Civil Resistance or Rebellion:
The Impact of Country-Level Factors on Revolutionary Strategy

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A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the
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ABSTRACT

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Abstract

This paper constitutes a partial answer to the question of when political resistance campaigns that use primarily violent or nonviolent strategies occur. In doing so, it attempts to bridge the gap between discussions of rebellion and civil resistance. A number of broad theoretical propositions are made and statistically tested by combining the NAVCO data on violent and nonviolent resistance campaigns with data that is commonly used in the civil war literature. The study finds that revolutionary civil resistance campaigns are unlikely to occur in democracies, population size does not obstruct nonviolent collective action, and the present favors nonviolent resistance more than the past, likely due to technological factors. It also provides evidence that divided societies are associated with rebellion rather than civil resistance.

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Introduction

The number of civil wars raging around the globe increased steadily throughout much of the latter half of the twentieth century (Fearon and Laitin 2003). The generally weak governments of underdeveloped post-colonial states were often unable to assert complete control over their populations, and sooner or later many of those states fell into chaos. In some cases, ethnic groups dissatisfied with arbitrarily drawn colonial boundaries sought states of their own, often through armed rebellion. In others, rebels fought for an increased share of power in the central government—or, sometimes, complete control of it. Some of these rebels were, once again, representatives of ethnic groups. Others were driven by religious or philosophical ideologies prescribing a different role for political power, while others still largely sought personal profit. Lines between these categories were often blurred, complicating efforts to achieve peace or prevent war.

The international environment further complicated many of these situations: during the Cold War, the struggling superpowers—especially the Soviet Union—provided massive amounts of support to ideologically friendly rebel groups, making possible "robust insurgencies" in many places where guerrillas otherwise would have been quickly crushed (Kalyvas and Balcells 2010). These conflicts were, however, not limited to new states. Many countries in Latin America developed leftist rebellions, and ideological civil wars were present in Europe both shortly before and shortly after World War II. A small wave of civil wars accompanied the termination of the Cold War; Eastern Bloc states gained independence, opening them up to contestation, and the superpowers lost interest in propping up weak but friendly regimes, leaving them vulnerable to challengers (Kalyvas and Balcells 2010). By the early 1990s, the number

of civil wars ongoing worldwide peaked at three dozen (Kalyvas and Balcells 2010).

Yet, not all groups seeking political change during this era turned to violence. In many states formerly controlled by the Soviet Union, nonviolent revolutions swept authoritarian regimes from power and installed democratic ones in their places. And this phenomenon was not limited to Central and Eastern Europe: in diverse locations such as Iran and the Philippines, mass resistance movements achieved regime change through (largely) nonviolent coercion. These movements no doubt learned some of their tactics from earlier successful movements for racial equality in the U.S. and independence in colonial India. Furthermore, these movements have generally had better results in terms of producing stable, democratic forms of governance than their violent counterparts (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011).

Still, mass nonviolent movements have not always been successful. In Cuba in the late 1950s, a relatively small band of leftist insurgents ousted dictator Batista; despite efforts to foment popular revolution, people did not flood the streets until the dictator fled the country.[1] More recently, the "Arab Spring" witnessed the fall of multiple governments across North Africa and the Middle East, but the strategies used in these cases have been mixed—though the governments of Tunisia and Egypt were overthrown by mass resistance movements, Libyans achieved regime change only through a rebellion accompanied by significant international assistance, and civil war in Syria is currently ongoing.

When do people seek regime change? When they do, why do some turn to

[1]See Leiden and Schmitt (1968), García-Pérez (1998), Pérez-Stable (1993), and Matthews (1975).

armed resistance while others utilize a nonviolent strategy? These questions, especially the latter, are the ones this paper seeks to answer. While much work exists on when and why civil wars occur and how nonviolent political resistance campaigns are conducted, little if any work exists on the question of why one develops as opposed to the other. This paper aims to initiate research on that question. It does so by presenting some theoretical propositions on the advantages that the strategies of rebellion or revolution may have for political dissidents in certain contexts and then employing statistical tests to evaluate these theories. Given the dearth of literature on this topic and the breadth of theory presented here, these tests cannot be exhaustive, but they aim to establish some general principles which can be used as starting points for more nuanced research on particular mechanisms in the future.

The paper proceeds as follows. The next section reviews some of the relevant pieces of literature on both civil war and nonviolent civil resistance movements as well as a couple of pieces that have attempted to compare the effectiveness of these two different "strategies" of political resistance. The third section contains a theoretical discussion regarding the choice of resistance strategy along with concomitant hypotheses. A fourth section describes the statistical method used to test these hypotheses, and a fifth reports the results of the analyses. A final section concludes.

Civil Resistance and Rebellion

Before proceeding, it is necessary to define more explicitly some of the terms that are commonly used in this paper. Many of these are heavily influenced, though not all follow directly, from the conceptions of Chenoweth and Stephan (2011), as their book in many ways prompted this investigation, which is also dependent upon the structure of their data. *Political resistance*, or just *resistance*, refers to popular, collective, extra-institutional political activity designed to achieve significant political change (not to be confused with *civil resistance*, which I will define momentarily). For the purpose of this paper, I will be using these terms in a *revolutionary* sense, meaning that resistance activities are designed to overthrow or radically revise the structure of a ruling regime.[1] Political resistance is often used to pursue lesser political goals, but those cases will be excluded by use of the term in this paper; in addition, I exclude from consideration cases of occupation, as these are not issues of domestic governance. The objective is to analyze when people pursue fundamental change in the way that they are governed, and occupations are theoretically problematic because their natures vary widely and, in many cases, they may not aim to provide a complete or long-term form of governance.[2]

I maintain continuity with Chenoweth and Stephan (2011), and before them Ackerman and Kruegler (1994), in defining a *campaign* as "a series of observable, continual tactics in pursuit of a political objective" (Chenoweth

[1] "Radical revision in structure" refers to significant, difficult to achieve, and generally democratic reforms such as the transition out of Apartheid in South Africa. There are only eight instances of such cases in the data used and the results of the quantitative analysis do not change if they are excluded.

[2] I also am not aware of existing data for occupations that would accomplish the tasks desired, but the theoretical issues are themselves sufficient to exclude these cases from the analysis. Decolonization, in particular, is very difficult to pin down (Sambanis 2004).

and Stephan 2011, 14). [3] *Dissidents* are the people primarily driving a campaign and the ones formulating campaign strategy. They may be the soldiers that begin a civil war, or they may the organizers of civil resistance in a nonviolent campaign; a supporting population in a civil war or common participants in a civil resistance campaign are thus generally not included.[4] In contrast, some campaigns/revolutions are relatively spontaneous (Lohmann 1994); their relationship with the framework in the paper is explained in more detail in the next section. A *movement* is the current of intellectual and organizational activity that underlies a campaign or forms a potential campaign. Any observed campaign will form part of a movement, but a movement will often involve a significant amount of activity that is not highly visible to outside observers and that may not actually produce the highly visible resistance tactics that characterize a campaign.

Campaign strategy or *campaign type* refers to the primary set of methods by which a campaign seeks to achieve its objective, while *tactics* refers to specific actions undertaken in the course of a campaign. A *violent* campaign is marked by the primary use of various violent tactics and essentially results in a civil war,[5] while a *nonviolent* (or *civil resistance*) campaign utilizes primarily nonviolent resistance tactics such as strikes and protest marches.[6] I also

[3] I will stress that the most important element of this definition is continuity rather than maintenance of the same demand(s); organization of the Iranian Revolution, for example, was conducted by an alliance of primarily democratic reformists and Islamists, and the demands and direction of the resistance changed over time (Stempel 1981; Rasler 1996).

[4] This distinction is commonly made in the nonviolent resistance literature (see, for example, Ginkel and Smith 1999), and extending it to violent campaigns is useful (consider again Castro's carefully planned leadership of the Cuban Revolution).

[5] Terrorism is basically "defined out," as the data I use consider only "major" campaigns, the definition of which almost precludes the inclusion of terrorist campaigns. Excluding terrorism makes sense, though, because terrorism relies exclusively on coercion (whereas rebellions can defeat a regime by force), terrorists are generally at least perceived as radicals, and terrorism is a "weapon of the weak" that is unlikely to work (See Pape 2003 and Abrahms 2006).

