

Judgments of Others' Trait Self-Control

by

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Dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of
the requirements for the degree of Doctor
of Philosophy in the Department of
Chemistry in the Graduate School
of Duke University

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ABSTRACT

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Abstract

People value others' good self-control when they feel their own self-control is inadequate or need help pursuing their goals. However, the process by which people distinguish good vs. poor self-control in others has not been examined. Two studies were conducted to examine the extent to which people's idiosyncratic experiences using self-control affect their perceptions of others' level of self-control and the extent to which people agree in their perceptions of others' self-control. Study 1 presented participants with 25 behaviors that typically require self-control and asked questions related to difficulty, frequency, and success rate. Participants then reviewed these behaviors and questions again but were asked to predict how the average person their age would respond. The results of Study 1 show that people think their experiences with self-control are different from those of the average person, but their perception of what is typical for others was not related to their own idiosyncratic self-control experiences. In Study 2, participants completed a measure of trait self-control and nominated six to eight people to serve as informants. Informants were sent a survey asking them to rate the self-control of the participants who nominated them. The results of Study 2 show that people tend to agree in their perceptions of the self-control of the people they know. Possible explanations for these findings and suggestions for future studies examining judgments of others' self-control are discussed.

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1. Introduction

Self-control refers to the ability to inhibit impulses and undesired behaviors as well as to initiate and maintain desired behaviors (Hoyle & Davisson, 2016).

Unsurprisingly, people who effectively use self-control are more likely to achieve their goals across a variety of domains (de Ridder, Lensvelt-Mulders, Finkenauer, Stok, & Baumeister, 2012; Moffitt et al., 2011). High self-control predicts greater success in achieving health goals, such as losing weight (Crescioni et al., 2011); greater success at school, such as earning higher GPAs (Duckworth, Quinn, & Tsukayama, 2012); and constructive communication in interpersonal relationships (Bornstein, vanDellen, & Shaffer, 2017). Conversely, low self-control is related to more procrastination (Steele, 2007), problematic drinking (Reisig & Pratt, 2011), and aggressive or delinquent behaviors (Krueger, Caspi, Moffitt, White, & Stouthamer-Loeber, 1996).

In addition to providing personal benefits, good self-control is related to adaptive social functioning. People high in self-control are seen as more accommodating, more trustworthy, and more reliable (Finkel & Campbell, 2001; Peetz & Kammrath, 2011; Righetti & Finkenauer, 2011). They tend to be more likeable in general and have more friends (vanDellen, Meisel, & Lynch, 2017). Furthermore, people seem to understand that others' self-control can have consequences for their own behavior. For instance, people tend to draw near to high-self-control others when they feel their own self-control is inadequate (Shea, Davisson, & Fitzsimons, 2013) and approach low-self-control others when they want to feel better about indulging in a temptation (Lowe & Haws, 2014).

People high in self-control are typically held to higher standards and asked to do more work toward a joint goal than their low-self-control counterparts, sometimes to the point that their high self-control can feel like a “burden” (Koval, vanDellen, Fitzsimons, & Ranby, 2015).

People also naturally ascribe self-control-relevant traits to others in written evaluations and everyday conversation: a mother may describe her child’s studious friend as a “good influence,” a boss may comment on an employee’s work ethic in an annual review, and a wife may comment on how impressed she is with her husband’s commitment to marathon training. Moreover, some jobs require people to make judgments of others’ self-control in ways that have serious consequences; for instance, doctors must judge patients’ ability to use self-control when considering treatment options that require patients to make drastic lifestyle changes. However, the process by which people make evaluations of others’ self-control is not clear, and basic questions related to the perception of trait self-control in others have not been empirically examined (e.g., What information is used to form self-control judgments? Are people generally accurate in these judgments?). The purpose of this dissertation is to start a new line of research that begins to address these questions.

1.1 Trait Judgments

Personality trait judgments help us summarize the information we know about a person for later use. For instance, if I know that a person likes working in groups, is talkative, and is comfortable approaching strangers, I can combine that information to

judge that person as high in trait extraversion. Forming trait judgments requires noticing behavioral patterns in another person and making inferences about those patterns reflecting what that person is like. One way we make these inferences is by comparing the behaviors we observe to underlying “conceptual templates” for different personality traits (Cantor & Mischel, 1979; Wood, Tov, & Costello, 2015). These templates contain people’s basic understanding of trait criteria; for example, a person’s conceptual template for selflessness may tell them that selfless acts (1) provide some benefit for others while they (2) provide no benefit to the actor. The benefit of conceptual templates’ simplicity is that people can use them in a variety of situations. So, a person can recognize both the act of giving up a seat on the bus and the act of donating a kidney as selfless acts, even though the actions are otherwise quite different.

Furthermore, per Wood and colleagues (2015), observers will connect an action to a trait only when observers’ conceptual template for a trait is aligned with what they infer are the actor’s expected effects of the behavior. Therefore, for a person to identify the act of giving up a seat on a bus as “selfless,” he or she must think that the act was done because the actor expected it would help others and not because the actor thought it would lead to personal gain. To understand the criteria used to identify behaviors relevant to trait self-control, we need to examine the content of the conceptual templates people have for self-control. How do people determine the criteria that need to be met in order to identify a behavior as an act of self-control? One possibility is that people’s conceptual

template for trait self-control is largely created based on their personal experiences with self-control success and failure.

The way people think and feel about themselves affects how they think and feel about other people (Dunning & Hayes, 1996). People overestimate the extent to which their own experiences, values, emotions, and other reactions are normative and project this knowledge onto others when making social judgments (Ross, Greene, & House, 1977). This assumption of similarity allows us to judge others by the standards with which we judge ourselves and preserve a positive self-image. For instance, consider the facets of trait conscientiousness delineated in the NEO PI-R (Costa & McCrae, 1995): competence, order, dutifulness, achievement striving, self-discipline, and deliberation. If people think their own dutifulness and self-discipline are particularly high, they are more likely to focus on these facets when judging conscientiousness in others. Conversely, a person low on order may deemphasize that facet in their conceptualization of conscientiousness. In short, people tend to have idiosyncratic definitions of traits that are based on their own experiences because their judgments are self-serving (Dunning & Cohen, 1992).

