

Nietzsche's Reformulation of Metaphysics

by

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Date: April 2nd, 2024

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Thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of
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ABSTRACT

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Abstract

Nietzsche's relation to metaphysics is a contentious topic. While some scholars consider Nietzsche's thought as anti-metaphysics due to his apparent critique of traditional Western metaphysics, some scholars such as Heidegger claim that his philosophy is the culmination of traditional Western metaphysics. Yet, this paper refutes both perspectives by suggesting that Nietzsche struggled to reformulate a new metaphysics to replace traditional Western metaphysics and overcome the consequences of nihilism produced by Christianity.

I claim that Nietzsche's new metaphysics is the metaphysics of the will to power. This new metaphysics was erected upon Nietzsche's anthropological narrative of Greek tragic culture, seeking a change from theocentric metaphysics to anthropocentric metaphysics. Then, Nietzsche addresses the problem of the "quasi-theodicy" that persists after the reformulation. By examining *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, I will assert that the idea of "the eternal recurrence of the same" is Nietzsche's resolution to the problem of "quasi-theodicy." Lastly, I demonstrate how the structure of Nietzsche's new metaphysics shows his vision of ideal politics that encompasses both aristocratic and democratic aspects.

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1. Introduction

Friedrich Nietzsche's relation to metaphysics is one of the most contentious topics in the studies of his thought. We can find extremely opposite positions among diverse interpretations of Nietzsche's relation to metaphysics. For example, whereas post-structuralist analyses of Nietzsche tend to emphasize Nietzsche's deconstruction of traditional metaphysics and frame his thought as anti-metaphysics, Heidegger interpreted Nietzsche as the culmination of Western metaphysical tradition. This interesting phenomenon is partly due to the fact that metaphysics itself is an ambiguous term that requires clarification by individual scholars. Some might comprehend it as a realm of seeking truth beyond the material world; whereas some might seek to adopt a different scope of metaphysics to encompass this world in flux, namely "becoming."

It is axiomatic that Nietzsche comprehends "metaphysics" in the former sense, given his description and hostility toward the metaphysical world in *Human, All Too Human*.¹ However, it remains ambiguous whether Nietzsche himself conceived of the need to extend the term "metaphysics." But even if he adhered to the traditional meaning of metaphysics, it would not be an exaggeration to perceive Nietzsche's body of work resonates with an expanded possibility of metaphysics.

In this paper, I claim that Nietzsche's lifelong project is a reconstruction of metaphysics. I contend that Nietzsche's revitalized metaphysics after the Death of God is

¹ Nietzsche, F. *Human, All Too Human: A Book for Free Spirits* (trans. Hollingdale, R.J.), Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 15-16. (Afterward, *HH*)

“metaphysics of the will to power,” following Heidegger’s claim. But I carefully delve into what this reformulated metaphysics of the will to power is, highlighting the pivotal role of philosophical anthropology as *metaphysica specialis* represented in *The Birth of Tragedy* and *On the Genealogy of Morals*. In doing so, I diverge from Heidegger by proving metaphysics of the will to power is not identical to the metaphysics of subjectivity.

After the exposition of what the metaphysics of the will to power is, I demonstrate why we should interpret the will to power as metaphysics. I assert that the comprehension of the will to power as metaphysics is significant for understanding the true lesson from *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*: the sustaining problem of quasi-theodicy that resides in his reconstructed metaphysics. Furthermore, this illuminates why Nietzsche’s concept of the “eternal recurrence of the same” stands as his most profound and biggest thought.

Lastly, I demonstrate that Nietzsche’s project of reconfiguring metaphysics can only be fully comprehended insofar as we understand the political implications of his project. To define this, I would examine the divergent interpretations of Nietzsche’s political thought as aristocratic and democratic. Then, I further demonstrate that Nietzsche’s vision of politics cannot be apprehended without understanding his new metaphysics as a whole. Following the structure of his new metaphysics that is completed by the thought of eternal recurrence of the same, we can ascertain the reason why his political thought encompasses both aristocratic and democratic aspects, and

how his politics after the settlement of his new metaphysics would be different from the modern politics.

2. Nietzsche's Metaphysics of the Will to Power: Theocentric Metaphysics to Anthropocentric Metaphysics

Understanding the metaphysics of the will to power requires an exploration of how metaphysics undergoes a transformation following the onset of nihilism, to which Nietzsche referred as the Death of God. The whole system of metaphysics is structured by the subdivision of metaphysics: 1) Ontology – theory of Being 2) Cosmology – the nature of the world 3) Philosophical anthropology – the nature of human beings 4) Theology.¹ The Death of God, namely the Great Noon for which Nietzsche anticipates, destroys the former metaphysics mainly shaped by Christianity. The bedrock of Christian metaphysics is understandably based on Christian theology that posits the omnipotent, omnibenevolent, and monotheistic God. The other components of metaphysics (ontology, cosmology, and philosophical anthropology) are constructed to vindicate and buttress this certain theological belief. This whole structure of metaphysics, other branches of metaphysics revolving around theology, gives the form and purpose of human existence. However, as Christian God eventually dies in the face of the scientific progress of humanity, as Nietzsche forebodes, theology that functioned as the crux of this traditional metaphysics is dismantled. Why this Death of God is extremely catastrophic for Nietzsche can fully be understood when we see it through the

¹ Here, I follow Adorno's subdivision of traditional metaphysics, see Adorno, T. *Metaphysics: Concept and Problems* (trans. Edmund Jephcott), Stanford University Press, 2001, 13. But it is important to recognize that one can add or change the branches of metaphysics regarding how they interpret metaphysics. For example, Michael Allen Gillespie adds logic in the subdivision of general metaphysics. See Gillespie, M.A. *Nietzsche's Final Teaching*, The University of Chicago Press, 2017. p13

lens of the total structure of metaphysics I have elaborated. The deconstruction of theology is not confined to the matter of theology. The other branches of metaphysics that shored up the development and history of humanity heretofore lose their foundation and meaning based on theology. Consequently, the entire fabric of human existence, propped up by this theocentric metaphysical structure, faces an existential void—an unraveling that leads toward total nihilism.

