The Lens of National Identity:
Comparing the Structural Components of Muslim and Christian-Majority Countries

by

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Thesis submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts
in the Department of Sociology
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ABSTRACT

In the midst of revolutions, overthrown governments, civil wars, and large-scale migration, sociologists need to reassess the structural components of national identity. Previous research has analyzed internal dynamics of a few countries or differences between geographical regions or methods of state formation that rarely included Muslim countries in their cross-national comparisons. This paper takes a previously unaddressed approach by looking at nation-states' religious majority, comparing Muslim-majority and Christian-majority states with a large cross-national sample. My research aims to discover whether there are different sources of national identity in the two types of countries. Using multi-level models with both individual and country-level characteristics, I analyze a dichotomous measure of national pride – an indicator of shared connection to the people of the country and thus a measure of national identity – from 9 Muslim-majority and 32 Christian-majority countries in the two most recent waves of the World Values Survey (2000 and 2005). I find that while country-level heterogeneity of language, ethnicity, and religion do not seem to affect one's sense of national pride in either type of country, one's individual position within their country with respect to ethnic, religious, and language majority groups are each strong positive predictors of national pride in both types of countries. More importantly the effect of being in ethnic or religious majority groups has a significantly stronger effect in Muslim countries than in Christian countries. This multi-level cross-national approach comparing Muslim and Christian-majority countries challenges sociologists to further explore the structural meaning of this dichotomy and to pursue research including more Muslim countries.

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THE LENS OF NATIONAL IDENTITY

In the midst of revolutions, overthrown governments, civil wars, large-scale migration

and growing multiculturalism, sociologists need to reassess the structural components of

countries' national identity. Previous empirical research has analyzed the national

identity of one or a few countries (Moran 2005; Tilley and Heath 2007) or broad regions

such as Europe (Dogan 1994; Citrin and Sides 2004; Hjerm and Schnabel 2010). Some

have also conducted large cross-national comparative studies (Jones & Smith 2001;

Kunovich 2009), but none of these have included a representation of Muslim countries,

and only one has conducted their analysis based on a country's religious make-up.

I take a previously unaddressed approach by including a global representation of

countries in a multilevel cross-national analysis, and looking at the structural composition

of national identity between Muslim-majority and Christian-majority countries. My

research aims to discover whether there are different structural components of national

identity in these two groups of countries.

Using multi-level models with both individual and country-level characteristics, I

analyze a dichotomous measure of national pride – an indicator of shared connection to

the people of the country and thus a measure of national identity – from 9 Muslim-

majority and 32 Christian-majority countries in the two most recent waves of the World

Values Survey (2000 and 2005). I find that while heterogeneity of language, ethnicity,

and religion within one's country do not present a relationship with national pride, a

person's individual position within their country in reference to ethnic, religious, and

language majority groups are each strong positive predictors of national pride in both

types of countries. More importantly, being in the majority has a significantly stronger positive relationship in Muslim countries than in Christian countries – one ten times stronger. My findings will challenge sociologists to further explore the structural meaning of this religious dichotomy and pursue research including more Muslim countries.

I will first provide a brief review of classic and current literature and conceptualization of national identity for my research. I will follow this with a discussion of the broad benefits and the two basic origins of national identity. From this foundational discussion, I will develop theoretical support for my research by revealing the lack of Muslim countries in prior national identity research, showing the power of religion in social structure and interacting with national identity, and suggesting a Muslim-Christian comparison of national identity. I will then provide an operationalization of my measure of national identity and description of the country and individual-level characteristics that will preview the variables in my analysis. Moving into my research, I will outline my analytical strategy, describe my data and variables, present my results and discuss my findings. I will conclude with avenues for future research and my contributions to the field of national identity.

AN OVERVIEW OF NATIONAL IDENTITY

The Conceptualization of National Identity

There is great conceptual diversity of nationalism and national identity within the

literature and research, though they all stem from common historical foundations.

Loyalties to kings and empires date back to the Roman Empire, but personal and group

identification with the nation-state emerged mostly within the 19th and 20th centuries from

wars of independence from colonial rulers throughout North and Latin America and

Western Europe. This identification became more widespread after the defeat of the

Ottoman Empire and the subsequent division of much of Middle East Asia and North

Africa by the British and French, and even more so after the Soviet Union's dissolution

and further division of countries throughout Europe and Asia. The nation-state has

progressively taken a prominent role in the international community and the lives of its

citizens, and has inspired various strands of literature that focus on this powerful sense of

collective identity.

National identity – often used in conjunction with or in context of nationalism –

has been described as a collective identity at the nation-state level that simultaneously

possesses elements of internal sameness or collective personality and external differences

between themselves and other states (Anderson [1983] 2006; Brubaker 2012:10).

Benedict Anderson ([1983] 2006:3), one of the central figures in the nationalism

literature, considers nation-ness as "the most universally legitimate value in the political

life of our time," through which nations command profound emotional legitimacy. Smith

(1991) defines nationalism as a cultural phenomenon (versus merely an ideology or form

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of politics), Kunovich (2009:574) proposes it is a social construction, and Anderson ([1983] 2006:7) additionally depicts the nation as a "deep, horizontal comradeship… regardless of the actual inequality and exploitation that may prevail."

Within the broad nationalism literature, I conduct my analysis from the corner that considers national identity as the mutual identity within politically recognized nation-states (also termed "countries" in my analysis), sharing common institutions, shared symbols, and an overall political structure. As Smith (1991) explains, the members feel that they belong to the territory and serve a purpose of striving for national unity, autonomy, fraternity, and authenticity. This unifying force keeps nations together and often subdues minority groups from desiring or demanding their autonomy from the state. Nationalism can also refer to the collective identity of homogenous ethnic groups (sometimes termed "nations") that are often minority groups within nation-states and do not have their own autonomous nation-state (Gellner [1983] 2008) (for example, the Kurds that live within the nation-state borders of Iraq, Iran, Syria, and Turkey, or the Basques that live within the nation-states of France and Spain). However, my conceptualization of national identity will be the strength of the unifying collective identity within the nation-state that transcends cultural, ethnic, political, and other differences within its borders.

My analysis is directed toward the nation-state, looking at a person's national identity as a whole. Other national identity research has focused on official requirements for citizenship or public opinion about what makes someone a cultural or civic citizen (either family decent and place of birth or living within national borders or following

laws) (Dejaeghere 2009; Hjerm 1998; Wright, Citrin and Wand 2012) or the importance

of these determinants and how people draw boundaries between "us" and "them" (Heath,

Martin and Spreckelsen 2009). Additionally, scholars have researched the impact that

various determinants of citizenship have on domestic and foreign policy preferences and

public opinions toward immigration, welfare, and citizenship (Citrin, Reingold and Green

1990; Citrin and Sides 2008; Kunovich 2009; Wright et al. 2012). Although fruitful, this

research simply asks different questions and focuses on different aspects of national

identity than I do. My focus is on the shared collective identity within the citizens of each

nation-state, and the structural components that may differ between countries with

different religious majorities.

The Benefits of National Identity

Understanding the concept of national identity justifies studying it in the current world

context of inter-state conflict and regional unrest due to its inherent contribution to world

security. Taking briefly from psychology, higher levels of group identity foster greater

trust amongst the members of the group and in its governing institutions (Miller 1995),

increase consideration of group welfare over their own (Kramer and Brewer 1984), and

mitigate competition between subgroups (Gaertner 2000). Strengthened national identity

can potentially reduce the likelihood of civil war, political revolutions, and wars of

secession or independence. But while an inclusive concept of nationality is essential for

social harmony in the diverse modern societies (Wright et al. 2012), it may not be

sufficient to overcome some wedges that currently exist. Understanding national identity

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and what structural components contribute to its salience can inform states of these trends and focus their efforts of further unifying their people.

In addition to promoting social harmony, national identity may lead its people to act in the best interest of the country over themselves or smaller groups. Having a national identity does not necessarily require one to abandon their other identities with family, class, gender, religion, ethnicity, or even regional or supranational levels. One sociologist of religion (Peek 2005) provides an understanding of having multiple simultaneous identities, suggesting that each identity has a certain salience, where one identity will have greater importance in the hierarchy of multiple identities that make up a sense of self. "As individuals become more committed to a given role, that role will assume higher identity. Moreover, the higher the identity in the salience hierarchy, the more likely that identity will be enacted in a given situation, or in many situations" (Peek 2005:217). Despite diversity within nation-states by culture, religion, or ethnicity, national identity captures the peoples' willingness to consider their country as a legitimate part of their own identity.

Origins of National Identity

Building upon the general concept and unifying benefits of national identity, I will briefly describe the two main sources of national identity to further understand its structure and lead my analysis. The discussion of ethnic and civic national identity will provide the foundation for both my religious dichotomy approach and the country and individual-level characteristics that will make up the structural composition of national identity.

The national identity of most nation-states is built upon either shared ethnicity, shared beliefs or values, or a combination of the two. Smith (1991:14) suggests that national identity is comprised of several interrelated components – ethnic, cultural, territorial, economic, and legal-political – and requires five fundamental features: a historical territory or homeland, common myths and historical memories, a common, mass public culture, common legal rights and duties for all members, and a common economy with territorial mobility for members.

Many states, even those that are multiethnic today, initially developed as unified communities of culture around a core ethnic group (Gellner [1983] 2008). It is around this dominant group that states established their administrative, judicial, fiscal, and military institutions and to which the state typically grants powerful political influence, thus providing benefits to majority groups (Smith 1991:39). This ascribed characteristic often establishes a rigid segregation that can either unify a nation-state through homogeneity or undermine its cohesion with heterogeneity.

For those countries that either did not have a dominant group or had several small or rivaling groups, it is necessary for a state to focus on a conscious and malleable civic nationalism to unify the people within its geographic borders. For instance, in Sub-Saharan Africa, "colonial states had to foster a purely territorial patriotism, a sense of political loyalty to the newly created states and their embryonic political communities" (Smith 1991:41). Theirs and others' national survival and unity relied on the ability to construct "a coherent mythology and symbolism of a community of history and culture out of whatever cultural components were available" (Smith 1991:42). In areas with great

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ethnic rivalries – such as Indonesia, the Philippines, Iraq, Algeria, and Zimbabwe – the dominant ethnic group encounters fierce opposition and reveals the lack of a unifying political culture that can transcend the ethnic majority and minority groups (Smith 1991).

Especially within multicultural populations, the state serves a critical role in developing its national identity, finding or creating the unifying force or the social "glue" (Miller 1995) that brings the people together despite social and cultural heterogeneity. Sometimes called civic nationalism, this concept builds upon shared values, symbols and traditions (Smith 1991:16). States deliberately emphasize the homeland's natural features (lakes, mountains, rivers, valleys; manmade statues, monuments, etc.), myths of origins and descent, periods of liberation, migration, oppression, and struggle, heroes, chosen people, symbols, customs, and ceremonies – all of which rally the pride and sense of shared history and belonging among the people. The state's mass education system is the most widely used vehicle for building national identity, i.e. socialization, through determined use of symbolism and the ever-growing and far-reaching mass media of newspaper, radio, and television. While every national identity may look slightly different in terms of its unifying symbols and historical legacies, ways of integrating people into politics, and emphasis on ethnic or civic foundations of national identity, all approaches serve the purpose of homogenizing one cultural aspect of their greatly heterogeneous population –their national identity.

