

Legacies of Slavery: An Analysis of the Dimensions of Slavery's Post-Emancipation

Effects

by

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Dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of
the requirements for the degree of Doctor
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ABSTRACT

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Abstract

Over the last few years, so-called “legacy of slavery” research has made great strides in helping us to understand how the Trans-Atlantic slave trade continues to affect contemporary life. New and improved data sources have allowed this work to become increasingly complex, with a combination of sub-national, cross-national, and individual level analyses. This research focuses on the former, where a number of questions remain, namely: do the long-term effects of slavery remain robust to other historical factors; does slavery exacerbate color stratification among black Americans; and does slavery have a net-positive influence on the contemporary social outcomes of white Americans? I use regression analysis and Census data to answer these questions. Ultimately, I find that the answers to these questions are “yes” to varying degrees. The effect of slavery remains robust to historical covariates, though the relationship is complex. Slavery seems to exacerbate color stratification among black Americans through its disproportionately negative effect on darker skinned black people. And on four of six contemporary measures, slavery improves the life outcomes of white Americans. I discuss the implications of these findings for the future of sociological research and the discussion of reparations for black Americans.

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1. Introduction

The trans-Atlantic slave trade was one of the most impactful world events since the Old World and New World connected. The forceful migration of over 12 million West Africans to Europe and the Americas as chattel dramatically altered the trajectories of nations on both the giving and receiving end. Until recently, our understanding of how trans-Atlantic slavery may have shaped the contemporary world was based primarily on speculation and anecdotal evidence. The ability of social scientists to offer deep empirical analysis of the long-term trajectory of places and people touched by slavery was limited, primarily because of data limitations. However, a recent boom in the availability of historical data on slavery has allowed social scientists to conduct a wide variety of analyses examining whether slavery continued to have a direct effect on post-Emancipation phenomena. The Census archives hosted by the Minnesota Population Center have become increasingly complex and far-reaching, and researchers have compiled a number of data sets on the Trans-Atlantic slave trade (Manning 2012).

Using mostly these data sources, researchers have analyzed what we've begun to call the "legacy of slavery" from a number of different angles. The first angle is research that examines the effect of slavery on contemporary social outcomes in the United States that are not explicitly or necessarily about racial inequality. These are generally conducted at the county or state level. In this vein, Vandiver et al (2006) show that modern criminal executions are more common in states that historically supported

slavery. Gouda and Rigterink (2016) show that the more slaves living on large plantations in a Southern county, the higher that county's violent crime rates today. And Acharary et al (2015) show that counties where slavery was more prevalent have lower average black turnout for elections, more lawsuits claiming constitutional violations based on race, and more racial polarization in political party identification. The second angle legacy of slavery research has taken focuses on the connection between slavery and contemporary racial inequality in the United States, also at the county or state level. Here, researchers find that higher concentrations of slaves in an area leads to higher inequality in educational attainment (Bertocchi and Dimico 2012; Bertocchi and Dimico 2014), poverty (O'Connell 2012), school segregation (Reece and O'Connell 2016), and income (Lagerlöf 2005). The third legacy of slavery angle examines the cross-national effects of slavery, both on countries receiving slaves and those where the slaves came from. This research shows that countries in the Americas that relied more heavily on slave labor have lower GDPs (Nunn 2007) and higher economic inequality (Soares et al 2012) today. In Africa, countries where more slaves were taken are poorer with more stagnant economic development (Nunn 2008a; Nunn2008b), more mistrust (Nunn and Wantchekon 2011), more negative attitudes towards migrants attempting to acquire citizenship (Tedeschi 2014), and higher rates of female HIV transmission (Bertocchi and Dimico 2015). Finally, the fourth angle of legacy of slavery research examines the intraracial impacts of slavery, particularly on black people in the United States, and is

usually conducted at the individual level. Ruef and Fletcher (2003) and Sacerdote (2005) examine whether the intraracial status hierarchy between free black people and slaves was preserved post-Emancipation in the form of ongoing material inequality between descendants of the two groups. Both studies find this to be true initially, but over a few generations the gap closed and the social and economic outcomes of the descendants of free black people and slaves converged. Price et al (2008) test whether the stigma of being a former slave made black people more likely to be lynched than former free black people. Their results reveal that former slaves were, indeed, more likely to be lynched.

Though extant legacy of slavery research is varied and complex, there is still room for important expansions to address a few outstanding concerns. The first concern is that of the studies that attempt to connect slavery to today, most of them only use data from two time points: a measure of slavery from the 1800s as the focal independent variable and a dependent variable and covariates from today. While this method seems to offer robust findings, the temporal distance between slavery and a contemporary measure of inequality often leaves open the question “what happens in between.” Ultimately, in order to be sure that what we are observing is actually a “legacy of slavery” and not merely “the legacy of slavery working through other historical epochs” it is important to test whether slavery remains robust to other historical covariates. Not only will this strengthen legacy of slavery arguments by showing that the effect of slavery we are observing is really slavery, but it also puts slavery in conversation with

other historical moments and literature that explores how other historical phenomena influence contemporary outcomes (eg, Andrews 1997; DeFina and Hannon 2011; McVeigh et al 2014; McVeigh and Cunningham 2012; Messner et al 2005; Petersen and Ward 2015; Porter 2011). The second concern is about the effect of slavery on intraracial inequality, particularly how it shaped color stratification among black Americans. Although research already examines slavery as a site of black intraracial inequality through the differences between free black people and slaves (eg Schweninger 1989; 1990), researchers have yet to examine the role of slavery in producing similar stratification among black people by color. Color remains a prominent axis of stratification among black Americans (Keith and Herring 1991; Monk 2014), and historical and anecdotal evidence suggests that the origins of that stratification lie in chattel slavery (Frazier 1930; Reuter 1917; Toplin 1979). However, to this point legacy of slavery researchers, and social scientists in general, have not assumed the challenge of empirically testing this claim. A test of whether slavery produced color stratification increases our understanding the complexity of its legacy as one that not only shapes interracial inequality but a lasting form of intraracial inequality. The third and final concern I will address here is that legacy of slavery research has been decidedly one-sided in that it disproportionately focuses on the groups—typically black people—who were disadvantaged by slavery and much less on groups—typically white people—who may have been advantaged by the institution. It stands to reason that if some groups

suffer long term hindrances because of slavery that opposing groups may receive long term benefits. Slavery was not happenstance. It was deliberately cultivated for the enrichment of Western nations, which, at the time, were dominated by white people. White people were free to capitalize on the labor of enslaved Africans, and failing to examine whether that crucial aspect of slavery led to long term benefits for white people neglects a large part of the legacy of slavery. In order to gain a well-rounded view of the legacy of slavery we must also understand any “positive” effects it may have produced.

This dissertation attempts to address those three concerns in the legacy of slavery literature with three separate investigations culminating in the three primary chapters of this document. The first chapter addresses the first concern with an analysis of the effect of the legacy of slavery on housing inequality. Using regression analysis, I trace the effect of the legacy of slavery on housing inequality through four time points representing four different post-Emancipation historical epochs: Reconstruction, Jim Crow, the Civil Rights/Black Power Era, and the contemporary day. At each point, I include period specific covariates and the variables that were statistically significant from each previous period. This allows me to examine whether the effect of the legacy of slavery weakens over time and whether it remains robust to other historical phenomena. My results reveal that while the strength of the legacy of slavery is remarkably consistent in direction and magnitude over time, the way that it shapes inequality seems

to change over time. Sometimes it generates inequality by disadvantaging black people and other times by enriching white people.

The second chapter attempts to address the second concern by examining the effect of the legacy of slavery on occupational stratification between blacks and mulattos in 1880. The distinction “black” and “mulatto” on the United States Census functions as a proxy for dark skinned black people and light skinned black people and allows me to test whether slavery shaped color stratification among black Americans. Testing this in 1880, just as the one-drop rule begins to flatten the formal color distinctions among black people offers insight into how slavery shaped the genesis of color stratification and how it may have initiated processes that continue to facilitate color stratification into today. My results reveal that slavery did seem to exacerbate occupational inequality between blacks and mulattos in the late 19th century, possibly setting in motion modern color inequality. Specifically, the results show that while both groups—blacks and mulattos—were negatively impacted by slavery, blacks may have been suffered at twice the magnitude as mulattos.

The third chapter tackles the third concern by testing whether the legacy of slavery improves white outcomes on six social and economic measures: proportion of uninsured residents, median income, unemployment rate, poverty rate, homeownership rate, and the proportion of adult residents receiving food stamps. I chose to examine a broad array of outcomes to gain a wide understanding of how slavery may shape the

lives of white people. My results reveal that slavery seems to have a net positive effect on the contemporary social and economic outcomes of white people. Of the six outcomes I examined, the legacy of slavery improved the social outcomes of white people on four. Of those four, slavery was the strongest or second strongest predictor every case. These results offer us a more well-rounded understanding of slavery by revealing that affected not only marginalized groups but the dominant group as well.

2. Legacy of Slavery, Racial Transitions, and Housing Inequality

2.1. Introduction

“...All political systems, all racial projects, bear the ‘birthmarks’ of their epochs of origin” (Omi and Winant 2015; 150). In the United States, one our primary “birthmarks” is racial inequality, where the “epoch of origin” is generally understood to be chattel slavery, an institution that ended over 150 years ago, leaving a powerful imprint. Social scientists have investigated this imprint—what we have begun to call the “legacy of slavery”—in a number of studies that demonstrate a strong link between slavery and contemporary racial inequality (Avidit et al 2016; Bertocchi and Dimico 2012; Bertocchi and Dimico 2014; Curtis and O’Connell 2016; Lagerlöf 2005; O’Connell 2012; Reece and O’Connell 2016). These studies are important in establishing the ongoing relevance of slavery to racial inequality, but to truly understand *how* this “birthmark” has persisted over the course of one and a half centuries our research must take another step. That step includes integrating the legacy of slavery with other periods of history to understand whether the legacy of slavery remains consistent across various epochs and how other factors combine to influence racial inequality across these epochs even as the social structure changes, sometimes dramatically. This will offer deeper insight into the historical forces shaping contemporary racial inequality by not only accounting for its starting point—chattel slavery—but the confluence of equally important history that followed and how the processes for maintaining inequality

changed over time. Such an examination provides a more comprehensive view of the origins of racial inequality than examining a single point, even if that point is as far-reaching as slavery. With that in mind, I investigate the origins of racial inequality in the American South by using regression analysis to study the effect of slavery on inequality over time. I examine the ongoing effect of slavery and other aspects of history by measuring the legacy of slavery at four historical time points, each with period specific co-variates, and I include the statistically significant variables from each historical time point in the model for the following time point.

Homeownership and home value are optimal metrics for examining the origins of racial inequality. In combination, they offer a measure of the depth of economic wellbeing in a way that a variable such as income does not. This is because of their connection to wealth, which has been shown to be a better measure of economic stability than income (Oliver and Shapiro 1995). Indeed, a report by the Urban Institute says, “Wealth isn’t just money in the bank, it’s insurance against tough times, tuition to get a better education and a better job, savings to retire on, and a springboard into the middle class. In short, wealth translates into opportunity” (McKernan et al 2013). Additionally, wealth is “an indicator of who does and does not have economic power in society” (Shammas 1993, 415).

Home equity accounts for more wealth than any other asset—about 56 percent for black people and 38 percent for white people (Kochhar et al 2011); more than twice

as much as the next prominent asset for both groups. Moreover, the racial wealth gap has remained large over time, even widening in recent years, similar to the gap in homeownership and home value (McKernan et al 2013). The stability of inequality in the two metrics is important for this study because a key part of my investigation is how the processes facilitating a relatively stable form of inequality change over time. Figure 1 and Figure 2 show the long-term trajectories of median home value and home ownership rate by race. Both figures demonstrate the stability of the racial gap in the two measures for almost a century, and this study will analyze the factors contributing to that stability.




Figure 1: Median Home Value Over Time




Figure 2: Homeownership Rate Over Time

My results contribute to literature on racial disparities in housing and the history of racial inequality by revealing the factors that shape historical housing disparities *and* which of those factors continue to shape housing disparities contemporarily. I find that a number of historical factors across different periods, including slavery, continue to influence contemporary housing disparities in profound ways. Perhaps most prominently other than slavery, housing inequality in 1930 and Jim Crow farm ownership continue to affect housing inequality today, which has important implications for the types of interventions necessary to disrupt racial inequality in housing and the ways we specify models of housing and inequality in the future, particularly in the South.

2.2. Legacy of Slavery and Racial Structures

Social scientists and historians generally agree that the origins of black-white racial inequality in the United States lie with chattel slavery, and in an attempt to explore how those origins continue to shape racial inequality today, social scientists have made great strides in empirically connecting the use of slave labor to contemporary racial inequality. Many of these researchers refer to this as the “legacy of slavery,” and they have found that slavery positively predicts a variety of racial disparities such as educational attainment (Bertocchi and Dimico 2012; Bertocchi and Dimico 2014), poverty (Curtis and O’Connell 2016; O’Connell 2012), income (Lagerlöf 2005), disinvestment from public schools (Reece and O’Connell 2016), and racial resentment (Avidit et al 2014). While these studies are very important for establishing an empirical connection between slavery and contemporary inequality, we must expand upon this work to continue to excavate the breadth and depth of the historical origins of racial inequality. The most immediate terms of this expansion must include an examination of the lengthy history that separates slavery from the modern-day, particularly we must investigate how slavery shapes inequality across time, whether the effect of slavery persists when accounting for other historical moments, and how other historical moments come together with slavery to cumulatively shape the contemporary moment. An investigation of this type is important not just because such a long time has passed since Emancipation but because it is important to avoid categorizing racial inequality as a

remnant of slavery that simply drifts through history and explore how the mechanisms for maintaining inequality change over time.

Eduardo Bonilla-Silva (1997) defines a racial structure as “the totality of...racialized social relations and practices” (470), that defines racial groups and facilitates the uneven distribution of resources among racial groups. Chattel slavery was the first American racial structure to govern the relations between black and white Americans, but racial structures are subject to change even as they continue to disproportionately advantage, and by extension disadvantage, the same racial groups. A number of scholars acknowledge this type of institutional change and attempt to delineate how it occurs.

Bonilla-Silva, himself, argues that these changes are a result of racial contestation where different groups—in this case black people and white people—struggle to achieve goals that represent their separate interests: one to preserve their ongoing advantage and the other to minimize their persistent disadvantage. McAdam (2007), though not explicitly discussing race, calls these times episodes of contention, “period[s] of emergent, sustained contentious interaction between...actors utilizing new and innovative forms of action vis-à-vis one another” (253). Fligstein and McAdam (2011) go on to say that episodes of contention are further defined by “a shared sense of uncertainty/crisis regarding the rules and power relations governing the field” (9) and a degree of sustained mobilization by those in power and those subordinated. The

subordinate expose and question rules and laws that had previously been taken for granted or assumed to be beneficial, while simultaneously the powerful mobilize appeals to the status quo and the state for support in an attempt to stabilize the situation. The state then responds to movement demands with new programs, reforms, and agencies that ultimately usher in the transition by establishing a new status quo (Omi and Winant 2015).

One slight limitation of the aforementioned conceptualizations of change in the racial structure is the implication that change must be initiated by the mobilization of the subordinate group—in this case black people—and the dominant group—white people—merely reacts. Instead, it is important to remember that social movements, particularly racialized social movements, are not the exclusive realm of the subordinate group. The most prominent example of white people initiating a racialized social movement rather than simply engaging in counter-movement activity is the end of Reconstruction, what historians have dubbed “Redemption,” when Southern whites ushered in Jim Crow through a combination of sustained violence and political activity. This example demonstrates the ability of white people to mobilize racially in their own interests without a social movement catalyst by black people sparking their need to respond. Acknowledging this is important because it offers a fuller view of the situations that shift racial structures.

These moments of racial contestation are rapid moments of change that punctuate long periods of relative stasis where the systems, institutions, and ideologies governing the racial order are relatively stable. Over the course of history this cycle creates a number of different racial structures each with its own set of rules for the racial order.

But change is only one feature of sustained racial inequality. As the country moves from one racial structure, through an episode of contention, to another racial structure, it is just as important to understand how the racial hierarchy is maintained on the other side. Ruef (2014) contends that when actors are unsure about details of the current situation, they experience an uncertainty that leads them to “reassemble elements of older traditions and organizational forms in order to confront uncertainty and find a new basis for social order” (4). Tilly (1997) calls this process “emulation,” which describes the process of importing models of social interaction, both equal and unequal, from elsewhere. Because the cost of developing and installing new forms of social interaction is lengthy, costly, and ultimately uncertain, it is often easier to simply repurpose and reuse past social models. This means that the institutions that construct racial structures occasionally resemble those that preceded them. One example of this cross-era resemblance is the Southern plantation system which was maintained by black slave labor during the antebellum era and was replaced with a combination of sharecropping and tenant farming after the Civil War. The sharecropping and tenant

farming systems kept many black laborers tied to the same labor they performed while slaves and indebted to the same wealthy planters who were slave owners previously. Indeed, this example brings emulation as a process in line with the idea that these transitions are supported by the state. The federally sanctioned Freedmen's Bureau was instrumental in encouraging former slaves not only to accept positions as sharecroppers and tenant farmers but occasionally on the very same plantations where they were slaves simply out of convenience (Giggie 2008). In that way, emulation reestablishes a status quo that continues to facilitate inequality by failing to meaningfully uncouple the inequality generating elements of the previous series of institutions during the repurposing process.

Drawing from these ideas about transition and emulation, I identify five unique racial structures across the history of the United States: antebellum chattel slavery (though slavery arguably went through a number of transitions of its own), Reconstruction, Jim Crow, the Civil Rights/Black Power era, and the contemporary period, sometimes called the "colorblind" or "post-racial" era.

2.3. The History of Housing Disparities in the South

To examine the origins of racial inequality in chattel slavery and subsequent changes in the racial structure since that time, I investigate black-white racial disparities in homeownership and home value. I chose homeownership and home value because the two are useful measures of economic wellbeing. I previously stated the importance

of home equity as a wealth asset. It accounts for about 56 percent of wealth for black people and about 38 percent for white people (Kochhar et al 2011). This difference in the importance of the home as an asset underscores the importance of racial differences in ownership and value as lower rates of homeownership and lower home values hit black people even harder because the home is a more important asset for them.

Post-emancipation, almost all former slaves started their free lives with nothing but perhaps a few meager clothes and personal possessions, certainly nothing approximating a home (Sundstrom 2011). But recognizing the value of land ownership to economic security the federal government launched a variety of initiatives to attempt to help black people secure farmland, which was integral to black people's early success as homeowners. Perhaps the most important of these initiatives was the Southern Homestead Act, which was supposed to work in conjunction with the newly established Freedmen's Bureau to facilitate land acquisition by former slaves. The Southern Homestead Act provided southerners, not just blacks—though former Confederate were barred from participation for the initial 6 months—the opportunity to apply for a tract of land and improve it for five years, after which the federal government would grant the homesteader ownership over the land (Canaday et al 2015). But the act netted only moderate successes, especially among black people. Even though black people, because of their farming backgrounds, were more successful than white people as homesteaders once they began the process the startup costs of the venture often proved too great for

most black Southerners, and, as a result, they were disproportionately unlikely to attempt homesteading (Canaday et al 2015; Lanza 1990).

Despite the apparently limited success of policies like the Southern Homestead Act, their reliance on white sellers, and a precipitous drop in black homeownership in the 1920s, in general black people managed to acquire land and homes at slightly higher rates than their white counterparts in the decades after the Civil War (Canaday 2007; Collins and Margo 2011). Black land ownership peaked in places where black illiteracy and tenant farming were comparatively low allowing them to leverage their literacy and farming skills to purchase and maintain land (Canaday 2008; Higgs 1982). Unfortunately, black people often paid more than white people for similar plots of land even though literacy slightly lessened this phenomenon (Canaday 2010).

After those early decades, black homeownership and home value largely stagnated, only closing slightly over the remainder of the 20th century. During the mid-20th century policies designed to facilitate homeownership for Americans not only failed to do so for black people but in many cases actively barred them from owning homes. In the 1930s the Homeowners Loan Corporation sought to systemize the home loan process by grading neighborhoods based on their desirability, but part of their equation used non-housing related characteristics such as race and religion, which dropped most black neighborhoods to the lower grades. These low grades severely diminished black people's ability to obtain home loans; this process became what we know as "redlining."