But one should ask whether the aftermath of nihilism demands a complete renouncement of metaphysics itself. If we adhere to the narrow conception of metaphysics tied to the theology-centered perspective, metaphysical faith or knowledge would be meaningless. Nietzsche holds this narrow definition of metaphysics when he critiques metaphysics, quoting “that knowledge of it (metaphysical world) would be the most useless of all knowledge.”² Yet, why should theology be the foremost category of metaphysics over other categories such as philosophical anthropology or cosmology? Couldn’t we seek the possibility of a metaphysics erected upon these alternate realms? In this light, I claim that Nietzsche’s anthropological works were attempts to found a new cornerstone upon which we can erect a new metaphysics that can confer higher meaning to our lives. While Nietzsche refrains from labeling this pursuit as explicitly “metaphysical,” adhering to the narrow definition of metaphysics, his works encapsulate a broader metaphysical ambition—an epochal shift from theocentric to

² *HH*, 15-16

anthropocentric metaphysics, redirecting inquiries from theology towards humanity and the cosmos.

Then, what was the aim of Nietzsche's anthropological discourse and how does this map out his new metaphysics? Nietzsche's anthropology can be described as genealogical anthropology,³ not least manifested in the work of *On the Genealogy of Morals*. The anthropological view of humans as moral beings was based on the former anthropological narrative fabricated to espouse Christian theology. Therefore, morality could not remain a universal truth after the death of God that sustains it. Nietzsche's genealogical anthropology accelerates the dissolution of this former anthropology of morality. But it is important to note that this negation is not the end of GM but a guide to the core question of his anthropology. The main question is as follows: *How did humans initially respond to suffering provoked by the world in flux?* Nietzsche wants his readers to see the moment of the origin that exhibits how natural man prior to the concept of morality responds to suffering. This is what Nietzsche calls the process of "naturalizing human beings" or "translating the human being back into nature."⁴ Employing a lens of genealogical anthropology, Nietzsche contends that unearthing these origins offers knowledge essential for constructing a new metaphysical

³ Matthew Dennis explains that the genealogical anthropology of Nietzsche is also a response to the Kantian anthropology that posits human beings as moral beings derived from *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View*. See Dennis, M. "On the Role of Maxims: Nietzsche's Critique of Kant's Philosophical Anthropology" in *Nietzsche's Engagements with Kant and the Kantian Legacy Vol 3: Nietzsche and Kant on Aesthetics and Anthropology*, Bloomsbury

⁴ Dennis, *Ibid*, 252.

framework, offering foundational elements to underpin a novel understanding of human existence.

In this context, a pivotal section in *GM* is the part where Nietzsche explicates how the Jews responded to the inherent sufferings of life provoked by life's contingencies characterized as the will. They responded to the insurmountable sufferings by creating their own values, referred to as "the slave revolt." Nietzsche sees this as "the most spiritual revenge" evoking "a radical reevaluation of their enemies' values."⁵ He further posits that Jewish "ressentiment itself becomes creative and gives birth to values ... compensate themselves with an imaginary revenge."⁶

This is the moment in which naturalized human beings encounter "the will to power." The foundation that Nietzsche strives to establish is the anthropological narrative of how humans react to the will to power as the pivotal cosmological concept⁷ in Nietzsche's new metaphysical framework. The metaphysical underpinning of the will to power as cosmology draws inspiration from Schopenhauer's concept of Will, notably exemplified in *The Birth of Tragedy*, where Nietzsche underscores the significance of music as "an immediate copy of the will itself."⁸ His assertion that music directly represents the will and "complements everything physical in the world" shows that Nietzsche embraces Schopenhauer's concept of the Will as cosmological knowledge;

⁵ Nietzsche, *On the Genealogy of Morals, First Essay, Section 7*(trans. Kaufmann), New York: Vintage Books, c 1967. (Afterward *GM*)

⁶ *GM I*, 10

⁷ Gillespie, M.A. *Nietzsche's Final Teaching*, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 13

⁸ Nietzsche, *The Birth of Tragedy* (trans. Kaufmann), New York: Vintage Books, 16 (Afterward *BT*)

moreover, he simultaneously claims that the Will is “the metaphysical, the thing-in-itself.”⁹ We can see that the cosmology of the will to power is what Nietzsche thinks ought to be the source of new metaphysics and his anthropology explores how human beings react to the cosmological, metaphysical world of the will to power. Consequently, we can conclude that Nietzsche’s new metaphysics is “the metaphysics of the will to power.”

Framing Nietzsche’s thinking as the metaphysics of the will to power precisely echoes the exact wording of Heidegger. As José D. Parra astutely explains, “for Heidegger’s Nietzsche, ... the will to power and metaphysics are coterminous, and have the same end.”¹⁰ However, Heidegger’s interpretation of metaphysics of the will to power is wrong considering that he treats it equally with “the metaphysics of subjectivity.” He suggests that “the metaphysics of will to power is rightly and necessarily a value thinking” and that the “will to power manifests itself as the subjectivity that is characterized by value thinking.”¹¹ This misapprehension, viewing the will to power as interchangeable with subjectivity, emerges from Heidegger’s underestimation of the Dionysian in Nietzsche’s thinking,¹² profoundly elucidated in Nietzsche’s first published work *The Birth of Tragedy*.

⁹ Ibid

¹⁰ Parra, J.D. *Heidegger’s Nietzsche: European Modernity and the Philosophy of the Future*, London: Lexington Books, 2019, 36.

¹¹ Heidegger, M. *Nietzsche Vol. III: The Will to Power as Knowledge and Metaphysics* (trans. By D.F. Krell, et al.), San Francisco: Harper & Row, c1979, 200.

¹² Gillespie, M.A. “Heidegger’s Nietzsche”, *Political Theory*, Vol.15, No.3 (1987), 431.

If *Genealogy of Morals* served as the guidebook that led to the disintegration of the former anthropology of Christian metaphysics through no-saying, then *The Birth of Tragedy* represents the anthropological work central to Nietzsche's envisioned new metaphysics. Although he eventually refuses to hold onto the main theme of the dialectical relationship between Apollinian and Dionysian in later years, by mooted in *Ecce Homo* that it "smells offensively Hegelian,"¹³ he unwaveringly held fast to his interpretation of how humans access the Dionysian state and his hope for a future of Dionysian music.¹⁴ Hence, to understand the anthropology of the will to power, an exploration into how ancient Greeks within the culture of tragedy affirmed their lives, characterized by the Dionysian, becomes imperative.

