Citizenship Configuration and Public Opinion towards Out-groups in the European Union

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<u>Abstract:</u>

This paper examines the sources of public opinion towards out-groups (including ethnic minorities and immigrants) in the European Union, using Eurobarometer data from the November-December 2006 survey on Social Reality, E-Communications, Common Agricultural Policy, Discrimination and the Media, and Medical Research. In particular, it investigates one national-level explanatory variable of interest– the state's policy-based citizenship configuration (either segregationist, assimilationist, multiculturalist or universalist) based on a framework expounded by Koopmans, et al in *Contested Citizenship: Immigration and Cultural Diversity in Europe*. The study uses a hierarchical ordered logit model, analyzing over 25,000 individual responses from 25 different countries, in order to ascertain the effect that living under a particular citizenship configuration has on an individual's attitude towards out-groups. Results, though mixed, indicate nominal support for the hypothesis that respondents in segregationist and multiculturalist countries exhibit higher tendencies towards positive opinions of out-groups than respondents in assimilationist countries. This finding has important implications for policymakers attempting to redress negative public opinion towards out-groups in their country.

I. Introduction:

As it strides into the second decade of the twenty-first century, Europe faces a social crisis of daunting proportions. The changing face of the Union has become a highly contentious topic, with much political capital at the local, regional and national levels expended towards addressing the new social realities of the continent. Concurrently, xenophobia and hate crimes have become pressing issues for Europe to deal with, particularly in the wake of the financial crises of the late 2000s. Indeed, the question of how to define the boundaries (external and internal) of European society has cropped up in many salient issues – the admission of Turkey to the European Union, for example.

Recent developments from the continent have also underscored this important trend and highlighted the shortcomings of the current modes of thinking in European societies. The political successes of right-wing politicians such as Geert Wilders in the Netherlands and Jean-Marie Le Pen in France exposed a strong current of anti-immigrant sentiment in Europe. In late 2008, a series of violent attacks on migrants in Italy prompted a flurry of debates in the National Parliament on whether the country was facing a "racism emergency." (Donadio 2008) Similarly, in June 2009, a wave of attacks on the Roma community in the United Kingdom resulted in one hundred members of the community being flown out to Romania. (Alberici 2009) As similar news poured in from other countries across the Europe, policy-makers undertook a wave of soul-searching.

Faced with increasing accounts of rising anti-immigrant sentiment as well as alienation from the mainstream on the part of minorities themselves, politicians called for a re-examination of national philosophies and policies long taken for granted. In France, President Sarkozy called for a nation-wide series of town-hall meetings designed to serve as

forums for a national debate on what it means to be French in the 21st century. Ostensibly designed as a renewed debate on French republicanism and traditions, the initiative quickly sputtered to a halt due to the expression of anti-Muslim sentiment. (Bonaventure 2010). In Germany, Chancellor Angela Merkel opined in 2010 that Germany's efforts to create a multicultural society had "utterly failed," and that immigrants should do more on their end to integrate. (Weaver 2010) One year later, British Prime Minister David Cameron expressed a similar belief – that "state multiculturalism" had failed Britain by fostering extremism within British society. (BBC 2011) In all of these cases, a groundswell of negative public opinion prompted debate at the national level on important questions of national identity as well as the official government position on citizenship and integration.

The notion of "state multiculturalism" is quite illuminating – it hints at the significant impact of government policy on such vague notions as national identity and culture. The underlying implication is that government policy is both a reflection of long-held philosophies underlying the concept of citizenship, as well as an instrument that can maintain these philosophies in national discourse. Distilling this notion of "philosophies of citizenship" into a framework usable for research, the authors Koopmans, Statham, Giugni and Passy outline an algorithm for classifying countries on the basis of their policies on citizenship and integration, in their book, *Contested Citizenship: Immigration and Cultural Diversity in Europe.* (2005) This system of classification implies an underlying philosophy to each of the four categories (termed "citizenship configurations) – assimilationist, segregationist, universalist and multiculturalist.