Using a similar grading process, when the newly established Federal Housing Administration and Veteran's Administration sought to insure mortgages to make them more accessible to the larger population, they generally refused to offer insurance in black neighborhoods, not only denying black people access to homeownership but home improvement. Even when black people managed to purchase homes, they were valued at lower prices than the home of their white counterparts, a disparity largely accounted for by differences in housing characteristics, another likely side effect of discriminatory housing policy (Collins and Margo 2001). Indeed, Roy Copeland (2015) remarks that:

Historically, African American land ownership has been dependent on government agencies and policies that on the surface were designed to increase their holdings and provide a means to bolster the economic stature of the landowners...the very agencies and legislative enactments designed to render assistance became nothing more than a bureaucratic field of land mines laden with racial prejudices and discriminatory practices (657).

As the Civil Rights and Black Power Movements began to gain steam in the following decades, the federal government passed fair housing legislation designed to prevent the racial discrimination in housing that had plagued the black population up until they point (Collins and Margo 2001). This legislation combined with increasing educational opportunities and improving occupational opportunities for black people, allowing them to purchase more and better homes, slightly closing both the gap in homeownership and home value (Collins and Margo 2001; Collins and Margo 2003; Gabriel and Rosenthal 2005). But the coming decades would reveal the ongoing

precariousness of black homeowners. As the 2008 recession forced many Americans out of the homeownership black homeowners were disproportionately impacted, losing their homes at higher rates than their white counterparts (Hall et al 2015). At least one study even suggests that banks with questionable lending practices specifically targeted black neighborhoods *because* they were black, net of other factors (Rugh et al 2015). Even as the economy recovered in the following years, the black housing market did not recuperate fully (Austin 2012).

Examining how racial disparities in homeownership and home value have persisted from Reconstruction into today will strengthen the empirical evidence for chattel slavery as the origins of racial inequality in the United States, particularly in the South, and offer insight into how different mechanisms work to maintain inequality over time and how history builds on itself to influence contemporary outcomes.

2.4. Methods

My data is drawn from a variety of sources. The slavery data is from the 1860 Census assembled by the Minnesota Population Center's National Historical Geographic Information System (NHGIS). The historical wealth data is from the 1870 Census microdata assembled by the Minnesota Population Center's Integrated Public-Use Microdata Series (IPUMS-USA). The other historical covariates are also from a combination of US Census data from NHGIS and IPUMS. My contemporary data is from the 2000 Decennial Census, with the exception of "natural amenity," "rural-urban

continuum,” and “retirement destination,” which are from the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) Economic Research Service (ERS). The study includes counties in the area defined by the US Census as the South, ie. Alabama, Arkansas, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, and West Virginia. I excluded Oklahoma because it was not yet a state in 1860 and thus lacks the county level data on slavery that centers this analysis.

Studies at the county level are common in legacy of slavery research (see: Bertocchi and Dimico 2012; Bertocchi and Dimico 2014; Lagerlöf 2005 O’Connell 2012; Reece and O’Connell 2016) because, according to Labao and Hooks (2007), the county is an optimal unit for analyzing historical path dependency processes, particularly in the case of racial inequality in the South. Because the region has been overwhelmingly rural, county governments have historically played a major role in facilitating and constraining civic, social, and economic opportunities. Southerner’s most salient and consistent interactions with the state have been with county governments (Giles et al 1980; Petersen and Ward 2015), and social life, including social movement and counter-movement organizations have been organized at the county level (Andrews 2002; Cunningham, 2014). Moreover, contemporarily, counties have been growing as centers of government distribution, employment in county government positions has been increasing faster than city governments while it has been declining at the national level,

and many major federal programs are distributed at the county level (Lobao and Hooks 2007).

2.4.1. Dependent Variables

My dependent variable is a ratio of black per capita home value (PCHV) to white per capita home value. This calculation gives black PCHV as a percentage of white PCHV such that a value of .65 signifies that on average, a black home in that county is worth 65 percent of a white home. A value of 1 indicates that PCHV is equal, and values above 1 mean that black people in the county tend to have higher PCHV than white people.

PCHV is calculated as median income multiplied by homeownership rate. This calculation yields a per capita estimate of home value that accounts for disparate homeownership rates as well as disparate home values. This prevents our perception of the living situation of county residents from being artificially inflated by relatively equal home value but dissimilar home ownership or the reverse. For example, if the median home value for both whites and blacks in a county was \$10,000, their respective economic situations may seem equal, but when including home ownership rates, 90 percent for white people and 60 percent for black people, the calculations reveal that white people are considerably better off with a PCHV of \$9000 compared to \$6000 for black people. Figure 3 shows PCHV for black people and white people and PCHV inequality over time.




Figure 3: Per Capita Home Value and PCHV Inequality Over Time

In 1870, the Census collected data on individuals' total real estate value but not data on homeownership or home value so I could not replicate the PCHV variable for 1870. But using individual level data from IPUMS, I constructed a variable for real estate inequality in 1870 that serves the same purpose as the PCHV inequality variable. It is essential the same formula: a ratio of black real estate value relative to white real estate value.

2.4.2. Focal Independent Variable: Legacy of Slavery

To measure the legacy of slavery, I use a ratio of the enslaved population to the entire county population in 1860. Though the calculation is relatively straightforward, temporal distance complicates the prospect of using it as an independent variable to

predict contemporary outcomes because county boundaries shift, sometimes considerably, over time. Researchers used a variety of methods to address shifting county boundaries (see: Curtis and O'Connell 2016 O'Connell 2012; Reece and O'Connell 2016). Because of the number of different time points in my analysis, I sampled the counties that had not significantly changed their county boundaries from 1860 to 2000, a method also used by Bertocchi and Dimico 2014 and Lagerlöf 2005. Figure 4 shows the county level distribution of slaves in 1860.




Figure 4: Proportion of Slaves in Counties, 1860

2.4.3. Racial Structures and Other Independent Variables

I analyze data from four time periods, representing four racial structures. The data representing Reconstruction are from 1870. The data representing Jim Crow are

averages from each decennial Census from 1880-1930, with the exception of “Confederate vets,” which is a single point estimate from 1910. For example, Jim Crow unemployment are county-level averages of unemployment rates in 1880, 1890, 1900, 1910, 1920, and 1930. The data representing the Civil Rights/Black Power period are averages from each decennial Census from 1940-1970. And the data representing the contemporary period are averages from 1980-2000, with the exception of “rural-urban continuum,” “natural amenity,” and “retirement destination,” which are single point estimates from 2000. Ideally, I would have used data up until 2010 or later, but the Census stopped providing county level averages of home value disaggregated by race, which is vital to the construction of my dependent variable, after 2000. Figure 5 shows the county level distribution of PCHV inequality for each historical time point.




Figure 5: Per Capita Home Value Inequality by Historical Time Point

See Table 1 for the full variable list and definitions.

Table 1: Means and Variable Definitions

Variable	Mean	SD	Definition
Real Estate Inequality 1870 (DV)	0.05	0.19	Ratio of the value of black real estate to white real estate in 1870
Black Real Estate 1870 (DV)	1.76	10.67	Value of black real estate in 1870
White Real Estate 1870 (DV)	265.83	451.7	Value of white real estate in 1870
Home Value Inequality 1930 (DV)	0.51	1.13	Ratio of black per capita home value to white per capita home value in 1930
Black Home Value 1930 (DV)	365.86	757.05	Black home ownership rate multiplied by black median home value in 1930
White Home Value 1930 (DV)	823.3	858.73	White home ownership rate multiplied by white median home value in 1930
Home Value Inequality 1970 (DV)	0.52	0.25	Ratio of black per capita home value to white per capita home value in 1970
Black Home Value 1970 (DV)	3221.88	1544.68	Black home ownership rate multiplied by black median home value in 1970

White Home Value 1970 (DV)	6443.32	2643.36	White home ownership rate multiplied by white median home value in 1970
Home Value Inequality 2000 (DV)	0.54	.27	Ratio of black per capita home value to white per capita home value in 2000
Black Home Value 2000 (DV)	35352.98	22575.27	Black home ownership rate multiplied by black median home value in 2000
White Home Value 2000 (DV)	63869.31	23584.12	White home ownership rate multiplied by white median home value in 2000
Legacy of Slavery	0.31	0.22	Number of slaves relative to total population in 1860
Natural Amenity Colorblind Era	3.63	0.69	Increasing scale from 1 to 7 indicating home desirability based on natural characteristics
Rural-Urban Continuum Colorblind Era	4.65	2.65	Increasing scale from 1 to 7 indicating county urbanization
Retirement Destination Colorblind Era	0.18	-	Dichotomous variable indicating the 60+ year old population increased by over 15% from 1990 to 2000
Black Proportion Colorblind Era	XXX	XXX	Ratio of black people to the total county population
Unemployment Rate Colorblind Era	0.04	0.01	Proportion of unemployed people in the labor force
Agriculture Prop Colorblind Era	0.06	0.06	Proportion of workers in agriculture, mining, and forestry in 2000
Manufacturing Prop Colorblind Era	0.18	0.09	Proportion of workers in manufacturing in 2000
Retail Prop Colorblind Era	0.12	0.19	Proportion of workers in retail in 2000
Information Prop Colorblind Era	0.02	0.1	Proportion of workers in information in 2000
Finance Prop Colorblind Era	0.04	0.18	Proportion of workers in finance and insurance in 2000
Professional Prop Colorblind Era	0.05	0.03	Proportion of workers in professional positions in 2000
Poverty Inequality Colorblind Era	2.35	.	Black poverty rate relative to white poverty rate in 2000
Income inequality Colorblind Era	0.63	0.4	Black median household income relative to white median household income in 2000
High School Plus Colorblind Era	71.42	0.08	Proportion of 25+ year old population with a high school diploma in 2000
High School Plus Civil Rights Era	0.35	0.11	Proportion of 25+ year old population with a high school diploma in 1970
Agriculture Prop Plus Civil Rights Era	0.1	0.09	Proportion of workers in agriculture, mining, and forestry in 1970
Manufacturing Prop Plus Civil Rights Era	0.24	0.13	Proportion of workers in manufacturing in 1970
Retail Prop Plus Civil Rights Era	0.16	0.04	Proportion of workers in retail in 1970
Finance Prop Plus Civil Rights Era	0.03	0.01	Proportion of workers in finance and insurance in 1970
Professional Prop Plus Civil Rights Era	0.14	0.05	Proportion of workers in professional positions in 1970
Public Administration Plus Civil Rights Era	0.05	0.03	Proportion of workers in public administration in 1970
Poverty Inequality Plus Civil Rights Era	3	2.54	Black poverty rate relative to white poverty rate in 1970
Black Out Migration Plus Civil Rights Era	-0.61	6.2	Proportion change in the proportion of the black population from 1940 to 1970
Private School Inequality Plus Civil Rights Era	0.71	5.15	Proportion of black students attending private school relative to the proportion of white students attending private school in 1970
Confederate Vets 1910	0.02	0.03	Proportion of adult men in 1910 who served in the

Confederate army			
Banks Suspended 1929-1930	0.11	0.17	Proportion of banks suspended in 1929 and 1930
Unemployment Rate 1930	0.06	0.05	Proportion of unemployed workers in the labor force in 1930
Black Out-Migration Jim Crow	-1.17	11.63	Proportion change in the proportion of the black population from 1900 to 1930
Tenant Inequality Jim Crow	1.67	0.71	Ratio of the proportion of black tenant farmers to white tenant farmers from 1880 to 1930
Farm Owner Inequality Jim Crow	0.61	0.32	Black farm ownership rate to white farm ownership rate from 1880 to 1930
Manufacturing Prop Jim Crow	0.03	0.03	Proportion of workers in manufacturing from 1880 to 1930
School Inequality Jim Crow	0.88	0.21	Ratio of the proportion of black children enrolled in school to white children enrolled in school from 1880 to 1930
Literacy Inequality Jim Crow	6.23	5.14	Ratio of the proportion of illiterate black people to illiterate white people from 1880 to 1930
Average Farm Value 1870	1981.06	2738.32	Average value of all farms in 1870
Cotton Per Farm 1870	4.5	12.58	Average bales of cotton produced by each farm in 1870
Manufacturing Prop 1870	0.01	0.02	Proportion of workers in manufacturing in 1870
School Inequality 1870	0.32	2.86	Ratio of the proportion of black children enrolled in school to white children enrolled in school in 1870
Denied the Vote 1870	0.02	-	Dichotomous variable for whether a black person reported being denied the right to vote
Free Black People 1860	0.07	0.14	Proportion of the total black population non enslaved in 1860
Black Real Estate 1860	20.71	297.37	Average value of black owned real estate in 1860
Black Personal Property 1860	52.92	991.03	Average value of black owned personal property, including slaves, in 1860
White Real Estate 1860	560.85	1601.03	Average value of white owned real estate in 1860
White Personal Property 1860	767.01	1104.66	Average value of white owned personal property, including slaves, in 1860

2.4.4. Model Design

I ran four series of regression models, one for each racial structure in chronological order. For each series, I begin by using PCHV inequality as the dependent variable and running a baseline model that includes the legacy of slavery and PCHV inequality for each previous period. This baseline models establishes a connection between the legacy of slavery and PCHV inequality at that time while controlling for

PCHV inequality at other periods. The first series of models examines the effect of the legacy of slavery on real estate inequality (remember that I could not calculate PCHV inequality for 1870) during Reconstruction. After the baseline model, including only the legacy of slavery, I add a series of covariates from 1860 to test whether the slavery association remains strong despite other antebellum characteristics. These variables include the proportion of the total black population that was free in 1860, the value of black and white personal property respectively, and the value of black and white real estate respectively. The third model includes covariates for 1870 that account for Reconstruction era factors that could shape the relationship between slavery and real estate inequality. These covariates include a measure of black-white schooling inequality, average cotton per farm, average farm value, proportion of workers in manufacturing, and whether a black person was denied the right to vote.

The second series of models examines the Jim Crow period. As aforementioned, the first model serves as a baseline and includes the legacy of slavery and real estate inequality in 1870. In the second model, I add the covariates representing Jim Crow, which include a measure of the proportion of banks suspended at the start of the Great Depression, unemployment, white confederate veterans, black out-migration, literacy inequality, schooling inequality, tenant farming inequality, farm ownership inequality, and proportion of workers in manufacturing. This allows me to test whether the legacy of slavery continues to influence inequality in 1930 net of other Jim Crow era factors.

The third model includes the variables with a P-value below .10 in the previous series of models, in this case those from Reconstruction. This third model represents the core of this study as it allows me to examine the effect of the racial structure between slavery and Jim Crow to gain a broader understanding of the historical factors shaping the latter period.

The following two series of models follow a similar strategy as the second. The third series of models represents the Civil Rights/Black Power era and begins with a baseline model that includes the legacy of slavery, real estate inequality in 1870, and PCHV inequality in 1930. In the next model, I add covariates from this period, including a measure of education, black out-migration, private school enrollment inequality, poverty inequality, and a number of industry variables. The third model includes the variables that remained consistent in the previous series of models to continue to account for the impact of previous racial structures.

The fourth series of models represents the contemporary racial structure. The first model includes only the legacy of slavery, real estate inequality in 1870, and PCHV inequality in 1930 and 1970. The second model includes covariates from the contemporary period: unemployment rate, poverty inequality, income inequality, education, black proportion, natural amenities, rural-urban continuum, retirement destination, and a number of industry variables. The third model includes the variables that remained consistent from the previous series of models. This model allows me to

investigate the effect of each former racial structure on this aspect of contemporary racial inequality, attempting to account for nearly 150 years of history in a way that other studies have not.

Additionally, to gain a deeper understanding of changes across racial structure, for each period I repeat the modeling strategy twice: once with black PCHV as the dependent variable and again with white PCHV as the dependent variable. These additional models offer insight into how inequality may be generated across periods. For example, whether the legacy of slavery produces PCHV inequality through black impoverishment or white enrichment or a combination of both and whether those processes remain consistent over time.

Because of limited space, I only show the final model in each series, ie, for each period I show the final model for PCHV inequality, black PCHV, and white PCHV.

I also tested for spatial autocorrelation using a Moran's I test, which confirmed that my residuals were spatially correlated. To account for this, I present spatially robust standard errors in my results.

2.5. Results

My results perform a few functions. First, they generally support the legacy of slavery idea that chattel slavery played a large role in the origins of racial inequality, particularly in the American South as the effect of the institution is not only evident at each of four different racial structures and remains strong throughout history. The

results also demonstrate how racial differences in PCHV persist relatively consistently over multiple racial structures even though the mechanisms change during each period. Finally, they show how historical racial structures continue to directly affect contemporary racial outcomes.

2.5.1. Reconstruction

Table 2: OLS Estimates for Reconstruction Era PHCV

	Inequality		Black		White	
	β	SE	β	SE	β	SE
Intercept	.07***	.02	.15	1.12	62.45*	26.68
Legacy of Slavery	-.09**	.03	.71	2.15	222.9**	74.73
Free Blacks	.003	.03	20.24***	4.60	189.27	128.28
Black Real Estate 1860	.000009	.00001	.001	.001	.05	.07
Black Personal Property 1860	-.000003	.000003	-.0003	.0004	-.01	.02
White Real Estate 1860	-.000001	.000003	-.0002	.0001	.002	.03
White Personal Property 1860	-.000000	.000003	.0003	.0005	.05	.03
Manufacturing 1870	.02	.13	2.88	18.00	-1915.61	1202.55
Average Farm Value 1870	-.000003**	.000001	.001**	.0002	.06***	.01
Cotton Per Farm 1870	.0004	.0004	-.09**	.03	-2.03	3.96
Schooling Inequality 1870	.05	.03	1.72	1.07	-.57	42.63
Denied the Vote	-.03***	.009	-.10	1.34	20.54	51.66
N	825		838		835	
R squared	.01		.05		.15	

***p < .01; **p < .05; *p < .10

The full model of real estate inequality in 1870 provides initial support for the legacy of slavery during Reconstruction, which seems intuitive considering the direct proximity of the two periods. The legacy of slavery is negative and significant, which means that the value of black real estate is lower relative to the value of white real estate becomes progressively lower in counties as the historical enslaved population increases. The full models of black and white real estate value reveal more about the workings of the legacy of slavery during this period. It is non-significant for black real estate value, but positive and significant for white real estate value. This means that while there was no direct connection between slavery and black real estate value during this period, as the historical proportion of slaves in a county increased so did white real estate value. Looking back on the history of black real estate, former slaves owned hardly anything in 1870, meaning that the variance from county to county would be relatively low so the legacy of slavery may not have much of an effect at the time. More notable, however, is that white populations seemed to have profited directly from slavery in the form of increased real estate value, which seems intuitive in historical context. Slavery was immensely profitable and created mass amounts of wealth for those involved, particularly in the plantations of the black belt (Baptist 2014; Dattel 2009) so it stands to reason that white people's real estate values would be higher in counties where slavery was more prominent.

For the inequality model, average farm value in 1870 and whether a black person reported being denied the right to vote in 1870 are also negative and significant, meaning that black-white real estate inequality was higher in counties where the average farm value was higher and in counties where a black person reported being denied the right to vote. It is important to note that though average farm value is significant, the effect is tiny, but, just as with the legacy of slavery, examining the models for black and white real estate value offers additional insight into the processes generating inequality. Average farm value is positive and significant for both the black and white populations, meaning that as farm value increases, real estate value also increases for both groups. But the effect is magnitudes larger for white people than for black people, suggesting that though both populations benefitted from relatively prosperous farms in the area, white people benefitted substantially more than their black counterparts. The differential benefits of valuable farms ultimately resulted in rising real estate inequality in these areas. In contrast, while “denied the vote” increases real estate inequality it is non-significant for both black and white real estate value, which makes the inequality facilitating processes unclear.

Additionally, the proportion of free blacks in 1860 is positive and significant for black real estate value, meaning that as the historical population of free blacks increased in a county, black real estate value increased correspondingly. This likely signals that the black populations in areas with free blacks, even though they were few, received a type

of head start that black people in other areas were denied (Schweninger 1989; 1990).

Simply put, black people who were not enslaved had more time to accumulated more and more valuable real estate, a luxury that apparently continued to benefit them during Reconstruction.

