas in Gellius the narrator and his various characters are Romans whose exploration of Latin phrases and Roman practices occasionally goes down a Greek rabbithole. As a result, in Gellius' discussions and his characters' dialogues, the Latin and Greek languages are frequently interwoven. In this respect, then, they resemble the letters between Fronto and Marcus Aurelius, Latin passages written by Romans but with enough quotation and discussion of Greek that the intended audience is assumed to be comfortable in both languages.[210] This bilingual practice is immediately apparent in the *praefatio*, when at P.2 Gellius informs the readers of this work that he was inspired to write it by his note-taking: *nam proinde ut librum quemque in manus ceperam seu Graecum seu Latinum vel quid memoratu dignum audieram, ita quae libitum erat, cuius generis cumque erant, indistincte atque promisce annotabam* (for whenever I had taken in hand a book in Greek or Latin, or heard something worthy of remembering, then—whatever it was, whatever genre it belonged to—I would make a note of it, copiously and indiscriminately).[211] The setting for this inspiration is apparently Attica—hence the title (P.4)—and by way of contextualizing his work in the tradition of other miscellanea he lists off the titles of 32 previous works of similar nature, of which twenty are Greek and 12 are Latin. As is typical of such passages, Gellius explains why his work will be different and superior, and not just explicitly: for instance, its greater breadth is suggested by the long list of titles, which include *Silvae* and *Λειμῶν* (forest and pastures, respectively) and *Corona* (garland) and therefore makes

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[210] Astarita (1993) 82.
[211] Gellius' self-deprecating language here fits into the well-established "*nugae*" *topos* – Catullus, e.g., employed it in his first poem and again in poem 49.

the work seem like it will be a *Silva Silvarum* or Λειμῶν Λειμώνων or *Corona Coronarum* that renders all previous efforts obsolete. In spite of his claims to novelty and advancing the field, it is also worth noting that he cites (P.12) a Greek axiom as the guiding principle for his project, Heraclitus' saying *πολυμαθίη νόον οὐ διδάσκει* (fr. 40 Diels), the antiquity of which counterbalances the ostensible novelty of purpose that distinguishes the *Attic Nights* from its predecessors. He will not be leaving behind the canonical texts, but rather engaging in a new way.

Gellius' use of Greek in the *praefatio* is a programmatic statement of both inclusivity and exclusivity. It is inclusive in the sense that he establishes early on that, just as he has not confined his education to the Latin language, he will not confine his texts to one tongue either. The world of Aulus Gellius is at least as Greco-Roman as Athenaeus' is. It is exclusive, of course, in that only a reader with both Greek and Latin can follow the discussion and even then, not every Hellenophone will immediately grasp Gellius' meaning. The Aristophanes quotation that concludes the *praefatio* (P.20) expresses a clearly elitist sentiment:[212]

> Εὐφημεῖν χρὴ κἀξίστασθαι τοῖς ἡμετέροισι χοροῖσιν
> Ὅστις ἄπειρος τοιῶνδε λόγων ἢ γνώμῃ μὴ καθαρεύει
> Ἢ γενναίων ὄργια Μουσῶν μήτ' εἶδεν μήτ' ἐχόρευσεν…
> Τούτοις αὐδῶ, καὖθις ἀπαυδῶ, καὖθις τὸ τρίτον μάλ' ἀπαυδῶ
> Ἐξίστασθαι μύσταισι χοροῖς, ὑμεῖς δ' ἀνεγείρετε μολπὴν
> Καὶ παννυχίδας τὰς ἡμετέρας, αἳ τῇδε πρέπουσιν ἑορτῇ.
>
> One must speak well, and stand apart from our choruses,
> whoever is ignorant of these words, or whose thought is impure,
> or who has neither learned nor danced the revels of the noble Muses…
> to these ones I speak, and again I speak out, and again I do speak out a third time:
> 'Stand apart from the mystic choruses, and you, raise our song
> and night-long vigils, which do befit this festival. (Ar. *Ran*. 354-6, 359-61)

Beyond the literal meaning of the quotation, the very act of quoting Aristophanes is itself an elitist one, due to the niche status of Old Comedy in the second century CE. As discussed in the previous chapter, Aristophanes and his contemporaries—while far from obscure—did not occupy

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[212] The proclamation of which had also by Gellius' time long since become a literary *topos*—Horace *Odes* 3.1, e.g.

a mainstream position in the theatrical world and were well known only to the educated set. New Comedy (Menander especially) and mime were orders of magnitude more popular. So, when Gellius uses a half-dozen lines of Aristophanes as a statement on his literary project it amounts to a doubly emphatic assertion of elite status for himself, his readers, and the text to follow.

Much as the work is couched (and titled) in Greek terms, however, the setting for the majority of the *Attic Nights* is later revealed to be Rome. Certain Greek locales are identified—the villa of Herodes Atticus, for instance—but for the most part the scenes are set against a Roman backdrop. Gellius' antiquarian practices fit into the Roman tradition through their consistent focus on the city and people of Rome itself, for instance, as well as the topography.[213] The default staging for the dialogues in this work is Rome, not Athens, and the default language is Latin, not Greek; the "Attic" of the title is therefore figurative and not literal because, while the work is nominally Greek in inspiration it is Roman in execution, Roman cultural practices (e.g. *paucula remotiora super augurio iure et pontificio*, P.13) occupy a far more prominent position than do Greek ones. In this light, Gellius' use of Greek references as programmatic statements takes on a new significance: by framing what promises to be a heavily Romanocentric literary assemblage in Greek terms, he suggests that Rome and its culture is not threatened or diminished by being placed alongside Greek. Roman speech can include Greek as well as Latin without becoming un-Roman; a Roman can be bilingual without necessarily being bicultural.[214] It is true that the two languages and cultures are interwoven throughout the *Attic Nights*, and (as will be shown) Gellius often shows them coexisting within the same continuum. As this section will show, the way that Gellius uses Greek knowledge (from language, literature, and other fields) as

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[213] Stevenson (2006) 151, Morgan (2004) 204-5.
[214] By way of comparison, Swain (2004) concludes that Cicero's use of individual Greek words, phrases, and quotations is an *unmarked* linguistic choice, and while Cicero's compositions in Greek are clearly marked, they do not mean that Cicero is asserting a Greek identity but rather constructing a Roman intellectual identity that includes Greek proficiency as a component.

evidence in his investigations into the Latin language and Roman practices suggests that Greek *paideia* (which Gellius translates as *humanitas*, following Varro and Cicero)[215] reaches its fullest realization as a constituent of Roman intellectual practice. As the *praefatio* to the *Attic Nights* suggests, Gellius' use of Greek in a Latin work serves largely to support the underlying thesis that Rome, as a culture, a language, and an intellectual tradition, can incorporate and even subsume Attica.

4.3.1 Grammar versus Learnedness

The question of what it means to be learned, or what constitutes learnedness, is a major theme in the linguistic discussions of the *Attic Nights*. Gellius scaffolds this question by framing it, either in his own voice or through dramatized dialogues, as a debate between grammarians (whose views he regards as generally incorrect[216]) and the serious intellectual elites with whom Gellius himself identifies.[217] The former group overlaps considerably with the pseudo-intellectual "Ulpianeans" of the *Learned Banqueters*, with the connection made explicit in *NA* 2.9 when Gellius criticizes Plutarch for his pettifogging:

> In eodem libro idem Plutarchus eundem Epicurum reprehendit, quod verbo usus sit parum proprio et alienae significationis. 2 Ita enim scripsit Epicurus: *Horos tou megethous ton hedonon he pantos tou algountos hypexaireis*. "Non" inquit "*pantos tou algountos*, sed *pantos tou algeinou* dicere oportuit; 3 detractio enim significanda est doloris," inquit "non dolentis". 4 Nimis minute ac prope etiam subfrigide Plutarchus in Epicuro accusando *lexitherei*. 5 Has enim curas vocum verborumque elegantias non modo non sectatur Epicurus, sed etiam insectatur.
>
> In the same book [= ps.-Plutarch *De Hercule* 2, cf. *NA* 2.8], the same Plutarch scolds the same Epicurus for using an inappropriate word of different meaning. For thus does Epicurus write: "*The scope of pleasures is the elimination of all that which causes pain*." "He should not," says [Plutarch], "have said '*of all that-which-causes-pain*,' but '*of all pain'*; for the elimination of pain must be meant, not of a painful thing." In his accusation of Epicurus, Plutarch—in an overly petty and rather cold manner—engages in *speech-*

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[215] *NA* 13.17; cf. Elsner (2013) 139-40.
[216] Kaster (1988) 57-9; generally, because some grammarians, exemplified by Sulpicius Apollinaris, are in fact quite knowledgeable and are cited as making valuable contributions.
[217] Kaster (1988) 51; Quiroga Puertas (2013).

hunting. For Epicurus not only does not pursue these concerns of speech and word, but even rails against them."

The deficient critical practice of which Gellius accuses Plutarch, when he says that the latter "engages in speech-hunting", is encapsulated by a Greek term (*lexitherei*). This word (a *hapax* in Gellius[218]) strongly resembles the label of *ὀνοματοθήρας*, "word-hunter", assigned by characters in the *Learned Banqueters* to Ulpian and his crowd when they use obscure, obsolete, or falsified Attic vocabulary.[219] Just as Ulpian's insistence on purified and attested Attic has a tendency to distract from the flow of ideas in the symposiasts' discussion, so too does Plutarch's practice here represent an attempt to divert the discussion of philosophy into one on the correct use of participles, thereby allowing Plutarch (an Academic Stoic) to score a cheap linguistic point against his Epicurean opponents. Gellius himself refuses to engage in this debate, despite the evidence available to him to refute Plutarch's criticism,[220] because in his view this kind of grammatical debate is utterly uninteresting. He says as much at *NA* 14.5,[221] where he concludes that he has better uses for his time than to listen to grammarians making the same arguments over and over again on inconsequential points. Serious intellectual practice, it is understood, must be found elsewhere, and those who engage in this kind of grammatical argumentation are *semidocti* at best.[222]

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[218] Marache (1957) I 97 n.1: "*lexitherei* est hapax: il signifie *faire la chasse aux mots*. Il ne s'agit pas ici de la chasse aux mots telle que la pratiquait Fronton, mais de la recherche trop subtile de nuances de sens." (*lexitherei* is a hapax: it means *to hunt after words*. Here it does not refer to hunting after words such as Fronto practiced, but to the overly subtle investigation of nuance of meaning.)
[219] The term is found at Ath. 3.53, 55; 4.83; 14.60; additionally, it is used in tmesis at 3.122c [= 3.95 K]: ὦ καλλίστων ὀνομάτων καὶ ῥημάτων θηρευτά (O hunter of the fairest words and phrases).
[220] Holford-Strevens (2004) 274-5: "first, that such neuter participles as *to algoun* for 'pain' are well known in Classical authors, especially Thucydides; secondly, that Plutarch uses them himself; and thirdly that *to algeinon* is not pain (§2 'doloris') but its cause."
[221] See Appendix D.3 for the full passage.
[222] As at *NA* 1.7 (vulgus semidoctum), or *NA* 15.9 (ille semidoctus grammaticus).

The central problem with Gellius' grammarians, aside from the low-class status implied by their taking payment for services rendered (*NA* 6.17, 13.3.3, 18.14.1, 19.10),[223] lies with their reliance on the *ratio* (or *analogia*) of grammatical theory-crafting, putting all of their stock in this single aspect of language and ignoring the other three that Varro and his successors had laid out. These include the *auctoritas* that comes from extensive, in-depth reading of the ancients, the *natura* of the word, and the *consuetudo* of the word's usage as easily determined by those who possess common sense.[224] The more serious figures, those whom Gellius considers to be deserving members of the intellectual elite, routinely defeat these grammarians and expose their ignorance, and they typically do so through their *auctoritas*, which in Gellius' view is the supreme metric of linguistic expertise.[225] Gellius deliberately constructs scenes so as to include grammarians against whom he can array his friends to serve as embodiments of his ideology.[226] Fronto is one such friend—at *NA* 19.10, for instance, Gellius paints a vivid picture of Fronto dismantling some grammarians' construction of Latin register, specifically in reference to the suspect adverb *praeterpropter* (more or less).[227] This grammarian asserts that the word *praeterpropter*, since it belongs to a working-class register (*opificum sermonibus*), is not worth investigating or discussing. Fronto counters by asking why he is reluctant to discuss a word *quo et M. Cato et M. Varro et pleraque aetas superior ut necessario et Latino usi sunt?* (which both Cato and Varro and the better part of the age before them employed as one necessary and Latin? *NA* 19.10.10). As he and his friend Celsinus illustrate, Ennius' *Iphigenia* features the word

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[223] Kaster (1988) 55, 122-3.
[224] Gunderson (2009) 22; Ceaicovschi (2009) 27 summarizes all three thus: "*Usus* includes the ability to call to mind and use words correctly with an appropriate demeanor in a social setting. *Ratio* is used to show how words work through analogy or etymology, and often is the basis for grammatical rules, while *auctoritas* in the form of didactic *exempla* gives the words value through the authority of the citation and lends certain moral, political, and ethical connotations to individual words that Gellius uses to reflect, explore, and reinforce existing social structures." This last point is crucial, as will be seen.
[225] Garcea and Lomanito (2004) 50.
[226] Johnson (2009) 321-2; Howley (2018) 221-2.
[227] See Appendix D.3.

prominently at the conclusion of a choral ode (*NA* 19.10.12 = En. *Iph.* 248), *Incerte errat animus, praeterpropter vitam vivitur.* (The spirit wanders, aimless; life is lived, more or less.) The grammarian, now sweating bullets and red with embarrassment, drops the issue. Fronto, as discussed in the previous section of this study, presents strong opinions in his writings about the proper use of words and the authority granted by antiquity, so Gellius' depiction of him ready to deploy a passage of Ennius at a moment's notice possesses a certain verisimilitude. Similar episodes include *NA* 6.17 and 18.4, with the humiliated *grammatici* resembling Socratic interlocutors (and identified with them in the latter example). Nevertheless, in this scene and others involving the consultation of *grammatici*, there is more than Gellius' expertise on the proper usage of a particular word is at stake;[228] such scenes depict the negotiation of identity and status as Latin-speaker and a Roman.

A century and a half before the *Attic Nights'* composition, M. Pomponius Marcellus criticized the Emperor Tiberius for having a faulty understanding of Latin idiom. The episode is recorded by Suetonius and by Cassius Dio, and most notably they both quote Marcellus asserting superior *Latinitas* as a counterbalance to the Emperor's political power:

> "tu enim, Caesar, civitatem dare potes hominibus, verbo non potes." (Suet. *Gramm*. 22)
> "σύ, Καῖσαρ, ἀνθρώποις μὲν πολιτείαν Ῥωμαίων δύνασαι δοῦναι, ῥήμασι δὲ οὔ." (Cass. Dio 57.17.2)
> "You, Caesar, can give (Roman) citizenship to men, but not to a word."

This grammarian (at least in this representation of him) displays a prescriptive ideology like those discussed in Chapter One: his expertise, rather than the social realities of the Imperial apparatus, sets the standard by which a word's validity is to be judged. Given that Suetonius calls Marcellus a *sermonis Latini exactor molestissimus* (a most annoying nit-picker of Latin speech),

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[228] Howley (2018) 221, *contra* Keulen (2009) 28-35.

he evidently does not believe him to have been in the right. Conversely, Cassius Dio (but not Suetonius) adds that Tiberius *ἐκεῖνον μὲν οὖν οὐδὲν ἐπὶ τούτῳ κακόν, καίπερ ἀκρατῶς παρρησιασάμενον, ἔδρασε* (did not inflict anything bad to him for this, despite his having spoken intemperately), a detail which makes Marcellus seem to prefigure Favorinus in being granted superior linguistic knowledge by an Emperor. The use of *civitas* in this sense, though, appears not to be unique to this context since Seneca employs the figure as well in one of his letters on virtue, in reference to a familiar Greek loan-word:

> Hoc nos natura docere non potuit: semina nobis scientiae dedit, scientiam non dedit. Quidam aiunt nos in notitiam incidisse, quod est incredibile, virtutis alicui speciem casu occucurrisse. Nobis videtur observatio collegisse et rerum saepe factarum inter se conlatio; per analogian nostri intellectum et honestum et bonum iudicant. Hoc verbum cum Latini grammatici civitate donaverint, ego damnandum non puto, immo in civitatem suam redigendum. Utar ergo illo non tantum tamquam recepto sed tamquam usitato.
>
> Nature has not been able to teach us this: she has given us the seeds of knowledge, but not knowledge itself. Some say that we have merely chanced to notice it, which is unbelievable—that the appearance of virtue could occur to someone by accident. It seems to us that observation, and a comparison of frequently performed deeds among themselves, have gathered it; our [Stoics] adjudge that the honorable and the good are judged by *analogy*. Since the Latin grammarians have endowed this word [analogy] with citizenship, I do not think it ought to be disparaged, but rather restored to its citizenship. Thus, I shall use it, not only as it has been received, but as it is frequently used. (Sen. *Ep.* 120.4)

Seneca appears to grant grammarians the authority to determine *Latinitas*, perhaps because he himself is engaged not in a linguistic debate but a philosophical one.

Gellius is, as noted, an active participant in the debate regarding the proper place of *grammatici* in the intellectual hierarchy, especially in relation to rhetoricians.[229] His discussion is clearly tied into the same context in which Seneca, Suetonius, and Cassios Dio write by the scene at *NA* 19.13, in which both Sulpicius Apollinaris[230] and another, unnamed grammarian seem to catch out the learned Fronto. Here, Apollinaris uses the same *civitas* figure of speech in order to

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[229] Kaster (1988) 53-60.
[230] Whom Gellius identifies as a *grammaticus* at *NA* 7.6.12, but not in his other appearances at *NA* 2.16, 4.17, 12.13, 13.18, 13.20, 15.5, 16.5, 18.4, 19.13, 20.6

gently mock Fronto's views on Latin purism and the question of whether the Greek *nanus* can be licensed when the Latin *pumilio* also exists:[231] *fuisset autem verbum hoc a te civitate donatum aut in Latinam coloniam deductum, si tu eo uti dignatus fores, essetque id inpendio probabilius, quam quae a Laberio ignobilia nimis et sordentia in usum linguae Latinae intromissa sunt.* (However, this word would have been endowed by you with citizenship, or colonized on behalf of Latin, if you had deigned to use it, and it would be a great deal more acceptable than those ignoble and sordid words which have been admitted by Laberius into the usage of the Latin language.) This representation of Fronto is, like *NA* 19.10, consistent with the impression obtained from his letters and treatises in that he wishes to seem scrupulous in avoidance of barbarism and convey his preference for Latin words of attested usage to Greek loan-words or neologisms. At the same time, that someone whom Gellius portrays as endowed with great *auctoritas* from his command of Latin literature should come across as ignorant, like Fronto does here, seems like a striking reversal of the situation in *NA* 19.10. While professions of ignorance are a tool for Fronto to perform rhetorical self-abasement before superiors (as discussed in the previous section), here Gellius depicts him asserting superior Latinity to his peers only to be, apparently, proven incorrect on two counts: not only is *nanus* a Greek word (not a barbarism, as he supposed), it is moreover attested in a Latin author (Helvius Cinna) who predates the *veteres* from whom he has drawn the supposedly pure *pumilio* and whose usage suggests that *nanus*, more than *pumilio*, should recommend its use as one of the *insperata atque inopinata verba*.[232] Fronto, who has briefly been cast in the role of a *semidoctus grammaticus*, is corrected by other intellectual figures whom Gellius also admires; crucially, though, he is not humiliated like the bad grammarians elsewhere. Instead, the episode serves to establish Gellius' own ideological stance

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[231] See Appendix D.4 for the full quotation.
[232] cf. Fronto, *Ad M. Caes.* 4.3.2, discussed in the previous section.

regarding loanwords, and show how he takes Apollinaris' side in disagreeing with Fronto's approach despite being, as Fronto's student, an admirer of his in general terms.[233] The central difference between Gellius' and Fronto's language ideologies appears to be that, while Fronto is careful to distinguish between Greek and Latin, Gellius shows that he believes words of Greek origin to be valid as well so long as their history as loanwords extends sufficiently far back in Latin literature. Gellius' Latin is not all-inclusive by any means, since his standard for authentic, high-register Latin excludes words he considers vulgar (which *nanus* evidently is not, thanks to Cinna's usage) as well as neologisms that, by definition, have no connection with Roman or Greek intellectual heritage. Both Gellius and Fronto view *auctoritas* as the central principle of *Latinitas*, but they differ as to its source.[234]

Where the grammarians try to define—or perhaps *con*fine—language, Gellius is interested in examining how language use tends to escape from its bounds and defy obvious explanation. In this pursuit, Gellius deploys a fictionalized version of another of his teachers, Favorinus, the *homo ille fandi dulcissimus* (*NA* 16.3) sophist/philosopher/orator whom Howley considers to be the most important character (after Gellius himself) and "the [*Attic Nights'*] own internal avatar, the character who most clearly resembles *the text itself* in manner and interests."[235]. Like Lucian and Athenaeus, with their various targets and sources of mockery,[236] Gellius creates in Favorinus a character who brings ideological debates to life in fictional situations, and thereby represents Gellius' own thinking. Known elsewhere for being a Roman

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[233] Garcea and Lomanito (2004) 64 note that the evidence from this passage contradicts Marache (1952) 158, 232-3, in which both are characterized as admiring Laberius; Fronto's own writings clearly show him to view Laberius as an ideal model for literary language, but elsewhere in the *Attic Nights* Gellius is skeptical on this point, as in *NA* 3.12, 11.15, and especially 16.7.
[234] Astarita (1993) 62 emphasizes, in particular, Gellius' disagreement with Fronto on the role of archaism.
[235] Howley (2018) 207; Favorinus' idiosyncrasies and paradoxes are widely acknowledged—every secondary author from Philostratus to Holford-Strevens has commented on them—and the *Attic Nights* presents similar taxonomic difficulties to anyone attempting to define it as a text.
[236] And, indeed, like Phrynichus' discussion of Favorinus—albeit drawing opposite conclusions from Favorinus' corpus.

Gaul who practiced Greek, in the *Attic Nights* Favorinus takes on the persona of a Latin Socrates,[237] whose Roman side is foregrounded in order to emphasize the Roman setting of this "Attic" text, and who is the ultimate expert for subtle questions of Latin by virtue of being supremely well read.[238] In this role, he polices other characters' bad Latin usage and deficient grammar—at *NA* 1.10, for example, he mocks someone speaking in an excessively archaic register by pointing out that, paradoxically, affecting an ancient style of speech is inauthentic because the ancients themselves always used the speech of their own time,[239] or at *NA* 3.19, he exposes the absurdity of Gavius Bassus' tortured etymology of *parcus* from *per arcas*.

Like Socrates, Favorinus relishes the opportunity to take a self-professed expert down a few pegs, perhaps best exemplified at *NA* 4.1 where—via Gellius' fictional *elenchus*—he exposes the ignorance of a boastful grammarian, when he notices Favorinus present in the same hall, begins loudly to expound on the ambiguous gender of *penus*. Given Favorinus' own sexual ambiguity, the punning insult is immediately obvious to the reader, who assumes Favorinus cannot have missed it either—but in an ironic turn, Favorinus not only responds with deadpan sincerity but embarks on a philosophical digression with this grammarian.[240] Where the grammarian has apparently adduced a slew of literary citations in support of his point (or so he thinks), Favorinus directs the conversation down a sociolinguistic avenue with the pragmatic-semantic question "*Quid enim refert mea eiusque, quicum loquor, quo genere "penum" dicam aut in quas extremas litteras declinem, si nemo id non nimis barbare fecerimus?"* ("For what difference does it make to my [usage], and that of the one with whom I speak, in what gender I

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[237] *NA* 2.1 makes the comparison all but explicit.
[238] Holford-Strevens (2004) 115-29.
[239] Vessey (1994) 1873-6; cf. the discussion in Chapter Two of this study.
[240] This scene can be understood best as a form of meta-humor since the obvious unsophistication of the *penus* pun (in a work so concerned with intellectual refinement) is a joke in itself, and Favorinus' enthusiastic engagement with the question—paying no mind to the low-hanging fruit of the pun's obvious fatuity—constitutes an extended humorous riff that is entirely earnest on its face but deeply ironic.

utter '*penus*' or in what final letters I decline it, if none of us has done so in an excessively barbarous fashion?" *NA* 4.1.5) After a whirlwind of citations of his own, including reference to a textual problem in Vergil,[241] Favorinus concludes: *"Haec ego," inquit "cum philosophiae me dedissem, non insuper tamen habui discere; quoniam civibus Romanis Latine loquentibus rem non suo vocabulo demonstrare non minus turpe est, quam hominem non suo nomine appellare."* ("These things," he said, "though I had dedicated myself to philosophy, I have nevertheless still considered worth learning, since for Roman citizens speaking Latin it is no less shameful to refer to something by another term than to call a man by another name." *NA* 4.1.18) Favorinus—as a textual agent of Gellius—has turned a grammatical discussion (and asinine joke) about a single mundane word into a far more expansive, profoundly aporetic philosophical investigation (and a much more sophisticated joke) on language and usage.[242]

Favorinus' language ideology is tremendously difficult to pin down, a character trait he acknowledges at *NA* 20.1: *scis enim solitum esse me pro disciplina sectae, quam colo, inquirere potius quam decernere* (for you know that I, in the manner of the sect which I cultivate, am accustomed to make inquiries rather than pronouncements). Being a Skeptic, Favorinus is compelled to take positions that will lead to the most productive arguments[243], even if it makes him appear at odds with the author who so often uses him as a mouthpiece. Whereas at *NA* 1.10

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[241] Vergil's canonicity is beyond question, making this an especially potent reminder of the difficulty of finding definitive answers even when making recourse to empirical examples; the passage in question is *Aen*. 1.704-5, *Quinquaginta intus famulae, quibus ordine longo/cura penum struere et flammis adolere Penates,* where Charisius has *longam* (making *penum* feminine) but Servius reads *longo* (making *penum* ambiguous).

[242] Or as Gellius puts it at *NA* 4.1.19: *Sic Favorinus sermones id genus communes a rebus parvis et frigidis abducebat ad ea, quae magis utile esset audire ac discere, non allata extrinsecus, non per ostentationem, sed indidem nata acceptaque*. (Thus was Favorinus wont to lead mundane conversations of that sort away from small, insipid matters towards those which it was more useful to hear or to learn, not brought in irrelevantly or for showboating, but born and taken up from the same place.)

[243] Holford-Strevens (2004) 110-12; Beall (2011) 88-9; assuming that Gellius' representation of Favorinus does not unduly exaggerate his Skeptic tendencies, Favorinus' philosophical preferences could also explain why Phrynichus—ever concerned with upholding traditional standards—seemed to dislike him so much.

Favorinus adopts an anti-archaizing attitude, at *NA* 5.21 when someone uses the archaic-sounding *pluria* (as opposed to *pluria*) Gellius has this to say about it:

> "Pluria" forte quis dixit sermocinans vir adprime doctus, meus amicus, non hercle studio se ferens ostentandi neque quo "plura" non dicendum putaret. Est enim doctrina homo seria et ad vitae officia devincta ac nihil de verbis laborante. Sed, opinor, assidua veterum scriptorum tractatione inoleverat linguae illius vox, quam in libris saepe offenderat.
>
> An exceptionally learned man, a friend of mine, happened to say "*pluria*" (rather more) in conversation, not, by Hercules, carrying himself with an eagerness to show off nor because he believed "*plura*" (more) should not be said. For he is a man of scholarship that is serious and dedicated to the duties of life, and which takes no great pains where words are concerned. Rather, I think, by his devoted reading of ancient writers his speech had become fixed on that which he had often encountered in his books.

Favorinus can be an archaizer or just as easily an anti-archaizer, depending on the circumstances, so long as the principle of learned intellectual exploration is maintained. Crucially, both he and Fronto are aligned against the grammarians in pursuit of this goal, though Favorinus (and Gellius) adhere to different standards of Latinity from Fronto—unsurprising, given that Favorinus regards himself as a philosopher while Fronto has little interest in philosophy himself. But the most salient difference between these two figures lies in their attitudes towards bilingualism, for where Fronto works diligently to identify some essential truths about Latinity, Favorinus is not as concerned with finding correct answers as he is with asking the right questions, summarized above as *inquirere potius quam decernere*. In this regard, Favorinus' project is essentially that of Gellius the *Attic Nights* as a whole, to open up avenues for linguistic, literary, and cultural exploration that illustrate the expansive range of topics within the scope of Roman intellectual discourse. Gellius—and, therefore, Favorinus—can pursue this objective most effectively by stepping outside the bounds of grammatical debates, and indeed, outside the bounds of a single language and culture.

4.3.2 Interlinguistic and Intercultural Connections

Central to the representation of Favorinus in the *Attic Nights* is his dual Greco-Roman identity; as Swain has summarized, "[h]e is biculturalism incarnate."[244] As discussed in the previous section, Fronto's usage of Greek is heavily marked and does not represent a true code-switching activity, a tendency which Gellius' representation of Fronto also preserves. By comparison, Favorinus has a tendency to slip into Greek when excited or, as in the case of *NA* 2.22, when drunk; he is, therefore, depicted as a bilingual speaker who does indeed code-switch. However, Gellius acknowledges that the scene in *NA* 2.22 is largely his own creation,[245] a fact which reinforces the 'Favorinus' character's role in service to Gellius' deliberately constructed representation of bilingual and bicultural Rome given that Gellius' text neither tells the reader which words are Favorinus' own nor clarifies in what language they were originally uttered. The great interest in and extensive knowledge of Latin language and linguistics displayed by this version of Favorinus is another aspect of Gellius' project, and in this respect the Favorinus of the *Attic Nights* differs most notably from the impression of him obtained from other sources, including Favorinus himself.[246] It is a historical accident that only the *Corinthian* oration (ps.-Dio Chr. *Or.* 37), *On Fortune* (ps.-Dio Chr. *Or.* 64) and *On Exile* (*P.Vat. gr.* 11) survive, but a fortunate accident indeed for those interested in Favorinus as a model of Imperial-era biculturalism. The passage below, from the *Corinthian,* explicitly discusses Favorinus' cultural identity in some detail:[247]

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[244] Swain (2004) 30.
[245] Howley (2018) 239 sees a parallel with *NA* 1.2, "where Gellius advertises the eloquence of Herodes' Greek, only to report the speech in Latin, thus claiming another character's eloquence for himself by implicit admission that the character—thought [sic] historically real—is entirely within his authorial control."
[246] Rochette (2015) 105 sees no other evidence besides the *Attic Nights* for Favorinus having had a Latin career; given the fictional (or at least fictionalized) nature of all of the characters and their interactions, one might safely assume that Favorinus' interest is exaggerated in service to Gellius' overall project.
[247] See Amato (2005) 53-8 regarding its transmission and authenticity.

