

Regulating Migrant Integration: Examination of Multiculturalism and Assimilation

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Abstract

In recent years, increased migration and humanitarian refugee flows have heightened fears that migrants could fail to integrate into their host countries – therefore becoming burdens on generous welfare states or turn towards extremist ideals. This research thus sought to measure the implications that certain immigrant integration policies could pose on opportunities for immigrants living in developed countries like France, Germany, Australia, and Canada. To assess assimilationist and multiculturalist policies, the attainment of migrant opportunities was measured with the OECD and European Union’s data source, *Indicators of Immigrant Integration (2015)*. While several indicators across the integration issue areas (economic, social, and political) demonstrate that countries with multiculturalist policies had smaller gaps of difference between native and nonnative populations, many are less significant after considering migrant education- and skill- level distribution. However, other conclusions in regard to future steps towards improved integration policies were found as well. The contributions from this study compounds on existing migration research and should move governing bodies closer to systematic policies that enable them to reap collective benefits of migration. In addition, civil society and intergovernmental organizations should use these insights in the development of realistic and effectual models of integration for future implementation.

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Introduction

In recent years, and especially in national elections across the globe, immigration policy has become a controversial and debated topic in the public sphere. Particularly, nations and politicians have been embroiled in long-standing conflicts about the ongoing global refugee crisis. With numerous countries overwhelmed by migration and humanitarian refugee flows, citizens and communities alike are torn between opening or closing their borders. For many political and anti-immigrant groups – as found in France, Italy, Germany, the United States, and Australia – their negative sentiments are based on the idea that migrants could fail to integrate into host countries and, therefore, become burdens on generous welfare states or turn towards extremist ideals.

However, long before these debates and the current refugee crisis, doubts of various immigrant groups integrating into host societies have been alive and thriving. Combined with how globally connected this world has become, countries are now turning to venues of possible change. Some of which have been with international organizations – most notably the European Union (EU). The EU is still in the midst of figuring out the best practices for immigrant settlement and integration. But the diversity of integration policies across the globe has brought along an astounding range of economic, social, and political implications. The distinctions between these policies could influence representations of immigrant potential, contribution, and belonging in their host societies. Further, countries who receive these influxes of immigrants – whether they are temporary, permanent, refugees, labor workers, or admitted through merit and family reunification policies – have a stake in how successfully these populations are incorporated.

The goal of this research is to measure how certain immigrant integration policies can impact the economic, social, and political opportunities of immigrants living in developed countries. Assimilation is one of the studied policies and will result in integration programs that only seek to increase civic and political participation. Countries that follow this policy will emphasize that acceptance and uniformity in the host country's culture, language, and principles are necessary tradeoffs to gaining the same or nearly equal benefits, rights, and protections as native citizens. The other policy examined in this study will be multiculturalism, which provide civic engagement programs for immigrants as well, but also focuses on building community relations between foreign-born (also referred to as nonnative) and native-born populations.

The effectiveness of assimilationist and multiculturalist integration policies is measured by its impact on economic, social, and political immigrant indicators. Using the data source, *Indicators of Immigrant Integration (2015): Settling In*, by the OECD and the European Union, this study will primarily consider Labour Market Outcomes, Job Quality, Household Income, Education and Training, Social Cohesion, and Civic Engagement. Each are measured through relevant indicators and through comparing the outcomes of a country's immigrant population against the reference group (natives of the host country). Indicator scores with smaller gaps of differences between native and nonnative communities would suggest that opportunities provided to natives are given to immigrants as well. This may mean that immigrants are able to access the

labor market, feel protected by the governing institutions from racial or ethnic discrimination, be allowed to vote, etc.

From studying Australia, Canada, France, and Germany, potential implications between types of integration policy and the outcomes of immigrant indicators can be established. Findings indicate that, in terms of economic, social, and political integration, results were overall mixed. While several indicators across the integration issue areas demonstrate that countries with multiculturalist policies had smaller gaps of difference between native and nonnative populations, many are less significant after considering migrant education- and skill- level distribution.

However, other conclusions were found. First, France and Germany tended to have the worst integration rates across the three issue areas. Second, Australia and Canada shared multiple indicators with smaller gaps of differences. This implies that their shared multiculturalist policy could be a driver to such success. But as respective countries, Australia and Canada each showed a higher prevalence of small gaps of difference in various indicators across the three issue areas. Last, country-specific initiatives (or their absence) led to individual countries having high or low social and political integration rates.

Theoretical and Empirical Context

Defining Immigrant Integration

Neither migration or the desire to integrate immigrants into host society are new phenomena. Integration refers to how government policies and receiving communities formally (and informally) incorporate immigrants and their descendants into their societies.¹ Immigrants and visiting populations (both high- and low-skilled) can influence a variety of domestic and international factors in a host country. For example, the extent of immigrant integration will impact economic factors, including the labor market, earnings, efficiency gains, and occupational divisions.² Social and political effects of integration can be demonstrated in ethno-racial relations, community institutions, political participation and public opinion.³ These immigrants' potential for success is often dependent on their ability to integrate into their host countries and also on how well those communities react to their presence.

Immigrant integration has long concentrated on two theories: classical assimilation and segmented assimilation.⁴ The former stresses the assumption that diverse ethnic groups will eventually come to fully embody the host society.⁵ By eliminating distinctive traits (such as native cultures, customs, languages, and the formation of enclaves), successive generations of immigrants should become identical to the host society and gain equal access to native opportunity structures.⁶ In contrast, segmented assimilation theory detail that host societies are often “highly stratified by class and race”, and that reception of immigrants by natives are “more contingent on circumstances.”⁷ In addition, immigrants will arrive with differing material resources that will hinder or aid them in integration.⁸ The theory, unlike classical assimilation, focuses on group-

specific contexts of exit and reception as major determinants of effective integration. As the study, *Segmented Assimilation and the American Experience of Asian Immigrant Children*, elaborates:

“Particular contexts of exit and reception can create distinctive ethnocultural patterns and strategies of adaption, social environments, and tangible resources for the group, and give rise to opportunities or constraints for the individual, independent of individual socioeconomic and demographic characteristics.”

These contexts of exit and reception can also be explained as “pre-migration” and “post-migration” circumstances. Pre-migration factors include social class statuses that were already attained by immigrants in their homelands, as well as their existing resources and means of migration.⁹ In conjunction with other similar theories, this categorization should include whether an immigrant’s migration decisions were voluntary and for capital gain (such as labor workers and high-skilled professionals) or forced displacement (refugees or those under political asylum).¹⁰ Differing motivations for migration will compel immigrants to vary in their decision to acclimatize to the host country; for example, this includes those that seek permanent residency or naturalization versus those that plan to ultimately return to their home country.

Pre-migration circumstances also consider the material and human capital that immigrants possess prior to migration. This includes the possession of advanced and recognized educational/technical credentials, fluent acquisition of the host country’s language, and prior business experience.¹¹ Those who possess these characteristics are typically the most rapidly integrated linguistically and culturally.¹² Additionally, education and professional training can give immigrants improved chances of gaining better-paid employment, while entrepreneurship can develop into self-employment once familiarity with the host economy is established.¹³

Segmented assimilation’s emphasis that host reception heavily determines successful immigrant integration is demonstrated in its theorized post-migration circumstances.¹⁴ While immigrants may actively attempt to integrate into their host societies, their efforts could be fruitless if their communities are alienated from rights, responsibilities, and access to opportunities.¹⁵ Therefore, post-migration factors are crucial to understanding why different groups of immigrants in each country integrate while others and their descendants continue to experience poverty or inaccessibility to economic mobility.

Globalized Issue of Integration: Role of Intergovernmental Intervention

Continued migration is inevitable if there are circumstances and social structures in migrant-sending countries that compel individuals to leave.¹⁶ These include revolutions within the past half-century, such as increased cross-border connections and facilitated migration, communication (via technological advances), cheaper and more accessible transportation, and the rights of individuals vis-à-vis government.¹⁷ Further, there has yet to be conclusive end dates to these ongoing migration flows. In combination, these factors have further increased the rate of

globalization and interconnectivity in the world – causing these issues to spill out onto an international stage.

Therefore, while countries collectively foresee migration as an existing reality, they disagree on how to accept immigrants and other non-citizens. They also differ their willingness to allow immigrants to “change” their native society or national identity. As a result, most countries abide by a combination of regulations and rarely utilize a singular perspective towards immigrant integration.¹⁸ With limited consensus on this question, governments and actors like civil society and nongovernmental organizations are considering the intervention of intergovernmental organizations (IGOs).¹⁹ The main purposes of such entities are to eliminate common problems of collective action on a global scale and shape associated standards and behaviors of international diplomacy and cooperation.²⁰ Intergovernmental organizations exist to create and sustain stability through an organizational structure and offer governance in the form of better coordination, enforcement of shared goals, and information-sharing.²¹

However, traditional migration-oriented IGOs, such as the International Organization of Migration (IOM) and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), have historically limited their input on immigrant integration.²² With migration management itself seen as polarizing and, potentially, a tool against state sovereignty, the two organizations do not appear at the forefront of the integration debate. The UNHCR has limited its UN mandate towards protecting refugees while the IOM has diverted its attention towards four key areas: 1) migration and development, 2) facilitating legal migration, 3) regulating illegal immigration, and 4) controlling forced migration of displaced populations.²³ As a structure itself, the IOM may not be conducive to immigrant integration matters.²⁴ With a funding model that leads to dependency on major donors (typically industrialized Western countries) and a historic lack of criticism on member states and donors’ decisions on migration, the IOM may be unable to resolve critical and difficult issues often arising in immigrant integration.²⁵

Fortunately, there has not been a complete lack of international discussion on the topic. For the past two decades, the European Union (EU) has become steadily involved in defining objectives of successful immigrant integration and supporting countries towards those goals. For example, the organization has negotiated and published basic integration principles for non-EU nationals. The *Common Basic Principles* (2004)²⁶, *Common Agenda for Integration* (2005)²⁷, *European Agenda for Integration of Non-EU Migrants* (2011)²⁸, and *Action Plan* (2016)²⁹ have served as the EU’s foundation for collaboration among national, regional, and local authorities on the development and implementation of integration policies.