2.5.2. Jim Crow

Table 3: OLS Estimates for Jim Crow Era PCHV

	Inequality		Black		White	
	β	SE	β	SE	B	SE
Intercept	.46	.27	2.28	122.31	1.05	180.66
Legacy of Slavery	-.57**	.22	-711.56***	119.93	-240.20	153.01
Real Estate Inequality 1870	-.15	.12	-12.83	91.97	109.72	134.64
Farm Ownership Inequality Jim Crow	.59***	.17	177.93*	76.02	-35.17	104.51
Tenant Farming Inequality Jim Crow	-.03	.03	-24.33	31.34	-16.77	44.01
Literacy Inequality Jim Crow	-.02*	.01	8.05	4.79	63.02***	10.67
Schooling Inequality Jim Crow	.07	.23	360.71**	116.63	306.02*	130.18
Black Out-Migration Jim Crow	-.09	.26	-131.89	220.75	.58	5.09
Manufacturing Jim Crow	-1.23	.89	3826.00**	1133.04	663.67***	798.48
Unemployment Jim Crow	-.000003	.00001	.08*	.04	.21***	.05
Banks Suspended	-.32*	.15	-221.96*	85.96	-31.20	140.95
Confederate Vet	3.56	2.56	-274.05	506.23	-2412.81**	869.43
Average Farm Value	-.00000	.00001	.02*	.006	.05***	.01
Denied the Vote	-.16	.10	-103.62	105.35	-30.32	129.79
N	713		715		728	
R squared	.10		.25		.43	

***p < .01; **p < .05; *p < .10

Similar to the models for real estate value during Reconstruction, the full model for PCHV supports legacy of slavery research. Legacy of slavery is negative and significant, meaning that as the historical proportion of slaves in a county increases, black per capita home value relative to white per capita home value decreases

correspondingly, which means inequality is greater. However, in contrast to the previous period, the effect of slavery on PCHV inequality during Jim Crow seems to be primarily a result of lower black PCHV in places where slavery was more prominent. Legacy of slavery is negative and significant for black PCHV, meaning that as the proportion of slaves increases, black PCHV decreases. However, legacy of slavery is non-significant for white PCHV, suggesting that there is no direct connection between the two during this time. This is important because it allows us to observe the work of a changing racial structure. While the legacy of slavery is very important in producing inequality during both Reconstruction and Jim Crow and the gap between black people and white people remains very large, it is clear that different processes are at work, even in the way that the exact same variable operates over time.

In the inequality model, farm ownership inequality is also positive and significant, literacy inequality is negative and significant, and banks suspended is negative and significant. That farm ownership inequality is positive and significant means that as the ratio of black farm owners increases relative to white farm owners, PCHV inequality decreases as the ratio of black PCHV relative to white PCHV also increases. Examining the other models offer deeper insight into the processes driving this effect. Farm ownership inequality is positive and significant for black PCHV and nonsignificant for white PCHV. This means that as the inequality in black-white farm ownership decreases, black PCHV increases, while farm ownership inequality shows no

connection to white PCHV. These combined results suggest that during this period, black homeownership was very strongly tied to their ability to purchase farmland, so where black people were able to purchase more farms, thus decreasing the gap between them and their white counterparts, their PCHV is higher. That literacy inequality is negative and significant means that as the proportion of illiterate black people increases relative to the proportion of illiterate white people the ratio of black PCHV relative to white PCHV decreases, meaning PCHV inequality increases. In this case, literacy inequality is nonsignificant for black PCHV and positive and significant for white PCHV. This means that higher ratios of black illiteracy relative to white illiteracy are associated with higher white PCHV, but it shows no association with black PCHV. The lack of an association to black PCHV likely speaks to the general difficulty black people experienced when attempting to purchase homes and purchase higher quality homes. The hostile racial climate of the time may have made purchasing a home so difficult that whether or not black people were literate hardly mattered for their ability to purchase a home. In contrast, decreasing white illiteracy would also increase literacy inequality and thus raise white PCHV, which may be unsurprising. Given the relative freedoms afforded to white people, literacy would have been a significant advantage, affording them the ability to purchase more and more valuable homes. The divergent impact of the racial structure on black people and white people likely facilitated the divergent effects of literacy on PCHV, which, in turn, increased PCHV inequality. An increasing

number of suspended banks also decreases black PCHV relative to white PCHV, and in the race specific models, banks suspended is negative and significant for black PCHV but nonsignificant for white PCHV. This means that as the number of banks suspended in a county increased black PCHV increased correspondingly, but there was no association between suspended banks and white PCHV. The negative impact of suspended banks on black PCHV may be attributable to the limited number of banks that would serve black people at all during Jim Crow (Marable 1979). The banks that served black people have been particularly vulnerable and as they started to close, black people's ability to purchase homes and valuable homes may have decreased (Ammon 1996). In contrast, white people had more options for financial institutions and may have thus been less likely to be affected by the bank closings so quickly, leading to the lack of correlation in the models.

Additionally, there are a few variables in the race specific models that are not correlated with inequality but are positive and significant for both black people and white people: schooling inequality, manufacturing, unemployment, and average farm value during Reconstruction. For each of these variables black and white people appear to benefit at roughly the same rate, which neither creates nor diminishes inequality. That schooling inequality increases PCHV means that as the proportion of black children enrolled in school increases relative to the proportion of white children enrolled in school—that is as schooling inequality decreases—both black and white people

experience increases in PCHV. This phenomenon is likely due to the relative scarcity of formal schooling during Jim Crow in the South. The educational system was largely patchwork until the mid-1930s when every state had established a system of universal elementary education (Anderson 1988). Decreasing schooling inequality may signal an unusual amount of available education in the county, and in these places black and white people may be able to leverage that education to accumulate more and better homes. Alternatively, places that willingly offered education to black people or had black communities that were capable of establishing their own schools may have been more hospitable to black homeownership or had relatively strong black communities that offered relatively valuable housing to black people. Similarly, both black and white people benefit from the proportion of workers in manufacturing; as the proportion of workers in manufacturing increases, black PCHV and white PCHV increase. This probably signals that both groups profit from the presence of manufacturing jobs that likely pay more than low-skilled agricultural work. These better jobs would allow workers to purchase more and better homes. Though black people seem to benefit about six times more than their white counterparts, because manufacturing is nonsignificant in the equality model, that disparity is not great enough to make a significant impact in closing the PCHV gap. That unemployment is positive and significant means that as the unemployment rate of a county increases, PCHV increases correspondingly for both black and white people. This finding is counterintuitive and difficult to explain, but the

effects are so small, the impact on PCHV is nearly negligible. The positive effect of average farm value for both groups is also miniscule, smaller even than the effect of unemployment. Though the coefficients indicate that the benefit of local farm value for black people is catching up with that of white people, in contrast to in 1870 when white people benefitted much more, the overall impact on PCHV for both groups is tiny.

The variable with the largest impact on white PCHV is confederate vet, which is negative and significant. As the proportion of adult men who were confederate veterans in 1910 increases in a county, white PCHV plummets. Though this variable was collected decades after the Civil War ended and any veterans still alive would have been elderly, it may still be a useful indication of a county's participation in the war, which may decrease PCHV in a number of ways. First, more participation in the war may invite heightened retribution from the Union army, which may be more likely to destroy local homes or infrastructure that may stunt growth in home value and/or home ownership for white people. Relatedly, increased participation in the war may have resulted in the death or injury of a larger number men (Grimsley 1997). Because men were primarily responsible for producing income and were typically the head of household, fewer men or more men who were unable to work may decrease the ability of the white population to purchase homes at all or force them to purchase lower quality homes on the salary of a single woman.

2.5.3. Civil Rights/Black Power Era

Table 4: OLS Estimates for Civil Rights/Black Power Era PCHV

	Inequality		Black		White	
	β	SE	β	SE	β	SE
Intercept	.85***	0.1	873.38	595.01	-1363.78	1019.05
Legacy of Slavery	-.10**	.04	456.69	253.26	1616.46**	424.63
Real Estate Inequality 1870	.02	.03	-47.29	126.16	-327.64	232.25
PCHV Inequality 1930	.01	.01	8.01	37.81	-59.47	41.48
Black Out-Migration Civil Rights Era	.01	.04	397.65	213.76	614.25*	255.45
Private School Inequality Civil Rights Era	.002	.002	4.43	7.68	7.10	6.47
Poverty Inequality Civil Rights Era	-.04***	.01	-80.85*	37.41	410.46***	55.27
Educational Attainment Civil Rights Era	-.22*	.10	3513.84***	747.96	9202.15***	1112.74
Agriculture Civil Rights Era	-.06	.10	-2526.56**	755.82	-4422.98**	1254.34
Manufacturing Civil Rights Era	-.08	.11	1357.09*	654.56	2585.08*	1118.80
Retail Civil Rights Era	-.92**	.30	-2688.48	1626.93	3906.22	3144.51
Finance Civil Rights Era	.07	.82	30646.83***	6261.03	70736.50***	7388.43
Professional Civil Rights Era	.27	.18	1864.65	1157.64	-1401.74	1825.15
Public Administration Civil Rights Era	.38*	.17	6432.88**	1985.03	5853.46	3237.02
Farm Ownership Inequality Jim Crow	.07**	.02	925.40***	135.24	952.71***	240.10
Literacy Inequality Jim Crow	-.0004	.001	-32.92**	8.60	-55.08**	15.40
Banks Suspended Jim Crow	.03	.04	-439.17	226.64	-910.35**	239.54
N	744		744		744	
R squared	.34		.50		.70	

***p < .01; **p < .05; *p < .10

Just as in the models for real estate inequality in 1870 and PCHV inequality in 1930, the legacy of slavery is negative and significant, meaning that as the historical proportion of slaves in a county increases PCHV inequality increases proportionally. But in contrast to the models from the previous period, the inequality is facilitated by increasing white PCHV in counties where slavery was more prominent. Legacy of slavery is positive and significant for white PCHV and nonsignificant for black PCHV.

This notably demonstrates another shift in the way that inequality is facilitated through slavery.

In the inequality model, poverty inequality—the ratio of the black poverty rate relative to the white poverty rate—, educational attainment, and retail workers are also negative and significant, meaning that as each increases so does PCHV inequality. Public administration workers and farm ownership inequality—black farm ownership rate relative to white farm ownership rate—during the Jim Crow era are positive and significant, meaning that as they increase PCHV inequality decreases. Again, examining the race specific models offers deeper insight into the processes at work. As for poverty inequality, it generates both lower black PCHV and progressively higher white PCHV, meaning that in places where black people are poorer relative to white people—whether that is because of high black poverty or low white poverty—black people have lower PCHV and white people have higher PCHV. The disparate effect of poverty inequality on the two groups ultimately drives its effect on PCHV inequality. The processes facilitating the effect of educational attainment on inequality differ. Educational attainment is positive and significant for both groups, meaning that as the proportion of people in a county with a high school diploma increases, PCHV increases for black people and white people. But the effect for white people is over 2.5 times bigger than their black counterparts, suggesting that though both groups benefit from the local education level, white people are more fortuitous recipients in the form of PCHV. This is

consistent with other research demonstrating that white people benefit more from education than black people (Appiah 2013). By 1970, educational opportunities had begun to open up for black people across the South and compulsory state-sponsored education had become a reality for all residents even if segregation still ran rampant (Anderson 1988). Regardless, more black people were able to complete high school and increasing higher educational and occupational opportunities allowed them to capitalize on their education (Webster 1981), but white people have generally been able to leverage their educations for better outcomes than black people with similar levels of education (Appiah 2013). That disparity is evident here and may explain how educational attainment creates PCHV inequality. The proportion of workers in the retail industry also increases PCHV inequality even though it is non-significant for both black and white PCHV. While it seems reasonable that black people may become concentrated in low paying retail jobs that would limit their ability to purchase homes or high quality homes, the non-significance of this variable in the race specific models leaves doubt about the specifics of the process. In contrast to the retail industry, the proportion of workers participating in public administration diminishes inequality in PCHV, seemingly through increasing black PCHV. Public administration is positive and significant for black PCHV and non-significant for white PCHV, meaning that as the proportion of workers in public administration increases, black PCHV increases but there is no connection between public administration workers and white PCHV. This is

also consistent with other research. As occupational opportunities increased for black people across the Civil Rights Era, one notable avenue to open was government jobs (Collins 1983), and research demonstrates that racial disparities in pay are lower in the public sector than in the private sector (Cooper et al 2012). Less discretion in the pay structure means that black people are not arbitrarily paid less than their white counterparts. Higher salaries would afford them the opportunity to increase their PCHV, thus decreasing the inequality between them and white people. Farm ownership inequality during Jim Crow also remains positive and significant, persisting from the previous period. That means that as black farm ownership increases relative to white farm ownership during Jim Crow, PCHV inequality decreases. But unlike the Jim Crow models, farm ownership inequality is positive and significant for both white and black people. The magnitude of the effect for the two groups is nearly identical, and this similarity is apparently enough to decrease PCHV inequality.

There are a number of other variables significant for both black people and white people that do not affect PCHV inequality. Agriculture and Jim Crow literacy inequality are negative and significant, and manufacturing and finance are positive and significant. The effect of agriculture is about 50 percent stronger for white people than black people, meaning that though both groups suffer lower PCHV as the proportion of agriculture workers in a county increases, white people suffer slightly more. Though it is difficult to explain the difference in the size of the coefficients, the general decrease in PCHV may

be attributable to the changing status of local economies across the period. Increasing farm mechanization decreased the number and value of agricultural jobs (Musoke 1981), and thus populations relying on these jobs would likely have lower economic prosperity and lower PCHV. Relatedly, the proportion of manufacturing workers increased PCHV for both black and white people, even though white people benefited at almost twice the magnitude. In contrast to agricultural positions, manufacturing work became more numerous throughout the region during this period and provided relatively stable and profitable jobs (Norton and Rees 1979) which may provide the economic prosperity to secure higher PCHV. Similarly, finance positions may have served the same purpose to a much greater extent, providing the largest increase in PCHV for both black and white people. Additionally, literacy inequality during Jim Crow is negative and significant, meaning that as the ratio of black illiteracy to white illiteracy increases—literacy inequality increases—PCHV decreases for both black and white people during the Civil Rights/Black Power Era. Jim Crow literacy inequality could be a measure of the educational trajectory of a county such that increasing inequality may be an indication of a place's ability to effectively educate its population, where higher inequality indicates less effective education, which may lead to decreases in PCHV in the Civil Rights Era.

Additionally, black out-migration is positive and significant and banks suspended during Jim Crow is negative and significant, both for white PCHV and nonsignificant for black PCHV even though they do not affect inequality. The former

result means that as the proportion of black people in a county increased from 1940 to 1970 white PCHV increased. The causal order here may actually be reversed, where black people are increasingly likely to migrate to places where white people are prosperous as it may signal a strong local economy. The latter result means increasing numbers of suspended banks in 1929 and 1930 lowers white PCHV in 1970. This may be a delayed reaction to the decreased number of banks or the fragile banking local banking industry. In contrast to black people who immediately felt the effect of suspended banks in 1930, as indicated by the previous series of models, white economic status may have been more robust, allowing them to withstand the banking crash a bit longer until ultimately falling victim to it later.

2.5.4. Colorblind/Post-Racial Era

Table 5: OLS Estimates for Colorblind Era PCHV

	Inequality		Black		White	
	β	SE	β	SE	B	SE
Intercept	.76***	.15	8564.10	10420.62	-6560.25	14056.23
Legacy of Slavery	.04	.29	8824.25**	3048.21	11145.10**	4002.83
Real Estate Inequality 1870	.002	.02	-1953.74	1783.97	-2984.55	2162.22
PCHV Inequality 1930	.02**	.01	1257.82**	358.81	-21.88	390.02
PCHV Inequality 1970	.07	.05	-470.89	3656.49	-7645.31*	3125.89
Black Proportion Colorblind Era	.25***	.05	21759.96***	3875.58	10576.67*	4521.14
Poverty Inequality Colorblind Era	-.03***	.01	-1484.92**	529.87	1481.65**	553.95
Income Inequality Colorblind Era	.12	.07	6635.32	4789.28	-2198.88*	963.08
Rural-Urban Continuum Colorblind Era	.001	.003	-336.10	251.65	-309.88	267.26
Retirement Destination Colorblind Era	.002	.02	2748.48*	1297.54	5552.18**	1635.13
Natural Amenity Colorblind Era	-.02*	.01	-1049.41	788.14	721.77	1073.96
Unemployment Colorblind Era	-.02**	.01	-2988.44***	414.68	-3357.39***	549.86
Educational Attainment Colorblind Era	-.001	.001	694.73***	107.20	1144.76***	157.33
Agriculture Colorblind Era	-.004	.002	-442.50**	164.82	-402.04*	189.59
Manufacturing Colorblind Era	-.0001	.001	56.23	75.09	174.84*	87.11
Retail Colorblind Era	.01	.004	295.93	307.65	-194.76	335.04
Information Colorblind Era	.01	.007	1257.88	674.56	694.19	878.45
Finance Colorblind Era	.001	.004	514.87	348.84	1474.11**	456.17
Professional Colorblind Era	.004	.004	2156.25***	369.16	4225.62***	603.59
Poverty Inequality Civil Rights Era	-.005	.006	-343.66	483.20	20.54	493.37
Educational Attainment Civil Rights Era	-.29**	.09	-65126.81***	8070.19	-70873.35***	9921.26
Retail Civil Rights Era	-.93**	.26	-107757.35***	19562.24	-96157.59***	18836.68
Public Administration Civil Rights Era	.22	.14	43245.18**	15956.89	35055.39	22344.77
Farm Ownership Inequality Jim Crow	.05*	.02	8922.83***	1680.47	9106.79***	2280.15
N	797		797		801	
R squared	.28		.56		.72	

***p < .01; **p < .05; *p < .10

In contrast to the other periods the legacy of slavery was non-significant for PCHV inequality in the contemporary period. In fact, it was positive and significant for both black people and white people, meaning that in places where there were a higher

proportion of slaves, black and white PCHV were both higher in 2000. In light of this counterintuitive result, I decided to run two additional series of models that disaggregated the PCHV variable to gain a deeper understanding of how slavery was shaping PCHV. I ran one series of models for median home value, which replicated the modeling strategy of the PCHV series so there were three models: one for median home value inequality—the ratio of black median income to white median income—, one for black median income, and one for white median income. Then I ran a second series of models with homeownership rate following the same modeling strategy: one model with homeownership rate inequality—the ratio of black homeownership rate to white homeownership rate—, one model for black homeownership rate, and one model for white homeownership rate. The results were telling.