εἰ δέ τις οὐ Λευκανὸς ὤν, ἀλλὰ Ῥωμαῖος, οὐδὲ τοῦ πλήθους, ἀλλὰ τῶν ἱπποτρόφων, οὐδὲ τὴν φωνὴν μόνον ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν γνώμην καὶ τὴν δίαιταν καὶ τὸ σχῆμα τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἐζηλωκώς, καὶ ταῦθ' οὕτως ἐγκρατῶς καὶ περιφανῶς, ὡς οὔτε τῶν πρὸ αὐτοῦ Ῥωμαίων οὔτε τῶν καθ' αὑτὸν Ἑλλήνων (εἰρήσεται γάρ) οὐδὲ εἷς· τῶν μὲν γὰρ Ἑλλήνων τοὺς ἀρίστους ἔστιν ἰδεῖν ἐκεῖσε πρὸς τὰ τῶν Ῥωμαίων πράγματα ἀποκλίνοντας, τὸν δὲ [προστάτην] πρὸς τὰ τῶν Ἑλλήνων καὶ τούτων ἕνεκα καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν καὶ τὸ πολιτικὸν ἀξίωμα καὶ πάνθ' ἁπλῶς προϊέμενον, ἵν' αὐτῷ περιῇ ἓν ἀντὶ πάντων Ἕλληνι δοκεῖν τε καὶ εἶναι—εἶτα τοῦτον οὐκ ἐχρῆν παρ' ὑμῖν ἑστάναι χαλκοῦν; καὶ κατὰ πόλιν γε· παρ' ὑμῖν μέν, ὅτι Ῥωμαῖος ὢν ἀφηλληνίσθη, ὥσπερ ἡ πατρὶς ἡ ὑμετέρα, παρὰ Ἀθηναίοις δέ, ὅτι ἀττικίζει τῇ φωνῇ, παρὰ Λακεδαιμονίοις δέ, ὅτι φιλογυμναστεῖ, παρὰ πᾶσι δέ, ὅτι φιλοσοφεῖ καὶ πολλοὺς μὲν ἤδη τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἐπῆρε συμφιλοσοφῆσαι αὐτῷ, οὐκ ὀλίγους δὲ καὶ τῶν βαρβάρων ἐπεσπάσατο. ἐπ' αὐτὸ γὰρ τοῦτο καὶ ἐδόκει ὑπὸ τῶν θεῶν οἷον ἐξεπίτηδες κατεσκευάσθαι, Ἕλλησι μέν, ἵνα ἔχωσιν οἱ ἐπιχώριοι τῆς Ἑλλάδος παράδειγμα ὡς οὐδὲν τὸ παιδευθῆναι τοῦ φῦναι πρὸς τὸ δοκεῖν διαφέρει· Ῥωμαίοις δέ, ἵνα μηδ' οἱ τὸ ἴδιον ἀξίωμα περιβεβλημένοι τὸ παιδεύεσθαι πρὸς τὸ ἀξίωμα παρορῶσι· Κελτοῖς δέ, ἵνα μηδὲ τῶν βαρβάρων μηδεὶς ἀπογιγνώσκῃ τῆς Ἑλληνικῆς παιδείας, βλέπων εἰς τοῦτον. (ps.-Dio Chr. [= Fav.] 37.25-7)

And if someone (sc. Favorinus) who is not Lucanian, but Roman, not one of the masses but of the equestrians, who has emulated not only the speech but also the thinking and lifestyle and dress of the Greeks, and done these things capably and admirably, as none of the Romans before him and not even one of the Greeks has, it must be said—for while it is possible to see the best of the Greeks inclining towards Roman ways, the man who stands before you pursues Greek ways and, for their sake, lets go of his property and political status and, simply put, *everything*, in order to achieve one thing before all: not only to appear Greek, but to *be* Greek—is it not then right that this man should be erected in bronze in your city? And indeed in every city: in yours, because though he is Roman he has become thoroughly Hellenized, just as your homeland has; and in Athens too, because he is an Atticizer in speech, and among the Spartans, because he loves athletics, and indeed in all cities, because he is a philosopher and has by this point recruited many Greeks to join him in philosophy, and has attracted no small number of barbarians as well. And it even seems as if he has been specially equipped by the gods for this very purpose: for the Greeks, that the inhabitants of Greece might have an illustrative example of the fact that there is no difference in appearance between being Greek by training and being Greek by birth; for the Romans, that not even those who are focused on their own reputation might overlook the significance of education towards one's reputation; and for the Celts, that no one of the barbarians might despair of acquiring Greek culture, looking towards this man.

As is readily apparent, Favorinus identifies with both halves of the Greco-Roman world as well as the "barbarian" cultures outside it, and moreover he argues that he is in effect a citizen of three traditionally great cultural centers of Greece (Athens, Sparta, and Corinth) because of his multifaceted public persona. If Philostratus' account is accurate, then Favorinus was not, as he claims, *τὴν οὐσίαν καὶ τὸ πολιτικὸν ἀξίωμα καὶ πάνθ' ἁπλῶς προϊέμενον* because he was in fact called to serve as a *flamen* in spite of asserting "Philosopher" status; nevertheless, he belabors the

point of his Hellenism at length and, crucially, emphasizes that he has become Greek as the result of a deliberate choice to pursue *τῆς Ἑλληνικῆς παιδείας*. He is the most Hellenized Roman, he claims, and more Greek than the Greeks themselves; he encompasses the totality of Greek culture and belongs in every city, but does not hesitate to remind the audience that he, like the Latin-speaking colony of Corinth, is Roman by nature. This passage from the *Corinthian* oration, therefore, shows Favorinus engaging in a kind of cultural-linguistic appropriation, a *Sprachanschluss* as it were,[248] which is exactly the kind of social positioning that might have made his work so objectionable to Second Sophistic Atticists like Phrynichus and motivated that lexicographer to target him so persistently.

Viewed in this context, Gellius' version of Favorinus presents what might be called his "esoteric" side, eager to engage in Latin/Roman questions in his personal dealings yet able to adopt a Greek persona whenever it suits him. He straddles the two worlds, but he is a *Roman* who does so, having mastered his native (or near-native) Latin idiom to the extent that he can establish himself in the Greek intellectual world as well.Indeed, the Romanness that he can turn on or off at will (mostly the latter it seems) has supposedly developed in a Celtic, not an Italian context; he has already pulled this magic trick of shifting identities once before. In his rhetoric, this fact makes his acquisition of *paideia* seem more impressive, but in fact it more likely facilitates his shifting between Roman and Greek.Favorinus' discussions of Greek in the *Attic Nights* depend on this shifting identity, and the fluidity of his self-presentation is reinforced by the Skepticism he professes elsewhere.[249] Gellius' Favorinus expresses opinions on Greek as freely as he does those on Latin, as at *NA* 2.5: *Favorinus de Lysia et Platone solitus dicere est: "Si ex Platonis" inquit*

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[248] Swain (2004) 5, borrowing a term from Becker, H. *Erkenntnisse und Probleme aus allen Gebieten der Geistes- und Naturwissenschaften. Sprachwissenschaften Bd. 2: Zwei Sprachanschlüsse*. Berlin: Mindt, 1948.
[249] Howley (2018) 243.

"oratione verbum aliquod demas mutesve atque id commodatissime facias, de elegantia tamen detraxeris; si ex Lysiae, de sententia. (Favorinus was accustomed to say, regarding Lysias and Plato, "If you remove or change even one word of Plato's speech, and do it very skillfully, you will nevertheless have detracted from his elegance; if you do it from Lysias, you will change his meaning.") Yet this version of Favorinus appears to have very little personal stake in Hellenism, at times appearing (in his Skeptic manner) to take the side of Greek language and culture purely for the sake of argument. This is the case at *NA* 2.26, when he engages Fronto in a debate on the relative richness of Greek and Latin vocabulary pertaining to colors. Favorinus argues—albeit insincerely—for Greek superiority via the classic *topos* of Latin "poverty": *eam vocum inopiam in lingua magis Latina video, quam in Graeca* (that deficiency of vocabulary I perceive more in the Latin language than in Greek, 2.26.5), appearing to take the position of a Greek chauvinist but only inasmuch as such a stance is calculated to provoke a more detailed and forceful rebuttal from Fronto (2.26.7-19).[250] When Fronto finishes cataloguing Latin's rich vocabulary of colors, Favorinus concedes the point. Fronto, and by extension the Latin language, appears to win this exchange; Favorinus, however, does not clearly seem to lose given that he gets the last word and uses it to honor Fronto's excellent argumentation via quotes from both Homer and Ennius, showing his own mastery of Greek and Latin literature by providing a relevant excerpt of each. That Favorinus is so willing, indeed happy, to accept defeat suggests that he was playing both sides all along, his underlying Roman-ness only bolstered—not effaced—by his Hellenism[251].

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[250] The *locus classicus* for this *topos* being Cicero, *Pro Archia* 23: *"Nam si quis minorem gloriae fructum putat ex Graecis versibus percipi quam ex Latinis, vehementer errat: propterea quod Graeca leguntur in omnibus fere gentibus, Latina suis finibus, exiguis sane, continentur."* (For if anyone supposes a lesser enjoyment of glory to be obtained from Greek verses than from Latin ones, he is sorely mistaken, on account of the fact that Greek is spoken among nearly all peoples, whereas Latin is contained within her own borders, narrow ones at that."

[251] Herodes Atticus, Greek by birth but Roman by career, is always introduced by his Roman title *consularis*, as in *NA* 1.2.1, 9.2.1, 18.10.1, 19.12.1.

Yet despite this apparent advocacy on behalf of Latin, both explicit and implicit, both in his own voice and that of Favorinus, Gellius takes numerous opportunities to highlight the foreign—usually Greek—origins of words in common Latin usage. While the *Attic Nights* is a Latin work it is also full of Greek text, and as such it does not appear to have been written with an eye towards pure *Latinitas* in intellectual inquiry. Indeed, Gellius may not believe that such a thing truly exists, given the number of sections in his work that deal with loanwords and explore the relationships between Latin and Greek. The argument at *NA* 2.26 over colors, for instance, requires extensive knowledge (on Gellius' part if not the reader's) of both languages, as well as an awareness of Roman attitudes towards Greek,[252] even though it serves ultimately to advance the cause of Latin as a language capable of great sophistication and precision.[253] This precision and sophistication in Latin emerges in part from its ability to incorporate words from other languages, as in the example at *NA* 11.1, which relates how to two different Latin words have entered the language from two different tongues:

> (1) Timaeus in historiis, quas oratione Graeca de rebus populi Romani composuit, et M. Varro in antiquitatibus rerum humanarum terram Italiam de Graeco vocabulo appellatam scripserunt, quoniam boves Graeca vetere lingua italoi vocitati sint, quorum in Italia magna copia fuerit, bucetaque in ea terra gigni pascique solita sint complurima.
>
> (1) Timaeus in his *Histories*, which he composed in Greek about affairs of the Roman people, and M. Varro in his *Antiquities of Human Affairs*, wrote that the land of Italy is called such from Greek usage, because oxen in the Greek language were, in ancient times, called *italoi*, of which there was a great number in Italy, and very many cow-pastures used to be grown and cultivated in that land.
>
> (5) Vocabulum autem ipsum multae idem M. Varro in uno vicesimo rerum humanarum non Latinum, sed Sabinum esse dicit, idque ad suam memoriam mansisse ait in lingua Samnitium, qui sunt a Sabinis orti. Sed turba grammaticorum novicia *kata antiphrasin* ut quaedam alia, hoc quoque dici tradiderunt.
>
> (5) However the same word *multa* (fine, penalty) itself, M. Varro says in his twenty-first book of *Human Affairs*, is not Latin but Sabine, and he says that according to his recollection it was still present in the language of the Samnites, who descended from the

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[252] cf. the "poverty" *topos*, brought up (perhaps ironically) by Favorinus in the colors debate.
[253] Astarita (1993) 196-205.

> Sabines. But the new crowd of grammarians have related that, like certain other words, this one is also said by antiphrasis.[254]

From this example, one sees Gellius' interest in identifying formerly foreign words in Latin, but no indication that he considers them illegitimate on the basis of their origin. Instead, the foreign etymology is offered as a clue to understanding their meaning [255]and their current Latinity is not called into question. The epitome of the otherwise lost *NA* 8.12 suggests a similar goal: *Quid significet in veterum libris scriptum "plerique omnes"; et quod ea verba accepta a Graecis videntur.* (What the expression *plerique omnes* means when written in ancient authors' books; and that those words seem to have been taken from the Greeks). The lost sections 8.2[256] and 8.13[257] appear similar, though in the absence of the original entries the conclusions one may draw are limited.

The relationship between Latin and Greek receives its greatest emphasis when Gellius uses Greek examples to resolve technical questions about Latin. At *NA* 1.7, a question arises regarding a quotation from Cicero, *In Verrem* 5 that concludes "…*hanc sibi rem praesidio sperant futurum."* (…they hope that this thing will be a source of protection for them). The participle *futurum* is at issue here, for some of the characters present—grammarians who rely on *ratio* and *analogia*—apparently believe the correct form is *futuram* to agree with *rem* (*Debuisse enim scribi putabant non "futurum", sed "futuram"*...) and that Cicero has committed an obvious (*manifestarius*) solecism. But Gellius' friend—an *amicus noster* who is unnamed here, but is

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[254] The same phenomenon as *lucus a non lucendo*, i.e. that a grove is called *lucus* because light (*lux*) does not shine into it. Quint. *Inst*. 1.32 contains this and several other examples that he find equally ridiculous.
[255] In perhaps, in the case of the Sabine *multa*, as a means of explaining the opacity of the etymology.
[256] *Quae mihi decem verba ediderit Favorinus, quae usurpentur quidem a Graecis, sed sint adulterina et barbara; quae item a me totidem acceperit, quae ex medio communique usu Latine loquentium minime Latina sint neque in veterum libris reperiantur.* (Ten words which Favorinus presented to me, which despite being used by Greeks are foreign in origin and barbarous; likewise, the same number which he received from me, which exist in the general and common use of Latin speakers but are not Latin at all, nor are they found in the books of the ancients).
[257] *"Eupsones," quod homines Afri dicunt, non esse verbum Poenicum, sed Graecum.* (That Eupsones, which African people say, is not a Punic word but a Greek one); Cavazza (2004) 87 emends to *cupsones*.

probably Favorinus (possibly Fronto)—happens to be there too and, being *lectione multa exercitus* (trained in much reading) he verifies that Cicero has in fact *probe ac vestuste locutum* (spoken rightly and in the ancient manner) and offers numerous quotations from other ancient authors (Gaius Gracchus, Publius Popilius, Claudius Quadrigarius, Valerius Antias, Plautus, Laberius, et al.) that support his usage. The reason, as a first-year Latin student today might know, is that *futurum* is really *futurum esse*, an infinitive "which the Greeks call *aparemphaton*" and, as such, "agreeing neither in number nor in gender" (*neque numeris neque generibus praeserviens*). Since Greek future infinitives "*erein*, *poiesein*, *esesthai*, *et similia*" have no number or gender, it makes perfect sense that Latin future infinitives would not either. The use of observations about Greek grammar in application to Latin suggests that Gellius regards Greek and Latin as parts of a whole, a sort of linguistic continuum. In Gellius' view, the main reason they ought not to be hermetically siloed, as Athenaeus' Ulpian would have them, is not simply that effective intellectual investigation in a cosmopolitan society cannot occur without the occasional look outside one's own language and culture, but also the fact that Greek and Latin remain connected on the syntactic level and, consequently, isolating the one from the other misrepresents their true nature.

This example demonstrates quite effectively Gellius' ideology of Roman cultural identity as regards language usage, namely, the idea of Hellenist expertise reinforcing rather than threatening Latinity and, in turn, Roman-ness. Not only is Latin etymology better understood through Greek, the structure of the language itself is. The example at *NA* 1.7 might seem to be an irresponsible deployment of analogy without Gellius' addition of Latin attestations (Gracchus, Popilius, Quadrigarius, Antias, and Plautus), but while the display of *auctoritas* through copious attestation is typical, this entry distinguishes itself by the reliance on the presumption of a genetic relationship between Latin and Greek. As a result, one can add to the ideological mix of the *Attic*

Nights the long-established (if minority) view that Latin is an offshoot of Greek, and specifically of Aeolic Greek, meaning that Romans are in fact Greek in origin.[258] This theory, called "Aeolism", emerged two to three centuries prior as the result of shared observations about Latin grammar made by immigrant Greek grammarians and Romans working in the relatively new field of Latin grammar.[259] Aeolism's development as a linguistic theory reflects the changing relationship between Greek and Roman cultures in the late Hellenistic/Republican and early Imperial periods, and was a means for Greek and Roman intellectuals to negotiate their relative status via their language and literature. Bruno Rochette frames its result, or indeed its aims, as:

> ...une profonde modification du statut de l'idiome romain par rapport au grec. Alors que durant toute l'époque hellénistique le grec n'avait devant lui qu'un seul groupe de langues, les *linguae barbarae* … le lien que ces gammairiens vont établir entre le latin et le grec va modifier radicalement le statut des langues. Le grec et le latin formeront désormais un seul groupe (utraque lingua) qui constituera un ensemble en face de l'autre domaine linguistique, celui des parleurs barbares.[260]

The linguistics of the *Attic Nights*, therefore, came into being with the late Hellenistic theory of Aeolism and in this sense it is ideologically contiguous with Dionysius of Halicarnassus' *Roman Antiquities*, a historical work predicated on the Greek origins of Rome.[261] In the case of that work, written from a Greek perspective, the notion of Romans' fundamental Hellenism serves to

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[258] Gabba (1963); Dubuisson (1984) 67: "on peut considérer comme au moins probable que l'elaboration de la théorie de l'origine éolienne du latin, indispensable complément à la légende de l'origine grecque de Rome, fut l'oeuvre des grammairiens grecs et romains de l'entourage de Pompée, suscités et encouragés par celui-ci." Stevens (2006) provides the most recent, comprehensive treatment of this linguistic ideology.
[259] Examples include Hypsicrates of Amysos, Philoxenus of Alexandria, Terentius Tyrannio, Claudius Didymus, L. Ateius Praetextatus Philologus, on the Greek side, and on the Latin side Santra, Clodius Tuscius, Cloatius Verus; cf. Cupaiuolo, T. *La teoria della derivazione della lingua latina dall'eolico*. Palermo: Boccone del povero, 1925; Stevens (2006) 123-7.
[260] Rochette (1997) 88: "...a profound modification of the status of the Roman language in relation to Greek. While for the entire Hellenistic period, the Greek language had before it only one group of other tongues, the *linguae barbarae* ... the connection that these grammarians sought to establish between Latin and Greek would radically change the status of the languages. Greek and Latin formed, henceforth, a unique group (*utraque lingua*) that constituted a pair in opposition to the other linguistic domain, that of the barbarian speakers."
[261] The clearest example is at 1.90.1: Ῥωμαῖοι δὲ φωνὴν μὲν οὔτ' ἄκρως βάρβαρον οὔτ' ἀπηρτισμένως Ἑλλάδα φθέγγονται, μικτὴν δέ τινα ἐξ ἀμφοῖν, ἧς ἐστιν ἡ πλείων Αἰολίς … ἀλλ' ἐκ παντὸς οὗ συνῳκίσθησαν χρόνου βίον Ἕλληνα ζῶντες καὶ οὐδὲν ἐκπρεπέστερον ἐπιτηδεύοντες πρὸς ἀρετὴν νῦν ἢ πρότερον. See Appendix D.5 for the full passage.

claim Roman accomplishments (including subjugation of much of the Greek world) for the Greeks. Among Gellius' contemporaries, or near-contemporaries, Athenaeus also displays this Aeolist ideology from a Greek perspective, via the character of Hieronymos of Rhodes:

> Σαπφώ τε ἡ καλὴ πολλαχοῦ Λάριχον τὸν ἀδελφὸν ἐπαινεῖ ὡς οἰνοχοοῦντα ἐν τῷ πρυτανείῳ τοῖς Μυτιληναίοις. καὶ παρὰ Ῥωμαίοις δὲ οἱ εὐγενέστατοι τῶν παίδων τὴν λειτουργίαν ταύτην ἐκτελοῦσιν ἐν ταῖς δημοτελέσι τῶν θυσιῶν, πάντα τοὺς Αἰολεῖς μιμούμενοι, ὡς καὶ κατὰ τοὺς τόνους τῆς φωνῆς. (Ath. 10.425a [=10.24 K.])
>
> And the great Sappho praises her brother Larichos, saying that he poured wine for the Mytilenians in the prytany. And among the Romans, the most highborn of the children fulfill this service in the public sacrifices, copying the Aeolians in every respect, including the accent of their language.[262]

As discussed in the previous section's exploration of Athenaeus, Ulpian and his crowd leap to call "barbarism" any usage they do not immediately recognize, while symposiasts like Cynulcus and the narrator frequently note the Hellenism of words falsely accused of being barbarian or, especially in the case of the former, the existence of many so-called "barbarism" in highly regarded ancient authors and the speech of latter-day Atticizing intellectuals. In that context, Aeolism serves much the same purpose as in Dionysius, to assimilate Latin to Greek to suggest that Greek intellectuals belong in Rome and have a place in Roman culture. In Gellius, its function is essentially opposite: because the Greek and Latin languages are so closely connected that Greek grammar can be used as the basis for understanding Latin grammar, and that Greek language and literature—*paideia*, essentially—should therefore be regarded as essential components of Roman *humanitas*.

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[262] Note the use of *φωνή* to refer to Roman language, in both Dionysius and Athenaeus. The wording is significant, because in Greek authors of the Classical era *φωνή* in the sense of "language" is primarily used to refer to barbarian (non-Greek) tongues from Herodotus onward (Hdt. 4.114, 17; 2.55; Aeschylus, *Ag.* 1051; Thuc. 6.5, 7.57; Pl. *Tht*. 163b, *i.a.*)

4.3.3 Greek Learning for Roman Culture

In the *Attic Nights*, Greek and Latin are shown as fully compatible, with Favorinus' linguistic and cultural flexibility being living proof of this compatibility and of the intellectual parity between Latin and Greek. Greek speakers have been a part of the Roman Empire for perhaps as many as ten generations, and Gellius is comfortable granting them cultural and intellectual *civitatem* to complement the political realities.[263] Greek-speakers are Roman citizens, but to be an elite intellectual—to be, in other words, the kind of person Gellius cares to know or his readers may care to become—one must self-identify as Roman, and that means knowing Latin. Whenever Herodes Atticus appears in the *Attic Nights*, for instance, Gellius introduces him with his Roman title, as in 19.12.1: *Herodem Atticum, consularem virum, Athenis disserentem audivi Graeca oratione* (In Athens I heard the consular, Herodes Atticus, discoursing in a Greek speech.)[264] At the same time, in Gellius' conception Latin is necessary but not sufficient for one to perform Roman cultural identity successfully, or even to speak Latin effectively—to use the future infinitive example of *NA* 1.7 again, the mistaken Latin is corrected (in part) with Greek examples, while the use of Greek in the debate on colors between Fronto and Favorinus at 2.26 ultimately serves to strengthen the position of Latin. To be fully embodied as an elite Roman and a Latin intellectual, i.e. to possess the *humanitas* (*NA* 13.17.1) that Gellius equates to *paideia*, one must also know Greek.

Roman identity, for Gellius, is not threatened by the knowledge and usage of Greek idiom; Roman identity does not depend on linguistic purism, and may in fact be contingent upon its rejection. This position shows how far Gellius' conception of Roman-ness has come from,

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[263] Astarita (1993) 199-205.
[264] Note how, despite being in Athens at the time (and, of course, having an Athenian demonym as his cognomen), Herodes is specifically described as speaking Greek—with the implication being that he could just as easily have been assumed to be speaking Latin, since he is after all a Roman magistrate.

e.g., Cato and his reluctance to admit to knowing Greek, but it also stands in stark contrast to the contemporary Second Sophistic Atticists, such as the Ulpian character in Athenaeus, for whom their knowledge of Attic Greek effectively *is* their identity. The previous chapter's examination of Lucian's satires on hyper- and pseudo-Atticism concluded that Lucian's humor relies on the idea that, while mastery of Attic is necessary for one to be a good Atticist writer, it is not sufficient. In Gellius, a similar attitude is on display—Greek is a means to a meta-linguistic end, the assertion of elite status through education, and for all of Gellius' deep dives into obscurities of Latin, neither Greek nor Latin is an end unto itself. They are a means to acquire the intellectual capital which, presumably in conjunction with monetary capital, enables one to travel in the circles of a Favorinus, a Fronto, or a Herodes.

However, while (as Favorinus likes to remind his audiences) extensive knowledge of Greek as a second language is impressive for someone who, with Latin as their first language, was born into relative linguistic "poverty", Gellius' work shows how Latin actually holds the upper hand over Greek because of its supposed "poorer" intellectual tradition. Because Latin does not have the same reputation (for purity, or richness of vocabulary, or antiquity) at stake, Latin can use Greek in a way that Greek cannot (or refuses to) use Latin, as Gellius does in the *Attic Nights*. Gellius' work illustrates how master of a foreign language, and foreign learning in general, will bolster one's native language and culture in a variety of ways. Where as Roman histories use heroes of past eras as *exempla* to establish Romans' cultural self-identity, the *Attic Nights* uses linguistic *exempla* to achieve the same aims. He, however, includes Greek *exempla* alongside Latin to construct a genuinely Greco-Roman setting for his ideas, his characters, and ultimately his readers to inhabit. For Gellius, both Latin and Greek are Roman languages, and thus the ideal Roman identity is at least partly Greek as well.

4.4 Conclusions: Cultural Signaling and Imperial Sociolinguistic Imaginaries

In each of the three case studies discussed in this chapter, the author explicitly acknowledges language practice as a central component of cultural identity. As presented in Athenaeus, Ulpian of Tyre's identity as a Greek intellectual is compromised by failure, on his part and that of associates such as Pompeianus, to recognize certain fundamental principles of Attic Greek. Consequently, Ulpian is regarded by his fellow *Learned Banqueters* as "Syro-Attic" (Ath. 3.## [= 3.100 K.], 3.# [= 9.5 K.]), a provincial unable to embody fully the Atticizing intellectual identity his role as symposiarch presumes. Ulpian also demonstrates his intellectual shortcomings through his unwillingness, or even inability, to acknowledge the Roman context in which their discussion (both the specific symposium, and the larger Second Sophistic cultural moment it embodies) takes place and which, in the symbolic persona of Larensis, has in fact enabled this Greek intellectual practice to thrive. The death of Ulpian near the end of the (extant) work symbolizes the decline of those aspects of Greek culture unable to adapt to the realities of the late second century. In comparison, Fronto's exchanges with Marcus Aurelius and others give the impression of a Roman provincial eager to stress his Roman identity by establishing a clear separation between his own linguistic practice of Roman oratory and the Greek-language discipline of philosophy to which his Imperial pupil is drawn. Fronto employs Greek rarely, despite his obvious facility with Atticizing prose and knowledge of the literary tradition, and his Greek usage is presented in such a way as to avoid signaling to his audience (Marcus, the court, and the wider readership) a Greek coloring to his self-identity. Fronto's engagement with Latin, on the other hand, comes as a central element in his own self-presentation, showing ritualized humility in acknowledgment of his African origins, but making only one brief mention of the Punic language. For Fronto, there ought to be no such thing as a "Greco-Roman" identity, only

Romans who know and make reference to Greek but always default to Latin. This ideology flies in the face of the evidence present within his epistolary corpus, however, since Marcus is by definition made no less Roman through his Hellenophone philosophizing. Prescriptive Latinity must ultimately yield to the privilege of power.

Gellius' representation of Fronto displays many of the same characteristics, such as the advocacy on behalf of Latin against Greek and the self-assigned role of linguistic gatekeeper against undue influence from foreign language or improper usage. At various points (*NA* 2.6, 10.19, e.g.) Fronto's depth of knowledge impresses and convinces other characters, yet Gellius also makes Fronto come off as the lesser intellect in other episodes (*NA* 19.10, e.g.). Fronto's Latin evangelism personifies? Gellius' own aims on that front, since he frequently draws on the most ancient Latin literature (Ennius et al.) as evidence of Rome's rich literary and, crucially, linguistic heritage. At the same time, Fronto's role in the *Attic Nights* is sometimes to show the limits of Latinity, and therefore the necessity for Greek. As discussed in §3.4, Gellius willingly acknowledges the impossibility or inadvisability of translating from Greek into Latin; one must therefore not try to transfer Greek *paideia* into Roman *humanitas*, but instead work to understand it on its own terms. Fronto is not ignorant but he is stubborn, and therefore he is counterbalanced by the pragmatic and mercurial Favorinus whose self-presentation in relationship to linguistic practice is flexible and constantly changing—not unlike the life cycle of a language. But Gellius' own authorial voice is rarely acknowledged as such, for, while the fictive nature of the dialogues in the *Attic Nights* makes it clear to the reader whose point of view Gellius considers to be correct, and the overall structure of the work—and arbitrary selection of topics and examples—by necessity reflects the preferences and interests of the author, the reader is hard-pressed to find a direct statement of opinion from Gellius. Some evidence from the text suggests that Gellius intends this to be a difficult task, as when he blurs the lines between Favorinus' dialogue and his

own composition (and at the same time makes the reader uncertain whether what was said was Greek or Latin—both of these things occur at *NA* 2.22, e.g.), but Gellius is explicit in his dislike of grammarians. The combination of such clarity in one area—preference for *auctoritas* over *ratio* and *analogia*—combined with Gellius' creating the closest thing the *Attic Nights* has to a protagonist as a conspicuously shifty, paradoxical Skeptic philosopher-cum-Attic orator-cum-Latin linguist makes Gellius himself appear partly aligned with Sextus Empiricus, discussed in the first chapter. Grammarians are engaged in defining—perhaps *confining*—the realm of language, while throughout the work Gellius emphasizes the importance of linguistic knowledge for unlocking other important information, albeit also worthwhile in its own right.

The writers in the preceding discussion display differing and opposing opinions regarding the division between Greek and Roman cultural identities. Yet, regardless of the specific views expressed, for each writer the imagined separation between "Greek" and "Roman" (and occasionally "barbarian") is present as an ideological backdrop which the author acknowledges and addresses. Each example in this case study uses linguistic practice as a major avenue towards exploring and commenting on this notional distinction between the two cultural categories. In Gellius' *Attic Nights*, the ideological division between Greek and Roman identity, specifically as a function of linguistic practice, is notably weakened. By representing Favorinus as able to move between Greek and Roman intellectual pursuits as easily as he code switches between Greek and Latin, Gellius presents a version of Roman educated elite society realized through extensive Greek learning. Favorinus, and by extension Gellius' ideal reading audience, attains the correct kind of *humanitas* to allow for thorough engagement Greek philosophy, grammar, rhetoric, etymology, *et cetera* without surrendering a high-status position in Roman society. In the *Learned Banqueters*, therefore, Athenaeus presents the outsider—that is, Greek—perspective on this idealized smart set of Roman elites, most notably in the form of Larensis. That Larensis is

identified as Roman and not Greek is somewhat immaterial, given that the opportunity to display Greek sophism is implied to have come about only because of the value assigned to it Roman elites and, therefore, Greek intellectualism—and, most relevant for the present discussion, the debate on principles of Attic usage—is in fact a constituent component of Roman elite society. In this light, the *Attic Nights* and *Learned Banqueters* both posit Greek (and *a fortiori* Attic) linguistic practice as falling under the larger umbrella of Roman culture. Both Athenaeus and Gellius, as discussed in the conclusion to §3.4 (above), allude to the Aeolist theory of the origin of Latin as a genetic offshoot of Greek and frequently adduce loanwords as evidence of the two languages' compatibility. Characters who resist the integration of Latin and Greek, like Ulpian and (in some cases) Fronto, often suffer humiliation at the hands of peers hipper to the realities of contemporary speech.

The examples of Ulpian and Fronto also demonstrate a tension or linguistic status anxiety, which all three of the writers under consideration depict, between the authority obtained through linguistic expertise (in whatever form) and the authority granted *a priori* to a given person's linguistic practice as a result of their social status apart from language, whether this status derives from their culture or their ethnicity. This tension also exists in Lucian and is one of the major themes in his treatment of Greek, as will be shown in the next chapter. In Fronto's case, despite no indication that his first language was anything other than Latin, he nevertheless emphatically distances himself from Greek to assert a Latin-speaking and therefore Roman identity, and conspicuously acknowledges his barbarian heritage to show deference to the superior Roman-ness of his Imperial addressees and wider audience. In other words, he explicitly recognizes that his usage of Latin is inherently lower-status because he is a provincial while his addressees are in the Imperial court. Ulpian's pedantry and insistence on attestation is revealed to be another manifestation of this same status anxiety, since his approach to Atticism is roundly

rebuked and he is labeled a "Syro-Atticist". As discussed in the previous chapter, Lucian's Lexiphanes is called by his peers "Hellene" with similar irony, and the chapter that follows will discuss further the problem of Syrian identity and Atticism in Lucian. Athenaeus' Syro-Attic Ulpian demonstrates through his ineffectual pseudo-Attic pedantry the limitations of Atticism (and of *paideia* generally) as a mechanism for asserting status within Second Sophistic communities of practice. This symbolic role is why Athenaeus makes Atticism both central to Ulpian's identity and deficient in its execution: his firmly-held views on Atticism are at several points unsupported by actual attested usage, just as his refusal to recognize the occasional Latin word or phrase makes him appear to have forgotten that this symposium, at which he himself is symposiarch, has its setting in Rome—not Athens. Lucian picks up on this issue—that of the Greek *pepaideumenos* (or professed *pepaideumenos*) failing to navigate a new Roman context—and fashions a lengthy satiric diatribe around it, as he does with many of the issues just examined in Athenaeus, Fronto, and Gellius. Like Athenaeus and Gellius (Fronto less so), Lucian creates different *personae* in order to respond to them from individual, though not unrelated, perspectives.