[6] See Schock (2003), Sharp (1973), Chenoweth and Stephan (2011), or King (2007) for more

call the former *rebellion*. Some may note that this definition deviates from some definitions of the word, but it does so in order to resolve two important linguistic-conceptual problems—namely, it is problematic to designate "civil war" a strategic choice, as civil war is an observable phenomenon that may result from the strategic choice to use violence to resist a regime, and there are not concomitant verbs or nouns that concisely define civil war initiation or participants.[7] However, "Rebellion," "to rebel," and "rebels" are easily accessible terms that generally connote civil war, and so I associate them with primarily armed political resistance despite occasional broader usage.[8]

It is important to note that primarily nonviolent campaigns may still be accompanied by a significant amount of violence: "no struggle has ever been entirely nonviolent or military in nature" (Sutherland and Meyer 2000, 270). The term "civil resistance" generally connotes nonviolent tactics such as those mentioned above, and when speaking about campaign *tactics* I maintain that usage, but *strategically* speaking my usage of "civil resistance" includes campaigns where violent acts occur—so, for example, a strike would be a tactic of civil resistance, but the use of bombs might accompany a campaign that *primarily* utilized nonviolent methods, and that campaign would still be designated as primarily nonviolent. Readers thus should thus not construct a pristine vision of nonviolent civil resistance; a nonviolent strategy may refer to a somewhat chaotic mass/popular uprising in which violence may play a significant role[9]—though violence need not necessarily play a large part and in

detail on methods of nonviolent resistance.

[7]Some might use the term "insurgency" and the accompanying "insurgents," but insurgency refers to irregular, asymmetrical (often called guerrilla) warfare, which is but one of several "technologies" of rebellion (Kalyvas and Balcells 2010).

[8]This usage is also employed by other political scientists such as Kalyvas and Balcells (2010) and Petersen (2001).

[9]Once again, the Iranian revolution provides an excellent example. Though strikes, boycotts,

fact may damage a nonviolent campaign's chances of success (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011; Sharp 1993). Finally, it is also important to note that tactical crossover also goes both ways: armed action often accompanies revolution, but nonviolent civil resistance action may accompany rebellion. The defining feature is the primary method of resistance utilized.

What Do we Know?

The civil war literature has analyzed in depth the question of when rebellions occur, but disputes and gaps in knowledge still exist. One of the earlier scholars of the subject, Gurr (1970), argues that rebellions occur when people encounter deprivation relative to their expectations. Horowitz (1985) writes that ethnically divided societies will be plagued by conflict for a host of reasons, among them intergroup competition for power and control of state resources. A tradition that includes Huntington (1996) holds that conflict often occurs due to cultural factors, one of the strongest being religion.

Influential quantitative work at first found many of these formulations to be unsubstantiated. Fearon and Laitin (2003) find that ethnic or "grievance" factors do not cause conflict; instead, poor and weak states enable rebellion, which, in these poor states, may offer lucrative opportunities for potential recruits. Collier and Hoeffler (2004) find similar results, and they argue that the presence of capturable, lucrative "primary commodities" in a country further increases the likelihood of civil war. However, Wimmer, Cederman, and Min (2009) and Cederman, Wimmer, and Min (2010) use new, improved data to show that political and economic discrimination against ethnic groups does lead to rebellion. In addition, Fearon and Laitin (2011), in a different study,

and demonstrations formed the core of opposition activity (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011), significant violent activity by extremists in several cities resulted in a loss of government control in those cities well before the Shah was overthrown (Stempel 1981).

argue that certain population distribution dynamics can lead to civil war, and Toft (2003) makes a somewhat similar argument. Extant scholarship thus agrees that rebellions often occur where they are "feasible" (Collier, Hoeffler, and Rohner 2009), but a consensus around how ethnic factors impact civil war has yet to be reached.

In contrast, studies of civil resistance seem to be much more process oriented.[10] Sharp (1973) lays out the mechanisms by which civil resistance operates. Ackerman and Kruegler (1994) and Schock (2005) compare the factors that lead to success and failure in different nonviolent movements. Many scholars examine the development of nonviolent resistance movements, but they tend to do so through the use of models where desire for change is assumed and the primary obstacles are collective action problems (Tilly 1978; McAdam 1982; Denardo 1985; Chong 1991; Lohmann 1994; Kuran 1995). Consideration of why dissidents might choose civil resistance as opposed to rebellion is markedly absent from this literature, just as the converse is absent from the civil war literature.

Comparison of the outcomes attained through the two strategies has begun to occur. Gamson (1990) argues that violence is often associated with successful resistance campaigns. On the other hand, Ackerman and Duvall (2000) argue that nonviolent campaigns promise better odds of success and better long-term outcomes than violent ones. Karatnycky and Ackerman (2005) also find that the type of revolutionary transition that occurs affects the outcome. In perhaps the first large-N analysis of the subject, Chenoweth

[10]The civil war literature has produced quite a lot of work on civil war dynamics (e.g., Wood 2003; Cunningham 2006; Kalyvas and Kocher 2007; Weinstein 2007; Lyall and Wilson 2009) and outcomes (Kaufmann 1996; Walter 1997; Walter 1999; Fortna 2008) as well, but the focus here is on campaign onset.

and Stephan (2011) concur with Ackerman and Duvall on both counts: nonviolent campaigns promise better odds of success, and they lead to more stable and democratic long-term outcomes.

What is missing from these studies, however, is an account of when one type of movement arises rather than the other. Perhaps nonviolent campaigns occur under favorable conditions and the results above are biased. Perhaps different campaign types occur for entirely different reasons and cannot be compared. Perhaps they occur for very similar reasons and nonviolent strategies are much more effective than violent ones; the point is, we do not really know.

This paper aims to prompt discussion on this issue by establishing some broad empirical trends associated with both types of campaigns. For rebellions, much similar work has been done, but the novel perspective of this paper claims to provide some additional insights. For civil resistance campaigns, this empirical analysis is perhaps the first of its kind. The paper thus answers one research question—when do campaigns of each type occur—but it has multiple related aims: to push scholars to conceive of the two resistance strategies as potential alternatives, to further our understanding of when rebellions occur, to establish some broad trends relating to the onset of major civil resistance campaigns, and to compare the factors that lead to each type of campaign. As a result, it sacrifices depth for breadth, but the sacrifice is one that is necessary at this point in the research agenda.

Campaign Strategy

This paper is motivated by two ideas. Firstly, like Chenoweth and Stephan (2011) and other scholars of nonviolent resistance, I conceive of civil resistance and rebellion as two essentially equal strategies[1] that are used to achieve political change. In contrast to, inter alia, Petersen (2001), I argue that nonviolent resistance is not a limited form of resistance where rebellions cannot develop or have not developed but rather a powerful, independent strategy of political resistance. Following from this conception is the important notion that the two strategies may in fact be *competing*; while they are not necessarily mutually exclusive, either conscious choice or momentum may drive a movement toward a particular campaign type. Dissident energies are generally directed toward one or the other,[2] possibly because of resource limitations, possibly because the strategies are just used in somewhat different contexts, and/or possibly because simultaneous employment of both strategies may obstruct a campaign's chances of success.[3] Returning briefly to examples mentioned previously, the Cuban Revolution succeeded through rebellion despite significant efforts to mount a civil resistance campaign, while the Iranian Revolution succeeded through nonviolence after an attempted insurgency had been largely defeated. In these opposite cases, both decisions on the part of the dissidents and campaign momentum resulted in an emphasis on one of the two strategies, underscoring the importance of determining when these potentially competing strategies will be used.

[1] In terms of categorization; of course, the authors just mentioned argue that they are not equal in their abilities to achieve results.

[2] There are only four cases in the NAVCO dataset where separate violent and nonviolent campaigns are initiated in the same country in the same year.

[3] The latter is argued by many scholars of nonviolent resistance, who hold that "maintaining nonviolent discipline" is often crucial to building a potentially successful campaign (Sharp 1973 and 1993; Van Inwegen 2006; Chenoweth and Stephan 2011).

Secondly, I argue that comparing the success potential of each of these strategies, while a valuable endeavor, requires first understanding when each type of campaign develops precisely because the two strategies are in competition. Particularly if one views campaign strategy as a conscious, planned choice on the part of dissidents, failing to account for that choice in any analysis will produce a skewed understanding of the difficulties associated with and odds of success of each strategy. In addition, resistance campaigns are, relatively speaking, rather rare: "We would find that only the tiniest fraction of the events that are said to make revolutions inevitable actually predated an uprising or insurrection, however pitiful or short-lived" (Denardo 1985, 17). As a result, the relevant universe of cases for determining which method of resistance is more effective (if, in fact, one is generally superior) is *potential* campaigns, not observed campaigns. This problem is of particular concern because, if campaign initiation and strategy are dependent upon context, analyzing only observed campaigns may also skew our understanding of the processes involved. Answering the central research question of this paper—when do violent resistance campaigns arise, and when do nonviolent resistance campaigns arise?—is thus crucial to evaluating the strategic potential of each campaign type.

Indeed, I hypothesize that it is the case that one or the other strategy develops organically or is strategically selected (more on this distinction will follow shortly) for very particular reasons; although it would seem the two types of campaigns develop for similar reasons—generally speaking, in response to corrupt, discriminatory, or nonresponsive political institutions—*which type* of campaign develops is likely highly dependent upon context rather than random chance. This proposition is grounded upon the differences between the

two strategies: because the strategies rely on somewhat different mechanisms to achieve success, certain situations will be more conducive to a particular strategy. It also implies that the strategy with greater potential for success is generally instantiated in observed campaigns, as people generally act with at least bounded rationality when faced with these sorts of alternatives.[4] Understanding the obstacles that each strategy faces as well as the advantages each has therefore forms an important element of understanding when each is used.