How Greek people embraced the Dionysian moment of the will to power is not equivalent to the metaphysics of subjectivity as Heidegger argued. This is profoundly evident in Nietzsche's rebuttal of the conventional comparison between Homer as an objective poet and Archilochus as a subjective poet. Against the common view of this comparison, Nietzsche claims that Archilochus, who "appalls us by his cries of hatred and scorn, by his drunken outbursts of desire,"¹⁵ is a Dionysian poet, namely, "a world-genius expressing his primordial pain."¹⁶ The Dionysian moment is Nietzsche's anthropological narrative of how human beings encounter the world of the will to

¹³ Nietzsche, "The Birth of Tragedy" 1 in *Ecce Homo* (trans. by Walter Kaufmann), 1 New York: Vintage Books, c1967, 270. (Afterward, *EH*)

¹⁴ *Ibid*, 274a

¹⁵ *BT* 5

¹⁶ *Ibid*

power. The crucial aspect of this encounter is that it requires a release from the subject's individual will¹⁷—the concept that Tracy Strong refers to as the “deindividuation.”¹⁸ By affirming the world characterized by the will to power, human beings assimilate into it; as Nietzsche expresses, they become “at once subject and object, at once poet, actor and spectator.”¹⁹ As a consequence, individuals become integral parts of the primordial unity of the will to power, making philosophical anthropology and cosmology intertwined together within the primordial unity of the will to power, forming a unified whole within the will to power. Thus, Nietzsche's earliest work lays the groundwork for a new metaphysics grounded in anthropology and cosmology, which can be designated as the metaphysics of the will to power.

¹⁷ Ibid

¹⁸ Strong, T. *Politics without Vision: Thinking without a Banister in the Twentieth Century*, Chicago; London: The University of Chicago Press, 2012, 77

¹⁹ BT 5.

3. The Quasi-Theodicy of Nietzsche's Renewed Metaphysics

I have shown that Nietzsche, from the start of his academic career, had a vision of new metaphysics that could proffer new meaning to human lives after the Death of God. This new metaphysics can be termed the metaphysics of the will to power, which is significantly different from Heidegger's illustration of it. Through this reforged metaphysics, Nietzsche seeks a comprehensive affirmation of life fraught with hardships. Although his metaphysics of the will to power is not grounded upon the emphasis on subjectivity as Heidegger argued, embracing this metaphysics would produce individuals who could subjectively create values after the deindividuation process. The superhuman would be the ones who adopt Nietzsche's new metaphysics of the will to power, a future generation in the expected culture established by Nietzsche's new metaphysics.

However, one important question remains in Nietzsche's reformulated metaphysics: what is "the eternal recurrence of the same" in his metaphysics of the will to power? Heidegger puts forth an interpretation suggesting that the eternal recurrence of the same is "a fundamental metaphysical position within Western thought,"¹ which makes Nietzsche the culmination and terminus of Western metaphysical thinking. In contrast, I propose that the idea of the eternal recurrence of the same derives from a

¹ Heidegger, M. *Nietzsche Vol. II: The Eternal Recurrence of the Same* (trans. by Krell, D.F.), San Francisco: Harper & Row, c1961, 7.

more fundamental issue within metaphysics itself, which I refer to as quasi-theodicy. To explain what I mean by this term, I will provide an exegesis of the relevant parts of *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* from the perspective of Nietzsche's metaphysics of the will to power.

Zarathustra, at the start, was certainly a teacher of the metaphysics of the will to power. He taught people to embrace "a sacred 'Yes'"² to the world of the will to power, which is "the world eternally imperfect, the image of an eternal contradiction"³

Zarathustra reiterates in the second part the same description of the Dionysian moment in *BT*: "Whatever in me has feeling, suffers and is in prison; but my will always comes to me as my liberator and joy-bringer. Willing liberates: that is the true teaching of will and liberty—thus Zarathustra teaches it."⁴ Much like the tragic culture of the ancient Greeks which pursued deindividuation by assimilating into the will, Zarathustra presents the same teaching of the metaphysics of the will to power. Heretofore, Zarathustra is the teacher of the metaphysics of the will to power.

However, suddenly the metaphysics of the will to power encounters its biggest adversary, the past of human beings which is represented as 'it was' or "the spirit of gravity". This problem of 'it was' is what produces the biggest and constant nausea for Zarathustra. After he acknowledges the problem of 'it was', the metaphysics of the will to power is in danger of being refuted thoroughly. Zarathustra realizes that "the will

² Nietzsche, *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, First Part, "On the Three Metamorphoses," in *The Portable Nietzsche* (trans. by Kaufmann, W.), New York: Penguin Books, c1982, 139. (Afterward *Zarathustra*)

³ *Zarathustra* I, "On the Afterworldly," 143.

⁴ *Zarathustra* II, "Upon the Blessed Isles," 199.

itself is still a prisoner" fettered by 'it was'.⁵ This directly contrasts his previous teaching at the core of his new metaphysics that "willing liberates", which denotes that the metaphysics of the will to power itself is at risk of disintegrating into nihilism, exactly as happened to Christianity.

Here, I follow the claim of Laurence Lampert that this problem of 'it was' is "a variant problem of theodicy,"⁶ which I designate as quasi-theodicy. Theodicy, in terms of traditional metaphysics based on theology, is the biggest threat to metaphysics itself, leading to nihilism. Although we cannot say 'it was' is a problem of theodicy since the new metaphysics of the will to power is based on anthropology and cosmology, we can sufficiently say that it is a quasi-theodicy that brings about the same catastrophic effect as theodicy. That the same problem of theodicy bedevils the new metaphysics is understandable since Nietzsche's goal was not to eradicate divine powers altogether with God, but to transfer that divine power to human beings. As human beings become capable of fully expressing "godlike desire," they also become subject to the similar problem of theodicy that God has suffered from.

Nietzsche and Zarathustra here realize that nihilism is not only the inevitable corollary of Christianity, but the new metaphysics of the will to power is also subject to falling into nihilism when it faces the problem of 'it was.' The nausea that made Zarathustra go back to silence again was not the nihilism of Christianity but the nihilism

⁵ *Zarathustra II*, "On Redemption," 251.

⁶ Lampert, L. *Nietzsche's Teaching: An Interpretation of Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, New Haven; London: Yale University Press, 171.

of the new metaphysics of the will to power itself stirred by the inherent quasi-theodicy of the metaphysics of the will to power.