5. Lucian's Satire of Language in Society

This chapter will explore the intersection between Lucian's treatment of language and the discussions of Syrian ethnicity, Greek cultural identity, and social status in his satirical worlds. The previous chapter illustrated three different perspectives on the respective roles of Latin and Greek in constructing Greek and/or Roman identity among the elite intellectual class. These perspectives emerge from the writings of several authors with contrasting views, whose experiences—both as depicted within their works, and to whatever extent they are documented historically—and the intended audiences for their work shape the presentation of sociolinguistic attitudes in different ways. Fronto is remarkably consistent in his comments on and usage of Greek, while Gellius' overall attitude is filtered through a cast of several characters (including Fronto and Favorinus) with different stances on linguistic practice. Athenaeus' *Learned Banqueters*, with its central conceit of transcribing an extravagant and well-attended symposium, presents a large and diverse cast of speakers with distinct views that, as in the case of Pompeianus and Cynulcus, differ drastically and humorously. Lucian's corpus, as discussed in the preface and in contrast to those of the authors discussed in the previous chapter, survives as a collection of works that vary in length, format, subject, and so forth. Most relevant for the present examination is the fact that Lucian's authorial voice, and thus the opinions he expresses directly or otherwise, changes markedly from one work to the next as he assumes different *personae* aligned more closely with Syrian or with Greek identities and with Atticist or anti-Atticist linguistic ideologies. Lucian's Syrian characters do not necessarily reflect Lucian's own ethnic or cultural origins, even though they may have borrowed details from the historical Lucian's biography. Rather, they are

staged characters designed to let Lucian critique Greek-ness, barbarism, and the conflicts between them as a function of cultural tradition and linguistic practice.[265]

5.1 Linguistic and Cultural Contexts

It is, therefore, important to keep in mind that there is no single "Lucianic" model for the relationship between ethnicity, linguistic practice, and cultural identity. As this chapter will illustrate, however, the evidence from literary and other sources suggests that no single "historical" model for this relationship can be mapped either. During the period corresponding with the Second Sophistic, the labels "Syrian", "Greek", and "Roman" change their respective significations and acquired new dimensions as circumstances (especially political ones) change across the Mediterranean;[266] moreover, multiple variations of the concepts denoted by these labels exist simultaneously at different locations and in different social strata. This chapter will argue that the variability in Lucian's self-representation constitutes a commentary on the range of contemporary attitudes towards cultural, ethnic, and linguistic social signifiers. Furthermore, it will argue that his linguistic humor highlights the artificial or staged nature of different identities and belies the essentializing ideology, held by some of his contemporaries, that "Syrian", "Greek", and "Roman" exist as a fundamental, fixed status.

5.1.1 Authority and Language Standards

The discussion in Chapter Three of this work outlined Lucian's ideology of Atticism (and literary language usage more generally) using the terminology of language standards and ideology explored in Chapter Two. Lucian's interest in the subject is most evident in the *Solecist*, *Lexiphanes*, and *Professor of Rhetoric* but they are certainly present in other works, including those discussed at greater length in this chapter such as the *Double Indictment* and the *Mistaken*

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[265] Richter (2011) 146-7.
[266] Stevens (2006) 134; Andrade (2013) 5.

Critic. He is more Atticist than Hellenist, because his writing requires Attic vocabulary and constructions in order to evoke specifically the drama, philosophy, and rhetoric from which he creates his pastiche and parody. His forays into Ionic in *On the Syrian Goddess* (discussed below) and *True Histories* are therefore all the more striking, though the same specificity of parody requires Ionic if he is to evoke Herodotus. Lucian is more anomalist than analogist, as well, because analogy in vocabulary, morphology, and usage enables the kind of pseudo-erudition for which he singles out his targets—Lexiphanes being the prime example—whereas reading Classical texts themselves brings one into contact with the full spectrum of distinctive, anomalous forms. But he is equal parts prescriptivist and descriptivist, making "Loukianos" speak with the pedantic voice of a Phrynichus or Herodian in the *Solecist* while imbuing Lycinus (especially in the *Lexiphanes*) with a noticeably anti-archaizing preference for more contemporary Koine-derived forms. The most obvious difference between Lucian and the lexicographers and grammarians discussed in Chapter Two is that his literary enterprises, even those that treat directly and extensively on linguistic practice, are not technical treatises but complex pastiches on multiple Greek (predominantly Attic) works. His comments on linguistics are therefore often meta-linguistic in nature, exploring the role of language in opening up creative possibilities, marking erudition, and, as this chapter will now explore, signaling cultural affinity.

The first through third chapters postulated the Atticism of the Second Sophistic as a community of practice in which individuals negotiate their membership by establishing standards for Atticism and demonstrating their adherence to these standards, in a manner that (certainly in the case of Phrynichus' treatment of Favorinus or the devotees of Menander) can become distinctly antagonistic. Lucian's representations of Atticists in the form of Loukianos, Lexiphanes, or the Professor draw on contemporary Atticist rhetoric and criticize via parody the deficiencies present in the various forms that Atticizing practice can take. These caricatured

versions of Atticists and Atticism situate Lucian's corpus and authorial self-representation in relation to the contemporary community of practice. The overall impression Lucian provides is one of a sophist who understands the Classical literature, from which Second Sophistic Atticism derives, better than the specialized lexicographers and grammarians do and, as a result, understands Atticism itself more effectively. The pedantry Lucian deploys in the *Solecist*, the humorous malaproprisms he creates in the *Lexiphanes*, and the biting satire of the *Professor of Rhetoric* establish the author's awareness of Attic arcana. The combination of this expertise with the claims of superior literary knowledge that feature so prominently in the last act of *Lexiphanes* and many other works (including the *Double Indictment*, discussed below) are instrumental in asserting his right as an author to write and speak as he pleases. From this assertion comes the name, given to the *persona* of the *Fisherman, or the Dead Come to Life*, of "Parrhesiades" or "Son of Free Speech" defending himself against charges of literary misconduct. Lucian recognizes the role that citing specifics of Attic grammar and usage plays in signifying membership in the sophistic community, but sets up the lexicographers, grammarians, and others who focus unduly on purely linguistic endeavors as targets of mockery whose practice stops short of true *paideia*.

This chapter will focus on how Lucian probes the nature of Greek *paideia,* both in terms of what it comprises and in terms of what it signifies in a multi-ethnic and arguably multi-cultural world.[267] Linguistic practice constitutes a major component of Lucian's model for *paideia*, as illustrated in Chapter Three, and so the discussion of this chapter will also consider the semiotic question of how Lucian envisions language (alongside other cultural idioms) as a signifier of cultural identity. The relationship between the authorial persona and the language in which he works is complex, because several—though not all—of his works emphasize the Syrian

[267] A major issue for Gellius as well; cf. Astarita (1993) 205.

background of the *persona* on whom they center. Not only are these figures not ethnically Greek, in several cases they are described as less than fully Hellenized. In the *Dream* and the *Double Indictment*, the Lucian-*persona*'s education and initiation into Greek culture are described in terms that make his non-Greek beginnings clear, and in the *Double Indictment* as well as the *Mistaken Critic* his status as Greek is apparently in jeopardy. Whether or not the historical Lucian was in fact a native speaker of Greek is unknowable, however, the authorial stand-ins he creates seem not to be.

That being said, it is worth remembering that terms such as "native speaker" and the related "mother tongue" are not always meaningful categories in discussions of ancient sociolinguistics. As seen in the previous chapter, Roman authors could appropriate Greek language and literature as components of Roman cultural identity, and the discussion below offers a brief illustration of ways in which Syrian cultural identity was reinforced through selective deployment of Greek or Roman idioms. As noted earlier, Bonfiglio (2013) illustrates how the connections between ethnicity (or race) and language established—erroneously—in 18th through early 20th century philology and linguistics did not exist in the conceptual scheme of Greek and Roman commentaries on language. Ethnicity was not dispositive of linguistic practice. However, it is incorrect to state, as Bonfiglio does, that "ideologies of race and ethnicity were not present in the *discourse of language* at that time."[268] As will be seen from the discussion to follow, Lucian and others do consider race and/or ethnicity in their discussion of linguistic practice, as well as the relationships among ethnicity, culture, and language. For Lucian, the Syrian ethnicity of his various *personae* is a crucial component of the schema he maps out on the question of language use and cultural identity, because the immutable Syrian-ness arising from their ethnic backgrounds represents a persistent threat to the stability of their being recognized as Greek. As

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[268] Bonfiglio (2013) 31.

Chapter Three argued that Lucian's *personae* work together to allow the author to claim Atticist expertise for his larger authorial presence, in this chapter Lucian will be shown to assert ownership of Greek language and literature by establishing the Greek cultural authority of his characters, in spite—or even because of—their "barbarian" heritage.

5.1.2 Syrians and Semi-Greeks

Apart from any considerations of the historical Lucian's biography, his authorial persona is frequently represented as Syrian.[269] No discussion of Lucian's social positioning, therefore, can take place without a review of the larger historical context of Syrian cultural and ethnic identity in the Greek and Roman worlds. The previous chapter discussed the Greek/Latin binary as represented in language practice, including the added complications of Fronto's provincial heritage, the rejection of the cultural binary as represented in Favorinus (both his own writing and his representation in Gellius), and the incorporation of Greek *paideia* into Roman identity as depicted in different ways by both Gellius and Athenaeus. In Lucian, the central tension emerges not between Greek and Roman—though such tension does exist—but rather between Syrian and Greek. As the discussion in this section will illustrate, one reading of the relationship of these two labels posits that one represents an ethnicity and the other a culture. However, while such a reading follows logically from certain literary sources, it does not accurately represent the relationship across all historical periods, nor does it recognize the degree to which cultural practices, including linguistic usage, marked a community as "Syrian" or "Greek" in the Greek and Roman social imagination. Lucian's own corpus, as the following sections of this chapter will

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[269] The "Syrian" is on trial in the *Double Indictment*; the location of the *Mistaken Critic* in Syria (or a Syrian community); the speaker of *On the Death of Peregrinus* is coming from Syria; the narrator of *On the Syrian Goddess* makes much of his Syrian background; both the speaker and the addressee of *Against the Ignorant Book-Collector* are Syrian; the narrator of the *Scythian* identifies as Syrian; the speaker of *How to Write History* is annoyed that his people, the Syrians, are being depicted inaccurately.

illustrate, relies on this more complex picture and exploits the flexibility of the divisions between culture and ethnicity.[270]

The "Syrian" *ethnos* as a concept denoted by *Σύρος, -α, -ον* in Greek thought derives from the ethnic scheme articulated by Herodotus, a scheme characterized by multiple elisions in geography and errors of translation.[271] The exonym "Syrian", by the Imperial period, had expanded to include people variously called Syrian, Assyrian, and Aramaean. This slippage was not lost on writers of the period, however, from the attention they bring to the distinction between the names used by Greek and Roman populations in referring to these Eastern civilizations, and the names used among Eastern populations themselves, the term "Syrian" frequently erased cultural or ethnic distinctions of considerable significance to the different peoples whom it labeled.[272] For writers of the Second Sophistic and their Roman contemporaries, the identity of "Syrian" was therefore the one created under Seleucid rule and entrenched under the Romans, and not necessarily one to which the so-called "Syrians" themselves subscribed. However, while the groups of people labeled as Syrian remained more or less the same under the Seleucids and the Romans, their social and political identities shifted dramatically between ca. 300 BCE and ca.

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[270] See also the discussion of Chapter One in which the usage of these terms in this dissertation is explained.

[271] Hdt. 7.63, e.g.: οὗτοι δὲ ὑπὸ μὲν Ἑλλήνων ἐκαλέοντο Σύριοι, ὑπὸ δὲ τῶν βαρβάρων Ἀσσύριοι. (And these people were called "Syrians" by Greeks, but "Assyrians" by the barbarians.) Also Xen. *An.* 1.4.19 ἐντεῦθεν ἐξελαύνει διὰ τῆς Συρίας σταθμοὺς ἐννέα παρασάγγας πεντήκοντα· καὶ ἀφικνοῦνται πρὸς τὸν Ἀράξην ποταμόν (And thence they marched out 9 stages and 50 *parasangs* through Syria and arrived at the river Araxes.) where "Syria" is used to refer the region called "Assyria" by the Persian kings, cf. Briant (2002) 173, but *contra* this distinction Frye (1992) 281-5.

[272] Josephus *AJ* 1.144: Ἀραμαίους δὲ Ἄραμος ἔσχεν, οὓς Ἕλληνες Σύρους προσαγορεύουσιν (and Aramos ruled the Aramaeans, whom the Greeks call Syrians); Strabo 1.2.34: εἰκάζει γε δὴ καὶ τὰς τῶν ἐθνῶν τούτων κατονομασίας ἐμφερεῖς ἀλλήλαις εἶναι. τοὺς γὰρ ὑφ' ἡμῶν Σύρους καλουμένους ὑπ' αὐτῶν τῶν Σύρων Ἀραμμαίους καλεῖσθαι ([Posidonius] also supposes the names of these peoples to be similar to one another, for, he says, those called "Syrians" by us are called "Aramaeans" by the Syrians themselves).

200 CE;[273] that is to say, while roughly the same people were "Syrians", what it meant to be "Syrian" and the way it was expressed underwent substantial changes. The most significant of these changes was the integration, which the Seleucids had created the ethnonym *Σύρος* to prevent happening, of Syrians into the Greek *politeia* under Roman rule.

The effect of this systemic change was to do away with the Greek/Syrian binary, at least in the political sphere; "Syrian" ethnicity no longer precluded one from also being "Greek". The bilingual epitaph of Thaimos Ioulianos son of Saad (a.2: *Σαάδου*/b.2: *Sati*), from Lugdunum in Gaul and dating to the early Severan period (*IGR* 1.245=*IG* 14.2532=*IGF* 141), provides an example of this phenomenon in the way it emphasizes his Syrian heritage and his Greek/Roman political status. His place of birth is specified as the Syrian town of Aatil/Athil in Arabia (Greek *Ἀθειλή*, Latin *Athela*): *[ἐ]σθ̣λός τε πέφυκε καὶ νήδυ[μ]ος Ἀθειληνός* (a.3-4: he was born an Athelene, noble and sweet) / *Syri de vico · Athelani* (b.2-3: from the town of Syrian Athelanum). Likewise, his political role in Qanawat (Κάναθα/Canatha) is given in both Greek and Roman terms: *βουλευτὴς πολίτης τε Κανωθαίων ἐπ̣[ὶ] Συρίης.* (a.5-6: councilor and citizen of the Kanothans in Syria) / *decurion[i] [S]eptimiano · Canotha* (b.3-4: decurion of Septimius in Canotha).[274] Documentary evidence from Palmyra (*IP* 16=*IGLS* 17.1.222), conversely, shows Aramaic used as an official language to conduct business of the Greek *πολιτεία* (Aramaic *pl̮ṭy'*);[275] the Syrian political organization *is* the Greek, and vice-versa.

Under Rome and Roman client-kings, being "Syrian" often *entailed* being "Greek", and vice-versa: as Andrade discusses, there is a wealth of evidence for Syrian groups' appropriating

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[273] Andrade (2013) 15-17, working from Comaroff (1997) 179-81; especially noteworthy is the point that the ethnic divisions were "stabilized" by Seleucid political systems, and therefore continued into the Roman era.
[274] Allmer and Dissard (1890) 66-72.
[275] Millar (1993); Andrade (2012).

Greek cultural signifiers to assert Syrian identity.[276] A second or early third century inscription from Apamea dedicated by one Aurelius Belios Philippos, *IGLS* 4.1346, exemplifies this practice: [-- --]η .ον[-- -- --] ἐκ κ[ελεύ]|σεως θεοῦ μεγίστου | ἁγίου Βήλου Αὐρ(ήλιος) Βήλιος | Φίλιππος ἱερεὺς καὶ || διάδοχος ἐν Ἀπαμείᾳ | τῶν Ἐπικουρείων (…by the order of the greatest god holy Bel, Aurelius Belios Philippos, priest and *diadochos* in Apamea of the Epicureans). Martin Ferguson Smith[277] interprets this inscription to mean that Philippos was a priest of Bel and, separately, held a leadership position among the otherwise unknown Epicurean community. In this view, Philippos held a Syrian religious identity but a Greek intellectual one. However, Gil Renberg[278] sees difficulty in reconciling such a religious role with Epicurean beliefs, and suggests that the priesthood may have been an honorary civic role that someone of high stature was compelled to assume—that Philippos was, in fact, not a practitioner of Near Eastern religious traditions.[279] Juliette Harrisson[280] conjectures that the title *ἱερεὺς* also refers to Epicurean leadership, though if true it would not necessarily resolve the framing of the inscription as a divine mandate. Regardless of which interpretation is correct, however, Andrade rightly cites this inscription as evidence of a Syrian community's use of Greek civic institutions—a priesthood, and its associated responsibilities—to promulgate the Near Eastern cultural practice of Bel worship.[281] Moreover, his tri-lingual *trianomina* encapsulates the multi-layered cultural landscape of the region; from all appearances, Philippos was equally Syrian, Greek, and Roman in different domains (civic and/or religious, intellectual, legal) and none necessarily preempted the other. While one might infer his ethnicity, that is to say his ancestry, to be native Syrian rather than

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[276] Andrade (2013) 13; this practice also resembles the appropriation of Greek *paideia* to assert Roman elite status, as in Gellius and Apuleius.
[277] Smith (1996).
[278] Renberg (2003) 273-4.
[279] The case of Favorinus, a self-professed philosopher who was nevertheless compelled to become a *flamen* when Hadrian refused to grant him immunity, is perhaps analogous.
[280] Harrisson (2012) 217-18.
[281] Andrade (2013) 160.

Macedonian-Greek, nothing in the inscription necessarily indicates this to be the case. In any case, the sources about this period to which Photius had access seven centuries later, when he wrote on Iamblichus, seemed sufficiently ambiguous that he felt the need to clarify that Iamblichus was "Syrian" not in the sense of being a Greek from Syria, but rather an autochthonous ethnic Syrian.[282] Even were someone like Philippos to be explicitly called "Syrian", it would not be dispositive as to his ethnic identity.

Nevertheless, in these examples the Greek identity claimed by or attributed to the Syrian individual or group is conditional: if Thaimos did not have his Greek political status or Philippos his *diadocheia*, they might not have been regarded as "Greek". Athenaeus, as shown in the previous chapter, assigns a similarly conditional Greek status to Ulpian and when Ulpian fails to earn this status in the eyes of the symposium guests by failing to live up to the Attic language standards that he himself has set, he is called "Syrattic" (Ath. 3.100K, 9.5K; Ath. ep. 2.1.31, 2.2.3). This chapter will illustrate how this theme is developed more fully as a major component of Lucian's satirical linguistics, and in particular, how the tension between "Greek" and "Syrian" as a literary theme reflects some of the historical evidence. Hellenized Syrian populations have, in past studies, been conceived of as a creolized group who, through *métissage/mestizaje*, embody a hybrid middle-ground between being fully Greek and fully Syrian.[283] Such a scheme, however, relies on the uninterrogated assumption that cultural categories are static, fixed boundaries which one can cross or between which one can be located, and neglects to consider how identity is a strategic and contextual product of a range of practices.[284] Crucially, this scheme does not consider how (as discussed above) the idioms of one culture could be appropriated to claim identity within another; the discussion in the previous chapter of this study has, in contrast,

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[282] Photius *Bibl*. 94.75b.
[283] Sartre (2008) 26-8.
[284] Whitmarsh (2001) 273, 305; Sommer (2009) 245-6.

illustrated how part of Gellius' program in the *Attic Nights* is to do exactly that. Nevertheless, while the historical practice may resist categorization by a fixed binary scheme, literary discussion of the Imperial period often *does* make such a distinction on the ideological or conceptual level.[285] That is to say, when it comes to labels someone is either Greek or not, and being semi-Greek meant that one was, in fact, not Greek;[286] Strabo (14.5.25), for example, explicitly refuses to recognize the existence of *μιγάδες* (mestizos):

> Τίνες δ' εἰσὶν οἱ μιγάδες; οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἔχοιμεν εἰπεῖν παρὰ τοὺς λεχθέντας τόπους ἢ ὠνομάσθαι ὑπ' αὐτοῦ ἢ παραλελεῖφθαι ἄλλους οὓς ἀποδώσομεν τοῖς μιγάσιν, οὐδέ γε αὐτῶν τινας τούτων ὧν ἢ εἶπεν ἢ παρέλιπε. καὶ γὰρ εἰ κατεμίχθησαν, ἀλλ' ἡ ἐπικράτεια πεποίηκεν ἢ Ἕλληνας ἢ βαρβάρους· τρίτον δὲ γένος οὐδὲν ἴσμεν τὸ μικτόν.
>
> And who are the "mixed" people? For we would not be able to say, compared with the places mentioned, that others were named or omitted by him (=Ephorus)[287] which we will assign to the "mixed" ones, nor indeed [can we call "mixed"] any of those which he has either spoken of or left out. For even if they had become mixed, the *epikrateia* has made them either Greek or barbarian; as to a third race, we know nothing of a "mixed" one.[288]

According to the principles by which Strabo defines his ethnography (1.4.9), the *ἐπικράτεια* or prevailing characteristic that marks an individual or group as either one or the other depends on civic (*νόμινον*, *πολιτικόν*) institutions. Lucian's corpus, conversely, pushes back against this model and locates the author's Syrian *personae* in a conceptual space that allows him to have both Greek and Syrian identities simultaneously, without the socio-political status that might otherwise grant him Greek-ness. While people fitting that description are attested in the evidence

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[285] Andrade (2013) 18.
[286] Andrade (2013) 29: "Some Syrians assimilated to Classical norms; others reinvented Greekness and Romanness. In turn, Roman imperial authorities and Greek intellectuals rendered them all 'imitation Greeks'. While claiming credit for making Syrians into Greeks, they simultaneously inscribed them with immutable 'barbarian' characteristics to foreground their own Greekness and Romanness."
[287] Ephorus of Cyme (the Elder) paraphrased earlier at §23: Φήσαντος δὲ τοῦ Ἐφόρου διότι τὴν χερρόνησον
κατοικεῖ ταύτην ἑκκαίδεκα γένη, τρία μὲν Ἑλληνικὰ τὰ δὲ λοιπὰ βάρβαρα χωρὶς τῶν μιγάδων… (And though Ephorus said that the sixteen tribes inhabit this peninsula, three of them Greek and the rest barbarian, with the exception of the mixed tribes…).
[288] Note how Strabo's view of "mixed" peoples differs notably from that of Dionysius *Ant. Rom.* 1.90.1, discussed in Chapter Four, where he draws the readers' attention to the Romans' mixed nature.

discussed above, it is Lucian's assertion of this status within the literary intellectual world of *paideia*, and his mastery thereof, that distinguishes him and makes the connection between his linguistic practice and the identity he claims for himself especially complex.

While official use of the label "Syrian" effaced the diversity among several different populations and represented them as a monolithic group, in practice a range of different identities fell under this label and they could be expressed in a variety of ways. Most relevant for the present discussion, in these different Syrian identities the relationships between Syrian, Greek, and Roman appeared in several possible combinations. In Antioch, for example, public inscriptions show how the *boulē* interwove symbols of different traditions to assert three complementary identities in separate categories, namely Greek *politeia*, Syrian *ethnos*, and Roman Imperial patronage.[289] By highlighting the patronage of Vespasian (and his sons Titus and Domitian), the Antiochene *boulē* showcased (to the Antiochene population, as well as to any citizens of other cities who might see the inscriptions) their high status among the cities of Greek Syria—and thus, the use of symbols of Roman authority in effect served to make Antioch appear more significant as a Greek city.[290] Conversely, in general terms some provincial figures who achieved success in the Imperial aristocracy often did so by the expedient of adopting a Greek or Roman position and repudiating their "barbarian" origins. As discussed in the previous chapter, Fronto's identity as a Roman depends on distancing himself from his (potentially) Punic roots; Herodian provides another example of this phenomenon, perhaps even a Syrian one.[291] By the

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[289] Burnett (2002) 119-20: reinforcing this final point, some public inscriptions were written in Latin rather than Greek.
[290] Andrade (2013) 152-3.
[291] Hdn. 2.7.9, 2.10.7; but cf. Sidebottom (2007) 78, who argues that Herodian's origins remain unclear despite evidence of his having a Syrian connection.

time of Trajan, the elite classes had adopted Greek and Roman cultural markers, including their language.[292]

The preceding discussion has attempted to demonstrate that, independent of the varied historical significations of the term "Syrian", the modes through which individuals and groups constructed their "Syrian" identity, especially in relation to Greece and Rome, were also markedly heterogeneous. Just as the concept of Syrian-ness was not a fixed, static position, neither were the significant features deployed in its construction. The rest of this chapter will consider the different social, political, and especially linguistic positions in which Lucian situates his authorial persona as literary representations of these diverse Syrian identities. While none of these is likely to accurately reflect the real Lucian's lived experience, they do reflect various combinations of linguistic ideology and cultural affiliation in the Syro-Greco-Roman world. The discussion will further argue that, given the variations evident in the historical constructions of Syrian-ness and its relationship with Greek and Roman identities and the Greek and Latin languages, Lucian's different personae constitute, when taken together as a group, a self-conscious literary realization of these variations. As this chapter will attempt to demonstrate, the shifts in perspective from one work (and one persona) to the next show how Syrian-ness and Greek-ness are moving targets, and that their signifiers—especially the language and literature of Greek *paideia*, as previously discussed in Chapter Two and Three—are likewise arbitrary and contingent. The variety in perspectives adopted by Lucian, in the form of several different *personae* who may or may not be identified as "Syrian", constitutes a self-conscious literary

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[292] The *Letter of Mara bar Serapion* appears to provide evidence from Samosata for an elite class of citizens who, despite studying Greek literature and Stoic philosophy, spoke Aramaic rather than Greek or Latin. However, the dating of this letter by most scholars to the immediate aftermath of the Roman annexation of Commagene, during which time the realities of Imperial occupation had not yet become an accepted fact of life (and may have been the target of some form of brief resistance on the part of the Commagene royalty), suggests that this group's linguistic choice was a carryover from the era of Commagene's independence. cf. Ramelli (2004, 2005), (2008) 2561-66; Merz and Tieleman (2008); Rensberger (2010). Chin (2006), however, argues for a later date.

mirroring of the range of different forms that being "Syrian" could take. In other words, only the characteristically slippery positioning of satire allows Lucian to represent several different versions of the relationship between language and identity, neither of which—as Lucian shows himself to be aware—possesses a static, fixed boundary but instead results from a complex interplay of explicit and implicit social imaginaries. In his writing, Lucian can manipulate these imaginaries as literary themes and demonstrate the range of possibilities that his mastery of linguistic-literary *paideia* enables, not only for literary innovation but also for the innovation of his authorial self-identity. In asserting his control over the Classical canon, Lucian also exhibits the capacity to command its modes of expression and the standards against which the canon, and in particular its Atticizing revival, are to be judged. Lucian's mastery of Atticism not only allows him to claim a Greek identity when convenient, it also permits him to challenge uninterrogated assumptions about what it means to be Greek and whether Greek and Syrian identities can (or should) co-exist in a single Attic-speaking persona.

5.2 Cultural Identification and Positioning in Lucian

Characterizing Lucian by the representations in his works is a complex proposition. He rarely gives his narrator or primary speaker the name "Lucian" (as noted in Chapter Three)[293], more frequently preferring to employ allegorical titles (such as Parrhesiades or Tychiades) or, especially when writing in first person, to leave himself unnamed (as in the *Mistaken Critic*). However, he frequently mentions or even highlights the Syrian, Assyrian, or otherwise barbarian origins of the various *personae* he creates, including the otherwise unnamed "Syrian" orator on

[293] Goldhill (2002) 60-65 sees only two definitive textual occurrences of Lucian's name, at *Alexander* 55 (the narrator refers to himself as "Loukianos") and *True Histories* 1.28 (in an epigram dedicated to him by Homer). The subtitle of *The Dream, or, Lucian's Life* and the character "Lucianus" in the *Solecist* are in his view suspect, whereas the name "Lucian" given to the sender of the epistolary works *On the Death of Peregrinus* and *Nigrinus* occurs outside the body of the works themselves.

trial in the *Double Indictment*.[294] Thus, even when the protagonist and/or narrator goes unnamed, it nevertheless has a Syrian focalization. In other works, though, there is no Syrian identity attached to Lucian's *persona* beyond what an audience familiar with his heritage might assume. Furthermore, the discussion below will show how Lucian portrays Syrians as "other" when the Greekness of his narrator is especially at issue, in contrast to the assertion of Syrianness when that attribute is salient to the discussion of the literary project.[295]

5.2.1 *On Salaried Posts in Great Houses*

In *On Salaried Posts in Great Houses* Lucian describes the lives of clients and their patrons, and in the process situates several different cultural positions in a complex relationship. Satire on life in the city of Rome is practically a genre unto itself (especially in the second century CE) and Lucian's work can be viewed as a Second Sophistic take on a theme previously explored by Martial and, most notably, Juvenal. The parallels between Lucian's detailed and darkly humorous account of the Greek intellectual at Rome and Juvenal's third *Satire* have been discussed at length in prior scholarship, most recently by Eleni Bozia[296] and Markus Hafner.[297] This thematic connection to an earlier work is an ideal place to set up a discussion of Lucian's positioning his authorial persona within the cultural and ethnic landscape. Juvenal's work, featuring the character Umbricius about to leave Rome for greener pastures, resembles a playful inversion of the rhetorical theme of praising the place being left behind; here, Umbricius makes it

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[294] The anonymity he gives this character is especially striking, considering the judicial conceit of the work. See the discussion of this work, below.
[295] Richter (2017) discusses Lucian's employment of Syrianness and barbarism as a trope in Lucian's literary project, to good effect. My exploration of the subject is indebted to his study, though my conclusions differ somewhat.
[296] Bozia (2015) 22-37.
[297] Hafner (2017) 11-12, 32ff.

clear that if he never returned to Rome it would be too soon.[298] On a basic level, Lucian's work treats on the same theme since he too goes into great detail describing to his addressee, Timocles, how miserable and decadent a place Rome is for one such as he. *On Salaried Posts* is not the only work of Lucian's to lambaste Rome and Roman culture, as *Nigrinus* 15-34 also consists largely of a condemnation of Rome—in this case, delivered by the titular Cynic philosopher as part of a celebration of Athenian virtue. Lucian's depictions of Rome also share features of Juvenal 1 and 4, and in general the similarity of authorial persona in both authors comes as no surprise given how many works by each of them devote considerable space to mocking human weakness.[299] Nevertheless, Juvenal's third satire is the Latin work that intersects most directly with Lucian and the present study will focus on that text. However, that being said, at the outset it is vital to clarify that the analysis to follow does not view Lucian's *On Salaried Posts in Great Houses* as a response to Juvenal's work.[300] This section will, rather, argue that in *On Salaried Posts* Lucian has in mind the same cultural phenomena that Juvenal did in the early decades of the century, to which both authors respond. These phenomena include the immigration into Rome of Greek-speaking Easterners and the use of Greek intellectual practice as a signifier of social status among Romans, as well as the supposed backlash of certain Roman groups (typified in Juvenal by the character of Umbricius) against the two trends. In addition, the anti-Roman sentiment expressed in *On Salaried Posts* from a nominally Greek perspective also has a parallel in Athenaeus'

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[298] Cairns (1972) 47-8, Braund (1989) 23. In this respect, Juvenal 3 may exemplify the same kind of rhetorical inversion as Lucian's *Professor of Rhetoric*, a backwards re-imagining of a typical rhetorical exercise.
[299] Bozia (2015) 24-30.
[300] In keeping with the current scholarly view, *contra* Helm (1906) 221-2 who, as part of a study that regards Lucian's corpus as primarily derivative of earlier satire—primarily Menippus—thus opines: "Wenn auch Lucian vielleicht dergleichen aus eigener Anschauung schildern konnte [. . .], so ist die Übereinstimmung der Gedanken doch zum Teil so weitgehend, daß man die Kenntnis Juvenals bei ihm voraussetzen möchte." (Although Lucian could be describing the same thing from his own point of view … the correspondence in sentiment is so extensive that one wants to presuppose knowledge of Juvenal on his (Lucian's) part.)

Learned Banqueters, which the previous chapter discussed and which will come back into focus later in this chapter. The most challenging dimension of this work, as is often the case with Lucianic satire, is the relationship between the authorial persona (the narrator, in this case) and the individual, group, or groups he is mocking. As will be shown, Lucian makes his words appear to come from both within and without the Greek, Roman, and Syrian groups who appear in *On Salaried Posts*, and by doing so he destabilizes the cultural signifiers and social strata assumed as the context for his satire.

The main speaker of Juvenal 3, Umbricius, devotes a significant amount of space to criticism of contemporary Rome's ethnic and cultural makeup. A tripartite social landscape of Rome is explicitly laid out at Juv. 3.60-5:

…Non possum ferre, Quirites,	…I cannot abide, Quirites,
Graecam Urbem; quamvis quota portio faecis Achaei?	a Greek Rome; but what share of this offal is Achaeans?
Iam pridem Syrus in Tiberim defluxit Orontes	Syrian Orontes has long since flowed into the Tiber
et linguam et mores et cum tibicine chordas	and brought along its language and customs and flute
obliquas nec non gentilia tympana secum	and slanted harp-strings, and the drums of its people
vexit et ad circum iussas prostare puellas.	and the girls compelled to street-walk by the Circus.