Before moving to specific theoretical propositions, it is helpful to quickly lay out the broad mechanisms, advantages, and obstacles of each campaign type, as these inform more specific hypotheses. Nonviolent revolutionary campaigns achieve success by undermining a regime's ability to govern through the removal of consent for its continued tenure, and they may be aided by defections of regime elements that perceive the campaign as legitimate (or perhaps the likely victor) (Sharp 1973). Their advantages lie in this latter phenomenon of "conversion" and their ability to attract greater numbers of participants due to their less extreme tactics (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011). Unfortunately, "successful revolutions necessarily involve the breakdown or incapacitation of states" (Goodwin 2001, 24), and in civil resistance campaigns "the rulers' will is thwarted in proportion to the number of disobedient subjects, the extent of noncooperating institutions, and the degree of the rulers' dependence upon them" (Sharp 1993, 95), meaning that a campaign that does not "recruit a

[4]Incorrect perceptions of strategic utilities might mean that dissidents do not choose the best option in every case, but it seems that dissidents would generally have enough information about the context in which they reside that this problem would arise only rarely. Intrinsic value placed on strategic type might also have an effect, but in this case it seems highly unlikely that committed dissidents would often jeopardize the chances of movement success based on methodological preference, and it is not clear that one of the strategies would be favored by such a preference anyway (some might prefer nonviolence on moral grounds while others might be committed to guerrilla-oriented theories such as that of Mao Zedong, where the countryside "encircles" the cities).

robust, diverse, and broad-based membership" (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011, 11) will have difficulty succeeding. Maintaining high participation levels may be difficult if the government is able to repress effectively (Lichbach 1987; Van Inwegen 2006). More important, however, is the fundamental problem of collective action that precedes and often prevents nonviolent resistance (see Chong 1991); people must first be able to share information regarding their revolutionary preferences, which may be difficult under a repressive regime, and once that is accomplished they still must organize the masses and convince them to act in the face of the potential dangers of repression (Kuran 1989 and 1995). Collective action at levels significant to overthrow a regime also requires relative unity of opinion—the aforementioned "high proportion of disobedient subjects." As a result, powerful nonviolent resistance campaigns may have a fairly high probability of success once they are launched, but initiating them can be a very difficult task indeed, or in some instances perhaps impossible.

Violent campaigns have their own obstacles and advantages. Rebels try to achieve success through displacing, incapacitating, eliminating, or coercing the regime (Bond 1994), although coercion will not be very useful for "maximalist" objectives.[5] Rebel odds of success are thus highly dependent on military capacity relative to the regime. This fact may be a tremendous advantage or a severe disadvantage for a violent strategy, depending on context. Of course, rebels also suffer from collective action problems; however, given that rebel groups generally have relatively few members (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011; Kalyvas and Balcells 2010; Collier 2000; Butler and Gates 2009) and they can

[5]Coercion is a difficult endeavor for actors in diverse situations, from the Allies in World War II to the Palestinians in Israel. See Pape (1996 and 2003) and Abrahms (2006).

easily send highly visible signals to potential recruits (Seidman 2001), they may not be as bad. Furthermore, disincentives to participate may be mitigated by the imposition of hardships on nonparticipants by the government (Kalyvas and Kocher 2007), and social pressures may also improve campaign participation (Humphreys and Weinstein 2008). Finally, lower participation is again both an advantage and a disadvantage for rebel groups. It means fewer individuals in direct opposition to the regime, and it will likely result in decreased legitimacy for the campaign, but rebel groups are also more likely to succeed with fewer participants: successful violent campaigns in the NAVCO data have one-twentieth the median peak membership of successful nonviolent campaigns. This means that they need not have overwhelming popular support or participation to achieve victory, which may be a critical advantage in a divided or highly repressive society. Violence thus has its own set of advantages and disadvantages as a campaign strategy.

The difficulties of collective action and the plausibility of success for each strategy should thus impact the type of movement that arises in a particular context (if in fact one does arise). This general framework underpins many of the more specific theoretical propositions that follow in the next subsection. First, however, one final point is in order: this paper remains agnostic as to whether campaigns, as I wrote previously, "develop organically or are strategically selected." Some authors favor a rational choice-based model of dissident decision making with regard to campaign strategy (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011; Ginkel and Smith 1999), while others argue that revolutions sometimes develop fairly spontaneously (Lohmann 1994). I contend that both hold weight in certain instances but that the distinction is not terribly relevant to the broad approach I take to my research question; my theoretical

framework argues that particular contexts are conducive to a particular strategy prior to campaign initiation and that rational dissidents will choose the strategy that appears most likely to succeed. Bounded rationality and the issue of whether strategy is selected or organic might impact a few cases, but they should not confound broad trends.

Now, we turn to some specific hypotheses regarding these broad trends. These hypotheses are generally informed by the civil war and civil resistance literatures, but the competition framework presented here hopefully leads to some new insights. Generally speaking, what motivates one type of resistance should motivate the other, but what facilitates one type of resistance should lead to a *decrease* in the prevalence of other: if one strategy has a relative advantage in a certain context, the other should have a relative disadvantage.

Theoretical Propositions

When analyzing decisions to oppose and attempt to fundamentally alter political regimes, the character of those regimes seems the best place to begin. The literature commonly uses three categories to designate political types: democracies, autocracies, and anocracies (also known as mixed regimes because they are marked by some democratic characteristics and some autocratic ones). I will use these, but I will introduce a fourth type: anarchies. This category includes cases where states have failed, are occupied, or are new to the international system (and thus have no institutional history to "grade"; furthermore, these states tend to be somewhat unstable). Oftentimes these cases are lumped together with anocracies for expediency, but I contend that this is inappropriate because by definition they are not anocracies. However, they do share common characteristics—instability, uncertainty about the future, and often a lack of public order—that make placing them in a single new

category a justifiable choice.

Theoretically, democratic regimes intrinsically offer their populations access to institutional power. If people dislike regime policy, they can simply vote an opposition party into power. As a general rule, democratic citizens will thus have little reason to attempt to fundamentally alter the regime, especially through extra-institutional channels. However, previous literature has not found a robust relationship between civil war onset and democracy (Fearon and Laitin 2003; Collier and Hoeffler 2004). The first theoretical hypothesis therefore follows, with the qualification that like-minded scholars have not found stable evidence that it is true regarding rebellion.

H1: Both resistance types will be less prevalent in democracies.

Anocracies and autocracies both infringe upon the political rights of their populations without offering institutional recourse, thereby creating motive for resistance. Because they are more authoritarian, autocracies probably generate more antipathy. On the other hand, the highly repressive nature of autocracies may make collective action against them exceedingly difficult (Zunes 1994; Hegre et al. 2001; Muller and Weede 1990), while the unstable nature of anocratic institutions may provide "political opportunities" that make them more susceptible to resistance movements (see Tarrow 2011; McAdam 1982; Goodwin 2001). Vreeland (2008) also argues that, because a certain amount of political violence leads to the characterization of a state as an anocracy, we should fully expect to see a greater amount of high-level political violence in anocracies. Two partially contradictory hypotheses result.

H2a: Due to the instability associated with anocratic regimes, both types of resistance will be more likely in anocracies than in democ-

racies or autocracies.

H2b: Due to the highly repressive nature of autocracies, nonviolent resistance will be more feasible, and thus most likely, in anocracies; however, dissent in autocracies will therefore find its outlet through violence. Because political violence is intrinsic to anocracies, rates of violent resistance may be high in both anocracies and autocracies.

The prediction for anarchies is much more clear: government weakness and potentially easily acquired spoils for rebel groups will increase the likelihood of rebellion in anarchies, but the lack of a centralized government to oppose will decrease the odds of nonviolent resistance.

H3: Anarchies will be characterized by high rates of rebellion but low rates of civil resistance.

The idea that opportunities for rebels lead to rebellion is one that is well established in the civil war literature, and theories tend to focus on both governmental weakness/inability to respond effectively to rebellion and the payoffs and/or opportunity costs that rebels with/without financial opportunities might find in insurgency (Fearon and Laitin 2003; Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Sambanis 2004; Collier, Hoeffler, and Rohner 2009). Government capacity and rebel opportunities are often jointly proxied through the use of the variable GDP per capita. I follow this practice, and I likewise expect rebellion to decrease as GDP per capita rises. However, because dissent must still find an outlet in relatively wealthy countries, because rebellion will be difficult, and because populations in wealthier countries will have more to lose, I expect that—controlling for regime type—nonviolent resistance will be positively associated with GDP per capita.

H4: As GDP per capita rises, violent resistance will decrease and nonviolent resistance will increase.

For the same reasons, other measures of military strength may have similar effects.

H5: As other measures of military capacity rise, nonviolent resistance will increase and violent resistance will decrease.