I predicted that people's beliefs about what constitutes good versus poor self-control are constructed around their own successes and struggles with self-control, and the ways they use those beliefs to judge others' self-control is self-serving. People's assumption that others experience self-control dilemmas the same way they do personally should help them validate their failures as normal and boost their self-esteem with

successes. For instance, if a person on a diet just ate four slices of pizza, they can justify that behavior by thinking about how often others give into the temptation to eat pizza. A person who successfully resisted the temptation to eat pizza can use others' failures to resist pizza to increase his or her self-worth by thinking about how they were able to overcome a challenge that others find difficult. Thus, if people are motivated to validate their own successes and failures at self-control, they should be biased to remember other people's failures more often than their successes.

However, trait judgments of others' self-control are probably motivated by more than a person's ego. People should be motivated to make accurate judgments of others' self-control when other people's self-control has consequences for their personal goal pursuit. For instance, if a person pursuing a new health goal is trying to decide who they should choose as a running partner, they will want the person they choose to have shown high self-control with health behaviors in the past. Therefore, people should prioritize accuracy in identifying evidence of high and low self-control over their desire to maintain a positive self-image when they want to "use" the good self-control of others. I propose that two competing motivations underlie people's judgments of others' trait self-control: the motivation to use others' self-control for personal benefit and the motivation to maintain a positive self-image. Both motivations are self-serving, but the former requires people to have at least some self-awareness of their vulnerabilities that the latter does not.

1.2 Cue Visibility and Closeness

Self-control is relevant to a wide variety of behaviors and is used in both an initiatory and inhibitory manner (Hoyle & Davisson, 2016). Self-control by initiation helps us start doing tasks we may be inclined to avoid, such as doing homework, cleaning, and having difficult conversations, whereas self-control by inhibition helps keep us from giving into temptations, such as overeating, using substances, or lashing out at others. Both forms of self-control are essential to most goal pursuit. For instance, pursuing academic goals requires both initiating good behaviors, such as studying and going to class, and inhibiting unhelpful behaviors, such as partying on weeknights and bingeing shows on Netflix. Sometimes, successful self-control requires performing behaviors that are observable by others, yet other times, good self-control requires no action at all.

Specifically, observers will likely have behavioral cues to use to make trait judgments when a person is using self-control by initiation but are unlikely to observe cues that help them predict when another person is using self-control by inhibition. The opposite will be true for self-control failures; we can see people engaging in behaviors that result from failed inhibition but will not detect cues that someone is failing to initiate a behavior. Therefore, an unacquainted observer's judgment of another person's self-control should be largely based on successful initiation and failed inhibition because these two types of self-control result in action rather than inaction.

Knowing that a person failed to initiate or successfully inhibited requires knowledge of that person's goals which can typically be gained only through self-disclosure. Self-disclosure, a core feature of close relationships, is correlated with feelings of intimacy and relationship quality (Collins & Miller, 1994). In general, increased closeness between an actor and observer is associated with greater trait judgment accuracy (Funder & Colvin, 1988), largely because close others have greater access to trait-relevant information (Funder, 2012). Closeness should promote accurate self-control judgment because self-control does not always manifest in visible behavioral cues. Thus, to know a person's successes and failures with initiation and inhibition, observers need to be well-acquainted with their targets.

1.3 The Current Studies

Social and personality psychology researchers have not investigated the process by which people judge others' trait self-control. The goal of this dissertation is to address questions related to the content and accuracy of these judgments. First, people's ability to detect cues that others are using self-control, and their use of those cues to form trait judgments, are likely to be influenced by their underlying conceptual templates or lay definitions of what self-control is and when it is used. Because people tend to assume that most people think and behave similarly to the way they do, their understanding of what self-control is should be largely based on their own experiences with self-control conflicts. For instance, imagine that the average person is able to resist the temptation to eat dessert after dinner 50% of the time. I predict that a person who successfully resists

dessert 70% of the time will tend to overestimate the average person's ability to resist that temptation, whereas a person who successfully resists dessert 20% of the time should underestimate the self-control of the average person. The first goal of the dissertation is to determine whether this self-reference bias influences observers' judgments of others' self-control.

The second goal of the dissertation is to examine the extent to which people agree in their perceptions of others' self-control. Some traits are easier to judge than others. Traits, such as extraversion, are easier to see in others because they tend to manifest themselves in observable behavior than those, others, such as openness to new experiences, that are more internal (Funder & Dobreth, 1987; Vazire 2010). Because the visibility of self-control cues varies depending on the type of self-control required (initiation versus inhibition) and whether a person has experienced self-control success or failure, I predict that people will show a moderate level of agreement on judgments of trait self-control relative to judgments of other traits.

However, the level of agreement across people should increase as closeness between an observer and target increases for two reasons. First, relationship closeness should be highly related to self-disclosure between the observer and target, which is essential to identifying instances when a target handled a self-control conflict in a way that did not manifest in observable behavior. Second, observers who are close to the people they are judging should be more motivated to judge others' self-control accurately because the other person's self-control is more consequential to their own goal pursuit.

Study 1 tested the notion that people tend to assume that the way they personally experience self-control conflicts reflects how the average person experiences self-control conflicts. In the study, MTurk workers read a list of 25 common self-control behaviors such as exercising and saving money. Participants rated each behavior in terms of its perceived difficulty, the frequency with which they are confronted with the behavior, and their success rate for performing the behavior. After completing measures of WHAT and WHAT, participants read each of the 25 behaviors again and were asked how the average person their age would answer the items about difficulty, frequency, and success rate. I hypothesized that people's own ratings of how effortful self-control behaviors are would correlate with how effortful they think others find those same behaviors. This pattern should also hold when people are asked how successful they are at performing each self-control behavior as well.

Study 2 examined the extent to which people agree in their judgments of others' self-control. Personality psychologists typically assess trait judgment in one of three ways: self-other agreement (the extent to which observers and targets provide the same ratings for the target), consensus (the extent to which multiple observers provide the same ratings for the target), or behavioral observation (the extent to which an observer's ratings match the observed behavior of the target; Funder, 2012). This study used consensus as its main index of judgment agreement. Participants responded to a measure of trait self-control and then nominated at least six peers to serve as informants. Informants were asked to evaluate participants' trait self-control by responding to the same measure of

trait self-control but worded to ask about others' self-control. Consensus was calculated by finding the average correlation between informants' ratings of participants' self-control. Thus, the difference between participants' ratings of self-control and each informant's ratings of that participants' self-control were calculated to produce an index of disagreement between participants and informants. I then conducted analyses to examine whether self-other disagreement was related to differences between informants.