Nonetheless, while these extensive efforts have resulted in progress, it has not been enough. In 2016, the European Commission acknowledged that “third-country nationals across the EU continue to fare worse than EU citizens in terms of employment, education, and social inclusion outcomes.”³⁰ Their *Action Plan* report also emphasized that effective integration policies must be

made with the acceptance that most non-citizens desire to permanently reside in their host countries or, at the very least, stay for long periods of time.

Thus, even within a global platform, countries will need to prepare their own long-term and systematic investment into this issue. Each migrant-receiving country face different challenges, especially considering individual and ethnic differences between migrant populations in host countries.³¹ The alternatives – an absent policy or a policy that does not reflect the realities of a country’s immigrant populations – will worsen efforts that organizations like the EU have achieved. Subsequently, assessing the types of utilized policies is the key to understanding how well a model may address a country’s main priorities, especially given its individual history with migration, current controls on borders and enforcement, visas and residency system, and other factors.

National Models of Integration Policy

In connection to segmented assimilation’s focus on post-migration factors, this study investigates overarching and systematic proxies of host reception. In this case, two contrasting government policies will be studied. One traditional, but still common, method of integrating immigrants is assimilation. Based off the theory of classical assimilation, it is defined as actions taken to “melt” the customs of diverse ethnic groups into the host country’s mainstream culture. Thus, it is primarily a one-sided process of adaptation.³² Immigrants are expected to adopt the rules of a host country and demonstrate the sacrificing of their native language, social, and cultural characteristics to be considered committed to their new home.³³ Since becoming a citizen or being granted permanent residency are seen as legal and tangible commitments to a host country, it is usually treated as a prerequisite for immigrants to share native citizens’ political, social, and economic rights and opportunities.³⁴

Conversely, a two-sided approach to integrating immigrants is multiculturalism.³⁵ In this method, immigrants and their host communities mutually acclimatize to each other.³⁶ Influenced by segmented assimilation, multiculturalism emphasizes that national governments are responsible for facilitating settlement of accepted immigrants.³⁷ While a society can be multicultural, their integration policies and legislation are considered multiculturalist if it promotes cultural diversity alongside aiding immigrant integration.³⁸ While immigrants voluntarily conform to the host country’s democratic key values, the host communities actively interact and help immigrants retain their native cultural origins and identity.³⁹

During the late 20th century, settlement countries like Australia and Canada slowly developed their paths towards multiculturalism while others veered away from it. By 2008, researchers at European-based think tank Real Instituto Elcano identified 11 EU countries that introduced mandatory integration programs, most of which emphasized “traditional national values and common identity.”⁴⁰ This finding does not eliminate the possibility that these countries may have offered concessions for this new obligation. However, it does imply that their policies

were becoming more assimilationist, due to their increasingly singular emphasis on conforming to an existing national identity.

For instance, Dutch policymakers towards the end of the 20th century worried that “emphasizing cultural differences” would spawn negative labor market effects, especially concerning immigrants with limited Dutch language skills.⁴¹ In 1998, a *Wet Inburgering Nederland* (WIN) law solidified the presence of mandatory integration courses and incited academic and political rhetoric against multiculturalist integration policies.⁴² As a result, the Netherlands is considered the first of multiple countries, including Sweden and France, to assume this particular model of assimilation. The Dutch law was modified in 2002 and now requires potential immigrants to demonstrate their language skills and knowledge of Dutch culture and society to renew residence permits and prior to obtaining a visa.⁴³

These are, by no means, the only integration policies that exist. It should also not be assumed that countries typically abide by a singular model. However, changing government administrations, political events, and societal eras often influence the type of integration policy that countries adopt within a certain time period. Throughout several countries’ histories, certain key legislation, government leaders, and signifiers of political positions have changed their approaches on immigrant integration (see the case studies of Australia and France). This study therefore clarifies that it is only focusing on assimilationist and multiculturalist policies because each approach provides stark elements that the other does not possess – thus allowing for more effective cross-analysis of differing integration policies.

Variables

The purpose of this study is to see whether the distinctions between national government policies could influence global indicators that measure economic, social, and political integration of immigrants. The three spheres of integration that typically signify individuals and communities' belonging into a mainstream society are economic (integration into economic activity and development), social (integration into existing institutions), and political (integration into national and local interests of the broader community).⁴⁴

Based on a country's official government policies, relevant legislation, and government-funded initiatives, they will be assigned as having either assimilationist or multicultural integration policies (Table 1). In accordance with Migration Policy Institute's *Multiculturalism: Success, Failure, and the Future* report, a country is considered to have an assimilationist approach if their policies only seek to encourage civic engagement and cultural assimilation into the majority society. This may be through providing native-language training courses, naturalization programs, and involuntary integration requirements not related to naturalization. Modern countries that continue to use assimilation have adapted their policies and legislation to emphasize borders and customs enforcement, as well as native language skills as a precursor to long-term residency.⁴⁵ They also state that acceptance and uniformity in the host country's culture, language, and principles by immigrants are necessary tradeoffs to gaining the same or nearly equal benefits, rights, and protections as native citizens.⁴⁶ Therefore, there is a lack of emphasis or direct government funding towards programs that encourage cultural activities, native-born and immigrant interactions, and legal protection of civil rights for immigrants.

A country with multiculturalist policies will provide civic engagement programs for immigrants as well, but they should be voluntary and not a formalization of immigrants' ability to receive public services or welfare programs.⁴⁷ Another key point to consider is whether they are funding cultural diversity programs, as well as protection through anti-discrimination laws.⁴⁸ Culture is a major aspect for both models; while assimilationist integration policies discourage the recognition of group-based differences, the multiculturalist model maintain that it is necessary to recognize them in shaping policy initiatives.⁴⁹ Underlying the latter focus is an argument that for migrants to become independent and participating members of society, the gap between non-citizens and citizens must be lessened.⁵⁰ While acquisition of the native or majority language is a basic necessity, policies solely focused on language instruction is insufficient if communities are geographically, culturally, and socially separated from each other. As a result, governments with multiculturalist policies typically create offices and taskforces geared towards creating dialogue and collaboration between the native and nonnative populations.⁵¹

Table 1: Summary of Assimilation and Multiculturalism Categorization

Policy Design	<i>Assimilation</i>	<i>Multiculturalism</i>
Adoption and committed demonstration of host country language, society, culture	Will be present in policies through involuntary integration prerequisites to residency, access to public sector/benefits, etc.	Will be present in policies, but without involuntary integration prerequisites to residency, access to public sector/benefits, etc.
Emphasis on increasing civic/political participation	Will be present, with emphasis on eventual naturalization as necessary trade-off for full native rights and opportunities	Will be present
Increase cultural diversity and accommodations	Will not be present	Will be present
Community/native population involvement in immigrant integration	Will not be present	Will be present

The dependent variable, immigrant integration indicators, will be measured using the data source by the OECD and the EU, *Indicators of Immigrant Integration (2015): Settling In*. Using outcome data from the OECD and the EU will guarantee a higher level of standardization among surveys and data collection methods across countries. The most recent edition of the organizations' comprehensive integration reports, *Indicators of Immigrant Integration (2015)*, considers eight integration areas.⁵² However, to focus on the three chosen spheres of integration, this study will primarily consider Labour Market Outcomes, Job Quality, Household Income, Education and Training, Social Cohesion, and Civic Engagement. Each are measured through relevant indicators and through comparing the outcomes of a country's immigrant population against the natives of the host country. Since the report collected outcome data based on 2012 census and surveys, this study will only look at policies (legislation, programs, agencies, and initiatives) leading up to 2012.

Indicator scores with smaller gaps of differences between native and immigrant communities would suggest that opportunities provided to natives are also given to immigrants. This may mean that immigrants are able to equally access the labor market, feel protected by governing institutions from racial or ethnic discrimination, be allowed to vote, etc.⁵³ In contrast, indicator scores with larger gaps imply limitations of immigrants' economic, social, and political standing that are not present for native members. This could thereby impact immigrants' ability or willingness to be a part of the host society.⁵⁴

Ideally, the study would measure indicators scores against specific time periods within the chosen case studies (Australia, Canada, France, and Germany). This would have improved within-case variation, especially since Australia and France have switched between assimilation and

multiculturalism throughout their countries’ respective histories. However, standardized data for these indicator outcomes does not exist prior to 2004, with the earliest attempt being the Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX).⁵⁵ But this dataset is inapplicable for this investigation’s objectives; unlike the OECD and EU’s *Indicators of Immigrant Integration*, MIPEX focuses more on whether countries are actively implementing integration efforts rather than measuring how such initiatives affect indicator outcomes.⁵⁶ The study thus assesses country policies leading up to 2012, and to that time period’s integration policy stances, in order to utilize the most updated and accessible indicator outcomes data (as of this study’s publication).

Table 2: **Immigrant Indicators**

<i>Issue Area</i>	Description of Issue Area	Indicators ^a
<i>Economic</i>		
Labour Market Outcomes	Accessibility to host country labor market and employment opportunities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Employment rate • Unemployment rate • Risk of market exclusion <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Long-term unemployment rate
Job Quality	To supplement Labor Market Outcomes; accessibility to job and career choices appropriate for skill level and formal qualifications, as well as upward mobility in terms of income, training, credentials	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Jobs distribution by: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Types of contracts ○ Job skills • Overqualification rate • Share of self-employment
Household Income	Determines range of socio-economic outcomes for individuals, families, and communities they reside in	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Poverty rate • In-work poverty rate
<i>Social</i>		
Education and Training	Accessibility to educational opportunities (including language acquisition) and job-related training that does not produce economic hardship for migrants with little-to-no expendable resources	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Participation in education and training • Share with unmet training needs • Participation in job-related training • Usefulness of job-related training
Social Cohesion	Accessibility to social, cultural, and other collaborative engagements with the native host society	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Share of immigrants who feel to have been discriminated against • Share of people who think that their area is a good place for migrants to live
<i>Political</i>		
Civic Engagement	Accessibility to political and community-based participation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Naturalization rate • Share of nationals among foreign-born population • Share of employment in the “public services” sector

^a Explanation of indicators can be found in Appendix A.