Table 6: OLS Estimates for Colorblind Era Median Home Value

	Inequality		Black		White	
	β	SE	β	SE	β	SE
Intercept	.77***	.18	-2252.17	16131.16	-7892.89	18143.82
Legacy of Slavery	-.09*	.04	-3221.48	3812.59	11599.99*	5016.39
Real Estate Inequality 1870	-.02	.02	-5435.03**	1955.58	-5389.27*	2476.06
PCHV Inequality 1930	.01	.01	1126.25	628.98	229.36	528.78
PCHV Inequality 1970	.09	.06	-1626.68	5467.37	-8834.95*	3796.21
Black Proportion Colorblind Era	.20**	.05	27338.70***	5080.47	11368.94	5846.02
Poverty Inequality Colorblind Era	-.02*	.01	-1701.42*	835.26	269.03	671.33
Income Inequality Colorblind Era	.12	.09	7629.67	7606.67	-4315.53**	1407.85
Rural-Urban Continuum Colorblind Era	-.001	.003	-619.16*	313.77	-397.18	330.08
Retirement Destination Colorblind Era	-.01	.01	1940.15	1761.60	4516.44*	2045.83
Natural Amenity Colorblind Era	-.03**	.01	-2015.19	1375.34	920.16	1528.30
Unemployment Colorblind Era	-.01	.01	-2888.27***	619.10	-2869.77**	777.24
Educational Attainment Colorblind Era	-.001	.001	954.60***	151.24	1305.99***	188.36
Agriculture Colorblind Era	-.01**	.003	-976.12***	239.20	-761.64**	237.56
Manufacturing Colorblind Era	.002	.001	250.70**	97.00	145.73	119.63
Retail Colorblind Era	.01	.004	290.14	388.61	-607.33	429.68
Information Colorblind Era	.01	.01	2826.30**	898.61	1618.28	1128.80
Finance Colorblind Era	-.0001	.004	729.40	425.63	1524.47**	536.99
Professional Colorblind Era	.002	.004	3632.40***	525.72	5604.77***	802.73
Poverty Inequality Civil Rights Era	-.01	.01	-905.82	658.60	-226.52	668.20
Educational Attainment Civil Rights Era	-.06	.09	-37987.01**	10112.73	-44761.11***	11320.66
Retail Civil Rights Era	-.29	.24	-81814.43**	22013.60	-85479.78**	23744.90
Public Administration Civil Rights Era	.33	.18	71751.21**	22995.52	25152.34	26163.74
Farm Ownership Inequality Jim Crow	-.004	.02	4624.67	2705.30	8483.17**	3133.40
N	801		801		801	
R squared	.20		.65		.74	

***p < .01; **p < .05; *p < .10

Table 7: OLS Estimates for Colorblind Era Homeownership Rate

	Inequality		Black		White	
	β	SE	β	SE	β	SE
Intercept	.75***	.13	.58***	.11	.79***	.05
Legacy of Slavery	.18***	.03	.14***	.03	.003	.02
Real Estate Inequality 1870	.02	.02	.03	.02	.02*	.01
PCHV Inequality 1930	.01	.004	.004	.003	-.002	.001
PCHV Inequality 1970	.10*	.04	.07	.04	-.01	.02
Black Proportion Colorblind Era	.18***	.04	.18***	.04	.05*	.03
Poverty Inequality Colorblind Era	-.03**	.01	-.01	.01	.01***	.002
Income Inequality Colorblind Era	.09**	.03	.08**	.02	.01*	.005
Rural-Urban Continuum Colorblind Era	.002	.003	.003	.003	.001	.001
Retirement Destination Colorblind Era	.01	.01	.02	.01	.02***	.005
Natural Amenity Colorblind Era	.01	.01	.01*	.01	.005	.003
Unemployment Colorblind Era	-.02***	.004	-.02***	.004	-.01**	.003
Educational Attainment Colorblind Era	.001	.001	.002	.001	.001*	.001
Agriculture Colorblind Era	.003	.002	.004*	.002	.003**	.001
Manufacturing Colorblind Era	-.002	.001	-.001	.001	.0005	.0004
Retail Colorblind Era	.001	.003	.002	.003	.001	.001
Information Colorblind Era	-.01	.01	-.01	.01	-.004	.003
Finance Colorblind Era	-.001	.003	.001	.003	.002	.001
Professional Colorblind Era	.01	.003	.01	.003	.001	.002
Poverty Inequality Civil Rights Era	.01	.005	.01	.004	.001	.002
Educational Attainment Civil Rights Era	-.32***	.07	-.51***	.07	-.32***	.05
Retail Civil Rights Era	-.77**	.20	-.88***	.18	-.39***	.05
Public Administration Civil Rights Era	-.26*	.11	-.13	.10	.09	.07
Farm Ownership Inequality Jim Crow	.06**	.02	.06**	.02	.02	.01
N	797		797		801	
R squared	.32		.41		.44	

***p < .01; **p < .05; *p < .10

The legacy of slavery was significant for both median home value inequality and homeownership inequality, but the results diverged. Legacy of slavery was negative and significant for median home value inequality, but positive and significant for homeownership rate inequality. That means that the legacy of slavery increased median

home value inequality, but decreased homeownership rate inequality. Examining the race specific models for each reveals more about the processes at work. Legacy of slavery is positive and significant for white median home value but nonsignificant for black home value. That means that white home value increases proportionally with the historical proportion of slaves in the county, while there was no connection between black home value and slavery. This suggests that the effect of slavery on median home value inequality was likely driven by disproportionate white gains in home value relative to black people at sites where slavery was more prominent. In contrast, the legacy of slavery was positive and significant for black homeownership rate but nonsignificant for white homeownership rate, meaning that black homeownership was proportionally higher in places where there was a higher historical proportion of slaves, while there was no connection between white homeownership rate and slavery. Viewing these results in the context of the original models of PCHV, we can now see that though slavery positively affected PCHV for both black people and white people, it did so through two different mechanisms. Slavery increased black PCHV primarily through increases in black homeownership, while it increased white PCHV primarily through increases in white median home value.

These results represent a dramatic change in the racial structure, where slavery still matters, but the processes that have facilitated its effect have changed dramatically even though the PCHV gap did not change much between the Civil Rights/Black Power

Era and the contemporary era. Slavery's increase in black PCHV, driven primarily by an increase in homeownership rate, may be the result of the presence of longstanding black communities in places where slavery was prominent. These entrenched communities, regardless of the persistently high levels of residential segregation, may have allowed the local black populations to slowly grow their homeownership rate over time, even if that meant purchasing homes of relatively low value and/or not purchasing homes at high enough rates to significantly close the gap in homeownership rates. In contrast, black communities that were more recently established may have been more likely to be renters. The processes driving slavery's increase in white PCHV, which was facilitated by increases in median home value, may be more complicated. It is possible that white people's greater access to quality homes during slavery and subsequent patterns of inheritance and segregation led white people in counties where slavery was prominent to own homes that appreciated in value faster than their counterparts in counties where slavery was less prominent.

In the inequality model, PCHV inequality in 1930, black proportion during the Colorblind era, and farm ownership inequality during Jim Crow are positive and significant, meaning that they decrease PCHV inequality. That PCHV inequality decreases PCHV inequality means that as PCHV inequality decreases in 1930, it decreases correspondingly in 2000. Similarly, as farm ownership inequality during Jim Crow decreases, PCHV inequality decreases contemporarily. Both results underscore the

importance of housing inequality during Jim Crow in shaping PCHV inequality contemporarily. This is likely the result of inheritance patterns where black people were able to will property they accumulated during Jim Crow to their children across the generations. This is borne out when examining the median home value and homeownership rate models. As farm ownership inequality decreases, homeownership rate inequality also decreases, while there is no effect on median home value inequality. The effect on homeownership rates is primarily through increases in black homeownership, as farm ownership inequality is positive and significant for black homeownership but nonsignificant for white homeownership. Building on the inheritance explanation, these results suggest that housing inheritances from the Jim Crow period may not have been particularly valuable as they do not increase black median home value despite increasing black homeownership rates. Relatedly, as the proportion of black people in a county during the colorblind era increases PCHV inequality decreases. This decrease is driven primarily by the disproportionate benefit of black proportion to black people relative to white people. Black proportion is positive and significant for both black people and white people, but the coefficient is twice as large for black people as their white counterparts, suggesting that black people benefit much more from the increasing size of the black population. Given the continuing salience of residential segregation denser black communities may afford black people the latitude to purchase more and higher quality homes in those communities. This idea is further supported by

the median home value and homeownership rate models, which show that black proportion decreases inequality on both variables by increasing black median home value and black homeownership rate.

The inequality model also reveals that poverty inequality, natural amenity, and unemployment during the Colorblind era, and educational attainment and retail during the Civil Rights era are negative and significant, meaning that they increase PCHV inequality. As poverty inequality increases, PCHV predictably increases through a combination of both decreasing black PCHV and increasing white PCHV. As the quality of natural amenities increase, PCHV inequality also increases, though the processes are unclear as it is nonsignificant in both of the race specific models. As unemployment increases, PCHV inequality also increases, though the processes are also convoluted. Unemployment is also negative and significant for both white people and black people, and the coefficients are roughly the same. Perhaps unemployment creates inequality despite the relatively equal effects on both groups because black people are much more likely to be unemployed than their white counterparts. As educational inequality during the Civil Rights Era increases, PCHV inequality increases contemporarily, which is likely the result of differential benefits of education for black people and white people even though the race specific models do not necessarily demonstrate this effect as it is negative and significant for both groups. This suggests that educational attainment in the Civil Rights Era decreases PCHV, but that is likely a result of collinearity due to the

high correlation with educational attainment contemporarily, which is positive and significant for black people and white people, with the latter appearing to benefit almost twice as much. As the proportion of workers in retail increases during the Civil Rights Era, PCHV inequality increases contemporarily, which is facilitated by black people's disproportionate disadvantage. Though retail during the Civil Rights Era is negative and significant for both black people and white people, the coefficient for black people is larger, meaning that their disadvantage is greater.

There are also a number of variables that are significant for both groups in the race specific models but are nonsignificant for inequality. PCHV is higher for both groups in places that are designated retirement destination, but the effect is twice as strong for white people as black people, which likely reflects racial differences in wealth upon retirement, with white people having accumulated much more wealth over the life course than black people (Killewald and Bryan 2015). Agriculture is also negative and significant for both groups, mirroring the Civil Rights Era and the ongoing devaluing of agriculture work. The proportion of workers in professional positions is positive and significant for both groups, though the effect is twice as strong for white people than their black counterparts. This is ultimately unsurprising as white people tend to hold higher ranking, more lucrative positions, professional positions than black professional workers (Associated Press 2009).

Additionally, other variables are significant for one racial group but not the other or inequality. PCHV inequality in 1970 is negative and significant for white PCHV, meaning that as PCHV equality increased in 1970, white PCHV decreased contemporarily. This is likely because lower white PCHV in 1970 would have translated to greater equality, which would be reflected in correspondingly lower PCHV in 2000. Similarly, as income inequality decreases across the Colorblind Era, white PCHV decreases, likely because of a strong correlation between white income and white PCHV. Lower white incomes would mean greater income equality, which, in turn, would correlate with lower white PCHV. Increases in the proportion of manufacturing workers also increases white PCHV, although the effect is very small. This stands in contrast to previous periods when manufacturing was positive and significant for both black and white people, with relatively large coefficients for both. The change over time likely reflects the change in the positioning of manufacturing occupations, which once offered robust, wealth-building jobs. Those jobs became increasingly devalued, but white people, who disproportionately occupy managerial manufacturing positions may still stand to leverage the industry for greater PCHV (Roediger and Esch 2012). Similarly, as the proportion of professional workers in a county increases so does white PCHV, and, the proportion of workers in public administration during the Civil Rights Era continues to have a sizeable and positive effect on black PCHV, underscoring the ongoing significance of government jobs to black economic health.

2.6. Discussion

These results help us round out our understanding of two phenomena: how the legacy of slavery persists through multiple changes in the racial structure to influence contemporary racial outcomes and which other historical forces also continue to directly shape racial inequality today.

One common criticism of legacy of slavery research has been that the work fails to account for the possibility that the supposed direct effect of slavery in the models was not a direct effect at all, that it may be mediated by other factors manifesting over the intervening period. These results directly combat that criticism by showing that the direct effect of slavery is present in each of four different American racial structures, including today, even when controlling for important phenomena from previous periods. This allows us to reflect on previous legacy of slavery research with more confidence that the direct effect of slavery we are seeing is, in fact, just that. Moreover, that the processes producing the effect of the legacy of slavery change repeatedly over time is evidence that the legacy of slavery is more than simply a “legacy.” That is, it is more than the remnants of an original sin floating through history until society intervenes appropriately. Instead, the “legacy” is remade, reconstructed with each new racial structure and stands alongside other phenomena to produce ongoing racial inequality.

That said, the legacy of slavery seems to stand prominently alongside farm ownership during Jim Crow, PCHV in 1930, and educational attainment and the retail industry during the Civil Rights era as historical factors directly shaping contemporary housing inequality. Importantly, this underscores the ongoing importance of early historical homeownership in structuring today's housing situation, particularly for black Americans who were (and are) systematically denied access to property ownership. The early disparities in housing are made more important by the fact that black net worth, which is only a small fraction of white net worth, is comprised of a less diverse set of assets than their white counterparts, with home equity comprising 56 percent of black wealth and only 38 percent of wealth for white people (McKernan 2013), and homeownership contributes to wealth accumulation over the life course (Pfeffer and Killewald 2016). Additionally, it highlights the importance of the Civil Rights economy and educational structure in influencing contemporary economics. That means that when structuring policy interventions, law makers must consider the impact of this history on their solutions and ponder how they can disrupt decades of lost housing inheritances and economic obstruction. More generally, for social scientists, this stresses the need for us to refuse to get bogged down in the present and reconsider the possibility of strong effects of history when specifying our models if we seek to be as comprehensive as possible in our research.

Coincidentally, this research is limited because of the time frame imposed by data limitations. Ideally, I would measure the contemporary period with a dependent variable later than 2000, at least in a year after the start of the “Great Recession.” This is important because black people lost a disproportionate amount of their homes and wealth during the recession *and* did not recover as much as their white counterparts when the economy began to heal. The lack of necessary data for a year after the recession makes my results conservative, but it highlights the need for more county level data from the United States Census and for future research that examines how the legacy of slavery shaped how the recession impacted black communities.

3. Genesis of U.S. Colorism and Skin Tone Stratification: Slavery, Freedom, and Mulatto-Black Occupational Inequality in the Late 19th Century

3.1. Introduction

Chattel slavery in the United States was a fundamentally racialized institution that previous research shows continued to shape racial inequality even after emancipation (Bertocchi and Dimico 2012; Bertocchi and Dimico 2014; Lagerlöf 2005; O'Connell 2012; Reece and O'Connell 2016). But slavery was more than an institution of interracial boundaries, creating and exacerbating racial inequality between blacks and whites; it also shaped intraracial boundaries among black people, determining not only who and who was not black but also contributed to skills differences that molded occupational success post-Emancipation (Ruef and Fletcher 2003).

Additionally, historians and social scientists credit chattel slavery with creating the system of light skin preference — through favor for mixed mulatto slaves (Frazier 1930; Reuter 1917; Toplin 1979). The general idea is that system of light skin preference persisted through the eventual codification and institutionalization of the one-drop rule into the modern system of colorism or skin tone stratification among black Americans (Keith and Herring 1991; Washington 2011). Research shows that lighter skinned black Americans outperform their darker skinned counterparts in income (Goldsmith et al 2006; Goldsmith et al 2007), education (Branigan et al 2013; Monk 2014), health (Diette et al 2014; Monk 2015), receive shorter prison sentences (Blair et al 2004; Viglione et al

2011), and are perceived as more attractive (Reece 2016). Historians posit that this stratification is an outgrowth of chattel slavery where lighter skinned black Americans were given preferential treatment both as slaves and freemen and those attitudes and social institutions erected to maintain that hierarchy continued to influence the differential treatment of lighter skinned black Americans and darker skinned black Americans even after Emancipation. But even though some researchers have examined colorism extending back to the 19th century, even during chattel slavery (Bodenhorn 1999; Bodenhorn 2002; Bodenhorn 2006; Bodenhorn and Ruebeck 2007), we have yet to empirically verify the claim that colorism was initiated by slavery by directly connecting slavery to skin tone stratification post-Emancipation.

Contemporary social scientists use sophisticated nationally representative surveys with complicated measures of “skin tone,” and even other racialized characteristics such as eye color, hair color, and hair texture, to investigate skin tone stratification. But those types of surveys are a relatively recent development and certainly did not exist during chattel slavery and in the 19th century. However, the United State Census provided researchers with a method to investigate colorism during those earlier periods. From 1850 to 1930 the Census did not record “black” as a single discrete racial category. Instead, Census enumerators were instructed to record whether a black identified person was also mulatto—black-white multiracial, but, generally, enumerators neglected to delve too deeply into the family histories of individuals and

relied on phenotypic markers such as skin tone, nose shape, and lip size in combination with local customs to decide how to code people (Gross 1998; Hochschild and Powell 2008; Toplin 1979). This meant that the distinction between “mulatto” and “black” often correlated strongly with differences in skin tone, with mulattos—presumed to be multiracial—light skinned and “regular” blacks—presumed to be racially pure—dark skinned. Therefore by analyzing differences in blacks and mulattos, researchers can examine intraracial skin tone stratification among black people during its early days, and the differences were similar to those among lighter and darker skinned black Americans contemporarily. When compared with blacks, mulattos had greater occupational prestige (Gullickson 2010; Saperstein and Gullickson 2013), lower mortality rates (Green and Hamilton 2013), lower child mortality rates (Frazier 1933), and greater wealth (Bodenhorn and Ruebeck 2007; Schweninger 1990). Drawing on this work I can use 19th century stratification between blacks and mulattos to examine whether early instances of American colorism were indeed rooted in the social circumstances unique to chattel slavery. This will give us a clearer understanding of the genesis of colorism as a contemporary phenomenon.

Specifically, this paper examines whether the economic statuses mulattos and blacks—in effect lighter-skinned black Americans and darker-skinned black Americans—before the widespread institutionalization of the one-drop rule varied across geographic space in proportion to a counties’ reliance on slave labor and the

characteristics of its free African American population. This offers an empirical test of the idea that colorism is rooted in the conditions of chattel slavery that privileged mulattos relative to blacks. If skin tone stratification is based on intraracial antebellum hierarchies, mulattos should continue be increasingly privileged relative to blacks in places where there was a heavier reliance on slave labor and where free mulattos accumulated more advantages. The results generally support this idea, showing that places with a stronger attachment to slavery and places where free mulattos were literate produced greater economic stratification between mulattos and blacks.

3.2. Mulattos-Black Stratification: The Genesis of Skin Tone Stratification

Colorism—an outgrowth of racism—is a system of practices and ideologies that privileges lighter skinned black people, with facial features typically associated with Europeans, over their darker skinned counterparts with more African-associated facial features (Feliciano 2015; Reece 2016). Studies consistently show that the effects of contemporary colorism are far-reaching. As I stated earlier, lighter skinned black Americans earn higher wages (Goldsmith et al 2006; Goldsmith et al 2007), obtain more education (Branigan et al 2013; Monk 2014), have better health (Diette et al 2014; Monk 2015), receive shorter prison sentences (Blair et al 2004; Viglione et al 2011), are perceived as more attractive (Reece 2016), and outperform their darker skinned counterparts on a number of other social outcomes.

Though scholars have become quite adept at describing the extent of colorism, few scholars manage to effectively describe the mechanisms of colorism—how it is facilitated. Goldsmith et al (2007) and Painter et al (2015) break this trend when they present the “preference for whiteness thesis.” They use a combination of social psychology and anthropology to explain the perpetuation of color stratification. In short, they argue that humans cognitively categorize the social into in-groups and out-groups that they use to organize their behavior. Generally, people express a preference for in-group members over out-group members and offer preferential treatment to the former while shunning the latter. When these patterns of differential treatment are mapped onto groups that are hierarchally organized with different levels of social power, such as racial groups—in this case white people as the in-group and black people as the out-group—they can result in widespread social inequality. People use visual cues to classify others into racial in-groups and out-groups, with certain physical characteristics—primarily skin tone, but also hair, eyes, lips, and noses—identifying a person as white and others as black, thus governing how they are treated. But the thesis forwards that people do not classify people into a strict group dichotomy using these visual cues. Instead, people receive social favor in proportion to their position on a sliding scale of visible blackness. The “more white,” “less black” a person looks—lighter skin, thinner noses, thinner lips, straighter hair—the more white in-group benefits they receive, lifting their social position above their “blacker” counterparts. Moreover, when

a group—black people—is forced to acknowledge the supposed superiority of a group higher on the social hierarchy—white people—they may also offer them preferential treatment, explaining why black people also tend to favor lighter-skinned people.

The preference for whiteness thesis was arguably codified during chattel slavery, particularly its the history of miscegenation and slave owner preferences for light-skinned and mixed-race—mulatto—slaves (Frazier 1930; Toplin 1979). Indeed, a growing number of studies examine social and economic differences between mulattos and blacks in the late-19th century, showing, unsurprisingly, that mulattos tend to perform better on almost every testable measure (Bodenhorn and Ruebeck 2007; Gullickson 2010; Green and Hamilton 2013; Saperstein and Gullickson 2013). But despite anecdotal acknowledgement of color stratification’s origins in antebellum slavery and empirical evidence showing mulatto advantage during the period, few studies attempt to empirically connect antebellum life to 19th century mulatto-black stratification as a basis for exploring the genesis of skin tone stratification among African Americans.

Though, officially, mulattos and blacks are defined by their racial heritage—the racial identities of their ancestors, sometimes up to four generations back—with black people being of “pure” black heritage and mulattos of mixed black and white heritage, practically, the categories primarily measure differences in skin tone and phenotype. It is unclear how often Census enumerators actually delved into the actual heritage of the people they counted as mulatto, but commonly they simply relied upon the knowledge

of the day and local customs and beliefs, which held that one could determine racial heritage based on appearance and social status (Gross 1998; Hochschild and Powell 2008; Toplin 1979). Prevailing social norms dictated that racial heritage was visible and easily discernable to any person who would pay attention. A quote from a North Carolina judge reflects this belief:

It does not require a distinguished comparative anatomist to detect the admixture of the African or Indian with the pure blood of the white race. Any person of ordinary intelligence who, for a sufficient length of time will devote his attention to the subject, will be able to discover, with almost unerring certainty, the adulteration of the Caucasian with the Negro or Indian blood (Gross 1998, 63).