The ethnic make-up of a nation-state, the extent of its shared history, beliefs and values, and the activity of the state toward building its national identity are at the forefront of my analysis and will be present throughout the rest of this paper. The next

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section will look at these main axes in the context of religion as a major social power in the structure of nation-states and their citizens' identity. Through this context I will suggest an analysis of national identity from a Muslim-Christian religious dichotomy.

WHY A RELIGIOUS LENS OF NATIONAL IDENTITY

Religion and National Identity

I consider that religion may be one type of shared value that could compliment or even

enable a state's national identity transcendent to other cultural or ethnic differences, and

thus plan to look at national identity through the lens of religion. While many scholars

consider ethnic or civic homogeneity to be necessary for a unified or strong national

identity, Ira Lapidus (2001) eloquently describes the inclusion of religion in its complex

make-up:

> National identity is neither rigorously secular nor exclusively religious.
> Nationality involves concepts of citizenship, concepts of ethnicity and
> concepts of religion in an ambiguous connection to each other so that it is
> possible for different people to participate in the same nationality on the
> basis of one or another of these factors or some combination of them, or a
> changing combination of factors (2001:47-8).
>
> [National identities] are not only political identities, but, like religions, are
> comprehensive systems of meanings and values. They fuse personal and
> collective identities. National as well as religious symbols have the power
> to invoke deep loyalty, devotion, sacrifice, love of community and a sense
> of the fulfillment of transcendental purposes. Religion and [national
> identity] work together because they are overlapping systems of meaning
> (2001:51).

While every individual may deduce and apply different meanings from religion, it is

never the less a powerful force in many people's lives.

Others emphasize the power of religion in construction and organization of

society. In his sociological analysis of religious nationalism, Roger Friedland (2001)

considers both the state and religion as models of authority. Most religions provide some

guidelines and principles for how society and the state are to function, and are inherently

intertwined in the regulation of all social life. In his four-volume series of "The Sources

of Social Power," Mann (1986) includes religion as one form of ideology that shapes and sustains societies in conjunction with political, military, and economic networks of power.

　　　With this potential for religion to unify people transcendent to their physical and cultural differences, two questions emerge: do different religions have similar unifying powers, and can they or do they unify people toward collective identities with the nation-state? In the next section I will establish a comparison of two major religions to analyze national identity through.

Muslim and Christian Religions and National Identity

With the conceptualization of national identity established and religion identified as a strong social force, I suggest an Islamic – Christian dichotomy as the lens for my analysis of national identity. Earlier national identity theorists suggested differences primarily based on regional or historical differences (Anderson [1983] 2006), and Western versus Middle Eastern or Arab countries (Sabagh and Ghazalla 1986). One religion-oriented analysis compared Catholic and Protestant-dominant nations and tendencies toward nationalism based on either ethnicity or acceptance of ethnic and language differences (Basanez 1993). Regarding analysis of national identity in the Muslim context, in a recent anthropological review piece on Arab-majority societies, Deeb & Winegar (2012) acknowledged the recent focus on both Islam and nationalism but suggested that this emphasis is still lacking. I have yet to find a study of national identity that compares the national identity of countries with a majority in two of the world's largest religions.

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We have seen a significant amount of political, ethnic, and religious unrest in several Muslim-majority countries with the Arab Spring in 2011, armed conflicts, and other political revolutions in Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan, and Iran to name a few. This raises intrigue over the collective national identity within these countries and how they might compare with others.

More simply however, I am continuing in the tradition of the popular Muslim – non-Muslim comparison that Steven Fish (2011) highlights in his recent book. He and others show statistical similarities from large scale surveys in attitudes of work, family, democracy, religion, and social debate topics such as abortion, divorce, and homosexuality. I will continue in the comparative trend, but will look at individuals' feelings about their own country. I expect that the two types of religion will yield different compositions or strengths of national identity.

Including Muslim Countries in Cross-National Studies

Before I look at national identity through the lens of a country's majority religion, I want to emphasize the critical need for cross-national analysis with a more global representation of countries. I have yet to find a large cross-national analysis that includes Muslim countries. There have been studies of national identity within one or a few Muslim countries or Muslim minority groups within other countries, such as the study of ceremonies and national holidays in Uzbekistan (Adams 2010), the large minority group of Turkish-Dutch Muslims in the Netherlands (Verkuyten and Yildiz 2007), national identity and foreign policy in Turkey (Bullen III 2009), and the Kurdish group across the national borders of Iraq, Turkey, and Iran (Natali 2005). Research has also included large

cross-national studies of national identity (Davidov 2009; Heath et al. 2009; Kunovich 2009; Rusciano 2003) as well as cross-national studies over time (Davidov 2011). Multilevel studies have included country-level differences as well as individual factors and their influence on national identity one of which included many of the same individual and country-level predictors I will include in this study (Kunovich 2009). Many of these studies have a near global representation including countries in Far East Asia, Europe, North and South America, Australia, and South Africa. But they also have a common glaring weakness in that none included any Muslim countries whether in the Middle East or South East Asia, Europe, or sub-Saharan Africa. While survey data may have previously been less accessible for many Muslim countries in the Middle East and Africa, that is no longer the case, and empirical research must include them for thorough and legitimate comparative analyses.

MULTI-LEVEL STRUCTURAL COMPONENTS OF NATIONAL IDENTITY

Both the social composition of a group and an individual's comparative social position within a group are likely to contribute to the strength of collective identity. Scholars acknowledge that there is unlikely one definition of identity (civic or ethnic) within a country (Hjerm 1998; Kunovich 2009), and that it is necessary to analyze at both the person and country level to account for differences within and between countries. Recent research provides me with both theoretical (Calhoun 1993) and empirical support (Kunovich 2009) to use multilevel analysis that includes characteristics at both levels. Durkheim's *Conscience Collective* has long highlighted the 'we-ness' of a group, stressing the similarities or shared attributes around which group members unite (Cerulo 1997). This would suggest that either as the heterogeneity of the state's population (of any social, cultural, or political factor) increases, the salience of national identity is likely to decrease. Additionally, however, existing outside a majority group is likely to have a similar negative effect on national identity. I will outline these and other structural components of national identity first at the country and then individual level with support from the literature. Additionally I will present control variables that I will include in my empirical analysis of national identity between Muslim and Christian countries.[1]

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[1] While some of the literature focuses on factors that contributed to the original establishment or independence of the nation-state and emergence of the collective national identity, others show that these same factors are instrumental in the sustainment of that national identity (albeit with slight changes) over time.

Country-Level Characteristics - Levels of Heterogeneity

Higher levels of heterogeneity are naturally likely to weaken the sense of collective identity within any group. Many countries' national identity is centered around a core ethnic group, and some even claim that it is impossible to explain national identity without at least some reference to ethnicity (Calhoun 1993). Gellner ([1983] 2008) claims that higher levels of ethnic heterogeneity are likely to lead to lower national pride within a state. Brubaker (2012:4) also suggests that even without territorial concentration along religious or ethnic lines, these differences can still serve as "axes of social segmentation in heterogeneous societies." On the other hand, Anthony Smith (1991) suggests that higher religious fractionalization may lead to higher national identity as heterogeneity may yield greater tolerance of people of different religions.

Authors have presented empirical evidence showing the relationship between heterogeneity and the quality of government and internal conflict, but have yet to include fractionalization in the analysis of national identity. In support of this empirical work, Fearon (2003:208) presents a concept of ethnic fractionalization as a measure of a country's aggregate diversity, defined as "the probability that two individuals selected at random from a country will be from different ethnic groups" (Fearon 2003:208), which can also be determined for religious and linguistic diversity. In one analysis, Alesina et al. (2003) find that both ethnic and linguistic fractionalization result in lower quality of government and slower rates of achieving democracy, but religious fractionalization has no significant association with either outcome. In the same article they also link ethnic fractionalization with negative economic success, less participation in social activities,

and decrease in trust. For a slightly different outcome, Fearon and Laitin (2003) find that once per capita income is controlled for, higher ethnic or religious diversity did not result in a higher likelihood for significant internal violence (in an analysis of internal violence since the end of the Cold War). This runs contrary to a common view among journalists, policy makers, and academics, which "holds 'plural societies' to be especially conflict-prone due to ethnic or religious tensions and antagonisms" (Fearon and Laitin 2003:75). While these empirical results show mixed conclusions for the impact of ethnic, religious, and linguistic fractionalization on other outcomes, the nationalism literature holds that greater levels of heterogeneity will have negative effects on national identity.

Levels of heterogeneity are not likely the only country-level characteristics that will impact national identity. Quoting Calhoun (1993:211), it is "impossible to explain [national identity] simply as a continuation of ethnicity or a simple reflection of common history or language." I will present several other country characteristics that will serve as controls in my analysis of national identity.

Country-Level Controls

Literacy. Anderson ([1983] 2006) emphasized common language as a catalyst for state formation and unification, but the growth of national collective identity was facilitated by increased literacy as well as growing commerce, industry, and communications which made language practical for use in business, science and literature, and less exclusively for the government and religious elite. With increased literacy, the masses realized their place in the collective with common actions, spoken

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language, and political goals. Including the literacy rate as a control will allow for comparison of countries at similar levels of this unifying mechanism.

Length of political independence. Citing an early nationalist, in his essay *What is a Nation?,* Ernest Renan (1882) explained that significant events in the life course of a nation build strong cohesion based on shared struggles, sacrifice, or victories. The independence of a nation, whether won through a war, granted based on the dissolution of an empire, or given by a colonial power based on treaties and agreements, is a significant event in defining the national identity for its people. This likely includes periods of struggle and disaster (internal and external to the state) as well as great joy and celebration that unifies the people transcendent to any of their other differences. As the state attempts to unify its people around a shared history, shared culture, and important icons, the longer the state has been an independent and politically-autonomous nation will result in more shared history and opportunity for the state to socialize its population.[2] While many countries have collective memories that extend past their political independence or regime establishment, the current national identity is likely to capture the identity of the country in its current form. Since pride in the country may differ from pride in the government or the current regime, another control variable will be used to account for those differences.

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[2] The relationship between the length of political independence and national identity assumes that all state institutions have equitable levels of effort in unifying their population, which is almost guaranteed not to be true. As a control variable, this will account for differences in the duration of shared history that states have to use in the building and strengthening of their national identity.

Individual-Level Characteristics- Majority Groups

There are more important structural components of national identity than just the characteristics of the country people live in. A person's position within the country's social, political, and cultural structure will likely contribute to their sense of national identity. This is directly in keeping with the need for multi-level analysis.