2. Study 1

2.1 Method

The purpose of Study 1 was to examine the types of self-control conflicts people experience and to determine whether these conflicts influence their inferences about other people's experiences with self-control conflicts. Participants were presented with 25 behaviors that commonly require self-control -- such as saving money, eating healthy food, and getting places on time -- and asked to indicate which behaviors they encountered on at least a monthly basis. They then rated how hard it is to perform each behavior, how often they are confronted with the opportunity to perform each behavior, and often they are successful in performing each behavior. After completing two individual difference measures, participants saw each of the 25 behaviors again and were asked to predict how the average person their age would respond to the same questions. Asking participants to consider each behavior twice, once in relation to their own experience and once in relation to what they think others experience, made it possible to create two response profiles for each participant that were then analyzed using a number of similarity indices. These similarity indices, also known as "profile correlations" (Furr, 2008), were used to address my hypotheses about how a person's own experiences with self-control influence his or her perceptions of how others tackle common self-control conflicts.

2.1.1 Participants

Using Amazon Mechanical Turk, 358 young adult participants (52% female, $M_{\text{age}} = 29.3$ years, $SD_{\text{age}} = 3.2$ years) were recruited for this study. Participation was limited to MTurk workers between the ages of 24 and 36 to control for potential generational differences in the perception of the behaviors presented in the study (e.g., texting and driving, using social media). Participants also needed to be fluent in English and live in the United States. They were paid \$1.50 for completing the study.

2.1.2 Procedure Overview

After giving informed consent, participants were told they would read a list of potential challenges many people encounter on a regular basis. Participants were asked to indicate how hard it is for them to do each challenge on a scale from 0 (*Not hard at all*) to 4 (*Very hard*), with the option to select “I do not regularly encounter this challenge” for any challenges they do not encounter at least once a month. Participants rated 25 challenges (Appendix A), which were separated into two lists based on whether the challenge was worded positively (e.g., “How hard is it for you to exercise?”) or negatively (e.g., “How hard is it for you to resist the urge to buy things you do not need?”).

Then participants were presented with the same challenges again, excluding challenges they rated as *not hard at all* and challenges they do not encounter at least monthly. For each, they were asked how frequently they were confronted with the challenge (response options: *about once a month*, *about once a week*, *a few times per*

week, 1-2 times per day, 3+ times per day) and, of those times, how often they successfully met the challenge (response options: *0% of the time* to *100% of the time* in 10% increments).

Following their initial ratings of challenge difficulty, frequency, and success, participants completed a measure of trait self-control (Hoyle & Davisson, 2016) which is provided in Appendix A. Participants also completed a the revised Big Five personality measure (BFI-2; Soto & John, 2017), but these data were not included in my analyses as they weren't relevant to my main hypotheses. Participants were then instructed to consider each of the potential challenges they read in the first part of the study again and to think about how the average person their age experiences and confronts those challenges. Specifically, they were told to think about all people their age, including co-workers, friends, family members, strangers, etc. and to rate their general impression of how these people experience and handle each challenge. Participants read the challenges and answered the same questions about difficulty, frequency, and success for each as they did in the first part of the study, but with instructions to think about the experiences of others (e.g., "How hard is it for the average person your age to limit the amount of alcohol they drink?"). Finally, participants responded to demographic questions about gender, age, ethnicity, education, and employment status.

2.1.3 Materials

2.1.3.1 Trait self-control

Trait self-control was assessed using the Capacity for Self-Control Scale (Hoyle & Davison, 2016). This scale measures three main types of self-control: self-control by initiation, self-control by inhibition, and self-control by continuation. Participants are presented with 20 statements and asked to indicate the extent to which they agree with each statement (*hardly ever* to *nearly always*, 5-point scale).

2.1.4 Analysis

My main prediction for this study was that people tend to think others' experiences confronting self-control challenges are like their own; in other words, I predicted significant correlations between self-ratings and ratings for the (average) other person for challenge difficulty, frequency, and success. To test these hypotheses, I calculated profile correlations using the techniques suggested by Furr (2008). Profile correlations (also called "*q*-correlations") estimate the correspondence between two sets of scores that measure the same attributes; for instance, they are frequently used in studies that examine similarities between romantic couples or roommates. One of the main benefits of using profile correlations is that, unlike simple Pearson correlations, they distinguish the extent to which profile correspondence is due to normative versus distinctive similarity. This method of disaggregating correspondence indices allows the researcher to account for the fact that two profiles paired at random are likely to be positively correlated simply because people in general tend to endorse some items more

than others (Wood & Furr, 2016). This bias creates an analytic issue such that two people with profiles that are very close to the average of all participant profiles will high correspondence, even though that similarity is more of a function of those two people's averageness rather than their similarity with each other. The method of calculating profile correlations outlined in Furr (2008) isolates the distinctive (unique) similarity between two profiles by subtracting the normative (average) profile from both profiles. Once each person's raw profile has been disaggregated into normative and distinctive components, different questions related to correspondence can be addressed by comparing different sets of profiles.

In Study 1, each participant provided both profiles: a "self" profile and an "other" profile. To examine the extent to which people's unique experiences with self-control challenges are related to their perceptions of others' experiences with self-control, I calculated the correlation between each participant's distinctive "self" profile and his or her distinctive "other" profile. To examine the extent to which people's perceptions of others' experiences reflect what people reported they experienced (also called "stereotype accuracy"), I calculated the correlation between each participant's raw "other" profile and the average "self" profile. I also examined whether any of the personality traits assessed in Study 1 were related to greater correspondence between the different types of profiles. For instance, I tested whether people who have high trait self-control more accurately predict how others experience self-control challenges than people with low trait self-control.

2.2 Results

2.2.1 Preliminary Findings

2.2.1.1 Difficulty ratings

Participants overwhelmingly thought that others find self-control challenges harder to confront than they do, $t(352) = -20.288, p < .0001, d = 1.073$. This pattern of results held at the item-level as well for all but one of the challenges (“start a difficult conversation with someone,” for which mean self-ratings were slightly higher than other ratings, though this difference was not statistically significant).

2.2.1.2 Frequency ratings

Each level of the frequency variable was assigned a number (1 = *once a month*, 2 = *once a week*, 3 = *a few times per week*, 4 = *once or twice a day*, 5 = *three or more times a day*), and the difference between self- and other-ratings was calculated. These difference scores were not normally distributed ($W = .993, p = .002$); thus, a non-parametric test (Wilcoxon sign-rank test) was used to assess differences. When averaging across the 25 self-control challenges, participants indicated that they encountered self-control challenges less often than the average person their age, $Z = -6.522, p < .0001$.