Indeed, a witness testimony from an Alabama court demonstrates the depth of this belief, as people thought they could discern specific quantiles of racial mixture from mere appearance:

Susan is of very light complexion, has straight hair, is slightly swarthy, and has rather thick lips and coarse features. From her appearance, I am of the opinion that she has a small amount of African blood in her veins...not more than an eighth or a sixteenth. Her mouth and features generally indicate the African blood (Gross 1998, 104).

Armed with the confidence that they had “for a sufficient length of time [devoted their] attention to the subject,” enumerators likely counted a fair number of lighter-skinned African Americans as mulatto regardless of their actual racial heritage. This is evident in the way that light-skinned African Americans have been shown to change race from black to mulatto or mulatto to black based on their occupational mobility patterns (Saperstein and Gullickson 2013).

But by no means does the relative arbitrariness of these Census enumerations mean that mulattos did not form a distinct class during this period in United States history. Indeed, it was not uncommon for mulattos to go to great lengths to preserve their distinctiveness, deploying social closure strategies such as marrying other mulattos and excluding African Americans of darker complexions from their social clubs (Bodenhorn 2006; Meier and Lewis 1959). These social closure strategies coupled with preferential treatment from white people translated into distinct racial differences in life outcomes, such as mulattos in homogamous marriages accruing more wealth than mulattos in mulatto-black marriages or blacks in homogamous marriages (Bodenhorn 2006).

Social closure tactics combined with local history to inform indigenous knowledge and understandings of who was black and who was mulatto. Census enumerators combined this local knowledge with broad understandings of phenotype to record their enumerations. But local history determined more than just the numerical demographics of blacks and mulattos, it also shaped the patterns of stratification between the two groups. I argue that places with a strong history of privileging mulattos during chattel slavery, either through less strenuous positions on plantations (Frazier 1930; Toplin 1979), disproportionate manumissions and freedom (Berlin 1974; Bodenhorn 2011), wealth and affluence (Bodenhorn and Ruebeck 2007; Schweninger

1989; Schweninger 1990), and/or better schooling and education (Toplin 1979) will continue to privilege mulattos in the post-bellum years.

Though the importance of different racial classifications for mulattos and blacks decreased as the Jim Crow “one-drop rule” began to gain traction across the country, legally and socially making millions of mulattos “black,” (for an in-depth discussion of the institutionalization of the one-drop rule, see: Washington 2011) the skin color stratification that had already been established through phenotypical differences in the two groups persisted. I believe that the geographic variation in black-mulatto stratification immediately before widespread shifts to the “one-drop rule,” allows me to test whether colorism is actually an outgrowth of antebellum mulatto advantage. I can do this by examining whether the geographic distribution of mulatto advantage in the antebellum years correlated with the differences in post-Reconstruction black-mulatto occupational stratification, specifically whether a history of privileging mulattos before Emancipation led to more intense stratification between the two groups later in history, which would support the idea that patterns of antebellum privilege created colorism.

3.3. The Mulatto Advantage from Slavery Through Jim Crow

Status differences in mulattos and blacks during the antebellum years were no accident. The flames of difference were stoked through differential treatment by white people, and eventually mulattos themselves, and reflected the predominant attitudes of whites towards blacks and mulattos (Frazier 1930; Reuter 1917; Toplin 1979). Because of

their presumed white blood, white people generally perceived mulattos as smarter, more attractive, more industrious, and generally less deviant than blacks (Berlin 1974; Bodenhorn 2006; Frazier 1930; Reuter 1917; Schweninger 1989; Schweninger 1990; Toplin 1979). In some cases white people even perceived mulattos as more closely allied with white people than their black counterparts, as evident by a legislative report on a planned slave revolt in the early 1820s:

Free mulattos are a barrier between our own color and that of the black and in cases of insurrection are more likely to enlist themselves under the banners of the whites...Most of them are industrious, sober, hardworking mechanics, who have large families and considerable property; and so far as we are acquainted with their temper and dispositions of their feelings, abhor the idea of association with the blacks in any enterprise...(Jones 2000, 1508-1509).

Enslaved mulattos received a number of advantages relative to their black counterparts. Mulattos were more likely to receive favored positions on plantations, such as in the house or in trades. Because whites generally thought that mulattos were sharper, more aesthetically pleasing, and more capable of being "civilized," they often offered them positions as house servants, away from the toils of field work, and afforded them the opportunity to acquire trade skills and other education that they could use outside of the plantation. Moreover, they were given significantly more freedom to move throughout and off the plantation (Frazier 1930; Toplin 1979). These advantages fed into those mulattos accrued as free African Americans. First, they were twice as likely to be manumitted as blacks, resulting in vast disparities in the number of free

mulattos and free blacks (Bodenhorn 2011). In 1860, about 41 percent of free southern blacks were mulatto, while only about 10 percent of enslaved blacks were mulatto. In the Deep South, the differences were even starker. In the Deep South about 76 percent of free blacks were mulatto and only 9 percent of slaves were mulatto. In some places, the mulatto free population so greatly contrasted the black slave population that “free black” and “mulatto” almost became synonymous (Berlin 1974). But more than simply being free, mulattos were afforded opportunities to capitalize on their freedom, sometimes because of the connection between their racial ancestry and the slave system. They were assisted by white people, either upon manumission or after (Bodenhorn 2011; Schweninger 1989). The manumitted children of slave-slave owner sexual liaisons were often given a financial head start by their white parent upon entering free society or were able to leverage the social networks of that parent to gain economic advantages. As a result, mulattos were disproportionately represented among prosperous freedmen and business owning freedmen (Schweninger 1989; Schweninger 1999) and held significantly more wealth than blacks. In 1860, mulatto wealth was 50 percent of white wealth while black wealth was only 20 percent of that of whites (Bodenhorn and Ruebeck 2007).

The advantages afforded to mulattos did not end with slavery. They persisted through reconstruction, up until the start of Jim Crow when the Census dropped the category altogether (and arguably then continuing as skin tone differences). Throughout the end of the late 19th century, mulattos continued to enjoy greater occupational

prestige (Gullickson 2010; Saperstein and Gullickson 2013), lower mortality rates (Green and Hamilton 2013), and lower child mortality rates (Frazier 1933).

3.4. The Mechanisms of Inequality and Boundary Formation

The degree of mulatto-black occupational inequality was shaped by the characteristics of places that influenced the strength of the social boundary, and thus the severity of stratification, between the two groups—that is certain places facilitated mulatto advantage to a greater degree than others rather than the phenomenon manifesting evenly across places. Gullickson (2010) argues that the interests of the local white population shaped the strength of the boundary between blacks and mulattos. His results suggest a status competition explanation, whereby differences between mulattos and blacks are exacerbated in places where the white population is more affluent. He argues that in these places elite whites may have actively encouraged, or at least not discouraged or suppressed, a class of middle class mulattos to serve as a buffer to upwardly mobile blacks. This buffer class may have ultimately eased white animosity and decreased the incidences of racial violence in these places as compared to places where whites, blacks, and mulattos were closer in occupational status. He also reveals that the proportion of free colored people in 1860 positively affects mulatto-black inequality. He attributes this correlation to the fact that free colored people were disproportionately mulatto, suggesting that he was actually measuring a type of historical advantage.

This paper builds on Gullickson's work in two ways: primarily by considering how local reliance on antebellum slave labor shaped the boundary constructing processes between blacks and mulattos that resulted in the differential distribution black-mulatto stratification, and secondly by disaggregating the other dimensions of historical mulatto advantage to understand how they operated alongside slavery to shape post-bellum stratification. Reliance on slave labor is an important predictor of mulatto advantage because of historical evidence that slaves were stratified by color (Berlin 1974; Frazier 1930). This means that measuring the strength of slavery locally offers a way to measure the level of color stratification it facilitates. Places with more slaves may have adopted a stronger connection to the differences between blacks and mulattos that characterized the institution while places with fewer slaves may be less attached to the boundary between the two groups. Relatedly, other markers of mulatto advantage over black people, such as freedom, literacy, and schooling, may reinforce the boundary between the two. But the transition from these states of antebellum mulatto advantage to boundary strengthening in the post-bellum era requires more explanation.

Uncertainty is a social state in which economic actors are unsure of the rules governing the new economy after a significant institutional transition, such as the transition from chattel slavery to Emancipation (Ruef 2014). Uncertainty is characterized by shared difficulty of the actors in an economic system in predicting the outcomes of decisions they make in the new system. The "norms, routines, and governance

structures that constrain economic action...are...in flux" (Ruef 2014 p. 4) leading actors to "reassemble elements of older traditions and organizational forms in order to confront uncertainty and find a new basis for social order" (Ruef 2014 p. 4). This process has been called emulation (Tilly 1997).

Often, the costs of creating brand new modes of social order exceed the cost of reusing past forms of social organization. Emulation decreases the cost of creating a stable social order in the midst of uncertainty by importing models of social interaction and organizational forms, both equal and unequal, from the past. It recreates old local knowledge and social relations, repurposes old institutions, and imbues new institutions with old norms, a combination of processes that combines to reconstruct past inequalities. These new, emulated forms of interaction appear similar but not identical to the past, but carry similar power relations. For example, sharecropping replaced plantation slavery in the cotton belt after Emancipation; though slightly different from chattel slavery, sharecropping offered white planters much of what they had with slaves: a relatively powerless, consistent source of labor to tend to their fields.

But I argue that the transition from slavery to freedom resulted in more than simple emulation in the case of blacks and mulattos. Instead, the boundaries between the two groups may have actually strengthened. Wimmer (2008) offers a theory of ethnic boundary formation that may be useful for explaining this possibility. He argues that actors emphasize ethnic boundaries when they have institutional incentive to do so. In

places where there were formerly greater concentrations of slaves, mulattos may have been incentivized to practice social closure strategies to strengthen the boundary between them and their black counterparts. The differentiation may have been more important in places where a stronger history of slavery caused higher white animosity toward people of African descent. Distancing themselves from black people may have offered mulattos a degree of relative safety and economic opportunity. Moreover, Wimmer emphasizes that social networks determine where ethnic boundaries are drawn. That is, groups with more connections to power, particularly political elites, in turn, may have more power draw boundaries between themselves and other groups. In the case of mulattos, a stronger history of slavery may have left them with more connections to powerful whites because of parental ties or other extended kin networks. Research suggests that free mulattos were able to leverage ties to whites for economic gain and the mulatto children of slave owners were often afforded a significant amount of freedom on plantations (Frazier 1930; Schweninger 1989; 1990). These ties may have allowed them to further distance themselves from their black counterparts in the post-bellum period. Finally, Wimmer argues that boundary decisions rely on cultural consensus; in this case, meaning that local actors essentially needed to agree on the privileged status of mulattos relative to blacks. Though the mulatto category was reified by the US Census, the strength of the hierarchy, and, indeed who was and was not mulatto, was negotiated locally (Gross 1998; Hochschild and Powell 2008; Toplin 1979).

A strong history of slavery may have reinforced the mulatto-over-black hierarchy as an integral part of the local social structure because of familiarity with the relative privilege of mulattos on plantations and perhaps even the conflation of “mulatto” with “free” and “black” with “slave.” In combination, these boundary formation processes may have led to a strengthening of black-mulatto boundaries that would exacerbate the occupational stratification between the two groups in the post-bellum period in places where there were greater concentrations of slaves.

Additionally, a number of other antebellum factors associated with the mulatto advantage Gullickson implies may have influenced post-bellum emulation and boundary strengthening processes. Mulatto advantage in areas such as disproportionate freedom, schooling, literacy, and wealth may also offer mulattos the requisite political and economic ties and cultural legitimacy to reinforce the boundary between themselves and blacks. Moreover, schooling, literacy, and wealth are all aspects of freedom that are transferable across generations that mulattos may have also been able to leverage to maintain their position in an emulation-type fashion, if not further strengthen it. With this in mind, I expect that mulatto-black economic stratification will be higher, with mulattos increasingly advantaged relative to blacks, both in place where there were higher concentrations of slaves and in places where free mulattos were better educated and economically advantaged in the antebellum period.

3.5. Methods

My data come from the U.S. Census as provided by the Minnesota Population Center's National Historical Geographic Information System and Integrated Public Use Microdata Series. The analysis includes counties from the Census-defined South (Alabama, Arkansas, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, and West Virginia) where the boundaries remained unchanged from 1860 to 1880. I was forced to exclude Oklahoma because it was not yet a state in 1860 and thus lacks the county-level data I used for my analysis.

Studies at the county level are common in research about slavery and path dependency (see: Bertocchi and Dimico 2012; Bertocchi and Dimico 2014; Lagerlöf 2005 O'Connell 2012; Reece and O'Connell 2016). It is an optimal unit for analyzing historical path dependency processes, particularly in the case of racial inequality in the South (Lobao and Hooks 2007). Because the region has been overwhelmingly rural, county governments have historically played a major role in facilitating and constraining civic, social, and economic opportunities. Southerner's most salient and consistent interactions with the state have been with county governments (Petersen and Ward 2015), and social life, including social movement and counter-movement organizations have been organized at the county level (Andrews 2002). Moreover, and perhaps most importantly for this study, the county was the area of operation for Census enumerators, meaning

that their definitions about who was mulatto and who was black were shaped by local norms and should be relatively consistent across each county (Gross 1998; Hochschild and Powell 2008; Toplin 1979).

I chose 1880 as the primary year of analysis because it represents the beginning of the transition to the one-drop rule. By 1880, Reconstruction had ended leading to what Gullickson (2010) calls “the dawn of Jim Crow” and the institutionalization of the one-drop rule was starting to quicken (Washington 2011). This makes 1880 a prime year to analyze the strength of the color boundaries that ultimately became modern colorism.

3.5.1. Dependent Variable

My dependent variable is mulatto occupational status relative to black occupational status in 1880. I measure occupational status using the average Duncan SEI score for blacks and mulattos in each county. The Duncan SEI score uses average income and education for occupations to develop a score for social prestige in 1950. While my study is set in the mid-late 19th century, almost 100 years before 1950, Duncan SEI score has been shown to reliably depict social prestige across time (Hout and DiPrete 2006), and similar studies of this time period (ie, Gullickson 2010; Saperstein and Gullickson 2013) use it because of its reliability. Duncan SEI scores are structured such that higher scores indicate higher occupational status. I used full count Census data from 1880 to construct county level averages for blacks and mulattos. The averages include people

from age 17 to age 65¹ to only capture those typically in the labor market. I then created a ratio of the scores to give a measure of mulatto-black inequality. Here, values above 1 indicate increasing inequality favoring mulattos, whereas values below 1 indicate increasing inequality favoring blacks. A value of 1 indicates equal mulatto-black occupational status in the county.

3.5.2. Focal Independent Variables

My focal independent variables seek to measure two phenomena: the local concentration of slavery and local mulatto head start.

My primary independent variable is the local concentration of slavery, which is represented by the proportion of each county's total population that was enslaved in 1860. This provides a measure of the density of the local slave population.

My other focal independent variables measure the local characteristics of free antebellum mulatto populations in 1860. I examine two dimensions of free mulatto populations: education and wealth. I use two variables to measure education: literacy and school enrollment. Literacy is a dichotomous variable indicating that a mulatto in the county can read and write, and school enrollment is a dichotomous variable indicating that a mulatto in the county is enrolled in school. I use both literacy and school enrollment because in the antebellum South, they measure different phenomena.

¹ Though I chose these numbers to match contemporary ideas about entry into the labor market, I also ran sensitivity analyses with slight variations to this age range using 14 as the lower bound and 60 as the upper. The results were consistent.

The presence of literate mulattos signals access to literate family members or whites that could teach others to read, not necessarily a formal education; indeed, formal education was very limited in the South in general at the time (Anderson 1998; Span 2009). I use dichotomies of these variables rather than proportions because of the ways that a few literate people could have large ripple effects on the future of a community at this time, either by translating and negotiating contracts or teaching others to read. With schooling, any mulattos enrolled in school signals a significant level of social privilege considering the infrequency of school enrollment for anyone but the elite (Anderson 1998; Span 2009).

I also use two variables to measure wealth: real estate value and personal property value. Real estate value is a dichotomous variable indicating that mulatto real estate value in the county is above the weighted average of mulatto real estate in the region, excluding debts. Personal property value is a dichotomous variable indicating that mulatto personal property value is higher than the weighted average of the value of mulatto personal property in the region.

3.5.3. Control Variables

In addition to my focal independent variables, I also include a variety of other variables to control for other phenomena that may shape mulatto-black occupational inequality. The first is the percentage of the local African American population that is identified as mulatto. This variable is important because it allows me to account for the

possibility that in some counties aggregate mulatto occupational prestige may be inflated because the county only has a very small number — two or three — mulattos, who are all in very elite positions. I control for mulatto-black literacy inequality and schooling inequality in 1880 to ensure that I'm narrowing in on the historical path dependency and that the observed differences in mulatto-black occupational prestige were not merely the result of other proximate causes.

Building on Gullickson (2010), I include a variety of historical and proximate measures of white affluence because he found a significant connection between white occupational prestige and mulatto-black occupational inequality.

I also include a measure of whether any African Americans in the county reported being denied the right to vote in 1870. Because 1870 was in the thick of Reconstruction, there were fewer restrictions on African Americans voting than there were in the subsequent decades under Jim Crow (Foner 1987) so a positive report of voting restrictions may be indicative of a county with an especially pernicious brand of racism that may dampen the differences between blacks and mulattos.

Finally, I include a variety of measures of the type and quality of the local economy to account for the possibility that certain types of economies, those heavy in manufacturing for instance, may increase occupational inequality by providing a wider variety of hierarchical occupations. In contrast, other economies, such as those heavy in

sharecropping, may dampen occupational inequality because the available occupational opportunities are relatively flat.

See table 8 for a full listing of the variables and definitions.

Table 8: Means and Variable Descriptions

	Mean	SD	Description
mulatto/black SEI	1.06	.23	ratio of average mulatto SEI to average black SEI
mulatto SEI	6.78	1.83	average SEI for mulattos
black SEI	6.44	1.32	average SEI for blacks
legacy of slavery	.31	.22	proportion of county population enslaved
mulattos 1880	.19	.16	proportion of county African American population identified as mulatto
mulatto/black literacy 1880	1.61	1.26	ratio of the proportion of literate mulatto adults to literate black adults
mulatto/black schooling 1880	1.37	2.15	ratio of the proportion of mulatto children in school to black children in school
free African Americans 1860	.07	.15	proportion of African Americans who were not enslaved
mulatto literacy 1860	.15	-	dichotomous variable indicating literate mulattos in the county
mulatto schooling 1860	.01	-	dichotomous variable indicating mulatto children in school in the county
mulatto real estate value 1860	.03	-	dichotomous variable indicating the value of mulatto real estate in the county is above the mulatto mean
mulatto personal property value 1860	.02	-	dichotomous variable indicating the value of mulatto personal property in the county is above the mulatto mean
black literacy 1860	.16	-	dichotomous variable indicating literate blacks in the county
black schooling 1860	.005	-	dichotomous variable indicating black children in school in the county
black real estate value 1860	.01	-	dichotomous variable indicating the value of black real estate in the county is above the black mean
black personal property value 1860	.007	-	dichotomous variable indicating the value of black personal property in the county is above the black mean
white SEI	9.30	2.43	average SEI for whites
white literacy 1880	.80	.12	proportion of white adults who are literate
white schooling 1880	.26	.09	proportion of white children in school
white real estate value 1860	555.04	1712.25	average white real estate value
white personal property value 1860	726.64	1054.3	average white personal property value
African American denied vote	.02	-	dichotomous variable indicating an African American reported being denied the right to vote
manufacturing	306830.88	1797854.66	amount of capital invested in manufacturing
sharecropping	.22	.12	proportion of farm operators sharecropping
farm owners	.68	.16	proportion of farm operators who own their farms
mean farm value	495.01	626.00	average value of farms in the county

3.5.4. Model Design

I initially estimated four models. The first model tests emulation processes by testing the effect of the proportion of slaves on mulatto-black occupational inequality in 1880. It offers some 1880 controls that could shape mulatto-black inequality such as the proportion of mulattos, mulatto-black literacy inequality, and mulatto-black schooling inequality. In the next model I add the variables that measure the mulatto opportunity hoarding during the antebellum years: proportion of free blacks, mulatto literacy in 1860, mulatto schooling in 1860, mulatto real estate 1860, and mulatto personal property 1860. This model examines whether emulation and opportunity hoarding work simultaneously to shape mulatto-black inequality and the specific opportunities that may have contributed to mulatto advantage. Model 3 adds controls for the characteristics of local white people: white occupational status, white literacy in 1880, white schooling in 1880, white real estate in 1860, white personal property in 1860, and whether a black person reported being denied the right to vote in 1870. This allows me to test whether path dependency processes were disrupted by white backlash in the form of voting restrictions or white prosperity. Model 4 adds industry variables: manufacturing capital invested, percentage of farmers sharecropping, percentage of farm operators own their farms, and mean farm value, to control for the effect of the local economy.