   Ethnic majorities and minorities. Being in the ethnic minority (coupled with political under-representation) is one of Gellner's ([1983] 2008) key predictors for not supporting or identifying with a nation-state's identity. Conflicting views say being in an ethnic minority group is incompatible with national identity (Sinclair, Sidanius and Levin 1998) and others say that strong identity with an ethnic group does not necessarily lead to a lack of national commitment (Parekh 2006). One study analyzed ethnic minorities with strong ethnic and religious identification and found lower levels of national identity (Verkuyten and Yildiz 2007). Another study showed that national, racial or ethnic, linguistic and religious minorities were all associated with lower commitment to both civic and ethnic forms of national identity (Kunovich 2009:585). Being in the ethnic majority is likely to contribute to a stronger national identity.

   Language majorities and minorities. Parallel to Gellner's ethnic cores, for Anderson ([1983] 2006) common language is the primary and most important cultural condition and catalyst for the emergence of nations and national identities, while print capitalism standardized the use of these languages and discovered a group's collective existence. As a cultural differentiator, language has the capacity and power to create imagined communities and build solidarity among otherwise culturally different and

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geographically dispersed people. Language is not just an emblem of the nation, but becomes personal property and part of one's identity.

One can question if language is still as strong of a unifying force within nations due to the ease of translation and the widespread use of English in international economic interaction. Are languages still an important component of peoples' identities? While some countries around the world have low literacy rates and others maintain a high number of local dialects, I would argue that they are. Smith (1991) provides us a modern example of the power of language and print capitalism toward national identity. In his book he explains that the Thai government actively discouraged attempts by foreign missionaries to provide one of their minority groups with their own systems of transcription to develop publications in their own language. The Thai government was reportedly indifferent to this minority group's speaking their language, but deliberately stifled the group unity (and likely reduced national identity) by stopping the unifying power of a common language in print. Being in the language majority is likely to contribute to stronger national identity.

Religious majorities and minorities. Religious identities are often but not always tied to ethnic identities, and religion can serve as a unifying characteristic in support of national identity. It can also serve as an exclusionary force for those not in the majority group. Smith (1991) describes the Punjabis in Pakistan who were the dominant ethnic group but faced competition with several other ethnic groups. Common religion (in this case Islam), however, provided the basis for a broader political culture and possible

national identity despite the ethnic heterogeneity. It is likely that being in the religious majority will be a positive predictor of national identity.

Individual-Level Controls

Confidence in the government. Confidence in one's state government (generally indicating satisfaction with the level of political representation and social relations) is likely to contribute to a positive collective identity of a country. It is especially important to include this control in combination with the country's years of political independence. Many countries have collective memories that date prior to their political independence, but the current measure of national identity is likely to include sentiment both about shared history and meaning as well as their satisfaction with or confidence in the government. This control variable will separate out the two different sentiments.

Education. Anderson ([1983] 2006) emphasizes the growth of nationalism and national sentiment through both common language and state-sponsored mass education that deliberately instills national ideology through sponsored language, common history, icons, and people. Acknowledging its central role in national identity development, I will control for the individual's level of education. The potentially different effects of state-sponsored primary education and (often) internationally-sponsored higher education suggest that education is likely to have a non-linear effect on national identity.

Age. There is minimal research on the effect of age on national identity, but Jung (2008) attributed younger generations with knowledge of more foreign languages, greater exposure to global news media, and more travel to foreign countries than older cohorts.

From this greater exposure, he showed a greater tendency of the younger cohorts toward supranational over national identities.

Gender. Due to vast gender differences in various cultures and countries, it is imperative to control for this individual characteristic. Controlling for both age and gender will help isolate the main effects of both country and individual level characteristics on national identity.

Variables not Included in my Analysis

I did not include a control for type of government in this analysis due to the likelihood of a disconnect between what is designated in writing and professed to the international world (e.g. a state's constitution), and the type of rule that is carried out within the country toward its people. The political representation of ethnic, religious, and language minorities may be unofficially oppressive in one republic and fully integrated and relatively equal with majority groups in another republic. Some governments may also turn to religious laws more than others, which could have an effect on religious minorities and their sense of inclusion. Additionally, while there is a large amount of research done within political science about the effect of democracy on inter-state and intra-state conflict, a sociological study of nationalism found that democracy does not guarantee national identity, and a national identity can certainly exist without democracy (Ringmar 1998). Without determining the internal effect of the government on the

people, it is not likely that the government type will yield a significant effect on the level

of national pride.[3]

[3] Other country-level characteristics that I did not include in my model but could be used as predictors or controls for national identity include recent political transformations, intra- or inter-state armed conflicts, and economic productivity (such as GDP, gross exports, unemployment rate, poverty rate, amount of arable land, and the Gini coefficient). Though these are excluded from my current model, they would be fruitful to explore in future analyses.

DATA AND ANALYTIC STRATEGY

The focus of this analysis is to determine whether various theory-driven factors (at both

the individual and country level) are similarly or differently related to national pride in

Muslim and Christian-majority countries. These differences can have different

magnitudes in the same predictive direction, or opposite predictive direction and in turn,

substantive conclusion. Despite including a host of predictors, I will specifically focus on

the effects of levels of ethnic, religious, and language heterogeneity within each country

as well as whether a person is in the majority group of ethnicity, religion, or language

within their country with the anticipation of different relationships in the two country

groups. All of the results – whether the same, somewhat different, or drastically different

between the two country types – will provide insight into what affects people's pride in

their nation and by how much.

Data

I will conduct my empirical analysis using data from the 2000 and 2005 waves of the

World Values Survey (2009), with the actual surveys conducted between the 1999 and

2007.[1] The data set consists of close to 50,000 respondents within 41 countries or nation-

states (335 – 2150 respondents per country, per wave). The sample includes 9 Muslim

and 32 Christian countries after dropping several due to key independent variables.[2]

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[1] Each wave had some overlap of countries, but each had countries the other did not include. The 2000 wave did not
have any Christian-majority European countries. The combination of waves allows for greater country representation as
well as two waves of data from seven of the countries. Understanding that the world and country context in each year
may be quite different from the prior or next, survey year will be controlled for in all of the analysis.
[2] All possible countries were used with the primary limiting factor being a lack of data for the individual and country-
level predictor variables. Specifically, several countries' respondents lacked values for language spoken at home,
ethnicity, or religion which were key predictor variables for national identity (Jordan, Morocco, Tanzania, Turkey,

Despite the comparatively smaller number of Muslim countries, every region where

Muslim countries exist is represented within the sample (including Europe, Asia, and

Africa).[3] The countries were categorized as either majority Christian or Muslim

population according to the CIA Factbook (2013) and US Department of State

International Religious Freedom Reports (2013).[4] For the duration of this paper, these

will be referred to as Christian and Muslim countries, respectively, and refer only to the

largest major religious group within the population, not a sponsored religion of the

government. Figure 1 shows the names and geographical location of the countries

represented in this analysis.

Dependent variable

The operationalization of national identity varies in research. Most research has been

conducted with large-scale survey data of opinions about a respondent's country or

complex measures combining neutral, positive, and negative measures of national pride

(Dekker, Malova and Hoogendoorn 2003). Others also look at nationalism not just as a

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Georgia, Germany, Netherlands, Norway, Slovenia, Spain, Switzerland, Morocco, and New Zealand). Several countries were missing one of more of the country fractionalization scores to be used in the analysis (Great Britain, Serbia, Puerto Rico, and New Zealand). There were three countries whose respondents were not asked whether they were willing to fight for their country, which will be analyzed as an additional measure of national identity for future research (Egypt, Nigeria, and Pakistan).
[3] North America, Central / Latin America, South America, and Australia do not have any Muslim-majority countries and are thus only represented by Christian-majority countries in the sample.
[4] All Christian denominations were combined in this category, including Catholic, Protestant, Orthodox, and other denominations. Likewise, all Muslim sects were combined into the Muslim-majority category, including Sunni and Shi'a Muslims, in order to focus on the comparison between the base religion majorities and not denomination or sect differences. Countries that were not a majority Muslim or Christian were not included in the analysis, which included Hindu and Buddhist-majority countries such as India, China, and Korea. This allows for the identification of clear differences between Muslim-majority and Christian-majority countries without the complexity of including Hindu and Buddhist-majority countries which are likely to have other cultural and ideological factors and entirely different structural patterns of national identity. This does however leave opportunities for future research comparing other religious-majority country groups.

product of internal views and characteristics, but as a combination of thoughts of those within the nation-state and the reputation of the state within the international community. Rusciano (2003) analyzes the "Selbstbild" (internal) & "Fremdbild," (external), with pride in the performance of one's state's institutions and perceptions of international image.

In my analysis, I use a positive/negative response for pride in one's country to measure the strength of national identity. I propose that high levels of NATIONAL PRIDE indicate a shared connection to the people of the country, general satisfaction with the policies and social structure of the state, and relatively low disgruntled feelings of minority groups with disadvantage and discrimination that may lead to a desire for an autonomous state (Gellner [1983] 2008). This analysis of national pride will not assume mutual exclusion between this and other group solidarity (allowing for multiple identities), but will infer a level of acceptance of the nation-state as a legitimate and substantial component of their personal identification.

The original variable included ordered responses to the question of how proud each respondent is to be their nationality (1 = not at all proud, 2=not very proud, 3=quite proud, 4=very proud). The distribution of the original four-category national pride variable is skewed toward the higher two categories with over 92% of all respondents answering either "quite proud" or "very proud." Considering the responses by country religious type, 70% of the Muslim country respondents answered "very proud" and 23% answered "quite proud" compared to 66% and 26%, respectively, within Christian

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Muslim-Majority Countries

Albania	Iran
Bangladesh	Iraq
Bosnia	Kyrgyzstan
Burkina Faso	Mali
Indonesia	

Christian-Majority Countries

Andorra	Ghana	S Africa
Argentina	Guatemala	Sweden
Australia	Italy	Trinidad & Tobago
Brazil	Macedonia	Uganda
Bulgaria	Mexico	Ukraine
Canada	Moldova	Uruguay
Chile	Peru	USA
Cyprus	Philippines	Venezuela
Ethiopia	Poland	Zambia
Finland	Romania	Zimbabwe
France	Russian Federation	

Figure 1: Names and Geographic Locations of Countries in the Data Set

countries. Only 6.5% of respondents in Muslim countries and 8% of respondents in

Christian countries answered for either of the negative national pride levels ("not at all

proud" and "not very proud"). These four responses naturally separate into negative and

positive national pride which provides strong conceptual justification to dichotomize the

national pride variable and analyze the effects of the structural factors on this binary

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variable rather than on linear national pride.[5] In addition, this binary variable relieves

some of the danger in cross-national survey studies that risk inconsistent meaning in

questions and/or answers between countries (Heath et al. 2009). This dichotomized

positive-negative measure of national pride will likely provide more reliable and valid

results than the four ambiguous response levels. Figure 2 shows the percentage of

respondents within each country who have positive national pride, separated by Christian

countries on the left and Muslim Countries on the right and group means in between. This

shows variance both within and between countries. For instance, at the low end there are

two European countries – 66% in Christian Moldova and 71% in Muslim Bosnia. At the

high end are two African countries, Christian Ghana and Muslim Mali both at 99% of the

population with positive national pride. Despite this variance, the means for the two

groups are both approximately 92%. With relatively similar levels of positive national

pride, it is more crucial to look at the structural compositions than gross measure of

national pride.