The quasi-theodicy of the metaphysics of the will to power means that the naturalized human beings cannot escape their own past that consequently preordains their destiny. As we have seen, Nietzsche's new metaphysics is modeled on the anthropological narrative of Greeks who responded to Dionysian world in their most naturalized form achieved by deindividuation. However, as the naturalization of human beings refuted the traditional idea of moral human beings, the same problem beset Nietzsche's new metaphysics, amounting to the conclusion that no man can exist as the anthropological model of Greek tragic culture insofar as the problem of 'it was' persists. This is why Zarathustra constantly proclaims that 'man has to be overcome' since the naturalized human beings themselves are confined by the problem of 'it was' in the quasi-theodicy of his new metaphysics. As a result, the only redemption that can overcome naturalized man and become the overman is "to recreate all 'it was' into a 'thus I willed it.'"⁷

Zarathustra successfully responded to this quasi-theodicy of his new metaphysics by articulating his greatest thought entitled "the eternal recurrence of the same." This last teaching of Zarathustra functions as the bastion of the new metaphysics preventing it from falling into nihilism. However, this cannot eradicate the problem of quasi-theodicy itself. Theodicy or quasi-theodicy is embodied as a physiological, natural,

⁷ *Zarathustra II, "On Redemption,"* 251

and phenomenal issue that refutes respective metaphysics which is deeply related to each theodicy. The answer to theodicy cannot be logical or rational. Rather, it ought to be an aesthetic portrait that can encompass both theodicy and metaphysics, which are incompatible. That is why in the Zarathustra section of *Ecce Homo* Nietzsche explicates the concept of “inspiration” as “an instinct for rhythmic relationship.”⁸ Rhythmic relationship enables the incompatible entities to coexist together and how they are tied together is through “the involuntariness of image and metaphor.”⁹ The eternal recurrence of the same is the aesthetic metaphor that bridges between the quasi-theodicy of ‘it was’ and the new metaphysics of the will to power.

It plays a similar role as the notion of “original sin” plays in Christian metaphysics. The image of human beings as the source of original sin, depicted in the book of Genesis, bridges the gap between unreasonable, evil conditions that human beings suffer from and benevolent Christian God. In the same way, the new metaphysics of Nietzsche, destined to fail due to its quasi-theodicy, is salvaged with the help of the aesthetic image of the eternal recurrence of the same. In other words, by suggesting the aesthetic image of the eternal recurrence of the same, the metaphysics of the will to power can continue to give higher meaning to humanity and erect a new culture that resembles the Greek tragic culture without degenerating into nihilism. It is clear that the eternal recurrence itself does not represent Nietzsche’s metaphysics, completing the long history of Western metaphysics as Heidegger misinterpreted; rather it is merely an

⁸ Nietzsche, *EH*, “Thus Spoke Zarathustra: A Book for All and None,” 3

⁹ *Ibid*

aesthetic, but at the same time the most powerful, thought that Nietzsche hopes will save his new metaphysics to become dominant over the next thousand years.

Experiencing the quasi-theodicy of metaphysics of the will to power, Zarathustra transfigures from the teacher of metaphysics of the will to power to the teacher of the eternal recurrence of the same. In this light, Zarathustra ought to be distinguished from the overman. The overman would be the result of the settlement of the metaphysics of the will to power in the world; in turn, the overman is the wholehearted follower of the metaphysics of the will to power. On the other hand, Zarathustra, the teacher of the eternal recurrence of the same, is the one who saved the metaphysics of the will to power from degenerating into nihilism. As he conveyed his deepest inspiration, the eternal recurrence of the same, he finished his role of saving the metaphysics of the will to power. Now Zarathustra only awaits and searches for the overman who could truly embrace the salvaged new metaphysics of the will to power, as manifested in the fourth part of *Zarathustra*.

Although *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* stands as Nietzsche's most immaculate work in delineating his resolution to the problem of quasi-theodicy, it is imperative to acknowledge that his awareness of this issue extends beyond Zarathustra. Rather, Nietzsche's cognizance of how the novel metaphysics of the will to power confronts the equal structure of the problem that traditional metaphysics has dealt with is apparent throughout his inaugural work, *The Birth of Tragedy*. Here, Nietzsche points out that the, irrespective of culture, there always exists a contradiction in the aspects of human

beings that intrinsically challenges the stipulated value of god and metaphysics. He asserts that it is “the very first philosophical problem” that “produces a painful and irresolvable contradiction between man and god and moves it before the gate of every culture.”¹⁰

Building upon this exposition of theodicy, Nietzsche suggests a comparison between the Semites and the Aryans on how this problem of theodicy manifested in each culture and how they respectively reacted to it. The Semites, as previously suggested, employed “a myth of the fall” or “original sin”, characterized by Nietzsche as displaying “pre-eminently feminine affects,”¹¹ to explain the unfathomable chasm between suffering human beings and omnibenevolent God. In contrast, the Aryans articulated a masculine retort, namely Greek tragedy, to address the contradiction between humans and gods, which is epitomized in the book as the conflict between the Apollinian and Dionysian. The metaphysics of the will to power represented as the Dionysian is in perpetual conflict with the Apollinian reality of human beings, marked by the suffering of individuation:

The misfortune in the nature of things, which the contemplative Aryan is not inclined to interpret away — the contradiction at the heart of the world reveals itself to him as a clash of different worlds, e.g., of a divine and human one, in which each, taken as an individual, has right on its side, but nevertheless has to suffer for its individuation, being merely a single one beside another. In the heroic effort of the individual to attain universality, in the attempt to transcend the curse of individuation and to become the one world-being, he suffers in his own person the primordial contradiction that is concealed in things, which means that he commits sacrilege and suffers.¹²

¹⁰ *BT* 9

¹¹ *Ibid*

¹² *BT* 9

Although Nietzsche, in his later works, eventually jettisons the notion of Apollinian as the symbol of individuation, the same structure of quasi-theodicy manifest in *BT* reiterates in *Zarathustra* as I have demonstrated. The Apollinian individuation, which in contradictory fashion refutes the Dionysian metaphysics, reappears in *Zarathustra* embodied in the biggest form, as the “it was.” This reiteration underscores that, as Nietzsche’s reconfiguring new metaphysics of will to power was a lifetime project, the challenge of quasi-theodicy that hindered his metaphysical project was also persistent throughout his life, resolved finally by the greatest thought, the aesthetic image of the eternal recurrence of the same.