The Koopmans work examines the effect of these citizenship configurations upon claims-making and collective action by groups in the political sphere on issues pertaining to

integration. A claim, in this context, may be an initiative to ban Islamic dress in the public sphere (as France recently debated). The authors conceptualize this relationship by theorizing that these citizenship configurations create opportunities (institutional and discursive) for certain types of claims and political actions to flourish, while discouraging others. They thus seek to explain why certain political movements related to integration arise while others do not. Why, for example, would a proposal to ban minarets be viable in one country and untenable in another?

This study is motivated by the same question, but approaches the problem from a different, but related angle. It operates under the assumption that political movements arise not only because of available opportunities in the political sphere, but also because of public opinion tending to be in favor of certain claims. Based on this insight, it seeks to explain public opinion towards out-groups as a function of these citizenship configurations promulgated through government policy. Thus, this study opens up a new dialogue with the Koopmans work by theorizing an alternate way in which citizenship configuration could ultimately affect the rise of political movements related to integration, through its effect on public opinion towards out-groups.

Public opinion in the European context has been much-studied, especially with respect to the perceptions of out-groups, precisely due to the frequent upswings in xenophobic political actions so alarming to policymakers. Because public opinion can so often translate into real social and political outcomes, it represents a valuable line of inquiry with respect to political action. Given the fact that citizenship configuration is currently highly contested in the European Union (as evinced by the soul-searching on the part of

leaders such as Merkel and Cameron), the question of how it may affect public opinion towards out-groups, and ultimately, political action, is of particular importance.

The independent variable in this study, citizenship configuration, refers to the constellation of national policies concerning immigration, integration and cultural rights. As outlined by Koopmans et al, it summarizes policies along two dimensions – individual equality and cultural difference – to create a four-fold classification. The researcher classified 25 European Union countries using a modified version of the Koopmans framework. The dependent variable, public opinion towards out-groups (here understood to comprise immigrants, refugees and ethnic minorities) was captured using a number of responses to certain questions on the Eurobarometer Survey (administered by the EU) on Social Reality, E-Communications, Common Agricultural Policy, Discrimination and the Media, and Medical Research from the year 2006. Units of analysis included both the individual and the country, specifying a hierarchical model, analyzed in STATA using an ordered logit regression.

It was hypothesized that segregationist, universalist and multiculturalist countries (all of which are less restrictive than assimilationist countries on at least one dimension) would demonstrate more positive attitudes towards out-groups than assimilationist countries. It must be noted that the outlined model cannot definitely prove causation in this case, but, rather more modestly, can point at a link between citizenship configuration and public opinion. As discussed further on, the results are mixed as to the explanatory power of citizenship configuration as a predictor of public opinion towards out-groups, but generally indicate that respondents in segregationist and multiculturalist societies have higher tendencies towards

expressing positive opinion towards out-groups, compared to respondents in assimilationist countries.

The remainder of this paper will provide background information, discuss the hypotheses in detail, outline the evidence and methods employed, present the results, and then discuss its implications, as well as directions for further research.

II. Background and Rationale:

Migration into the European Union

The presence of out-groups, migrants, immigrants and minorities has been a feature of European society for centuries, despite cultural conceptions of the continent as a united race (often drawn in opposition to Asia and Africa). By 2005, official Eurostat data indicated that "all countries of Western Europe (the European Union's first 15 members (EU-15), Norway, and Switzerland) [had] a positive migration balance, as [did] six of the 10 new EU Member States — Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Malta, Slovenia, and Slovakia." (Muenz 2005) This migration into European countries has occurred as a result of several historic and economic factors:

Firstly, colonization of other countries resulted in the colonized peoples being granted certain rights to citizenship in the wake of independence. This applies in the case of the British Commonwealth, the Francophone world, the former Dutch colonies, among others. These former colonial subjects often exercised their rights by immigrating in large numbers. This gave rise to the large North African minority in France and (South) Asian population in Great Britain, for example. Because of their status as former citizens of empires, they were often accorded more political rights than other types of immigrants (guest workers, for example).