Another potential indicator of state military capacity is the urbanization of a country's population, as more concentrated populations may be easier to observe and control (Collier and Hoeffler 2004). Urbanization thus may lead to a decrease in violent resistance. More importantly, however, urbanized populations should have greater capacity to produce nonviolent resistance campaigns; population concentration will increase the potential turnout for tactics like mass demonstrations, and it will also lead to grassroots networks with more/closer ties. Not only are well-developed networks an important element of resisting repression in civil resistance campaigns (Siegel 2009), but they also may help in getting the campaign off the ground. Urbanization thus may be an important predictor of nonviolent campaigns.

H6: Urbanization will be positively associated with nonviolent campaigns and negatively associated with violent campaigns.

Larger populations may also be hard to monitor effectively, meaning that population size may increase the risk of rebellion—and, indeed, other scholars find this proposition to be true (Fearon and Laitin 2003; Collier and Hoeffler 2000 and 2004; Sambanis 2004). At the same time, large populations may increase collective action problems for nonviolent campaigns. Olson (1965) argues that the severity of collective action problems increases with group

size, essentially because it is simply harder to get a larger group of people to cooperate. In addition, larger populations will tend to be dispersed among a greater number of cities, and coordinating between locations will also be difficult. Simple wisdom thus dictates that larger populations will be negatively associated with civil resistance campaigns. On the other hand, Esteban and Ray (2001) show formally that larger groups may have collective action advantages under certain conditions. In addition, the increased difficulty of monitoring larger populations may enable civil resistance campaigns as well, and greater numbers of people to march with may increase the a priori perceived probability of success while decreasing the probability of government sanction for participation (meaning that individuals are more likely to participate). We are thus left with competing hypotheses:

H7a: Larger populations will be positively associated with rebellion and negatively associated with civil resistance.

H7b: Population size will be positively associated with rebellion but will have a positive or inconsistent effect on civil resistance.

Potentially one of the most important factors in determining campaign type is time period. Nonviolent resistance appears to have been a highly effective strategy over the last century, but this is an odd fact given that its historical footprint is far smaller than that of rebellion. However, I argue that there are very good reasons for this phenomenon. Firstly, the high military capacities of modern states make rebellion less and less attractive as time progresses, and nonviolent resistance will thus increase in relative utility at the same time. Of course, controlling for military capacity should eliminate this effect, but it is not the only reason that time should favor nonviolent resis-

tance. Secondly, the global diffusion of democratic norms and the growth of civil society have likely produced populations that are more politically conscious, politically active, and politically demanding of the state; the idea that the state belongs to the people is a relatively new one in many corners of the globe, but it is an idea that may have a strong connection to mass political participation—and, as Chenoweth and Stephan (2011) argue, the masses will be more enthusiastic about a nonviolent strategy. Thirdly, the study and committed use of nonviolent resistance strategies by scholars and major historical figures in the last century has undoubtedly improved their efficacy; not only do historical precedents and academic treatments provide dissidents with information about how to practice nonviolent resistance more effectively, they also expose populations at large to civil resistance tactics, priming them for employment of a revolutionary strategy that they may not have understood (and therefore may have resisted) a century earlier. Thus, as these historical precedents accumulate over time, effectively mobilizing populations for and properly employing nonviolent resistance strategies should become easier.

Finally, technological advances can greatly aid nonviolent campaigns. Social media platforms can facilitate both anti-regime discourse and the unprecedentedly rapid organization of huge masses of people; messages can be sent instantaneously across long distances and to a large number of people at once, and online anonymity enables sharing and may make repression of anti-regime discourse difficult. Populations are thus empowered by technology to overcome the collective action problems that previously formed one of the greatest barriers to nonviolent action (and success). Furthermore, advances in personal media devices may increase backlash against repressive regimes. Backlash occurs when non-participating, neutral, or even regime-friendly civilians become

more opposed to a regime as a result of its harsh policies against other civilians (Lichbach 1987; Khawaja 1993). Devices such as cell phone cameras can easily capture and spread images or videos of harsh repressive action by security personnel; this dissemination of footage provides much more solid proof of regime abuse than does rumor, but the often-harsh visual images also may cause a stronger emotional response for many viewers than hearing or reading about such an event would. Additionally, these media can be much more easily spread online to foreign populations, which may pressure their own governments to take action. Technological advances and time thus provide many advantages to nonviolent resistance strategies, and Hypothesis 8 results:

H8: The progression of time will be strongly associated with the prevalence of nonviolent resistance strategies. As a result, the prevalence of rebellion may decrease with time.

Given the strong effect expected by H8, will rebellion eventually become an obsolete strategy? I expect that it will not, which is why the latter part of H8 reads "the prevalence of rebellion *may* decrease over time." While nonviolent resistance should continue to become a more and more powerful tool for the reasons discussed above, there are certain cases where violent resistance strategies will continue to play a major role: cases of divided societies.

The relationship between ethnic divisions and civil war has been a hotly debated one. Posen (1993) argues that ethnic groups may become antagonists due to fear of and an inability to trust the other. Horowitz (1985) argues that severely divided societies may turn to violence for many reasons, including the remediation of group inequalities and/or hierarchies. Petersen (2002) shows that emotions play a role in producing inter-ethnic violence. However, quantitative work shows that ethnic heterogeneity alone does not cause civil war

(Fearon and Laitin 2003); rather, it is political exclusion, which often does fall along ethnic lines for some of the reasons that the scholars above mention, that is the more immediate culprit (Wimmer, Cederman, and Min 2009; Cederman, Wimmer, and Min 2010). Ethnicity seems to matter, but the picture is complex and still emerging.

Treating violent and nonviolent resistance as competing strategies will hopefully shed light on this debate: I expect that divided societies will be more likely to produce a rebellion than a civil resistance campaign. This expectation rests on not only "intangible" factors but also a rational assessment of the mechanisms of each resistance strategy. Just as the general limitation of political rights will likely lead to resistance, group-based limitation of political rights should also lead to resistance. However, theorists of nonviolent resistance stress that widespread, socially diverse participation is a crucial factor in achieving success through that strategy (Sharp 1973; Chenoweth and Stephan 2011; Zunes 1994); unfortunately, mobilizing a broad-based movement is probably highly unlikely in cases where political exclusion occurs on an ethnic basis. Zunes (1994) writes that "suppressed ethnic minorities...would have particular difficulty winning the support of majority sectors against government repression thanks to widespread popular prejudice" (420). In line with the frameworks that Horowitz (1985) and Posen (1993) present, these majority (or minority-in-power) sectors might often even support ethnic oppression on the grounds that it protects them or provides them with benefits.[6][7] Either way, social groups excluded from political power on the basis of group

[6]These arguments are also supported by the work of Bates (1983) and Gellner (1983).

[7]As a side note, important regime elements such as the military may also be resistant to conversion by a nonviolent campaign in a society where one ethnic coalition controls the government for any of these reasons.

membership are unlikely to have the popular strength required to accomplish a revolution through nonviolence, and they will therefore often turn to violence to achieve their aims.

H9: When only a portion of the population is excluded from power, it will be forced to rely on rebellion as its political resistance strategy, as the potential for a broad-based civil resistance movement will not exist. Civil resistance will be more likely when levels of exclusion are very high.

Ethnic divisions may also have implications for collective action. Bates (1983) argues that ethnic social capital such as shared language and connections facilitates cooperation; conversely, one might imagine that ethnic divisions, especially linguistic, impede collective action. Higher levels of ethnic fractionalization (or diversity) *in exclusionary political contexts* thus may be associated with rebellion, not because ethnic differences intrinsically lead to violence but rather because coordinated nonviolent action will be more difficult when groups speak different languages and social networks are highly clustered. Also, ethnic divisions may lead to ineffectuality on the part of civil resistance due to the prejudices that Zunes mentions. At the same time, ethnic diversity has no reason to lead to conflict when political exclusion does not occur.

H10: Ethnic fractionalization will be positively associated with rebellion and negatively associated with civil resistance in exclusionary contexts.

Finally, Toft (2003), Weidmann (2009), and Fearon and Laitin (2011) argue that ethnic groups are relatively likely to engage in separatist campaigns

and/or engage in rebellion when they are concentrated in a geographical "homeland." In these cases, nationalist sentiments and discrimination may both be more salient than when ethnic groups are dispersed. Again, nonviolent resistance should be largely precluded by the divided nature of the society.

H11: Concentration of ethnic groups will lead to rebellion but not civil resistance.

Aided by the conception of civil resistance as an alternative political resistance strategy to rebellion, this section has laid the theoretical groundwork for an investigation into some broad principles regarding the question of when nonviolent resistance campaigns emerge. It has also sought, through the utilization of this conception, to improve on extant understanding of when rebellion occurs, especially in relation to ethnic factors. In the next section, I will describe the statistical tests used to evaluate the propositions presented here.