Umbricius has in mind three categories: Roman, Greek, and Syrian—the latter conceived of as a kind of semi-Greek along the lines of the discussion in the introduction to this chapter. The terminology he uses to label these social categories is telling. He calls Romans "Quirites", an antiquarian term of public address, with religious overtones, that refers specifically to elite Romans with venerable heritage.[301] In a similar vein, the poetic *Achaei*, as distinct from *Graecam*, rejects the contemporary social realities—in which, as discussed above, Greek and Syrian identities could each signify the other, reciprocally—and recalls an idealized, remote or

[301] Enn. *Ann.* 112W [= 102Sk]; Sall. *BJ* 31.11.

even Homeric past[302] in which only true Greeks (whoever they are) could be called "Greek", before the Hellenic civilization had become mixed with the East, before Rome had in turn been similarly polluted. This schema Juvenal does not present at face value, nor does he portray anything Umbricius says as reliable or objective. He makes Umbricius ironically undermine himself throughout the work, in fact, when he witlessly reveals his ignorance of the Greek past of the Roman landscape from the start: he purposes to escape from the de-Romanized city of Rome and resettle in a place more suitable for true Romans like himself (though his name suggests his family is Umbrian), but the place he has picked is Cumae, with its mythical Greek founder Daedalus (3.25) in an area with a long history of Greek settlement.[303] Umbricius yearns for a Roman past that is, Juvenal ironically implies, nothing more than a product of his own reactionary imagination, since he is ignorant of Rome's true history as a multi-ethnic city from its very beginning.[304] In comparison, Lucian does not give even this level of attention to the question of ethnicity among the Greeks, perhaps surprisingly, because if any speaker were going to elide the variations in Greek-speaking populations one would expect it to be the Roman and not the Greek. Instead, Lucian briefly mentions two "barbarian" archetypes, *ὑπὸ θυρωρῷ κακῶς συρίζοντι καὶ ὀνομακλήτορι Λιβυκῷ* (*De merc.* 10: a doorman speaking with a horrible Syrian accent, and a Libyan announcer[305]), in one breath and moves on. Lucian's narrator, and his

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[302] Recall, from the discussion in Chapter Two, how Sextus Empiricus draws attention to a strain of Hellenist ideology in which the language of Homer appears to represent an undifferentiated ur-Greek from which later dialects descend.
[303] Braund (1989).
[304] On the subject of Rome's multi-ethnic and humble foundation, see Dench (1995, 2005). Recall also Gellius' account of the etymology for *Italia* from the Greek ἰταλοί (*NA* 11.1).
[305] See Hafner (2017) 182-3 for bibliography on these two servant roles, including Ath. *Deip*. 2.47e *κατεκλίνθημεν ὡς ἕκαστος ἤθελε, οὐ περιμείναντες ὀνομακλήτορα τὸν τῶν δείπνων ταξίαρχον* (we were seated as each person wished, not waiting for the announcer to be the arranger of the dinner places). On *συρίζω*, Sext. Emp. *Adv. math.* 1.314: *ἐβαρβάριζεν ἀντὶ τοῦ ἐσύριζε* [...] *βάρβαροι γὰρ οἱ Σύροι* ('he was barbarizing' for 'he was Syrizing' … for the Syrians are barbarians).

addressee Timocles are presumed to be Greek where it counts, and their Greek identity is set in opposition to that of the Roman patrons and guests who fill out the scene.

A significant portion of Umbricius' invective appears to address Greek *paideia*, here framed in a negative light. Specifically, he seems to have Near Eastern Hellenophone sophists—perhaps not unlike Lucian—in mind when he describes the type of Greek pouring into Rome (Juv. 3.73-85):

ingenium velox, audacia perdita, sermo	His ingenuity is quick, his brashness profligate, his speech
promptus et Isaeo torrentior: ede quid illum	ready and more flowing than Isaeus:[306] say what you
esse putes. quemvis hominem secum attulit ad nos:	suppose him to be, he has brought any man to us:
grammaticus, rhetor, geometres, pictor, aliptes,	grammarian, rhetor, geometer, painter, trainer,
augur, schoenobates, medicus, magus, omnia novit	soothsayer, rope-dancer, doctor, mage, he knows them all,
Graeculus esuriens: in caelum iusseris, ibit.	that hungry Greekling: if you order him into the sky, he'll go.
in summa non Maurus erat neque Sarmata nec Thrax	In all, the one who took up the wings was not a Moor, nor a
qui sumpsit pinnas, mediis sed natus Athenis.	Sarmatian nor a Thracian, but born in the middle of Athens.
horum ego non fugiam conchylia? me prior ille	Should I flee these men's purple robes? Shall he sign before
signabit fultusque toro meliore recumbet,	me, lie down and recline on a better couch,
advectus Romam quo pruna et cottana vento?	one carried to Rome by the same wind as the plum and the fig?
usque adeo nihil est quod nostra infantia caelum	Is it so worthless that my childhood drank in the Aventine air
hausit Aventini baca nutrita Sabina?	nourished on Sabine olive?

Lucian ventriloquizes the same Roman attitude in *On Salaried Posts* at §17 of his work:

> ἐπίφθονος δ' οὖν ἀπὸ τῆς προπόσεως ἐκείνης πολλοῖς τῶν παλαιῶν φίλων γεγένησαι, καὶ πρότερον ἐπὶ τῇ κατακλίσει λυπήσας τινὰς αὐτῶν, ὅτι τήμερον ἥκων προὐκρίθης ἀνδρῶν πολυετῆ δουλείαν ἠντληκότων. εὐθὺς οὖν καὶ τοιοῦτός τις ἐν αὐτοῖς περὶ σοῦ λόγος· "Τοῦτο ἡμῖν πρὸς τοῖς ἄλλοις δεινοῖς ἐλείπετο, καὶ τῶν ἄρτι εἰσεληλυθότων εἰς τὴν οἰκίαν δευτέρους εἶναι, καὶ μόνοις τοῖς Ἕλλησι τούτοις ἀνέῳκται ἡ Ῥωμαίων πόλις· καίτοι τί ἐστιν ἐφ' ὅτῳ προτιμῶνται ἡμῶν; οὐ ῥημάτια δύστηνα λέγοντες οἴονταί τι παμμέγεθες ὠφελεῖν;"

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[306] This Isaeus is not the canonical Athenian orator of the fifth century BCE, but rather a contemporary Syrian orator (Philostr. *VS* 1.20) who arrived in Rome and made a splash with his rhetorical performances (Plin. *Ep*. 2.3).

> And so, from that toast, you have become the object of jealousy for many of [your patron's] old friends, having aggrieved some of them previously regarding the seating arrangement, because you, arriving just that day, were preferred to men who had endured service for many years. So straightaway there will be talk among them about you, like this: "This was left for us, on top of the other indignities, to come second even to those who have just entered the house, and the city of Rome is open to these Greeks alone; and what even is the reason why they are honored above us? Surely they don't suppose that they confer any great benefit by delivering wretched little speeches?

The jilted Roman elites of both Juvenal and Lucian feel the newly-arrived Greeks have jumped the line, so to speak, because the wealthy patrons of Rome now esteem Greek *paideia* more than the loyalty of their clients. The speakers in both passages emphasize the way these Greeks (or semi-Greeks) talk, *sermo/ promptus et Isaeo torrentior* and *ῥημάτια δύστηνα λέγοντες*, and both groups of Romans consider it an insult that these affected performances of Greek language and literature have supplanted traditional Roman values. This Hellenophobic view is an anachronism in Juvenal, and even more so in Lucian, intended to highlight the jealous Roman clients' lack of cultural sophistication; they clearly do not wish to live in the Rome of Gellius or Athenaeus. Both versions of this Roman gripe question the value of the sophistic showpieces for which the wealthy patrons fund their Greek acquaintances, but the patrons themselves clearly believe them to have value or else they would not seek to fill their houses with Greeks to show off their own sophistication.

But the patrons' quest for sophistication is no less problematic. While Juvenal's poetic persona has little to say, letting Umbricius do all the talking, Lucian's work is narrated primarily from the perspective of a Greek sophist with obviously high regard for the art that he himself practices. A major element of his admonitions to Timocles, therefore, is that this new social context, into which this intellectual practice has been transferred, tends to degrade the status of the sophist to that of a traveling entertainer (if not a servant) primarily due to the sophist's utter dependence on his patron. The sophists' treatment by boorish Romans is a major theme

throughout the work,[307] but Lucian's narrator draws attention to the more acute problem that this new social arrangement produces deficient sophistic performances and degrades the quality of the language used. In *On Salaried Posts* §35, Lucian first describes the demeaning role even a competent sophist is forced to play when delivering a speech on command to a drunken applause like a juggler or mime, then turns to a subject more degrading still—the sophist's obligate flattery in the face of a patron's own amateurish compositions.[308] The ultimate result of this dynamic is the destruction of the language itself: *χρὴ δὲ καὶ σοφοὺς καὶ ῥήτορας εἶναι αὐτούς, κἂν εἴ τι σολοικίσαντες τύχωσιν, δι'*[309] *αὐτὸ τοῦτο τῆς Ἀττικῆς καὶ τοῦ Ὑμηττοῦ μεστοὺς δοκεῖν τοὺς λόγους καὶ νόμον εἶναι τὸ λοιπὸν οὕτω λέγειν.* (And they must also be sophists and rhetors themselves, and if they should happen to commit a solecism, for that very reason their words must be treated as though laden infused with Attica and Hymettus, and the custom thereafter must be to speak in this manner.) The patrons' behavior here parallels the disingenuous pseudo-intellectualism that Umbricius sees in Greek immigrants (Juv. 3.88-9, discussed above), and in fact here Lucian seems to agree with him in blaming the Greeks for their complicity. By joining the entourage of such Roman patrons and lending legitimacy to these opsimathic pretensions to verbal artistry, sophists abdicate their own responsibilities as gatekeepers of *paideia* and even the Attic language itself. *On Salaried Posts* shows how the Roman exploitation of Greek sophistic identity can lead to degradation of the very linguistic and other intellectual attributes that lend Greeks their cultural cachet. This eventuality is brought about by Greek surrender to Roman models of cultural identity, in which the Attic language and Atticizing sophists no longer take the lead in defining the standards of language and intellectualism but allow Romans to do so, not debating amongst

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[307] Bozia (2015) 23.
[308] The guests at Trimalchio's party are represented in the same way, *'sophos' universi clamamus* (Pet. *Sat.* 40.1), and more relevant for the present discussion, Juv. 3.100 describes Greeks always ready to feign admiration in the hopes of earning favor. cf. Hafner (2017) 322.
[309] Conjecture from Nesselrath (1984) 607.

themselves (as discussed in Chapter Two) but instead filling a social role that Romans have created for them. The Greeks, by putting themselves into this situation, become not Greeks but the Roman *idea* of Greeks, while the Romans, boorish though they may be, remain themselves.

For Lucian, therefore, whose *personae* in other works possess and—in the section to follow—display Syrian heritage, the unalloyed or undifferentiated Greek perspective he constructs in *On Salaried Posts* permits effective demonstration of *paideia*'s shortcomings. When he highlights the "Syrism" of the doorman or the Libyan ethnicity of the announcer, he implicitly distances himself from either of those positions—the speaker is not Syrian or Libyan, or if he were, he discourages the supposition. Instead, by emphasizing Greekness in contrast to any other cultural or ethnic identity—Roman, Syrian, Libyan, and so forth—the admonition to Timocles becomes even starker. The speaker is simply "Greek" and therefore his connection to Greek *paideia* is uncomplicated by any additional shades of identity; the criticism he levels at the other Greeks is therefore all the harsher because it is delivered from an insider perspective against his compatriots. Ultimately it is *they* who are to blame for cheapening the arts of rhetoric, philosophy, and sophistry, motivated most truly (*ἀληθέστατον*, §7) by their greed. Timocles, he warns, must avoid turning his sophism into a commodity; as one who knows better, the narrator is therefore a more serious Greek intellectual. This Greek persona railing against the failings of his fellow Hellenes is stands in stark contrast to the Syrian voice with Lucian speaks in other works, as the subsequent exploration will reveal.

5.2.2 *On the Syrian Goddess*

The Herodotean pastiche *On the Syrian Goddess* sees Lucian take on the persona of a Hellenized Syrian, who relies on his Near Eastern heritage (§1: *γράφω δὲ Ἀσσύριος ἐών...*) as a source of authority for his discussion of the religious practices in a city he identifies as Hierapolis. The cultural position Lucian assigns this persona is complex, and the broader portrait

of Syrian practices even more so; Lucian presents his audience with a semiotically multilayered representation of his ostensible native country, in which the categories of Syrian, Greek, and Roman resist definition and shift position even as they are relied upon as absolute points of reference. The centrality of semiotic ethnography to the work is clear from §33, where Lucian describes an object central to the worship of Atargatis, the titular goddess:

> Ἐν μέσῳ δὲ ἀμφοτέρων ἕστηκεν ξόανον ἄλλο χρύσεον, οὐδαμὰ τοῖσι ἄλλοισι ξοάνοισι εἴκελον. τὸ δὲ μορφὴν μὲν ἰδίην οὐκ ἔχει, φορέει δὲ τῶν ἄλλων θεῶν εἴδεα. καλέεται δὲ σημήιον καὶ ὑπ' αὐτῶν Ἀσσυρίων, οὐδέ τι οὔνομα ἴδιον αὐτῷ ἔθεντο, ἀλλ' οὐδὲ γενέσιος αὐτοῦ καὶ εἴδεος λέγουσιν. καί μιν οἱ μὲν ἐς Διόνυσον, ἄλλοι δὲ ἐς Δευκαλίωνα, οἱ δὲ ἐς Σεμίραμιν ἄγουσιν· καὶ γὰρ δὴ ὦν ἐπὶ τῇ κορυφῇ αὐτοῦ περιστερὴ χρυσέη ἐφέστηκεν, τοὔνεκα δὴ μυθέονται Σεμιράμιος ἔμμεναι τόδε σημήιον. ἀποδημέει δὲ δὶς ἑκάστου ἔτεος ἐς θάλασσαν ἐς κομιδὴν τοῦ εἶπον ὕδατος.
>
> And in the middle between the two there stands another gilt wooden object, not at all like the other wooden ones. And it does not have its own form but bears the images of the other gods. And it is called by the Assyrians themselves *semeion*, and no proper name is given to it, nor do they say anything about its origin or appearance. And some attribute it to Dionysus, others to Deucalion, and yet others to Semiramis; for indeed there is, standing on its crown, a golden pigeon, on which account this *semeion* is said to belong to Semiramis. And twice each year it moves down to the sea for the drawing of the water I mentioned.

This passage describes how different groups imbue the same holy object with different meanings, each of which bears on their own version of the temple's founding (§12), and in so doing it makes a broader point about the arbitrariness of signs much like Sextus Empiricus' discussion of the topic, as highlighted in Chapter Two. In principle any given object (especially one with little in the way of distinguishing characteristics, i.e. *μορφὴν μὲν ἰδίην οὐκ ἔχει*) can be assigned symbolic value and as such used in any given cultural practice[310], and while this notion may be uncontroversial in current cultural studies, in the larger context of *On the Syrian Goddess* Lucian's description of the *semeion* and its various explanations seems remarkably sophisticated.

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[310] Eco (1976) 27-8.

Regarding the arbitrary assignation of culturally-specific meanings to neutral-seeming objects, the detail of the *περιστερὴ χρυσέη* atop it should not be overlooked: while the narrator of *On the Syrian Goddess* presents the work as a factual report, the voice that Lucian gives him (including his Ionic dialect) suggests that he is meant to be an ersatz Syrian-born Herodotus practicing exactly the same kind of fanciful ethnography that Lucian criticizes elsewhere in other voices.[311] This narrator is not necessarily reliable, and either he or his sources could be mistaken about certain details—such as the genus of bird perched atop this *semeion.* While a golden pigeon may be a strange sight, the image of gilt bird atop a sign is quite familiar if one imagines that it is not a pigeon but an eagle, and that this uppermost component is made from a Roman army standard—a *signum*, in Greek *semeion*. And in fact, the veneration of Roman standards in Imperial-era Near Eastern religious practice is attested from Hatra in Mesopotamia, where worship of the divinity *Samya/smy'*—likely a Semitic derivation of *semeion*—served to strengthen Hatrene identity in the face of Roman imperialism.[312] If Lucian is describing such a practice, or has one in mind while creating the fictional elements in his world of Hierapolis, then *On the Syrian Goddess* furnishes an example of the reuse of tokens originating in one culture (in this case Roman) in service to the construction of collective identity in another.

This reading has a significant effect on the understanding of the work as a whole. The narrator devotes a considerable amount of space (§11-28) to describing the origins of Hierapolis

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[311] For instance, *How to Write History* 24: εἷς γοῦν οὕτω ῥᾳθύμως συνήγαγε τὰ πράγματα, οὔτε Σύρῳ τινὶ ἐντυχὼν
οὔτε τὸ λεγόμενον δὴ τοῦτο τῶν ἐπὶ κουρείῳ τὰ τοιαῦτα μυθολογούντων ἀκούσας, ὥστε περὶ Εὐρώπου λέγων οὕτως ἔφη, "Ἡ δὲ Εὔρωπος κεῖται μὲν ἐν τῇ Μεσοποταμίᾳ σταθμοὺς δύο τοῦ Εὐφράτου ἀπέχουσα, ἀπῴκισαν δὲ αὐτὴν Ἐδεσσαῖοι." (At any rate, one writer has so carelessly assembled his facts—one who has never met a Syrian nor indeed heard what is said by those telling similar stories at the barbershop—that when he talks about Europos, he says "Europos lies in Mesopotamia, two days' travel from the Euphrates, and Edessans live there".

[312] Swain (1996) 304-8 surveys the bibliography of religious history written from this source; more relevant for the present study, however, is his observation (306) that this "homophony allowed him to include the Aramaic word in his Greek". Dirven (2009) 54-5; Andrade (2013) 1-3.

and its temple without necessarily endorsing the veracity of every account, as is clear from a prefatory statement that evokes Hecataeus: *πολλοὶ λόγοι ἐλέγοντο, τῶν οἱ μὲν ἱροί, οἱ δὲ ἐμφανέες, οἱ δὲ κάρτα μυθώδεες, καὶ ἄλλοι βάρβαροι, οἱ μὲν τοῖσιν Ἕλλησιν ὁμολογέοντες· τοὺς ἐγὼ πάντας μὲν ἐρέω, δέκομαι δὲ οὐδαμά.* (§11: many tales were told, of which some are sacred, some self-evident, and others quite fanciful, and some of them are barbarian while others accord with what the Greeks say; I will tell—but by no means accept—all of them.) The story that the narrator does accept, which is the one that accords most with the Greek legends (§16: *ἃ λέγουσιν τοῦ ἱροῦ πέρι τοῖς Ἕλλησι τὰ πολλὰ ὁμολογέοντες*), has the following to prove its veracity:

> …φαλλοὶ δὲ ἑστᾶσι ἐν τοῖσι προπυλαίοισι δύο κάρτα μεγάλοι, ἐπὶ τῶν ἐπίγραμμα τοιόνδε ἐπιγέγραπται, "τούσδε φαλλοὺς Διόνυσος Ἥρῃ μητρυιῇ ἀνέθηκα." τὸ ἐμοὶ μέν νυν καὶ τόδε ἀρκέει…
>
> …and two enormous *phalloi* stand in the *propylaea*, on which the following epigram has been written: "I, Dionysus, erected these *phalloi* to Hera my mother." As for me, this is satisfactory.

For an allegedly historical work, the blithe acceptance of possibly the least rational explanation for the foundation of this holy site seriously undermines the narrator's credibility. He simply takes at face value the epigram claiming to be written by the god Dionysus, while so much of the work as a whole makes the clear point that single objects can be assigned a range of meanings depending on the culture interacting with them and irrespective of their origins. The narrator's Herodotean discussion of cultural primacy and succession (§2-5) establishes him as someone concerned with antiquity and original meanings, not unlike the strictest of the Atticists (though he himself is an Ionicist *rara avis*), and who believes that the truth of the present rests in an understanding of the past. Nevertheless, a throwaway line in his description of a Tyrian temple (§3) belies this notion: *καὶ ἔστιν ἱρὰ καὶ ἐν Συρίῃ οὐ παρὰ πολὺ τοῖς Αἰγυπτίοισιν ἰσοχρονέοντα, τῶν ἐγὼ πλεῖστα ὄπωπα, τό γε τοῦ Ἡρακλέος τὸ ἐν Τύρῳ, οὐ τούτου τοῦ Ἡρακλέος τὸν Ἕλληνες ἀείδουσιν, ἀλλὰ τὸν ἐγὼ λέγω πολλὸν ἀρχαιότερος καὶ Τύριος ἥρως ἐστίν*. (And in Syria there are

also temples not far off from being contemporaneous with the Egyptian ones, of which I have seen a great many, in particular the temple of Heracles in Tyre—I do not mean the Heracles of whom the Hellenes sing, but one who is much more ancient and a Tyrian hero). This reference to prefigured Heracles seems connected to Herodotus 2.44, where a Tyrian Heracles[313] is identified as a separate god more ancient than the Olympian. In this greatly abbreviated adaptation, Lucian has made his narrator (likely ironically) throw into relief the inherently contradictory proposition of such an *interpretatio Graeca*: if the Tyrian Heracles is the more ancient, it is out of keeping with the stated chronological and etiological goals of the work (either Herodotus' or Lucian's) to make a later figure the namesake for an earlier one. Both the shorter example in *On the Syrian Goddess* and its Herodotean inspiration illustrate succinctly how the signifiers of one time period and culture can easily be inscribed onto figures of another one.

In the *Lexiphanes*, Lucian plays on the humorous incongruity resulting from the title figure's latching onto one social signifier (Atticizing vocabulary) without appreciating the wider context. *On the Syrian Goddess*, with its detailed and rich pastiche of Herodotean historiography, explores the same basic issue of cultural signification but at much greater length. Here language is not the main focus (though the Ionic dialect is not to be overlooked) and the work presents less overt humor compared to the *Lexiphanes* and other works focusing more directly on linguistic topics. Nevertheless, in its drawn-out, richly detailed satire of Herodotus (and possibly Strabo as well) Lucian explores the same ironic incongruity of the speaker's claim to expertise and his evident lack of self- awareness. The narrator of *On the Syrian Goddess* purports to seek the true origins of the Atargatis cult in Hierapolis and leverages the covert prestige of his Syrian identity to legitimize his account, yet as the work progresses, the interweaving of Greek and Near Eastern mythology and religious observance on display illustrates the appropriation of Greek figures and

[313] i.e. Melqart, or Milqartu.

symbols for non-Greek religious purposes and suggests (contrary to the assertions of the narrator) that origins of certain practices do not necessarily determine their significance in a contemporary context. The temple at Hierapolis, the narrator tells us, has its roots somewhere in the remote Greek mythological past and cites as proof the Greek inscription of Dionysus—a god whose own uncertain Greekness is a persistent trope despite the long-reaching history of his Greek worship. Dionysus is a mutable god who can, in Lucian's other treatments of him, be assimilated to the several of the *personae* whom the author explicitly treats as self-representations: a newcomer, a foreigner, not recognized as an equal yet whose story concludes with his enemies defeated and his status recognized.[314] The narrator of *On the Syrian Goddess* does not have adversaries over whom to triumph, but the question of his identity in relation to established points of Greek-ness is raised at the very beginning and goes unresolved at the end. He writes as both outsider and insider, veering between a Herodotean level of distance from his subject (reporting what others have told him, e.g. §11) and a deeply personal, indeed physical connection to it (his name and first beard shavings are in the temple to this day, §60). Like many of Lucian's personae, the narrator's departure from Syria and his acquisition of Greek *paideia* are central to his identity, yet his Syrian heritage as much as his education allow him to produce the work in question. Furthermore, while the work itself resembles the fanciful ethnographies of Herodotus, it ultimately reveals the complexity and instability of cultural identity in the Greek East of the Roman Empire, as well as the arbitrary and ultimately fictitious assignment of ancient and foreign parallels to recognizable contemporary Greek cultural markers.[315] Rather than the stated goal of the piece, Lucian's *On the Syrian Goddess* demonstrates to the audience his ability to change both the cultural reference points and his perspective on them from Syrian to Greek and back again. In the works under

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[314] *Bacchus* – prolalia, cf. Bozia (2015) 55-7; the "victory lap" framing device of the *Dream* fits this model neatly.
[315] Andrade (2013) 267.

discussion in the following section, his *personae* will deliberately and deftly use this superposition of identities to win the day and allow Lucian to define a position that is both Greek and barbarian.

5.3 Constructing and Performing Personae through Language Practice

The discussion in Chapter Three illustrated the range of attitudes that Lucian's satiric *personae* display towards language standards and Atticism in particular. As that chapter has shown¸ Lucian's satirical treatment of Second Sophistic Atticism derives its humor from the contrast between the appearance of erudition and erudition itself, made possible by the presumption that the audience have sufficient savviness to recognize the difference. The title character of *Lexiphanes*, for instance, uses words inappropriately to create bizarre double entendres, and latches onto distinctive vocabulary from Plato and Aristophanes that he employs far out of proportion compared to their original usages. Humor in that work emerges from the discrepancy between the audience's knowledge of Attic and the speaker's. Likewise, the Professor of Rhetoric exploits his audience's ignorance of Attic while Lucian invites *his* audience of cognoscenti to laugh at the absurdity of the modern atmosphere in which such specious oratory is popular. Taken together, Lucian's satires on language standards suggest an ideology both descriptivist and antiquarian, in which the authority to evaluate language usage derives from intimate familiarity with the Classical models and cannot be reduced to the level of a lexicon or a grammatical reference. What this authority of language and literature—of *paideia*, in other words—actually signifies in a social or cultural context, though, is the subject of the present discussion. Many of Lucian's works deal with the question of correct (or just as often, deficient) linguistic practice; a great number of those works, as well as several others that do not deal specifically with questions of Attic and Hellenic usage, explore in addition the question of how

correct or incorrect usage serves to position the speaker or writer inside a given cultural context. As the previous section and introduction of this chapter have illustrated, a range of idioms can be imbued with significance to function as markers of cultural identity. Language plays a large role in marking identity, but as the previous chapter argued, the specific significance attached a given feature of linguistic practice can vary widely. The discussion to follow will show how Lucian, in the voice of several different *personae*, explores the instability of cultural identity as signified through language usage.

5.3.1 *Paideia* and Greekness: *Toxaris, Anacharsis*, and the *Double Indictment*

The ostensibly autobiographical *Dream*, like the *Professor of Rhetoric*, draws upon the well-known "Heracles at the Crossroads" trope[316] to frame Lucian's sophistic career as the result of his choice between the gifts promised by two goddesses, the personifications of Sculpture, *Ἑρμογλυφικὴ Τέχνη* (referred to primarily as simply *Τέχνη*), and of Education, *Παιδεία*. Having been unsuccessful and unfulfilled as an apprentice to his uncle the sculptor, young Lucian chooses the latter, and by doing so he leaves behind his family's working-class banausic origins to achieve the fame and fortune for which he is now celebrated around the world. At the end of the text, the narrator explicitly states his purpose in telling this story: *τοῦτον τὸν ὄνειρον ὑμῖν διηγησάμην ἐκείνου ἕνεκα, ὅπως οἱ νέοι πρὸς τὰ βελτίω τρέπωνται καὶ παιδείας ἔχωνται* (§18: I narrated to you this dream for the purpose that the youths might turn in the better direction and cleave to education). The work depicts Techne as the antithesis of Paideia, perhaps most notably in regard to her speech, when at the end of her offer Lucian provides this summary:

> Ταῦτα καὶ ἔτι τούτων πλείονα διαπταίουσα καὶ βαρβαρίζουσα πάμπολλα εἶπεν ἡ Τέχνη, μάλα δὴ σπουδῇ συνείρουσα καὶ πείθειν με πειρωμένη· ἀλλ' οὐκέτι μέμνημαι· τὰ πλεῖστα γὰρ ἤδη μου τὴν μνήμην διέφυγεν. (§##)

[316] Attributed to Prodicus, by Xen. *Mem.* 2.1.21; see the discussion in Chapter Three in connection with the *Professor of Rhetoric*.

> These things and even more besides did Techne speak, sputtering and barbarizing completely, certainly speaking with great eagerness and trying to persuade me; but I no longer remember; for the majority (of what she said) already escapes my recollection.

By turning his back on Techne, Lucian avoids becoming as inarticulate and barbaric-sounding as she and, *a fortiori*, all who practice in her domain are. In choosing Paideia, instead, he has been able to enter into the world of Greek intellectuals and the rest, so to speak, is history.

Barbarians encounter Greek culture in a number of other works by Lucian, and perhaps the most fully developed example appears in the *Anacharsis* and its apparent preface the *Scythian*. The archetype of the foreigner who acquires and is civilized by Greek *paideia* since his appearance in Herodotus (Hdt. 4.76), Anacharsis the Scythian is a lodestar for several Greek and Latin authors whose heritage classifies them as ethnically "barbarian". Fronto, as discussed in Chapter Three of this study, assimilates himself to Anacharsis in his letter to Domitia Lucilla by comparing his own ostensible weakness at writing Attic to that of the ancient Scythian philosopher (*Ad M. Caes.* 10.5). Lucian introduces Anacharsis in the *Scythian* by saying that he *ἀφίκετο ἐκ Σκυθίας Ἀθήναζε παιδείας ἐπιθυμίᾳ τῆς Ἑλληνικῆς* (came from Scythia to Athens out of desire for Greek education, *Scythian* 1), but was not in fact the first to do so:

> ἀλλὰ καὶ Τόξαρις πρὸ αὐτοῦ, σοφὸς μὲν καὶ φιλόκαλος ἀνὴρ καὶ ἐπιτηδευμάτων φιλομαθὴς τῶν ἀρίστων, οἴκοι δὲ οὐ τοῦ βασιλείου γένους ὢν οὐδὲ τῶν πιλοφορικῶν, ἀλλὰ Σκυθῶν τῶν πολλῶν καὶ δημοτικῶν, οἷοί εἰσι παρ' αὐτοῖς οἱ ὀκτάποδες καλούμενοι, τοῦτο δέ ἐστι, δύο βοῶν δεσπότην εἶναι καὶ ἁμάξης μιᾶς.
>
> …but Toxaris also came before him, a wise man of excellent taste and eager to learn the ways of the best people, and in his homeland not of royal birth nor one of those accustomed to wear a *pilos* but one of the common Scythian masses, as are called in their country the *oktapodes*, which means being the master of two oxen and one cart.

Toxaris (a renowned physician) welcomes Anacharsis when he arrives at the Piraeus, visibly assimilated to Athenian culture by his local dress and his fluent Attic speech to the extent that Anacharsis, mocked by the Athenians for his barbarism and his garb, does not recognize him as a

fellow Scythian (*Scyth.* §3). Only when Toxaris uses the Scythian language (*Scyth.* §4) does Anacharsis realize who he is, at which point Toxaris brings him to meet Solon who, in his words, is *ὁ Ἑλληνικὸς κανών* (the measure of Greek-ness, *Scyth.* §7). Through the friendship between Solon and Anacharsis, the Scythian is eventually naturalized (*δημοπίητος*) as an Athenian (*Scyth.* §8). The narrator makes his similarity to Anacharsis explicit by saying *φημὶ δὴ ὅμοιόν τι καὶ αὐτὸς παθεῖν τῷ Ἀναχάρσιδι… βάρβαρος μὲν γὰρ κἀκεῖνος καὶ οὐδέν τι φαίης ἂν τοὺς Σύρους ἡμᾶς φαυλοτέρους εἶναι τῶν Σκυθῶν.* (*Scyth.* §9: I say that I myself have endured something similar to Anacharsis…for he was a barbarian, and you would not say at all that we Syrians are lowlier than the Scythians).

The assimilation of Lucian's narrator to a famously Hellenized barbarian suggests that the story of becoming Greek through education will be the major theme of the *Anacharsis*. However, when Lucian presents a detailed scene from the friendship of Anacharsis and Solon, the episode he chooses to depict is one in which the barbarian character is *not* imbued with Greek-ness. In fact, he persistently questions and critiques the iconic Greek institution of the gymnasium, asking at the beginning *τίνος ἕνεκα* (for what purpose) the Athenian youths are engaged in the strange practices he sees before him, smearing themselves with oil and grabbing each other (*Anach.* §1), becoming covered in sand (§2), punching each other without punishment (§3), and *ἀναπηδῶσιν ὥσπερ θέοντες ἐπὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ μένοντες* (§4; springing up as though running but remaining in the same place). To him it all looks like *μανία* (madness), but Solon assures him that it is anything but, and furthermore that once Anacharsis himself acclimates to life in Athens, *τὸ πρᾶγμα ἡδύ τε ἅμα καὶ λυσιτελὲς εἶναι δόξει* (§6; the matter will seem to be sweet and even profitable). For the present, however, the notion of engaging in such violent or strenuous acts to obtain a reward of nothing more than an olive wreath seems to Anacharsis quite preposterous, in spite of Solon's attempt to explain that the true reward is the glory they earn as victors in the

games (§8-14). Nevertheless, Solon promises Anacharsis that if he is not convinced, and that if instead he convinces Solon of some other wisdom, he will gladly share it with the other Athenians, claiming *εὖ ἴσθι ὡς οὐκ αἰσχυνεῖται ἡ Ἀθηναίων πόλις παρὰ βαρβάρου καὶ ξένου τὰ συμφέροντα ἐκμανθάνοντες.* (§17; know well that the city of the Athenians is not ashamed at having learned beneficial things from one barbarian and foreign).