In addition to the primary series of models, I also ran four supplementary series of models. The first two series are at the county level with mulatto SEI and black SEI each as the dependent variables to gain greater insight into the processes driving occupational inequality between the two groups. I used the same modeling strategy as above with one exception. I substituted the mulatto antebellum freedom variables with variables to examine black freedom in 1860: black literacy, black schooling, black real estate value, and black personal property. I estimated my models using OLS regression, but a test for spatial autocorrelation using a Moran's I test confirmed that my residuals were spatially correlated. To account for this, I present spatially robust standard errors in my results.

3.6. Results

Consistent with boundary strengthening arguments, my results show that the intraracial status hierarchy between mulattos and blacks remained after Emancipation with mulattos increasingly advantaged over blacks as the local historical attachment to slavery and antebellum mulatto advantage increased. My first model shows that slave proportion increased mulatto occupational status relative to black occupational status, meaning that as the proportion of slaves in a county increased in 1860 the higher mulatto occupational status relative to black occupational status in 1880. Mulatto proportion was negative and significant, suggesting that as the proportion of mulattos increased in a county, mulatto-black occupational inequality decreased proportionally.

This may simply signify a process of mulatto occupational prestige regressing to the center as the mulatto population increases because of mulatto occupational prestige in a few counties being represented by a small number of elite mulattos. Literacy inequality was also positive and significant while schooling inequality was nonsignificant, suggesting that literacy, not necessarily schooling, was the key to occupational success, and as literacy inequality increased so did occupational inequality.

Table 9: OLS Estimates for Mulatto-Black Occupational Inequality (n=623)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
intercept	1.01*** (.03)	1.00*** (.03)	.86*** (.06)	.87*** (.08)
legacy of slavery	.22*** (.08)	.22*** (.04)	.13** (.04)	.12* (.05)
mulatto %	-.28*** (.08)	-.32*** (.08)	-.38*** (.08)	-.38*** (.08)
literacy inequality 1880	.02* (.01)	.02* (.01)	.02* (.01)	.02* (.01)
schooling inequality 1880	-.001 (.003)	.001 (.003)	.002 (.002)	.002 (.002)
free African descendants		.05 (.05)	-.005 (.05)	-.006 (.06)
mulatto literacy 1860		.05** (.02)	.05*** (.01)	.05*** (.01)
mulatto schooling 1860		.06 (.06)	-.02 (.05)	.01 (.06)
mulatto real estate 1860		.04 (.04)	.04 (.03)	.03 (.03)
mulatto personal property 1860		.02 (.05)	.02 (.05)	.03 (.05)
white SEI			.01*** (.003)	.01*** (.003)
white literacy 1880			.03 (.07)	.04 (.07)
white schooling 1880			.09 (.08)	.09 (.08)
white real estate 1860			.00001** (.000002)	.000004 (.000003)
white personal property 1860			-.000001 (.000001)	-.000001 (.000005)
African descendants denied vote			.01 (.04)	.01 (.04)
manufacturing				-.00000 (.00000)
sharecroppers				.001 (.07)
farm owners				-.02 (.06)
mean farm value				.00001 (.00001)
r-squared	.15	.17	.23	.23

***p < .01; **p < .05; *p < .10

In model 2 I add my other key independent variables to examine whether the relationship between slavery, other types of mulatto advantage, and boundary strengthening processes. Proportion of free blacks, mulatto schooling, and the mulatto wealth variables are nonsignificant while mulatto literacy is positive and significant, which means that counties where literate mulattos lived in 1860 tended to have higher mulatto-black occupational inequality in 1880. This suggests that literacy may be among the most important types of advantage facilitating mulattos' privileged status relative to their black counterparts. Literacy differs from school and wealth because it represents knowledge that cannot be taken away and can be transferred inter-generationally without the help of external institutions. This means it can serve multiple functions: first, it can ease emulation by providing a mechanism that is durable to violent transitions like the Civil War; second, it offers both an avenue to connect with high status whites and a status marker to build the boundary between mulattos and blacks. Both schooling, which was universally limited in the South in the 19th century, and wealth are both vulnerable to seizure and destruction, particularly during a time as disruptive as the Civil War, which wiped out vast swaths of southern institutions. Additionally, slave proportion remains positive and significant and its coefficient is over four times larger than literacy, suggesting that mulatto-black economic inequality was driven primarily by boundary formation processes resulting from the strength of the local attachment to

slavery. Mulatto proportion in 1880 remained negative and significant, and literacy inequality in 1880 remained positive and significant.

Model 3 includes variables to test the role of the local white population in disrupting or facilitating color boundary construction processes. White SEI in 1880 and white real estate in 1860 are both positive and significant as expected, meaning that as white economic status in 1880 and/or white antebellum wealth increased mulatto economic status increased relative to black economic status. This is additional evidence for the possibility of a mulatto buffer class in places where whites were more affluent (Gullickson 2010), meaning that white people may encourage, or at least not discourage, a stronger boundary between blacks and mulattos to protect themselves from a possible uprising from the collective African American population. The other white characteristic variables were nonsignificant, but slave proportion, literacy inequality in 1880, and mulatto literacy in 1860 remained positive and significant, suggesting that other boundary formation processes may work in concert with the idea of a mulatto buffer class, that the ideas complement each other rather than competing. The magnitude of slave proportion decreased by almost half, suggesting that slavery's boundary formation processes may be partially mediated by the interests of local white elites. But slavery's coefficient remained larger than all of the other variables except mulatto proportion, again underscoring the institution's importance in facilitating inequality between blacks and mulattos. Mulatto proportion in 1880 remained positive and significant.

In model 4, I include industry variables: capital invested in manufacturing, proportion of farm operators who are sharecroppers, proportion of farm operators who are farm owners, and average farm value, to control for the possibility that the characteristics of the local economy interrupted path dependency. All of the industry variables were nonsignificant, but slave proportion, literacy inequality in 1880, mulatto literacy in 1860, and white SEI remained significant. Additionally, the magnitude remained stable on each variable, suggesting that, counterintuitively, the shape of the local economy had very little impact on the other processes affecting mulatto-black economic inequality. The only exception was white SEI in 1860 which went from positive and significant in model 3 to nonsignificant in model 4.

For my supplementary models, I only present and discuss the output from the final model for each dependent variable.

Table 10: OLS Estimates for Mulatto and Black Occupational Status (n=623)

	Mulatto SEI		Black SEI
intercept	6.14*** (.75)	intercept	7.31*** (.93)
legacy of slavery	-.65† (.36)	legacy of slavery	-1.23*** (.22)
mulatto %	-1.84*** (.65)	mulatto %	.92 (.82)
literacy inequality 1880	.12 (.07)	literacy inequality 1880	-.04 (.06)
schooling inequality 1880	.02 (.02)	schooling inequality 1880	.004 (.01)
free African descendants	-1.37*** (.43)	free African descendants	-.71 (.59)
mulatto literacy 1860	.29* (.12)	black literacy 1860	-.15 (.11)
mulatto schooling 1860	-.24 (.51)	black schooling 1860	-.27 (.31)
mulatto real estate 1860	.20 (.29)	black real estate 1860	-.23 (.18)
mulatto personal property 1860	.22 (.35)	black personal property 1860	.18 (.16)
white SEI	.37*** (.03)	white SEI	.26*** (.03)
white literacy 1880	-1.16† (.68)	white literacy 1880	-1.75 (1.06)
white schooling 1880	-.55 (.61)	white schooling 1880	1.57* (.65)
white real estate 1860	-00005† (.00003)	white real estate 1860	-0.0001* (.00004)
white personal property 1860	-0.00002 (.00004)	white personal property 1860	-0.00003 (.00004)
African descendants denied vote	-.11 (.30)	African descendants denied vote	-.28† (.16)
manufacturing	.00000 (.00000)	manufacturing	.00000 (.00000)
sharecroppers	-.71 (.58)	sharecroppers	-.64 (.54)
farm owners	-1.82*** (.54)	farm owners	-1.53** (.58)
mean farm value	.00002 (.0001)	mean farm value	.0001 (.0001)
r-squared	.44	r-squared	.32

***p < .01; **p < .05; *p < .10

Slave proportion is negative and significant for both mulattos and blacks, meaning that both suffered lower occupational status as the proportion of slaves in 1860 increased, but the magnitude is almost twice as strong for blacks as it is for mulattos. While both groups were negatively affected by slavery, the effect was much stronger for blacks than their mulatto counterparts. This supports the primary hypothesis, suggesting that though mulattos also suffered the negative effects of slavery, blacks seemed to have suffered much more in the long term. This is evidence of mulatto's

advantage during slavery and how connections to the institution may have facilitated economic inequality and strengthened the boundary between blacks and mulattos. Similarly, antebellum literacy is positive and significant for mulattos but nonsignificant for blacks, suggesting that mulattos were able to successfully leverage their literacy to garner greater economic status while blacks may have lacked the same opportunities. Not only is this evidence of a boundary between the two groups, it suggests that the boundary may have been created by the upward movement of mulattos while blacks remained stagnant. Again, literacy is a characteristic that is transferable and offers access to whiter networks, which may have allowed mulattos to distance themselves from blacks.

White SEI is also positive and significant for both groups, but the effect is stronger for mulattos than for blacks. This result also supports the idea of a mulatto buffer class (Gullickson 2010); as the cumulative affluence of a locality increases, whites may seek to support a class of middle class mulattos to as an intermediary group between them and relatively prosperous blacks. Alternatively, when the local economy thrives, all three groups (blacks, whites, and mulattos) may see increases in their economic status, but mulattos may be better positioned than blacks to capitalize on the local availability of resources and thus they see greater increases in occupational status as white economic status increase.

Consistent with the original series of models mulatto proportion is negative and significant for mulattos but nonsignificant for blacks, which, as I stated earlier, may simply be a function of demographics with mulatto SEI regressing to the mean as their population increases. This is important because it accounts for the possibility that an extraordinarily high mulatto economic status in some places may be simply representative of the high status of a very small number of local mulattos. The proportion of free blacks is also negative and significant for mulattos but nonsignificant for blacks, but because the proportion of free blacks does not affect inequality, its effect must on inequality must be dampened by other factors. Similarly, white schooling in 1880 is positive and significant for blacks but nonsignificant for mulattos, but white schooling showed no effect on mulatto-black economic inequality, suggesting that its effect on inequality may be mediated by other phenomena. White literacy follows a similar pattern. It is negative and significant for mulattos and nonsignificant for blacks but showed no effect on economic inequality as it may have been mediated by other factors just as white schooling. Being denied the right to vote is also negative and significant for blacks, meaning that in places where people of color report being denied the right to vote black economic status is lower. But being denied the right to vote is nonsignificant for mulattos and mulatto-black inequality, again suggesting that other factors mediate its effect on inequality.

White real estate value in 1860 and the percentage of farm owners in 1880 are both negative and significant for mulattos and blacks, but neither shows an effect on inequality. This suggests that the negative effect on both groups are of similar magnitude and may ultimately cancel each other out and thus fail to contribute to the inequality between them.

3.7. Discussion

These results not only add depth to our conceptions of early colorism by demonstrating that it is indeed connected the circumstances surrounding chattel slavery, but they also offer insight into the specific mechanisms that created the post-Emancipation gap between lighter skinned and darker skinned black Americans. Most notable is probably the differential effect of slavery on blacks and mulattos. Though a variety of sources documented mulattos' preferential treatment as slaves, until now we understood little about how that privileged treatment translated into post-slavery social outcomes, but my results reveal that slavery was twice as detrimental to blacks as mulattos. This supports an argument for emulation by revealing that the mulatto-over-black hierarchy of slavery continued to manifest in the differential opportunities available to the two groups to such a degree that mulattos were seemingly able to shrug off a half of slavery's negative effects.

In addition to emulation, other factors associated with slavery may have been at play. Though data limitations prevent me from analyzing other specific aspects of

slavery that may have proved more harmful to blacks than their mulatto counterparts, other research may offer plausible explanations for this disparity. Ruef and Fletcher (2003) found that receiving training in a manual trade as a slave increased a person's post-emancipation occupational status. Though, their data preclude them from accounting for the effect of color or multiracial status in their analyses, they may still provide at least a partial explanation for ongoing inequality between blacks and mulattos. Because mulattos were reportedly more likely to receive trade training, they would be able to continue to leverage the benefits of those experiences after emancipation, whereas their black counterparts, denied similar experiences, would lack comparable opportunities. While both blacks and mulattos would certainly fall victim to discrimination and racist policy, the training received by former mulatto slaves and whites' general affinity for them over blacks would give them advantages that may have allowed them to diminish the adverse effects of slavery.

Additionally, while current data does not allow us to completely analyze how much of contemporary colorism is because of this initial gap and how much is driven by other factors, the intergenerational impact of mulatto advantage cannot be understated. Mulattos were significantly more likely to marry other mulattos (Bodenhorn 2006) and because homogamous mulatto marriages held more wealth than mulatto-black marriages (Bodenhorn 2006), these families held the potential to leave more wealth to their likely lighter-skinned children. Researchers have documented similar marriage

practices among lighter skinned and darker skinned black Americans today, showing that lightered skinned blacks perform better on the marriage market, resulting in partners with higher socio-economic statuses than the partners of darker skinned blacks (Monk 2014). In this way, the stratification created by slavery may have been replicated far beyond the immediate wake of the institution.

The second major finding is that literacy was the primary characteristic of free mulatto communities that increased occupational inequality by increasing mulatto occupational prestige post-Emancipation while having no effect on black occupational prestige. This stands in contrast to schooling and wealth which displayed no measurable effect on inequality or mulatto occupational prestige. This supports an opportunity hoarding argument, but reveals interesting features about the types of opportunities and resources that could be successfully amassed to survive institutional transitions. The strength of literacy as a resource likely boils down to its intangibility in the face of the destruction of the Civil War. Because the war ravaged large swaths of the region and displaced an untold number of communities, all but large quantities of mulatto wealth may have been destroyed, making it an unsuitable vessel to transfer privilege through the transition from chattel slavery to freedom. Schools were already rare across the region, even for whites, and the war would have likely destroyed a great number of those as well. Under these circumstances, literacy was best poised to be site of longer term opportunity hoarding among mulattos as it is unable to be destroyed by war as

directly as wealth and schools. Literacy could survive to open doors to more prestigious occupations and could even be relatively easily passed down intergenerationally to confer similar benefits to children of literate parents.

Emulation and opportunity hoarding compliment also complement Gullickson's (2010) status competition explanation for 19th century occupational inequality between blacks and mulattos, and combined they offer a broad view of the factors shaping early skin tone stratification in the United States. It is unclear whether these explanations continue to shape skin tone stratification after this period or whether they simply influenced the initial gap. More research is necessary to connect contemporary skin tone stratification to this early period

4. Whitewashing Slavery: Legacy of Slavery and Improvement in White Social Outcomes

4.1. Introduction

American chattel slavery has claimed a new place in social science. The widespread availability of historical Census data (thanks in large part to the Minnesota Population Center at the University of Minnesota) coupled with the return of racial reparations to the fore of public conversations has sparked a revival in the study of the “peculiar institution.” But this recent wave of research has been unique. Rather than studying slavery as an enclosed historical phenomenon, researchers have attempted to bridge the gap between historical slavery and post-Emancipation outcomes. Typically focusing on how contemporary social outcomes map onto the geographical distribution of antebellum slavery, researchers have explored the connections between slavery and executions (Vandiver et al. 2006), rural poverty (Duncan 1999), violent crime (Gouda and Rigterink 2015), voting behavior (Acharya et al 2015), racial differences in educational attainment (Bertocchi and Dimico 2012; Bertocchi and Dimico 2014), racial differences in poverty and income (Lagerlöf 2005; O’Connell 2012), and school segregation (Reece and O’Connell 2015).

This research has revolutionized how we view the ways slavery shaped contemporary society. Prior to this work establishing direct empirical connections between slavery and today, much of our knowledge of the links between the two periods was based completely on historical understandings paired primarily with

speculation about slavery's possible contemporary effects. This "legacy of slavery" research, as it is sometimes called, offers evidence that slavery continues to directly affect the social contours of contemporary America. But for all of its innovations, this research has taken a decidedly one-sided view of the ways slavery shapes racial inequality in America. Most of the work focuses on the ways that slavery has disadvantaged black Americans and how those disadvantages have endured over the past 160 years to produce present-day inequalities. Very little of the literature examines the converse: how slavery *advantaged* white people and how those accumulated advantages may be reflected in the geographic distribution of white social outcomes today. This study attempts to reframe the legacy of slavery conversation to include white advantage alongside black disadvantage as a contributor to inequality.

To examine the effect of slavery on white advantage, I use OLS regression and a combination of historical Census data and the American Community Survey to test whether white people in Southern counties that had higher concentrations of slaves have better outcomes on a number of social and economic indicators today. The results offer strong evidence for the idea that slavery offered white people lasting advantages. Slavery predicted better outcomes for white people on four out of six indicators. Moreover, on each of the four indicators, slavery was one of two strongest predictors in the models, suggesting not only does slavery shape white outcomes, it may play a larger role than any other previous scholarship has acknowledged.

4.2. Legacy of Slavery

Legacy of slavery research began to trickle through the social sciences just over a decade ago, but it has exploded over the past five years. This explosion has followed the increasing availability of historical data and a resurgence in public discourse around racial reparations. The research falls into four broad areas: first, is a thread that examines the legacy of slavery and social phenomena not necessarily related to inequality; second, is a group of papers that examines the legacy of slavery and racial inequality; third, is a segment of research that examines the legacy of slavery cross-nationally; and the fourth area consists of research that examines intraracial inequality among black people.

The first segment of legacy of slavery research investigates the effect of slavery on contemporary social outcomes that are not explicitly about racial inequality. For example, Vandiver et al (2006) find that states in the US that supported slavery account for a disproportionately high number of modern criminal executions. Relatedly, Gouda and Rigterink (2016) find that southern counties with more slaves living on large plantations positively predicts levels of violent crime contemporarily. And Achary et al (2015) show that counties where slavery was more prevalent have lower average black turnout for elections, more lawsuits claiming constitutional violations based on race, and more racial polarization in political party identification. These studies offer similar explanations for their results, relying primarily on cultural and behavioral mechanisms. Specifically, they generally argue that slavery shaped local values, political attitudes,

and ethics in ways that may have been passed through the generations by a combination of parent-to-child socialization and institutional reinforcement. Along those lines, Vandiver et al (2006) discuss a “culture of violence” throughout the South that condones violence as a response to problems and thus justifies executions, and Achrary et al (2015) present what they call a “culture of disenfranchisement” that dampens the black vote. These studies also demonstrate the far-reaching effects of slavery, particularly how an institution that was so intrinsically about race and racial inequality has a total effect on places and affects many different types of phenomena.

The second segment of legacy of slavery research focuses on how the legacy of slavery shapes contemporary material racial inequality in a number of areas, including educational attainment (Bertocchi and Dimico 2012; Bertocchi and Dimico 2014), poverty (O’Connell 2012), school segregation (Reece and O’Connell 2016), and income (Lagerlöf 2005). This research generally uses county-level analysis and a combination of institutional and human capital explanations. O’Connell (2012) suggests that slavery gave way to future economic systems that were also based on economic exploitation and they may have continued to facilitated black-white inequality. Otherwise, she suggests that political institutions in high slave counties may have continued to function to funnel resources disproportionately to white populations. Lagerlöf (2005) and Bertocchi and Dimico (2014) focus on human capital explanations for the ongoing effect of slavery. Specifically, Lagerlöf (2005) suggests that to maintain these exploitive systems, white

people invested heavily in private schools so that they could offer themselves quality education while denying black people similar opportunities. This would function to enrich white people and impoverish black people, increasing inequality. Similarly, Bertocchi and Dimico (2012; 2014) argue that slavery shapes inequality indirectly through by unequally distributing the educational attainment of black people and white people. Cumulatively, this segment of legacy of slavery research may be the most intuitive. It maps slavery, an intrinsically unequal relationship between black people and white people, onto contemporary inequality between those same two groups.