Hypotheses

Since modern assimilation integration policies are based off classical assimilation, outcomes between the two are presumed to be potentially similar. Classical assimilation has been mainly disproven through three primary findings. First, persistent intergenerational disadvantages have been demonstrated through the reproduction of poverty (as well as interethnic differences in schooling and economic attainment) in sequential generations of immigrant groups.⁵⁷ These findings go against classical assimilation's assumption that successive generations of immigrant families will be more successful than the previous because of their native cultural and behavioral patterns' gradual abandonment. Second, there are positive outcomes of contemporary immigrant adaption without full assimilation.⁵⁸ This has been proven through the existence of varying long-term economic opportunities in ethnic enclaves, which have created alternative paths of upward mobility.⁵⁹ Lastly, in terms of adaptation, classical assimilation may not matter as much as settlement location and where immigrants are able to afford. The commonality of low-income and vulnerable immigrant children living in areas of high-risk behaviors has been shown to disrupt academic and eventual economic integration.⁶⁰

In contrast, multiculturalism caters to the promotion of cultural diversity, nonnative connections to the host society, and recognition of ethnic/cultural differences of migrants. Integration policies in these countries could address the unique integration challenges of each immigrant groups.⁶¹ In combination of not requiring immigrants to spend additional resources to formally show their adoption of the national identity, this may mean immigrants are better able to participate in the host society. This would result in less differences of percentage points between foreign-born and native-born outcomes, which would signify convergence of equal accessibility and opportunity. Therefore, this study hypothesizes that countries with national assimilationist integration policies will result in indicator scores with larger gaps of differences between native and immigrant communities. Unlike multiculturalism, these policies will create barriers that will prevent immigrants from fully participating economically, socially, and politically.

Alternative Explanations

In consideration of other possible influencing factors, immigrant indicators that demonstrate significant outcome gaps between foreign-born and native-born populations could be due to the absence of integration programs. This study will only measure indicators for countries that have a formalized integration policy, which is determined by the existence of legislative precedent, published government agendas, and established agencies or taskforces.

Immigrant indicators could also be influenced by country-wide factors outside of official policy, including economic stability and extent of sustainable development.⁶² Both affect labor market outcomes for the total population. These possibilities are considered by ensuring that national GDP (gross domestic product), GDP per capita, and development indicators are similar in selected case studies. Development will be measured with the Human Development Index (HDI).

These efforts will also guarantee that countries with specific integration policies have the monetary and political resources to carry out initiatives, programs, and other related efforts.

Another aspect that could affect immigrant integration could be the principles of the governments themselves. Governments that are represented through similar democratic principles, such as liberty, equality, and free speech, will most likely consider them at the forefront of social cohesion.⁶³ By choosing country case studies that attempt to attain similar types of social cohesion, it will be easier to compare how they choose to enforce these beliefs on non-citizen populations through integration policy.

Lastly, immigrant integration can be affected by the demographics of immigrant groups. Existing immigrant indicators that standardize data collection methods across countries currently do not separate outcomes by ethnic, racial, and demographic of immigrant groups within host countries.⁶⁴ This is due to limitations in the collected surveys and other data resources itself. This issue is addressed by studying countries with immigration populations that share similar socio-demographic and identity characteristics.

Australia and Canada will be studied as multiculturalist countries, with France and Germany as their assimilationist counterparts.^b The four are used as primary case studies because their current immigrant integration policies could be categorized as one of those two integration policy approaches. They are also similar in terms of country-wide factors, adoption of democratic principles, and immigrant demographics. The latter category includes age and gender composition of migrants, duration of stay, and language of origins and languages spoken at home. However, these countries vary in terms of foreign-born percent share of the population, new immigration flows types, and immigrant household types. This will be taken into consideration in the detailed case studies and analysis of results.

^b Control variables between Australia, Canada, France, and Germany can be found in Appendix B.

Results

Table 3: Summary of Integration Policy Type

	Country	Official Agencies (1992 – 2012)	Key Legislation & Government Agendas	
Multiculturalism	Australia	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Council of Multicultural Australia (supported by Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs) ○ Australian Multicultural Council 	<p>The Racial Discrimination Act (1975)</p> <p><i>Review of Post Arrival Programs and Migrants (also known as the Galbally Report)</i> (1978)</p> <p><i>National Agenda for a Multicultural Australia</i> (1989)</p>	<p><i>A New Agenda for Multicultural Australia</i> (1999)</p> <p><i>Australian Multiculturalism for a New Century: Towards Inclusiveness</i> (1999)</p> <p><i>Multicultural Australia: United in Diversity</i> (2003)</p> <p><i>The People of Australia – Australia’s Multicultural Policy</i> (2011)</p>
	Canada	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Citizenship and Immigration (CIC) ○ Canadian Heritage ○ Human Resources and Social Development Canada (HRSDC) 	<p>Official Languages Act (1969)</p> <p>Multiculturalism Policy of 1971</p> <p>Citizenship Act (1977)</p>	<p>Canadian Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms (1982)</p> <p>Canadian Multiculturalism Act (1988)</p> <p>Employment Equity Act (1995)</p>
Assimilation	France	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Social Affairs Ministry ○ Interministerial Committee of Integration ○ Office Français de l’Immigration et de l’Intégration, OFII ○ Ministry of Immigration and National Identity 	<p>Law 2006-911 on Immigration and Integration (2006)</p> <p>Decree 2007-999 on the Powers of the Ministry of Immigration, Integration, National Identity and Co-development (2007)</p> <p>Law 2007-1631 on Immigration, Integration, and Asylum (2007)</p>	<p>Decree 2008-1115 on the Preparation of Integration for French Foreigners Wishing to Reside Permanently (2008)</p> <p>Law 2011-672 on Immigration, Integration and Nationality (2011)</p> <p>Decree 2011-1266 concerning "French language of integration" (2011)</p>
	Germany	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (BAMF) 	<p>Federal Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs memorandum: <i>The Status Quo of Immigrant Integration</i> (1979)</p> <p>Reform to Nationality Act (2000)</p> <p>Immigration Act/Residence Act (2005)</p> <p>The National Integration Plan (2006)</p>	<p>Amendments to Immigration Act/Residence Act (2007)</p> <p>National Action Plans on Integration (NAP) (2007)</p> <p>Act to Transpose European Union Directives on Immigration and Asylum (2007)</p>

Case Studies: Multiculturalism

Australia

Since the late 1970s, Australia's official immigrant integration policy has been characterized as multiculturalist. While the policy has not been formally enacted as a law, it was institutionalized during the Whitlam Government (1972-1975).⁶⁵ This systematic implementation came nearly two decades after the "White Australia" policy (1901-1956), which limited immigration to only European residents.⁶⁶ The Whitlam Government's approach for multiculturalism turned away from the former "White Australia" policy to increase Australian presence on the global sphere. As a result, the Whitlam Government deemed domestic acceptance of cultural diversity as necessary for improved foreign and trade relations.⁶⁷ Subsequently, most successive governments have promoted multiculturalism as the national approach to integrating immigrants.

One of the most immediate demonstrations of multiculturalism was the 1975 Racial Discrimination Act, which is one of the first pieces of Australian legislation to formally forbid discrimination based on race, color, descent, national/ethnic origin, and immigrant status.⁶⁸ Later, a 1978 government report, *Review of Post Arrival Programs and Migrants*, defined the nation's integration policy as "an ideal of society based on principles of social cohesion, equality of opportunity, and cultural identity."⁶⁹ The report's recommendations solidified the presence of multiculturalism in Australian policy and led to the establishment of the Australian Institute of Multicultural Affairs in 1979, as well as multiple Ethnic Affairs Commissions.

However, maintaining Australia's policy of multiculturalism has not been an effortless process. Public support for the policy was slim during the first years of the Whitlam administration and varied by socio-economic class. In a 1988 *Issues in Multicultural Australia* survey by the Office of Multicultural Affairs, 47 percent of participants with trade qualifications agreed with the statement, "Having lots of different cultural groups in Australia causes lots of problems."⁷⁰ In contrast, 43 percent of people who had a university-level education disagreed.⁷¹

Multiculturalism was also re-defined during the 1980s. The 1989 government publication, *National Agenda for a Multicultural Australia: Sharing Our Future*, emphasized that the significant limitations and expectations of multiculturalism. While immigrants – as well as other ethnic and cultural populations – have the right to express their own cultures, they must also demonstrate an "overriding and unifying commitment to Australia, acceptance of rule of law, freedom of speech and religion, English as the national language, and the equality of sexes."⁷² This has been inferred as a reaction to the influx of Southeast and East Asian asylum-seekers and refugees entering Australia during this time.⁷³ Further, an investigative document called the 1988 Fitzgerald Inquiry led to Australia changing visa-awarding preferences. Instead of continuing to support family reunification efforts, Australia sought to invite highly-skilled and business migrants – an immigration policy that still exists to this day.⁷⁴

The Howard Government from 1996-2007 closely followed this shift, which resulted in a regression of the multiculturalist agenda. During this time, Prime Minister John Howard urged for a greater emphasis on national identity by changing tangible elements of existing multiculturalist programs.⁷⁵ For example, immigrant access to the Adult Migrant Education program, multicultural immigrant integration programs, and most forms of welfare became heavily restricted.⁷⁶ Funding for ethnic organizations was also reduced.⁷⁷ The Howard Government also published the 2003 *Multicultural Australia: United in Diversity – Updating the 1999 New Agenda for Multicultural Australia: Strategic Directions for 2003-2006*. The publication argued that the multiculturalist policy must actively promote “social harmony” through unity.⁷⁸ In addition, citizenship and naturalization of immigrants must be pursued for the mainstream society and to guarantee essential civic obligations.