4. Political Implications of Nietzsche's New Metaphysics

Nietzsche's lifelong project of reconstituting a new metaphysics of will to power was an ambitious project, given his belief that it could be the replacement of Platonism and Christianity in the future days of whole humanity. In this light, it is obvious that Nietzsche sought the position that Plato has served as "the lawgiver of new customs."¹ As Lampert elucidates, "Nietzsche follows his lead or imitates the greatest example by conducting a campaign on the same level of seriousness, with the whole future of mankind on his conscience."² Nietzsche anticipated that his new metaphysics of the will to power would evoke profound effects on humanity, like dynamite, the effect would be realized in the form of a "cultural" revolution to embrace a tragic Dionysian view of life.

In contradistinction to the envisioned cultural impact of his new metaphysics, however, it is not clear how he anticipated the change or influence it would have on politics. Not only is the nature of the political impact of his project unknowable, it also seems that Nietzsche disliked politics itself, regarding his critique of the concept of culture-state. He insists, in *The Twilight of Idols*, that "culture and the state—one should not deceive oneself about this—are antagonists: "Kultur-Staat" is merely a modern idea.

¹ Nietzsche, *Daybreak* 496. On the notion of the lawgiver, Ansell-Pearson illustrates that "Nietzsche's conception of the task of the lawgiver is one which has recourse to force and violence in order to impose its creative will on humanity." In turn, Pearson claims that the lawgiver is the emblematic figure of aristocratic politics that is bound to the limitation of the deployment of suppressive political manipulation. (See Ansell-Pearson, K., Chap 6. "Bending the bow: great politics, or, the problem of the legislator" in *Nietzsche contra Rousseau: A Study of Nietzsche's Moral and Political Thought*, Cambridge University Press, 1991) In contrast, I claim that the position of lawgiver that Nietzsche applies to himself and Plato is the founder of a culture and metaphysics, such as Zarathustra.

² Lampert, *Nietzsche's Teaching*, 269.

One lives off the other, one thrives at the expense of the other. All great ages of culture are ages of political decline: what is great culturally has always been unpolitical, even anti-political.”³ Moreover, he cautions his readers of the danger of politics, in *Human All Too Human*, through the historical example of Greece, stating that “*polis* was mistrustful of the growth of culture and sought almost exclusively to paralyse and inhibit it.”⁴ This reiterating stipulation of culture and state as antipodes to each other seems to prove that Nietzsche himself was anti-political,⁵ preferring the renaissance of tragic culture over political revolution.

Despite the apparent hostility toward institutional politics, in this section, I propose that Nietzsche’s project of recasting new metaphysics has a precise vision of how politics ought to be. The overall process of how Nietzsche’s new metaphysics was structured suggests significant political implications that we should carefully examine. Through this examination, I will demonstrate that Nietzsche’s metaphysics of will to power is not indifferent to the realm of politics; rather, the new metaphysics was indeed a political project and depicts an ideal image of politics that Nietzsche strived for.

Scholarly consensus about Nietzsche politics is just as fraught as his relationship to metaphysics. The controversy about his political thought is extreme, with a great deal

³ Nietzsche, *Twilight of Idols*, “What the Germans Lack,” 4, in *The Portable Nietzsche* (trans. and ed. By Kaufmann) (afterward *TI*)

⁴ *HH* 474.

⁵ The perspective that Nietzsche was essentially anti-political is heavily promulgated by Walter Kaufmann, who explicitly averred that “Nietzsche opposed both the idolatry of the State and political liberalism because he was basically antipolitical and, moreover, loathed the very idea of belonging to any party whatever.” See Kaufmann, *Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist*, Princeton University Press, 1974, especially “The Epilogue.” However, Kaufmann’s interpretation relies upon Nietzsche’s critique of modern politics and refuses to engage in the possibility of political vision that Nietzsche might have had in his thoughts.

of debate about whether his thought is aristocratic or democratic. I claim that it is wrong to simply determine which type of regime he is inclined to support. Rather, the overall structure of his metaphysics of the will to power points to a specific image of an ideal political society that he imagines. Moreover, my understanding of the structure of his new metaphysics can help explain the complex relationship between aristocratic politics and democracy, and explain why there is a strictly divided controversy over his political thought. To prove this point, I will review both aristocratic and democratic interpretations of Nietzsche's political thought.

4.1. Aristocratic Interpretations of Nietzsche

The aristocratic interpretation of Nietzsche is easy to see, since it is axiomatic in many portions of his works that he valorizes geniuses and values created by them over the democratic value of equality and equal political participation by every individual. The state, for Nietzsche, is essentially aristocratic and politics should be assigned to the genius-artists who can create and implement value over the inferior people. Nietzsche never perceived that everyone could reach the level of an overman who could produce his or her own values, and thus thought some ought to be leaders and some are destined to be followers. In "The Greek State," he claims that this rank between people is the truthful fact of the state that modern democracy states are hesitant to acknowledge:

All other citizens are in the dark about what nature intends for them with their state instinct, and follow blindly; only those who stand outside this know what they want from the state, and what the state ought to grant them. Therefore it is practically inevitable that such men should win great influence over the state,

because they may view it as means, whilst all the rest, under the power of the unconscious intention of the state, are themselves only means to the state purpose.⁶

As Zarathustra endeavored to get rid of feelings of pity for those petty human beings, Nietzsche sought no equal treatment to run-of-the-mill people who cannot will or create value by themselves.

This aristocratic tendency prevails more in that Nietzsche directly condemns modern democracy. He asserts that modern democracy that tends to conceive of itself as “liberal” is “the historical form of the decay of the state.”⁷ It dismantles the organizing power that exerts and sustains the specific “will to tradition, to authority, to responsibility for centuries to come, to the solidarity of chains generations.”⁸ People in modern democracy lose their consciousness as collective beings and become individuals with no engagement with the will to power: “One lives for the day, one lives very fast, one lives very irresponsibly.”⁹ According to Hugo Drochon, this critical stance towards democracy is developed into his aspiration of Nietzsche’s “great politics” to transform Europe into “a transnational and transracial European caste.”¹⁰ Nietzsche is straightforward in his willingness to establish an aristocratic regime over modern democracy in *Beyond Good and Evil*:

To acquire one will by means of a new caste that would rule Europe, a long, terrible will of its own that would be able to cast its goals millennia hence—so the long-drawn-out comedy of its many splinter states as well as its dynastic and democratic splinter wills would come to an end. The time for petty politics is over: the very

⁶ Nietzsche, “The Greek State,” 170, in *The Portable Nietzsche* (ed. and trans. by Kaufmann)

⁷ HH 472

⁸ TI, “Skirmishes of an Untimely Man,” 39

⁹ Ibid

¹⁰ Drochon, H. *Nietzsche’s Great Politics*, Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2016, 160.