Methodology

Because this is perhaps the first-ever quantitative investigation of the question of when nonviolent resistance movements occur, and because the endeavor is complicated by simultaneous examination of rebellions, the statistical tests I employ aim to establish some very broad first principles of association rather than a detailed, complete picture. I seek merely to build a partial, general theory of when populations turn to one strategy or the other; in the real world, the complexities and dynamics of any conflict make each case different, but general trends offer a useful starting point. This section describes the approach I take in my regression analysis.

In many ways, I mirror the practices of much of the quantitative literature on civil war onset. The question of how to account for campaigns that do not occur is a difficult one; I follow many scholars in the field by using the country-year as my unit of observation. Each independent country of the world will be represented in the data one time for each year that it exists in the time period that the dataset spans, so every country-year in essence contains a potential resistance campaign. Variables of interest are often measured on the same basis, so this decision is practical. The data sources that I have drawn from have determined that the time period under examination is 1946-2005 and the countries included have a population of at least 1,000,000 and an area of at least 500,000 km^2. These constraints produce a dataset including 155 states with a total of 7155 observations.[1]

The dependent variables of interest are the onset of rebellions and the onset of civil resistance campaigns. I code these as separate dichotomous

[1]These constraints imposed by forming the data around the Ethnic Power Relations (EPR) dataset produced by Cederman, Min, and Wimmer (2009).

variables. Because it is perhaps the only data on nonviolent campaigns in existence, and in order to maintain consistency, Chenoweth's (2011) NAVCO 1.1 dataset provides observed cases of these variables—that is, the campaigns that the NAVCO data describes are designated violent or nonviolent, and each of these campaigns is coded a "one" in the appropriate one of my two dependent variables (although campaigns that occurred as resistance against a foreign power have been removed per the earlier discussion). While definitions of violent and nonviolent campaign observations are not exactly equivalent, as violent campaigns are generally defined in the literature according to the number of deaths they produce (and powerful nonviolent campaigns may never produce any deaths), Chenoweth attempts to ensure that these definitions are as analogous as they can be. Violent campaigns are defined according to the relatively conservative criterion of producing "a thousand battle deaths during the course of the conflict," and any "major" nonviolent campaign, determined by extensive research and consultation with experts, is included. Coding of these onset variables is thus ostensibly comparable.

Model selection was difficult. Given the theoretical framework, wherein the two strategies compete with one another, multinomial logit regression was a very attractive choice (where the dependent variable is categorical—outcomes could thus be violent, nonviolent, or neither, juxtaposing the dependent variables against each other). Unfortunately, the strategies are not absolutely mutually exclusive: there are four instances in the NAVCO data where a rebellion occurs in the same year as a civil resistance movement begins. If there were more cases where both occurred, a fourth dependent variable category for dual onset might be included, but dependence upon the few cases that actually exist would make regression results highly unstable. As a result, I

have chosen to use parallel versions of normal logit models. Each model utilizes one of the two dependent variables, but in every case the same set of independent variables is used to build and present a parallel model with the alternative dependent variable. In this way, I can still test the hypotheses presented in the previous section, and I can seek to provide indirect evidence that factors associated with one strategy may decrease the probability of the other strategy's use. Unfortunately, however, direct evaluation of the effects of the relative favorability of each strategy on the other's likelihood of use cannot be measured via this method.

Independent variables were drawn from a number of different sources. Dichotomous variables for each regime type were built using the Polity IV index (Marshall, Jaggers, and Gurr 2011), which gives states a composite score between -10 and 10 based on several different dimensions of political openness, higher scores being more democratic. States with scores between -10 and -6 I placed in the category of autocracies, states with scores between 6 and 10 became democracies, states with scores in the middle were designated anocracies (or mixed regimes), and states that lacked scores for various reasons—they might have just gained independence, they may have experienced a period of state collapse, etc.—were placed in the category of anarchies. Traditional practice has not utilized this last category, but I deem it more appropriate than lumping these states together with anocracies because they are not anocracies any more than they are autocracies or democracies; they are states which have no recent history of stable independent governance. Use of this additional category permits us to capture the high level of instability that anarchies embody, and, as I argued in the previous section, there are theoretical reasons to suspect that this type of state will have its own distinct relationship with the depen-

dent variables. Thus, the designation of anarchies seems a very appropriate one.

In modeling, polity measures are lagged one year because they are measured at the very end of the year for which they are recorded. Anocracy is used as the baseline category because it lies at the center of the others (it relates to anarchy, which perhaps exists in a separate dimension, through its instability). However, as mentioned previously, Vreeland (2008) shows that use of the anocracy category can be potentially problematic when studying the onset of rebellion. Though this issue should not affect the models of civil resistance, I attempt to evade it by sometimes reducing the polity categorization to democracies and non-democracies, under the assumption that political resistance is motivated by lack of access to institutional power. The expectations with these variables are that democracy will have low levels of both types of resistance, nonviolent resistance will be more likely in anocracies than autocracies, and anarchies will have very high rates of rebellion but low rates of civil resistance.

LOG GDP PER CAPITA is based on 1985 constant dollars and drawn from Fearon and Laitin (2003), who use economic growth rates to estimate missing figures for which economic data is not widely available. Estimating figures for these countries is superior to omitting them from consideration because the missing data would be highly nonrandom (nonreporting was generally a function of Cold-War politics), and it could therefore bias the results. While these data may not be precise, they should be in the ballpark of the true figures, and minor differences will be rendered even more insignificant by my use of the log scale. I log the figures (after transforming them from a thousands scale to a ones scale) because the data are highly nonlinear (rich countries are much,

much wealthier than poor countries); this avoids according wealthier countries inordinate weight in the regression. For years that occur after the Fearon and Laitin data end, I use growth rates from the World Development Indicators (World Bank 2012) to build forward in time from the previous figures. I also use data from Balcells and Kalyvas (2012), who use similar methods, to fill in some further gaps. Again, GDP per capita is expected to be negative in the rebellion models and positive in the civil resistance models.

Many different indicators of state military capacity are also used. One is the log of the percent of a state's territory that is covered by mountains (LOG % MOUNTAINS); mountainous terrain ostensibly enables insurgents by allowing them to hide from the government (Fearon and Laitin 2003). This variable is drawn from Fearon and Laitin (2003). Others include the number of military personnel in thousands (MILPER) and the Composite Index of National Capability (CINC) score, which considers a number of dimensions of state power; both of these were taken from the COW NMC Data. The most interesting measure of military capability included is the proportion of a country's population that lives in urban centers (PROPURBANPOP; constructed from figures in the NMC Data; urban center defined as a principality with at least 100,000 people; variable on a scale of 0 to 1), because, as discussed in the previous section, this variable also has direct implications for nonviolent movements. All of these variables are expected to have a negative association with rebellion, and therefore perhaps an indirect positive association with civil resistance, but proportion urban population is directly expected to have a positive association with civil resistance.

Population figures are drawn from the Correlates of War National Material Capabilities (COW NMC) Data (Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey 1972) and the

Penn World Tables (Heston, Summers, and Aten 2012). Once again, total population is logged due to severe nonlinearity. Population is expected to associate positively with rebellion, but extant theories predict different effects on civil resistance campaign onsets; the results will hopefully help us adjudicate between these theories.

Time is modeled as the number of years that have passed since 1945. Another choice that might have been appropriate for rebellion only might have been a dummy variable for the Cold War, but that would not have properly drawn out the effects of the very strong prediction that nonviolent strategies will become increasingly useful with time. One of the most important hypotheses of this paper is that nonviolent resistance will increase with time; as a result, rebellion should decrease.

In order to account for some measure of historical experience, a regional factor variable is also included. While each country's experience will be unique, countries within the same region tend to share many similar characteristics. This categorical variable also forms a crude control for spatial diffusion effects as well as the argument that certain cultures may tend toward violence (e.g., Huntington 1996). While I do not propose any a priori hypotheses regarding this variable, finding predispositions for any region will provide an interesting avenue for future investigation. The categorization is taken from Fearon and Laitin (2003), and regions include the West, the former Soviet bloc, Latin America, Sub-Saharan Africa, North Africa and the Middle East (later abbreviated as Middle East), and Southern and Eastern Asia (just called "Asia").

Other important controls are also included. A dummy variable is included for an ongoing campaign of each type; ongoing campaigns could signal state weakness and therefore opportunity for other groups of dissidents. Alterna-

tive dissidents with prior ideological commitments especially might initiate a campaign of the other strategic type—a failing strategy of one sort might pave the way for them to attract recruits to their new method.

In the civil war literature, "peace years," the number of years that have passed since a country was last embroiled in civil war, is often used. However, there are two problems with this variable. Firstly, it has little to do, theoretically, with civil resistance campaigns. Secondly, and more importantly, the variable is left-censored. Most instances of which I am aware do not measure the variable all the way back to the independence of each nation (in some cases, such a year might even be impossible to establish); instead, they measure to the year that forms the first in the data. Thus, the first year that the United States enters the data will be treated the same as the year after a several-decade war in some other country, and this is obviously immensely problematic. Furthermore, newly independent states will also lack a history of peace years. While they will almost certainly be less stable than states with a long-established history, newly acquired statehood is not a condition that is theoretically similar to post-war-hood. I therefore do not employ peace years as a variable.