But surprisingly, public support began to veer positively towards multiculturalism. A Newspoll survey in 1997 found that 79 percent of respondents in Australia believed that “multiculturalism has been good for Australia.”⁷⁹ Approximately eight years later, a separate survey found that 80 percent of the Australian public supported “a policy of multiculturalism in Australia.”⁸⁰ *Contemporary Australian Attitudes to Immigration* noted that this support for multiculturalism – even amidst the Howard Government’s stance – may have stemmed from the policy’s perceived contribution to increased economic development.⁸¹ In addition, the policy also gained popularity for encouraging immigrants to enter into Australian society, rather than remaining in isolated ethnic/cultural enclaves.⁸²

These sentiments partly aided the continued development of Australia’s multiculturalist integration services. For example, the 2003 *Report of the Review of Settlement Services for Migrants and Humanitarian Entrants* led to the creation of the Settlement Grants Program.⁸³ The program focuses on ensuring immigrants could find jobs, accommodation, and health-care through active connection with community organizations and contacts.⁸⁴ In addition, it also funds organizations that provide important integration services, including helping new immigrants settle into their host communities, improving migrant socio-economic outcomes, and promoting social participation.⁸⁵

Overt government support behind multiculturalism was restored in the following governments with prime ministers Kevin Rudd (2007-2010) and Julia Gillard (2010-2013). Under Prime Minister Rudd, the government created the Australia Multicultural Advisory Council (AMAC), which aimed to promote social cohesion and positive engagement with diversity.⁸⁶ In addition, more focus was placed on the Living in Harmony program (established in 1998).⁸⁷ While considered an unofficial settlement program, Living in Harmony aims to build social integration and a sense of belonging among migrant populations. Through multiple community-based functions, Living in Harmony is known for sponsoring projects that build positive community relations, partner large national and regional organizations together to promote multicultural Australian values, and advance public information and research.⁸⁸

Later, the 2011 launch of the Australian Multicultural Council (AMC) concentrated on advancing access and equity goals of migrant populations and conducting research on improving cultural diversity.⁸⁹ The Gillard government also established the National Anti-Racism Partnership and Strategy, which partnered multiple agencies together (including the Department of Immigration and Citizenship, the Australian Human Rights Commission, the Race Discrimination Commissioner, and the Department of Families, Housing, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs).⁹⁰ Collaborating with non-governmental organizations, the strategy outlined five key areas of interest: 1) result and consultation, 2) education resources, 3) public awareness, 4) youth engagement, and 5) ongoing evaluation. Signifying a stronger path towards multiculturalism, other initiatives like the Multicultural Arts & Festival Grants and the Multicultural Youth Sports Partnership Program soon followed.

Canada

Canada is internationally known for its wide-ranging, multiculturalist immigrant integration policy. Throughout the 20th century, the government's willingness to accept cultural diversity steadily grew as a result of two factors. The first was the absence of large-scale uncontrolled migration.⁹¹ The second was a long-existing "culture of accommodation" that was borne out of historic interactions between English and French settlers, as well as with indigenous people.⁹² By 1959, the country's first official acknowledgement of a multiculturalist integration policy occurred in the Canadian Year Book. An annual government resource that outlines the trends and patterns in the nation's economy, population, society, and environment, the Year Book considered immigrant integration – unlike assimilation – both "voluntary in nature" and the "responsibility of the host society."⁹³ This was later reinforced by the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, which cited that separating migrants from their "roots" would "destroy" parts of their personalities, capabilities, and values that they can contribute to the native Canadian society.⁹⁴

With the passage of the Official Languages Act (1969) and the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism's recommendations, Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau (1968-1979 and 1980-1984) announced to the House of Commons that multiculturalism would become an official Canadian policy. Declarations of his 1971 speech continue to be at the forefront of modern Canadian multiculturalism, including:

"There cannot be one cultural policy for Canadians of British and French origin, another for the original peoples, and yet a third for all the others. For although there are two official languages, there is no official culture, nor does any ethnic group take precedence over any other... The government will support and encourage the various cultures and ethnic groups that give structure and vitality to our society. They will be encouraged to share their cultural expression and values with other Canadians and so contribute to a richer life for us all." ⁹⁵

Under Prime Minister Brian Mulroney (1984-1993), Canada codified Trudeau's sentiments into the Canadian Multiculturalism Act in 1988.⁹⁶ Other important legislation that supported multiculturalism also passed during this time. In 1977, the Citizenship Act removed barriers against Canada's non-British population and the passage of the Canadian Human Rights Act was considered a chief anti-discrimination victory.⁹⁷ The later Employment Equity Act (1995) required employers to actively employ and increase representation of marginalized groups, including women and visible minorities.⁹⁸

As of 2012, the Canadian government consolidated integration efforts into three main agencies: Citizenship and Immigration (CIC)^c, Canadian Heritage, and Human Resources and Social Development Canada (HRSDC).⁹⁹ The HRSDC and CIC provide initial settlement services, but the latter is known for supporting critical integration projects that facilitate immigrant and native interactions. One has been the LINC, a language instruction initiative that is well-regarded for its purposeful curation of multicultural classrooms.¹⁰⁰ Another project has been the Host Program, which matches immigrants to local and trained Canadian volunteers. Through the program, immigrants can “practice language skills, learn about Canadian society, and build a network of support and friends to aid in integration.”¹⁰¹

The CIC also funds the Canadian Immigrant Integration Program (CIIP). As a pilot program in 2007 and later a permanent settlement fixture in 2010, the program addresses potential integration issues for migrants prior to their arrival to Canada.¹⁰² It provides free pre-departure orientation and information on local partner organizations during the final stages of the immigration process.¹⁰³ With Canadian Heritage, CIC also funds other similar programs, such as the Library Settlement Partnerships, the Gateway Project, the Spot, and the Positive Spaces Initiative.¹⁰⁴

In contrast to the two other agencies, Canadian Heritage's sole focus is on the maintenance of an inclusive Canadian society.¹⁰⁵ Through its Multiculturalism Program, Canadian Heritage strives to strengthen Canada's multicultural identity and ensure equality of rights and opportunities for all Canadian residents – regardless of citizenship.¹⁰⁶ Through three priority policy goals (fostering a diverse national identity, social justice, and civic participation), the Multiculturalism Program creates, funds, and supports various multiculturalism-related initiatives.¹⁰⁷ This includes the *Action Plan Against Racism*, a five-year plan launched in 2006 to achieve priorities like promoting diversity, strengthening civil society, and educating children and youth on anti-racism.¹⁰⁸

These three agencies also fund provincial and local programs. Most of these programs teach migrants foundational skills that can help them contribute and interact with the broader society. For example, the Language Education at a Distance-LINC Home Study program was launched in 1995 and helps newcomers improve English-language skills on their own working schedule. Similarly, the Multicultural Liaison Officer Program (a provincial program funded by

^c In 2015, the CIC was renamed Immigration, Refugees, and Citizenship Canada (IRCC).

CIC) was created in 1991 to address the integration needs of migrant families and ensure their participation in the Ottawa school system.¹⁰⁹

Case Studies: Assimilation

France

In the past half-century, France has gone through differing integration policies. Shortly after the Second World War, French immigration policy was heavily skewed towards a “civic-territorial” assimilationist model, which outlined a political but voluntary effort to adopt democratic values.¹¹⁰ “Voluntary” political conformity was defined as being heavily encouraged using the possibility of societal exclusion, but not threatened with formal government penalty or punishment.¹¹¹ But for migrants, integration in these terms began to mean abiding by the mainstream model of social cohesion through economic, state, and cultural means.

For most of the 1960s and 1970s, France’s stance on integration was dominated with this ideal of assimilation. But the 1980s brought along new challenges, such as the spike in family reunification of guest workers in France. This contributed to an increasing physical segregation between immigrant families and the mainstream native communities.¹¹² With the former housed in working-class neighborhoods that suffered high rates of unemployment, delinquency, and residential/ethnic segregation, new urban policies were established. Further, the French government devoted resources to organizations that increased social integration, community acceptance, and political participation of immigrant populations. However, these organizations often integrated immigrants while simultaneously encouraged them to retain and promote their cultural diversity.¹¹³ As a result, the government inadvertently ventured away from an assimilationist integration policy during this time period.

This divergence was furthered after the 1990 government-sponsored formation of the High Council for Integration, which brought together various stakeholders and discussed innovative methods for improving immigrant integration.¹¹⁴ By 1991, the High Council for Integration released a controversial report that rejected France’s original assimilation model. *For a French Integration Model* stated that integration is “not midway between assimilation and insertion, but a specific process where active participation in the national society of varied and different elements is encouraged.”¹¹⁵ Yet, the report did not veer France towards multiculturalism. Combined with external factors, such as increasing national trends of crime, French conservative and far-right political groups in the late 1990s began to resent most multiculturalist integration policies.¹¹⁶

What resulted was a decade of re-emerging assimilationist views that fostered a singular French national identity and subsequent legislative reform. Eventually, the French government began to perceive multiculturalist integration as un conducive to promoting national and social cohesion.¹¹⁷ By recognizing the cultural differences of communities and encouraging their presence in mainstream French society, it would weaken migrants’ willingness to pledge allegiance to the country’s republican principles.¹¹⁸ With French law historically banning ethnic membership in government censuses, the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attack, and the increasing

global threat of extremism, French national identity began to become heavily associated with native language acquisition and citizenship.

This were especially exemplified between 2006-2012, when Nicolas Sarkozy was the French Interior Minister and then the French president. In 2006, the then-French Interior Minister succeeded in passing Law 2006-911 on Immigration and Integration. The law's four objectives ("recruiting skilled workers, facilitating foreign student' stay, tightening the rules on family reunification, and limiting access to residence and citizenship") intended to better control migration into France.¹¹⁹ The law also made language acquisition a compulsory requirement for residency, which ultimately favored highly skilled and educated migrants. Calling it a process of "selective immigration," Sarkozy commented that it should result in better integration outcomes of migrants.¹²⁰

During his presidency, he created an agency that furthered migrant language acquisition and national identity, Ministry of Immigration and National Identity.¹²¹ Shortly after, his government introduced the Reception and Integration Contract (RIC) in November 2007. Modelled after other assimilationist European contracts, the RIC is a major proponent of current French integration policy. Signed by immigrants upon arrival, the contract stipulates that they must undergo mandatory integration courses on the "values of French society" and language instruction.¹²² To be awarded a ten-year residence permit, immigrants must earn a certificate that demonstrates successful completion of the contract's terms. Failure to receive the certificate results in a one-year residence permit.¹²³

The rhetoric of the RIC was also mirrored in France's immigrant guide, *Living in France*, which stated that "living in France means having rights as well as obligations."¹²⁴ The RIC contributed to a 2011 law that heightened assimilation in French integration policy. While the law primarily passed three EU directives, it reiterated that migrants "must show full integration into French society, 'notably by a sufficient knowledge of the French language, history, culture and society... and of the rights and duties bestowed by French nationality and by adhering to the essential principles and values of the French Republic.'"¹²⁵

Germany

Like Australia and Canada, Germany began considering its role in integration during the 1970s. (West) Germany was motivated by the increasing numbers of guest workers seeking continued residency and family reunification.¹²⁶ While the labor recruitment programs were eventually discontinued, the lack of immigrant integration for the existing migrants proved to be a major obstacle to social and economic development.¹²⁷ As a result, Chancellor Helmut Schmidt's administration created an office of a commissioner for foreigners within the Federal Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs in 1978.¹²⁸

By the next year, the commissioner published a memorandum that would affect Germany's immigrant policy for several decades. The memorandum demanded that the national government

take a vested interest in improving integration measures and in ensuring that young immigrants have “access to professional education and labor.”¹²⁹ The commissioner also recommended that Germany’s national and provincial governments accept two realities: 1) the country’s new status as an “immigration destination” and 2) the country’s socio-economic and political stability depends on the national government’s role in immigrant integration.