2.2.1.3 Success ratings

Participants rated their own success at meeting the self-control challenges higher on average than they rated other people’s success, $t(352) = 8.217, p < .001, d = .437$. The self-other differences in success scores were in the opposite direction for five challenges, although none of these differences were significantly different from zero (all

$ps > .23$). Descriptive statistics for difficulty, frequency and success ratings are provided in Appendix B.

2.2.2 Correspondence Analyses

Profile correlations were calculated only for difficulty and success scores because the frequency items were measured on an ordinal scale. The average correlations between participants' raw self-profiles and raw other-profiles were relatively small for both the difficulty ratings, $r = .209$, 95% CI [.106, .307], and the success ratings, $r = .171$, 95% CI [.067, .271]. The average correlation between the normative self-profile and a participant's raw self-profile (self-normativeness) was larger for both difficulty, $r = .458$, 95% CI [.371, .536], and success measures, $r = .367$, 95% CI [.272, .454], suggesting people's experiences with self-control are more normative than they assumed.

Distinctive agreement, which compares the residual profiles of self and other scores that remain once the normative profile for each profile is removed, was weak for both difficulty measures, $r = .095$, 95% CI [-.009, .197], and success measures, $r = .097$, 95% CI [-.008, .200]. Specifically, people's unique experiences with self-control challenges were not strongly related to how they perceive others' experiences with self-control challenges.

Finally, participants' stereotype accuracy (the correlation between raw other-profiles and the normative self-profile) for the items assessing difficulty, $r = .310$, 95% CI [.212, .401] was higher than participants' distinctive agreement but lower than their

level of self-normativeness. This pattern held for items assessing success as well, with level of stereotype accuracy falling between level of distinctive agreement and level of self-normativeness, $r = .317$, 95% CI [.220, .408].

2.2.2.1 Trait self-control

Trait self-control was not related to overall agreement ($r = -.049$), distinctive agreement ($r = .008$), self-normativeness ($r = -.047$), or stereotype accuracy ($r = -.053$) in difficulty scores (all $ps > .25$). Correlations between trait self-control and overall agreement ($r = .054$), distinctive agreement ($r = .041$), self-normativeness ($r = -.054$), and stereotype accuracy ($r = -.012$) were not significant either (all $ps > .31$). Thus WHAT DO THESE INDICATE?

2.3 Summary

Overall, participants consistently rated their own experiences with self-control behaviors as different from the average person's experiences. They inferred that other people found the behaviors more difficult, encountered them more frequently, and were less success enacting the behaviors than they were. One interpretation of these findings is that they simply reflect the better-than-average effect, whereby people tend to think they are better than others in terms of socially desirable characteristics, particularly when thinking of others abstractly (Alicke, 1985; for a review, see Alicke & Govorum, 2006).

However, the combination of higher difficulty ratings with lower success ratings for others complicates this interpretation. If we think others find self-control behaviors more difficult than we do, others' relatively lower success rate does not necessarily indicate that we think they have worse self-control; rather, we could think that others have the same level of self-control we do, but that others need to use more self-control than we do to accomplish the same task. Thus, there is not sufficient evidence that people think of themselves as better at self-control than others, only that they think others perceive behaviors that require self-control as more difficult than they do.

My hypothesis that people's unique experiences facing self-control challenges affects their perceptions of others' experiences facing those challenges was not supported; rather, people seem to understand that regarding a self-control behavior particularly challenging does not indicate that behavior is particularly challenging for others. In asking participants to rate the "average person their age," I was essentially asking them to make a normative prediction. Thus, the overall agreement between people's ratings of themselves and their rating for the average other can be seen as their estimate of their own normativeness. The fact that these overall agreement correlations were significantly smaller than the self-normativeness correlations (which are indexes of actual normativeness) suggests that people think their perceptions of and success with self-control behaviors differ more from the average person's perceptions and success than they actually do.

Participants' stereotype accuracy, the agreement between participants' prediction of the normative profile and the actual normative profile (calculated by averaging all participants' ratings for themselves), was also high relative to their overall accuracy, suggesting people are better at assessing what is normative for others relative to their ability to assess their own normativeness. Finally, trait self-control was not related to any correlations assessing agreement, suggesting that having good self-control does not make a person a better judge of what is typical for others.

Study 1 asked participants to think about the self-control experiences of the average person their age; thus, participants' ratings for others were based on their general assumptions about of others' experiences. However, in practice, trait judgments are generally made about individuals rather than "people in general" and are used to distinguish people from one another. Thus, Study 2 was designed to examine people's impressions of self-control in people they know.

3. Study 2

3.1 Method

The purpose of Study 2 was to determine the extent to which people agree in their judgments of others' trait self-control. Participants provided the contact information for at least six people who would serve as informants. Informants were asked to complete a measure assessing the trait self-control of the person who nominated them. The average correlation among informant reports was calculated to index the self-control judgment consensus. Participants also rated their own self-control and answered questions about

their relationships with each informant; this information was used to conduct some additional exploratory analyses.

3.1.1 Participants

Participants were 113 undergraduates (72 identified as female, 41 identified as male) recruited from the Department of Psychology & Neuroscience's participant pool. Participants were asked to complete two online surveys and received one half-hour of participation credit for each survey they completed. Additionally, 430 people completed the informant survey; thus, the average participant had 3.8 analyzable informant reports.

3.1.2. Procedure

3.1.2.1 Part one

Study 2 was administered via Qualtrics surveys. In the first survey, participants completed the Capacity for Trait Self-Control scale (Hoyle & Davisson, 2016), as in Study 1. The revised Big Five Inventory (BFI-2; Soto & John, 2017) was also administered, but these data were not used in the analyses for this study. Next, they were asked to nominate six to eight peer informants, providing their names and email addresses, who would likely be willing to complete a short online survey about the participant. All informants were required to be at least 18 years old and could be peers from Duke, their hometown, etc.

3.1.2.2. Informant reports

Informants were sent a survey link via email within two days of being nominated by a participant. The survey explained that they were being asked to join the participant who nominated them in a personality study and requested that they take a short survey. Informants who agreed to participate responded to the Capacity Trait Self-Control Scale, reworded to reference others (e.g., “[Participant] finds it hard to resist temptations”). They were also asked additional questions about their overall impression of the participant’s self-control, the participant’s meta-perception of their control (e.g. “How would [participant] rate their own level of self-control?”), their perception of their own self-control, and the closeness of their relationship with the participant. These additional items are provided in Appendix C. Informants were asked to complete the survey within a week and were sent at least one reminder email.

3.1.2.3. Part two

One week after informants were sent their survey, the participants were emailed a link to the part two survey. Participants responded to a set of items about each of the informants they nominated. These questions asked about the length and nature of the relationship between the participant and informant, feelings of closeness with the informant, and the average amount of time spent with the informant.