next century will bring the fight for the dominion of the earth—the compulsion to large-scale politics.¹¹

Bruce Detwiler also emphasizes Nietzsche's ultimate advocacy of aristocracy, notwithstanding some parts of his works in which Nietzsche implies the limited usefulness of democracy.¹² But the qualified usefulness of democracy is that the new ruling caste of great politics can emerge out of the democratic movement; "the future masters of the earth" could "make the experiment of a fundamental, artificial and conscious breeding of the opposite type and its virtues,"¹³ employing "democratic Europe as their most pliant and supple instrument for getting hold of the destinies of the earth."¹⁴ Ultimately, Detwiler underscores that the goal of Nietzsche's spiritual and political project was not to champion "the universal good or common good," but to promote the higher type of men that could lead a new aristocracy "fraught with illiberal" and "undemocratic" implications.¹⁵

4.2. Democratic Interpretations of Nietzsche

Similarly to these multifaceted justifications of Nietzsche as the advocate of aristocracy, there are many attempts to show he was a democratic thinker. Mark Warren is one of the scholars who stands firmly for this position. Although admitting that Nietzsche was

¹¹ Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil* 131.

¹² Detwiler, *Nietzsche and the Politics of Aristocratic Radicalism*, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1990, 176-177.

¹³ Nietzsche, *Will to Power* (trans. & ed. Kaufmann & Hollingdale), New York: Vintage Books, c1967, Section 954.

¹⁴ Ibid, Section 960.

¹⁵ Detwiler, 101.

ostensibly a supporter of aristocracy, Warren claims that there is a lacuna between his political thought and the hidden political implication of his philosophy, which Nietzsche himself thoroughly misunderstood.¹⁶ What Warren underscores from Nietzsche's philosophy is the production of individuals unrestrained from the domination of knowledge of truth. Nietzsche's teaching of the will to power enables us to see the individuals as "the individual *qua* agent,"¹⁷ namely "power organized as subjectivity."¹⁸ The valorization of the individuation process in Nietzsche's philosophy, thus, posits an inexhaustible possibility of "communal intersubjectivity, egalitarianism, and pluralism."¹⁹ But this democratic capacity of Nietzsche's thought of individuation is permanently bound within the irony of the "tragic feature of human condition," the fact that the notion of individuality cannot be produced without collective action.²⁰ In turn, Warren's interpretation asserts that Nietzsche's deployment of aristocratic politics to establish and develop his philosophy would, ironically, include the possibility to enhance democratic values, such as equality and freedom.

In addition to Warren's democratic interpretation based on his emphasis on individuation, many other democratic interpretation frames Nietzsche as the advocate of agonistic democracy. Tracy Strong is one of the representatives who construe Nietzsche as who espouses agonism. In his assertion to prove Nietzsche's inherent proclivity to

¹⁶ Warren, M. *Nietzsche and Political Thought*, Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1988, 237.

¹⁷ *Ibid*, 59.

¹⁸ *Ibid*.

¹⁹ *Ibid*, 247.

²⁰ *Ibid*, 60-61.

agonism, Strong mainly depends on Nietzsche's earlier text entitled "Homer's Contest." According to Strong, Nietzsche demonstrated in his short essay how the Greek culture thrived through the preservation of the *agon*, the existence of competition and strife.

The Hellenic genius was ready with yet another answer to the question, "What is life of struggle and victory for?" and it gave the answer through the whole breadth of Greek history. To understand it, we must start with the point that the Greek genius tolerated the terrible presence of this urge and considered it justified.²¹

The form of contest that the Greeks aspired to was what Hesiod reveals as "Eris as good," spurred by "jealousy, hatred, and envy," which is contrasted with "Eris as evil," the form of "hostile fights of annihilation against one another."²² Strong underscores that this aspect of Hesiod that brings the sense of human nature of the *agon* developed as a possibility of Greek culture transforming itself into "potentially much richer variations."²³ Furthermore, Strong asserts that the significance of Hesiod becomes doubled from the fact that he himself becomes the agonistic competitor of Homer.²⁴ It is not that Homer did not recognize the importance of the *agon*; rather, Homer was thoroughly conscious of it on the grounds that Homer's dominance made "all the drives and desires and lust for war"²⁵ which he endorsed as the foundation of institutional structure. However, "the universality of his [Homer's] triumph"²⁶ is a peril to the Greeks, and Hesiod as the agonistic competitor of Homer prevents the Greeks from

²¹ Nietzsche, "Homer's Contest" in *The Portable Nietzsche*, 35.

²² *Ibid.*

²³ Strong, Tracy. *Friedrich Nietzsche and the Politics of Transfiguration*, (expanded edition), Berkeley: California: University of California Press, 151.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, 150.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, 149.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, 150.

being soaked up in the myth of Homer, conjuring up the fundamental sense of the agon. Strong asserts that, for Nietzsche, the agon is “the most important Greek political institution”²⁷ that preserves Greek culture in a healthy manner.

Strong argues that while Nietzsche’s critique of the modern democratic movement sees democracy as a form of the decay of political organization, it is not an indication that Nietzsche was entirely hostile to democracy. Rather, it is the condemnation of modern society that displays a considerable diminution of what is political, in other words, the agon.²⁸ In this light, Strong proves that Nietzsche was not anti-political, but extremely aware of the significance of the political. Nietzsche believed that “culture depends on the existence of strong and agonistic politics.”²⁹

The agonistic tendency of Nietzsche is further developed by several scholars who endeavored to demonstrate Nietzsche’s influence on the political thought of Hannah Arendt, one of the most distinctive proponents of agonistic democracy. Most of these scholarly attempts mainly pertain to the notion of overman that Nietzsche suggests as the resolution to the nihilistic consequences of the modern world. For example, Dana Villa explains that after the withering of the transcendent grounds of the world, “then the choice is between a positivistic/nihilistic embrace of ‘meaningless appearances’ and

²⁷ Ibid, 194. Furthermore, Fredrick Appel shares the same perspective that highlights the significance of the agon in Nietzschean politics. “He argues that the institutionalized competitions of the Greek agon provided a constructive outlet for the potentially destructive wills of competitors, thereby preserving Greek community life and fostering its high culture. Casting his eyes to the future, Nietzsche wishes to foster a space of contest and rivalry with a similar function.” (Appel, *Nietzsche contra Democracy*, Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1999, 140)

²⁸ Ibid, 201.