Following the report, Germany recognized its role as an immigration destination. For example, various political parties like the Social Democrats and the Green Party worked to change public misperception that guest workers did not contribute to Germany’s long-term economic and societal expansion.¹³⁰ However, Germany’s national government continued to avoid creating a comprehensive integration policy. Between the release of commissioner’s memorandum and the early 2000s, most integration efforts and demands still fell to the responsibility of employers, local governments, and civil society organizations.¹³¹

With the reform of the Nationality Act in 2000, Germany’s integration policy began a paradigm shift. For most of the 20th century, Germany granted citizenship based on descent (*ius sanguinis*).¹³² But the 2000 reforms allowed children of non-German parents to automatically acquire German citizenship if at least one parent has been a legal resident in Germany for eight years and possessed permanent residency status. While that brought relief to immigrant families (as citizenship included significant benefits like voting and public sector employment), the law highlighted that citizenship should be used as a tool towards migrant assimilation into the native society.¹³³ In a booklet delivered to the federal government in August 1999, Federal Minister of the Interior, Otto Schily, emphasized:

“This opportunity [reform of the Nationality Act] entails certain minimum requirements [for foreigners]. Anyone wishing to live permanently in Germany must respect our constitution and our legal system. It also goes without saying that he or she will have to learn German.”¹³⁴

These ideals translated itself into another portion of the reforms: in allowing children of non-German parents to keep their parents’ nationality at birth, while gaining German citizenship, these children would have to choose between the two nationalities at the age of 21.¹³⁵ This refusal of dual nationality stems from the concern that possessing more than one nationality would cause an imbalance of political rights.¹³⁶ This would therefore be a potential threat to national cohesion and provoke political and social disloyalty.

Assimilation was further cemented as an official integration policy with the Immigration Act of 2005. While the act created the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (BAMF) and signified integration as a national priority, the act incurred significant changes to Germany’s perception of cultural and migrant diversity. The Immigration Act addressed four issue areas of integration: 1) language education, 2) labor market, 3) general education, and 4) social.¹³⁷ At the center was a singular solution: mandatory 100-hour integration lessons and 600-hour language

courses for migrants considered to have limited German language skills.¹³⁸ Most of BAMF's resources and initiatives are devoted to these courses; the government argued that possessing German language skills is the "key to and thus the essential prerequisite for successful integration."¹³⁹ Therefore, failure to pass these courses and/or demonstrate "adequate knowledge of the German language and culture" could result in penalties ranging from fines, revoking of residence permits, and possible expulsion from the country.¹⁴⁰ Prior to 2016, language courses for professional purposes and development were not offered.¹⁴¹

Soon after the passage of the Immigration Act, the Federal Chancellery held its first Integration Summit in 2006. Used to convene and facilitate discussions of integration practices across departments, civil society, migrant associations, and other actors, it resulted in the 2006 National Integration Plan.¹⁴² The plan's report summarized current integration projects across Germany and outlined future strategies."¹⁴³ Later, in 2007, the National Action Plans on Integration was published and the Law on the Transposition of European Union (EU) Directives passed. The former identified key integration areas of interest, including employment, labor market, and integration courses.¹⁴⁴ But the latter stood out because of its expectations on immigrant integration. Not only did the law provide legislative groundwork for tests that examined migrants' knowledge of German language and culture (and their eligibility for citizenship), but it also introduced integration contracts for immigrants who receive social security.¹⁴⁵ For these immigrants, participation in integration courses became mandatory.

Connection to Integration Indicators^d

Summary of Analysis

In terms of economic, social, and political integration, results were overall mixed. While several indicators across the three issue areas demonstrate that countries with multiculturalist policies show smaller gaps of difference between native and non-native populations, a few are less significant after considering migrant education and skill level demographic. Other indicators simply fail to show a smaller gap of differences between native and nonnative populations in multiculturalist countries than in assimilationist countries. In some instances, higher integration rates for some indicators are present in some assimilationist countries.

What can be considered from these results are several conclusions. The first is that France and Germany – in the same and in separate indicators – tended to have the worst integration rates across the three issue areas. For example, migrants in France (especially high-skilled) face lower employment rates and higher unemployment rates. Germany had large gaps of difference between native and nonnative populations in terms of job and skills distribution. However, for some indicators, Germany and the multiculturalist countries shared similar sizes in gaps of difference. This indicates that, although France and Germany both ascribe to assimilationist integration, Germany may be offering services that are not typically associated with these policies or their

^d Additional indicator figures are in Appendix C.

existing institutions allow migrants – even with lower integration success – to still succeed (such as a generous welfare system).

Second, Australia and Canada shared multiple indicators with smaller gaps of differences. This implies that their multiculturalist policy could be a driver to such success. But as respective countries, they individually showed a higher prevalence for smaller gaps of difference in various indicators across the three issue areas. Considering the number of integration indicators where an assimilationist country had similar gaps of difference in percentage points, this positive finding for the original hypothesis is more likely due to other possibilities. One could be the result of human and social capital that many immigrants in Australia and Canada possess prior to migrating. In conjunction with the theory of segmented assimilation (where pre-migration factors are considerable for determining the extent and success of immigrant integration), existing qualifications and knowledge of highly-educated migrants may play key roles towards better integration.

Another reason could be the overall third trend found across the four countries: country-specific initiatives (or their absence) could lead individual countries to have high or low social and political integration rates. Education and training, as well as the extent of migrant and native community relations, are emphasized in the multiculturalist countries; they had much higher migrant education and training participation rates than France and Germany. In addition, Australia and Canada's native and nonnative residents had more positive opinions about how open their communities were to migrant settlement. The multiculturalist countries' tendency to combine immediate integration services (such as employment, housing, language acquisition) with opportunities for immigrants to gain education, training, and other related factors appear to be the most fruitful for social cohesion and integration.

Initiatives like Australia's Settlement Grants Program and Canada's LINC and Host Program are notable for connecting immigrants to their local communities, as well as to social engagement tools and organizations that facilitate their entry into the mainstream host society. This gives migrants better access to native opportunities, as shown by the heightened level of participation in education/training initiatives. These types of programs are not as apparent in assimilationist countries like France and Germany. While France and Germany provide immigration guides, pamphlets, and initial information on settlement, there is a lack of explicit resources that aid immigrants in adjusting adequately enough to improve nonnative social contribution.

I. Economic

Employment and Unemployment

According to [Figure 1.1A](#), multiculturalist countries in 2012-2013 had smaller gaps of difference between native and nonnative employment rates. They also collectively had smaller gaps of difference between highly-educated natives and nonnatives. But in terms of skills distribution for the employed in [Figure 1.1B](#), Australia, Canada, and France had similar rates of employment for low-educated migrants. Further, France and Germany's highly-educated migrant employment rate gap is 12.3 and 10.0 percentage points lower than the native population – indicating that their highly-educated migrants have less access to employment.

But it is also important to assess employment rates together with unemployment. [Figure 1.1B](#) suggests that assimilationist countries are indeed having worse integration rates, in terms of employment, for highly-educated immigrants. But from looking closer at unemployment rates by skills distribution in [Figure 1.2](#), both multiculturalist countries and Germany have comparably similar gaps. France appears to be an outlier at +6.0 percentage points, but that is only 2 points higher than Germany and 2.8 points higher than Canada. This is not significant enough to support the initial claim that only highly-educated migrants in assimilationist countries are having difficulty with employment. The same trend follows in long-term unemployment rates. As shown in [Figure 1.3](#), three of the four countries have similarly low gaps of difference between natives and nonnatives. The exception is France, which has the largest and relatively significant gap of difference in long-term unemployment rate.

While it appears multiculturalists countries' highly educated migrants are employed more often than those in assimilationist countries, this data does not tell us whether they are actually finding appropriate employment for their skill level. Instead, they could be accepting jobs below their skills level to earn income or are working part-time and temporary jobs. The contradiction between the unemployment and employment rates shows this possibility. Thus, it cannot be concluded to support the original hypothesis that multiculturalist countries have smaller gaps in these particular indicators.




FIGURE 1.1B: DIFFERENCE IN EMPLOYMENT RATE BETWEEN FOREIGN-BORN AND NATIVE-BORN




FIGURE 1.2: DIFFERENCE IN UNEMPLOYMENT RATE BETWEEN FOREIGN-BORN AND NATIVE-BORN, BY EDUCATION





FIGURE 1.3: DIFFERENCE IN LONG-TERM UNEMPLOYMENT RATE BETWEEN FOREIGN-BORN AND NATIVE-BORN



Jobs and Skills Distribution

When considering jobs and skill distribution indicators separately, they appear to show that multiculturalist integration policies create smaller gaps of difference between native and nonnative populations. [Figure 1.4A](#) demonstrates that the difference in percentage points between native and nonnative populations in temporary employment (part-time contracts that may not offer supplementary benefits and job guarantees) are higher in France with +4.7 and Germany with +4.0 in comparison to Australia (+0.6) and Canada (0). Australia and Canada's migrants are indeed finding more permanent jobs, which eliminates the possibility that was proposed in the analysis of employment/unemployment rates. This could mean that their integration policies are aiding significantly in ensuring that migrants are not only accessing temporary or part time work.