Independent variables

The independent variables – as I've also called structural components and predictors of

national identity – include both country-level and individual-level characteristics. In his

analysis of "The Sources and Consequences of National Identity" Kunovich (2009)

emphasizes the need to include both contextual social forces and individual

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[5] In addition to the binary logistic regression on the dichotomized positive national pride variable, I also ran regressions on the original 4-level national pride variable with different link functions as a robustness check to observe any significant changes in the results – the minor differences are presented in footnote 2 in the results section.

Figure 2: Percentage of Positive National Pride by Country and Muslim/Christian-Majority

characteristics in the study of national identity. While there are a host of predictor

variables included in my regression models, some are included primarily as controls in

order to hold these characteristics constant to isolate the association between levels of

heterogeneity and social position with national pride. Additionally, even though the

results of each predictor, whether the same, slightly different, or dramatically different

between the country groups has an interesting story to be told, I will focus my results and

discussion on the primary findings and allow your sociological curiosity to drive

additional exploration and research.

Country-Level Independent Variables. A measure of whether the country's

population is of Muslim majority or Christian majority (or the largest portion of the

population is of these major religions) is presented in a simple binary variable

(MUSLIM-MAJORITY COUNTRY) with a value of 1 for Muslim majority and 0 for

Christian majority, created based on information from the CIA Factbook (2013) and US

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Department of State International Religious Freedom Reports (2013). The Muslim country variable will be interacted with each predictor variable to parse out the effects of each variable between the Muslim and Christian country groups and determine if there is any significant difference.

To measure the levels of heterogeneity within each country, I use three types of fractionalization score for each country – based on ethnicity, religion, and language – from an article published in *The Journal of Economic Growth* (Alesina et al. 2003).[6] The authors presented newly re-calculated ETHNIC, RELIGIOUS, AND LANGUAGE FRACTIONALIZATION SCORES (with values from 0 – 100) – as the probability that two randomly selected people will be from different groups – for hundreds of countries on the three named categories. The calculations are based on detailed information from several sources found to be consistent with each other. As could be expected, there is some correlation between the three types of fractionalization scores (language/religious =.37; religious/ethnic=.39; ethnic/language=.71). Additionally, an average of these three scores is correlated with the original ethnic, religious and language fractionalization scores at .87, .86, and .71, respectively.

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[6] There are limitations to the values, especially the measures of ethnicity. Some countries emphasize differences of race, physical attributes, social conventions, and social definitions rather than ethnicity or national origin. Others are resistant to accurate ethnic counting which would lead to the redistribution of political representation between minority and majority groups. Though the ethnic fractionalization scores are based on information dating to the 1990's for some countries, Alesina et al. suggests that the fractionalization is "tremendously time persistent" and that changes due to civil wars, inter-state conflicts, and migration or genocide are rare and generally provide little change. These fractionalization scores will include greater ethnic detail than some of the survey responses that combine many African ethnicities or tribes.

Country-Level Control Variables. The country's LITERACY RATE – the percentage of people age 15 and older who can read and write – was reported from the CIA Fact Book (CIA 2013) and presented as a percentage from 0 to 100.

The number of years of political independence was calculated by subtracting the year of political independence[7] (taken from the CIA Fact Book (2013)) from the year the survey was conducted, and then by logging the continuous variable to normalize the distribution (YEARS OF INDEPENDENCE).

The countries in my sample have POPULATION sizes ranging from .1 to 314 million people. This continuous variable of the number of people in millions (also reported from the CIA Fact Book) was logged for a more normal distribution and included as a control.

With the combination of two waves of data (2000 and 2005), the actual survey responses range from 1999 to 2007. I include dummy variables for each SURVEY YEAR (with a baseline of 1999).

Individual-Level Independent Variables. The primary individual-level variables are binary responses for whether each respondent is in the majority group from their country in ethnicity, religion, and language (ETHNIC, RELIGIOUS, AND LANGUAGE MAJORITY). These three separate variables were created from individual responses to ethnicity, religious denomination (including a response for none), and primary language

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[7] Some countries have debatable years of independence, such as Iran who became a nation-state in 1925 but became the Islamic Republic of Iran after the revolution in 1979. Likewise, the Russian Federation has been in existence in various forms for centuries, but only gained its current identity after the dissolve of the Soviet Union in 1991. Lastly, Ethiopia has been acknowledged as one of the oldest known regions in the world, but gained its independence from the Colonial Power of Italy in 1896. In each of these cases, I considered the year of independence to be the year when its current national identity was established, since that is the nation that the survey respondents are proud of (or not).

spoken at home or during the interview. Each was given a value of 1 if there were in the

country's majority group (determined through the CIA Factbook (2013)) and 0 if in any

other group.[8] The correlations within the data differ between Christian and Muslim

countries. Ethnic majority and language majority are correlated at .430 in Muslim

countries but much lower at .255 in Christian countries. Religious majority and language

majority is more highly correlated in Christian countries at .204 versus .122 in Muslim

countries. Lastly, ethnic majority and religious majority are correlated at .108 in Muslim

countries and less than half at .047 in Christian countries.

Individual-Level Control Variables. I control for a person's CONFIDENCE IN

GOVERNMENT using a four-level ordered response to the question of "how much

confidence do you have in your government." This variable includes the following

responses: 1=none at all, 2= not very much, 3=quite a lot, and 4=a great deal. The

correlation between confidence in government and national pride was .196 in Christian

countries and .149 in Muslim countries.

I use an ordered response variable of highest education level attained (with eight

levels), and after considering the conceptual meaning and testing natural cut points,

created a 3-tiered revised education variable (with dummy variables to be used in the

regression): NO EDUCATION consists of none or incomplete primary education;

MEDIUM EDUCATION ranges from the completion of some primary education through

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[8] One limitation in the data is the lack of detail or specificity in the response for ethnicity. For example, CIA Fact Book lists "African (Black)" as the primary ethnicity for the country of Zambia, which includes 10 named groups and others possible. The survey data only includes the response of African / black, which may not identify true ethnic majority groups and tensions within the country. Similarly, religious sects were not always specified in the survey responses, specifically for Muslims, where large proportions of respondents listed Muslim, and not Sunni or Shi'a, while others did specify.

the completion of secondary education; HIGH EDUCATION encompasses the

completion of some college and obtaining a degree.

As done in other research (Comstock and Partridge 1972; Flannelly et al. 2010;

Stack and Lester 1991), an individual's level of piety or religious commitment is

measured by an eight-level response for frequency of RELIGIOUS ATTENDANCE

(ranging from never/practically never to more than once/week).

I control for gender with a binary variable with Male=1 and Female=0 (MALE).

The respondents' AGE (a continuous variable ranging from 15-97) is centered on the

mean of each country to account for different age distribution by country, and rounded to

the nearest whole number. I determined this configuration based on observed differences

in my model fit and significance levels with age as a continuous variable, a 3-category

variable, a 6-category variable, squared, centered on the country mean, and rounded.

Descriptive Statistics

The grand means and country-type means and ranges for each variable are shown in

Table 1 (not including survey year) while a full table of country-level averages is

included in Appendix A. These descriptive statistics show similar mean values of

national pride (both the binary and ordinal forms) within the two religious country types.

Looking at the structural characteristics, however, one can see that the average Muslim

nation has much higher language and ethnic heterogeneity while the average Christian

nation has much higher religious heterogeneity. Also, the highest fractionalization scores

in all three categories are Christian nations (the highest ethnic fractionalization is .9302 in

Uganda; the highest religious fractionalization is .8603 in South Africa; the highest

Table 1: Variable Mean Values and Range by Country Type

	Full Sample	Muslim Nations		Christian Nations	
	mean values	mean values	(min - max)	mean values	(min - max)
Dependent Variable:					
Positive National Pride (binary)	0.93	0.94		0.92	
National Pride (1-4)	3.58	3.62		3.56	
Country-Level Independent Variables:					
Language Fxn (0-100)	45.98	55.25	(9.25 - 83.88)	42.51	(4.68 - 92.27)
Ethnic Fxn (0-100)	49.40	51.21	(4.54 - 73.77)	48.72	(6.00 - 93.02)
Religious Fxn (0-100)	46.96	33.90	(3.99 - 68.51)	51.85	(13.50 - 86.03)
Average FXN (0-100)	43.98	48.25	(11.56 - 68.01)	42.78	(11.21 - 82.87)
Years of Independence	110.68	49.80	(9 - 90)	133.45	(10 - 727)
Literacy Rate (0-100)	85.73	72.62	(21.8 - 98.7)	90.63	(42.7 - 100)
Population (millions)	61.35	72.75	(3.0 - 248.6)	57.08	(0.1 - 313.8)
Individual-Level Independent Variables:					
Language Majority (binary)	0.71	0.69		0.72	
Ethnic Majority (binary)	0.74	0.82		0.71	
Religious Majority (binary)	0.88	0.90		0.87	
Confidence in Govt (1-4)	2.44	2.61		2.37	
Education (1-8)	4.31	4.02		4.42	
Religious Attendance (1-8)	5.35	5.16		5.42	
Male (binary)	0.48	0.51		0.47	
Age	39.91	36.06	(15 - 95)	41.35	(16 - 97)
Sample Size					
Individuals (n)	48991	13337		35654	
Countries (N)	41	9		32	

linguistic fractionalization is .9227 in Uganda). A large difference exists in years of

independence, where Christian nations have a much higher average (133 years) and range

(10 – 727) compared with the Muslim countries which are all less than 100 years old (in

their current political form). Another notable difference is that the average Christian

country has a 20% higher literacy rate. The lowest Christian country is 43% literate

(Ethiopia) compared with the two lowest Muslim countries at 31% (Mali) and 22%

(Burkina Faso). The average Muslim nation has a larger population , but both the smallest

(Andorra, .1 million) and largest (United States, 313.8 million) are Christian countries.

Looking at individual-level characteristics, the two groups have relatively

comparable levels of confidence in government, and education, gender distribution, and

frequency of religious attendance. The average Christian nation has a slightly higher

percentage of those in the language majority (72% compared with 69%), slightly lower

percentage in the religious majority (87% compared with 90%), and much lower

percentage in the ethnic majority (71%) compared with the average Muslim nation

(82%). While conjectures could be made about these country-group mean values alone,

clearly more complex empirical analysis needs to be conducted to accurately determine

the relationships between these factors and national identity.