This statement opens up the possibility of there being such a thing as "barbarian *paideia*", a notion that lingers unresolved by the end of this dialogue but figures into other works of Lucian that the rest of this chapter will address. Anacharsis does not take Solon seriously when he proposes to accept any wisdom Anacharsis can show him, and in fact in a later section Solon seems to walk that statement back when, after Anacharsis asks why the Athenians do not employ Spartan training as well, he says *Ὅτι ἡμῖν ἱκανά, ὦ Ἀνάχαρσι, ταῦτα τὰ γυμνάσια οἰκεῖα ὄντα· ζηλοῦν δὲ τὰ ξενικὰ οὐ πάνυ ἀξιοῦμεν.* (§39; Because, Anacharsis, these exercises, which are our own, are sufficient for us; and we do not generally care to emulate foreign practices.) Just as well, since Anacharsis thinks the Spartans perhaps even more risible than the Athenians. In any event the Athenian practices, both the *gymnasia* and the literature and drama by which the Athenian mind is cultivated (§21-22) have not won Anacharsis over by the end of the work, which ends in *aporia* with the promise of resuming the next day. As Lucian leaves things, for all of Anacharsis' evident respect for Athenian legal institutions (and Solon as their creator) he still thinks Attic comedy, tragedy, and above all athletics fundamentally silly practices with little if any obvious benefit to civic or military practices.

This pair of works, showing a foreigner's encounter with Athenian culture, explore in considerable depth the construction of culture, though the *Anacharsis* goes into far greater detail on this point. The present study has made references throughout to "cultural identity" as well as "ethnicity", and these concepts appear similar to what Lucian may be referring to in the passages

where Solon describes how Athenians bring up their youths to become productive citizens. Lucian gives Solon, called by Toxaris in the *Scythian* "the measure of Greekness", ample space in *Anacharsis* to describe exactly what Greek-ness (or more specifically Athenian-ness) entails and what the relationship is between its different elements. Perhaps most importantly, Solon does not suggest at any point that being Athenian by birth is sufficient to make one culturally Athenian; quite the opposite, in fact, since he states several times (such as at §6) his expectation that the Scythian-born Anacharsis will assimilate to Athenian ways in time and become Athenian himself. Moreover, Solon illustrates how complex the process of acquiring Athenian cultural identity really is, with many stages and components as well as the need to continue practicing Athenian idioms (law, literature, athletics) if an individual or indeed the entire *polis* is to remain Athenian.

Yet roughly half the *Anacharsis*—virtually all of the title character's speech—consists of observations that Athenian customs are strange and nonsensical, at least on their face, and more than a little bit risible. Anacharsis has seen nothing of the kind practiced before, and as a result he is eager to question everything. He does not take Athenian-ness for granted, and by his interrogation of the idioms it comprises he compels Solon to explain and justify the means by which it is constructed. The outsider's perspective is, therefore, essential to the understanding of the nature of a Greek cultural identity, yet in *Anacharsis* the outsider leaves the page without having assumed a Greek identity himself (although he is not opposed to the possibility) which may strike the reader as odd, because even after a lengthy description of the virtues of *paideia*—which Lucian's narrator in the *Scythian* has praised—their effect is not felt by Solon's interlocutor. From outside, the necessity of this Greek practice or *askesis* to the development of wisdom and virtue is not immediately apparent and is instead suspect.[317] Is it possible, in this

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[317] Goldhill (2001) assimilates the comments made by Anacharsis to the Roman perspective on Greek athletics.

version of Anacharsis' story, that the barbarian might come to understand *paideia*, indeed to contribute valuable insight into its nature, yet not actually assume a Greek identity by the end? This question lingers as the work ends abruptly, but it is touched on in another Lucianic work with an ostensibly more personal connection to its author, the *Double Indictment*.

Frequently discussed alongside *Prometheus in Words* and the *Fisherman, or Dead Come to Life*,[318] the comedic legal dialogue *Double Indictment* (*Bis accusatus*) also deals explicitly with the question of reception in Lucian's corpus and the way his works innovate upon their models across genre boundaries. All three works show Lucian's *persona* defending himself against accusations of intellectual dishonest or literary misconduct, however the *Double Indictment* is distinguished by the attention it devotes to the Lucian *persona*'s cultural identity, including the role of language and literature in signaling that identity and the authority that granted by the legitimation of that identity. In this work, the authorial persona is called "The Syrian" (Σύρος) and, in a sense, the work treats on the litigation of his cultural identity and status as a semi-Greek, since the central question is whether he is entitled to create texts that fuse two distinct literary genres. Lucian addresses directly the notion of language use as dispositive of cultural identity when the personified Rhetoric takes credit for having educated the Syrian—who when she met him still spoke a barbarian tongue[319]—and bestowing Greekness upon him:

> Ἐγὼ γάρ, ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί, τουτονὶ κομιδῇ μειράκιον ὄντα, βάρβαρον ἔτι τὴν φωνὴν καὶ μονονουχὶ κάνδυν ἐνδεδυκότα εἰς τὸν Ἀσσύριον τρόπον, περὶ τὴν Ἰωνίαν εὑροῦσα πλαζόμενον ἔτι καὶ ὅ τι χρήσαιτο ἑαυτῷ οὐκ εἰδότα παραλαβοῦσα ἐπαίδευσα….εἶτα ἀγαγοῦσα αὐτὸν εἰς τοὺς φυλέτας τοὺς ἐμοὺς παρενέγραψα καὶ ἀστὸν ἀπέφηνα, ὥστε τοὺς διαμαρτόντας τῆς ἐγγύης ἀποπνίγεσθαι. (Luc. *Bis. acc.* 27)
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> For I, gentlemen of the jury, found this man while he was still a boy, still a barbarian in speech and all but robe-clad in the Assyrian fashion, and when I found him wandering about Ionia, still moldable and not knowing what to do with himself, I took responsibility for him and educated him … then, taking him to my fellow-tribesmen I enrolled him—

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[318] Baldwin (1973) 64; Branham (1989) 32-4, 37.
[319] The reference is likely to Aramaic or Syriac, though the question of Lucian's first language is not settled; cf. Millar (1993) 454-6.

> illegally—and presented him as a citizen, so that those who had failed to woo me would be choked with envy.

Moreover, the Syrian acknowledges the truth of Rhetoric's central claim, saying "*πάντα γὰρ ὁπόσα διηγήσατο περὶ ἐμοῦ ἀληθῆ ὄντα διηγήσατο· καὶ γὰρ ἐπαίδευσεν καὶ συναπεδήμησεν καὶ εἰς τοὺς Ἕλληνας ἐνέγραψεν, καὶ κατά γε τοῦτο χάριν ἂν εἰδείην τῷ γάμῳ.*" (§30: "For everything that [Rhetoric] described regarding myself, she has described as it truly is; for she did educate me and accompany me as I went abroad and register me among the Greeks, and at least in this respect I should be grateful for my marriage to her.) This short narrative assimilates the personified Rhetoric to the goddess Paideia as she appears in Lucian's ostensibly autobiographical work *The Dream*, particularly §8 of that work where the narrator describes other personified goddess, Techne, as (in contrast to Paideia) *διαπταίουσα καὶ βαρβαρίζουσα πάμπολλα* (stuttering and speaking in an utterly barbarous fashion).

In keeping with the work's legalistic conceit, the specific word used here, *ἐγγράφω* meaning "register", is used in a technical sense referring to citizenship and other kinds of political status.[320] The case under consideration, *Ῥητορικὴ κακώσεως τῷ Σύρῳ* (§29: Rhetoric v. the Syrian, for maltreatment) likewise employs a Classical Attic legal term, *κάκωσις*, that has ample attestation in court speeches of the canonical orators[321] and refers to neglect or misuse of something or someone entrusted into the defendant's care.[322] Demosthenes, for example,

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[320] Ar. *Pax* 1180, of the military draft; Dem. 39.4, of registry into the phratry; Is. 2.14, registering as a demesman and *orgeon*; etc.
[321] Lys. 13.91; Is. 8.32 (3), 8.34; Dem. 10.40, 24.103-105, 58.32; Lyc. 1.147.
[322] Harpocration K.12: Κακώσεως· δίκης ὄνομά ἐστι ταῖς τε ἐπικλήροις κατὰ τῶν γεγαμηκότων καὶ κατὰ τῶν παίδων τοῖς γονεῦσι, καὶ κατὰ τῶν ἐπιτρόπων τοῖς ὑπὲρ τῶν ὀρφανῶν ἐπεξιοῦσι διδομένη· Δημοσθένης Κατὰ Τιμοκράτους καὶ Λυσίας ἔν τε τῷ Περὶ τοῦ Ἡγησάνδρου κλήρου καὶ ἐν τῷ Ὑπὲρ ... καὶ Ὑπερείδης Περὶ τοῦ Πυρράνδρου κλήρου. ὅτι δὲ ἐξῆν καὶ παντὶ τῷ βουλομένῳ γράφεσθαι κακώσεως γονέων καὶ ταῖς ἐπικλήροις βοηθεῖν δηλοῦται ἔν τε τῷ προειρημένῳ λόγῳ Ὑπερείδου καὶ ἐν τῷ Λυσίου Κατὰ Φιλωνίδου βιαίων, εἰ γνήσιος. ἦν δὲ καὶ ἄνευ ὕδατος.
Kakoseos (for maltreatment): It is the name of a suit granted to *epikleroi* against those who have married them, and to parents against their children, and to those who prosecute on behalf of orphans against guardians: Demosthenes, *Against Timokrates*, and Lysias in *On the Estate of Hegesandros* and in *For* ... ,

summarizes the responsibility of children to their parents by saying "*δεῖ γάρ, οἶμαι, τοῖς γονεῦσι τὸν ὡρισμένον ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων ἔρανον, καὶ παρὰ τῆς φύσεως καὶ παρὰ τοῦ νόμου, δικαίως φέρειν καὶ ἑκόνθ' ὑποτελεῖν.*" (Dem. 10.40: "For, I suppose, one ought justly to deliver to parents the contribution set by both authorities, both by nature and by custom, and to pay it willingly.") This specific description, intended to suggest the opposite of *κάκωσις*, frames the proper treatment of parents in terms of both nature (*φύσις*) and custom (*νόμος*), which as discussed in the second chapter are also poles in the debate over language from the beginnings of Greek (and Latin) grammar up to Lucian's day. In the *Double Indictment*, the Syrian's status as a Greek comes not by birth but by enrollment, that is to say, custom (or law) rather than nature. It is important to note, however, that while the Syrian uses the word *ἐγγράφω* (§30), Rhetoric had originally characterized her Hellenization of him with the verb *παρεγγάφω* (§27) to suggest that his registry as a Greek was somehow illegitimate. His status as a Greek is therefore conditional and could presumably be revoked at any time if he is found to have abused his *paideia*, which has thus far allowed him to be recognized as Greek.

The personified Dialogue also brings a complaint against the Syrian, asserting that he has suffered *ὕβρις* (*Bis acc.* 14, 33) after the Syrian took liberties with his form and subject, combined him with other genres of literature (mentioning by name Eupolis, Aristophanes, and Menippus) and brought him down from his rightful lofty position. He summarizes his suffering thus:

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and Hypereides, *On the Estate of Pyrrhandro*s. That is was possible also for anyone who wished to bring the charge for maltreatment of parents and to aid the *epikleroi* is shown both in the aforesaid speech of Hypereides and in Lysias' *Against Philonides* for violence, if it is genuine. Also it was without water (i.e. not timed by the water-clock). Tr. Sosin, J., Aldrup-MacDonald, J., Zalin, M. "Κακώσεως". Harpokration On Line. http://dcthree.github.io/harpokration/ (accessed January 24, 2019).
Harpocration's final note seems to run contrary to Rhetoric's opening statement (§26), which ends with her saying *ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἵνα μὴ μακρὰ προοιμιάζωμαι τοῦ ὕδατος πάλαι εἰκῆ ῥέοντος, ἄρξομαι τῆς κατηγορίας* (But in order not to run long in making my introduction, since the water has been running freely for some time, I shall begin the accusation.)

> Πῶς οὖν οὐ δεινὰ ὕβρισμαι μηκέτ' ἐπὶ τοῦ οἰκείου διακείμενος, ἀλλὰ κωμῳδῶν καὶ γελωτοποιῶν καὶ ὑποθέσεις ἀλλοκότους ὑποκρινόμενος αὐτῷ; τὸ γὰρ πάντων ἀτοπώτατον, κρᾶσίν τινα παράδοξον κέκραμαι καὶ οὔτε πεζός εἰμι οὔτε ἐπὶ τῶν μέτρων βέβηκα, ἀλλὰ ἱπποκενταύρου δίκην σύνθετόν τι καὶ ξένον φάσμα τοῖς ἀκούουσι δοκῶ. (*Bis acc.* 33)
>
> So how can I not have been done horribly wrong, no longer dwelling on my proper subject, but instead making comedy and cracking jokes and acting out strange plots for him? For the most out absurd thing of all, I have been blended into a nonsensical mixture and I am not on foot nor do I go on horseback, but I seem indeed to my audience some assemblage of a centaur and strange creature.

Much as the speech of Rhetoric recalls Lucian's *Dream*, the description of the Syrian's alleged wrongdoing strongly resembles the discussion of *To the One Saying 'You're a Prometheus in Words'*. The Syrian has combined registers of literary language that do not belong together, says Dialogue, and has shown *hybris* by willfully inflicting himself upon another. Lucian, as is typical, makes Dialogue undermine himself even as he pleads his case—when he claims to have previously possessed a dignified position among the genres, he says that he was *σεμνὸν τέως ὄντα καὶ θεῶν τε πέρι καὶ φύσεως καὶ τῆς τῶν ὅλων περιόδου σκοπούμενον*, *ὑψηλὸν ἄνω που τῶν νεφῶν ἀεροβατοῦντα* (previously dignified and contemplating the gods and nature and the cycle of all things, treading aloft high up somewhere above the clouds, §33) which, as already noted in Chapter Three, plays on a line of Aristophanes' *Clouds*, *ἀεροβατῶ καὶ περιφρονῶ τὸν ἥλιον* (Ar. *Nu.* 225: I tread aloft and ponder the sun). Dialogue even names the work in which it appears (as *τῶν νεφῶν* rather than *Νεφέλαι*, making the reference slightly more subtle) and apparently does not see the irony in doing so, since the joke here is that dialogue and comedy have been combined together since the time of Aristophanes. He has not illicitly broken the boundaries between genres, rather he has maintained an authentic Attic literary tradition and exposed the anachronism of such rigidly imposed generic divisions. While the Syrian may not be Greek by birth, he closes his argument by saying *οὐκ ἂν οἶμαι μέμψαιτό μοι, ὡς θοἰμάτιον τοῦτο τὸ Ἑλληνικὸν περισπάσας αὐτοῦ βαρβαρικόν τι μετενέδυσα, καὶ ταῦτα βάρβαρος αὐτὸς εἶναι δοκῶν· ἠδίκουν γὰρ ἂν τὰ τοιαῦτα εἰς αὐτὸν παρανομῶν καὶ τὴν πάτριον ἐσθῆτα λωποδυτῶν. (*§34: I do not think he could

accuse me of having stripped him of his Greek cloak and clothing him in a barbaric one, even though I appear to be a barbarian in these respects; for I would be committing such injustices against him if I were to transgress against custom and steal away his native garb.) He acknowledges Dialogue as having an ancestral claim to Greek-ness, yet at the same time asserts that he himself has done nothing un-Greek with his works. Dialogue has not commented on nationality or ethnicity, but the Syrian's message could not be clearer: while he is a barbarian, he commands the Greek language and literature—*paideia*—so completely as to know it better than it knows itself.

This combination, of avowed Syrian identity with the assertion of a right to use the Greek language and its literary forms in a new way, effectively assimilates Lucian's persona to Lucian's literary enterprise. The boundaries between genres are explicitly being litigated in the *Double Indictment*, along with the linguistic registers that characterize them, but also at stake in both the *κάκωσις* and *ὕβρις* suits is the Greek status of the "Syrian" character. That the Athenian jury exonerates the Syrian suggests they consider him fit to dwell among them as a free man, meaning that they deem him not to have mistreated or committed outrages against either of the plaintiffs. However, the question of whether he is Greek or Syrian goes unanswered, and indeed the conclusion to the trial suggests that this question does not need an answer. The *Double Indictment* assimilates issues of language and genre to those of identity, and just as the Syrian is found to be justified in his inter-genre innovation, so too is he found to be justified in working within a Greek space despite his barbarian origins. Dialogue and Rhetoric in the *Double Indictment* represent the Atticizers of the Second Sophistic, claiming to preserve and revive Classical language and literature in its original forms by drawing on Attic models like Plato, Old Comedy, and the canon of Athenian orators. As can be seen in (e.g.) the brief *Ecloga* of Phrynichus or the sprawling *Onomasticon* of Pollux, Atticizers combined vocabulary of all of these genres together to

generate their picture of "authentic" Attic Greek. This version of the language, the genres in which sophists employed it, and the cultural category of Greek-ness that the Second Sophistic celebrated, did not simply exist as holdovers from the Classical past, and the notion that the Second Sophistic writers were reviving or replicating Classical models is a fiction.[323] Instead, Classical models are identified, canonized, and stabilized to create a point of reference from which to assign meaning to the *paideia* that sophists claim. That is to say, the generic, stylistic, and linguistic features of Second Sophistic literature do not signify *paideia* by nature but rather by an agreed-upon custom, not *physis* but a *nomos* produced by a specific cultural context. In turn, what exactly *paideia* signifies is likely an arbitrary target determined by the accepted customary practice; the Syrian's *paideia* is recognized, yet he nonetheless retains some of his barbarian identity. Based on the ruling at the end of the trial, Lucian leaves his readers with the impression that, in the Second Sophistic cultural context, the relevant *nomos* can be interpreted in a way that does not require the boundaries between genres to be fixed lines or the signified positions of "Greek" and "barbarian" to be fixed points.

5.3.2 Barbarism as Failed Performance

As discussed above, in the *Double Indictment* the Syrian concludes with an acknowledgment of his own barbarian identity. What exactly this means in Lucian, however, is neither obvious nor consistent, and this section will demonstrate some of the ways Lucian uses the term in reference to a character's linguistic usage, including that of his own personae. In Lucian's corpus there are 89 references to barbarians or barbarism.[324] Whether Lucian is a barbarian or not (and whether his interlocutors are too) is a significant theme in his corpus, and

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[323] Andrade (2013) 261-8, applying the concept articulated by Benjamin (1968) 256-7, 263-6 that the historical models are "staged" in the present and derive their status as origins, models, and genres from present moments to at once produce the Second Sophistic culture and validate it.
[324] βάρβαρος: 68; βαρβαρικός: 11; βαρβαρίζω: 8; βαρβαρισμός: 1; μιξοβάρβαρος: 1.

this section will discuss the way that this theme ties into Lucian's other discussions of competence and performance in linguistic (chiefly Attic) matters. The previous chapter's discussion of Athenaeus noted how Ulpian is addressed as "Syrattikos" (Ath. 3.126f) after his attempts at pedantic Atticism are frustrated by quick-witted symposiasts, including one moment when he accuses another guest of barbarizing only to have it blow up in his face. Towards the end of Lucian's *Lexiphanes*, Lycinus makes an extended comment to similar effect about that work's title character:

> Ἐὰν ταῦτα ποιῇς, πρὸς ὀλίγον τὸν ἐπὶ τῇ ἀπαιδευσίᾳ ἔλεγχον ὑπομείνας καὶ μὴ αἰδεσθεὶς μεταμανθάνων, θαρρῶν ὁμιλήσεις τοῖς πλήθεσι καὶ οὐ καταγελασθήσῃ ὥσπερ νῦν οὐδὲ διὰ στόματος ἐπὶ τῷ χείρονι τοῖς ἀρίστοις ἔσῃ, Ἕλληνα καὶ Ἀττικὸν ἀποκαλούντων σε τὸν μηδὲ βαρβάρων ἐν τοῖς σαφεστάτοις ἀριθμεῖσθαι ἄξιον. (Luc. *Lex*. 23)
>
> If ever you do these things, after enduring a brief *elenchus* on your ignorance, and not feeling shame at entering into remedial learning, you will gladly join in with the masses and will not be laughed at as you are now, or be talked about unfavorably by the best citizens, when they call you "Hellene" and "Attic" when you do not even deserve to be counted among the wisest of barbarians.

The nicknames Lexiphanes has supposedly been given, "Hellene" and "Attic", are clearly ironic (even sarcastic) since he has succeeded in creating only a *doxa* of Atticism, one which (like the Professor of Rhetoric) lacks true *paideia*. This passage makes the issue of barbarism explicit, and states that Lexiphanes has failed in his attempts to perform an Atticizing Greek identity through his language use because he does not know the difference between *doxa* and *paideia*, much as how bad historians and ethnographers produce only a *doxa* of the peoples they describe.[325] The same is true of the title character of the *Mistaken Critic*, who, exactly like Athenaeus' Ulpian,[326] has questioned the validity of someone else's usage only to be drowned in a flood of attestations that exhaustively demonstrate his would-be victim's learnedness. The scene

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[325] Andrade (2013) 267; cf. discussion above regarding *On the Syrian Goddess.*

[326] Ulpian the father of the jurist, presumably the inspiration for Athenaeus' character of that name, has also been suggested as the target of the *Mistaken Critic*; cf. the discussion in Chapter Three citing Jones (1972), who rejects the conclusion of Baldwin (1962) that the critic's identity is irretrievable, and instead decides that Hadrian of Tyre must have been Lucian's target.

here resembles several of those in Gellius, such as Favorinus' takedown of the *grammatici* at *NA* 4.1, though the deadpan anti-humor of Favorinus hardly parallels the vitriol with which Lucian infuses his speaker. The extent to which Lucian's persona goes to showcase his own *paideia* (and the critic's lack thereof) reflects the cultural anxiety with which Lucian imbues the character. He is emphatic in denying the notion (§11) *ὅτι βαρβαρίζω καὶ ξενίζω καὶ ὑπερβαίνω τοὺς ὅρους τοὺς Ἀττικούς* (that I use barbarian and foreign words and overstep the bounds of Attic). However, he is so eager to argue against the critic that he monologues for 32 paragraphs to show his knowledge of the word *ἀποφράς* (and of his critic's personal history) without actually addressing the central question of whether or not one can use the word in application to a person. He is essentially dodging or delaying the real issue by throwing up a smokescreen of attestations that will wear down his critic (along with anyone else in earshot) and ward off the charges of barbarism or solecism. In fact, he tries to argue, if anyone is a barbarian it is the critic himself, as he suggests at (e.g.) *Ps.-log.* 2: *ὡς αὐτὸς μὲν Σκυθῶν καταφανέστερος γένοιο κομιδῇ ἀπαίδευτος ὢν καὶ τὰ κοινὰ ταῦτα καὶ τὰ ἐν ποσὶν ἀγνοῶν* (so that you yourself might become more notorious than the Scythians, uneducated as you are and ignorant of these things that are in common knowledge and close at hand.) In addition he suggests that it is also tantamount to barbarism to suggest one avoid using archaic words for pragmatic reasons, saying *"τοῖς δ' ἄλλοις Ἕλλησιν οἶμαι καθ' Ἑλλάδα γλῶτταν συνεῖναι χρή."* (§14: But I believe that one ought to use the Greek language when speaking with other Greeks) and claiming that, regardless, the word in question is still in current usage.[327]

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[327] The full passage (*Ps.-log.* 14) reveals that the views of the speaker here stand in marked contrast to the attitude displayed by Lycinus in *Lexiphanes*: Ἔστω, φησί τις, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν παλαιῶν ὀνομάτων τὰ μὲν λεκτέα, τὰ δ' οὔ, ὁπόσα αὐτῶν μὴ συνήθη τοῖς πολλοῖς, ὡς μὴ ταράττοιμεν τὰς ἀκοὰς καὶ τιτρώσκοιμεν τῶν συνόντων τὰ ὦτα. ἐγὼ δέ, ὦ βέλτιστε, πρὸς μὲν σὲ ἴσως ταῦτα περὶ σοῦ εἰπὼν ἥμαρτον· ἐχρῆν γὰρ ἐχρῆν ἢ κατὰ Παφλαγόνων ἢ Καππαδοκῶν ἢ Βακτρίων πάτρια διαλέγεσθαί σοι, ὡς ἐκμάθῃς τὰ λεγόμενα καὶ σοὶ ἀκούειν ᾖ ἡδέα. τοῖς δ' ἄλλοις Ἕλλησιν οἶμαι καθ' Ἑλλάδα γλῶτταν συνεῖναι χρή. εἶτα καὶ τῶν

That Lucian deliberately creates a character at least as concerned with the appearance of knowledge as knowledge itself (if not more so) seems clear from his refusal to cite evidence of the usage he is defending, on the pretext that his interlocutor wouldn't recognize them anyway: *Εἶπον ἂν καὶ τοὺς πρὸ ἡμῶν κεχρημένους τῷ ὀνόματι, εἰ μὴ καὶ ταύτῃ σε διαταράξειν ἔμελλον, ξένα σοι καὶ ἄγνωστα ποιητῶν καὶ ῥητόρων καὶ συγγραφέων ὀνόματα διεξιών*. (*Pseud. log.* 15: I would have named in addition those before our time who have used the word, if I were not going to confuse you in doing so, going through names of poets and rhetors and historians that are foreign and unknown to you.) Moreover, the specific expression *ἄνθρωπος ἀποφράς* (which, as we have seen, is the subject of his monologue from §1-3) is, in fact, attested in Eupolis (Fr. incert. 32M, 309K) whom Lucian, as discussed in Chapter Two, is elsewhere eager to name-check when the opportunity presents itself. It is unlikely that Lucian himself is unfamiliar with the Eupolis reference, but he heavily implies that the critic (like the ignorant book-collector) is. However, there is a subtle implication that the speaker, Lucian's persona, is also unaware of that quotation. His casual skipping over of sources in §15 sharply contrasts with the earlier passage in which Lucian's speaker cites and adapts an extended image from Menander, the personified *elenchus* from a presumably lost comedy (*Pseud. log.* 4-9) and seems to enjoy wielding other authors' names (such as Archilochus) as rhetorical cudgels to emphasize the critic's ignorance. Menander, as discussed in Chapters Two and Three, was historically a popular and well-known playwright

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Ἀττικῶν κατὰ χρόνους τινὰς πολλὰ ἐντρεψάντων τῆς αὑτῶν φωνῆς, τοῦτο ἐν τοῖς μάλιστα τὸ ὄνομα διετέλεσεν οὕτως ἀεὶ καὶ πρὸς ἁπάντων αὐτῶν λεγόμενον.
"Okay," someone says, "but even of ancient vocabulary some should be said and others, which are unfamiliar to the masses, should not be, lest we upset the audience and wound the ears of those in attendance." And I, my dear friend, perhaps made a mistake in saying these things to you about yourself; for I should, I *should* have spoken to you in the ancestral ways of the Paphlagonians or Cappadocians or Bactrians, so that you might understand what was being said and, and it might be pleasing for you to hear. But as for the other Greeks, one ought to speak with them in the Greek language. And then even though the Attics have, over some period of time, made many changes to their language, this word has continued to be said by them always, and by all of them.

whose works were performed regularly across the Greek-speaking parts of the Empire, whereas Eupolis and other Old Comedy authors were, if not obscure, certainly more likely to be confined to the niche of elite intellectuals. The way he conspicuously skips over this group of poets, rhetors, and historians, including missing what could well have been an obvious (to Lucian's audience) opportunity to signal his own elite erudition by dropping the name of Eupolis, seems therefore to be a deliberate dodge on the part of Lucian's persona and one to which Lucian the author intentionally draws his readers' attention. The author undermines his persona, like he does "Loukianos" in the *Solecist* or the failed orator who introduces the *Professor of Rhetoric*, in order to highlight both the pseudo-erudition of the critic and the anxiety inherent in the performance of Greek-ness (especially through Atticizing) undertaken by Near Eastern sophists. The *Mistaken Critic* is explicitly set in a Syrian context (*Pseud. log.* 10, 20, 21, 27) and both characters are Syrian themselves, each one trying to upstage the other in order to assert their own right to membership in the Atticizing community of practice. The Syrian in the *Double Indictment* appeared comfortable with a "barbarian" identity (*Bis acc.* 34), and his expertise in Greek language and literature receives official sanction from a third party in the form of the jury of Athenians and judge Hermes. Neither character of the *Mistaken Critic* resembles him, as the title character is given no opportunity to speak and the narrator is eager to disprove allegations of barbarism—all while accusing his opponent of succumbing to it. Given that they represent "barbarism" in markedly different ways, the *Double Indictment* and *Mistaken Critic*, treating as they on a similar topic, appear to represent two contrasting perspectives on cultural identity.

Of similar format to the *Mistaken Critic*, the diatribe *Against the Ignorant Book-Collector* sees Lucian's narrator engage in perhaps the most overt cultural gatekeeping in any of his works. The basic premise, that the speaker seeks to "out" a wealthy bibliophile who possesses a vast library by exposing his lack of literary knowledge, resembles the other Lucianic works discussed

here and in Chapter Three. Like the *Solecist*, *Lexiphanes*, and *Mistaken Critic*, the target of Lucian's mockery is one who projects an image of intellectualism that (to the sensibilities of Lucian's persona at least) he has in no way earned. For instance, as discussed in Chapter Three the collector's ignorance of Old Comedy, a genre favored by Atticizing connoisseurs, is evident from his impassivity at the mention of Eupolis' *Baptai*, a work that would provoke a strong reaction in anyone who actually read it (27, discussed above in §3.5). Also like the *Lexiphanes* and *Mistaken Critic*, the eponymous ignorant book-collector is an Easterner; in fact, it is implied that he too is a Syrian, like the speaker: *καὶ μὴν ὅσα γε κἀμὲ Σύρον ὄντα εἰδέναι* (§19: And indeed as far as I know, being Syrian as well…). Being not only an Easterner but an ignorant one, he appropriates Hellenic *paideia* without possessing the requisite Hellenism or Atticism to make good on it. Thus, he commits barbarism:

> τίς δὲ τοῖς ἐμπόροις καὶ τοῖς βιβλιοκαπήλοις ἤρισεν ἂν περὶ παιδείας τοσαῦτα βιβλία ἔχουσι καὶ πωλοῦσιν, ἀλλ' εἴ γε διελέγχειν ἐθέλεις, ὄψει μηδ' ἐκείνους πολύ σου τὰ εἰς παιδείαν ἀμείνους, ἀλλὰ βαρβάρους μὲν τὴν φωνὴν ὥσπερ σύ, ἀξυνέτους δὲ τῇ γνώσει, οἵους εἰκὸς εἶναι τοὺς μηδὲν τῶν καλῶν καὶ αἰσχρῶν καθεωρακότας. … εἰ μὴ καὶ τὰς ἀποθήκας αὐτὰς τῶν βιβλίων ἡγῇ πεπαιδεῦσθαι τοσαῦτα περιεχούσας παλαιῶν ἀνδρῶν συγγράμματα; (§4)
>
> And who would contend in *paideia* with the merchants and booksellers who possess and sell so many books? But if you wish to press them, you will see that they are not much better than you in matters of *paideia*, but barbarous in speech just like you, and uncomprehending in mind, just the kind of people it is likely do not see the difference between good and bad. … Unless you also think bookcases themselves are learned, since they hold so many writings of ancient men?
>
> τὸ αὐτὸ δὴ καὶ σὺ πάσχων οὐχ ὁρᾷς, ὁπόταν τὸ μὲν βιβλίον ἐν τῇ χειρὶ ἔχῃς πάγκαλον, πορφυρᾶν μὲν ἔχον τὴν διφθέραν, χρυσοῦν δὲ τὸν ὀμφαλόν, ἀναγιγνώσκῃς δὲ αὐτὸ βαρβαρίζων καὶ καταισχύνων καὶ διαστρέφων, ὑπὸ μὲν τῶν πεπαιδευμένων καταγελώμενος, ὑπὸ δὲ τῶν συνόντων σοι κολάκων ἐπαινούμενος, οἳ καὶ αὐτοὶ πρὸς ἀλλήλους ἐπιστρεφόμενοι γελῶσι τὰ πολλά; (§7)
>
> Do you not see how you suffer the same thing, whenever you hold a gorgeous book in your hand, with its purple cover and gilt knob, but read it in a barbarous and shameful and twisted manner, laughed at by the educated crowd but praised by the flatterers around you (who for the most part also turn to each other and laugh)?

The first example ends in a *reduction ad absurdum* on the collector's fallacious assumption that one can acquire *paideia* and concomitant Greek-ness through osmosis alone. The second example parallels *On Salaried Posts* §35 (discussed above) where Lucian describes Greek client sophists compelled by their indigent circumstances to flatter their patrons' inept attempts at epideixis, although here the addressee is in the patron role. Both references to barbarism highlight the contrast between the collector's suppositions about the image he projects and the way he appears to those he wishes to impress: he tries and fails to showcase knowledge of Greek culture, and by doing so he creates an even more un-Greek identity for himself.