Third is research that takes a broad view of the trans-Atlantic slave trade by examining its effects cross-nationally, both on countries receiving slaves and the African countries where the slaves came from. The results are consistent on both ends. Countries in the Americas that were more attached to slavery suffer poorer economic outcomes today, while African countries where more slaves were taken perform more poorly economically and suffer from a variety of cultural maladies. Nunn (2007a) shows countries in the Americas with a stronger historical intensity of slavery have lower GDPs today. Similarly, Soares et al (2012) show that those countries also have worse economic inequality, and the relationship between slavery and economic inequality is stronger than that between economic inequality and geography, development, and the strength of public works and institutions such as sewage availability, number of hospital beds, and property rights. In Africa, countries today where higher numbers of slaves

were taken historically have had more stagnant economic development and are poorer (Nunn 2008a; Nunn 2008b). Moreover, Nunn (2007b; 2008a) suggests that the slave trade disrupted the historical trajectories of African regions that were more developed at the time. More slaves were exported from more developed places, but many of those are places are, in turn, relatively worse off than African countries where fewer slaves were taken. In addition to poorer economic outcomes, the slave trade shaped the cultures of African countries. Countries historically harder hit by the slave trade demonstrate more mistrust today and more negative attitudes towards migrants attempting to acquire citizenship (Nunn and Wantchekon 2011; Tedeschi 2014). These countries even have higher rates of female HIV transmission, which Bertocchi and Dimico (2015) argue is an unfortunate result of increased polygyny (because a historical disproportionate lack of men made this a cultural norm) leading women to be more dissatisfied in their marriages and more likely to engage in infidelity. These studies show the complex global impact of the slave trade. Though many studies focus on the United States, slavery has demonstrably negatively affected all of the countries that heavily participated, either as recipients of slaves or victims of slave exports.

The fourth and final segment of legacy of slavery research that I will discuss is research that examines the intraracial impacts of slavery on black people in the United States. This research is usually conducted at the individual level rather than in aggregate like most of the above research and yields interesting results. Ruef and Fletcher (2003)

and Sacerdote (2005) examine whether the intraracial status hierarchy between free black people and slaves was preserved post-Emancipation in the form of ongoing material inequality between descendants of the two groups. Both studies find this to be true initially, but over a few generations the gap closed and the social and economic outcomes of the descendants of free black people and slaves converged. Price et al (2008) take a slightly different approach and examine whether former free black people and former slaves experienced post-Emancipation culture differently. They investigate this idea by testing whether the stigma of being a former slave made black people more likely to be lynched than former free black people. Their results reveal that former slaves were indeed lynched more frequently. In combination, this group of research continues to expand our understanding of the legacy of slavery, showing that in addition to its cross-national effects and contributions to racial inequality, it also differentially shaped the lives of black people based on their status during the antebellum era.

Each of these research threads makes a unique contribution to our cumulative understanding of the way the trans-Atlantic slave trade had long-lasting effects on the world. It seems safe to say that effects of slavery are almost ubiquitous. However, notably absent from this discussion is a thorough examination of the ways that slavery benefitted white people specifically, which, ultimately, was the entire goal of the institution. This makes the question of whether white people continue to benefit from slavery akin to “Did slavery work” and does it continue to “work” by offering white

people long-term social and economic benefits. This is the crucial “other side” to legacy of slavery research.

4.3. Slavery, Durable Inequality, and White Advantage

The idea that chattel slavery enriched certain white Americans seems relatively straightforward and uncontroversial; after all, they literally owned the slaves and the plantations and continued to benefit from black labor and from that landownership long after Emancipation. However, this study takes the next step in that process by considering how slavery shaped the historical conditions of local places in ways that benefitted all white people. These benefits were both geographically contingent, meaning that they vary based on a place’s connection to slavery, and temporally resistant, meaning that they lasted over time. In fact, I argue that slavery so benefitted white populations, white people in places with a stronger connection to slavery continue to have better social outcomes than their counterparts in places with a weaker connection to slavery contemporarily.

My argument that slavery continues to benefit all whites in formerly slave-heavy places rather than only (or primarily) the direct descendants means pushing past intuitive mechanisms, such as inheritances, to connect slavery to contemporary white outcomes. Instead, slavery may have initiated boundary formation processes that resulted in the long-term privileging of local white populations. Tilly (1997) and

Wimmer (2008) offer theories of boundary formation and maintenance that help delineate this possibility.

The formation and reification of boundaries is the response to an institutional need, in this case the antebellum need for a permanent labor force and the resulting need to control that labor force (Tilly 1997; Wimmer 2008). Maintaining dominance over the slave population was seen as vital to ensuring consistent and efficient production. In places where there were more slaves, white people would have been spurred to emphasize and strengthen the boundary between themselves and black people. This would mean not only using strategies to facilitate the disadvantage of black people but also to maintain and fortify their own dominant positions. They would have used a variety of formal strategies such as legislation and informal strategies such as local norms and social closure.

Though Emancipation may have temporarily disrupted life in slave states, the boundaries formed between black people and white people persisted even if they were mapped onto slightly different roles. These new roles were similarly hierarchal. The slave-owner or slave-overseer relationships were simply replaced with relationships such as sharecropper/tenant farmer/railroad worker-owner/overseer/manager. This role re-mapping represents the core processes that allow these boundaries to remain consistent, or even strengthen, over time.

First, “emulation” describes the process of importing old modes of social interaction into a new social system after a disruption such as the Civil War (Tilly 1997). Because the same needs existed before and after Emancipation—namely a stable, inexpensive workforce—it was easier for white people to imprint qualities of chattel slavery onto the post-bellum society. That meant recreating old knowledge and social relationship, such as preference for black deference to white people in public spaces; repurposing old institutions to serve new needs, such as antebellum slave patrols becoming municipal law enforcement; and instilling new institutions with old norms, such as the Freedmen’s Bureau convincing many former slaves to remain on their local plantations. Over the course of the 150 years between chattel slavery and today, the social order has been recreated multiple times, each time reinventing the same white-over-black structure that was initiated by slavery. The new structures continued to reflect the strength of those initial boundaries such that places with a stronger connection to slavery continued to have stronger black-white boundaries and stronger boundary policing.

Second, working in conjunction with emulation processes are patterns of what Tilly (1997) describes as exploitation and opportunity hoarding. Exploitation refers to the “unequal distribution of rewards proportionate to value added among participants in the same enterprise” (Tilly 1997, 88). Exploitation allows dominant groups to disproportionately profit from the labor of other groups. Opportunity hoarding

compliments exploitation. It describes the process of hoarding access to valuable opportunities or resources in order to maintain elite and/or privileged status, often ensuring that other groups remain vulnerable to ongoing exploitation.

In this case, slavery takes exploitation and opportunity hoarding to their ultimate extremes. The rewards of slave labor are not merely disproportionate, as exploitation requires, the entirety of the value of the labor of slaves is funneled upwards to the free group. Likewise, white people hoarded the opportunity to the most basic human right: bodily freedom. They erected structures to facilitate both of these processes. The most basic of these is legislation that maintains slavery itself and makes the exploitation possible, but this was accompanied by other, often informal regulations. Slave owners governed how long slaves worked, which functioned to increase their productivity and thus increase profits for the owners. Owners also controlled whether and how much slaves could perform contract labor outside of their normal duties, and if slaves were allowed to complete their own contracts, they were most likely forced to give a significant amount of their income to their owners. This combination allowed slave owners to maximize their exploitation of black populations. Similar regulations also shaped opportunity hoarding. In denying slaves access to education (both formal and informal) and the vast majority of occupations, white people not only lowered the status of black people but raised their own status.

These exploitative and opportunity hoarding processes would have been more important where slavery was proportionately more important. That means that even as the social structure was disrupted by events such as the Civil War or the Civil Rights Movement, emulation would lead to the recreating of structures that continued to facilitate exploitation and opportunity hoarding, processes that would strengthen the boundaries between black people and white people. As these structures were recreated, they would continue, even into today, to map onto the original structures initiated by slavery.

Over time the aforementioned boundary construction processes would lead places with a strong history of slavery to develop a black underclass (a fact that is already borne out in other legacy of slavery research; see: Bertocchi and Dimico 2012; Bertocchi and Dimico 2014; Lagerlöf 2005; and O'Connell 2012), a segment of disproportionately poor, less educated, low wage workers, occupying less prestigious positions. According to Tilly (1997) and Tomaskovic-Devey et al (2009), when hierarchally organized categories such as race are mapped onto hierarchally organized institutional categories such as occupational positions, inequality is exacerbated. In these situations, the dominant group—white people in this case—clamp down even tighter on resources, which would improve their social outcomes. This clamping down on resources is evidenced by literacy has been shown to be higher for white people in places with a stronger legacy of slavery (Lagerlöf 2005) and that white people are more

likely to use private schools in similar places (Reece and O'Connell 2016). Maintaining a tighter control on resources ultimately means that white people in places that relied more heavily on slavery historically should have better social outcomes than their counterparts in places where slavery was less important. In this paper, I test that premise.

4.4. Data and Methods

My data comes from three places: 1860 the United States Census, the 2010-2014 American Community Survey (ACS), and the 2014 United States Department of Agriculture Economic Research Service (USDA ERS) data. Consistent with similar legacy of slavery research, I conduct my analyses at the county level. I include every slave state in 1860, except Oklahoma because Oklahoma was not a state yet in 1860 so there is no county level slavery data available. That left me with Alabama, Arkansas, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, Missouri, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, and West Virginia and yielded a total of 1455 counties.

The focal independent variable is the "legacy of slavery," which I measure as the proportion of each counties' total population that was enslaved in 1860. That means that in a county with a legacy of slavery value of .9, 90 percent of *all* the people in the county were slaves and 10 percent were free. However, matching county-level data from 1860 to contemporary county data can be difficult because the county boundaries shift

considerably over time. Researchers take a variety of approaches to dealing with this problem, but in this paper, I replicated the method used by Reece and O'Connell (2016). See that paper for the full details, but, in short, the county-level slavery data from 1860 was reallocated geographically to match contemporary county boundaries. This allows me to conduct analyses without being forced to omit data where the county boundaries are mismatched.

I used a variety of dependent variables in order to take a broad account of white socio-economic position. So, I used the 2010-2014 ACS to calculate county-level values for the proportion of uninsured residents, median income, unemployment rate, poverty rate, homeownership rate, and the proportion of adult residents receiving food stamps.

I also controlled for a number of other variables to isolate the effect of slavery. These first variables also come from the ACS. First, I included a variable for the proportion of the county population that identifies as black to ensure that the effect of the legacy of slavery is not merely an effect of the black population. Next, I included a series of industry variables: the proportion of adults employed in agriculture, construction, manufacturing, retail, professional positions, education and healthcare, the arts, and public administration. I then included a measure of education, which I operationalized as the proportion of adults over 25 with a high school diploma. Last among the ACS variables are total unemployment rate, white homeownership, white median income, and white poverty rate where appropriate. The next series of variables

comes from the USDA ERS. First here are measures of recent migration patterns: a variable for in-migration, defined as the percentage of the county population that was born outside of the count, and a dichotomous variable for whether the county experienced population loss between the 1990 and 2010 Censuses. Next is a dichotomous variable for whether the county is a retirement destination, which is a county where the number of residents aged 60 or over increased by at least 15 percent between the 2000 and 2010 Censuses. Then I include a measure of the counties' natural amenities, which is a progressive rating from 1 to 5 reflecting the desirability of the county's natural features such as climate, topography, and water. Places with physical characteristics people tend to enjoy living near receive higher ratings than places with characteristics people tend to dislike. For example, a county on the beach in South Florida will receive a higher rating than a county in a desert in West Texas. Finally, I include a measure of rural-urban status, which is a scale from 1 to 9 representing progressively lower levels of urbanization. That is, 1 represents the most urban counties and 9 represents the most rural counties, with others falling somewhere in between.

Table 11: Means

	Mean	SD
white uninsured	15.44	4.81
white median income	46656.05	12684.78
white unemployment	8.28	2.88
white poverty rate	15.93	5.64
white homeownership rate	.75	.07
white food stamps	.13	.06
legacy of slavery	.27	.22
% black	16.5	17.95
agriculture	5.58	5.92
construction	7.45	2.49
manufacturing	12.53	6.56
retail	11.77	2.43
professional	6.90	3.12
education and healthcare	23.11	4.35
arts	7.76	3.30
public administration	6.22	3.36
high school	80.97	6.44
unemployment rate	5.38	1.78
in-migration	6.88	3.36
population loss	.11	-
retirement destination	.21	-
natural amenities	3.61	.69
rural-urban continuum	4.72	2.66

4.4.1. Analytic Strategy

I estimated six models, one for each dependent variable. That is, one model for white uninsured rate, one for white median income, one for white unemployment rate, one for white poverty rate, one for white homeownership rate, and one for the proportion of white people on food stamps. Each model includes the legacy of slavery variable and a series of base control variables: percentage black, agriculture,

construction, manufacturing, retail, professional, education and healthcare, arts, public administration, high school, unemployment rate, in-migration, population loss, retirement destination, natural amenities, and rural-urban continuum. But each model only includes other economic variables (unemployment rate, white homeownership rate, white median income, white poverty rate) where they are appropriate. For example, I obviously would not include white homeownership rate as a predictor variable in a model of white homeownership rate, but I also would not include white poverty rate in a model of white median income, or the reverse, because the two are very strongly correlated.

I estimated my models using OLS regression, but because of the spatial autocorrelation of county-level data, I present spatially robust estimates for each model.

4.5. Results

The results support a durable inequality argument that white social and economic outcomes would be higher in places with a stronger historical attachment to slavery. Of the six measures I analyzed, the legacy of slavery improved white outcomes in four. In the other two, the legacy of slavery was non-significant. Moreover, slavery was one of two strongest predictors in each of the four models where it was significant, showing that slavery continues to have a powerful positive effect on the lives of white Southerners. I will discuss each model individually.

Table 12: OLS Estimates for White Insurance Rate

	β	SE
Intercept	21.51	13.76
Legacy of Slavery	-1.21	.88
% Black	.03**	.01
Agriculture	.32***	.1
Construction	.35***	.1
Manufacturing	-.06	.08
Retail	.14	.1
Professional	.09	.09
Education and Healthcare	-.11	.08
Arts	.07	.09
Public Administration	-.05	.08
High School	-.15***	.05
Unemployment Rate	.21***	.08
In-Migration	.01	.04
Population Loss	-.88**	.37
Retirement Destination	.39*	.23
Natural Amenities	.87***	.17
Rural Urban Continuum	-.03	.06
White Homeownership	-4.74	3.47
White Median Income	-.00004*	.00002
White Poverty	.02***	0.06
n	1455	
R-squared	.47	

***p < .01; **p < .05; * p < .10

Table 12 shows the model for the percentage of white people in a county without insurance. This is one of the two models where legacy of slavery was non-significant. Instead, uninsured rate was decreased by a number of other county characteristics, namely percentage of residents with a high school education, whether the county experienced persistent population loss, and median income, which were all negative and significant. In contrast, percentage black, percentage of workers in agriculture,

percentage of workers in construction, unemployment rate, whether the county was a retirement destination, the quality of the county's natural amenities, and white poverty rate were all positive and significant, meaning that they proportionately increased the uninsured rate.

Table 13: OLS Estimates for White Median Income

	β	SE
Intercept	-4248.98	5627.95
Legacy of Slavery	7317.38***	1378.5
% Black	76.85***	18.94
Agriculture	290.33***	77.25
Construction	-321.01**	128.95
Manufacturing	-197.19***	57.4
Retail	-778.87***	94.67
Professional	1729.17***	153.12
Education and Healthcare	-380.69***	59.22
Arts	-317.98***	74.12
Public Administration	117.62	90.61
High School	641.91***	42.69
Unemployment Rate	-785.9***	132.97
In-Migration	156.92**	71.23
Population Loss	-508.65	628.01
Retirement Destination	-99.92	514.61
Natural Amenities	1140.49***	298
Rural Urban Continuum	1060.03***	91.2
White Homeownership	25345.38***	3967.36
n	1455	
R-squared	.73	

***p < .01; **p < .05; *p < .10

Table 13 shows the model for white median income. Here, legacy of slavery is positive and significant, meaning that as a county's historical attachment to slavery

increased, white median income increased proportionally. This result is consistent with similar tests of the effect of slavery on white income by Lagerlöf (2005), and it is one of the most straightforward tests of the durable inequality processes I laid out earlier in this paper. If white people tighten their hold on resources as a long-term result of boundary construction processes initiated by slavery, they would be able to disproportionately occupy more prestigious, well-paying occupational position, ultimately raising their median income. The strength of the relationship between slavery and white median income is second only to the relationship between white homeownership rate and white median income. Moreover, the relationship is robust to a number of other factors that improve white median income, such as the percentage of workers in agriculture, the percentage of workers in professional positions, the intensity of local in-migration, the quality of the county's natural amenities, and the county's urbanity, which were all positive and significant.

Table 14: OLS Estimates for White Unemployment Rate

	β	SE
Intercept	4.3*	2.61
Legacy of Slavery	.07	.45
% Black	-.001	.006
Agriculture	-.08***	.03
Construction	-.01	.04
Manufacturing	.05**	.02
Retail	.06	.04
Professional	.14***	.05
Education and Healthcare	-.04	.02
Arts	.02	.03
Public Administration	.08**	.03
High School	-.03*	.02
In-Migration	.07*	.04
Population Loss	-.08	.29
Retirement Destination	.62***	.17
Natural Amenities	-.05	.1
Rural Urban Continuum	-.08**	.04
White Homeownership	8.39***	1.64
White Median Income	-.00009***	.00001
White Poverty	.16***	.03
n	1455	
R-squared	.34	

***p < .01; **p < .05; *p < .10

Table 14 shows the model for white unemployment rate. This is the second model where the legacy of slavery was non-significant. This result is particularly surprising in context of my arguments about white people leveraging a black underclass to secure higher status. Other factors may mediate the relationship between slavery and white unemployment rate. Particularly, white homeownership, white median income, and white poverty rate are all significant in this model *and* are predicted by slavery in their own respective models so the effect of slavery on white unemployment rate may

run through one of these alternate pathways. Even though slavery is non-significant when predicting white unemployment rate, a variety of other factors are important. The percentage of workers in agriculture, the percentage of residents with a high school diploma, the urbanity of a county, and white median income are all negative and significant, meaning as they increase, white unemployment rate decreases proportionally. In contrast, the percentage of workers in manufacturing, the percentage of workers in professional positions, the percentage of workers in public administration, the amount of a county's in-migration, whether a county is a retirement destination, white homeownership rate, and white poverty rate are all positive and significant, meaning as they increase, white unemployment rate also increases.

Table 15: OLS Estimates for White Poverty Rate

	β	SE
Intercept	29.77**	14.88
Legacy of Slavery	-3.34***	.92
% Black	-.09***	.01
Agriculture	.11	.13
Construction	.31**	.12
Manufacturing	.24**	.11
Retail	.45***	.13
Professional	.06	.12
Education and Healthcare	.48***	.11
Arts	.32***	.11
Public Administration	.18*	.11
High School	-.4***	.05
Unemployment Rate	.54***	.09
In-Migration	.01	.06
Population Loss	-.47	.41
Retirement Destination	-.52*	.29
Natural Amenities	.06	.15
Rural Urban Continuum	.28***	.06
White Homeownership	-12.55***	3.99
<i>n</i>	1455	
R-squared	.57	

***p < .01; **p < .05; *p < .10

Table 15 presents the model for white poverty rate. In this model legacy of slavery is negative and significant, meaning that as a county's historical attachment to slavery increases, the white poverty rate proportionally decreases today. While the strength of the relationship between slavery and white poverty is a distant second to the relationship between white poverty and white homeownership, the slavery remains a much stronger predictor of white poverty than any other variable in the model. This result supports my primary argument in a similar way to white median income. If white

people hoard resources as a result of slavery and ongoing boundary formation processes, they would be able to leverage their favorable resource acquisition into benefits that reduce poverty rate, such as better education and better jobs. In addition to the legacy of slavery, other factors also function to reduce the white poverty rate. The percentage of black people in a county, the percentage of residents with a high school diploma, whether the county is a retirement destination, and white homeownership rate are all negative and significant, meaning as they increase white poverty rate decreases. Conversely, the percentage of workers in agriculture, manufacturing, retail, education and healthcare, the arts, or public administration; county unemployment rate; and county urbanity are positive and significant, meaning as they increase, white poverty rate also increases.