Analytic Strategy

I will use a multi-level model to analyze the relationship between individual and country-

level characteristics and the dichotomous measure of national pride. There are both

theoretical and statistical justifications for this method. Highlighting the conceptual

justification, Kunovich (2009) emphasizes in his multi-level cross-national study that the

study of nationalism (or national identity) must include both contextual and individual

social forces, with analysis at both the individual and collective (country) levels.

Statistically, having the data structured as individuals within countries presents a

strong likelihood that the observations will be clustered by country and have correlated

errors, which Luke (2004) explains will violate a key assumption of standard multiple

regression that observations are independent from one another. Within the data, levels of

heterogeneity, years of independence, population size, and literacy rates may lead to

clustering of the error terms within countries. An initial look at the data shows that 26%

of the variance in national pride is at the country level, which supports my need for the multi-level analysis. Conducting multi-level modeling allows me to relax the assumption of independent observations and calculate more accurate standard errors. Additionally, a standard regression model would ignore the possibility that the regression coefficients may apply differently to various countries (Luke 2004). Using a multilevel model provides the opportunity to include random effects, allowing the intercepts to vary to by country.

In order to separate the effect of each independent variable for each of the two country types, I will interact each variable with the binary Muslim country variable and observe whether the slopes are significantly different. If the interaction term is statistically significant, then the slopes for the two country-groups are significantly different. The main variable coefficient will be interpreted as the change in the odds of the having positive national pride rather than negative national pride when all other variables are held constant and the variable in question increases by one unit – but only within Christian nations. If significant, the interaction term is added to the main effect for that variable and this sum is the change in the outcome with a one unit increase in the predictor within Muslim countries.

I will run several multilevel logistic regression models on the binary positive national pride variable with the XTMELOGIT command in STATA. The first model starts with no interaction terms, which implies that all predictors have the same relationship in both types of countries. The second model will include interactions with every predictor, which assumes that all of the predictors have significantly different

relationship in the two country groups. The third will include only significant interaction

terms for better model fit and reduced complexity from the semi-saturated model. I will

compare model fit by their Bayesian Information Criteria (BIC) and Akaike Information

Criteria (AIC) values and conduct likelihood ratio tests of the nested models to determine

which model has the higher predictive power balanced with level of complexity. This

will answer whether the predictive power justifies the added complexity and whether the

additional interactions are necessary. Finally, I will interpret both the substantive

direction of my variables as well the differences in effects within Christian and Muslim

nations.

RESULTS

Table 2 shows the regression output for the three logistic regression models of national pride described above.[1] Model 2 included interaction terms that allowed the slopes for every predictor to vary between the two country-groups and was a better fit than the first model with no interactions. Model 3 yielded a better accuracy-complexity balance and model fit when the non-significant interaction terms were dropped.[2]

When all other factors were held constant, being in a Muslim-majority country had a negative effect on national pride, but it only became significant in model 3 after the non-significant Muslim country interaction terms were dropped, which may imply colinearity and certainly reduces the robustness of the finding. The logistic regression coefficients are in logged odds, so exponentiating the coefficient provides the change in odds of having positive national pride with a one-unit increase in the independent variable. For the Muslim-majority country variable in Model 3, exponentiating (-0.835) = .434, which means by moving from a Christian-majority to a Muslim-majority country (holding all other values constant) a person has 43.4% the odds of having positive national pride (or a decrease in odds of 56.6% (1-.434 = .566)).

For the primary country-level characteristics, none of the three fractionalization scores (ethnic, religious, and language) were significant predictors of national pride in

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[1] All of the models also control for the survey year with dummy variables (from 1999 – 2007).
[2] The multi-level linear regression using the XTMIXED function yielded similar results as the logistic regression for the 3 fractionalization score and 3 majority variables both in substantive direction and significance. There were control variable coefficients that became significant in the linear model, including logged years of independence in Muslim countries (+), confidence in government in Muslim countries (-), no education (-) and high education (-) compared to medium education, and age squared (+). These differences do not change the patterns I highlight in my results and discussion sections. Ordinal logistic regression and binary logistic regression between levels 1-3 and level 4 of national pride yielded similar results with no significant differences in my primary variables of interest and the patterns between the two country groups.

Table 2: Multi-Level Logistic Regression Models of Positive National Pride

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3	
	Coeff.	SE	Coeff.	SE	Coeff.	SE
Country-Level Predictors						
Muslim-majority Country	0.096	(0.388)	-7.154	(-6.200)	-0.835 *	(0.394)
Ethnic Fractionalization	-0.004	(0.007)	-0.005	(0.006)	0.004	(0.006)
Ethnic FXN x Muslim-majority Ctry			-0.062	(0.173)		
Religious Fractionalization	0.004	(0.006)	0.007	(0.006)	0.004	(0.006)
Religious FXN x Muslim-majority Ctry			0.022	(0.060)		
Language Fractionalization	-0.001	(0.007)	-0.007	(0.007)	-0.001	(0.007)
Language FXN x Muslim-majority Ctry			0.072	(0.173)		
Literacy	0.019 *	(0.008)	-0.019	(0.012)	0.015	(0.008)
Literacy x Muslim-majority Ctry			0.012	(0.015)		
Years of Independence	0.400 **	(0.139)	0.341 **	(0.128)	0.377 **	(0.131)
Years of Indep x Muslim-majority Ctry			0.743	(0.447)		
Population	-0.013	(0.071)	-0.042	(0.074)	-0.009	(0.066)
Population x Muslim-majority Ctry			0.346	(0.696)		
Individual-Level Predictors						
Ethnic Majority	0.493 *	(0.052)	0.185 **	(0.062)	0.189 **	(0.062)
Ethnic Majority x Muslim-majority Ctry			1.042 ***	(0.120)	1.039 ***	(0.120)
Religious Majority	0.533 *	(0.058)	0.428 ***	(0.067)	0.430 ***	(0.067)
Religious Majority x Muslim-majority Ctry			0.258	(0.145)	0.295 *	(0.144)
Language Majority	0.601 *	(0.054)	0.563 ***	(0.065)	0.564 ***	(0.065)
Language Majority x Muslim-majority Ctry			0.009	(0.120)	-0.006	(0.119)
Confidence in Government	0.533 *	(0.022)	0.555 ***	(0.026)	0.541 ***	(0.022)
Conf in Govt x Muslim-majority Ctry			-0.056	(0.052)		
No Education	-0.065	(0.064)	-0.115	(0.074)	-0.075	(0.064)
No Education x Muslim-majority Ctry			0.151	(0.149)		
High Education	0.147 **	(0.045)	-0.102	(0.053)	-0.140 **	(0.045)
High Education x Muslim-majority Ctry			-0.155	(0.105)		
Male	0.067	(0.037)	0.017	(0.042)	-0.015	(0.042)
Male x Muslim-majority Ctry			-0.325 ***	(0.090)	-0.348 ***	(0.090)
Age	0.005	(0.006)	0.009	(0.007)	0.005	(0.006
Age x Muslim-majority Ctry			-0.012	(0.016)		
Age^2	0.000	(0.000)	0.000	(0.000)	0.000	(0.000)
Age^2 x Muslim-majority Ctry			0.000	(0.000)		
Religious Attendance	0.066 *	(0.008)	0.053 ***	(0.010)	0.054 ***	(0.010)
Religious Attend x Muslim-majority Ctry			0.050 **	(0.019)	0.047 *	(0.019)
Constant	0.416	(1.309)	0.994	(1.629)	0.259	(1.233)
BIC	22671.5		22695.0		22588.8	
AIC	22433.9		22316.6		22307.3	

Notes: n=48991; Coefficients in logged odds; Standard Errors in Parentheses

* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

No Education and High Education not statistically different; Baseline of Medium Education

either Christian or Muslim countries in any of the three models.[3] These levels of heterogeneity were non-significant when comparing people in the same three majority statuses, but when I dropped the individual majority variables, the country levels of heterogeneity were still non-significant predictors of national pride.

Interpreting the coefficients of the variables requires consideration of both the main variable and its interaction with the Muslim country variable. When only the main variable is included in the model, the coefficient is interpreted as the effect for the average country (both Muslim and Christian). For instance, the fractionalization score coefficients in model 1 are for the average country (though non-significant). When the variable is also interacted with the Muslim-country variable, the coefficient for the main variable is the effect for the average Christian country, or when Muslim country = 0. (For example, for ethnic fractionalization in Model 2, the main effect of -.005 is the change in logged odds within Christian countries when fractionalization increases by one point (though this is non-significant)). The significance of the interaction term coefficient shows whether the effect in Muslim countries is significantly different from the effect in Christian countries. If it is (e.g. see the ethnic majority interaction term coefficient in models 2 and 3), the effect of a change in that variable in Muslim countries is the sum of the main coefficient and the interaction term coefficient. (For example, the effect of an increase in religious attendance in Christian countries is .054 and in Muslim countries is

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[3] I also ran the model replacing the average fractionalization score for the three separate scores, and included the interaction of all three fractionalization scores, but they were both non-significant predictors for either group.

.054+.047 = 101. These values can be exponentiated to interpret them as changes in the odds of having positive national pride).

None of the Muslim-country interactions with country-level predictors or controls were significant. The only country-level control that was a significant predictor of positive national pride was years of independence (.377), which applied to both types of countries, but was not significantly different between Muslim and Christian countries (as shown by the non-significance of the interaction term with years of independence in the second model (.743)). Literacy was only significant in Model 1 prior to the inclusion of the Muslim-country interaction terms, but it did not remain so. Population was not a significant predictor of national pride in any of the models.

There was much more significance within the individual-level predictors. Being in the ethnic, religious, or language majority each had positive effects on national pride for the average country both before and after the effects within the Christian and Muslim countries were separated with interaction terms. In model 3, being in each of the three majority groups were significant and positive predictors for national pride in Christian countries (.189, .430, and .564, respectively). The significant interaction terms for ethnic majority (1.039) and religious majority (.295) show that the effect of being in these majority groups in Muslim countries was significantly different than in Christian countries while the non-significant interaction term for language majority shows that this effect in Muslim countries was no different than in Christian countries. These relationships are present in similarly heterogeneous countries, but to test the robustness of

the findings, I dropped the fractionalization score from the regression model and the results remained identical in both significance and magnitude.

For the individual-level control variables, High Education (vs. medium education) was a negative predictor of national pride (exp(-.140)=.869, a decrease in odds of positive national pride by 13.1%), but not significantly different between the two types of countries. Being male (vs. female) in a Muslim country was a significant negative predictor of national pride (-.348), but gender was not a significant predictor in Christian countries. A one-level increase in religious attendance was a positive predictor for national pride in Christian countries and both positive and significantly different (stronger) in Muslim countries. No education (vs. medium education), age, and age squared were not significant predictors in either type of country.