The preceding discussion illustrates how Lucian comments on the role *paideia* in both language and literature plays in protecting its possessor from accusations of barbarism and allowing him to assert membership in the sophisticated intellectual community of practice. Whether or not one is a "barbarian" depends on one's ability to deploy Greek (and in this case Attic) phrases correctly and recognize them when used by others; these characters, with their Eastern background, are therefore always perched on an unstable precipice of identity where their status can change with the slightest faux pas (or in Lexiphanes' case, a series of egregious ones). It is not enough simply to assemble knowledge, in the form of extensive vocabulary or volumes of bookrolls, rather one must understand the situations in which such knowledge is relevant. Using one's *paideia* correctly, a sort of *metapaideia*, is therefore a socially- and culturally-conditioned practice, meaning that its effective realization creates and is created by recognition as a *pepaideumenos.* But in Lucian's works, as mentioned already, the points of reference or the boundary lines used to denote various categories of socio-cultural identity are rarely fixed in place, a phenomenon one can readily observe by returning to *On Salaried Posts*

to consider whom exactly the narrator identifies as "barbarian" in the context of that work. As seen in section 4.2 above, the Greek sophist to whom the work is addressed is likely to encounter slaves from barbarian lands, and in the case of the Syrian doorman his ethnicity is revealed through his accent, *κακῶς συρίζοντι* (§10). Timocles, and the general audience whom he represents, is meant to understand that his entering into service with Roman elites will require him to spend much time in un-intellectual and un-Greek circles dealing with barbarians such as these.

The elite Roman crowd are likewise uneducated and boorish—yet Lucian does not call them barbarians; he instead turns the label back on the Greek sophist himself: *καὶ οὐκ αἰσχύνῃ κόλαξιν ἀνθρώποις καὶ ἀγοραίοις καὶ βωμολόχοις ἀντεξεταζόμενος καὶ ἐν τοσούτῳ πλήθει Ῥωμαϊκῷ μόνος ξενίζων τῷ τρίβωνι καὶ πονηρῶς τὴν Ῥωμαίων φωνὴν βαρβαρίζων…;* (§24: and don't you feel shame at being compared with the flatterers and traders and scavengers, and being the only one in this Roman mob marked as foreign by your cloak, and tortuously barbarizing the Latin tongue…?) This line telescopes and re-imagines the scenario depicted in *A Slip of the Tongue in Greeting*, in which the speaker has apparently conflated the expressions *χαίρειν* and *ὑγιαίνειν* in the company of a wealthy patron. In that work the speaker resembles that of *The Mistaken Critic*, running rapidly through an extensive list of citations to demonstrate his familiarity with the proper social context for each usage. Timocles may be an accomplished Greek intellectual comfortable mocking deficient *paideia* when it arises, but like his Roman satirist forerunner Horace, who admonished his audience *mutato nomine de te fabula narratur* (*Sat.* 1.1.69-70), Lucian reminds him that even one who is recognized as Greek

and valued for his *paideia* (after a fashion) is still a barbarian when he is a stranger in a strange land.[328]

What makes the peril of barbarism in *On Salaried Posts* distinctive is that here it is not his Atticism or Hellenism that Timocles must protect but rather his Latinity; such a consideration is never at issue in any of the debates on Greek usage but, by entering into this Roman elite context, the sophist will find himself in an entirely new social and intellectual setting.[329] This is the fact that Ulpian in the *Deipnosophists* fails so often to recognize: the Roman elite world destabilizes and indeed inverts traditional relationships, with the result that those speaking Latin—which Ulpian had called *βαρβαρίζοντες* (Ath. 3.121f)—are now the default and the Greek-speakers are lumped in with other non-Latin speakers as barbarians. Knowing Attic and other literate Greek dialects is not enough given the reality of this new order; Lucian's advice in *How to Write History* against translating certain Roman words would also seem to suggest as much.[330] Furthermore, while the Syrian background of the defendant in *Double Indictment* or the *Ignorant Book-Collector* is framed as a potential obstacle to Hellenism (which can only be

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[328] Lo Piccolo (2012) 102 draws attention to the especially jarring image of a sophist who barbarizes: „La condizione di non riuscire ad esprimersi correttamente nella lingua del luogo [. . .] risulta ancora più grave se si considera che essa si riferisce ad un dotto, cioè a un individuo per il quale l'abilità nel parlare costituisce un elemento essenziale per lo svolgimento della professione." (The condition of not succeeding at expressing oneself correctly in the local language…becomes even more serious if one considers that it refers to a learned man, that is, to an individual for whom ability in speaking constitutes and essential element of professional development.)

[329] In *A Slip of the Tongue*, where Lucian's narrator is in a similar situation with a Roman patron, he makes sure to demonstrate some familiarity with Latin by saying at §13 *ἀλλὰ καὶ ὑμεῖς αὐτοί, εἴ τι κἀγὼ τῆς Ῥωμαίων φωνῆς ἐπαΐω, τοὺς προσαγορεύοντας ἀντιδεξιούμενοι τῷ τῆς ὑγιείας ὀνόματι πολλάκις ἀμείβεσθε*. (But you yourselves, if I know a bit of the Roman speech, also exchange the word for 'health' (i.e. 'salve') when greeting each other.) Aside from this and the passage at *De merc.* 24, Lucian only refers to the Latin language four other times – once in *Nigrinus* (30) and twice in *How to Write History* (14 and 21).

[330] *QHCS* 21: Καὶ μὴν κἀκεῖνο λεκτέον οὐ μικρὸν ὄν· ὑπὸ γὰρ τοῦ κομιδῇ Ἀττικὸς εἶναι καὶ ἀποκεκαθάρθαι τὴν φωνὴν ἐς τὸ ἀκριβέστατον ἠξίωσεν οὗτος καὶ τὰ ὀνόματα μεταποιῆσαι τὰ Ῥωμαίων καὶ μεταγράψαι ἐς τὸ Ἑλληνικόν, ὡς Κρόνιον μὲν Σατουρνῖνον λέγειν, Φρόντιν δὲ τὸν Φρόντωνα, Τιτάνιον δὲ τὸν Τιτιανὸν καὶ ἄλλα πολλῷ γελοιότερα.
And indeed this point must be said, and it is no little quibble: for out of a desire to be perfectly Attic and be purified in his speech as precisely as possible this one has thought it right also to transfer the names of Romans and translate them into Greek, so as to call Saturninus "Kronios", Fronto "Frontis", Titianus "Titanios" and other much more ridiculous examples.

overcome through learning), here the *Greek* ethnicity of Timocles—signified by his foreign dress, *ξενίζων τῷ τρίβωνι*—also makes him an outsider, just as Anacharsis' Scythian origins and dress did him.[331] Such a setting upends the frame of reference within which the label "barbarian" has thus far been conceived, because in Roman culture the intellectual signifiers—in this specific case, the Atticism over which sophists, grammarians, and lexicographers constantly squabble—do not function as they do in Greek. Failure to correctly use the cultural and linguistic idioms of Rome makes one as much a barbarian as an Anacharsis, but without earning the respect he did for his prodigious insight. The term "barbarian" therefore has no meaning but that with which it is imbued in a given social context, and likewise the prestige attached to being "Greek" is highly contingent.

This example highlights Lucian's interest in interrogating the social imaginaries of Greek intellectualism, especially the assumptions about social categories and the relation between the *barbaros* and *pepaideumenos*. Several of the texts discussed, most notably those involving two characters of Syrian or other Near Eastern background, show the main speaker and his interlocutor (or more often, his target) negotiating Greek cultural identity through impromptu agonistic performance of *paideia*, represented by their knowledge of literature (as in the *Ignorant Book-Collector*) or Attic usage (as in the *Mistaken Critic*). In such episodes Lucian illustrates how, as Whitmarsh observes, the intellectual culture of the East is homogenously "bound up with the articulation of Greek superiority"[332] such that one who has mastered Greek cultural idioms can become part of the elite social class, whereas those who do not have access to the idioms that

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[331] *Anach.* 16: *ὡς μὴ μόνος ἐν ὑμῖν ξενίζοιμι τῷ σχήματι*, and also *Scyth*. 3 *συνίει καταγελώμενος ὑπὸ τῶν ὁρώντων ἐπὶ τῇ σκευῇ*. Hafner (2017) 254 highlights the τρίβων's association in Lucian's corpus with philosophers (*Demon*. 48, *D. Mort* 20.2, *Symp*. 13), as well as its mention in *Tim.* 56, where it is considered a noble garment in contrast to the *πορφυρίς*.
[332] Whitmarsh (2001) 129.

signify *paideia* become marginalized.[333] But in *On Salaried Posts* Lucian exposes the naïveté of accepting Greek cultural supremacy as a given: while the *τρίβων* signifies in-group membership in an Eastern context, it signifies a visibly foreign ethnicity in Rome, and while speaking Attic (or any polished Greek) well is essential for membership in the Greek intellectual community of practice, in Rome it makes one a cultural outsider. Even fully-realized *paideia*, which in works like the *Dream* distinguishes Lucian's persona as upwardly-mobile, becomes in Rome the mark of a subaltern who has to ply his craft for a living—a banausic laborer, just what Lucian (and presumably Timocles) has determined not to become. Lucian shows his readers that the labels used for different cultural categories derive their meaning entirely by convention, and the significance assigned to markers of identity is entirely arbitrary. In its original sense, and the sense in which it has been used throughout this dissertation, a "barbarian" is one who does not understand or practice (or does not successfully practice) Greek idioms of dress, religion, politics, athletics, or language; Lucian, however, decouples the term from its Greek frame of reference in two ways. The first is the scenario described in *On Salaried Posts* where "barbarian" becomes a non-Roman distinguished by his *habitus* and *illatinitas*. The second is how the Syrian in the *Double Indictment*, who is recognized as having mastered *paideia* to the extent that he has license to do as he pleases with Rhetoric and Dialogue, nevertheless concludes his speech by acknowledging his own barbarian appearance and dress. The texts under discussion show Lucian positing a wider array of reference points in the relationship between language, ethnicity, and cultural identity. While for Strabo a semi-Greek is just a failed Greek, for some of Lucian's personae, at least, it is just as valid a goal to be a successful Greco-Syrian.

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[333] Andrade (2013) 25.

5.4 Conclusions: Atticism, Cultures, and Self-Representation

In Chapter Three, the discussion of Lucian's linguistic ideology concluded that his Atticism should not be regarded as "moderate" but rather "rigorous". Arguably, in his detailed examinations of deficient practice the central issue is "language-in-use", that is, emphasis on the context and purpose of correct usage rather than correct usage as an abstract standard. Lexicography holds little interest, perhaps because it represents "telling" rather than "showing" knowledge of Attic literature. To effectively show such knowledge, of course, is to do what Lucian does: read ancient literature closely and produce original commentary in the form of pastiche, parody, and satire that preserves the recognizable linguistic and structural features of the original without slavishly copying it. Resurrection of Classical literature is not possible, because Lucian and his contemporaries are not living in the Athens of six hundred years prior. Instead, new Atticist intellectualism must arise, which in a word is sophism—and Lucian's sophism is dependent upon effective display of *paideia* that is, as Whitmarsh states, "bound up with the articulation of Greek superiority".[334] This uniform Greek superiority is characteristic of the East, not the West (witness Aulus Gellius and even Athenaeus as Western counterexamples), and as illustrated in this chapter, Lucian's works dealing with cultural affiliation tend either to take place in or to make reference to Eastern settings. Lucian does not question the superiority of Greek culture, rather he advocates for Greek culture for its own sake. In the *Lexiphanes* the speaker Lycinus complains that the titular character has done violence to Greek learning and seeks to help him, as much for the sake of *paideia* in the abstract as for Lexiphanes' own sake. His *personae* assert their expertise in the form of superior understanding of Greek cultural idioms (or sometimes, as in *A Slip of the Tongue*, excuse their ignorance of Roman ones) as do other figures like the Mistaken Critic or the plaintiffs of the *Double Indictment*. Greek *paideia* of language and

[334] Whitmarsh (2001) 129.

literature are at stake in Lucian's works, and the majority of Lucian's characters have as their object the effective display of this cultural learning.

When Lucian identifies two characters in an agonistic setting as both being Syrian, he frequently does the same thing that many Syrian elites appear to have done in the historical record: use Greek idioms—linguistic and otherwise—to claim a relatively higher social status in this Eastern context. The eponymous ignorant book-collector is already fantastically wealthy but is now attempting to claim a higher social status than money alone can obtain; the narrator of the diatribe against him challenges his right to this status, arguing that he, not the collector, deserves to travel in such elite circles. In like manner, the titular nemesis of the *Mistaken Critic* and the compatriot narrator wrangle over status on Greek terms; that the narrator fails to demonstrate the breadth of knowledge he claims suggests an ironic discrepancy between the author and his apparent *persona*. The narrator of the *Mistaken Critic* may have an extensive Greek vocabulary, including the contentious *ἀποφράς*, but his engagement with Greek literature is too superficial for him to know the Eupolis quotation that would prove his case. Most prominently, in the *Double Indictment* the defendant Syrian is exonerated of having mistreated two incarnations of Greek culture. He has not committed *κάκωσις* or *ὕβρις* or made Dialogue to wear *βαρβαρικόν τι*, instead here (as in *Fisherman* and *Prometheus in Words* as well) his faithful but innovative reworking of both dialogue and comedy has kept the cultural tradition alive in a space where others—in this case, taking the names of the genres themselves—might threaten to extinguish its vitality. Perhaps Lucian does indeed project the image of Prometheus, after a fashion: a culture hero bringing light to a people not his own.

As much as Lucian appears to celebrate Greek culture by signaling an adherence to classical Attic usage, his feelings on Greek identity or Greekness are less clear. The main reason for this ambiguity is the creation of *personae* whose Syrian ethnicity he not only reveals, like the

short *κἀμὲ Σύρον ὄντα* in the *Ignorant Book Collector* §19 or the self-comparison with Anacharsis in the *Scythian*, but in fact foregrounds, as in the case of the defendant in the *Double Indictment* or the narrator of *On the Syrian Goddess*. In that last work, the narrator's Syrianness is a central concern because he presents his ethnographic history from a native-born perspective, however no such consideration explains this tendency in the works where Lucian's *persona* asserts mastery of Greek idioms. The Syrian of the *Double Indictment*, despite having an appearance or reputation as a "barbarian" (*βάρβαρος αὐτὸς εἶναι δοκῶν*, §34), nevertheless understands the Classical canon well enough that he receives divine sanction to continue with his innovative recombinations of it. It may in fact not be *despite* his barbarian background that he commands the linguistic and literary idioms so well, but *because* of it. The depiction of Anacharsis is instructive, for while Fronto uses him as a reference to show deference and disclaim his own Atticism, Lucian shows Anacharsis in his unassimilated condition, uncomprehending of the Greek customs surrounding him and questioning all of them. The Scythian engages in an *elenchus* that is only made possible by his outsider status and lack of prior exposure to the subject (in this case, gymnastics and athletics), asking questions that a Greek would not bother to ask yet would have difficulty answering when pressed. The Syrian is the same: when Rhetoric and Dialogue induct him into the world of Greek culture, he questions the assumptions they make – that dialogue cannot be undertaken for humorous literary purposes, e.g. – because such assumptions are not self-evidently true. In fact, the *paideia* that the Syrian has acquired shows them to be largely false. By looking in from the outside and preserving this outsider status even as he familiarizes himself with the trappings of Greek identity, this and other Lucianic *personae* can maintain their full-field view of the Greek culture in which he works.

In taking this literary posture, Lucian reifies the notion of *μιγάδες* that Strabo (14.5.25) rejects; he is not Greek *or* Syrian, nor is he Greek *in spite of* being Syrian, nor is he barbarian

despite his Atticism, but rather the variations of his *personae* encompass all of these positions. Furthermore, he does not occupy a "middle space" between Greek and Syrian but instead he challenges the idea of there being two poles to which one must be drawn, at all. This interrogation of the cultural schema is certainly in evidence in the way Lucian uses the word *βαβαρίζειν* to refer either to being insufficiently Greek or to being excessively Greek, depending on the context. In suggesting that a Greek accent is "barbaric" in *On Salaried Posts*, Lucian emphasizes how in the Roman social reality (also in view during *A Slip of the Tongue*) the social imaginary of Greekness supreme is not a given, as it is elsewhere in Lucian's corpus presumed to be. Yet in that same work, a Syrian accent is also deprecated and Libyan ethnicity seen as a negative. This fact should not surprise given the work's Hellenist and/or Atticist focalization, but combined with the "barbaric" characterization of a Greek intellectual it makes the speaker of *On Salaried Posts* seem also to be an outsider. Certainly, he claims to have a more objective perspective on the situation of Greeks in Rome than the Greeks (or indeed the Romans) do, and in a sense, he is evenhanded in his social criticism. Though he shares negative opinions of Romans, he is not anti-Roman; he lays the blame for the degradation of Greek culture at the feet of Romans and Greeks equally, even though he clearly values Greek culture and language and has little interest in their Roman counterparts.[335] Those who regard their Greek identity or Greekness as the end product of their Greek linguistic and literary expertise, their *paideia*, do so because they lack the sophistic nous to express linguistic and literary creation for its own sake. As Lucian looks to use linguistic expertise as a means to open up the possibilities made possible through the artistic language of Attic, so too does he explore and exploit the creative possibilities inherent to his superposition of linguistic, ethnic, and cultural identities.

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[335] There is no mention of Aeolism in Lucian's corpus, in contrast with several other contemporary or recent sources that explore cultural identity and language; see Chapter Four for this discussion.

6. Conclusions

In the preceding discussion of Lucian's writing, that of his contemporaries, and the language ideologies of the Second Sophistic, this project has two central aims. The first is to show how Lucian reforms and restages the conflict among Atticists and others to create a humorous and multiform commentary on the intellectual climate in which he writes. The second is to draw on portrayals of ethnic and cultural identity—Greekness and Romanness—in works by Lucian and other Second Sophistic writers—to explain the connection between Lucian's comedy of language and the complex self-representation conveyed through his changing *personae*. This concluding section will summarize the individual arguments of each chapter and explain how the conclusions regarding Lucian's corpus inform and are informed by a wider reading of Second Sophistic sociolinguistic imaginaries. This argument does not posit intertextuality between Lucian and his contemporaries, but rather highlights the features of Lucian's linguistic and cultural commentaries that distinguish his perspective and aims from those of the set of other Greek and Roman writers addressed in this study.

6.1 Linguistic Gatekeeping

Whether one views the Second Sophistic intellectual culture as a revival of Classical models, as Philostratus did when laying out his thesis of the concept, or as a fundamentally different phenomenon that produced new modes of expression made possible by a renewed interest in Classical models, the language ideologies of the authors involved contribute significantly to the overall picture. Differentiation of linguistic practice is an essential component of the project to carve out a distinctive cultural space for this new form (or an old form) of Greek intellectualism. Such differentiation may take the form of clear-cut categorization into specific registers, as in Moeris' lexicon, or involve protracted discussions on the validity of usage based

on a variety of ideological stances, as Phrynichus' *Ecloga* does, or it may balloon out into encyclopedic digressions like those found in Athenaeus and Gellius. Whatever form it takes, the underlying practice is one of linguistic gatekeeping: identifying and defining through linguistic terms a cultural space to which the author controls access—or at least aims at such control.

In Phrynichus' lexicon the gatekeeping project is explicit and persistent, since he makes it his stated objective to drive out the un-Attic usages from the language of Imperial Athens. The mechanisms through which he seeks to attain this objective are nevertheless complex, despite the short length of the work, and as shown in Chapter Two's discussion, arbitrary and idiosyncratic. It is nowhere explained where Phrynichus learned Attic, or on what basis he defines the period and genres in which to find examples of good Atticist language. Based on his treatment of Demosthenes and his references to Macedonians,[336] he may well envision a periodization of Greek history in which the conquests of Alexander the Great mark a clear distinction between Classical and Hellenistic cultures and the language associated with them, in spite of the Macedonian rulers' deliberate adoption of Attic as the dialect or register of official communication.[337] This is speculation, however, and ultimately the precise date of the "end of Atticism", as Phrynichus envisions it, is not as important as the fact that there evidently was one and that Phrynichus can use this date to shut the gate, so to speak, on the rest of Greek literature and his contemporary rivals. The Antiatticist pushes back against this kind of gatekeeping, though not entirely—that work mostly aims to enclose a larger linguistic space for Atticism, which involves extending the timeframe to include Menander but which also recognizes certain features of contemporary usage as, if not strictly Attic themselves, not sufficiently un-Attic as to be unsuitable for literary purposes. For Pollux in the *Onomasticon*, gatekeeping is accomplished

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[336] *Ecl*. 354 and 383.
[337] Landucchi (2007).

primarily through the rigorous combing of Attic texts (whichever they may be) in order to assemble the largest collection possible of Attic vocabulary on any given subject. Sextus Empiricus, opposite these figures (and others) represents himself as a gate-opener who exposes the flaws in the grammatical conception of there being any inherent right or wrong to language. Such an intellectual project, however, represents its own kind of gatekeeping, since Sextus advises his readers to shut out the (he thinks) fallacious arguments of grammarians and instead adopt the Epicurean-Skeptic view of language as an arbitrary and conventional practice.

These writers on language and linguistics engage in active debate on language and linguistics, whereas Lucian for the most part prefers to stage versions of this debate through his characters and literary conceits. "Lucianus" in the *Solecist* is a strict gatekeeper of Atticism, and not an especially sympathetic one at that; conversely, Lexiphanes is a zealous Atticist looking to participate in the intellectual community of which Lycinus is apparently a member, but Lycinus denies him entry (by refusing to engage with his attempts at Platonic dialogue), has Sopolis purge him, and then stipulates an ambitious course of preparation before Lexiphanes can be recognized as a *pepaideumenos*. The standards to which these characters hold their interlocutors are not quite the same, but the effect is. In the *Professor of Rhetoric*, the title character breaks down for the reader the shortcuts by which one can gain entry into the world of successful *Konzertredner*—to jump over the fence, so to speak, rather than go through the gate—whereas the unsuccessful rhetor who introduces the work describes his own failures to join the educated elite through attainment of *paideia*, finding himself ultimately shut out.

In that work, however, the calculating and manipulative advice dispensed by the Professor is an ironic satire on the deficient Atticizing rhetoric of unnamed contemporaries. The *Professor of Rhetoric* illustrates how damaging a mismanaged program of linguistic gatekeeping can be to the intellectual disciplines, when the rapid deployment of obscure Attic vocabulary

passes for learnedness and stylistic excellence. A Lexiphanes-type, or a disciple of the Professor, can easily acquire this veneer of Atticism from consulting a lexicon like those of Moeris and Pollux; Lucianus in the *Solecist* gives the impression of being a Phrynichus-like pedant who sees Atticism as a function of vocabulary, morphology, and syntax, in which excellence can be attained by rigorous practice with a good grammar-book and lexicon. Yet Lucian's own language does not conform to the standards laid out here, and some of them (like the deprecation of *ἄν* with the future) are dubiously Attic themselves. In the *Lexiphanes* and *Professor*, however, Lucian's staging of the Atticist ideological debate performs gatekeeping in a way that seems to shut out the Atticist lexicographers and grammarians themselves—use of the language cannot be licensed by lists of definitions, rather, only in-depth engagement with the themes and images of Attic literature suffices to make a responsible Atticizing sophist.

6.2 Language and Cultural Affiliation

Athenaeus and Gellius stage similar scenes of gatekeeping in their own works, many of which fail. This tendency for failure is especially evident in the *Deipnosophists* in the form of Ulpian, and in the *Attic Nights* whenever a grammarian (or a pack of them) arrives to challenge the usage of one of the principal cast members such as Favorinus or Fronto. Ulpian's Atticist ideology is again largely a function of vocabulary and is predicated on two primary qualifications, that a word must be previously attested and that it must come only from the Attic dialect. As shown in Chapter Four, the objections Athenaeus raises (in the voice of Cynulcus and Myrtilus, or others) to the linguistic program of Ulpian and his allies lie partly in their failure to live up to their own standards—since they fail to recognize several Attic words as such due to their apparently deficient memory or, more likely, reading experience—and partly in its being fundamentally flawed to begin with; there is no such thing as a "pure" Atticism free of loanwords from other languages and dialects. Moreover, the admission of occasional Latinisms into the

elevated Greek of the symposium (including some so-called barbarisms that are preferred to a Greek alternative) shows evidence of a language ideology that recognizes Roman realities, such as the fact that this symposium is only taking place due to the philhellenism of the wealthy Larensis, a Roman magistrate. Athenaeus and his characters are not seeking to leave the linguistic past behind—if they were, their choice to quote thousands of centuries-old Greek authors would be a curious way of going about it—but instead they recognize that the changing cultural environment means that an insistence upon a (fallacious) notion of Attic purity will prevent just the kind of intellectual discussion that Atticism is supposed to enable. Furthermore, Ulpian's unwillingness to assimilate to the new Greco-Roman culture in which he lives only serves to reinforce how un-Greek he is, earning him the sobriquet of "Syro-Attic". His eventual death near the end of the work signals that the notion of pristine Hellenic-Attic intellectual culture (if it ever really existed) must be let go of and left as a monument of Greek culture in an increasingly Roman world.[338]

The language debates played out in the *Attic Nights*, on the other hand, are delivered in (mostly) Latin and meant to be seen from a Roman perspective. On a basic level, the variety and complexity of Latin questions raised by Gellius and his characters attest to the intellectual richness and rigor of the Roman linguistic heritage—Favorinus, Fronto, Sidonius et al. can go down rabbit holes as deep as any of those in Athenaeus, and can frequently perform the same magic trick of extemporaneously reciting scores of lines of evidence (Latin and Greek) that the Deipnosophists do. More complex, and ultimately more significant, is Gellius' portrayal of the interlinguistic relationship of Latin and Greek, of which several versions are on display. The bilingualism of Favorinus shows one such relationship, since Favorinus is remarked to be a masterful Greek orator but usually appears in Gellius as an expert on Latin questions; he therefore

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[338] Davidson (2000) 292-299.

demonstrates how one can be immersed in *utraque lingua* without diminishing one's standing in either. Another relationship is the frequent reference to Latin words of Greek origin, including even the name *Italia* (*NA* 11.1), as well as whole phrases (*NA* 8.12), which give no indication of being less Latin as a result; in fact, the Latin language is enriched by its contact with Greek, and thus so are its speakers. Then there is the contest of Fronto and Favorinus over which language has the superior vocabulary, a contest that Fronto wins on behalf of Latin (*NA* 2.26).

Yet another relationship, with even more profound ramifications, is hinted at through the use of Greek to address Latin language puzzles, such as the resolution of a morphological question of Cicero's use of *futurum [esse]* (*NA* 1.7) accomplished by making reference to Greek future infinitives. Though Gellius does not specifically name it (like Dionysius, *Ant. Rom.* 1.90, or Athenaeus, *Deip.* 10.425a) the Aeolism theory, or some version of it, is on the board in the *Attic Nights*. Latin is related to and possibly descended from Greek, and thus even were the Roman political reality insufficient to license the practice of Greek-style sophism by elite Romans, the linguistic truths Gellius' work purports to reveal would be. Quite unlike Fronto's letters, in which the author distances himself from Greek in order to strengthen his Roman self-representation—a representation (possibly) threatened by his underlying Libyan heritage—the *Attic Nights* shows Romans asserting and validating their membership in elite Roman circles because of their willingness and capacity to expound on Greek topics alongside Latin ones. To be an elite Roman, an unhyphenated Roman, one must be comfortable with the idioms of Greek cultural expression as well as those belonging to Latin. The putative descent of Latin from Greek is largely unnecessary here—the *Attic Nights* shows how, by understanding the richness of their own Italian heritage, Romans can appropriate Greek cultural idioms and integrate them into their own construction of Roman group identity. Fronto may have to be on guard against the possibility of his barbarian heritage undermining his claims to elite Romanness, but Romans themselves—

far from the barbarians that Athenaeus' Ulpian imagines them to be—can be Greek intellectuals just as well as the Greeks can yet also be no less Roman. Fronto may be an expert Latin orator, but if the Emperor is a Greek philosopher then who is Fronto to say that the Greek language is incompatible with Romanness?

6.3 A Barbarian at the Gates

The argument of this dissertation has been that Lucian's linguistic explorations, especially into Attic, are central to his project of innovative engagement with the Classical literature that forms the nucleus of the Second Sophistic. Migrating from the subject of language ideologies and Atticist language standards to the question of how language relates to and indeed determines a given cultural identity position, this argument has continued onwards to unpack some of the sociolinguistic imaginaries represented in Greek and Latin authors of the period and explain how they envision the relationship between language and identity. This relationship is a major subject in Lucian's corpus, and his representations of it look towards a reorientation of the linguistic, ethnic, and cultural reference points around which the language/identity dynamic is conducted. It is clear from the study of Lucian's depiction of Attic expertise that the *personae* he puts into the protagonist role (even ironically) command the language well; the way he represents their cultural position relative to Greek, Roman, or the barbarian other is not so consistent. In some works, like *On Salaried Posts*, the significance of linguistic practice to assertion or construction of Greekness is not at issue; rather, the significance of Greekness itself in the larger context is the focus. However, in other works, such as the *Dream* and the *Double Indictment*, mastery of Atticism (and *a fortiori* Greek) is posited as a means to lift oneself up out of barbarism. In the latter, it seems not to actually accomplish this end, and the Syrian defendant is acknowledged to seem barbarous even at the close. In *On Salaried Posts*, the Romans are depicted as being so inept at using the Greek language to construct rhetorical and philosophical

thoughts that the possibility of their possessing the Greekness Gellius envisions seems more than remote; yet, the Greek sophists on their client-rolls must act as though their patrons have achieved it, if they are to retain their seats at dinner.

These visions of Greek culture and Greek identity exist in roughly the same ideological framework as Gellius and Athenaeus—mastery of Greek cultural idioms (language, literary themes, rhetorical schemata, etc.) is the key to attaining Greekness, in the intellectual communities of practice where such idioms are recognized as having that significance. However, Lucian also probes and pushes back against this presumed relationship between mastery of cultural idioms and the cultural identities they signify. The Syrian of the *Double Indictment* is found not guilty of having barbarized—either by neglect or abuse—the Greek literary genres who accuse him, yet in spite of the legal (indeed, divine) recognition of his right to work in Rhetoric and Dialogue, he is still a barbarian. Plainly, being a barbarian in this sense does not mean one does not know Greek or understand Greek culture. This situation instead emerges as one piece of evidence for a positively constructed barbarianness (as distinct from barbarity or barbarism) articulated throughout Lucian's corpus, signifying not a failure to attain Greekness, but rather staking out a new position from which to access and manipulate the idioms of Greek culture. Another work providing evidence to this effect is *On the Syrian Goddess*, in which the narrator delivers a detailed pastiche of Herodotean ethnography (in neo-Ionic, no less) that claims to draw on his personal experience growing up a Syrian and concludes by retelling his own performance of (some of) the rites of Atargatis. He thus relies on familiarity with Syrian cultural idioms (his Syrianness) to establish the veracity of his work, even as he displays throughout it a confident command of a specific Greek literary dialect and format.

These *personae*, the Syrian orator and Syrian narrator, are simultaneously insiders and outsiders; they do not exist somewhere in between being one thing or the other, but instead their

position relies on different aspects of both Greek and barbarian perspectives. The perspective of a barbarian looking in on Greek culture from the outside is the central focus of the *Anacharsis*, a Platonic-style dialogue which does not treat on language—the title character has learned how to speak perfect Attic between his arrival in the *Scythian* and his dialogue with Solon—but helps illuminate the picture of Lucian's *personae* and their positioning relative to Greek culture and Greekness. Specifically, Anacharsis' outside-in view of Athens displays no familiarity with Athenian cultural institutions, and thus he has no idea why the young men are slathering oil onto themselves and grabbing one another forcefully nor does he understand why virtue would be learned from sitting on a hillside watching people sing and dance while wearing grotesque masks. His interrogation of such strange sights compels his companion, Solon himself, to explain in great detail how and to what end the Athenian institutions of gymnastics and drama are practiced. Without Anacharsis' questioning, Solon would not have had to produce this systematic explanation of his own culture, and there would be no dialogue. The outsider perspective therefore enables Anacharsis to challenge assumptions and require Athenians (and Greeks generally) to demonstrate insight into their own culture, rather than continue to practice traditions simply because they always have. In like fashion, the Syrian orator wins his case through a demonstrated mastery of Greek idioms—specifically those of Attic rhetoric, dialogue, and comedy—that comes not despite his barbarian heritage, but *because* of it. He knows that, e.g., dialogue and comedy have been blended together since the time of Aristophanes, whereas Dialogue, insisting on his right to be free of the comedic muck, inadvertently cites Aristophanes yet fails to recognize it himself. The outsider, free of the ossified notions of generic division, approaches the Second Sophistic's Classical models with fresh eyes and sees them as they are.