Secondly, certain European countries, in response to post-war economic needs and the problems of an ageing population, recruited guest workers to revive their economy. A classic example of this phenomenon was Germany's *gastarbeiter* program, encouraging guest workers to enter the country and contribute to the economy. This was the primary mechanism by which Turkish immigrants came to be the largest minority group in Germany. Because of the supposed temporary nature of their stay, these immigrants were often not included in national dialogue on inclusion. In reality, however, many guest workers stayed on and the second and third generations of this population are now citizens of these host countries.

Lastly, many non-Europeans came to Europe as refugees and asylum-seekers. As we will later note, the historical context of immigration in a particular country has been shown to correlate strongly with the country's approach towards immigrant integration. Former colonial powers and countries which never had significant colonial holdings often pursue very different strategies in dealing with immigrant integration and the consequent revision of the ethnic-based conception of nation or citizen.

Some Determinants of Public Opinion towards Out-Groups

Various studies have been undertaken measuring public opinion towards out-groups (immigrants, ethnic minorities, refugees, etc) in Europe, ever since the first Eurobarometer survey was administered in 1973. Most have been focused on the causes and predictors of xenophobia in Europe, for numerous polls have shown high levels of negative attitudes towards out-groups, across many of the countries surveyed.

Previous studies have demonstrated links between individual level factors such as political orientation and attitudes towards the EU. Kessler and Freeman, in a paper published

in 2005 and using Eurobarometer data from 1993 to 2000, found that rightist ideology and negative attitudes towards the EU were very strong predictors of negative attitudes towards out-groups (Kessler 2005). In addition, they confirmed previous findings (by Scheve and Slaughter) indicating that age, labor market position (blue collar status) and low levels of education were correlated with higher levels of prejudice or xenophobia. Sides and Citrin found that strong feelings of cultural and national identity, economic interests and the level of information about immigration were all positive predictors of negative attitudes held by individuals. (Sides 2007)

Other studies have focused on higher levels of analysis – social groups and nation-states. Quillian, in a much cited paper from 1995, used a framework of group threats/population composition which explained that groups expressed prejudice in response to a perceived loss of privilege due to the changing relative proportion of the out-group. (Quillian 1995) This sort of Darwinistic model focused not only on the relative number of the majority and minority in the society, but the dominant group's *perception* of the growth of the minority group. The study found evidence, in a multilevel analysis using the 1997 Eurobarometer data, which supported the finding that perceived threat to the dominant group was an explanatory factor in prejudicial attitudes to immigrants and out-groups.

Kehrberg, in a response to Quillian's work, also focused on certain national variables – political tolerance and economic wealth/growth – and found support for the importance of national-level factors in predicting public opinion. More specifically, his work demonstrated that a national culture of political tolerance, trust in others and ethnic inter-mixing was positively correlated with positive attitudes towards immigrants. In addition, economic factors such as change in GNP were positively correlated with positive public opinion.

(Kehrberg 2007) In a similarly economics-focused approach, Gang et al found that Europeans who compete with immigrants in the labor market have more negative attitudes towards foreigners. (Gang 2002) By contrast, in a culture-focused national-level analysis of public opinion, Leong and Ward examined cultural value orientations (mastery, masculinity, power distance, etc) and found that countries that scored highly on certain masculine value orientations were associated with weaker support for social co-existence with out-groups. (Leong 2006) Thus both political and social cultures, as well as national economics, have been posited as predictors of public attitudes towards out-groups

Thus there appears to be little consensus in disentangling individual and group or national- level factors influencing public opinion towards out-groups. Many possible predictors have been offered; this study attempts to provide an alternative, in the form of a country's citizenship configuration. It is also likely that a more complete model should involve both individual and group/national factors, because although prejudice or xenophobia is expressed at an individual level, every individual is embedded within a particular community and nation, all milieus capable of exercising an impact. This study, in the vein of studies previously mentioned, will study individuals, but examine the role of a national-level explanatory variable in influencing their opinions. Unfortunately, due to data constraints, it cannot possibly account for all the previously proposed determinants of public opinion; an effort has been made, however, to incorporate a good number of previously-studied control variables at the individual level.