However, when considering the distribution of job types and skills together – which provides better context for both indicators – the original hypothesis does not entirely hold. For example, the number of medium-skilled migrants for all four countries are nearly on par with the number of medium-skilled native workers. Additionally, France and Germany have higher rates of temporarily employed migrants in comparison to its native population, but this could be due to the migrant population rather than the assimilationist policies. [Figure 1.4B](#) shows that the number of low-skilled immigrants in France and Germany are, respectively, 9.5 and 13.8 percentage points higher than the number of low-skilled workers in their native populations. In addition, the assimilationist countries' high-skilled migrants are in shortage, with the population being 10 percentage points lower than the native population in France and 17.8 percentage points lower in Germany. The same trends are also found in the case of settled migrant populations (those who have lived in the host country for at least 10 years) in [Figure 1.4C](#).

This contrasts sharply with the multiculturalist countries. The number of Australian and Canadian low-skilled and high-skilled migrant workers are more than the native populations' averages, but they are not as significantly different as France and Germany's disproportionate skill demographics. The unequal skills demographic in assimilationist countries could be a key factor to its high temporary employment rate. With large surpluses of low-skilled immigrant workers, there may not be enough demand for permanent low-skilled positions in the French and German labor markets.

FIGURE 1.4A: DIFFERENCE IN TEMPORARY EMPLOYMENT RATE BETWEEN FOREIGN-BORN AND NATIVE-BORN




FIGURE 1.4B: DIFFERENCE IN SKILL DISTRIBUTION BETWEEN FOREIGN-BORN AND NATIVE-BORN





FIGURE 1.4C: DIFFERENCE IN SKILL DISTRIBUTION BETWEEN SETTLED FOREIGN-BORN AND NATIVE-BORN




Overqualification

In [Figure 1.5](#), multiculturalist countries and France have similar differences in overqualification rates between foreign-born and native-born populations. In fact, the overqualification rate for men and women are higher in Australia than it is in France. While Australia and Canada’s employment rates are higher and their unemployment rates are lower than the assimilationist countries, their overqualification rates imply that their integration policies may not help enough migrants to find jobs that are suitable for their skills and qualifications.

Similarly, Germany has the lowest long-term unemployment gap between natives and nonnatives of the four countries, but the highest disproportion of low-skilled and high-skilled migrants and the largest gap of overqualified migrants to natives. These results demonstrate that

there is an absence of cooperative national and local services devoted to these inadequacies in Germany.


FIGURE 1.5: DIFFERENCE IN OVERQUALIFICATION RATE BETWEEN FOREIGN-BORN AND NATIVE-BORN



Self-Employment

Unsurprisingly, [Figure 1.6](#) establishes that self-employment rates of migrants are greater than the native populations in all four countries. Entrepreneurship can be a pathway for migrants to gain upward socioeconomic mobility while avoiding the mainstream labor market. Canada has the largest gap of difference between native and nonnative populations at 3.7 percentage points. This may indicate that integration for this indicator has been successful in all four countries. Both native and nonnative groups are able to access self-employment as an alternative to overqualification and/or temporary contracting. However, this does not support the original hypothesis that multiculturalist countries have smaller gaps of differences between native and nonnative populations.

FIGURE 1.6: DIFFERENCE IN SELF-EMPLOYMENT RATE BETWEEN FOREIGN-BORN AND NATIVE-BORN



Poverty Rate

The findings on poverty rates may be the most concerning, considering the greater likelihood that migrants in Australia, Canada, France, and Germany will be impoverished. In France, there are 17.8% more migrants in poverty – making it the largest gap of difference of the four countries. As seen in [Figure 1.7](#), France’s migrant poverty rate difference is the outlier of the four. However, the multiculturalist countries do not have the lowest gaps of difference – Germany surprisingly does. This may be due to external factors outside of integration policies, such as Germany’s robust welfare state counteracting economic integration issues that migrants may run into (such as long-term unemployment and overqualification).

In-work relative poverty rate in [Figure 1.8](#) shows comparable trends. An interesting discovery is that Australia’s in-work poverty rate for low-educated and highly-educated workers are nearly the same. This hints the potential that both groups may be provided supplementary poverty-prevention integration services that are tailored to each group’s needs. However, the same cannot be said for Canada; their highly-educated in-work poverty rate is 10.1 percentage points higher than the native population, while their low-educated in-work poverty rate is almost half of that. This suggests that Australia is offering more services than Canada within, or even beyond, the multiculturalist policies they set out to address migrant poverty rate incidence.

FIGURE 1.7: DIFFERENCE IN POVERTY RATE BETWEEN FOREIGN-BORN AND NATIVE-BORN





FIGURE 1.8: DIFFERENCE IN (IN-WORK) RELATIVE POVERTY RATE BETWEEN FOREIGN-BORN AND NATIVE-BORN



II. Social

Education and Training Participation

In terms of whether migrants are participating in education/training initiatives as much as the native population, Australia's gaps of difference are significantly smaller than Canada, France, and Germany. Averaging between women and men in [Figure 2.1A](#), Australia's migrant participation rate was only 1.8 percentage points less than native participation rates. Canada's participation rate for female migrants are much higher than male migrants, with only a -4.8 gap of difference between native and nonnatives. Conversely, male migrants in Canada are suffering an -8.0 percentage point difference.

For France and Germany, education and training participation rates for males and females are the worst of the four countries. The French migrant participation rate's gap of difference is only slightly higher than Canada's results. But Germany is the outlier with a 13.1 gap of difference for female migrants and 18.4 gap of difference for male migrants. Collectively, according to [Figure 2.1B](#), France has the worst education and training participation rates for native and nonnative populations. The findings, in combination with [Figure 2.1C](#)'s education distribution (which is similar to the results of economic skills distribution) imply three possible conclusions. First, Australia's small gaps of difference in education and training may be due to initiatives that they are providing that Canada is not; therefore, the multiculturalist policy does not ensure that countries will provide education and training integration as the current policy criteria holds.

Second, the opposite can be said for Germany. Unlike Australia, there are not enough adequate or accessible services to address these specific integration needs. Separate studies noted that in Germany, most non-EU migrants informally have no choice in integration course participation, as guidelines are unclear and local authorities decide who needs to participate. Only 49.1% of participants said the courses offered through the German assimilation policies made a high or very high contribution to their labor market integration and socioeconomic mobility.¹⁴⁶

Last, [Figure 2.1B](#) implies that education and training is not a major priority for French native populations. This can create a lasting effect by ensuring that France continues to not implement additional training programs or improve the participation rates of existing ones – even if migrant populations may benefit the most from them.

FIGURE 2.1A: DIFFERENCE IN EDUCATION/TRAINING PARTICIPATION RATE BETWEEN FOREIGN-BORN AND NATIVE-BORN




FIGURE 2.1B: EDUCATION/TRAINING PARTICIPATION RATE OVER THE LAST 12 MONTHS (2012-2013)





FIGURE 2.1C: DIFFERENCE IN EDUCATION LEVEL BETWEEN FOREIGN-BORN AND NATIVE-BORN



Job Training Participation

According to [Figure 2.2A](#) and [Figure 2.2B](#), the type of training provided by governments and other stakeholders for migrant populations matters in terms of participation rates. Further, [Figure 2.2C](#) shows that, overall, migrants benefit much more from these initiatives than native populations. In [Figure 2.2A](#), there are much smaller gaps of difference in job-oriented training participation between native and nonnative populations for both Australia (3.6 for men, 2.7 for women) and Canada (1.4 for men, 5.4 for women). Germany trails close behind, with male migrants participating in job-oriented training more often than male natives at a positive difference gap of 0.7.

France does not have high job-oriented participation rates; in fact, the gap difference between female migrant and native participation is 19.2 percentage points. In [Figure 2.2C](#), 36.5% of foreign-born populations in France found job-oriented training useful while 13% of natives agreed. Combined with France's findings on migrant education and training participation rates, this further supports the prospect that the country is not ensuring access or availability of such programs, especially to nonnative populations. Along with education and training integration, France may be overlooking necessary job-oriented trainings as a result of native French opinion and/or lack of general accessibility to such programs, but these may be the wrong perspectives to sustain for the purpose of successful immigrant integration.

On the other hand, on-the-job training participation rates in [Figure 2.2B](#) have noticeably larger gaps for Canada, France, and Germany. Canada may be providing more services for job-oriented training, but not as much for on-the-job training. Their gap of difference in native and nonnative populations are -13 percentage points for men and -10 percentage points for women. That is not entirely different than France's figures, but Germany's gaps in percentage points are considerably worrying at -16.7 for males and -18.8 for females. It is clear from these results that countries, regardless of integration policies, are not doing enough to integrate migrants via on-the-job-training. This will bear larger consequences on their abilities to relate to the host societies, their socioeconomic statuses, and their economic contributions.

FIGURE 2.2A: DIFFERENCE IN JOB-ORIENTED TRAINING PARTICIPATION RATE BETWEEN FOREIGN-BORN AND NATIVE-BORN




FIGURE 2.2B: DIFFERENCE IN ON-THE-JOB TRAINING PARTICIPATION BETWEEN FOREIGN-BORN AND NATIVE-BORN





FIGURE 2.2C: EMPLOYED POPULATION WHO REPORT BENEFITTING FROM JOB-ORIENTED TRAINING



Unmet training needs

The percentage of working individuals with unmet training needs is generally the same for foreign-born and native populations in the four countries. In [Figure 2.3A](#), the percentages average out to 25.05% in Australia, 32.55% in Canada, 18.8% in France, and 28.65% in Germany. The lowest percentage of individuals with unmet training needs is in France, but that may be due to lesser expectations of education and job-related training participation.

These findings are further detailed in [Figure 2.3B](#), [Figure 2.3C](#), and [Figure 2.3D](#). The largest gap differences in reasons for unmet training needs are mostly concentrated in education-or-financial-related and employment-related categories. This indicates that integration efforts may need to focus on these improving these indicators in order to reach better social (and economic) integration.

In France, the gaps between native and nonnative population in education-or-financial-related reasons (12 percentage points) and employment-related reasons (13.9 percentage points) as obstacles to mitigating unmet training needs are the largest among the four countries. In conjunction with the education and skills distribution of France’s migrant population, this implies that they struggle to integrate economically as a lack of pre-migration and post-migration resources. However, Germany’s gap differences – while slightly higher than the multiculturalist countries – follows more closely with Australia and Canada than with France. Therefore, the original hypothesis does not hold for this integration indicator.