Greekness is no guarantee of Greek cultural mastery or *paideia*; from a glance back to the beginning of this dissertation, Phrynichus' attitude towards the language of the *hoi polloi* makes

that fact abundantly clear, while Lucian in *On Salaried Posts* shows how Greekness in a new, Roman context can loop back around to signify barbarism. Lucian also shows how mastery of the cultural idioms that would seem to denote Greekness does not always grant one the status of a Greek *pepaideumenos* when a conflicting ethnicity or even cultural practice is in the picture; other, extra-linguistic modes of cultural gatekeeping preclude it. But Lucian's version of the sophistic project does not represent the attainment of Greekness as the ultimate aim of, or a prerequisite to, mastery of Attic and the Attic artistic tradition. His *personae* are allowed to be barbarians sometimes, and to demonstrate their knowledge of Attic and Classical literature in spite and even because of their barbarianness. Lexicographers and grammarians in the Second Sophistic call *barbaros* or *barbarismos* something that upsets the form of a word, the usage of words and forms that have no basis in the history of the Greek language whatever the dialect. A barbarism is thus a novel and non-Greek element introduced from outside, whereas a solecism is the mistaken arrangement of elements that are otherwise legitimate Greek. In a sense, the cultural position of *barbaros/barbarismos* is conceived of in this way too: a barbarian—an Anacharsis or a Lucian—approaches the Greek world from outside and finds that the grammar of Greekness has no role for him to play, just as a barbarism has no place in the grammar of the Greek language, Attic or otherwise. Sometimes the barbarian erases those attributes that makes him un-Greek and replaces them with Greekness, but in Lucian's work it becomes possible for the barbarian to engage faithfully with Greek culture in all its linguistic and literary idioms yet retain the distinctive voice of an outsider even when—or if—he is invited inside.

Appendix A

1. Dialects

Apollonius Dyscolus:

De constructione 4.62:

τὰ γὰρ μεταπίπτοντα παρὰ ταῖς διαλέκτοις τῆς φωνῆς ἀμοιβὴν σημαίνει, οὐ τοῦ δηλουμένου.

For the changes from one dialect to another denote an alteration of the sound, not of the meaning.

De conjunction 223 (e.g.):

Ἆρα· Οὗτος κατὰ πᾶσαν διάλεκτον, ὑπεσταλμένης τῆς κοινῆς καὶ Ἀττικῆς, ἦρα λέγεται…

âra (interrogative): this is the word among every dialect, except for the common and the Attic ones, in which *êra* is said.

Clemens Alexandrinus, *Stromateis* 1.142 on dialects:

διάλεκτος δέ ἐστι λέξις ἴδιον χαρακτῆρα τόπου ἐμφαίνουσα ἢ λέξις ἴδιον ἢ κοινὸν ἔθνους ἐμφαίνουσα χαρακτῆρα. φασὶ δὲ οἱ Ἕλληνες εἶναι τὰς παρὰ σφίσι πέντε, Ἀτθίδα, Ἰάδα, Δωρίδα, Αἰολίδα, καὶ πέμπτην τὴν κοινήν· ἀπεριλήπτους δὲ οὔσας τὰς βαρβάρων φωνὰς μηδὲ διαλέκτους, ἀλλὰ γλῶσσας λέγεσθαι.

A dialect is a form of speech that shows the particular character of a place, or a form of speech that shows the particular or common character of a people. And the Greeks say that they have five dialects, Attic, Ionic, Doric, Aeolic, and fifth, Koinê; and that the ways of speaking [*phonai*] of the barbarians, since they are unintelligible, are not 'dialects' but 'languages' [*glossai*].

2. Cultural, political, and stylistic senses of "Atticism" and "Asianism"

Thucydides 3.65:

τὸν ὑμέτερον ἑκούσιον ἀττικισμὸν τοιαῦτα ἀποφαίνομεν· ἃ δὲ τελευταῖά φατε ἀδικηθῆναι, παρανόμως γὰρ ἐλθεῖν ἡμᾶς ἐν σπονδαῖς καὶ ἱερομηνίᾳ ἐπὶ τὴν ὑμετέραν πόλιν, οὐ νομίζομεν οὐδ' ἐν τούτοις ὑμῶν μᾶλλον ἁμαρτεῖν.

We demonstrate that your Atticism with respect to such matters is willing, and as for the ways in which you profess to have been wronged—that we came illegally against your

city while under treaty and during your holy festival—we do not believe ourselves to be at fault in these matters any more than you are.

Cicero, *Brutus* 285:

'Atticos', inquit, 'volo imitari.' quos? nec enim est unum genus. nam quid est tam dissimile quam Demosthenes et Lysias, quam idem et Hyperides, quam horum omnium Aeschines? quem igitur imitaris? si aliquem: ceteri ergo Attice non dicebant? si omnis: qui potes, cum sint ipsi dissimillumi inter se?

"I wish to imitate the Attics," he says. Which ones? For there is no single kind. For what difference is as great as that between Demosthenes and Lysias, and between that and Hyperides, and between all of them and Aeschines?

Cicero, *Brutus* 325:

Genera autem Asiaticae dictionis duo sunt: unum sententiosum et argutum, sententiis non tam gravibus et severis quam concinnis et venustis…. aliud autem genus est non tam sententiis frequentatum quam verbis volucre atque incitatum, quali est nunc Asia tota, nec flumine solum orationis sed etiam exornato et faceto genere verborum

However there are two kinds of Asiatic diction: one is pithy and verbose, with sentiments not so much serious and sober as they are harmonious and charming … however the other kind is not as full of sentiments as it is rapid and rousing in words, as there is now in all of Asia, not just a river of speech but even an ornate and elegant kind of words.

Pollux, *Onomasticon* 4.22:

καὶ τὰ πράγματα δεινότης, σοφία, δεξιότης, συνέχεια, πυκνότης, εὔροια, ῥᾳστώνη, πλῆθος, ἀφθονία, ἐπιμέλεια, ἀκρίβεια, σκέψις, περίσκεψις, ἑλληνισμός, ἀττικισμός, πολυγνωμοσύνη, πολύνοια, πολυλογία, εὐγλωττία, εὐφωνία, ἀφθονία, βραχυλογία, συντομία, σαφήνεια, σφοδρότης, ἰσχύς, δύναμις, βία, ῥαγδαιότης, πιθανότης, ἡδονή, γλυκύτης, εὐρημοσύνη, τέχνη, κακοήθεια, πικρία, πειθώ, φενακισμός, ἀπάτη ἐξαπάτη, παροξυσμός, δεινολογία, οἰκτρολογία, ταπεινολογία.

And with respect to the matters [there are] cleverness, wisdom, dexterity, coherence, conciseness, fluency, accessibility, magnitude, abundance, attentiveness, clarity, perception, consideration, Hellenism, Atticism, depth of knowledge, thoughtfulness, loquacity, glibness, euphony, abundance, brevity, clarity, earnestness, strength, power, force, fury, persuasiveness, pleasure, sweetness, eloquence, skill, malignity, bitterness, persuasion, imposition, beguilement, deceit, exaspiration, plaintiveness, piteous discourse, low speech.

Appendix B

1. Phrynichus' statement of purpose

Phryn. *Ecl.* pr.:

> Φρύνιχος Κορνηλιανῷ εὖ πράττειν
> Τήν τε ἄλλην σου παιδείαν θαυμάζων, ἣν διαφερόντως ὑπὲρ ἅπαντας ὅσοις ἐγὼ ἐνέτυχον πεπαίδευσαι, καὶ δὴ καὶ τοῦτο θαυμάσας ἔχω, τὸ περὶ τὴν τῶν καλῶν καὶ δοκίμων ὀνομάτων κρίσιν. ταῦτ' ἄρα κελεύσαντός σου τὰς ἀδοκίμους τῶν φωνῶν ἀθροισθῆναι πάσας μὲν οὐχ οἷός τ' ἐγενόμην τὰ νῦν περιλαβεῖν, τὰς δ' ἐπιπολαζούσας μάλιστα καὶ τὴν ἀρχαίαν διάλεξιν ταραττούσας καὶ πολλὴν αἰσχύνην ἐμβαλλούσας. οὐ λανθάνει δὲ σέ, ὥσπερ οὐδ' ἄλλο τι τῶν κατὰ παιδείαν, ὥς τινες ἀποπεπτωκότες τῆς ἀρχαίας φωνῆς καὶ ἐπὶ τὴν ἀμαθίαν καταφεύγοντες πορίζουσι μάρτυράς τινας τοῦ προειρῆσθαι ὑπὸ τῶν ἀρχαίων τάσδε τὰς φωνάς· ἡμεῖς δὲ οὐ πρὸς τὰ διημαρτημένα ἀφορῶμεν, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὰ δοκιμώτατα τῶν ἀρχαίων. καὶ γὰρ αὐτοῖς εἴ τις αἵρεσιν προθείη, ποτέρως ἂν ἐθέλοιεν διαλέγεσθαι ἀρχαίως καὶ ἀκριβῶς ἢ νεοχμῶς[339] καὶ ἀμελῶς, δέξαιντ' ἂν ἀντὶ παντὸς ἡμῖν σύμψηφοι γενόμενοι τῆς ἀμείνονος γενέσθαι μοίρας· οὐ γάρ τις οὕτως ἄθλιος ὡς τὸ αἰσχρὸν τοῦ καλοῦ προτιθέναι.
> ἔρρωσο.
>
> Phrynichus, to Cornelianus[340], well wishes.
> Marveling at the rest of your erudition, which you have learned pre-eminently beyond all whom I have encountered, and I have also come to marvel especially at this aspect, your discrimination as to which words are refined and legitimate. Therefore, while I have been unable at present to fulfill your request for all the unacceptable words to be assembled, [I have collected] those that are especially prevalent and throw the ancient speech into disarray and cause much embarrassment. And it does not escape you, just as with anything else with respect to erudition, that some who have slipped away from the ancient speech and escaped into ignorance adduce certain pieces of evidence of the following words' having been previously spoken by the ancients; but we will not look towards what is mistakenly adduced, but rather towards the most acceptable of the ancient sources. For even if someone should offer them a choice of whether they should wish to conduct discussion in an ancient and precise manner or in a newfangled and careless one, they would choose, over anything else, to vote with us and share in the better outcome; for no one is so wretched as to prefer the shameful to the fine.
> Be well.

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[339] Only attested in second century CE Atticizing prose; Strobel (2005) 99 suggests Phrynichus deliberately breaches protocol in using a word he knows to be novel as a meta-rhetorical trick (given its literal meaning) to highlight the severity of failing to adhere to ancient models.

[340] He is identified as Sulpicius Cornelianus, the *ab epistulis Graecis* to Marcus Aurelius and perhaps Commodus too. On the evidence of this letter, he also seems to have been an acquaintance of Phrynichus—or at least Phrynichus made it look that way. Marcus Cornelius Fronto, one of the subjects of Chapter Four, wrote a letter of recommendation in Attic (*Ad am.* 1.2) on behalf of Cornelianus to P. Aelius Apollonides; cf. Bowersock (1969) 54-5, Fischer (1974) 44-7, Champlin (1980) 29-30, Argyle (1989).

2. Phrynichus' sources

Table 5: Sources cited by name, genre, or other category in Phrynichus, *Ecloga* (expanded) [341]

Author/Speaker/Genre	Entries	Accepts	Rejects
the ancients	64	*	*
Favorinus	16	0	16*
Menander	15	1(2*)	14
Athenians	14	14	0
Aristophanes	12	9	3*
Ionians	10	4*	6*
Demosthenes	9	8	1*
Plato	6	5	1
Thucydides	6	6	
Cratinus	6	4	2*
orators	5	1	4
Old Comedy	5	4	1*
Dorians	5	1*	4
Herodotus	4	0	4*
Stoics	4	0	4
Homer (The Poet)	3	3	0
Lysias	3	1	2
Polemo	3	0	3
Lollianus	3	0	3
Alexis	3	0	3
New Comedy	3	0	3
Syracusans	2	0	2
Epicharmus	2	0	2
pseudo-Atticists, etc.	2	0	2
Xenophon	2	0	2
Eupolis	2	2	0
physicians	4	2	2*
Chrysippus	2	0	2
Sophocles	2	0	2*
Plutarch	2	0	2
Aristotle	2	0	2*
Alexander (soph.)	2	0	2
Teleclides	2	1	1
Egyptians	2	0	2
Aeolians	2	1*	1
Alexandrians	2	0	2
Hyperides	2	0	2

[341] Numbers with asterisk* are ambiguous as to whether they are positive or negative commentary on the sources in question—for instance, 411: *Αἰχμαλωτισθῆναι· τοῦθ' οὕτως ἀδόκιμον ὡς μηδὲ Μένανδρον αὐτῷ χρήσασθαι. διαλύων οὖν λέγε αἰχμάλωτον γενέσθαι.* (Aichmalotisthenai' (to be taken captive): This is so unacceptable that not even Menander would use it. So, eliminate it and say 'aichmaloton genesthai' (to become captive).)

Macedonians	2	0	2
Cornelianus	2	2	0
Dion (phil.)	1	0	1
Greeks	1	1	0
Poets	1	0	1
the masses	1	0	1
Hesiod	1	0	1
Sulla	1	0	1
Theopompus*	1	1*	0
dialects	1	0	1
Antiochus	1	0	1
rustics	1	0	1
educated	1	1	0
Hecataeus	1	0	1
comedy	1	0	1
tragedy	1	0	1
Alcaeus	1	0	1*
ps.-Demosthenes	1	0	1
Phrynichus (com.)	1	1	0
Philoxenus (Alex.)	1	0	1
Secundus (gramm.)	1	1*	1
poets	1	0	1
Sappho	1	0	1
gymnastikoi?	1	0	1
Korinna	1	1	0
Hippias	1	0	1
Ion (hist.)	1	0	1
Antiphanes (com.)	1	0	1
Eubulus	1	0	1
Theophrastus	1	0	1*
Euripides	1	0	1
Philemon	1	0	1
Phocylides	1	1*	0
Philippides	1	0	1
Theon (gram.)	1	0	1
Pherecrates	1	1	0
Romans	1	1	0
Solon	1	1	0
Balbus	1	0	1
Gaianus (rhet.)	1	1*	0
Gaius (gram.)	1	0	1
Phylarchus	1	1*	0
Myrtilus	1	0	1
Strattis (com.)	1	0	1

3. Descriptivist language in Phrynichus

Ecl. 14: *Ἀποτάσσομαί σοι ἔκφυλον πάνυ· χρὴ γὰρ λέγειν ἀσπάζομαί σε. οὕτω γὰρ καὶ οἱ ἀρχαῖοι εὑρίσκονται λέγοντες, ἐπειδὰν ἀπαλλάττωνται ἀλλήλων. (Ecl. 14)*

'Apotassomai soi' (I bid you adieu) is altogether unnatural, for one must say *'aspazomai se'* (I take leave of you). For the ancients are also found speaking this way, whenever they depart from one another.

Ecl. 46: Τελευταιότατον λέγειν ἁμάρτημα τῶν περὶ παιδείαν δοκούντων τευτάζειν· ἐπεὶ γὰρ ἀρχαιότατον εὗρον λεγόμενον παρὰ τοῖς ἀρχαίοις, ᾠήθησαν καὶ τοῦτο δεῖν λέγειν. ἀλλὰ σὺ τελευταῖον λέγε. (*Ecl*. 46)

'*Teleutaiotaton'* (finalmost): to say this is an error of those who appear to be concerned with education (*paideia*); for when they found it as a very old word said by the ancients they supposed that they should also say this. But you, say *'teleutaion'*.

Ecl. 123: Ἤμην· εἰ καὶ εὑρίσκεται παρὰ τοῖς ἀρχαίοις, οὐκ ἐρεῖς, ἀλλ' ἦν ἐγώ.

'*Emen*' (I been): You will not say this, even if it is found among the ancient writers, but rather '*en ego*' (I was)

Ecl. 126:Βρῶμος· πάνυ ἐζήτησα, εἰ χρὴ λέγειν ἐπὶ τῆς δυσωδίας· μέχρι οὗν εὑρίσκεται, ἄχαριν ὀσμὴν λέγε ὥσπερ οἱ κωμῳδοποιοί. (*Ecl*. 126)

'Bromos' (a stink): I inquired fully whether one must say this in application to a foul smell; so, as far as it is found, you should say it of an unappealing odor just as the comic authors do.

Ecl. 145: Τύλην, εἰ καὶ εὕροις που, σὺ κνέφαλον λέγε.

'*Tylen'* (swelling): even if you should find this somewhere, you say 'knephalon'.

Ecl. 200: Ἀλεκτορίς· εὑρίσκεται καὶ ἐν τραγῳδίᾳ καὶ ἐν κωμῳδίᾳ, λέγε δὲ ἀλεκτρυὼν καὶ ἐπὶ θήλεος καὶ ἐπὶ ἄρρενος ὡς οἱ παλαιοί.

'*Alektoris'* (hen): It is found both in tragedy and in comedy, but you say, *'alektryon'* (chicken) both for feminine and masculine, as the ancients do.

Ecl. 232: Εὐαγγελίζομαί σε· καὶ περὶ ταύτης τῆς συντάξεως διασκεπτόμενος ἐπὶ συχνὸν δή τινα χρόνον, εἴτε αἰτιατικῇ συντακτέον αὐτὸ πτώσει εἴτε δοτικῇ, εὑρίσκω κατὰ δοτικὴν ἡρμοσμένον, Ἀριστοφάνου μὲν οὕτω λέγοντος ἐν τοῖς Ἱππεῦσιν (vs. 643)· "εὐαγγελίσασθαι πρῶτος ὑμῖν βούλομαι", Φρυνίχου δὲ τοῦ κωμῳδοῦ ἐν τοῖς Σατύροις (fr. 44 K.) οὕτως· "ὅτι πρὶν ἐλθεῖν αὐτὸν εἰς βουλὴν ἔδει καὶ ταῦτ' ἀπαγγείλαντα πάλιν πρὸς τὸν θεὸν ἥκειν· ἐγὼ δ' ἀπέδραν ἐκεῖνον †δευριανὸν δεῖ†". Καὶ οὕτω λέγουσιν εὐαγγελίζομαι ἢ εὐαγγελῶ, οὗ ὁ Πλάτων (Theaet. 144 b. v. 1.) τὸ δεύτερον πρόσωπον λέγει εὐαγγελεῖς.

'*Euangelizomai se'* (I tell you the good news): Examining for quite some time whether, with regards to this construction, it should be constructed with the accusative case or the dative, I find it fitting in the dative, since Aristophanes says it thus in the Knights: "I wish to be first to announce the good news to you (*hymin*)", and Phrynichus the comedian in the Satyrs: "Because it was necessary the one who announced this goods news go to the

god again before entering into the boule; and I escaped ?need? that ?*deurianos*?". They also say thus *'euangelizomai'* or *'euangelo'*, where Plato says *'euangeleis'* in the second person.

Ecl. 244: Κατ' ἐκεῖνο καιροῦ· παρὰ μὲν ἄλλῳ τῶν δοκίμων οὐχ εὗρον, ἡγοῦμαι δὲ καὶ Θουκυδίδην ἐν τῇ η′ (7, 2, 4) μετὰ τοῦ ἄρθρου εἰρηκέναι "κατ' ἐκεῖνο τοῦ καιροῦ". καὶ ἐγὼ μὲν φυλάττεσθαι παραινῶ οὕτω χρῆσθαι, εἰ δ' ὅτι Θουκυδίδης εἴρηκε θαρροίη τις χρῆσθαι, χρήσθω μέν, σὺν δὲ τῷ ἄρθρῳ.

'Kat' ekeino kairou' (at that point in time): Though I did not find it in another of the reputable sources, I believe that even Thucydides has said it with the article, in the seventh book: "At that point of the occasion" (Thuc. 7.2). And I advise you to be careful to use it this way, if someone should take heart at the fact that Thucydides used it, and let someone use it, but with the article.

Ecl. 248: Ὑπόστασις ἔργων· καὶ τοῦτο τῶν ἠμελημένων, ἐπὶ πολὺ δὲ παρὰ τοῖς ἐργολάβοις τῶν ἔργων. ζητοῦντες δέ, τί ἂν ἀντ' αὐτοῦ ἀρχαῖον θείημεν ὄνομα, οὐ ῥᾳδίως ἄχρι νῦν εὑρίσκομεν, εἰ δ' εὑρεθείη, ἀναγεγράψεται.

'*Hypostasis ergon'* (substance of works): This is also characteristic of careless people, and especially among contractors of works. But despite searching for what ancient word we ought to use in its place, thus far we do not easily discover it, but if it should be discovered, it will be recorded.

Ecl. 351: Πρόσφατον· καὶ περὶ τούτου πολλὴν διατριβὴν ἐποιησάμην ἐπισκοπούμενος, εἰ μόνον λέγεται πρόσφατος νεκρὸς καὶ μὴ πρόςφατον πρᾶγμα. εὑρίσκετο δὲ Σοφοκλῆς ἐν τῇ Ἀνδρομέδᾳ (fr. 124 N.2) τιθεὶς οὕτω· "μηδὲν φοβεῖσθαι προσφάτους ἐπιστολάς".

'Prosphaton' (recent): Also regarding this word I spent much time considering whether only *'prosphatos nekros'* (fresh corpse) is said, and not *'prosphaton pragma'* (recent matter). But Sophocles was found in *Andromeda* to have used it thus: "in no way to fear recent letters" (fr. 124 N.2).

Ecl. 355:Σαπρὰν οἱ πολλοὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ αἰσχράν. Θέων φησὶ ὁ γραμματικὸς (fr. 39 Guhl) εὑρηκέναι παρὰ Φερεκράτει (fr. 229 K.), πταίων· ἅπαντα γὰρ ἃ φέρει μαρτύρια ἐπὶ τοῦ παλαιοῦ καὶ σεσηπότος εὕρηται κείμενα.

'Sapran' (putrid): The masses [use it] for 'shameful' (*aischran*). Theon the grammarian erroneously says he found it in Pherecrates; for all of the pieces of evidence which he adduces have been found attested in application to something old and rotten.

Ecl. 364: Φυγαδεῦσαι καὶ φυγαδευθῆναι· ἐπισκέψεως πολλῆς δεῖται, εἰ ἐγκριτέον τοὔνομα τοῖς δοκίμοις. εἰ τοίνυν εὕροις, βεβαιώσεις τὸ ἀμφισβητούμενον.

'*Phygadeusai'* (to banish) and *'phygadeuthenai'* (to be banished): There is a need for much examination as to whether one must admit the word among the acceptable ones. Therefore, if you should find it, you will settle the dispute.

4. Phrynichus praises Cornelianus

Ecl. 357: "Τὰ πρόσωπα ἀμφότερα παρῆν"· οἱ ἀμφὶ τὰς δίκας ῥήτορες οὕτω λέγουσιν παραπαίοντες. ἀλλὰ σὺ καθαρὸς καὶ ἀρχαῖος ὢν ῥήτωρ καὶ μόνος μετά γ' ἐκείνους, τοὺς ἀμφὶ τὸν Δημοσθένην λέγω, ἐπανάγων εἰς τὸ ἀρχαῖον σχῆμα καὶ δόκιμον τὴν ῥητορικήν, οὐ μόνον αὐτὸς δυσχεραίνων οὐδεπώποτε ἐχρήσω τῷ ὀνόματι, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ἐκώλυσας χρήσασθαι, ἐξελληνίζων καὶ ἐξαττικίζων τὸ βασιλικὸν δικαστήριον καὶ διδάσκαλος καθιστάμενος οὐ μόνον αὐτῶν τῶν λόγων, οἵους χρὴ λέγειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ σχήματος καὶ βλέμματος καὶ φωνῆς καὶ στάσεως. τοιγαροῦν σε τῶν μεγίστων ἀξιώσαντες οἱ Ῥωμαίων βασιλεῖς ἀνέθεσαν τὰ Ἑλλήνων ἅπαντα πράγματα διοικεῖν, παριδρυσάμενοι σύμβουλον ἑαυτοῖς, λόγῳ μὲν ἐπιστολέα ἀποφήναντες, ἔργῳ δὲ συνεργὸν ἑλόμενοι τῆς βασιλείας. ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν καὶ αὖθις. τὰ δὲ πρόσωπα, ὡς πρόκειται, οὐκ ἐροῦμεν, ἀλλὰ καθάπερ οἱ παλαιοί, οἷον "καλὸν ἔχει πρόσωπον".

'Ta prosopa amphotera paren' (both visages were present): The orators in lawsuits say thus, wrongly. But you, being a pure and ancient[-style] orator, and the only one following those ones--I mean the circle of Demosthenes--in directing your rhetoric towards the ancient and legitimate figure, not only did you yourself never use the word reluctantly, but you also prevented the others from using it, thoroughly Hellenizing and Atticizing the Imperial court and appointing yourself teacher not only of the speeches themselves, such as are necessary to speak, but also of form and look and sound and position. For that very reason the emperors of the Romans, the greatest people, esteemed you and appointed you to administer all the affairs of the Greeks, setting you up beside them as advisor, in word pronouncing you secretary, but indeed selecting you as colleague of the Empire. But these things are also the same as before. But 'the characters' (*ta prosopa*), as mentioned above, we will not say, but [we will speak] just as the ancients, as in 'he has a good visage' (*prosopon*)

5. Phrynichus on Menander

Ecl. 394: Σύσσημον· οὐχ ὁρῶ μὰ τὸν Ἡρακλέα, τί πάσχουσιν οἱ τὸν Μένανδρον μέγαν ἄγοντες καὶ αἴροντες ὑπὲρ τὸ Ἑλληνικὸν ἅπαν. διὰ τί δὲ θαυμάσας ἔχω; ὅτι τὰ ἄκρα τῶν Ἑλλήνων ὁρῶ μανικῶς περὶ τὸν κωμῳδοποιὸν τοῦτον σπουδάζοντα, πρώτιστον μὲν ἐν παιδείᾳ μέγιστον ἀξίωμα ἁπάντων ἔχοντα σὲ καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἐκ προκρίτων ἀποφανθέντα ὑπὸ βασιλέων ἐπιστολέα αὐτῶν, ἔπειτα δευτέρᾳ τιμῇ, λειπόμενον πολὺ τῆς σῆς παρασκευῆς, ἐξεταζόμενον δ' ἐν τοῖς Ἕλλησιν, Βάλβον τὸν ἀπὸ τῶν Τράλλεων, ὃς εἰς τοσοῦτο προθυμίας καὶ θαύματος ἥκει Μενάνδρου, ὥστε καὶ Δημοσθένους ἀμείνω ἐγχειρεῖν ἀποφαίνειν τὸν λέγοντα "μεσοπορεῖν" (cf. gl. 392) καὶ "γῦρος" (cf. gl. 393) καὶ "λήθαργος" (cf. gl. 391) καὶ "σύσσημον" (Perik. vs. 362 Koe.) καὶ "πορνοκόπος" (cf. gl. 390) καὶ "ὀψωνιασμός" (fr. 895 Koe.) καὶ "ὀψώνιον" (fr. 896 Koe.) καὶ "δύσριγος" (fr. 880 Koe.) καὶ ἄλλα κίβδηλα ἀναρίθμητα καὶ ἀμαθῆ· τὰ αὐτὰ δὲ σοὶ καὶ Βάλβῳ πεπονθότα καὶ Γαϊανὸν τὸν Σμυρναῖον ῥήτορα, ἄνδρα ζηλωτὴν καὶ ἐραστὴν τῆς σῆς ἐν παιδείᾳ φιλοκαλίας. ἄγε οὖν ὅπως λύσῃς μου τὴν ἐν τῇ τοιᾷδε δυσχερείᾳ τῶν ὤτων ἀπορίαν· οὐ γὰρ περιόψεσθαί σε ἡγοῦμαι ἐρήμην ὀφλόντα σου τὰ παιδικὰ Μένανδρον.

'*Syssemon'* (signal): By Heracles, I do not see what is wrong with the people who magnify Menander and elevate him above the entire Greek canon. And what have I marveled at? That I see the elites of the Greeks showing manic enthusiasm in regards to this comedic writer, that on the one hand you, first in erudition, having the greatest respect from everyone, and for this reason proclaimed secretary out of a select group of candidates by the emperors themselves, and then with a second honor, leaving far behind your upbringing, but on the other hand that Balbus of Tralles is counted among the Greeks, who has come to such a state of enthusiasm and wonder for Menander that he even attempted to demonstrate that the one who says 'mesoporein' and 'gyros' and 'lethargos' and 'syssemon' and 'pornokopos' and 'opsoniasmos' (furnishing with provisions) and 'opsonion' (provision) and 'dysrigos' (sensitive to cold) and countless other spurious and unlearned words was better than Demosthenes; and that even Gaianus the Smrynaean orator who has suffered the same as you and Balbus, a jealous man and a desirer of your attentiveness to erudition. Come now, [and see] how you might separate from me this bewilderment in such distress of the ears; for I do not suppose that you will overlook the fact that Menander has lost the case to you by default for his puerilities.

6. Menander's effeminate appearance

Phaedrus 5.1 "*Demetrius rex et Menander poeta*":[342]

Demetrius rex, qui Phalereus dictus est,
Athenas occupauit imperio improbo.
Vt mos est uulgi, passim et certatim ruit;
feliciter succlamant. Ipsi principes
illam osculantur qua sunt oppressi manum,
tacite gementes tristem fortunae uicem.
Quin etiam resides et sequentes otium,
ne defuisse noceat, repunt ultimi;
in quis Menander, nobilis comoediis,
quas ipsum ignorans legerat Demetrius
et admiratus fuerat ingenium uiri,
unguento delibutus, uestitu fluens,
ueniebat gressu delicato et languido.
Hunc ubi tyrannus uidit extremo agmine:
"Quisnam cinaedus ille in conspectu meo
audet ceuere?" Responderunt proximi:
"Hic est Menander scriptor." Mutatus statim
"Homo" inquit "fieri non potest formosior."

King Demetrius, who was called Phalereus,
seized Athens with unlawful power.
As is the custom of the mob, they rushed up to
him in crowds and acclaimed him happily. The
prominent citizens themselves kissed the hand
by which they were oppressed, silently
bemoaning their sad change of luck.
Even those retired men and those of the leisure
class came, albeit at the end, so their absence
would not count against them; among them
was Menander, famous for his comedies, which
Demetrius had read and admired his genius,
despite not knowing him; Menander, reeking of
perfume, with flowing robe,
approached walking daintily and languidly.
When the tyrant saw him at the end of the line,
he said
"Who's that faggot there, who dares to prance
in my presence?" Those nearest him replied,
"This is Menander, the writer." Demetrius, his
mood now changed, said "A man could be no
more handsome!"

[342] I would like to thank Dr. Kristin Mann, currently of DePauw University, for having brought this passage of Phaedrus to my attention.