Citizenship Configuration in Previous Literature

The Koopmans framework used as the independent variable in this study is not the only published attempt to quantify the citizenship approaches of the European countries. This

framework, however, does have several unique advantages for the purposes of this study.

Early studies focused on cataloguing the citizenship regimes of countries without attempting

to classify them into general categories. For example, Dilek Cinar focused on legal

citizenship requirements in his paper "From Aliens to Citizens: A Comparative Analysis of

Rules of Transition": residency, language proficiency and renunciation or loss of previous

citizenship." (Cinar 1994) In addition, Harald Waldrauch examined citizenship by birth,

naturalization, family-related right and affinity-based acquisition in "Acquisition of

Nationality." (Waldrauch 2006)

  One significant attempt to measure citizenship configuration came out of an October

2007 study by the Migration Policy Group and the British Council – the "European Civic

Citizenship and Inclusion Index," also known as the Migrant Integration Policy Index (or

MIPEX. (available at: http://www.integrationindex.eu) The indicator involves six broad

measures affecting immigrants (comprising over 200 indicators): labor market status, family

reunion, long term residence, political participation, access to nationality and anti-

discrimination. Though a significant attempt to codify existing policies into a framework of

liberal vs. non-liberal (a ranking) –this study does not make the conceptual distinction that

Koopmans, et al make between individual and cultural group rights with respect to

integration. It merely ranks a country on a scale from restrictive to liberal, without teasing

out the nuances of how each policy is applied. Components of this study's results, however,

have been used to assemble the data for the independent variable.

  Another major attempt to create an empirical measure of citizenship configuration

came out of Marc Morjé Howard's book, *The Politics of Citizenship in Europe.* (Howard

2009) In it, he created the Citizenship Policy Index, incorporating measures of *jus soli*

(citizenship by birth in the territory), residency requirements and dual citizenship for naturalized citizens. Though a fairly simple additive index used to rank the EU countries, it aligns quite well with the previous indicator in classifying countries as more or less liberal in terms of their citizenship configurations. It also, however, suffers from the same weakness, in not being as comprehensive or as conceptually sophisticated as the Koopmans measure. Unlike the Koopmans measure, it does not attempt to distinguish policies affecting migrants on the individual level from those conferring rights on the group level, and it makes use of relatively few indicators.

Gist of the Koopmans Framework

Thus, the data for the independent variable of interest in this study – citizenship configurations – was derived by the researcher for each of the 25 EU countries in accordance with the framework outlined by Koopmans, et al in *Contested Citizenship: Immigration and Cultural Diversity in Europe.*[1] The method used by Koopmans, et al attempts to classify national policies along two dimensions: conceptions of the individual citizen (civic-territorial or ethnic, referred to as the "individual equality dimension of citizenship" in the book) and attitudes to cultural difference (cultural monism vs. cultural pluralism).

On the individual-citizen dimension, a state that espouses a civic-territorial view of the citizen is more likely to adopt a lax policy to citizenship and naturalization. This is because their view of the citizen is informed by a republican and civic notion of shared political values (democracy, etc). Such countries would have *jus solis* laws allowing for those born in the territory to receive citizenship (regardless of ethnic descent) and would be more likely to provide easier access to naturalization, through shorter residency requirements and the like. A country that espouses an ethnic-based view of the individual citizen (a view of the

citizen as a member of the national "people") would be more likely to impose stricter citizenship and naturalization laws- for example, by adopting *jus sanguinis,* or citizenship by descent, and by making the naturalization process more stringent through longer residency requirements.

On the cultural difference dimension, a country may be considered culturally pluralist if it allows or embraces the expression of group-based difference the public sphere. On the other hand, a culturally monist society may discourage cultural difference by restricting the political representation of ethnic-based organizations, imposing cultural requirements for naturalization and espousing a form of neutrality that prohibits the collecting of data on race, the outward expression of faith in the public sphere (religious symbols, for example) and affirmative action. A culturally pluralist society, by that token, would affirm the rights of groups to be different, as it were.