In order to more easily understand the substantive meaning of the predictor coefficients, and to clearly see the difference in magnitudes between country types, Table 3 shows the change in odds of a person having positive national pride with a one-unit change of each of the predictors. This is calculated by exponentiating the regression coefficients, and adding the interaction effect to the main effect before exponentiating to determine the effect of the predictor within Muslim countries. The table shows the substantive direction and magnitude of the effect on national pride and the differences between Christian and Muslim nations.

The most significant result is the different effect of being in the majority groups for ethnicity and religion between the two groups. Being in the religious majority increases the odds of having positive national pride by 54% in Christian countries but

Table 3: Change in Odds of Positive National Pride by Country Type

	Christian-Majority	Muslim-Majority	Magnitude Difference
Country-Level Predictors:			
Muslim-majority Nation	■■■■■■■	- 56.6% odds *	Strong - predictor for Muslim nations
Years of Independence (logged - tenfold increase))	+ 45.8% odds **	+ 45.8% odds **	No Significant Difference
Individual-Level Predictors:			
Ethnic Majority	+ 20.8% odds **	+ 241.4% odds ***	Stronger + predictor for Muslim nations
Religious Majority	+ 53.7% odds ***	+ 106.5% odds **	Stronger + predictor for Muslim nations
Language Majority	+ 75.8% odds ***	+ 75.8% odds ***	No Significant Difference
Confidence in the Govt (1 level increase)	+ 71.8% odds ***	+ 71.8% odds ***	No Significant Difference
High Education (compared to medium education)	- 13.1% odds **	- 13.1% odds **	No Significant Difference
Male (compared to female)	no sig change	- 29.4% odds ***	Strong - predictor for Muslim nations
Religious Attendance (1 level increase)	+ 5.5% odds ***	+ 10.6% odds *	Stronger + predictor for Muslim nations

Note: n = 48,991 (individual responses); N=41 (countries)
p-value: * (< .05) ** (<.01) *** (<.001)

107% greater odds in Muslim countries. Similarly, being in the ethnic majority yields 21% greater odds within Christian countries, but more than 240% greater odds of positive national pride within the Muslim countries. Being in the language majority yields 76% greater odds within Christian countries and was not significantly different for Muslim countries (thus the same 76% increase in odds).

Briefly summarizing the other significant findings in terms of change in odds of having positive national pride, years of independence (logged) and confidence in government were both positively associated with national pride at similar levels for the two country types (an odds increase of 46% and 72%, respectively). Having a high level of education rather than mid-level education was also at the same level in both groups, but decreased the odds of positive national pride by 13%. A one level increase in religious attendance increased the odds of national pride by 11% in Muslim countries, which was double the 5.5% increase in odds in Christian countries from one level of religious attendance increase. Lastly, being male (rather than female) in a Muslim

country decreased the odds of having positive national pride by almost 30%, while there was no significant difference by gender in Christian countries.

DISCUSSION

The bottom line in this analysis is that levels of heterogeneity do not appear to affect national pride in either type of country, but a person's relative position to majority groups within their country matters significantly. The data suggests that levels of heterogeneity in ethnicity, religion, and language do not make a significant difference in a person's national pride. This implies that people of similar education level, age, gender, and religious attendance that are in the majority (or minority, but similarly) ethnic, religious, and language groups, and are from countries that have similar duration of independence, population, and Muslim or Christian majority will have positive pride regardless of whether they are in a highly homogenous or highly heterogeneous country for any of the ethnic, religious, or language categories. In their article, Alesina et al. (2003) acknowledge that these scores do not account for polarity within a country (such as two large opposing groups rather than numerous small groups), but primarily account for the number of different groups that drives the level of heterogeneity.

The different effects between Muslim and Christian countries for being in two types of majority show the structural composition difference in national identity I anticipated. Being in the religious, ethnic, and language majority groups rather than minorities increased the odds of positive national pride for both types of countries. But being in the religious majority in Muslim countries increased the odds twice as much as in Christian countries, and being in the ethnic majority in Muslim countries increased the odds over ten times that in Christian countries. (There was no significant difference in effect of language majority between the two country groups but it was a positive

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predictor for national pride). This suggests that it is much more important for one's

national pride to be in the majority religion and majority ethnic group in Muslim

countries. In Christian countries is it still important, but only a fraction as much.

The data don't provide mechanisms for why being in the ethnic and religious

majority groups matter so much more for national pride within Muslim-majority

countries, but I suggest a few plausible mechanisms for why these differences presence

themselves.

One mechanism may be the extent to which religions affect political

representation and social standing – either formally in theocracies and integration of

Islamic law into countries' legal systems or informally manifested through different

levels of religious acceptance or discrimination. Very few nation-states have endured as

theocracies (where a deity is considered the supreme civil rules) or religious republics

(whose civil laws are based upon and compatible with religious laws). Most of the

official theocracies or religious republics (including Afghanistan, Iran, Mauritania,

Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia) are governed by Islamic law (CIA 2013). Over 30 additional

countries' legal systems are integrated with Islamic religious law, including countries not

only in the Middle East, but also in Central and South Asia, Africa, and Indonesia (ibid).

Two examples also show Islamic religion as the motivation for either revolution for

government reform and state independence. The Revolution in Iran in 1979 overthrew the

current government and reestablished the state as the Islamic Republic of Iran. The

independence of Pakistan from India in 1947 showed the unifying (and also

distinguishing) force of Islam for a population divided by tribal, ethnic, linguistic, caste, and local differences (Lapidus 1992:20).

In addition to differences in state structure, there is also less separation of state and religious institutions in Muslim countries and for Muslim people. In his earlier work, Lapidus (1996:26) suggested that definitions of national identity in some Muslim and Christian countries are leaning more toward civic beliefs and loyalties while others focus more on ethnic heritage and language. Holliday (2011) specifically notes that Iran's contemporary national identity is shifting toward a more civic-based orientation due to its multi-religious and multi-ethnic composition and historical experience. States are showing less official support for religions, and some say that secular education and judicial systems compete with the functions of Islam (Lapidus 1992). The same author also noted in a later paper however, that when the mass of the population is loyal to the Muslim principles and way of life, the states tend to give special consideration to Muslim symbols and Muslim practices which could provide the collective identity and rallying icons that provide for national identity and unity (Lapidus 1996). For the individual people, "Islam continues to define national identities precisely because it remains the basis of local community life and personal religious beliefs" (Lapidus 1992:24). My findings suggest that non-Muslim religious minorities feel less included in the national identity of their nation-state displayed by less positive national pride.

Looking at ethnicity, being in the majority rather than a minority group in a Muslim country has a relationship with positive national pride ten times stronger than in Christian countries. This relationship may be enhanced due to stronger polarity or

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strength of opposition of ethnic groups within Muslim countries even though levels of heterogeneity are comparable. National identity within Muslim countries may also have a greater emphasis on ethnicity, where minorities suffer from greater political or social exclusion. Countries whose heterogeneity is a result of constructed political boundaries that cross ethnic, religious, or linguistic groups may differ from countries who have higher levels of immigration and appreciation for diversity. The Middle East, South East Asia and North Africa particularly suffered from artificial boundaries created by former colonial rulers who neglected or chose not to consider natural boundaries of ethnic groups within the territories. Most nations were partitioned in 1918 by the British and French following the defeat of the Ottoman Empire. There are both Muslim and Christian states that were created this way, but far more Muslim states were affected. There was also a large wave of state independence with the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 where its 15 former Soviet Republic regained their political independence.[1] These countries, however, maintained their geographical boundaries and did not suffer as much cultural separation like those partitioned from the former Ottoman Empire.

Looking at these results from a slightly different perspective, the order of importance of these three majorities within the two country groups (shown in Table 4) may also support the claim of varying ideological power strength and form. In the average Christian country, being in the language majority has the strongest effect,

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[1] The former Soviet Republics include Russia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Belarus, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Tajikistan, Moldova, Kyrgyzstan, Lithuania, Turkmenistan, Armenia, Latvia, and Estonia (CIA 2013).

Table 4: Ordered Strength of Majority Status on National Pride by Country Type

	Christian-Majority		Muslim-Majority	
Ethnic Majority	3	+ 20.8% odds	1	+ 241.4% odds
Religious Majority	2	+ 53.7% odds	2	+ 106.5% odds
Language Majority	1	+ 75.8% odds	3	+ 75.8% odds

followed by religious majority at 2/3 the strength, and ethnic majority at a mere 1/3 the strength of language majority. Alternately, in Muslim countries, being in the ethnic majority is by far the most powerful when determining positive national pride, over twice as strong as being in the religious majority, and being in the language majority is still quite powerful but the least of the three majority statuses.

This contrasting order of ideological influence may suggest different priorities within the general populations of the two types of countries, which may be driven by the ideological power of the majority religion. As the Christian religion weakened as an ideological power in many Western countries (Mann 1986), capitalism and economic power increased, suggesting the power of common language in Christian-majority countries where religion has lost some of its social and collective power. Although a common spoken language was and is one of the driving factors nationalism and its collective identity according to Anderson ([1983] 2006) and Gellner ([1983] 2008), language may serve more as a means to connection and productivity versus ethnicity and religion that serve as definitions of personal identity. The distinction between personal and occupational identity or collective identity and productivity may be worth exploring in context of these two religions.

ADDITIONAL COUNTRY-LEVEL VARIANCE IN NATIONAL PRIDE

The data and my findings suggest that different patterns exist between Muslim and Christian countries, but a closer look shows substantial variance of the effects on national pride remaining at the country level. Looking at the three most fruitful indicators of national pride – being in the ethnic, religious, and language majority – by religious majority showed significantly different patterns of their effect on national pride. Ethnic majority had a significantly greater positive relationship with national pride in Muslim countries than Christian countries (ten times stronger), as did religious majority (two times stronger). Being in the language majority had a similarly positive relationship in both types of countries that were not significantly different from each other. These were the patterns of the structural components of national pride when the slopes were allowed to vary by religious majority. Looking at the same components and allowing the slopes to vary by country reveal fewer patterns and show that there are more differences between countries that are affecting national pride than those in the present research.