Instead, I include several other measures of political instability. The first of these is the anarchy category itself; this category marks presently collapsed or new regimes. A second, broader measure of instability (INSTABILITY) is a dichotomous variable which indicates whether the state was characterized as an anarchy or underwent a change in its polity score greater than or equal to three within the last two years. I also use coups to attempt to measure instability.[2] A short-term measure, RECENT COUP, is a dichotomous vari-

[2]Data is from the INSCR Coup Data (Marshall and Marshall 2012), although I have built

able indicating whether a coup has occurred in the country in the last five years. A longer-term measure, COUP PROP, contains the number of coups that have occurred in a country divided by the number of years which have been observed for it so far in the data. Through the use of multiple potentially relevant controls, I attempt to account for several dimensions of ongoing political instability.

"Ethnic" variables are taken from the EPR data. H9 is addressed through the use of the variable PROPEXCLPOP, which measures the proportion of the population that is excluded from access to central power in a state.[3] Because I predict that middle levels of exclusion will lead to rebellion while very high levels lead to more civil resistance, I also include a quadratic term for this variable. The expectation is thus that the linear terms will both be positive, but the quadratic term will be negative for rebellion and around zero for civil resistance.

To address H10, I interact the level of ethnolinguistic fractionalization (ELF)[4] with PROPEXCLPOP and PROPEXCLPOP^2. The idea is that when some middling proportion of the population is excluded in a fractionalized context, that exclusion is likely ethnically based; thus, diversity should have little effect on conflict when there is no exclusion, but it should increase the probability of rebellion when exclusion exists. When exclusion is very high, however, it is unlikely to be ethnically based (everyone is equally excluded), and an ethnic rebellion is unlikely. Instead, civil resistance should be the strategy of choice. On the other hand, high levels of fractionalization may impede civil collective

the variables.

[3]This variable is called EXCLPOP in the EPR data.

[4]This index, which runs from 0 to 1, essentially measures the probability that two randomly selected people from a given country will belong to the same ethnic group.

action in highly exclusive contexts and lead to rebellion as a result. Of course, interpretation of these coefficients will not be straightforward and will require more detailed explanation, but I expect that higher levels of fractionalization will lead to rebellion rather than civil resistance when levels of exclusion are high—instances where civil resistance might otherwise be expected.

To assess the impact of the territorial concentration of ethnic groups, I create a count variable of the number of regionally concentrated ethnic groups in each country-year, NCONCGROUPS, from the GeoEPR dataset (Wucherpfennig et al. 2010). Groups included are those described as "regionally based" or "regional and urban" by the GeoEPR data. To control for the sheer number of ethnic groups that exist in a country, I also include the EPR count of the total number of groups in that country. Ostensibly, total number of groups should not matter, but more concentrated ethnic groups will lead to more rebellions.

Finally, to account for potential bias due to serial dependence of country observations, I run random effects models that assign random intercepts to each country. The results do not change, and the country intercepts are not large either: the *largest* variance in country intercepts in any of the core models is less than .13, with the others having substantially less variance in country intercepts. Serial error correlation thus should not be an issue. Now, we turn to the models themselves.

Results and Discussion

Table 1 shows the first three logit models for each type of campaign onset. The models for civil resistance are displayed on the left side of the table, and the models for rebellion are displayed on the right. As one can see, corresponding models of each strategic type (e.g., 1NV and 1V) contain exactly the same variables as a sort of indirect test of the idea that what increases the likelihood of one strategy decreases the likelihood of the other. Model 1 includes the core structural variables, and Model 2 introduces the rest of the non-ethnic variables—although several of the instability and military capacity measures mentioned in the previous section did not have any effect; it made little sense to include discussion of several similar, insignificant variables, and so these have been excluded.

Model 3 does three things. It trims off some more of the controls that have no effect for the sake of parsimony, it switches the baseline category for the region factor in order to help draw out the regional effects, and it reduces the regime-type categorization to a distinction between democracies and non-democracies, a step that is taken for several reasons.[1] Firstly, the complications noted by Vreeland (2008) regarding the anocracy category (and my anarchy category would undoubtedly be included) makes the full categorization of regime types potentially problematic; reducing the distinction to democracies and non-democracies attempts to draw out the effect that popular access to institutional power has on the probability of a resistance campaign onset without being confounded by comparison with a category that is intrinsically defined by a certain level of political violence. Secondly, generally speaking, fewer variables are better in a regression (as long as the regression

[1]None of the results change if the full polity categorization is included.

is not being biased by an omitted variable). Thirdly, proportion excluded population, which will be used in the next set of models, is theoretically correlated with autocratic regimes. It therefore makes sense to reduce the polity categorization to one that minimizes correlation with this other independent variable, and it is helpful to do it before that variable is included to show that results do not change.

The massively different intercepts between the rebellion (v) and civil resistance (nv) models show that, generally speaking, rebellions have occurred more often between 1946 and 2005.[2] Of course, one can easily see that in the NAVCO data, which contains 217 violent campaigns and 106 nonviolent ones[3]; still, this is an important factor to note, because, if one accepts that dissidents act relatively rationally, it indicates that either nonviolent campaigns are much harder to initiate or they are perceived to have lower odds of success in many contexts. Regression intercepts rarely receive much attention, but in this case they demonstrate that the question of *when* different campaign types occur is crucial to understanding when and why they succeed.

As expected, democracy shows a very strong negative association with nonviolent resistance: in a fairly average scenario for the year 2000 in model 3NV,[4] the predicted probability of a civil resistance campaign onset drops from .0361 to .0044 when a country is coded as democratic as opposed to

[2]While a direct comparison of the two coefficients is not conducted, the 95% confidence intervals for the intercepts only barely overlap in Model 2. In all other models they are far apart.

[3]Though not all of them are included in this analysis, as anti-occupation and anti-colonial campaigns have of course been excluded.

[4]The scenario used throughout this section is that of an anocratic (or non-democratic, where applicable) Latin American country in the year 2000 with no civil war ongoing and all other variables taken at their means. Variation is given on the variable in question at any time (in this case, polity). The scenario is not meant to represent any particular country; it simply uses the baseline polity type with a middle-of-the-road region in a year that is somewhat intuitively appealing.

Table 1: Logistic Regressions of Observed Campaigns by Type on Country-Level Variables

	NONVIOLENCE MODELS			VIOLENCE MODELS		
	1NV	2NV	3NV	1V	2V	3V
(INTERCEPT)	-13.74***	-13.56***	-15.31***	-4.07***	-5.91***	-3.90***
	(1.62)	(2.28)	(2.01)	(1.28)	(1.78)	(1.44)
DEMOCRACY	-2.39***	-2.25***	-2.14***	-0.80***	-0.49	-0.33
	(0.46)	(0.51)	(0.48)	(0.31)	(0.31)	(0.29)
AUTOCRACY	-0.15	0.05		-0.56**	-0.55**	
	(0.26)	(0.27)		(0.23)	(0.23)	
ANARCHY	-15.28	-15.02		0.52*	0.62**	
	(550.10)	(536.74)		(0.30)	(0.30)	
LOG GDP PER CAPITA	0.27**	0.17	0.26	-0.59***	-0.53***	-0.60***
	(0.14)	(0.21)	(0.20)	(0.11)	(0.14)	(0.14)
LOG POPULATION	0.49***	0.42***	0.41***	0.27***	0.30***	0.31***
	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)
LOG % MOUNTAINS	-0.12	-0.12		0.14*	0.12	
	(0.10)	(0.10)		(0.07)	(0.08)	
PROPURBANPOP	0.16			0.19		
	(0.30)			(0.20)		
YEARS SINCE 1945		0.03***	0.03***		-0.01	-0.01
		(0.01)	(0.01)		(0.01)	(0.01)
NONVIOLENT ONGOING		-0.25			0.47	
		(0.49)			(0.45)	
VIOLENT ONGOING		-0.38	-0.43		-0.65**	-0.57*
		(0.38)	(0.37)		(0.30)	(0.30)
(POST-)SOVIET BLOC		0.96	2.00***		0.91	-0.73*
		(0.75)	(0.63)		(0.73)	(0.42)
LATIN AMERICA		0.83	1.76***		1.26*	-0.10
		(0.74)	(0.65)		(0.66)	(0.34)
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA		0.22	1.40**		1.15	-0.49
		(0.90)	(0.70)		(0.73)	(0.33)
ASIA		0.61	1.61**		1.18*	-0.30
		(0.79)	(0.66)		(0.68)	(0.33)
MIDDLE EAST		-1.02			1.52**	
		(0.93)			(0.69)	
WEST			0.83			-1.40**
			(0.91)			(0.69)
N	6922	6923	6923	6922	6923	6923
AIC	777.99	760.51	762.35	1129.4	1128.6	1140.2

Two-Tailed Significance Levels: *.1 **.05 ***.01
Standard Errors in Parentheses

non-democratic, an 88% decrease. For rebellion, however, the coefficient for democracy is only statistically significant in model 1V (though the sign is "correct" in all of them). Despite very strong statistical support in the core model, controlling for region and ongoing civil war leaves the variable insignificant. H1 is thus essentially supported: popular access to institutional power significantly decreases the odds of civil resistance, but the evidence that it decreases the odds of rebellion is not robust. Collier, Hoeffler, and Rohner (2009) argue that rebellion is more about "feasibility" than motivation, but it seems highly unlikely that rebellion occurs without any motive. Perhaps rebellions occur in democracies precisely because certain fringe groups cannot get their needs satisfied and, due to lack of broad support, they therefore rely on rebellion rather than civil resistance—for example, Chenoweth and Stephan (2011) demonstrate that separatist groups *overwhelmingly* rely on rebellion when they confront the government through extra-institutional means, and these groups are socially restricted by definition.[5] This is a proposition that remains unsubstantiated, but it is one worth investigating further in the future.