Having established these dimensions, it is possible to classify a country's citizenship configuration by where it falls on the two continuums. A country with an ethnic-based conception of the citizen and a culturally monist framework would be considered *assimilationist.* Such countries keep tight control over the sorts of people invited to join the state, and they do not support the expression of cultural difference among ethnic groups living within the state. Switzerland is a good example of a country with an assimilationist citizenship configuration.

A country that has an ethnic-based conception of the citizen and is culturally pluralist would be classified as *segregationist*. In other words, these countries do not welcome the naturalization of different ethnic groups into the state, but they do not interfere with the cultural self-expression of these groups. They may very well encourage education in the

foriegners' native languages in order to keep them connected to their homelands. This is often the case in countries with established guest-worker programs, such as Germany in the early 1990s, where foreigners are not expected to assimilate nor are included in the national mindset as future citizens.

A country that has a civic-territorial conception and is culturally monist would be considered *universalist.* This means that, while the standards for becoming a citizen are flexible, citizens are expected to suppress their cultural differences, especially in the public sphere. An example of the universalist configuration is in France, where naturalization is relatively easy but markers of cultural difference (religious garments such as the niqab) are frowned upon in the "neutral" public sphere.

Finally, a country that has a civic-territorial conception of the citizen yet is culturally pluralist is regarded as *multiculturalist*. Here, not only are the rules for obtaining citizenship relatively lax and not tied specifically to ethnicity, but ethnic groups within society are freely allowed and encouraged to express their differences without conforming to a republican norm. The United Kingdom and United States represent current examples of this approach.

Figure 1: The Koopmans Framework of Citizenship Configuration

III. Links between Citizenship Configurations and Public Opinion

Why examine citizenship configuration at all? Citizenship configuration, being a reflection and aggregate of governmental policies and social realities, paints a holistic picture of the national culture surrounding shared identity. Moreover, this framework, in drawing a conceptual delineation between the dimensions individual equality and cultural difference, provides a means of distinguishing between national policies in a more sophisticated manner.

This study is attempting to demonstrate a link between national policy and public opinion, which naturally involves endogeneity bias, since, in democratic nations, policies are generally the result of preferences expressed through voting for parties. One might argue that public opinion is the more appropriate independent variable. However, since the policies of 2006 have been in place in most of these countries for numerous years, the causal link cannot be reversed. More importantly, there are pathways through which it may be possible for policy to affect opinion.

For example, if integration policy was developed prior to the issue becoming of national prominence, the policies may have been drafted with little public input, perhaps in line with international norms. Adrian Favell, in *Philosophies of Integration,* introduces the notion of path dependency in integration philosophy, arguing that colonial legacy and historical precedent, having sown the roots for a particular citizenship configuration, lead the country down a certain path of policy development, which may or may not reflect public input at various points in time. Indeed, he notes that public opinion is not necessarily entirely stable: "it is picked up as an issue and blown center stage […] if a successful solution is found, the salience of the problems may decline again." (Favell 1998) Thus public opinion may come about as a direct response to the perceived efficacy of the framework or policies in

place. (Favell 1998) In *The Multiculturalism Backlash,* the authors trace a surge in negative public opinion towards multiculturalist policies and diversity in the early 2000s. (Vertovec 2010) The notion of a "backlash" in response to a policy indicates that opinion can indeed be a result of policy, in the case of events transpiring that may indicate the failure of the policy to live up to the expectations of the public.

Rather than being entirely a reaction to the successes or failures of integration policy, it is also possible that public opinion may be manipulated or shaped by it. In so far as national policies become part of the national discourse, they may reinforce or shape opinions regarding the (often rocky) integration of out-groups. In addition, since many proactive liberal policies – especially policies regarding cultural difference - involve visible measures (affirmative action, allowance of cultural symbols, the use of minorities in media), the increased visibility of out-group issues may have the effect of normalizing diversity within the native society. Given Kehrberg's evidence showing that having minority friends reduces negative opinion towards minorities, (Kehrberg 2007) the increased visibility and normalization of cultural difference found under certain integration regimes may have the effect of lowering negative public opinion. Thus it may be the case that liberal policies along both dimensions of the Koopmans framework may anticipate liberal public opinion and have a role in shaping it.