3.1.3. Materials

Participants responded to two measures of closeness about each of their informants. They responded to the two-item Subjective Closeness Index (Gachter, Starmer, & Tufano, 2015), which asked participants to rate the closeness of their relationship with each informant compared to all of their other relationships and what they know about other people's relationships (*not close at all to very close*, 7-point scale). Participants also responded to the Inclusion of Other in the Self task (Aron, Aron, & Smollan, 1992), which asks participants how they would best characterize their relationship with each informant using a series of seven increasingly overlapping circles.

3.1.3. Analysis

When analyzing the correspondence between two judges, it's important to consider whether or not the judges are distinguishable. Most personality judgment studies use distinguishable judges, meaning the source of one judgment is meaningfully different than the source of the other judgment. For instance, a study may look at the correspondence between the judgments of a husband and his wife or a teacher and her student; in these examples, each participant falls into one role or category or the other. In Study 2, however, participants chose all informants based on the same criteria; thus, differences between any pair of informants are arbitrary; thus, the informant reports are considered indistinguishable.

This matters because consensus between judges is calculated much like we calculate the internal reliability, or consensus, of the items in a scale. Specifically, I used

SAS to generate correlations between all possible pairs of scores. SAS also generates an α statistic to capture the consistency between pairs of scores. This α , along with the average number of informants per participant (k), are entered into the following equation from Cronbach (1951) to calculate the average correlation (\bar{r}) between informants:

$$\bar{r}_{ij} = \frac{\alpha}{k + \alpha(1 - k)}$$

However, the calculation of α , and subsequently the average correlation, is complicated by the fact that the informants in this study are indistinguishable, meaning that the pairing of scores that SAS used to calculate α is arbitrary. Therefore, before calculating consensus, I created five datasets, each containing informants that were randomly assigned to be in informant position one through eight within a participant. I then used SAS to calculate all possible correlations between informant scores and the α among these correlations. Following the suggestion of Greco, O’Boyle, Cockburn, and Yuan (2017), I then averaged the five α s and used that average α , along with the average number of informants per participant, to calculate the average correlation between informant reports.

3.2 Results

3.2.1 Descriptive Statistics

All available informant ratings were averaged within each participant so that each participant had a “self” rating and a composite “other” rating of trait self-control.

Participants rated themselves as having lower self-control, $M = 3.188$, $SD = 0.544$, than rated by their informants, $M = 3.702$, $SD = 0.486$. More than half of informants were categorized as family members ($N = 34$, 7.91% of informant reports) and/or people who do not attend Duke ($N = 100$, 23.26% of informant reports), but mean informant self-control ratings were only slightly different when these informants were removed from the dataset ($M = 3.610$, $SD = 0.548$ without family members, $M = 3.667$, $SD = 0.500$ without non-Duke informants). The same pattern of mean differences applied to the three subscales, with the greatest discrepancy being between participant ($M = 2.847$, $SD = 0.777$) and informants ($M = 3.638$, $SD = 0.657$) on the initiation subscale, followed by the continuation subscale ($M_{\text{part}} = 3.428$, $SD = 0.632$, $M_{\text{inf}} = 3.917$, $SD = 0.438$) and inhibition subscale ($M_{\text{part}} = 3.278$, $SD = 0.621$, $M_{\text{inf}} = 3.570$, $SD = 0.538$).

3.2.2 Average Consensus Among Informants

I found that the average correlation between informant reports was $r = .480$. A previous study examining consensus among close others using an undergraduate sample found average consensus correlations among the Big Five personality domains ranging from $r = .24$ to $r = .54$ (Biesanz, West, & Millevoi, 2007). In Biesanz et al., the average consensus correlation for conscientiousness, the Big 5 domain most closely related to self-control, was $r = .31$. In contrast, the average consensus correlation found in this study was closer to the average consensus Biesanz et al. (2007) found for the domain extraversion ($r = .54$), which is typically regarded as the most “visible” Big 5 domain.

3.2.3 Exploratory Analyses

I conducted exploratory analyses to see if any of the other information we collected about participants and their informants could potentially explain the observed difference between participants' ratings of themselves and the average ratings of each participant's informants. To do so, I created a rough estimate of self and informant dissimilarity by finding the squared differences between the mean self and informant ratings of trait self-control. I then calculated the correlation between these squared differences and the items assessing participants' perceptions of and relationships with their average. The squared difference between self and average informant scores were not significantly correlated with participant closeness, though this correlation was in the expected direction ($r = -.129$, $p = .174$). Squared difference scores were not correlated with the average length of relationship between participants and their informants ($r = .092$) or participants' average ratings of their informants' self-control ($r = -.065$).

3.3 Summary

Although I did not have a hypothesis regarding the discrepancy between participant and informant ratings of self-control, I was surprised that the average informant rating of trait self-control was a full standard deviation higher than the average participant rating of trait self-control. I initially thought this difference could be due to heterogeneity in informants. For instance, because self-control is correlated with academic achievement, it's reasonable to assume that a competitive academic environment such as the one at Duke probably attracts people with above-average self-

control; thus, perhaps informants who also attend Duke have a different perception of what constitutes high self-control compared to informants from home (e.g., siblings, high school friends).

However, separating the dataset in terms of Duke versus non-Duke informants and family member versus non-family member informants produced only slightly different means for participants and informants. The discrepancy between participants' and informants' ratings of participants' self-control did vary by subscale. Specifically, the discrepancy for initiation scores was almost three times larger than the discrepancy for inhibition scores. One possible explanation for this effect is the difference between informants' access to cues related to participants' initiation versus inhibition. One way to think about a person's level of trait self-control is by comparing his or her rate of self-control success to their rate of self-control failure. However, because initiation failure is defined by a lack of a desirable behavior, people experiencing initiation failure do not display the cues others need to integrate that initiation failure in a trait judgment. Therefore, whereas a person's self-ratings of initiation will take both success and failure into account, informants' ratings largely rely on instances of initiation success because they are less likely to know about instances of initiation failure. Failures of inhibition, however, typically involve performing undesirable behaviors, and are thus often visible to informants. Thus, the difference in participant-informant mean differences across the types of self-control may be attributable to the varying visibility of failures of each type of self-control.