FIGURE 2.3A: INDIVIDUALS WITH UNMET TRAINING NEEDS, AGE 25-65 (2012-2013)







FIGURE 2.3B: DIFFERENCE IN REASONS FOR UNMET TRAINING NEEDS BETWEEN FOREIGN-BORN AND NATIVE-BORN (2012-2013)



**FIGURE 2.3C: REASONS FOR UNMET TRAINING NEEDS
(FOREIGN-BORN POPULATION)**



**FIGURE 2.3D: REASONS FOR UNMET TRAINING NEEDS
(NATIVE-BORN POPULATION)**



Social Cohesion

[Figure 2.4](#) reveal that migrants in all four countries have reported being discriminated against based on their cultural and ethnic identities. The highest rate for all foreign-born is in France at 17.5%. Australia holds the highest rate for those from a lower-income country at 24.2%. Across both categories (all foreign-born and from a lower-income country), discrimination rates are relatively similar for the four countries. On average, 16.3% of all foreign-born in multiculturalist countries and 15.15% in assimilationist countries reported being discriminated against. This is not a significant difference, even as multiculturalist countries have reported a higher discrimination incidence rate. But this does assert that Canada and Australia’s policies may not be efficient in combating prejudice and bigotry. It should also be noted that cases involving identity discrimination can go unreported. Therefore, these figures are conservative, but should still serve as major considerations on how integration policies can be better crafted to eliminate future incidents of discrimination.

However, the percentage of native and nonnative individuals that believe their area/city of residence are welcoming and appropriate for migrant settlement are much higher in multiculturalist countries. According to [Figure 2.5](#), Australia and Canada’s results indicate that an average 92.2% of both natives and nonnatives believe this, while only an average of 78.95% of those surveyed in France and Germany say the same. A factor that plays a role is public opinion on whether countries are addressing migrant needs. For Canada and Australia, this is often shown through specific legislative and government-sponsored taskforces. While multiculturalist integration policies may not address discrimination as readily as its policy criteria expects, it does improve and create more openly favorable environments for migrant settlement and the beginning of long-term immigrant integration.

FIGURE 2.4: IMMIGRANTS WHO HAVE FELT/REPORTED BEING DISCRIMINATED AGAINST BASED ON ETHNICITY, NATIONALITY, OR RACE (2012-2013)





FIGURE 2.5: POSITIVE OPINION OF CITY/AREA OF RESIDENCE FOR PLACE FOR MIGRANT SETTLEMENT (2012-2013)



III. Political

Civic Engagement

Between 2002-2012, naturalization rates were the highest in Canada when compared to the other three countries. Shown in [Figure 2.6A](#), Australia lagged behind France and Germany. But in [Figure 2.6B](#), both multiculturalist countries had the highest share of naturalized citizens among their foreign-born populations.

Australia and Canada succeeded in having higher naturalization rates – and thus better political integration – through two major efforts linked to their multiculturalist policies. The first involves increased community-based public education efforts on naturalization and political involvement, such as Canada’s Host Program. The second is the absence of mandatory integration courses. Australia and Canada also do not use them as punitive justifications against long-term residency, which limits access to naturalization. This finding is also demonstrated through public sector employment in [Figure 2.7](#), where gaps of difference between native and nonnative populations that have resided in the host country for at least ten years are much smaller in Australia and Canada than in France and Germany.

It should also be noted that many migrants in Australia and Canada are highly-skilled and may have had more personal resources that aided them in naturalization. Additionally, countries with historically high rates of immigration and settlement (such as the United States, Canada, and Australia) typically have smoother and well-established routes towards naturalization. Another consideration is that, regardless of education level, immigrants from lower-income countries will seek to gain citizenship; it can further accessibility of opportunities for socio-economic upward mobility or allow highly-skilled migrants to use their existing pre-migration capital (e.g. formal qualifications, resources, professional connections). For future related studies, the origin groups of these naturalized citizens should be examined when data for such is available. Nonetheless, it does not deter from the fact that assimilationists countries’ mandatory integration contracts do not achieve their primary goals (higher naturalization rates and increased migrant participation in the public sector).

FIGURE 3.1A: NATURALIZATION RATE (2002-2012)




FIGURE 3.1B: SHARE OF NATURALIZED CITIZENS AMONG FOREIGN-BORN POPULATION (2012-2013)





FIGURE 3.2: SHARE OF POPULATION EMPLOYED IN PUBLIC SERVICES SECTOR (2012-2013)



Limitations

While this study intended to provide extensive case studies and accurate interpretations of integration indicator results to ensure analysis accuracy and validity, there are a few limitations that should be considered. Further, these limitations should act as avenues for future research endeavors on immigrant integration.

The first limitation in this research is the case studies' histories and extent of investment into their integration policy. Canada and Australia have had a decades-long interaction with integration policy and multiculturalism. In contrast, the integration policies set in France and Germany are considered relatively new, as most of its main initiatives and laws came to fruition in the early 2000s. Therefore, the limited integration programs they currently maintain have not been experimented with or improved as extensively as many of Canada and Australia's programs have. This can be seen with some of Canada's other integration services that do not focus entirely on multiculturalism, but still have an impact on integration indicators.

Another limitation is that only four cases have been studied in comparison with each other. The countries were chosen as primary case studies because their control variables were the most similar to each other and possessed clear connections to their respective integration policy. But to increase the validity of the determined conclusions, other case studies that are similar regarding other important integration factors (such as foreign-born percent share of the population, new immigration flows types, immigrant household types, and homogeneity of the native society) should be considered for analysis.

Earlier case study possibilities included New Zealand, Luxembourg, Switzerland, United States, United Kingdom, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, and Finland. However, along with their varying demographic variables, their integration policies were not defined clearly enough to be considered assimilationist or multiculturalist. In considering countries like the United States, future analysis should study immigrant indicators in countries that do not offer any form of official integration policy. This could create a better picture on how impactful and effective integration policies can be in comparison to its absence.

Lastly, a major limitation was with the immigrant indicators themselves. While the OECD have provided information on wide-ranging topics regarding integration, a few from each issue area had to be omitted because similar data collection methods and survey standardization for these outcomes was not apparent in the four countries studied. This included indicators like Activity Rate, Voter Participation, and Host-Society Attitudes Towards Immigrants. Due to the time constraints of this study, supplementary indicators aside from those provided by the OECD's report could not be found for all four countries.

Conclusion

Migration, especially in this increasingly connected world, will never cease as long as there are individuals and communities seeking to improve their quality of life. Regardless of immigration trends, the citizens of a host country have interests in ensuring that the country's social and economic wellbeing are being held up to a certain standard of equality and equity. However, this cannot happen if the potential of immigrants in the economic, social, and political sphere of nations are constantly overlooked or underestimated. From the results of this research, this often occurs when integration initiatives do not consider migrant demographic, identities, and needs. It is therefore important to consider national policies, like assimilation and multiculturalism, because they can determine whether policymakers will incorporate such imperative factors in the development and outreach of country-wide integration efforts.

Assimilation is an integration policy that is built from a normative ideal of a unilinear national identity in a multicultural society. It mainly seeks to increase only civic and political engagement of immigrants. The contrasting policy studied was multiculturalism, which aims to accomplish major goals of assimilationist policies while also increase cultural and societal engagement between native and nonnative population. These policies' extent of success was determined through immigrant integration indicators, which was measured using the OECD and the European Union data source, *Indicators of Immigrant Integration (2015): Settling In*. Indicators within three issue areas of integration (economic, social, and political) were considered. Within each issue area included the indicators: Labour Market Outcomes, Job Quality, Household Income, Education and Training, Social Cohesion, and Civic Engagement. In assessing the effectiveness of integration policies, indicator scores with smaller gaps of differences between native and immigrant communities would suggest that opportunities provided to natives are also given to immigrants.

The original hypothesis for this research theorized that countries with national assimilationist integration policies will result in indicator scores with larger gaps of differences between native and immigrant communities. Unlike multiculturalism, these policies will create barriers that will prevent immigrants from fully participating economically, socially, and politically. Ultimately, the study's original hypothesis was not completely fulfilled. In the economic issue area, assimilationist and multiculturalist countries shared both the worst and best integration rates. Similar conclusions were reached with indicators in social integration; however, multiculturalist countries did successfully utilize their integration policy to curate local and community-based efforts that mitigated large gaps in education, training, and social cohesion between native and nonnative populations. The only issue area where the original hypothesis mostly held true was in political integration, where the purposes of assimilationist countries' integration policies were not achieved and showed worse integration rates than their multiculturalist counterparts.

France and Germany were categorized to have an assimilationist integration policy. Both emphasize the adoption and committed demonstration of country language, society, and culture through involuntary integration prerequisites to residency and public sector benefits. While this policy did not affect economic integration as much as hypothesized, related programs and laws were weak in accomplishing its own social and political integration goals. Naturalization rates, as well as foreign-born public sector employment, were lower in comparison to their multiculturalist counterparts. Social cohesion was also slightly fragmented, as demonstrated by the rates of discrimination reports and in the opinions collected by their total populations. The narrow focus on furthering national identity – at the cost of multicultural awareness – took effort and investment away from necessary settlement services that would better aid immigrant contribution into the economy and labor market. For example, migrants in France (especially high-skilled) faced lower employment rates and higher unemployment rates. Germany had large gaps of difference between native and nonnative populations in terms of job and skills distribution.

As multiculturalist countries, Australia and Canada were used as contrasting case studies to France and Germany. In addition to encouraging immigrants to learn about the native host society/language, Canada and Australia sought to increase cultural diversity and facilitate connections between the foreign-born and native-born populations. While many of their programs encourage multiculturalism, they also made these initiatives address key settlement issues for immigrants – including finding employment, housing, learning English/French while on a working schedule, etc. Canada and Australia also focused on maintaining multiculturalism by issuing anti-discrimination laws and campaigns.

However, Australia and Canada’s multiculturalist integration policies were inconsistently successful throughout the three issue areas. First, they shared similar economic indicator outcomes to France and Germany. While their results were somewhat better than France and Germany, the gaps in percentage points between native and nonnative populations were not small enough to prove the original hypothesis. The two countries also did not fare as well as expected in reducing discrimination rates, which went against the intentions of their anti-discrimination laws and campaigns.