In order to demonstrate these differences, I run the best fitting multi-level logistic regression model allowing for the intercept as well as the slopes for ethnic, religious, and language majority to vary by country. This will provide the effect of being in each of the majority types (separately) on having positive national pride within each country instead of within each religious majority type of country. Table 5 shows the change odds of having positive national pride when in the ethnic, religious, and language majority within each country. (The change in odds is calculated by exponentiating the regression coefficient and subtracting 100%.) The table is grouped by geographical region and then

Table 5: Change in Odds of Positive National Pride for Majority Groups, by Country

Region	MajRelig	Country	Change in Odds if Majority vs. Minority		
			Ethnic maj	Religious maj	Language maj
Africa	Christian	Ethiopia	-0.373	0.836	-0.744
		Ghana	-0.193	-0.188	0.572
		South Africa	0.113	-0.278	-0.358
		Uganda	-0.241	-0.531	-0.658
		Zambia	-0.333	-0.557	-0.525
		Zimbabwe	-0.205	-0.122	0.304
	Muslim	Furkina Faso	-0.258	-0.047	-0.248
		Mali	-0.169	-0.102	-0.396
Europe	Christian	Andorra	-0.358	-0.159	-0.493
		Bulgaria	-0.436	-0.497	-0.468
		Cyprus	-0.077	-0.318	-0.308
		Finland	0.374	0.754	0.520
		France	-0.552	-0.126	-0.266
		Italy	-0.043	0.057	-0.117
		Macedonia	4.054	4.453	5.336
		Moldova	-0.368	-0.664	-0.387
		Poland	0.354	0.460	0.773
		Romania	-0.437	-0.295	-0.221
		Sweden	-0.251	0.070	-0.499
		Ukraine	-0.068	-0.386	1.081
	Muslim	Albania	0.698	-0.030	0.243
		Bosnia & Herzegovina	3.854	0.966	0.984
		Kyrgyzstan	1.229	0.036	-0.035
C Asia	Christian	Russian Federation	-0.269	-0.144	-0.109
Mid East Asia	Muslim	Iran	0.174	-0.016	-0.508
		Iraq	12.435	-0.043	1.138
SE Asia	Christian	Philippines	-0.324	-0.129	-0.257
	Muslim	Bangladesh	-0.393	-0.373	-0.388
		Indonesia	-0.058	0.689	-0.484
N America	Christian	Canada	-0.401	-0.331	1.346
		Mexico	-0.335	0.413	0.275
		United States	-0.054	0.644	-0.139
		Uruguay	-0.004	-0.050	0.646
C America	Christian	Guatemala	-0.157	0.011	0.048
		Trinidad & Tobago	0.356	0.472	5.550
S America	Christian	Argentina	0.992	0.201	0.188
		Brazil	-0.362	-0.247	-0.592
		Chile	-0.146	-0.053	-0.111
		Peru	-0.350	0.584	0.144
		Venezuela	0.006	1.050	2.531
Australia	Christian	Australia	-0.166	0.276	0.033

by religious majority to facilitate comparisons within these two categories. The regions of Africa, Europe, and South East Asia include both Muslim and Christian countries. (Note: these effects are still controlling for all other individual-level control variables such as education, age, and religious attendance).

There are three glaring results from this analysis: The first is the large number of countries that show decreased odds of positive national pride by being in any of three majority types while the religious majority groups both showed the opposite (increased odds of positive national pride). Second, no pattern emerges for the Muslim and Christian countries, even when comparing within regions. Third, there are several countries that show extreme positive effects of being in one or more of the majority groups compared with relatively low rates for the remainder of the countries. All three of observations suggest that there are characteristics of each country that affect how an individual's position within the ethnic, religious and language majority groups is associated with their national pride.

Looking at Africa, both Muslim countries of Burkina Faso and Mali show a decrease in the odds of positive national pride when people are in any of the three majority groups, and the same is true in two of the Christian countries (Uganda and Zambia). In the other four Christian countries (Ethiopia, Ghana, South Africa, and Zimbabwe), being in one of the majority types increases their odds of positive national pride, but are almost all different.

Quite a bit of variety emerges within the European states where three of the Christian countries (Finland, Macedonia, and Poland) all show increased odds being in

every type of majority which is the same for Muslim Bosnia and Herzegovina. Six of the Christian countries (Andorra, Bulgaria, Cyprus, France, Moldova, and Romania) have the exact opposite, with decreased odds of national pride for all three types of majority. For most of the remaining countries, being in the religious majority does not have the same directional impact on national pride as being in the ethnic or language majority.

An additional way to see the similarities, differences, and outliers is graphically. Figures 3, 4, and 5 show the effects of being in the ethnic, religious, and language majority, respectively, on positive national pride. These graphs allow for a clear visual comparison between countries both of the relative starting position of positive national pride for minorities (the y-intercept) and the difference between minorities and majorities of having positive national pride (the slope of the lines).

First looking at the effect of being in the ethnic majority on positive national pride in Figure 3, the largest positive effect is within the country of Iraq, with the minorities having one of the lowest relative odds of positive national pride. Arabs make up 75-80% of the population with 15-20% Kurds as a large minority group and are well-known for the chemical gas attacks by Saddam Hussein toward the end of the Iraq-Iran War in 1986-1988 (CIA 2013). The ethnic Kurds also reside in parts of Iran, Turkey, and Syria and have strived for their own autonomous political state. Whether it is the history of oppression and political representation, being in the ethnic majority (Arab) has the most drastic positive effect on having positive national pride out of all the countries. Muslim Bosnia and Herzegovina, Christian Macedonia, and Muslim Kyrgyzstan have the next highest increases from being in the ethnic majority. Christian Trinidad and Tobago has a

Figure 3: Effect of Being in the Ethnic Majority on National Pride, by Country

very slight positive effect from being in the ethnic majority, but they have one of the highest relative positions in national pride. Christian Brazil on the other hand, has one of the lowest. Understanding the strength of ethnic minority groups within a nation-state and previous armed or political conflict may be an additional factor for future analysis of national identity.

Moving next to Figure 4 and looking at a few countries and the effect of being in the religious majority on having positive national pride, the greatest effect as well as the

highest relative odds of positive national pride all belong to Christian nations. Macedonia shows a 443% increase in the odds of having positive national pride going from the religious minority to the majority. The CIA (2013) reports that the country's population consists of approximately 66% Orthodox (Christian) and 33% Muslim and has a literacy rate of over 97%. The US State Department's "International Freedom Report of 2002"[1]

Figure 4: Effect of Being in the Religious Majority on National Pride, by Country

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[1] I referred to the 2002 report since the survey data for Macedonia was collected in 2001. This would give the most accurate representation of the country's religious situation as the respondents would have experienced.

(US 2013) describes religious tolerance as somewhat strained by ethnic conflict with government support for freedom of religion and no preferential treatment for either religious group. The report also indicates that religion is often tied to ethnicity with most Muslims also being Albanians (an ethnic minority within Macedonia). It seems again that recent ethnic conflict within countries effects the effect of being in the religious majority as well. It is also possible that the relative size of the majority and minority groups, i.e. a strength of quantitative opposition, may be a better predictor of national identity than pure measures of heterogeneity and fractionalization.

To provide a brief regional comparison, Macedonia and Bosnia and Herzegovina were both formerly part of Yugoslavia and gained their independence between 1991 and 1992. Bosnia and Herzegovina however has less freedom of religion (sometimes resulting in violence) in regions where their religion is the minority or that are ethnically homogeneous (US 2013). There is a large minority group, closely tied to ethnicity, with Bosniaks who are usually Muslim comprising 46% of the population, Serbs who are usually Orthodox that are another 31%, and Croats who are typically Roman Catholic that include another 14%. Their literacy rate is close to 98%. Again, the government officially supports freedom of religion, but local leaders sometimes contribute to religious discrimination. Within my data analysis, both countries have strong positive effects of being in the religious majority on positive national pride, with a 455% increase in odds in Macedonia and 97% increase in odds in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Again, there are likely country-level characteristics that attribute to this difference between similar countries.

Lastly, a look at language majority in Figure 5 sees Christian Trinidad and Tobago (an archipelago in Central America) with the highest effect of being in the language majority followed closely by Christian Macedonia in Europe. Trinidad and Tobago's official language is English with Indian, Spanish, and French influences in creole dialects, and has a literacy rate of almost 99%. It has an ethnic mix of 40% Indian (South Asia), 37.5% African, 20.5% mixed and 1.2% other. Their religious mix is 58% Christian (26% Roman Catholic, 26% Protestant, and 6% other), 22.5% Hindu, and 6% Muslim (CIA 2013).

Figure 5: Effect of Being in the Language Majority on National Pride, by Country

Catholic, 26% Protestant, and 6% other), 22.5% Hindu, and 6% Muslim (CIA 2013).

While there is no Central American Muslim comparison for Trinidad and Tobago, it is

possible that its geographic composition of the state (several islands) and concentration of

people by ethnicity, religion, and language spoken will affect the national identity.

This brief look at the country variance of ethnic, religious, and language majority

effect on national pride doesn't necessarily support the trends found between Christian

and Muslim countries, but serves to show the large amount of variance at the country

level. Different countries likely have varying levels of inclusion and tolerance for those

of different ethnicities, religion, and spoken language, whether officially through political

representation, or culturally through economic opportunities and public acceptance. They

also may have other economic, social, or political characteristics that directly affect the

structural composition of national identity or interact with other country or individual-

level characteristics. This brief review demands that the field explore further and include

more country-level variables to the fruitful multi-level analysis to better understand

comparisons of national identity.

LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH

The aim of my research was to look at the aggregate patterns of national identity in a large cross-national sample. There is an ever-present tension between breadth and depth of research, and one thing this study did not accomplish was account for all of the country-level variance in national pride as I showed at the end of my paper. There are likely many different mechanisms at work within every country, and studying individual countries or regions provides a different contribution than my comparative study. In addition to the country-level characteristics I highlighted in the previous section, it would also be fruitful to explore individual-level characteristics of citizenship duration, political affiliation, and tolerance of other ethnic or religious groups as predictors or controls for national identity. Working with multi-level data, however, the number of variables will be limited by the number of second-level (country) groups in the data set.

In most quantitative analyses, scholars use the best data available, even if it wasn't designed directly for their research. To more accurately test the effect of ethnic minority status on national identity, there must be improved individual ethnic responses in the data. Within the World Values Survey data sets, there were several African countries that have hundreds of ethnicities on record through the CIA Fact Book, but have 99% of the surveyed population listed as "African: black." Obviously this loss of detail obscures the reality of the majority and minority ethnic groups that may have political power and influence within the state and highlights the drastic differences between the gross minority of whites or other ethnicities amongst the 99% black

Africans. Additionally, a more desirable sample would include a larger representation of both types of countries to better generalize the findings the world population.

As I focused on the national identity composition between Muslim and Christian countries, additional tests should consider this religious comparison and expand to include different measures of national identity. With the same data set, I conducted preliminary analysis of the same structural components on a person's willingness to fight for their country if there were a war (binary response, yes/no). The results were substantially different for some of the predictors between the Muslim and Christian countries. In this case, being in the religious and language majorities were both large positive predictor for those in Muslim countries, but were non-significant in Christian countries. In Christian countries, the order of importance for majority status was language first, ethnic second, and no effect for religious majority. In Muslim countries, the majority effect order for willingness to fight was first religious (almost 3.5 times bigger than the next), language second, and closely followed by ethnic majority. The main effect of being in a Muslim country on the person's willingness to fight for their country was still negative.

For future research to further pursue my interests in this field , one avenue of research that I'd like to follow includes looking at another set of aggregate patterns in national identity through the lens of religion, separating the sects and denominations of Islam and Christianity that could reveal further patterns and relationships. And as a direct result of my findings, I also want to take a deeper look at ethnic and religious minority-

majority relationships with national identity, social acceptance, and discrimination

through the same Christian-Muslim dichotomy.