²⁹ Ibid.

an aestheticist revaluation of appearances,"³⁰ which is the role of the overman. Thus, Villa claims that there cannot be "a shared world of appearances" for Nietzsche and this agonistic tendency leads to "Nietzschean perspectivism,"³¹ which many post-modern and post-structuralist readers enshrined.

4.3 Politics after the Settlement of Metaphysics of the Will to Power

The interpretations of the political thought of Nietzsche are extremely varied, stretching from radical aristocratism to agonistic democracy. From the previously enumerated interpretations, we could ascertain that he was undeniably envisioning politics that is led by geniuses who can make humanity greater by their creation of value. However, his stance towards democracy remains ambiguous due to the fact that he condemns modern democracy as petty politics but simultaneously valorizes the agon of the Greeks.

In this section, I claim that this ambiguity of Nietzsche's political thought is understandable insofar as we embrace his project of renewed metaphysics and carefully examine the political implications of this project. The illustration of Nietzsche's metaphysical project thus far elaborated can be summarized as follow: a) Nietzsche sought to develop a new anthropology, corresponding to the cosmology of the will to power, as the kernel of new metaphysics in lieu of theology. b) The new metaphysics of

³⁰ Villa, D. "Beyond Good and Evil: Arendt, Nietzsche, and the Aestheticization of Political Action," *Political Theory*, Vol. 20, No. 2 (1992), 283.

³¹ Ibid, 291. Also, for further explanation of Nietzschean perspectivism compared to Arendt, see Villa, D. *Arendt and Heidegger: The Fate of the Political*, Princeton: New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1996, 99-109.

the will to power faces its own problem of quasi-theodicy, which is the problem of 'it was.' c) The eternal recurrence of the same is given by Nietzsche, or Zarathustra, as the greatest aesthetic image that can bridge the problem of the 'it was' and metaphysics of will to power. d) After adopting the eternal recurrence of the same, overmen can thrive as the followers of the metaphysics of will to power, willing and creating their own values, without falling into nausea of nihilism.

Following this sequence and structure of his new metaphysics, we can see that for Nietzsche *a well-functioning democratic culture, such as the agon, always requires a transcendental or metaphysical source that can bind the collective together, notwithstanding the different values created by the individual geniuses.* Nietzsche anticipated that the new culture to be erected upon the new metaphysics of the will to power would resemble that of the Greek culture of tragedy. The overmen of new culture would be characterized by the same Dionysian sense as the Greeks, which as Nietzsche argues, is the basis on which "the union between man and man reaffirmed"³² that makes its appearance at the "collapse of the principium individuationis."³³ Therefore, overman's creation of various kinds of values and the agonistic interaction between those created values would never be possible without Dionysian metaphysics that holds individuals together as collective beings. In turn, a good form of democratic culture is only possible for the people who embrace the final teaching of the eternal recurrence of the same and truly adopt the Dionysian, namely the metaphysics of the will to power.

³² BT 1

³³ Ibid

This interpretation refutes Warren's or Villa's democratic interpretation that Nietzsche refused any kind of transcendental value that binds people together, and that he adhered to "individuation" and "perspectivism," which holds great potential to develop into competitive democratic values. But it is important to remark that Nietzsche perceived this radical individuation as the principal threat of modern democracy for human flourishing. In *Human All Too Human*, Nietzsche argued that the main problematic feature of prevailing democratic states was "to treat religion as a private affair and to hand it over to the conscience and customs of every individual."³⁴ This is a crucial problem since religion is what protects "the power that lies in unity of popular sentiment, in the fact that everyone holds the same opinions and has the same objectives."³⁵ Religion provides metaphysical solace to the people in times of loss and the debacle of the state; religion is the crux of popular culture that grants people a sense of unity, which is a sine qua non to the belief in the sacredness of the existence of the state. As modern liberal democracy consists in "the liberation of the private person"³⁶ and disregards the significance of religion or any source, which binds the collective and sustains the strength of culture, "the decay of the state" is a corollary for Nietzsche.

The new metaphysics of the will to power is assumed to play this role of religion that strengthens popular culture, in which Christianity is dismantled into nihilism. However, after Nietzsche's new metaphysics of the will to power replaces Christian

³⁴ *HH* 472.

³⁵ *Ibid*

³⁶ *Ibid*

metaphysics, the political modality of culture would be immensely different compared to the former one. Whereas Christianity would impose slavish morality, in which “will and desire are abolished altogether,”³⁷ bringing forth compliant citizens who aspire to metaphysical solace from the otherworldliness, the new metaphysics would offer metaphysical solace from the Dionysian world of the will to power, producing overmen who can produce values of their own. Furthermore, the created values would not remain private but would publicly engage in competitions, or even what Nietzsche calls indispensable war.³⁸ Therefore, the agonistic democratic culture can exclusively stem from adopting the renewed metaphysics of the will to power and the eternal recurrence of the same, not from adopting radical individualism or perspectivism. In this light, I believe Laurence Lampert’s insight is right.

As a public teaching therefore, eternal return replaces the superman teaching. It seems to me that one of the greatest single causes of the misinterpretation of Nietzsche’s teaching is the failure to see that the clearly provisional teaching on the superman is rendered obsolete by the clearly definitive teaching on eternal recurrence. That there is no call for a superman in the books after *Zarathustra* is no accident.³⁹

As I depicted, the quasi-theodicy of the ‘it was’ obstructs the production of the overman. The true agonistic culture of the overman is only possible when people adopt the idea of the eternal recurrence of the same and the metaphysics of the will to power.

³⁷ GM III, 17.

³⁸ HH 477.

³⁹ Lampert, *Nietzsche’s Teaching*, 258.

However, it is important to remember that Nietzsche was only supporting agonistic “culture” that might seem to have democratic implications, and that he was not an advocate of democratic “state” or “institutions.” The democratic interaction between the people ought to be tethered to the boundaries of culture. Again, this democratic interaction is not that of Rousseau or Locke, establishing a state out of a peaceful social contract. Rather, it is a “construction of war-like society”⁴⁰ where people strive to get power over others by ranking values by the revaluation of values. Nietzsche firmly claims that this war is “the archetype of the state”⁴¹ and freedom exists only where “manly instincts which delight in war and victory.”⁴²

Needless to say, the upshot of this agonistic Dionysian culture of war would be the aristocratic state, ruled by the geniuses who gain power over others through Dionysian war. He precisely expounds in *GM* that “the oldest state appeared as a fearful tyranny, as an oppressive and remorseless machine.”⁴³ However, the aristocratic regime operated by the geniuses, established as the result of Dionysian culture of war based on the new metaphysics, marks a distinctive difference compared to other forms of government that do not stem from Dionysian metaphysics. The overmen that provide the power of aristocratic

⁴⁰ Nietzsche, “The Greek State,” 172, in Nietzsche, *On the Genealogy of Morality* (trans. by Diethe, C.), Cambridge; UK: Cambridge University Press, 2007.