The average correlation between informant reports was higher than I expected based on previous studies on personality judgment. The consensus correlation in Study 2 may have been higher than the consensus correlation for conscientiousness in Biesanz et al. (2007) for a few reasons. First, measures of self-control and measures of conscientiousness tend to be correlated, but they are not redundant. Perhaps the difference in consensus is due to a difference in the observability of the unique aspects of self-control versus the unique aspects of conscientiousness. Alternatively, the difference in consensus may be due to differences in the samples of participants, informants, or both. For instance, we know that people who are well-adjusted tend to have higher self-control and tend to be easier to judge accurately (Human & Biesanz, 2013). If the student population at Duke actually has a higher level of trait self-control as predicted, they are likely more well-adjusted than average and, thus, easier to judge accurately. Duke students' self-control may also be easier to judge because self-control among Duke students varies less than in the population. Because a large proportion of informants were Duke students themselves, lower variability among informants could have contributed to higher consensus as well.

Finally, the lack of correlation between squared participant-informant self-control difference scores and participant-informant closeness was unexpected due to the number of studies that have shown a significant positive correlation between self-other judgment agreement and length of acquaintance. One possible explanation for the small correlation

between difference scores and closeness is low variability in closeness scores; for instance, only 10% of informants were rated as below the midpoint on closeness.

4. General Discussion

The purpose of these two studies was to make an initial attempt to extend existing personality trait judgment research and methods to the domain of self-control. Although I generated a few specific hypotheses, my main goal was to describe how people think about others' self-control and assess the extent to which people agree in their judgments of others' self-control. The findings suggest several things about the nature of self-control judgments that warrant further study.

First, people tend to think that self-control behaviors are more challenging for others than they are for themselves. They also tend to think others are less successful at enacting self-control behaviors. This pattern may be due to the better-than-average effect or the desire to self-enhance (Alicke, 1985; Sedikides & Strube, 1997). However, the mechanism underlying the better-than-average effect is complicated and can vary a great deal depending a number of factors such as the method used to collect personality judgments and whether a trait is typically evaluated using objective (e.g., intelligence) or subjective (e.g., morality) criteria (Alicke & Govorun, 2006).

In Study 1, the self-other differences may be due to biases in how participants saw themselves, but they may also be due to biases in how participants think about the "average" other. Modern societies scaffold people's self-control in many ways; for instance, companies may require that employees contribute to a retirement fund or block "time-wasting" websites like Facebook. The availability of programs and tools that are intended to supplement or replace a person's self-control may lead people to believe that

the average person has a self-control deficit. Furthermore, various media often highlight how rates of problem behaviors, such as accumulating credit card debt, over-eating, or illegal substance use, are on the rise. If people attribute these societal problems to a lack of self-control, these media reports could negatively bias perceptions of the average person's capacity for self-control. Thus, the difference between self-perceptions of self-control and perceptions of others' self-control may not be due to a desire to protect one's own ego, but due to the perception that the average person's self-control is lower today than it used to be and is declining over time.

I had predicted that people's idiosyncratic experiences with self-control behaviors would affect their perceptions of other people's experiences because people tend to hold self-serving definitions of personality traits (Dunning & Cohen, 1992). Furthermore, when judging another person's standing on a personality trait, people are more likely to supplement their understanding of that trait with their own experiences when they don't have sufficient information to make a judgment based solely on what they observed (Kenny & West, 2010). Therefore, people should rely on their own experiences with self-control to some degree when judging the self-control of others, as self-control successes and failures are sometimes unobservable. However, the data did not support this hypothesis; rather, people seemed to overestimate the extent to which their self-control experiences are unique. People were better at predicting what is normative for others than their own level of normativeness; in other words, people have an idea of what is "normal" when it comes to enacting self-control behaviors, but they tend to think their experiences

are more unique than they actually are. Participants' underestimation of their own normativeness could be due to the "false uniqueness effect," the assumption that one is more different than most other people than is, in fact, the case (Chambers, 2008).

The results of Study 2 also suggest that people may have some misperceptions about their own self-control. However, in this case, people seemed to underestimate their self-control. If we assume Duke undergraduates have higher self-control than the average MTurk worker, the average informant had a more appropriate perception of a participant's self-control than that participant has of their own self-control. Some Duke students rated their self-control as exceptionally low (e.g., an average of a 1.8 on a scale with response options of 1 to 5), even though it is unlikely that a person with such poor self-control would be admitted to an elite university. One possible explanation for these apparent underestimations of trait self-control is that examples of past self-control failures were more salient to participants than self-control successes when responding to items assessing trait self-control. Self-other differences in perception are based on different information, simply because people have access to information about themselves that others do not (Vazire, 2010). However, having more information does not always lead to more accurate impressions. Integrating information about one's thoughts, emotions, physiological states, and behaviors into a cohesive self-judgment is difficult, and people tend to prioritize some types of information about themselves over others (Andersen, 1984). Thus, perhaps participants were relying too much on their thoughts and feelings about past self-control failures when assessing their self-control

and failed to adequately account for the observable self-control behaviors informants used to make their judgements.

The social and academic environment of Duke may have also contributed to participants' lower ratings of self-control. Perhaps students re-calibrate their perceptions of their own self-control once they are surrounded by high achievers and start to think they have low self-control because they think they have lower self-control than the average Duke student. Additionally, this study was conducted in the second half of the spring semester, when students' self-control is more likely to be tested by midterms, sorority/fraternity recruitment, and the improving weather. This effect of reference group may also explain why participants underestimated their initiation compared to their informants. Good initiation is essential to being a good student, and Duke students are constantly confronted with people showing good initiation in class, at the library, at the gym, and elsewhere. However, most students also privately deal with initiation failure in the form of procrastination that others cannot know about unless they disclose it. Thus, if participants are comparing themselves to their Duke peers when rating their level of initiation, they likely have a biased view of their reference group's capacity for initiation.

The results of Study 2 also suggest that people generally agree in their perceptions of others' self-control. In fact, given the observability issues related to judging self-control, I was surprised that people showed the same degree of consensus when judging self-control as they do when judging more "visible" traits such as extraversion. However, the high level of consensus, like the low self-ratings for self-control, could be partially

due to factors unique to the elite university environment. First, because most students have high self-control compared to the general population, their self-control scores are also going to be less variable than they are in the population, and reduced variability among the people being judged should increase consensus (Kenny, 1991). Similarly, research on the factors that affect how accurate a person is judged by others has shown that people who are more well-adjusted (which is correlated with high self-control) and verbally complex tend to be perceived more accurately (Davis & Kraus, 1997; Funder, 1995, 2012). Thus, perhaps a Duke student's personality is generally easier to accurately judge than the average person's personality.