The relationships between autocracies and anocracies and resistance types are less expected. The probability of a civil resistance campaign onset in an autocracy is not significantly (or substantively) different from that in an anocracy. This finding refutes the "political opportunity" argument; the relatively

[5]Separatist sentiment is confined to a segment of a population; though some members of the non-separatist portion of society might support separatist aims (some Israelis supported Palestinian independence during the First Intifada, for example, although many also opposed it—see King 2007), governments are often highly resistant to separatist demands (Toft 2003). It also seems unlikely that many citizens would be willing to incur the costs of resistance to promote someone else's political goals when selfishly motivated collective action is so difficult. Not all separatist movements need to rebel, as some are accommodated by their host governments—consider the current case of Scotland—but the NAVCO data shows clearly that those that are not accommodated *do* overwhelmingly rebel.

more "open" structures of mixed regimes do not generate higher levels of civil resistance. It also indicates that the key distinction for nonviolent movements is in fact that between democracies and non-democracies—civil resistance campaigns occur when civilians do not have access to power. On the other hand, autocracies are less prone to rebellion than anocracies, which Vreeland (2008) expects as a result of the way the variables are coded. The unexpected result regarding rebellion is that the probability of rebellion does not appear to be fundamentally different between autocracies and democracies (theoretically speaking—as mentioned previously, other work has obtained similar results). Perhaps, as discussed above, this is because severe dissent in democracies is actually relatively likely to turn to violence—it seems that there must be some motivation for rebellion; "feasibility" cannot be the only part of the equation. This statement seems especially true given that the regressions clearly show that popular access to political power is a crucial element in determining when civil resistance campaigns develop. This polity difference between rebellions and civil resistance provides another interesting avenue for further research.

H3 was wholly confirmed. Anarchies are even more violent than anocracies—which indicates that previous polity formulations were even more biased toward anocratic rebellion—and they basically never lead to civil resistance. The coefficients in the nonviolent models are not technically statistically significant (they have massive standard errors), but this is probably because a civil resistance campaign *never occurs* under anarchic conditions in the data, exactly as expected (there is no regime to resist).

As expected by H4, LOG GDP PER CAPITA leads to a severe decrease in the probability of rebellion. On the other hand, while the sign is correct for the civil resistance models, the statistical significance of the coefficients is not

robust; once we control for time and region, the significance of the effect drops out (though, curiously, it does not change much substantively). The magnitude of these effects in Model 3 is shown in Figure 1 below. The bold lines show the predicted effects according to the scenario used previously, while the hashed lines show confidence intervals—or, perhaps, prediction intervals, as the plot shows predicted probabilities of campaign onset instead of the coefficients themselves. The latter have been constructed by using the two bounds of the 95% confidence intervals of the coefficients in question to make predictions instead of the predicted coefficient itself; these predictions form the edges of the shaded regions. The bounds of the x-axis are equal to the most extreme data points in the set. The plot shows that the effect of increased wealth on the probability of rebellion is tremendous; poor countries are at very high risk, while rich countries are at extremely low risk. It also shows, however, that the results for the nonviolence models, while not always statistically significant, are still substantively strong. As a result, the lack of statistical significance does not allow us to reject the null hypothesis that wealth has no impact on civil resistance, but we also should not interpret the test as indicating that wealth has no impact; we cannot *accept* the null hypothesis as scholars sometimes (improperly) do. Regarding wealth and nonviolent campaigns, the test is inconclusive.

H5, however, was generally not otherwise supported. LOG % MOUNTAINS is significant at the 10% level in the core rebellion model, but it drops out entirely once other controls are introduced. The NMC military capacity index (CINC) and number of military personnel (MILPER) did not prove significant (not shown in Table 1). Perhaps most surprisingly, PROPURBANPOP is not significant in either model (H6 is therefore also not supported).



Figure 1: Probability of Campaign Onset by Log GDP per Capita

It also is not of much substantive significance due to its smaller coefficient and much smaller scale as a variable compared to LOG GDP PER CAPITA, which makes more credible the assertion that it "does not matter." In light of these findings, it seems that financial opportunity is at least as important as state weakness in driving rebellion. On the other hand, these variables do not appear to have much of a relationship with civil resistance; the implication is that some rebellions, at least, are largely opportunistic, whereas civil resistance perhaps arises from political factors alone.

H7B is strongly confirmed: larger populations increase the probability of both kinds of resistance. It appears that the difficulties governments have in controlling larger populations outweigh the collective action problems potentially associated with them. Perhaps in the information age, especially, the

obstacle of distance is overcome by technology. The effects of population are tremendous, too, especially for civil resistance campaigns: as Figure 2 below demonstrates (using the same baseline scenario), a country the size of the largest in the data is predicted to have a likelihood of nonviolent campaign onset *25 times* larger than a country the size of the smallest in the data. One should also note that, while the lower bounds of the prediction intervals look to be approximately zero, large effects occur here as well; the difference is still that of a factor of 8 for the same change.



Figure 2: Probability of Campaign Onset by Population

Table 1 and figure 3 show strong confirmation of half of H8: the probability of a civil resistance campaign increases massively with time—520% between 1946 and 2005 for our scenario, to be exact. Although the simple time variable used here cannot adjudicate between the theoretical factors wrapped up in-

side it—technological advances, learning from previous campaigns, etc.—this is an important point. It indicates that nonviolent resistance is becoming more used, but, if one accepts that dissidents are rational, *it also demonstrates that nonviolent resistance is becoming more useful*. This finding has implications both for academia and the wider world: for the former, it means that comparative analysis of rebellion and civil resistance must take into account the evolution of strategic realities over time, while for the latter it indicates that we can continue to encourage the use of nonviolent resistance tactics and hope to reduce the amount of conflict in the world in the future.



Figure 3: Probability of Campaign Onset by Year

The sign for rebellion, on the other hand, is in the expected direction, but it is not significant. Though rebellion may be increasingly less useful in the future, there will perhaps be cases that are always susceptible to violence; as

I have argued above, divided societies may be one of those cases. The recent Libyan civil war demonstrates that dictators may hold onto power no matter the potential costs, and they may receive support from significant portions of their populations. The absence of a significant relationship between time and violent campaigns, however, raises another question when considered in light of the positive relationship between time and nonviolent campaigns: is the prevalence of major political resistance generally on the rise? An affirmative answer is suggested by these findings, and this is a proposition that demands more research on the questions of this paper.

The other controls in Table 1 also show some significant results. Perhaps against expectation, extant war decreases the probability of a new rebellion. One would expect that more potential rebels, sensing state weakness, might join the fray. However, the negative association might simply be an artifact of the coding scheme—that is, additional rebel groups may often be coded as part of the same campaign as long as they hold some of the same general objectives (multiple campaigns are typically not coded for multiple groups). Still, ongoing civil war seems important to control for. NONVIOLENT ONGOING does not appear significant and is therefore removed.

The regional controls convey more information. The Middle East is the region least prone to civil resistance and most prone to rebellion, although it would be interesting to see how recent events affected that result. The West is also the least likely to suffer a rebellion, even controlling for wealth and polity type; while the Middle East result might be due to the "resource curse," this latter result suggests that cultural factors and/or regional environment do in fact matter. Wealth reduces the probability of conflict by a lot, but wealth alone does not preclude rebellion.

Table 2 shows the results of the regressions used to assess hypotheses 9 and 10—two of the "ethnic" hypotheses. The variables used to evaluate H11, the number of ethnic groups and the number of regionally concentrated ethnic groups, did not appear significant and were not included. However, this is again not a finding that ethnic concentration does not matter, only an inconclusive result—especially since a raw count of the number of concentrated ethnic groups in a country is by no means the only way to measure the potential effects of ethnic nationalism and/or grievance. None of the previous results change.