This study will use this assumption as the underlying basis for the hypothesis and model. Though the specific causal link between liberal policies, visible actions and public opinion cannot be proved using the methods in this study (or currently available data), this study nevertheless can point at important relationships between the moving parts in society and polity.

Building on the work of Koopmans et al in examining the link between citizenship configuration and political claims-making, this work can help delineate an alternative mechanism through which configurations affect political action (i.e. through the shaping of public opinion rather than providing opportunities at the national level, as Koopmans et al indicate). Results in Koopmans indicate that these citizenship configurations provide institutional and discursive opportunities for certain types of political claims to be made at the national level, therefore. If, for example, religious groups are given representative rights in consultative bodies, then they may have a more effective platform for making political claims. This would be an example of an institutional opportunity afforded under a particular citizenship framework. To provide another example, if a country does not allow religious rights within the public sphere, then claims regarding the right to wear Islamic dress will prove ineffectual in public discourse because they run counter to the national philosophy embodied by the citizenship configuration.

It is clear from the above two examples, therefore, that citizenship configuration, in so much as it works through the mechanism of opportunities, can have a powerful and significant impact on political claims-making, translating ultimately into real-world outcomes for members of out-groups. If it is also possible for citizenship configuration to influence public opinion (through the mechanisms previously outlined), then its effect on political claims-making may be doubly stronger, since it would be operating through two channels. Since claims need both motivation and opportunity in order to manifest on the national stage, a link between citizenship configuration and public opinion would address the motivation part of the equation. Thus this study provides an important missing piece of the puzzle.

IV. General Hypothesis

Given the possible links between citizenship configuration and public opinion listed above, it was hypothesized that countries on the more liberal ends of at least one of the two dimensions would have higher levels of positive public opinion towards out-groups. Specifically, this would indicate that segregationist (liberal on the cultural difference dimension), universalist (liberal on the individual equality dimension) and multiculturalist (liberal on both dimensions) countries would have higher levels of positive public opinion when compared to assimilationist countries (conservative on both dimensions). In the context of this study, this would be measured in terms of positive responses to each of the six questions regarding out-groups.

It is also hypothesized that gender will have a negative coefficient (indicating a tendency to more positive opinions from females, as shown in previous research); that age will also have a negative coefficient (that older generations will have a lesser tendency to expressing positive opinions, in keeping with previous research); that Type of Community will have a positive coefficient (that larger populations centers, because they possibly foster diverse interactions, will positively affect the tendency to express positive opinions); that home ownership will have a positive coefficient (because higher incomes have been correlated with more positive opinions); and that left-right political orientation will have a negative coefficient (because research indicates a rightist political orientation is aligned with a lower tendency to express positive opinions of out-groups).

V. Evidence and Methods

Dependent Variable – Public Opinion Towards Out-Groups

This study primarily made use of data from the Eurobarometer, a yearly series of surveys administered across the member countries of the European Union on a wide variety of topics related to social realities in the EU. The surveys are administered in person by an interviewer to around a thousand individuals per member country, generally in the official language of the country where the respondent is resident. Respondents are required to answer verbally to a series of questions posed by the interview, often with the use of visual aids. They are allowed to elaborate on their opinions or to expand on their replies where appropriate. The respondents include citizens of the European Union (EU) aged 15 and over residing in the 27 EU member countries: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Republic of Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom, plus the citizens in the two EU candidate countries: Croatia and Turkey, and the citizens in the Turkish Cypriot Community. For the purposes of this study, Croatia, Turkey, the Turkish Cypriot Community, Bulgaria and Romania were excluded.

