Browsing by Subject "property rights"
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Item Open Access Community‐based conservation strategies to end open access: The case of Fish Refuges in Mexico(Conservation Science and Practice, 2021-01) Quintana, ACE; Basurto, XItem Open Access Mobility of Common-Pool Resources and Privatization of Land Tenure in the Argentine Semi-Arid Chaco(Conservation and Society, 2008) Altrichter, Mariana; Basurto, XavierDuring the last few decades there has been a strong tendency towards privatisation of land tenure to increase protection and sustainable use of natural resources. We assess this approach in the context of land privatisation in a dry region of the Argentine Chaco where low income peasants depend on multiple common-pool resources (CPRs) to survive and where most recently privatisation of land tenure has also included large absentee landowners. We hypothesise that the results of such policies depend in part on the mobility of the resources in question, and compare the harvesting practices of CPRs of varied mobility before and after the conversion of land to private property to assess the effects of privatisation. We found that privatisation by low income peasants increased control of access to stationary and low mobility CPRs but highly mobile species continued being used as open access and over-exploited. In contrast, the later privatisation of land by large absentee landowners is likely to pose serious threats to the conservation of the ecosystem in general, and to the ability of low income peasants to maintain their livelihoods in this region.Item Open Access Unbundling the Relationship between Authoritarian Legislatures and Political Risk(British Journal of Political Science, 2014-07) Jensen, N; Malesky, EJ; Weymouth, StephenA strong statistical association between legislative opposition in authoritarian regimes and investment has been interpreted as evidence that authoritarian legislatures constrain executive decisions and reduce the threat of expropriation. Although the empirical relationship is robust, scholars have not provided systematic evidence that authoritarian parliaments are able to restrain the actions of state leaders, reverse activities they disagree with, or remove authoritarian leaders who violate the implied power-sharing arrangement. This article shows that authoritarian legislatures, by providing a forum for horse trading between private actors, are better at generating corporate governance legislation that protects investors from corporate insiders than they are at preventing expropriation by governments. The statistical analysis reveals that the strength of authoritarian legislatures is associated with corporate governance rules and not expropriation risk. Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2013.