Browsing by Subject "Clientelism"

The literature on clientelism has extensively covered the direct exchange of private goods for political support between voters and politicians. Yet, patronage does not end with the distribution of food, medicine or public employment. In poor informal settlements, access to a sanitation system or clean drinking water is often mediated by local politicians.Therefore, the interaction between slum politics and the provision of Local Public Goods (LPG) is quite relevant and requires further study.

This dissertation explains the variation in infrastructure and public services in shantytowns as a function of social capital. Well-connected communities --with stronger ties among its members-- solve collective action problems, improving slum dwellers' quality of life. The linking mechanism between social capital and LPG is electoral coordination (bloc-voting). Neighbors agree for a common electoral strategy at the slum-level, which translates into an effective mechanism to demand for improvements in their locality (``good-type partisan homogeneity'').

Alternatively, isolation among slum dwellers deteriorate their access to and quality of LPG. Under the absence of social capital, when slum-level electoral behavior appears to be homogenous, it is likely signaling political clientelism and not community-led coordination. Ultimately the ``bad-type partisan homogeneity'' represents the inability of slum dwellers to enforce electoral accountability and sanction unresponsive governments. I test my hypotheses with survey data from Udaipur (India) and eight provinces in Argentina.

Public opinion tools are used to look at voter motivations to engage in clientelistic practices and their variation across structures of competition.

This dissertation investigates how politically-expedient decisions and resource constraints create winners and losers on the path toward development, focusing on slum evictions, public recordkeeping, and public health crisis response. This manuscript extends findings from prior scholarship on the politics and consequences of redistribution to understand decision-making in the context of urban informality and Covid-19 crisis response in India. I combine survey data with webscraping and remote sensing techniques to study why some urban slums were evicted while others were left intact; which areas experienced underreporting of Covid-19 mortality; and where government directed limited Covid-19 vaccine stocks. I find evidence that greater local economic activity was associated with evictions, that Covid-19 mortality counts were lower in areas aligned with the ruling coalition, and that Covid-19 vaccination supplies were strategically directed to areas of electoral importance to the ruling coalition. Taken together, these findings show that, even during crises, electoral incentives shape policy.

Businesspeople are a highly represented occupational group in the governments of many countries. What electoral strategies do these businessperson politicians employ that afford them high electoral success? In a context where non-programmatic electoral strategies are common and when faced with strong constraints on the utilization of personal, party, and public resources for distributive purposes, I argue that businessperson candidates' access to private sector resources provides them with an alternative set of distributive resources that can be used to pursue political support, thereby granting businessperson candidates with an electoral advantage over other occupational groups.

Businessperson candidates are able to distribute private sector jobs to build an army of political workers who can provide political services. To test my arguments, I conducted list experiments with 986 employees in firms of businessperson candidates in Thailand. I find that employees in firms of businessperson candidates provide political services such as voting for the businessperson candidate, attending rallies, persuading acquaintances to support the businessperson candidate, and distributing goods and services produced by the firm to voters. Businessperson candidates, however, face a risk of shirking by patronage employees once hired. To overcome the commitment problem, I find that businessperson candidates rely on monitoring and negative inducements, in the form of employment termination threats, to mobilize these patronage employees to provide political services.