With regard to rebellion, the exclusion variables behave exactly as expected: the linear term is positive and the quadratic term is negative, indicating an inverted-U-type relationship between exclusion from power and rebellion. The substantive effect is demonstrated in Figure 4 below (prediction intervals can no longer be shown because of the quadratic term). However, it is somewhat puzzling that PROPEXCLPOP has no significant impact on the probability of civil resistance campaign onset; theoretically, the inverted-U result for rebellion should go hand-in-hand with a linear, increasing result for nonviolent resistance. Thus, this is at once a tremendously important finding, as it strongly supports the idea that divided societies will engage in rebellion rather than civil resistance, and a problematic one, as the second portion of the theoretical prediction in H9 is not substantiated.

Finally, Model 6 tests for H10, which considers the interaction of political exclusion and ethnic diversity. Once again, the coefficients in the nonviolence models are not significant, but the rebellion results are highly significant and exactly what we expect. These coefficients are next to impossible to interpret on their own, so Figure 5 will assist in the endeavor.

Table 2: Logistic Regressions of Observed Campaigns by Type with Ethnic Variables

	NONVIOLENCE MODELS			VIOLENCE MODELS		
	4NV	5NV	6NV	4V	5V	6V
(INTERCEPT)	-14.47***	-14.34***	-14.58***	-4.01***	-5.51***	-4.56***
	(1.65)	(2.24)	(1.69)	(1.26)	(1.79)	(1.29)
DEMOCRACY	-2.38***	-2.26***	-2.40***	-0.37	-0.46	-0.40
	(0.43)	(0.50)	(0.43)	(0.28)	(0.31)	(0.28)
AUTOCRACY		0.04			-0.52**	
		(0.27)			(0.23)	
ANARCHY		-15.03			0.57*	
		(543.56)			(0.31)	
LOG GDP PER CAPITA	0.16	0.16	0.18	-0.57***	-0.54***	-0.54***
	(0.14)	(0.20)	(0.14)	(0.11)	(0.14)	(0.12)
LOG POPULATION	0.51***	0.46***	0.50***	0.26***	0.29***	0.25***
	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.06)
YEARS SINCE 1945	0.03***	0.03***	0.03***	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
VIOLENT ONGOING	-0.45	-0.36	-0.49	-0.52*	-0.63**	-0.61**
	(0.37)	(0.38)	(0.38)	(0.29)	(0.29)	(0.29)
PROPEXCLPOP	-2.75	-2.88	0.22	3.70***	3.00**	10.77***
	(1.77)	(1.82)	(4.95)	(1.25)	(1.25)	(3.58)
PROPEXCLPOP^2	2.28	2.97	-7.69	-4.19**	-3.15*	-12.73***
	(2.47)	(2.56)	(9.06)	(1.73)	(1.74)	(4.74)
ELF			-0.01			1.37***
			(0.53)			(0.50)
ELF*PROPEXCLPOP			-4.57			-13.24**
			(7.26)			(5.45)
ELF*PROPEXCLPOP^2			14.71			16.07**
			(12.26)			(7.24)
(POST-)SOVIET BLOC		1.08			0.75	
		(0.75)			(0.73)	
LATIN AMERICA		0.86			1.15*	
		(0.74)			(0.67)	
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA		0.44			0.86	
		(0.88)			(0.74)	
ASIA		0.60			1.08	
		(0.79)			(0.69)	
MIDDLE EAST		-0.83			1.36**	
		(0.93)			(0.69)	
N	6906	6906	6906	6906	6906	6906
AIC	768.52	758.44	771.42	1118.5	1111.2	1115.3

Two-Tailed Significance Levels: *.1 **.05 ***.01
Standard Errors in Parentheses



Figure 4: Probability of Campaign Onset by Excluded Population

Figure 5 demonstrates the effects of PROPEXCLPOP when ELF is held constant at different, evenly-spaced levels, and it mostly shows the relationship we expect: the inverted-U shapes of the curves show that violence is most likely when a middling portion of the population is excluded from power and there is a moderate level of ethnic fractionalization. In these cases, it is likely that the exclusion is ethnically based, and so rebellion is the strategy of choice. At very extreme levels of ELF, however, we essentially see a monotonically increasing relationship between PROPEXCLPOP and probability of rebellion (the ELF=1.00 curve isn't quite monotonic, but given that we are attempting to describe a very complex relationship with only a few terms, the curves will not be perfect—this one seems to demonstrate a relatively monotonic positive association). This is expected when ELF is extremely high, as



Figure 5: Probability of Rebellion by PROPEXCLPOP at Different Levels of ELF

nonviolent collective action is theoretically more difficult. It is not entirely expected when ELF=0, as I predicted that high levels of exclusion would have a greater tendency to lead to nonviolent resistance in the absence of ethnic complications. However, it is not a severely problematic finding; it is not a theoretical stretch to imagine that increased levels of exclusion lead to more violence, even when that exclusion is not ethnically based. Also, the effect of exclusion when ELF=0 is substantively comparably small. More puzzling is the fact that PROPEXCLPOP and ELF had no significant relationship with civil resistance campaigns.

Conclusion

This paper has attempted to do three things. Firstly, it provides a novel quantitative analysis of when civil resistance campaigns occur. Secondly, it uses theoretical insights generated by the conception of rebellion and civil resistance as competing strategies to make and test some new propositions regarding the onset of rebellions. Thirdly, it compares the relationship between the two resistance strategies with regard to certain broad factors.

While evidence was not found for all of the theoretical propositions presented in this paper, several interesting new relationships were established. It was shown that major civil resistance campaigns are much less likely to occur in democracies, where the population generally has access to institutional power, and rebellions are most likely to occur in anarchies, a new but useful polity category. Like the bulk of the civil war literature, higher wealth was associated with a decrease in the probability of rebellion, but there was also some evidence that it leads to an increase in the probability of civil resistance, though that evidence was not robust. Larger populations, against some conventional expectations, are also strongly associated with civil resistance campaign onsets; population size does not seem to increase collective action problems. Time is strongly associated with an increase in civil resistance campaigns. For reasons that cannot be pinned down specifically through the use of a simple regional control, the West was associated with the least rebellion and North Africa and the Middle East was associated with the most rebellion and the least civil resistance, even controlling for polity type and wealth. Other regions fell somewhere in between. Middling levels of political exclusion were associated with rebellion, and interaction with ethnolinguistic fractionalization suggested that ethnically based exclusion, especially, leads to

rebellion.

Perhaps the two most important results are the final one described above and the relationship between civil resistance and time. I have argued that there are strong theoretical reasons to believe that civil resistance strategies will continue to be very useful in the future, as the world becomes increasingly connected and technology makes government action increasingly transparent. This argument has two implications: civil resistance strategies should be promoted in the future, but scholars should also recognize that civil resistance as a strategy has never been quite as effective as it is today—the evolution of strategic context must be considered if we are to properly understand the subject. At the same time, rebellion will remain an important strategy of political resistance, perhaps especially in divided societies. The relatively quick attempt to establish this principle that was presented here cannot be considered ironclad evidence of it, but it is suggestive enough to warrant further investigation. Much quantitative work in the last decade has argued that ethnic social divisions do not lead to violence, but this paper provides another small piece of evidence that ethnic divisions do lead to violence in certain contexts—specifically, it argues that ethnic groups that are excluded from state power will rebel because they have no strategic alternatives. Hopefully this insight can help to focus the continuing research agenda on the relationship between social divisions and conflict.

Generally speaking, evidence that what facilitates one campaign leads to a decrease in the other type of campaign was not strong. Coefficients were sometimes consistently in the right direction but not statistically significant (log GDP per capita, for example). The implication could be one of several things. Firstly, perhaps civil resistance and rebellion do lie on the same

spectrum of resistance types and are therefore not competing; scholars of nonviolent methods would, however, likely dispute that proposition vehemently. Secondly, perhaps there are cases where the strategies are competing, but perhaps there are also cases where one of the types of resistance arises from factors that do not contribute to the other. In particular, the civil war literature has found that rebellions may often be driven by opportunism; the same sort of opportunism does not really exist in nonviolent campaigns,[1] so direct statistical converse relationships may be confounded by this difference in causes. Thirdly, perhaps the data structure is not optimal for analysis of this question; while attempting to account for non-observations is important, the country-year method is a rough approach which does not account for the early dynamics of a campaign—it is possible that, as in the Cuban case, campaigns might not eventually proceed by the method initially intended. Delving into the strategic thought processes of dissidents as campaigns evolve, most likely through personal interviews, is a potentially lucrative avenue for future research.

Many of the findings presented here do, in fact, present only a rough cut of a research agenda for which much more detailed work is needed. Do dissidents actively contemplate which strategy to use, and what other factors might impact their decisions? Are the theoretical propositions presented here regarding the increasing prevalence of civil resistance correct, and do they mean that the efficacy of civil resistance is also on the rise? Do cultural factors matter? These are all questions on which more detailed work is needed, and that work needs to bridge the divide between fields. To properly understand one method of

[1]Looting may sometimes occur in the process of a civil resistance campaign, but nonviolent campaigns rarely, if ever, have personal financial opportunity as a primary driving factor.

political resistance, it is necessary to understand its alternatives.

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