Several questions from the 2006 Eurobarometer 66.3, administered between November and December of 2006, served as indicators of public opinion towards out-groups. In particular, this study utilized QA25: "Do you agree with the following statements:

1. People from other ethnic groups are enriching the cultural life of (OUR COUNTRY)

2. The presence of people from other ethnic groups is a cause of insecurity.

3. The presence of people from other ethnic groups increases unemployment in (OUR COUNTRY).

4. We need immigrants to work in certain sectors of our economy.

5. The arrival of immigrants in Europe can efficiently solve the problem of Europe's ageing population.

Four responses were recorded in the survey: Tend to Agree, Tend to Disagree, It Depends, and Don't Know. These responses were coded on a Likert scale with 4 representing "Agree", 3 representing "It Depends," 2 representing "Don't Know" and 1 representing "Disagree." The choice was made to categorize the "Don't Know" responses (a small fraction of the actual responses) as a 2 (despite uncertainty over the individual meaning of this response) because they represent more ambiguous feelings than the other categories.

In addition, this study examined QE3: "If on a (NATIONALITY) television channel the televised news were presented by a journalist of an ethnic minority would this make you..." Responses included: "Rather want to watch the televised news on this channel," "Rather want to watch the televised news on another channel," "Have no influence whatsoever on my choice of television channel," and "Don't Know." Similar to the previous questions, responses were coded on a Likert scale with 4 representing "Want to watch the televised news on this channel," (the strongest expression of approval for the out-group), 3 representing "Have no influence whatsoever on my choice of television channel," (the neutral position), 2 representing the small fraction of respondents who responded "Don't Know" (again, because of the ambivalent nature of this response) and 1 representing "Rather want to watch the televised news on another channel" (the strongest expression not in favor of the out-group).

These questions are all helpful in measuring public opinion because they directly address the sorts of problems (unemployment, insecurity, etc) generally attributed to the presence of out-groups in society. Moreover, the question regarding the viewing of a

minority journalist is an indirect way of measuring personal feelings towards the visibility of out-groups in mainstream society, and is thus a highly useful component in measuring public opinion towards out-groups.

It is also true that survey data has its flaws since respondents are free to construe questions as they may, disguise their true preference, or be subject to the observer effect, given that the survey is conducted in person with an interviewer. Particularly in dealing with sensitive topics such as one's views towards out-groups, these dynamics may be especially present. Nevertheless, surveys represent one of the most feasible and commonly studied ways of measuring opinion on key issues, faults notwithstanding, and are thus important to consider in any analysis of the relationship between policy and opinion.

Independent Variable – Citizenship Configurations

The independent variable of citizenship configuration was calculated in accordance with the framework outlined in the Koopmans work. This framework involves different components (policies) being aggregated into a sub-indicator, which is then aggregated into a country score for the dimension in question. Data for all 25 countries surveyed was limited and therefore certain sub-indicators or components were deleted or compressed. Every effort was made, in such cases, to find suitable proxy indicators. In addition, each country was scored based on policies in effect in 2006, the year of the Eurobarometer survey; most of these policies, however, had been in place for numerous years. The following section describes the component parts of each sub-indicator and the index (the summary score), as well as the manner of their derivation and their coding for the purposes of this study.

According to the Koopmans framework, for each component, a country is scored based on its relative position along the continuum of that dimension. A component more representative of cultural pluralism or civic-territoriality (more liberal tendencies) would be coded as a +1, while a component more representative of cultural monism or ethnic-based citizenship (more conservative tendencies) would be coded as a -1. Any intermediate would be classified as a 0. For example, a specific preference for co-ethnics in the citizenship laws would garner a classification of -1; similarly, automatic attribution of nationality to the second generation (otherwise known as *jus soli*) would merit a classification of +1. The average of the component scores would form the sub-indicator score. The average of the sub-indicator scores would form the summary score for the country's index on a particular dimension. The two summary scores – the indices on the individual equality and the cultural difference dimension – would be used to place countries on the coordinate plane, thus classifying them in the categories of assimilationist, segregationist, universalist or multiculturalist.