On a more positive note, Australia and Canada’s individual country-specific efforts – which could have been fueled by their own interpretation of multiculturalism – led to programs that allowed immigrant populations to socially integrate. Further, political integration for Australia and Canada showed smaller gaps of difference between native and nonnative populations. However, Australia and Canada did not share success in most indicators as one multiculturalist policy unit. Separately, they found higher integration rates in several social integration indicators. Each country provided specific opportunities for education, as well as job-related, training and growth.

While these findings did not fully support the original hypothesis and revealed new useful conclusions, there are still venues for future analysis and for these integration policies to improve.

Immigrant indicators should be explored in other variations of integration policy. They should also be investigated in countries with large and diverse immigration flows, as well as in those without any official integration policy. The actual programs offered within policies should also be studied over an extended period to pinpoint successful initiatives and/or areas that may need improvement.

Additionally, troubling findings on immigrant poverty rate, discrimination, and overqualification were found in all four countries. Future related studies should thus consider the origin groups of nonnative citizens to assess if this factor influences migrants' likelihood of discrimination, naturalization, poverty, upward socioeconomic mobility, etc. Even in Australia and Canada, findings demonstrate that the programs and initiatives within their integration policy can still be improved with continued research, community input, and government investment.

What this study sought to establish is the notion that it is indeed imperative to study the effectiveness of multiple immigrant integration policies. Without continued study and improvement of these policies, communities – on local, national, and global levels – risk sustaining long-term problems that could exacerbate harmful generalizations of immigrant issues and policy innovations. Not only will it impact the communities closest to us, but it will determine the economic and social stability of broader native and nonnative populations.

On the other hand, policymakers and researchers alike must understand how the recent involvement of international organizations are shaping integration policies. Ultimately, these efforts can influence the global community's perspective on migration and humanitarian flows. For the public interest to reap collective economic and societal benefits of migration, it is therefore the obligation of a governing body to guarantee that this objective is carried out through accurate and effective integration policies.

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Appendices

Appendix A: Explanations of Indicators, by Issue Area

ISSUE AREA	INDICATORS	EXPLANATION OF INDICATORS, AS FOUND IN “INDICATORS OF IMMIGRANT INTEGRATION 2015: SETTLING IN” (P. = PAGE NUMBER)
ECONOMIC		
LABOUR MARKET OUTCOMES	Employment rate	“Employed persons are all those who worked at least one hour in the course of the reference week and those who had a job but were absent from work. The employment rate denotes people in employment as a percentage of the population of working age (15-64 years old).” (p. 84)
	Unemployment rate	“Unemployed persons are those without work, available for work and who have been seeking work in the course of the reference week. The unemployment rate is the percentage of unemployed people in the labour force (the total number of people employed and unemployed).” (p. 89)
	Long-term unemployment rate	“The number of job seekers who have been without a job for at least 12 months as a percentage of all the unemployed.” (p. 94)
JOB QUALITY	Jobs distribution by: Types of contracts	“In addition to not being as well paid as permanent positions, temporary jobs often do not entitle workers to paid holidays, sick leave, unemployment insurance, other non-wage benefits, and training to the same degree as permanent positions. And employment protection legislation often does not require the same standards from employers. By its very nature temporary work often breeds a sense of insecurity.” (p. 112)
	Jobs distribution by: Job skills	“The International Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO) drawn up by the International Labour Organization (ILO) describes the tasks and duties undertaken in some 400 jobs divided into families of jobs. ISCO enables jobs to be grouped by the levels of skills and qualifications required. This section divides jobs into three main skill levels: highly skilled – senior managers, professionals, technicians and associate professionals (ISCO 1-3); low-skilled – elementary occupations (ISCO 9); medium-skilled–all other (ISCO 4-8).” (p. 116)
	Overqualification rate	“Overqualification denotes situations where workers’ levels of formal education are higher than those required by the jobs they fill. The overqualification rate estimated here is the share of people with tertiary-level qualifications who work in a job that is classified as low- or medium-skilled by the International Standard Classification of Occupations.” (p.118)
	Share of self-employment	“The self-employed are people who work in their own firms or create their own business, sometimes hiring employees. Self-employment includes business people with their own firms, the professions, artisans, traders, and many other freelance activities. Because of the specific nature of self-employment in agriculture, this section does not consider that sector. Any calculation of the share of self-employed workers in the whole employed population excludes the agricultural sector.” (p.120)

HOUSEHOLD INCOME	Poverty rate	“The relative poverty rate is the proportion of individuals living below the poverty threshold. According to the Eurostat definition used here, the poverty threshold is 60% of the median equivalised disposable income in each country.” (p.166)
	In-work poverty rate	“The relative poverty rate is the proportion of individuals living below the poverty threshold. According to the Eurostat definition used here, the poverty threshold is 60% of the median equivalised disposable income in each country. Earnings from work are the main source of disposable income for most of the population. Although employment helps to reduce the risk of poverty, it is not always enough to fully protect individuals from poverty, especially if they have dependent children.” (p.168)
SOCIAL		
EDUCATION AND TRAINING	Participation in education and training	“They refer to all types of education and training schemes followed in the previous 12 months – education programmes, remote learning platforms, on-the-job training, seminars, working groups, and private lessons.” (p.140)
	Share with unmet training needs	“Reasons are split into three categories: i) Education or financial: “Don’t meet the standard for following a course” or “The programme is too expensive”; ii) Employment: “Lack of support from employer” or “Too busy at work”; iii) Family: “The course is scheduled at an inconvenient time” or “Don’t have time because of family commitments”. Respondents give other reasons occasionally, e.g. “Something came up that stopped me from attending”, or do not give an explanation.” (p.140)
	Participation in job-related training	“The data relate to the most relevant education or training programme (see Indicator 7.3) followed in the previous 12 months and, primarily, whether it was work-oriented. Training may be work-related because coworkers or superiors organise it during working hours to help employees perform their duties more effectively, or because its content focuses on a specific job and is designed to increase trainees’ chances of finding work or securing a better job. If the purpose is to find work or a better job, anyone may be concerned, regardless of their employment status (in work, unemployed, or inactive) when training begins.” (p.142)
	Usefulness of job-related training	“Discusses whether the training course was perceived to be of benefit to attendees in their current job or the job they held at the time.” (p. 142)
SOCIAL COHESION	Share of immigrants who feel to have been discriminated against	“Ethnic discrimination is generally understood as unfairly treating an individual or a certain group of people on the grounds of their ethnicity, race, or citizenship. It can come in various guises and may be inherent in individual behaviour and institutional structures and practices. This indicator measures ethnic discrimination perceived by people born abroad. Depending on the country, it reflects discrimination that is perceived personally in a given situation or by the respondent’s entire ethnic group.” (p. 220)
	Share of people who think that their area is a good place for migrants to live	“Seeks to assess the integration of immigrants from the point of view of the host country, as positive attitudes make integration easier. Host country opinions of immigration have been assessed using various questions: is the respondents’ city or area of

residence a good place for migrants to live – which can be considered an indicator of welcoming.” (p. 224)

POLITICAL

CIVIC ENGAGEMENT	Naturalization rate	“Nationality acquisition rates should be calculated by dividing the stock of national foreign-born by the eligible foreign-born population. However, the definition of “eligible foreign-born population” varies from one country to the next because the legal practicalities of acquisitions differ greatly across countries. A key criterion for nationality acquisition is a minimum duration of residence. In virtually all countries, this is at most ten years. To focus on those who are eligible in principle, the acquisition rate considered in this section is therefore based on the share of immigrants who have resided in the host country for at least ten years and who hold its nationality.” (p.206)
	Share of nationals among foreign-born population	“An immigrant is a person born abroad (i.e. foreign-born).” (p.42)
	Share of employment in the “public services” sector	“The share of immigrants employed in the public services sector, among all immigrant employment. The public services sector encompasses public administration, healthcare, the social services, and education.” (p.122)

Appendix B: Alternative Explanations – Control Variables¹⁴⁷

Table 3: Country Demographics

	Population (millions)	Foreign-Born Population (millions)	% Foreign-Born in Population
<i>Australia</i>	22.7	6.20	27.3%
<i>Canada</i>	34.9	6.91	19.8%
<i>France</i>	63.5	7.56	11.9%
<i>Germany</i>	80.4	10.69	13.3%

Table 4: Economic and Development Stability

	GDP (in millions, US\$)	GDP per capita	Human Development Index Score (HDI)
<i>Australia</i>	1,543,411	67,864	0.929
<i>Canada</i>	1,824,288	52,496	0.908
<i>France</i>	2,683,825	40,874	0.886
<i>Germany</i>	3,543,983	44,065	0.928

Table 5: Age Composition of Foreign-Born Population

Age range	Foreign-born (distribution in %)			Difference in % points with native-born		
	<i>0-14</i>	<i>15-64</i>	<i>65+</i>	<i>0-14</i>	<i>15-64</i>	<i>65+</i>
<i>Australia</i>	6.1	75.0	19.0	-18.2	+11.1	+7.1
<i>Canada</i>	6.1	74.8	19.0	-14.0	+7.3	+6.6
<i>France</i>	5.5	75.1	19.4	-14.6	+11.6	+3.0
<i>Germany</i>	3.1	83.1	13.8	-11.4	+19.6	-8.2

Table 6: Distribution of Foreign-Born Populations by Duration of Stay as of 2012, aged 16-64 (Share of Total Foreign-born population)



	<5 years	5-9 years	≥10 years
<i>Australia</i>	17.6%	11.9%	70.5%
<i>Canada</i>	14.6%	13.5%	71.8%
<i>France</i>	10.9%	12.6%	76.5%
<i>Germany</i>	12.1%	10.0%	78.0%




Table 7: Languages Learned and Spoken by Immigrants, aged 16-64 (Total = 100)




	Foreign speakers: host-country language most often spoken at home	Not speaking the host-country language at home	Monolingual native speakers	Multilingual native speakers
<i>Australia</i>	22	29	39	10
<i>Canada</i>	22	46	18	14
<i>France</i>	30	28	21	21
<i>Germany</i>	36	40	14	10




Appendix C – Additional Integration Indicator Figures




I. Economic
















II. Social



Endnotes

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