Appendix C

1. Lucian's alleged solecisms

Table 6: Lucianic usages censured by Lucianus in *Solecist*

Solecism	Error	Use in Lucian
1: ἃ μὲν ... ἃ δὲ	Relative pronoun used rather than article	*Timon* 57; *RP* 15; *Ass* 23
2: συνήσων ἄν	ἄν used with future (instead of present or aorist)[343]	*Phalaris* B 10; *Downard Journey* 20; *Fisherman* 29; *Anacharsis* 17, 25, 31; *Fatherland* 8; *On the Home* 19; *Zeus Rants* 32; *Ass* 26; *Charon* 14
4: εἰ οὐ νῦν ἔγνως σολοικίζοντά με	εἰ οὐ rather than εἰ μή used to introduce contrafactual	*Zeus Catechized* 5; *Parasite* 12; *Praise of Demosthenes* 21
4: ἑαυτῶν	used reflexively, instead of ἡμῶν αὐτῶν[344]	*True Story* 1, 6; *Ass* 8
5: κορυφαιότατος	A redundant superlative	*Parasite* 42; *Alexander* 30; *How to Write History* 34
5: ἐξορμῶ	Should not be used intransitively	*Dialogues of the Dead* 25; *True Story* 2, 4
5: ἐξ ἐπιπολῆς	ἐπιπολῆς is an adverb in Classical Attic, not a noun	*Nigrinus* 35; *On Mourning* 16
5: περιέστης τὸν ἕνα	Using περιίσταμαι to mean "shun" is a later Greek usage	*Hermotimus* 86
6: Ἡ δὲ τῷ Ἡρακλεῖ μιχθεῖσα	μίγνυσθαι should be used of the man in coitus	*True Story* 1.8; *Dialogues of the Sea-Gods* 3.2
6: Προκόπτει…ἐν τοῖς μαθήμασιν	προκόπτω is un-Platonic	*Hermotimus* 63; *Parasite* 13
7: πλὴν εἰ μή	A tautological construction	*Dialogues of the Dead* 29.2; *On Salaried Posts* 9, 23
7: ἰδού ἐπὶ τοῦ ἰδέ	ἰδού should only be used as an interjection	*Dialogues of the Courtesans* 2.1
7: βαρεῖν	Should be intransitive; the transitive is βαρύνειν[345]	*Dialogues of the Dead* 20.3; *Aetion* 5
7: λέλογχα	εἴληχα is the better-attested Attic form	*Affairs of the Heart* 18[346]
7: ἵπτασθαι	Incorrect cognate of πέτεσθαι[347]	*Judgment of the Goddesses* 5, 6; *Downard Journey* 2; *Dream* 16[348]
8: κἄν	καί should be used here, as there is no "if" clause, or perhaps ἄν	*Downard Journey* 13, 14, 20; *Nigrinus* 23

[343] cf. MacLeod (1956).
[344] Macleod (1967) 16 identifies other incorrect pronouns in reflexive usage at *Banquet* 45, *Hermotimus* 1, *Demonax* 17, *Dialogues of the Dead* 1, 3.
[345] In Plato, *Symposium* 203b βαρεῖν is used transitively as well; Socrates of Mopsus is most likely mistaken here.
[346] In the same Lucianic work §24 *εἰλήχασι* is used however.
[347] cf. *Lexiphanes* 25.
[348] All of these usages are in compound form, it should be noted.

	with the future is the problem as in §2	
8: ἀνέῳγε	Used instransitively for ἀνέῳκται	*Cock* 6, 32; *Ship* 4; *Anacharsis* 29; *Dialogues of the Dead* 14.1
8: ἱππεῖς ἐς πεδίον καλεῖν	ἱππεῖς used as accusative plural, properly ἱππέας	*Ship* 26; *Ass* 23
9: μαντεύεται	The verb is un-Attic if used to mean "give an oracle"—original meaning is "consult an oracle"	*Alexander* 9, 19; *Dialogues of the Dead* 10.1, 25.2; *Demonax* 37; *True History* 2.46; *Zeus Confounded* 12; *Cock* 2 (twice); *Astrology* 7; *Mistaken Critic* 17; *Council of the Gods* 12; *Hesiod* 7; *Dialogues of the Dead* 9.3, 10.1;[349] *Dialogues of the Gods* 3.1, 5.2, 18.1, 25.1
9: μνηστευόμενον αὑτῷ	The reflexive is redundant with the middle verb μνηστεύομαι[350]	*On Salaried Posts* 23
9: παρελθὼν ὡς ἀπολείποι τὴν γυναῖκα	ἀπολείπω should be used of the wife, not the husband	*Dialogues of the Gods* 8.2; *Double Indictment* 29
10: σὲ ὑβρίζειν	Incorrectly used for ὑβρίζειν ἐς σέ, "to assault your property"; σὲ ὑβρίζειν means "to assault your person"	Of some 45 usages in Lucian, this is the only time such a distinction is made.
11: καθέσθητι	A barbarism, not a valid Attic form of καθίζω or κάθημαι	*True Story* 1.23[351]

2. Neologisms in Lexiphanes:

Table 7: *Hapax* words used by Lexiphanes[352]

§	Compounds	Derivatives	(Ineptly) Transferred Meaning
1	ἀρτιγραφής κυψελόβυστος εὔλεξις[353]		περιδινησόμεθα ἀνθοσμίαι
2	ἡλιοκαές ἀπιτητέα ἐπίλουτρον ἐγγυ(ο)θήκη ἀστραβηλάτης[354] συντυμβωρυχήσας[355]	φωσώνιον λουτιάω μαλακιάω λιγυρίζω	

[349] *Dialogues of the Dead* 23.1 (…*ὁπότε ἧκεν μαντευσόμενος*) in fact, is Lucian's only usage of this word in its original Attic sense.
[350] The pseudo-Sophist repeats the verb but omits the pronoun—i.e. while he fails to catch it, he also does not reproduce it, suggesting that his internalized knowledge of Attic exceeds his ability to describe it.
[351] Used in a compound, *περικαθεσθέντες*
[352] From Casevitz (1994) 78-86
[353] cf. Luc. *RP* 17
[354] cf. Poll. *Onom*. 7.185

	συγχειροπονήσας γηπάτταλος αὐτοποδητί		
3	γρυμεοπώλης[356] φίλαγρος	λαταγεῖν	ἄβατον
4	ὀφθαλμόσοφος	λημαλέοι	ἀπερυθριᾶσαι ἀρτίδακρυς[357]
5	ἀπησθημένοι ἀκροχειριασμός ὀρθοπάλη χειροβολέω παρανέω θερμοτραγέω	χερμάδιον τῇ ὀδοντώτῃ ξύστρᾳ[358] δελφινίζω	
6	ἰπνοκαής λ(ε)ιπογνώμων		συμφοραί ὑποβρύχιοι ἀπῳδός παράσιτος ὑπερφυής
7	κρυψιμέτωπος μεντορουργής δειροκύπελλον ὑμενόστρακος		εὐλαβής γηγενής
8	ὑπερπαφλάζω ποδοκτύπη	ληκίνδα	
9	δικοδίφης ἐχεγλωττία ῥησιμετρέω[359] ὀπτός[360]		ἄδικος[361] ἄλογος ἄχρηστος
10	ἀρρητοποιός ἐγκαμψικήδαλος καρπόδεσμα ὑπερβδύλλω	πορδαλέος ἄγδην	ἱερώνυμος
11	πολυνίκης		ἀπαγχονάω

[355] See discussion in 3.3 regarding the possible Aristophanic origin of this word.
[356] cf. Phryn. *Ecl*. 202, for the related *γρυμέα*
[357] cf. ἀρτί used with the future tense in *Sol.* 1
[358] This is a ridiculous kenning for "comb" (κτείς)
[359] cf. *Mistaken Critic* 24
[360] a neologism here because it is derived from ὄψομαι to mean "visible" whereas the attested word ὀπτός in fact means "grilled"; this joke is repeated, albeit as a deliberate pun, at Ath. 8.338c (=8.20 K.
[361] Used here as a synonym for ἀποφράς, the key word of the *Mistaken Critic*

	διαπιέζω		
12	λακκοσχέας	λαικαλέος πεωδής	
	τηλέμαχος[362]		
13	εὐπυνδάκωτα	κρωβυλώδης	
	παιδοβοσκός		
	διέμπιλος		
14	ἐνοινοφλύειν	λάλη	
	ὑποπυκνάζω		
	χειμοθνής		
15	ἀπεγλωττισμένος	λογάω	ἀρχαιολογέω
	ἀκροκρυματόω		
	εὐηνεμία		
16	περιβομβούμενος[363]		
19	ὀλισθογνωμονέω ῥιναυλέω	μακκοάω	γλωτταργία
			ἄβατος
			ἀνήροτος
20			σίλλος
21	σιληπορδία		

3. Lexiphanes' Ancient Vocabulary

Table 8: Sources of distinctive vocabulary in Lexiphanes' writing and speech

Word/Phrase	Ar.	Eup.	Crat.	Aesch.	Eur.	Sop.	Pl.
μῶν	36	0	2	3	47	8	87
κᾷτα	37	0	0	0	2	4	3
ἀμηγεπή	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
δήπουθεν	4	0	0	0	0	0	2
ἄττα	8	1	2	1	0	0	129
λῷστε {?}	0	0	0	0	0	1	5
ἦ δ' ὅς	2	0	2	0	0	0	355
ἦν δ'ἐγώ	3	0	0	0	0	0	868
ἴκταρ	0	0	0	5	0	0	0
τευτάζω	0	0	0	0	0	0	3

[362] A *hapax* neologism in the sense that it is a Homeric character name used as an epithet of Artemis, and redundantly so.
[363] Note that Lycinus, not Lexiphanes, is speaking here.

οὐτοσί	74	1	73	0	0	0	21
θαμά	6	0	0	0	0	3	14
κοττάβους	2	1	1	6	2	0	0
ὀκλαδίας	2	0	0	0	0	0	0
ἀσκάντης	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
ὕεια	4	0	0	0	0	0	22
σχελίς	4	0	0	3	0	0	0
ἠτριαία	3	0	0	0	0	0	0
τάγηνον	1	3	0	0	0	0	0
μυττωτός	0	2	2	0	0	0	0
ἀβυρτάκη	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
θρῖον	11	0	0	0	0	0	0
μελιτοῦττα	2	0	0	0	0	0	0
σελάχιον	0	2	0	0	0	0	0
τέμαχος	9	0	2	0	0	0	0
σαργάνη	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
κωπαΐς	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
σκορδινῶμαι{?}	3	0	0	1	0	0	0
καταπυγών[364]	11	0	0	0	0	0	0
λακκοσχέας	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
λακκόπρωκτος							
σχῖνος	4	2	2	0	0	0	0
σχινοτρώκτης	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
ἀναφλάω	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
φλάω	8	0	0	0	0	0	0
ἰπνολέβης	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
ἰπνός	8	0	0	0	0	0	0
ὑπερπαφλάζων	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
παφλάζω	5	1	2	0	0	0	0
δίχηλα	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
τοκάς	0	0	0	0	4	0	0
ὀκλάξ	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
λάξ	0	0	0	3	0	0	0

4. Lucian's reception of Aristophanes

Aristophanes, *Clouds* 657-693:

Σω. ἀλλ' ἕτερα δεῖ σε πρότερα τούτου μανθάνειν,
τῶν τετραπόδων ἅττ' ἐστὶν ὀρθῶς ἄρρενα.
Στ. ἀλλ' οἶδ' ἔγωγε τἄρρεν', εἰ μὴ μαίνομαι· (660)
κριός, τράγος, ταῦρος, κύων, ἀλεκτρυών.
Σω. ὁρᾷς ἃ πάσχεις; τήν τε θήλειαν καλεῖς
ἀλεκτρυόνα κατὰ ταὐτὸ καὶ τὸν ἄρρενα.
Στ. πῶς δή, φέρε;

[364] Aristophanes has the only (surviving) usage of καταπυγών before Lucian, marking it as perhaps the most "Aristophanic" word among many others that recall old comedy.

Σω. πῶς; ἀλεκτρυὼν κἀλεκτρυών. (664)
Στ. νὴ τὸν Ποσειδῶ. νῦν δὲ πῶς με χρὴ καλεῖν; (665)
Σω. ἀλεκτρύαιναν, τὸν δ' ἕτερον ἀλέκτορα.
Στ. ἀλεκτρύαιναν; εὖ γε, νὴ τὸν Ἀέρα·
ὥστ' ἀντὶ τούτου τοῦ διδάγματος μόνου
διαλφιτώσω σου κύκλῳ τὴν κάρδοπον.
Σω. ἰδοὺ μάλ' αὖθις, τοῦθ' ἕτερον· τὴν κάρδοπον (670)
ἄρρενα καλεῖς θήλειαν οὖσαν.
Στ. τῷ τρόπῳ; (671)
ἄρρενα καλῶ 'γὼ κάρδοπον; (672)
Σω. μάλιστά γε, (672)
ὥσπερ γε καὶ Κλεώνυμον. (673)
Στ. πῶς δή; φράσον. (673)
Σω. ταὐτὸν δύναταί σοι κάρδοπος Κλεωνύμῳ. (674)
Στ. ἀλλ', ὦγάθ', οὐδ' ἦν κάρδοπος Κλεωνύμῳ, (675)
ἀλλ' ἐν θυείᾳ στρογγύλῃ γ' ἀνεμάττετο.
ἀτὰρ τὸ λοιπὸν πῶς με χρὴ καλεῖν;
Σω. ὅπως; (677)
τὴν καρδόπην, ὥσπερ καλεῖς τὴν Σωστράτην. (678)
Στ. τὴν καρδόπην, θήλειαν;
Σω. ὀρθῶς γὰρ λέγεις. (679)
Στ. ἐκεῖνο δ' ἦν ἂν "καρδόπη Κλεωνύμῃ". (680)
Σω. ἔτι δέ γε περὶ τῶν ὀνομάτων μαθεῖν σε δεῖ,
ἅττ' ἄρρεν' ἐστίν, ἅττα δ' αὐτῶν θήλεα.
Στ. ἀλλ' οἶδ' ἔγωγ' ἃ θήλε' ἐστίν.
Σω. εἰπὲ δή. (683)
Στ. Λύσιλλα, Φίλιννα, Κλειταγόρα, Δημητρία. (684)
Σω. ἄρρενα δὲ ποῖα τῶν ὀνομάτων; (685)
Στ. μυρία. (685)
Φιλόξενος, Μελησίας, Ἀμυνίας. (686)
Σω. ἀλλ' ὦ πόνηρε, ταῦτά γ' ἔστ' οὐκ ἄρρενα.
Στ. οὐκ ἄρρεν' ὑμῖν ἐστιν;
Σω. οὐδαμῶς γ', ἐπεὶ (688)
πῶς ἂν καλέσειας ἐντυχὼν Ἀμυνίᾳ; (689)
Στ. ὅπως ἄν; ὠδί· "δεῦρο δεῦρ', Ἀμυνία". (690)
Σω. ὁρᾷς; γυναῖκα τὴν Ἀμυνίαν καλεῖς.
Στ. οὔκουν δικαίως, ἥτις οὐ στρατεύεται;
ἀτὰρ τί ταῦθ' ἃ πάντες ἴσμεν μανθάνω;

So. But you must learn some other matters first:
As, what are males among the quadrupeds.
St. I should be mad indeed not to know that. 660
The Ram, the Bull, the Goat, the Dog, the Fowl.
So. Ah! there you are! there's a mistake at once!
You call the male and female fowl the same [*alektryōn*]
St. How! tell me how.
So. Why fowl and fowl of course.
St. That's true though! what shall I say in future? 665

So. Call one a fowless [*alektryaina*] and the other a fowl.
St. A fowless? Good! Bravo! Bravo! by Air.
Now for that one bright piece of information
I'll give you a barley bumper in your trough.
So. Look there, a fresh mistake; you called it trough, 670
Masculine [*kardopon*] when it's feminine.
St. How, pray?
How did I make it masculine?
So. Why "trough",
Just like "Cleonymus".
St. I don't quite catch it.
So. Why "trough" [*kardopos*], "Cleonymus" [*Kleōnymos*],
both masculine.
St. Ah, but Cleonymus has got no trough, 675
His bread is kneaded in a round mortar:
Still, what must I say in future?
So. What! why call it
A "troughess" [*kardopē*], female, just as one says
"an actress" [*Sōstratē*].
St. A "troughess", female?
So. That's the way to call it.
St. O "troughess" then and Miss Cleonymus. 680
So. Still you must learn some more about these names;
Which are the names of men and which of women.
St. Oh, I know which are women.
So. Well, repeat some.
St. Lysilla, Philinna, Cleitagora, Demetria.
So. Now tell me some men's names.
St. Oh yes, ten thousand! 685
Philoxenos, Melesias, Amynias.
So. Hold! I said men's names: these are women's names.
St. No, no, they're men's.
So. They are *not* men's, for how
Would you address Amynias if you met him?
St. How? somehow thus: "Here, here, Amynia!" 690
So. Amynia! a woman's name, you see.
St. And rightly too; a sneak who shirks all service!
But all know this: let's pass to something else.[365]

Aristophanes, *Frogs* 1126-1165:

Αι. "Ἑρμῆ χθόνιε, πατρῷ' ἐποπτεύων κράτη, (1126)
σωτὴρ γενοῦ μοι σύμμαχός τ' αἰτουμένῳ.
ἥκω γὰρ εἰς γῆν τήνδε καὶ κατέρχομαι."

[365] Tr. adapted from B. B. Rogers (1930) 327-31

…
Ευ. δὶς ταὐτὸν ἡμῖν εἶπεν ὁ σοφὸς Αἰσχύλος.
Δι. πῶς δίς; (1155)
Ευ. σκόπει τὸ ῥῆμ'· ἐγὼ δέ σοι φράσω.
"ἥκω γὰρ εἰς γῆν," φησί, "καὶ κατέρχομαι·"
"ἥκω" δὲ ταὐτόν ἐστι τῷ "κατέρχομαι".
Δι. νὴ τὸν Δί', ὥσπερ γ' εἴ τις εἴποι γείτονι,
"χρῆσον σὺ μάκτραν, εἰ δὲ βούλει, κάρδοπον."
Αι. οὐ δῆτα τοῦτό γ', ὦ κατεστωμυλμένε (1160)
ἄνθρωπε, ταῦτ' ἔστ', ἀλλ' ἄριστ' ἐπῶν ἔχον.
Δι. πῶς δή; δίδαξον γάρ με καθ' ὅτι δὴ λέγεις;
Αι. 'ἐλθεῖν' μὲν εἰς γῆν ἔσθ' ὅτῳ μετῇ πάτρας·
χωρὶς γὰρ ἄλλης συμφορᾶς ἐλήλυθεν·
φεύγων δ' ἀνὴρ 'ἥκει' τε καὶ 'κατέρχεται'. (1165)

Ae. "Under-dwelling Hermes, watching over paternal domains,
become a savior and an ally to be, I pray you.
For I have come back to this land and make my return."
…
Eu. The wise Aeschylus has told us the same thing twice.
Di. How so, twice?
Eu. Look at the verb: for I will tell you.
"For I have come back to the land", he says, "and make my return."
Di. By Zeus, it's as if one were to ask a neighbor,
"lend me a kneading-trough, or if you prefer, a trough for kneading."
Ae. That's not it at all, you blabbering
idiot—I was using precisely the right words.
Di. How's that? Would you educate me on what basis you say so?
Ae. "To make a return" to a land applies to anyone who belongs to a country;
for he makes a return there without any other ill consequence.
But an exiled man both "comes back" and "makes a return".

Appendix D

1. Fronto's technical usage of Greek

Ad Ant. Imp. 1.2.6: cum Cyzicenorum gravem causam commemorares, ita orationem tuam figurasti, quam figuram Graeci παράλειψιν appellant, ut praeterundo tamen diceres et dicendo tamen praeterires.

…when you were commemorating the serious matter of the Cyzicenes, you crafted your speech in such a way, the figure which the Greeks call *paralipsis*, so as to mention it by avoiding it, and to avoid it by mentioning it.

Ad Ant. Imp. 3.1.1: figuras etiam, quas Graeci σχήματα vocant illum historiae, hunc orationi congruentes adhibuisse…

… figures, which the Greeks call *schemata,* that one has employed ones suited to history, this one to oration…

Ad Ant. de eloq. 4.7: Graecis verbis fortasse apertius significabo: τὰ καινὰ παράδοξα τῶν ἐνθυμημάτων εἴδωλα εἰς αὐτὰ πλάσματα…

Perhaps I shall make my meaning clearer in Greek terms: *the fresh paradoxes of enthymemes are as images for the creations themselves…*

Ad Ant. de orat. 8: Nam 'convenire' et 'decere' et 'aptum esse' et 'congruere' est quod Graeci ἡρμόσθαι appellant.

For 'to convene' and 'to befit' and 'to be apt' and 'to suit' is that which the Greeks call *to accommodate*.

Ad amicos 1.13: Internatium Graeci 'ἱερὸν ὀστοῦν', Suetonius Tranquillus 'spinam sacram' appellat. Ego me neque Graecum neque Latinum vocabulum ullius membri nosse malem, dum istius doloris expers vitam degerem…

Of the innards the Greeks call it the *holy bone*, and Suetonius Tranquillus calls it the 'sacral spine'. I for one wish I had never learned the Greek or the Latin term for any body part, if it would have meant leading a life free of pain…

2. Fronto writing to Lucilla

Ad M. Caes. 2.2.8: Epistulam matri tuae scripsi quae mea inpudentia[366] est Graece, eamque epistulae ad te scriptae inplicui. Tu prior lege et, si quis inerit barbarismus, tu, qui a Graecis litteris recentior es, corrige atque ita matri redde.

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[366] Kaimio (1979) 250 suggests that this term "cannot be taken too seriously; it is only a literary figure of speech apologizing for possible errors."

Nolo enim me mater tua ut Opicum[367] contemnat. Vale, domine, et matri savium da, cum epistulam dabis, quo libentius legat.

I have written a letter to your mother, which in my foolishness is in Greek, and I have attached it to the letter to you. Read it first and, if there be some barbarism in it, please correct it (since you are fresher in your knowledge of Greek literature) and pass it on thus to your mother. For I do not wish that your mother should condemn me for a barbarian. Farewell, my lord, and give your mother a kiss, when you give her the letter, so she might read it all the more happily.

Ad M. Caes. 2.3.8: εἴ τι τῶν ὀνομάτων ἐν ταῖς ἐπιστολαῖς ταύταις εἴη ἄκυρον ἢ βάρβαρον ἢ ἄλλως ἀδόκιμον ἢ μὴ πάνυ Ἀττικόν, ἀμελεῖν μὲν τοῦ ὀνόματος σ᾽ ἀξιῶ τήν δὲ διάνοιαν σκοπεῖν αὐτὴν καθ᾽ αὑτήν· οἶσθα γὰρ ὅτι ἐν αὐτοῖς ὀνόμασιν καὶ αὐτῇ διαλέκτῳ διατρίβω. καὶ γὰρ τὸν Σκύθην ἐκεῖνον τὸν Ἀνάχαρσιν οὐ πάνυ τι ἀττικίσαι φασίν, ἐπαινεθῆναι δ᾽ ἐκ τῆς διανοίας καὶ τῶν ἐνθυμημάτων. παραβαλῶ δὴ ἐμαυτὸν Ἀναχάρσιδι οὐ μὰ Δία κατὰ τὴν σοφίαν ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὸ βάρβαρος ὁμοίως εἶναι. ἦν γὰρ ὁ μὲν Σκύθης τῶν νομάδων Σκυθῶν, ἐγὼ δὲ Λίβυς τῶν Λιβύων τῶν νομάδων. κοινὸν δὴ τὸ νέμεσθαι ἐμοί τε καὶ Ἀναχάρσιδι· κοινὸν οὖν ἔσται καὶ τὸ βληχᾶσθαι νεμομένοις, ὅπως ἄν τις βληχήσηται. οὕτως μὲν δὴ καὶ τὸ βαρβαρίζειν τῷ βληχᾶσθαι προσῄκασα. οὐκοῦν παύσομαι μηδὲν ἕτερον γράφων ἀλλὰ εἰκόνας.

If any of the words in these letters should be an obsolete, barbaric, otherwise illegitimate, or not fully Attic, I beg you to overlook the word and consider the meaning in and of itself; for you know that I spend my time on words and idiom. And indeed they say that that famous Scythian, Anacharsis, did not Atticize but was praised for his sentiments and conceptions. I will therefore compare myself to Anacharsis, not by Zeus in wisdom but by virtue of being likewise a barbarian. For where he was a Scythian of the Scythian nomads, I am a Libyan of the Libyan nomads. Thus I and Anacharsis may be pastured alike, may bleat alike as we graze, just as one may bleat. Thus have I likened barbarism to bleating. So I will stop writing nothing except similes.

3. Gellius on Grammarians

NA 14.5.4: Sed cum ille paulisper oppositu horum vocabulorum commotus reticuisset et mox tamen se conlegisset eandemque illam, quam definierat, regulam retineret et propugnaret diceretque et "proprium" et "propitium" et "anxium" et "contrarium" itidem in casu vocativo dicendum, ut "adversarius" et "extrarius" diceretur, "inscium" quoque et "impium" et "ebrium" et "sobrium" insolentius quidem paulo, sed rectius per "i" litteram, non per "e", in eodem casu pronuntiandum eaque inter eos contentio longius duceretur, non arbitratus ego

[367] A vintage term, derived from an ethnonym for Oscans, used originally by Greeks as a derogatory slur for Romans (Pliny, *NH* 29.14 = Cato, *De med.* fr.1), and in this era a label for Romans who do not understand Greek. (Juv. *Sat.* 3.207, Gell. *NA* 13.9.4, et al.). Fronto manifestly does know Greek, of course.

operae pretium esse eadem istaec diutius audire clamantes conpugnantesque illos reliqui.

But when that one, after having been stirred up by the interposition of these words, had kept silent for a short while; but soon he nevertheless composed himself and began to uphold that same rule which he had laid out, and said that *proprium* and *propitium* and *anxium* and *contrarium* ought to be said the same way in the vocative case as *adversaries* and *extrarius* were said, and that *inscium* too and *impium* and *erbium* and *sobrium*, should be pronounced a little less commonly, but more correctly, with the letter *i* and not *e* in the same case—when that was going on, the argument between them was getting longer and I, judging that it was not worth my time to hear them shouting and fighting over the same arguments any longer, left them.

(NA 19.10.4-9)…cumque architectus dixisset necessaria videri esse sestertia ferme trecenta, unus ex amicis Frontonis "et praeterpropter" inquit "alia quinquaginta". 5 Tum Fronto dilatis sermonibus, quos habere de balnearum sumptu institerat, aspiciens ad eum amicum, qui dixerat quinquaginta esse alia praeterpropter necessaria, eum interrogavit, quid significaret verbum "praeterpropter". 6 Atque ille amicus "non meum" inquit "hoc verbum est, sed multorum hominum, quos loquentis id audias; 7 quid autem id verbum significet, non ex me, sed ex grammatico quaerundum est", ac simul digito demonstrat grammaticum haud incelebri nomine Romae docentem. 8 Tum grammaticus usitati pervulgatique verbi obscuritate motus "quaerimus" inquit "quod honore quaestionis minime dignum est. 9 Nam nescio quid hoc praenimis plebeium est et in opificum sermonibus quam . . . notius."

And when the architect had said that it seemed it would cost around three hundred thousand sesterces, one of Fronto's friends said "and another fifty thousand, more or less". Then Fronto, suspending the conversation he had been starting about the cost of the baths, looked at the friend who had said that another fifty thousand were necessary, and asked him what the word "Praeterpropter" meant. And that friend said, "This is not my word, but one belonging to many people, whom you may hear saying it; however, the meaning of the word should not be sought from me, but from a grammarian", and at the same time he pointed with his finger towards a grammarian of a famous name, who was teaching in Rome. Then the grammarian, startled by uncertainty about a well-used and common word, said "We are looking investigating something which is hardly worth investigation. For this is some utterly plebeian word, better known in the speech of craftspeople than …"

4. Citizenship of words in Gellius:

NA 19.13: 1 Stabant forte una in vestibulo Palatii fabulantes Fronto Cornelius et Festus Postumius et Apollinaris Sulpicius, atque ego ibi adsistens cum quibusdam aliis sermones eorum, quos de litterarum disciplinis habebant, curiosius captabam. 2 Tum Fronto Apollinari "fac me," inquit "oro, magister, ut sim certus, an recte supersederim "nanos" dicere parva nimis statura homines

maluerimque eos "pumiliones" appellare, quoniam hoc scriptum esse in libris veterum memineram, "nanos" autem sordidum esse verbum et barbarum credebam." 3 "Est quidem" inquit "hoc" Apollinaris "in consuetudine inperiti vulgi frequens, sed barbarum non est censeturque linguae Graecae origine; νάνους enim Graeci vocaverunt brevi atque humili corpore homines paulum supra terram exstantes idque ita dixerunt adhibita quadam ratione etymologiae cum sententia vocabuli competente et, si memoria" inquit "mihi non labat, scriptum hoc est in comoedia Aristophanis, cui nomen est Ὁλκάδες. **Fuisset autem verbum hoc a te civitate donatum aut in Latinam coloniam deductum, si tu eo uti dignatus fores, essetque id inpendio probabilius, quam quae a Laberio ignobilia nimis et sordentia in usum linguae Latinae intromissa sunt**." 4 Tum Festus Postumius grammatico cuipiam Latino, Frontonis familiari "docuit" inquit "nos Apollinaris "nanos" verbum Graecum esse, tu nos doce, in quo de mulis aut eculeis humilioribus vulgo dicitur, anne Latinum sit et aput quem scriptum reperiatur." 5 Atque ille grammaticus, homo sane perquam in noscendis veteribus scriptis exercitus, "si piaculum" inquit "non committitur praesente Apollinare, quid de voce ulla Graeca Latinave sentiam, dicere, audeo tibi, Feste, quaerenti respondere esse hoc verbum Latinum scriptumque inveniri in poematis Helvi Cinnae, non ignobilis neque indocti poetae", versusque eius ipsos dixit, quos, quoniam memoriae mihi forte aderant, adscripsi:

> at nunc me Genumana per salicta
>
> bigis raeda rapit citata nanis.

Fronto, Festus, and Apollinaris happened to be standing in conversation together in the lobby, and I, standing there with some others near their conversations—which they were holding on the subject of the literary disciplines—was catching it with considerable curiosity. Then Fronto said to Apollinaris, “Please make me sure, teacher, on whether I was rightly reluctant to call people with exceptionally short stature *nanos* (dwarves) and preferred to label them midgets (*pumiliones*), since I had remembered that this term was written in the books of the ancients,[368] whereas I believed *nanos* to be a filthy and barbarous word.” “This word,” he said—Apollinaris, that is, “is indeed common in the usage of the lay crowd, but it is not barbarous, and it is assigned by its origin to the Greek language; for the Greeks have called *nanous* those people who stand a little above the earth, by dint of their short and humble body, and they have said it thus, using a certain application of etymological reasoning, with an appropriate meaning of the term and,” he said, “If my memory does not escape me, this word is written in a comedy of Aristophanes, which has the name *The Freighters*. **However, this word would have been endowed by you with citizenship, or colonized on behalf of Latin, if you had deigned to use it, and it would be a great deal**

[368] The *veterum* who use the term *pumiliones* include, at least, Lucretius (*DRN* 4.1160-70) and presumably Pliny the Elder (*NH* 7.75, 10.156, 11.260, 12.13, 17.176). As mentioned in Chapter One, *De eloquentia* 4.4 gives a list of Fronto’s model authors, comprising Cato, Sallust, Ennius, Coelius, Naevius, Lucretius, Accius, Caecilius, Laberius, Novius, Pomponius, Atta, Sisenna, and Lucilius.

more acceptable than those ignoble and sordid words which have been admitted by Laberius into the usage of the Latin language." Then Festus Postumius said to a certain Latin grammarian, an acquaintance of Fronto's, "He has taught us, Apollinaris has, that nanos is a Greek word; teach us, in which common speech it is said of mules or smaller ponies, whether it is Latin and in what source it is attested." And that grammarian, a man clearly very well-versed in knowledge of old writings, said "If with Apollinaris present a crime is not being committed, what am I to feel regarding any Greek or Latin speech, I dare say to you, Festus, in response to your questioning that this word is Latin and can be found written in the poems of Helvius Cinna, neither an ignoble nor an unlearned poet," and he recited the very words of that poet, which, since they chanced to stick in my memory, I have written:

> but now through groves of Genuman willow
>
> the swift wagon with its dwarf-sized (*nanis*) horse-team carries me off

5. Dionysius of Halicarnassus on the origins of Latin

Ant. Rom. 1.90.1: Ῥωμαῖοι δὲ φωνὴν μὲν οὔτ' ἄκρως βάρβαρον οὔτ' ἀπηρτισμένως Ἑλλάδα φθέγγονται, μικτὴν δέ τινα ἐξ ἀμφοῖν, ἧς ἐστιν ἡ πλείων Αἰολίς, τοῦτο μόνον ἀπολαύσαντες ἐκ τῶν πολλῶν ἐπιμιξιῶν, τὸ μὴ πᾶσι τοῖς φθόγγοις ὀρθοεπεῖν, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα, ὁπόσα γένους Ἑλληνικοῦ μηνύματ' ἐστὶν ὡς οὐχ ἕτεροί τινες τῶν ἀποικησάντων διασώζοντες, οὐ νῦν πρῶτον ἀρξάμενοι πρὸς φιλίαν ζῆν, ἡνίκα τὴν τύχην πολλὴν καὶ ἀγαθὴν ῥέουσαν διδάσκαλον ἔχουσι τῶν καλῶν οὐδ' ἀφ' οὗ πρῶτον ὠρέχθησαν τῆς διαποντίου τὴν Καρχηδονίων καὶ Μακεδόνων ἀρχὴν καταλύσαντες, ἀλλ' ἐκ παντὸς οὗ συνῳκίσθησαν χρόνου βίον Ἕλληνα ζῶντες καὶ οὐδὲν ἐκπρεπέστερον ἐπιτηδεύοντες πρὸς ἀρετὴν νῦν ἢ πρότερον.

And the Romans speak a language neither highly barbarous nor completely Greek, but something mixed out of both of which the greater part is Aeolic, and out of their many admixtures, the only disadvantage they have is that of of not pronouncing all sounds correctly. But they preserve the other signs of Greek origin as no other colonists do, since they did not just now first begin to live in an amicable fashion, when they have great and abundant good fortune as teacher of fine things, nor was it from the time they first extended their reach overseas after overthrowing the empires of the Carthaginians and Macedonians, but rather the entire time since they founded their city they have been living in a Greek way of life; and they are not pursuing anything more suitable to virtue now than formerly.

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Biography

David Stifler began studying Classics in fourth grade, and committed to the discipline fully after a year-long study abroad in Viterbo, Italy during high school. He attended Swarthmore College, where in 2008 he received a B.A. with High Honors in Latin and Linguistics, with minors in Greek and Mandarin Chinese. After some years teaching Latin and English and serving as assistant to a dealer of incunabula, he returned to school via the Post-Baccalaureate program in Classics at the University of Pennsylvania where, incidentally, he had his first chance to read Lucian. Leaving the Philadelphia area in 2011 after seven fruitful years there, he earned an M.A. in Classics at Florida State University in 2013 and was awarded the M. Lynette Thompson fellowship both of his years in the degree program; during that time, was nominated by his Latin students for the FSU graduate teaching award. David came to Duke University immediately after completing his M.A. studies, and is planning to graduate in May 2019. During his time at Duke, he received two Foster-Coomes dissertation research scholarships, an international travel award, and was selected as a Preparing Future Faculty fellow. With the completion of this dissertation, he looks forward to transitioning out of the student life for good.