⁴¹ *Ibid*

⁴² *TI*, “Skirmishes of an Untimely Man,” 38.

⁴³ *GM* II, 18.

regime through war are the ones that do not want to exterminate the presence of enemies, but rather “need enemies more than friends.”⁴⁴ The aristocratic regime founded upon the bedrock of new metaphysics adopts the framework of “good and bad” in lieu of “good and evil,” which served as the framework of the slave revolt of the Jews and Christianity. The stipulation of the enemy as “evil” would stimulate the feeling of “revenge” and “ressentiment,” and the ruler cannot appreciate the existence of their enemies. On the other hand, noble overmen who are bound by the collective sense of Dionysian show reverence for their enemies, even “he desires his enemy for himself, as his mark of distinction.”⁴⁵ Thus, the overman that would lead the new aristocratic politics ought to be capable of simultaneously combating and loving his enemies. He is “the redeeming man of great love and contempt.”⁴⁶

Additionally, Nietzsche claims that these virtues of love and contempt are a matter of “spiritualization.” In *Twilight of Idols*, Nietzsche underscores the need for the “spiritualization” of both love and hostility:

The spiritualization of sensuality is called love: it represents a great triumph over Christianity. Another triumph is our spiritualization of hostility. It consists in a profound appreciation of the value of having enemies: in short, it means acting and thinking in the opposite way from that which has been the rule. The church always wanted the destruction of its enemies; we, we immoralists and Antichristians, find our advantage in this, that the church exists. In the political realm too, hostility has now become more spiritual—much more sensible, much more thoughtful, much more considerate. Almost every party understands how it is in the interest of its own self-preservation that the opposition should not lose strength; the same is true of power politics. A new creation in particular—the new

⁴⁴ *TI*, “Morality as Anti-nature,” 3.

⁴⁵ *GMI*, 10

⁴⁶ *GM II*, 24

Reich, for example—needs enemies more than friends: in opposition alone does it feel necessary, in opposition alone does it become necessary.⁴⁷

Nietzsche's renewed metaphysics of the will to power offers this process of spiritualization of love and hostility. Only the ones that fully embrace the new metaphysics of the will to power, especially adopting the eternal recurrence of the same, could understand the meaning of themselves as Dionysian collective being imbued with both love and contempt.

Thus far, we have confirmed that the reformulated metaphysics of the will to power plays a significant role in both the democratic and aristocratic thoughts of Nietzsche. For agonistic democratic culture such as the agon of the Greeks to function requires a metaphysical framework that can preserve people's sense of themselves as collective beings and forestalls cultural decline into mere subjectivism or perspectivism. Aristocratic politics also requires the settlement of metaphysics of the will to power for the rulers to enshrine the existence of their opponents, despite their engagement in war-like competitions. As we can see, there is a specific vision of politics that Nietzsche considered as ideal, which was a compound of agonistic democratic culture and the aristocratic state. This ideal politics is only possible after the settlement of Nietzsche's renewed metaphysics of the will to power, particularly through adopting the eternal recurrence of the same that perfects his new metaphysics.

⁴⁷ *TI*, "Morality as Anti-nature," 3

5. Conclusion

In this paper, I have delved into the long-pending question of Nietzsche's relation to metaphysics. Though Nietzsche was opposed to the traditional metaphysics that pertains to the transcendent realm beyond this world, I argue that his works are better understood as the attempt to reformulate metaphysics to replace traditional Western metaphysics that started from Platonism and was promulgated by Christianity. I have elaborated on three major aspects of Nietzsche's project.

First, Nietzsche sought to recast his new metaphysics based on an anthropological narrative. The former Western metaphysics was theocentric, with all other branches of metaphysical substances revolving around the notion of the Christian god. However, after the Death of God, Nietzsche considered that we would need a new cornerstone to construct new metaphysics. Nietzsche saw the possibility of bringing this about in the anthropological narrative of how human beings in their most naturalized manner responded to the will to power. In *Genealogy of Morals*, Nietzsche tried to deconstruct the fabricated anthropological narrative of morality to reach the initial moment of people reacting to the will to power. In *The Birth of Tragedy*, it is meticulously described how the Greeks, in their most naturalized way, responded to the will to power. That the Greeks assimilated this notion with Dionysian, namely the will to power, through the process of deindividuation was essential to the anthropology that Nietzsche deployed as the cornerstone of his new metaphysics.

Second, I contended that in *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* Nietzsche navigated over the direst threat to the new metaphysics—the problem of quasi-theodicy. As demonstrated above, his new metaphysics is established upon the anthropological narrative of naturalized human beings. However, the problem of ‘it was’ precludes human beings to become naturalized and assimilate to the will to power. This was the problem of quasi-theodicy that could demolish the new metaphysics and allow humanity to fall back into nihilism. Nietzsche has solved this final problem of his new metaphysics by articulating the thought of “the eternal recurrence of the same,” which is the great thought that bridges between ‘it was’ and metaphysics of the will to power. Through the teaching of the eternal recurrence of the same, Nietzsche’s new metaphysics is salvaged.

Lastly, Nietzsche’s project of new metaphysics implies the ideal political structure that Nietzsche envisages. The political thought of Nietzsche was as contentious as his relation to metaphysics. Nietzsche was a proponent of aristocratic politics and believed the state ought to be ruled by geniuses who can create values and promulgate them over others. However, he also endorsed the importance of the agon in Greek culture. The ambiguity of Nietzsche’s political thought is resolved when we understand that his political vision requires the settlement of the new metaphysics prior to politics. As people adopt the Dionysian sense of the will to power, the agonistic democratic culture would thrive in the form of war, protected by the Dionysian sense of collectivity. The aristocratic regime that eventually derives from this war-like culture would be different from mere suppressive tyranny in the sense that the rulers know the significance of the enemies.

Therefore, Nietzsche's new metaphysics implies the envisioned politics that Nietzsche thought of as ideal, which encompasses both aspects of aristocratic politics and democratic culture.

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