Table 16: OLS Estimates for White Homeownership Rate

	β	SE
Intercept	.44*	.23
Legacy of Slavery	.02*	.01
% Black	.001***	.0002
Agriculture	.001	.002
Construction	.01***	.003
Manufacturing	.001	.002
Retail	.002	.002
Professional	-.004**	.002
Education and Healthcare	.0005	.002
Arts	-.004**	.002
Public Administration	.001	.002
High School	.002*	.0009
Unemployment Rate	.002	.002
In-Migration	-.01***	.001
Population Loss	-.009	.007
Retirement Destination	.02***	.004
Natural Amenities	.007***	.002
Rural Urban Continuum	.005***	.001
White Median Income	.000002***	.000000
n	1455	
R-squared	.41	

***p < .01; **p < .05; *p < .10

Table 16 shows the model for white homeownership rate. In this model legacy of slavery is positive and significant, meaning as a county's historical attachment to slavery increases, white homeownership rate increases today. Though these results also support my primary argument, the relationship between slavery and white homeownership seems to be unique among the measures I analyze. Legacy of slavery is the strongest predictor of white homeownership rate, but white homeownership rate is the strongest predictor of every other measure where slavery is significant. That means that slavery

may work through dual mechanisms: its direct effect *and* through its strong effect on white homeownership. Essentially, slavery may be responsible for the two most powerful predictors of white social and economic outcomes. The effect of slavery on white homeownership may also be more complex than the durable inequality processes I present. In addition to those processes, white homeownership may benefit from slavery through long-term transmission of landownership. Places with more slaves historically had more white landownership due to the very nature of slavery and what it was used for, primarily agricultural ventures. This land would have been transferred to subsequent generations of white people, affording them more opportunities for homeownership (see: Chapter 2 for a fuller discussion of slavery and the history of homeownership). These intergeneration transfers may combine with other durable inequality and boundary construction processes to increase the influence of slavery on white homeownership *and* of white homeownership on other phenomena. In addition to the legacy of slavery, some other variables seem to boost white homeownership. The percentage of black people in a county, the percentage of workers in construction, the percentage of residents with a high school diploma, whether the county is a retirement destination, the quality of the county's natural amenities, the county's urbanity, and white median income are all positive and significant, meaning as they increase white homeownership subsequently increases. The percentage of workers in professional industries, the percentage of workers in the arts, and the amount of a county's in-

migration are all negative and significant, meaning as they increase, white homeownership rates decrease.

Table 17: OLS Estimates for White Food Stamp Rate

	β	SE
<i>Intercept</i>	.2**	.09
Legacy of Slavery	-.03***	.01
% Black	-.001***	.0001
Agriculture	-.001	.001
Construction	.001	.001
Manufacturing	.001	.001
Retail	.002**	.001
Professional	.001	.001
Education and Healthcare	.001**	.001
Arts	.0003	.001
Public Administration	.003***	.001
High School	-.003***	.0003
Unemployment Rate	.01***	.001
In-Migration	-.001***	.0004
Population Loss	.004	.003
Retirement Destination	.002	.002
Natural Amenities	-.01***	.001
Rural Urban Continuum	-.001	.0005
White Homeownership	.06**	.0001
White Poverty	.01***	.0004
<i>n</i>	1455	
<i>R-squared</i>	.73	

***p < .01; **p < .05; *p < .10

Table 17 presents the model for white food stamp rate. Legacy of slavery is again negative and significant, meaning that as a county's historical reliance on slavery increased, the proportion of white people on food stamps in a county today decreased. As in most of the other models, the legacy of slavery has a sizeable effect, again, second only to the effect of white homeownership rate. This provides final support for my

primary argument that slavery set in motion processes that allowed white people to hoard resources and leverage the disadvantage of a black underclass to raise their social standing. A higher social standing would mean proportionally fewer white people need to use food stamps. In addition to the main effect of slavery, other variables also seem to decrease white food stamp usage. The proportion of black people in a county, the proportion of the county with at least a high school education, the intensity of in-migration, and the quality of the county's natural amenities are all negative and significant, meaning that as they increase, the proportion of white people using food stamps decreases proportionally. A few other variables seem to increase white food stamp rate. The proportion of workers in retail, education and healthcare, and public administration; unemployment rate in the county, white homeownership, and white poverty are positive and significant, meaning that as they increase, the proportion of white people using food stamps increases proportionally.

4.5.1. The Legacy of Slavery and Proportion Black

Across these six models, it is also important to note the effect of the proportion of black people in a county. In almost every model, proportion black mirrors legacy of slavery in direction and significance, although the effect size is smaller. Previous research already shows that legacy of slavery and black proportion/racial threat, despite their similarity, are two different concepts that *both* work to increase racial inequality rather than one serving as a proxy for the other (O'Connell 2012; Reece and O'Connell

2016). This work builds on those ideas and supports the argument that a black underclass contributes to white people's social and economic prosperity. Racial threat literature demonstrates that black social outcomes worsen as the proportion of black people in an area increases (eg. Avery and Fine 2012; Jacobs and O'Brien 1998; Welsh and Payne 2014). My results reveal that in addition to, perhaps because of, that assumed worsening, white social and economic outcomes improve. It is possible that though slavery initiated a long-term pathway to white people leveraging their relationship with the black population to their advantage, the size of the black population could produce a similar effect through a shorter-term pathway. In addition to the historical boundary construction processes of slavery, an increasingly large black population may motivate white people to even further hoard their resources and give them an underclass to assume menial occupations, thus pushing white people up the occupational ladder. In contrast, in places with a weaker historical attachment to slavery and a lower proportion of black people would not have developed the same strong boundaries between black and white people and would have lacked the same sizeable black underclass as places with a stronger attachment to slavery and a higher proportion of black people. White people in these places would be unable to map occupational inequality onto racial inequality and would be forced to perform more of the lower occupations that would typically be reserved for black people. This would lower their collective advantage,

worsening their social and economic outcomes relative to places with more slaves and more black people.

These results also offer an interesting contribution to the racial threat hypothesis, which I will discuss more towards the end of the paper.

4.6. Discussion

The simple conclusion to this paper is that yes, white populations seem to continue to benefit from chattel slavery in the United States, at least in the South. The effects appear to be direct and robust despite the temporal gulf between slavery and today. This research is the first step in filling a critical hole in legacy of slavery literature. Too many of our investigations of the topic have focused almost exclusively on who was harmed by slavery without a complementary analysis of who benefitted from the institution. Chattel slavery was an intricate and brutal practice with a clear economic goal: to enrich the white population. This goal initiated the processes that led to the long-term disadvantage of millions of people globally, but focusing exclusively on that disadvantage ignores a crucial half of the story. We must continue to expand our examinations of the legacy of slavery to understand the complex ways that white people may have been affected. This research offers a broad start, but it is just a beginning as many questions remain unanswered, particularly the specifics of the processes involved and whether/how/when the beneficial effects of being a slave owner may have converged with those of non-slave-owning white people.

Moreover, while research shows that slavery harmed receiving countries in the aggregate (Nunn 2007a; Soares et al 2012), it is important for studies like this to break apart such large units of analysis in order to complicate that narrative. Although an entire country may appear to suffer the consequence of its slave owning past, particular groups within the country, particularly white people and maybe white people living in certain areas, may have benefitted.

4.6.1. Racial Threat and White Advantage

The racial threat hypothesis has become a staple of social science research. At its simplest, it proclaims that white people react to large black populations—racial threat—with proportionally conservative political attitudes and measures of racial social control, which, in turn, lower black people’s social and economic outcomes (Key 1949). Racial threat scholarship has identified connections between the size of the black population and, for example, white anti-affirmative action attitudes (Tolbert and Grummel 2003), punitive discipline in schools (Welch and Payne 2014), capital punishment (Jacobs et al 2005), white voter turnout (Enos 2015), and felon disenfranchisement (Behrens et al 2003) among many other phenomena. However, similar to legacy of slavery research racial threat research focuses very little on white social and economic outcomes. Instead, it almost exclusively examines white political and racial attitudes and black social and economic outcomes. This narrow focus is a sizeable oversight in the literature. It stands

to reason that if white social control worsens outcomes for black people that they would, in turn, improve them for white people.

Although an examination of the racial threat hypothesis is not the primary focus of this paper, the results nonetheless lend themselves partially to a racial threat explanation and suggests that white people may benefit from racial threat processes in ways previously unexplored. This is an important finding that should push examinations of racial threat into new directions. Particularly, scholars cannot continue to ignore the role racial threat in facilitating the affluence of white people. The current paper only offers a cursory glance at this phenomenon, but future research should take care to broaden its scope to include the study of white people's social and economic outcomes.

4.6.2. Legacy of Slavery Research and Racial Reparations

In *The Social Life of DNA*, Alondra Nelson (2016) discusses the 2003 court case *Farmer-Paellmann v. FleetBoston*, which attempted to secure racial reparations for black Americans by suing corporations that they argued benefited from the slave trade. Activist and lawyer Deadria Farmer-Paellmann became convinced that geneology could offer a way to make claims for reparations by offering a way to trace the families of people directly damaged by slavery. She thus filed a class action lawsuit against a number of corporations alleging that their participation in the slave trade negatively impacted black descendants of slaves, causing them to lose generations of wages that

should be returned. Two of the major barriers the lawsuit faced were the judge's claims that the plaintiffs could not offer direct evidence of injury from the corporations named in the suit, nor could they offer sufficient evidence of a familial relationship with enslaved parties they claimed were harmed. Because of these barriers, the judge dismissed their first lawsuit. The plaintiffs later filed a second lawsuit, this time armed with results from a genetic ancestry test supposedly establishing a direct link between the plaintiffs and regions of Africa where slaves were historically taken. They figured that connection would be enough to establish that they were direct descendants of slaves and give them the leverage to proceed with the lawsuit. The judge disagreed and dismissed the lawsuit again.

The Farmer-Paellmann lawsuit was not the first appeal for reparations for slavery in the United States. It was considered unique because it sought to redirect the burden for damages to corporations, rather than the state, using genealogy as a basis for damages. Legacy of slavery research may suggest that we return to petitioning the state, using research such as this. Demonstrating that slavery has not only continues to disadvantage black populations but also continues to enrich white populations may bolster the argument that financial reparations are a necessary intervention in these ongoing processes. They shift the topic of discussion from tracking the individual descendants of slaves—a grueling, difficult process and a constant critique levied by anti-reparations advocates—to the need to reimburse populations. Research such as this,

which analyzes local populations and champions mechanisms that do not necessarily rely on a direct slave lineage can be vital for the reparations cause. Moreover, other research demonstrates that the economic outcomes of the descendants of free black people and black slaves converged only a few generations after Emancipation (Ruef and Fletcher 2003; Sacerdote 2005). This further suggests that the processes by which slavery disadvantages black people are more complicated than simply denying opportunities to slaves and former slaves. Similarly, we can infer that the processes by which slavery advantages white people do not rely on a direct lineage of slave ownership. Instead, slavery seems to shape the social and economic outcomes of entire populations through its effect on institutions and norms. This necessitates an intervention from state as it is impossible to attach culpability for the ravages of slavery on a collection of individuals or even corporations. Legacy of slavery research will be vital to advocacy on this front, and the current paper helps round our understanding of the institution to strengthen these claims. I will discuss this more in depth in the next chapter.

5. Conclusion: The Future of Legacy of Slavery Research, Historical Sociology, and Racial Reparations

Cumulatively, these results contribute to our complex understanding of the legacy of slavery, particularly in the United States. They fill holes in the literature and answer some important outstanding questions concerning the post-Emancipation effects of chattel slavery. Particularly, I reveal that (1) the legacy of slavery remains robust even when controlling for other historical phenomena; (2) slavery does indeed seem to have shaped the conditions for colorism; and (3) the legacy of slavery works in two directions, not only impoverishing black people but also enriching white people.

That the effect of slavery persists even when accounting for the wide swath of history between slavery and today quiets one of the largest criticisms of legacy of slavery research. Although, our investigations cannot stop here, now we can begin to feel relatively assured that the effects we are measuring are indeed the effects of slavery and not slavery operating through some other historical phenomena. Indeed, slavery seems to work alongside other aspects of history rather than competing, and future investigations of slavery's place among the historical factors shaping contemporary inequality should focus on the interactions between these factors. Specifically, whether slavery exacerbates the effects of other features of history that research shows to be detrimental. The effects of phenomena such as lynching (which I did not investigate here) and historical farm/land ownership and various industries may manifest differently in places where slavery was more prominent.

My finding that slavery seems to have shaped the conditions for colorism confirms a plethora of longstanding anecdotal and historical evidence. But equally important is how this research sets the stage for deeper examinations of the historical transmission of color advantage. Using the black and mulatto categories as proxies for “light skinned” and “dark skinned” black people allows us to examine colorism at a time before our current survey methodology. I am already attempting to leverage this data to explore the role of marriage selection in facilitating color advantage by concentrating economic resources among mulattos/light-skinned black people intergenerationally. This will allow me to develop a theory of colorism and skin tone stratification that does not rely completely on individual level preferences (eg. Goldsmith et al 2007; Painter et al 2015) but combines those ideas with more macro level mechanisms such as the ways that affluent families offer economic advantages to their children. Indeed, the study presented in this dissertation is just the beginning as the rapid expansion of available data will allow me to continue to investigate more and more complex phenomena associated with historical color advantage.

The third chapter of this dissertation is particularly groundbreaking despite its apparent simplicity relative to the other two. Up until this point, no study of this type focused solely on the how slavery continues to shape the social outcomes of white Americans. This previously unexplored aspect of the legacy of slavery is an important half of the story that requires the same rigor of investigation that we have applied to

investigating the ways that slavery facilitates disadvantage. This means conducting detailed inquiries, perhaps similar to the first chapter I presented here, into the processes that have continued to advantage white populations over the course of American history. In addition to exploring the effect of the legacy of slavery on white outcomes, social science in general suffers from an obsession with the mechanisms of disadvantage, often ignoring the apparatuses associated with advantage. Certainly, the emergence of “whiteness studies” as a subset of critical race theory has gone a long way towards shifting our collective focus to the seemingly unseen aspects of the top of the racial hierarchy. However, much of this work has been theoretical or anecdotal, and it is critical that social scientists—sociologists in particular—assume the responsibility of empirically investigating how racial advantage is facilitated, codified, institutionalized, and made invisible.

5.1. We are the ones we have been waiting for: On Legacy Of Slavery Research And Reparations

These results also make vital contributions to the conversation on racial reparations. If inequality is at least partially the result of long-term historical trajectories—that have both unjustly impoverished black people and unjustly enriched white people—it is important that policy interventions address that history in addition to dismantling contemporary institutions that also facilitate inequality. Reparations for

chattel slavery is the most intuitive, and perhaps important, of policy solutions to disrupt the ongoing effect of a pernicious history.¹

Even if the policy was approved, exactly how to issue reparations for chattel slavery remains an outstanding question. Logistical challenges in public discourse often revolve around the “who” of reparations, which, in itself, encompasses a number of questions. First among them is whether reparations should only be issued to the direct descendants of chattel slavery, which includes specific questions such as: should black immigrants receive reparations and should the descendants of free black people receive reparations. Second is a more straightforward logistical question: if we are to issue reparations *only* to the direct descendants of slaves, how can we identify those people? After all, even though slaves were recorded on the Census in the aggregate, individual slaves, especially their names, were deliberately excluded from enumeration. Legacy of slavery research offers possible solutions to those questions of “who.”

Darity and Frank (2003) recognized the problem of identifying possible candidates for reparations. Particularly, they predict numbers of people suddenly claiming black heritage where they had not before in a bid for a supposed cash payment. They offer a two pronged solution to the problem of eligibility:

¹ A great deal of reparations discourse, and indeed, ironically, a fair amount of its opposition, revolves around the perceived difficulty of passing reparations policy through any legislature in the United States. But it is not necessarily the place of the scholar to constrain his imagination based on legislative limitations. On the contrary, I argue that it is his job to present what he sees as the best solutions based on his empirical testing regardless of their perceived feasibility.

- (i) individuals would have to provide reasonable documentation that they had at least one ancestor who was enslaved in the United States, and
- (ii) individuals would have to demonstrate that at least 10 years prior to the onset of the reparations program they self-identified as black...(327).

While their eligibility requirements are compelling, their usability and, indeed, their morality is questioned by more recent evidence that suggests that we should consider the effect of slavery, not at the individual level—that is, whether or not a person is a direct descendant of a slave—but at the aggregate level—whether a person is a part of a group that was injured by slavery.

Ruef and Fletcher (2003) and Sacerdote (2005) show that even though there were initial differences between the descendants of free black people and former slaves, over just a few generations their life outcomes converged. (Importantly, the two studies use two different types of data and methods to come to virtually identical conclusions.) This suggests that the legacy of slavery on individuals may have dissipated over time, meaning that having a slave ancestor may be an imperfect method of determining which people—particularly which black people—deserve reparations. *However*, the legacy of slavery on *places* remains robust, as my research demonstrates, both before and after the 1920 threshold Sacerdote (2005) identifies as when the gap closed between the lineages of free black people and slaves. For policy implications, specifically reparations, this means that *place-based* reparations for slavery may be preferable to individual cash transfers.

Place-based reparations may take the form of heavy investment in predominately black communities (given the state of segregation in this country, identifying such places should not be too difficult), creating havens or sanctuary communities with institutions designed to offer black populations the leverage to begin to close the gap between themselves and their white counterparts. These institutions may include organizations that we already have the logistical knowledge to implement such as free high quality housing, extensive tutoring programs, and free job training. Accompanying these organizations should be programs that offer grants for ventures such small businesses, college attendance, and debt repayment that would be accessible to black people both in and outside of designated sanctuary communities.

Darity et al (2010) raise the concern of reparations transfers inadvertently benefiting the “payees” — the dominant group, white people — by giving black people money that they ultimately funnel back to wealthy white people through their consumption patterns. This is a valid and often unconsidered concern when discussing reparations, particularly direct cash payments. Place-based reparations addresses this concern to a degree. Rather than payments that black people are essentially forced to return to the top of the racial hierarchy, place-based reparations with an accompanying grant program offers deep investment that offers black people the tools and relief they have been denied without immediately and directly contributing to the consumer economy.

However, it is important to note that racial reparations are not a cure-all for racial inequality, and it is unfair to expect black people to wipe the racial slate clean and never make mention of racial again upon obtaining them. Instead, reparations for chattel slavery, regardless of what form they take, are merely the correction of a historical wrong and an intervention in one mechanism of inequality generation. Many contemporary institutions facilitate inequality in their own right and must be dismantled with their own specific interventions that stand apart from reparations. True, these interventions may need to be smaller and less intense after the implementation of a reparations program, but reparations alone will not rectify the subtle complexities of racist phenomena such as subprime lending, neighborhood steering, or the lack of support black students receive in STEM programs. For a specific example, place-based reparations that increase the overall education level of the black population would not go as far towards creating equality as we would like if black people continue to receive smaller returns on their education. Therefore, while I am an advocate of racial reparations and the totality of legacy of slavery research up until this point lends itself to reparations as necessary, I must reiterate they are not a racial inequality “final solution.” We must continue to push our research forward to better understand the contours of inequality and imagine a policy solutions that lead us to a better, more equal world.

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Biography

Robert L. Reece was born on August 11, 1988 in Greenville, MS. He grew up in Leland, MS before attending the University of Mississippi where he obtained a Bachelor's degree in Sociology in 2010 with minors in Journalism, English, and African American studies. He also obtained a Master's degree in sociology from the University of Mississippi in 2012 before enrolling in the sociology PhD program at Duke University. Robert has published a number of articles including "Sex as Subversion: The Ethnosexual Protestor and the Ethnosexual Defender" in the *Routledge International Handbook of Race Class and Gender*, "Blackening Up Critical Whiteness: Dave Chappelle as a Race Theorist" in *(Re)positioning Race: Prophetic Research in a Post-Racial Obama Era*, "The Plight of the Black Belle Knox: Race, College, Web Cam Models, and the Internet" in *Porn Studies*. "How the Legacy of Slavery and Racial Composition Shape Public School Enrollment in the American South" with Heather O'Connell in *Sociology of Race and Ethnicity*, and "What Are You Mixed With?: An Analysis of Perceived Attractiveness, Skin Tone, and Mixed Raciality" in *The Review of Black Political Economy*. He has also received numerous awards and honors including the American Sociological Association Minority Fellowship, the Eastern Sociological Society Charles V. Willie Award, the Mid-South Sociological Association Graduate Student Paper Award, the Ottis Green Fellowship, the Kenan Institute for Ethics Fellowship, and the Women Studies Department Race and Gender Award.