The high degree of consensus seen in Study 2 relative to previous studies on personality judgment may also be due to the increasing number of ways in which people can disclose personal information that can be used for form trait judgments. Most personality studies measuring consensus were conducted more than 15 years ago, before the rise of social media and the societal shift in preference for text messages and emails over phone calls. Social media encourages self-disclosure, and research has shown that people often disclose information on platforms such as Facebook that they would not disclose face-to-face (Hollenbaugh & Ferris, 2014). Therefore, the high level of consensus could also be attributable to young adults today sharing more information about themselves and to many people at one time (Sheldon, 2008).

The results of these two studies provide a more optimistic view of people's ability to judge self-control than I predicted. Though I did not measure accuracy specifically, the

level of agreement seen among people predicting the average person's experience and people judging their peers suggests that, despite not always having access to cues that someone is experiencing self-control success or failure, people are able to arrive at some common understanding of what good versus poor self-control tends to look like in others. Furthermore, I'm not sure that it is possible to assess the actual "accuracy" of trait self-control judgments, as people vary in the extent to which a behavior requires self-control. However, we can extend this work in ways that give researchers more insight into the process of judging others' self-control. For instance, future studies could examine the effects of context on judgments of trait self-control. Existing models of person perception posit higher consensus among judges who only see the person they are judging in a specific environment, such as colleagues in a work setting, as judges in the same environment would be relying on the same pool of information to make their judgments about a person's trait self-control (Kenny, 1991).

One of the limitations of Study 2 is that I did not examine any moderators of consensus between informants in self-control judgments. The fact that I was examining consensus between indistinguishable informants limited my analytic options. Having participants nominate informants in specific categories (e.g., one friend, one parent) would make it possible to model consensus as a latent factor that could be used to test more specific hypotheses about the variables that influence consensus. In addition, using a different study design would also allow for different analyses of agreement. For instance, the majority of personality judgment studies have used a round-robin design,

wherein participants in a group serve as both judgment targets and informants. Had I used a round-robin design myself, I could have used an established model, such as Kenny's (1994) Social Relations Model, to analyze my data.

In summary, research on self-control in the context of interpersonal relationships suggests that people naturally make judgments of others' self-control given that others' self-control can have consequences for their own goal pursuit. Indeed, people seem to affiliate with people who have high self-control when they feel their own self-control is inadequate (Shea et al., 2013) and affiliate with people who have low self-control when they want to indulge (Lowe & Haws, 2014). The present research represents the first attempt to study the process by which people make self-control judgments. The results indicate that people tend to agree with one another when judging others' self-control, although the criteria on which they base these judgments remain unclear. Future studies should attempt to identify these criteria as well as potential cognitive biases and contextual factors that influence our ability to judge others' self-control accurately.

Appendix A

Study 1 Behaviors

1. Get places you need to be on time
2. Limit the amount of alcohol you drink
3. Limit the amount of caffeine you consume
4. Cook meals at home instead of going out to eat
5. Exercise
6. Get out of bed right after your alarm goes off
7. Do chores around the house
8. Limit the amount of time you spend watching TV, movies, YouTube videos, etc.
9. Eat healthy food
10. Go to sleep on time
11. Start a difficult conversation with someone
12. Limit the amount of time you spend playing video or online games
13. Complete errands (e.g., grocery shopping, going to the bank)
14. Save money
15. Stay on task at work or school
16. Limit the amount of time you spend on the phone or internet
17. Text while driving
18. Buy things you do not need
19. Eat junk food
20. Interrupt or speak over other people
21. Buy lottery tickets or participate in other forms of gambling
22. Check social media when you should be doing something else
23. Buy things you cannot afford using a credit card
24. Talk about people behind their backs
25. Raise your voice during an argument

Capacity for Self-Control Scale (Hoyle & Davisson, 2016)

Self-Control by Inhibition

1. I am able to resist temptations.*
3. I have trouble resisting my cravings. (R)
6. I can deny myself something I want but don't need.
9. My bad habits cause problems for me. (R)
12. When I want something that is bad for me, I go after it anyway. (R)
15. I am able to control how I react to impulses.*
18. If I want to do something I know I shouldn't, I won't do it.*

Self-Control by Initiation

2. I waste a lot of time before getting down to work. (R)*
4. I delay as long as possible before starting something I expect to be unpleasant. (R)
7. I waste time on things that don't really matter, rather than working on things that do. (R)*
10. I just can't seem to get going, even when I have much to do. (R)
13. Even when the list of things to do is long, it is easy for me to get started.
16. I get started on new projects right away.*
19. I do nothing despite having plenty to do. (R)

Self-Control by Continuation

5. I am able to keep doing what I think I should do, even when other people would stop.
8. When I commit to doing something difficult, I see it through to the end.*
11. Not much can stop me from honoring a commitment to better myself.
14. I find it hard to continue doing something I don't want to do. (R)*
17. After I have started a challenging task, I find it easy to stick with it.*
20. I find it easy to keep with good behavior.

Appendix B

Self-Other Difficulty Ratings

Self-Control Behavior	Self-Ratings			Other-Ratings		
	<i>n</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>n</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>
Get places you need to be on time	347	1.130	1.199	358	2.025	1.060
Limit the amount of alcohol you drink	297	0.815	1.209	355	2.121	1.049
Limit the amount of caffeine you consume	330	1.776	1.448	358	2.684	1.086
Cook meals at home instead of going out to eat	350	1.406	1.316	358	2.698	1.039
Exercise	351	2.319	1.318	357	2.485	1.013
Get out of bed right after your alarm goes off	347	2.245	1.427	357	2.683	0.988
Do chores around the house	354	1.528	1.119	357	2.146	1.017
Limit the amount of time you spend watching TV, movies, YouTube videos, etc.	352	1.855	1.341	357	2.672	1.064
Eat healthy food	353	1.958	1.234	357	2.742	0.894
Go to sleep on time	355	2.293	1.299	357	2.695	1.019
Start a difficult conversation with someone	328	2.570	1.264	355	2.499	1.053
Limit the amount of time you spend playing video or online games	302	1.285	1.316	358	2.237	1.111
Complete errands (e.g., grocery shopping, going to the bank)	351	1.245	1.102	357	1.678	0.994
Save money	351	2.148	1.376	357	3.011	0.969
Stay on task at work or school	347	1.438	1.189	357	2.174	0.941
Limit the amount of time you spend on the phone or internet	350	2.137	1.302	357	3.112	0.950
Text while driving	317	1.060	1.380	354	2.672	1.093
Buy things you do not need	352	1.642	1.339	356	2.688	0.932
Eat junk food	353	2.244	1.274	356	2.750	0.923