CONCLUSION

In this paper, I set out to determine whether differences exist in the structural composition of national identity between Muslim and Christian-majority countries. My findings suggest that there are. Analyzing a dichotomized measure of national pride, I found that being in the ethnic and religious majority groups within their country contributed significantly more to a positive national identity in Muslim countries than in Christian countries. Speaking the majority language mattered similarly in both types of countries. Surprisingly, levels of heterogeneity, by ethnicity, religion, and language did not affect this measure of national identity in either type of country, suggesting that a person's individual position within their country affects their sense of national identity more than the characteristics of their country. It is likely, however, based on the remaining country-level variance in national pride, that there are other unaccounted for country characteristics that need to be identified and included in continued analysis of national identity.

Two particular aspects of my research add to the national identity literature that warrants notice and further exploration. In conducting thorough empirical analysis of national identity, it is essential to account for both individual and country-level characteristics, which I have continued in this paper. In adding to the growing pool of cross-national analyses, I have contributed one of the first with a representation of Muslim countries in the sample. Additionally, I analyzed national identity from a Muslim-Christian religious dichotomy that considers the ideological power of these religions toward a national collective identity transcendent to physical and cultural

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differences. Both of these approaches will prove fruitful in future analysis with other measures of national identity and additional predictors.

Though many historical and cultural factors seem to work against the unification of people with cultural and ethnic differences within a nation-state, religion may serve as a unifying ideological force above those differences. However, it may also foster a stronger sense of exclusion for minorities within their borders, and run counterproductive to the goal of national identity. In the current state of political instability, civil wars, and growing multi-culturalism within countries around the world, the study of national identity continues to prove necessary to understanding the nation-state's collective identity.

APPENDIX A: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS BY COUNTRY

Table 6: Descriptive Statistics by Country

| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Data-produced Statistics - Mean Values by Country | | |
Country	Region	Population (millions)[1]	Year of Indep[1]	Survey Year[3]	Years Since Indep	Largest Ethnic Group[1]	Ethnic FXN[2]	Largest Religious Group[1]	Religious FXN[2]	Most Common Language[1]	Language FXN[2]	Average FXN[1]	Literacy Rate[1]	Educ[3]	Age[3]	Natl Pride[3]	Conf in Govt[3]	Sample Size
Albania	Europe	3.0	1912	2002	90	Albanian	0.2204	Muslim	0.0399	Albanian	0.4719	0.4996	98.7%	4.14	41.82	3.72	2.70	635
Bangladesh	S. Asia	161.1	1971	2002	31	Bengali	0.0454	Muslim	0.2090	Bengali	0.0925	0.2898	56.8%	3.99	33.69	3.69	3.24	1304
Bosnia	Europe	3.9	1992	2001	9	Bosniak	0.6300	Muslim	0.6851	Bosnian	0.6754	0.7798	97.9%	4.45	40.30	3.03	2.25	687
Burkina Faso	Africa	17.3	1960	2007	47	Mossi (Black)	0.7337	Muslim	0.5798	More	0.7228	0.5069	21.8%	2.36	34.32	3.81	2.44	1093
Indonesia	SE Asia	248.6	1945	2006	61	Javanese	0.7351	Muslim	0.2340	Javanese/Indonesian	0.7680	0.6353	90.4%	5.60	35.51	3.40	2.61	1726
Iran	Mid East Asia	78.9	1979	2007	28	Persian	0.6684	Muslim	0.1152	Persian	0.7462	0.5438	77.0%	4.48	33.19	3.56	2.63	2089
Iraq	Mid East Asia	31.1	1932	2004	72	Arab	0.3689	Muslim	0.4844	Arabic	0.3694	0.5453	78.2%	3.53	37.05	3.76	2.48	3940
Kyrgyzstan	Central Asia	5.5	1991	2003	12	Asian	0.6752	Muslim	0.4470	Kyrgyz	0.5949	0.6763	98.7%	5.58	37.44	3.30	2.15	855
Mali	Africa	15.5	1960	2007	47	Mande	0.6906	Muslim	0.1820	Bambara	0.8388	0.4439	31.1%	2.39	36.34	3.90	2.95	1008
Andorra	Europe	0.1	1278	2005	727	Spanish	0.7139	Christian	0.2326	Catalan	0.6848	0.6391	100.0%	4.97	42.63	3.32	2.27	551
Argentina	S America	42.2	1816	1999	183	White (Spanish/Italian)	0.2550	Christian	0.2236	Spanish	0.0618	0.4191	97.2%	3.62	24.26	3.60	2.02	1556
Australia	Australia	22.0	1901	2005	104	White	0.0929	Christian	0.8211	English	0.3349	0.7153	99.0%	5.80	52.75	3.67	2.39	773
Brazil	S America	199.3	1822	2006	184	White	0.5408	Christian	0.6054	Portuguese	0.0468	0.5127	88.6%	3.10	40.35	3.20	2.35	1206
Bulgaria	Europe	7.0	1878	2006	128	Bulgarian (White)	0.4021	Christian	0.5965	Bulgarian	0.3031	0.6279	98.4%	4.86	47.85	3.27	2.18	472
Canada	N America	34.3	1867	2000	133	White/Canadian	0.7124	Christian	0.6958	English	0.5772	0.7543	99.0%	4.98	49.64	3.65	2.36	2414
Chile	S America	17.1	1810	2000	190	White/Amerindian	0.1861	Christian	0.3841	Spanish	0.1871	0.5094	95.7%	4.02	43.40	3.62	2.54	1386
Cyprus	Europe	1.1	1960	2006	46	Greek (White)	0.0939	Christian	0.3962	Greek	0.3962	0.5895	97.6%	5.24	42.06	3.44	2.60	972
Ethiopia	Africa	91.2	1896	2007	111	Oromo	0.7235	Christian	0.6249	Oromo	0.8073	0.6197	42.7%	3.61	29.86	3.65	2.05	979
Finland	Europe	5.3	1917	2005	88	Finn (White)	0.1315	Christian	0.2531	Finnish	0.1412	0.4648	100.0%	4.45	47.43	3.52	2.69	810
France	Europe	65.6	1789	2006	217	White	0.1032	Christian	0.4029	French	0.1221	0.5050	99.0%	3.81	50.99	3.24	2.14	396
Ghana	Africa	24.7	1957	2007	50	Akan	0.6733	Christian	0.7987	Twi (Akan)	0.6731	0.7149	67.3%	2.72	33.72	3.93	2.97	1350
Guatemala	C America	14.1	1821	2004	183	Mixed-European	0.5122	Christian	0.3753	Spanish	0.4586	0.5083	69.1%	4.08	34.12	3.83	2.22	840
Italy	Europe	61.3	1861	2005	144	Italian (White)	0.1145	Christian	0.3027	Italian	0.1147	0.4671	98.4%	5.09	45.85	3.34	2.11	719
Macedonia	Europe	2.1	1991	2001	10	Macedonian	0.5023	Christian	0.5899	Macedonian	0.5021	0.6883	97.3%	4.14	42.90	3.33	1.61	774
Mexico	N America	115.0	1810	2000	190	Mestizo (colored-light)	0.5418	Christian	0.1796	Spanish	0.1511	0.3972	86.1%	3.87	39.30	3.77	2.31	2210
Moldova	Europe	3.7	1991	2002	11	Moldovan/Romanian	0.5535	Christian	0.5533	Romanian	0.5603	0.6995	98.5%	5.08	42.44	2.81	2.14	1543
Peru	S America	29.5	1821	2001	180	Mestizo	0.6566	Christian	0.1988	Spanish	0.3358	0.4879	92.9%	5.24	35.93	3.70	2.07	1301
Philippines	SE Asia	103.8	1898	2001	103	Tagalog	0.2385	Christian	0.3056	Filipino (Tagalog)	0.8360	0.6892	92.6%	5.09	38.59	3.82	2.56	958
Poland	Europe	38.4	1918	2005	87	Polish (White)	0.1183	Christian	0.1712	Polish	0.0468	0.4043	99.5%	4.13	45.46	3.60	1.94	787
Romania	Europe	21.8	1877	2005	128	Romanian (White)	0.3069	Christian	0.2373	Romanian	0.1723	0.4622	97.7%	4.40	47.92	3.21	1.99	1354
Russian Federation	C Asia	142.5	1991	2006	15	Russian	0.2452	Christian	0.4398	Russian	0.2485	0.5614	99.6%	5.36	42.57	3.35	2.41	817
S Africa	Africa	48.8	1910	2000	90	African (Black)	0.7517	Christian	0.8603	Zulu	0.8652	0.8632	86.4%	4.54	38.47	3.67	2.68	4202
Sweden	Europe	9.1	1523	2006	483	Swedish	0.0600	Christian	0.2342	Swedish	0.1968	0.4737	99.0%	5.88	47.73	3.34	2.34	663
Trinidad & Tobago	C America	1.2	1962	2006	44	Indian	0.6475	Christian	0.7936	English	0.1251	0.6349	98.6%	3.58	43.46	3.89	2.17	862
Uganda	Africa	33.6	1962	2001	39	Black	0.9302	Christian	0.6332	Luganda	0.9227	0.7413	66.8%	4.46	30.34	3.59	3.13	759
Ukraine	Europe	44.9	1991	2006	15	Ukrainian (White)	0.4737	Christian	0.6157	Ukrainian	0.4741	0.6956	99.7%	5.76	43.24	3.09	1.98	408
Uruguay	S America	3.3	1825	2006	181	White	0.2504	Christian	0.3548	Spanish	0.0817	0.4722	98.0%	3.09	49.36	3.77	2.73	335
USA	N America	313.8	1776	1999	223	White/European	0.4901	Christian	0.8241	English	0.2514	0.6885	99.0%	5.30	47.28	3.67	2.36	1636
Venezuela	S. America	28.0	1811	2000	189	Spanish/Moreno Claro	0.4966	Christian	0.1350	Spanish	0.0686	0.3779	93.0%	4.89	37.52	3.91	2.62	794
Zambia	Africa	13.8	1964	2007	43	African (Black)	0.7808	Christian	0.7359	Bemba	0.8734	0.8051	80.6%	3.90	29.42	3.51	2.42	1128
Zimbabwe	Africa	12.6	1980	2001	21	African (Black)	0.3874	Christian	0.7363	Shona	0.4472	0.6968	90.7%	2.92	34.41	3.69	2.60	699

[1] - CIA Factbook, 2013 and US Department of State, 2013

[2] - Alesina et al, 2008

[3] - Calculated from Survey Data

Data Source: World Values Survey 1981-2008 Official Aggregate v.20090901, 2009. World Values Survey Association (www.worldvaluessurvey.org). Producer: ASEP/JDS, Madrid. http://www.wvsevsdb.com/wvs/WVSData.jsp?Idioma=I

Note: (**Bold** Survey Year indicates surveys collected during multiple years; years of independence are calculated in context of the year the survey was conducted for each respondent)

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