Interrupt or speak over other people	348	1.207	1.251	356	1.736	1.084
Buy lottery tickets or participate in other forms of gambling	298	0.547	0.964	358	1.321	1.013
Check social media when you should be doing something else	343	1.583	1.352	355	3.149	0.987
Buy things you cannot afford using a credit card	309	1.061	1.304	355	2.617	0.954
Talk about people behind their backs	331	0.873	1.074	357	2.294	1.142
Raise your voice during an argument	339	1.640	1.315	356	2.093	0.999

Self-Other Success Ratings

Self-Control Behavior	Self-Ratings			Other-Ratings		
	<i>n</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>n</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>
Get places you need to be on time	210	73.905	18.893	358	63.966	18.769
Limit the amount of alcohol you drink	120	63.750	25.207	358	59.525	20.649
Limit the amount of caffeine you consume	235	50.170	25.520	358	49.721	21.640
Cook meals at home instead of going out to eat	230	63.522	21.275	358	48.911	19.977
Exercise	309	48.608	29.865	358	49.134	20.030
Get out of bed right after your alarm goes off	294	56.871	27.008	358	57.849	19.478
Do chores around the house	285	67.895	20.584	358	60.168	19.052
Limit the amount of time you spend watching TV, movies, YouTube videos, etc.	279	53.907	23.123	358	51.117	21.456
Eat healthy food	296	56.959	21.821	358	50.168	19.082
Go to sleep on time	315	51.048	24.099	358	52.989	19.838
Start a difficult conversation with someone	300	53.667	25.731	358	55.279	20.009
Limit the amount of time you spend playing video or online games	183	60.055	23.358	358	57.011	21.414
Complete errands (e.g., grocery shopping, going to the bank)	248	72.339	20.740	358	70.196	19.221
Save money	302	52.152	26.395	358	43.855	20.748
Stay on task at work or school	254	68.386	18.527	358	61.508	18.756
Limit the amount of time you spend on the phone or internet	300	50.600	22.598	358	41.872	21.554
Text while driving	147	64.014	25.899	358	49.721	23.868
Buy things you do not need	261	66.590	20.668	358	52.291	18.751
Eat junk food	315	54.222	21.760	358	50.307	18.124
Interrupt or speak over other people	211	66.493	21.975	358	63.855	22.322

Buy lottery tickets or participate in other forms of gambling	95	66.000	24.642	358	71.229	21.813
Check social media when you should be doing something else	240	54.125	22.390	358	39.469	23.239
Buy things you cannot afford using a credit card	159	64.591	25.151	358	52.458	20.799
Talk about people behind their backs	172	65.058	22.980	358	53.855	22.781
Raise your voice during an argument	258	62.093	24.019	358	58.156	20.387

*Note: Participants who indicated they either didn't regularly perform a behavior or did not find a behavior difficult during the first set of behavior ratings were not asked about their success rate performing that behavior

Self-Other Frequency Ratings

Self-Control Behavior	Self-Ratings					Other-Ratings				
	Once a month	Once a week	Few times per week	1-2 times per day	3+ times per day	Once a month	Once a week	Few times per week	1-2 times per day	3+ times per day
Get places you need to be on time	13.9	24.4	42.6	17.2	2.0	5.9	10.9	46.9	28.8	7.5
Limit the amount of alcohol you drink	25.8	40.8	26.7	5.0	1.7	10.9	37.2	44.1	6.2	1.7
Limit the amount of caffeine you consume	7.7	13.3	34.6	34.2	10.3	2.8	7.0	33.5	45.3	11.5
Cook meals at home instead of going out to eat	3.9	20.8	49.8	19.9	5.6	1.7	7.5	54.7	29.1	7.0
Exercise	8.4	15.8	63.2	9.7	2.9	1.1	11.2	75.1	10.9	1.7
Get out of bed right after your alarm goes off	2.7	10.9	46.3	36.4	3.7	1.1	4.5	57.5	35.2	1.7
Do chores around the house	2.1	24.9	45.3	19.7	8.0	2.5	22.6	55.0	17.9	2.0
Limit the amount of time you spend watching TV, movies, YouTube videos, etc.	2.5	11.8	38.2	30.7	16.8	1.7	6.4	39.1	36.9	15.9
Eat healthy food	3.4	6.7	35.0	36.4	18.5	1.1	2.8	37.7	42.7	15.6
Go to sleep on time	1.9	9.8	52.4	33.0	2.9	2.0	4.8	58.1	34.1	1.1
Start a difficult conversation with someone	73.2	16.1	7.7	2.7	0.3	46.7	24.9	22.4	4.8	1.4

Limit the amount of time you spend playing video or online games	13.1	23.0	43.7	13.7	6.6	9.5	18.4	47.5	21.0	3.6
Complete errands (e.g., grocery shopping, going to the bank)	8.5	39.9	47.6	2.8	1.2	5.9	34.4	49.4	9.2	1.1
Save money	24.8	30.1	30.8	9.6	4.6	14.8	29.3	34.9	16.8	4.2
Stay on task at work or school	5.5	17.3	33.5	26.8	16.9	2.5	12.0	43.6	31.3	10.6
Limit the amount of time you spend on the phone or internet	3.7	11.0	25.3	32.0	28.0	0.6	5.6	21.8	33.2	38.8
Text while driving	8.8	18.2	30.4	33.1	9.5	2.2	7.0	31.3	38.6	21.0
Buy things you do not need	23.4	36.4	34.1	5.0	1.2	4.5	27.1	54.5	10.9	3.1
Eat junk food	2.5	15.6	40.0	32.7	9.2	0.6	9.8	48.6	34.6	6.4
Interrupt or speak over other people	18.5	27.0	34.6	12.8	7.1	11.5	25.1	38.0	20.1	5.3
Buy lottery tickets or participate in other forms of gambling	51.6	20.0	21.1	5.3	2.1	43.0	31.6	18.7	5.0	1.7
Check social media when you should be doing something else	1.7	7.9	28.3	33.3	28.9	0.6	5.6	14.3	33.0	46.7
Buy things you cannot afford using a credit card	36.5	29.6	25.8	6.9	1.3	14.0	29.3	44.1	8.7	4.0
Talk about people behind their backs	32.0	32.0	26.2	8.7	1.2	10.1	21.5	43.6	19.3	5.6
Raise your voice during an argument	58.1	19.4	14.7	6.2	1.6	33.0	31.3	29.9	5.0	0.8

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Biography

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