Though this is a relative crude measure, it provides an easy and elegant procedure for classifying the underlying philosophy behind national citizenship policies, and is therefore used in this study. Another strength of this method is that it draws from actual government polices and empirically verifiable fact in order to measure somewhat intangible concepts such as the acceptance of cultural difference. This provides us with a concrete way of measuring citizenship configurations and classifying countries based on this model.

A. The Index for the Individual Equality dimension of citizenship

The scores for this dimension were calculated from an average of three pertinent sub-indicators. Each sub-indicator was, in turn, created from components grounded in

governmental policies and hard data. The aforementioned sub-indicators were: nationality

acquisition, rights for foreign residents and anti-discrimination rights.

1. <u>Ease of Nationality acquisition</u>:

      The following components are used by Koopmans et al to create this sub-indicator:

number of years of residence before qualifying for starting a naturalization application,

whether welfare and social security dependence are considered an obstacle to naturalization,

whether there is automatic attribution or facilitated naturalization for the second generation,

the allowance of dual nationality, privileged access to nationality for co-ethnics, and actual

naturalization rates.

      For the purposes of this study, data was culled from the 2006 Migrant Integration

Policy Index (MIPEX, published by the British Council and the Migrant Policy Group).

Their aggregate index of nationality acquisition includes all of the above categories, and

assigns each country a score between 20 and 75 (using a points system which assigns higher

points to more liberal policies), as well as a rank. The countries ranking in the top third (i.e.

with the most liberal citizenship policies) were coded as +1, countries in the bottom half (the

most restrictive and ethnic-based) were coded as -1, and the remainder were coded as a 0.

2. <u>Rights for foreign residents:</u> The following two components were scored: protection

against expulsion, and voting rights. Again, data from the MIPEX report was used.

Specifically, their country scores for "security of status" measured the policies on expulsion

of foreigners. Countries, in their report were coded as either 1, 2, or 3, with 3 being the most

protective legislation against expulsion. This was recoded on the -1, 0, +1 scale for

consistency with other components. In addition, their scores for voting rights at the local level (the only level for which data was available for all countries) were used for the second component. Again, their report used a 1-2-3 coding system with 3 being assigned to countries with the most liberal voting rights for foreigners; these scores were ultimately also transformed to conform to the -1,0,-1 scale.

3. <u>Anti-discrimination rights:</u> Four components are utilized by Koopmans: provisions against racial hatred in the penal code, provisions against discrimination in the penal code, special antidiscrimination law in the civil code, and the presence of state offices dealing with discrimination complaints. For this study, the aggregate scores on the "anti-discrimination" index from the MIPEX were used, because they quantify precisely those four components. Again, countries in their dataset were scored from 20 to 100 based on their antidiscrimination policies, with more stringent protections garnering higher scores. The rankings produced from these scores were then used to assign the final score - +1 for the top third, 0 for the middle third, and -1 for the bottom third.

As mentioned previously, the average of these three sub-indicators formed the country's score for the individual equality dimension of citizenship configuration.

B. The Index for the Cultural Difference dimension of Citizenship

In the Koopmans framework, this index is comprised of five sub-indicators: cultural requirements for naturalization, religious rights outside public institutions, cultural rights in public institutions, political representation rights, and affirmative action. Unfortunately, data for several of these sub-indicators has not been collected on an EU-wide basis as of 2011. As

a result, several components from the original framework have been deleted from this study's examination of citizenship configurations. However, most of the different components and sub-indicators under this dimension align well with each other – in other words, liberal policies in one sub-indicator tend to mean liberal policies in another. Thus the components which do remain in this analysis do serve as good proxies for the omitted components.

1. Cultural requirements for naturalization: The single component for this sub-indicator measures the presence of any requirements for naturalization that go beyond a language and civics test, for example, a written test on national history, customs, politics and society, or the use of an examiner's discretion in assessing whether a candidate for naturalization has sufficiently adapted to the national culture. Again, data from the MIPEX index was used, specifically the country scores measuring this very policy. As mentioned before, their study classifies liberal policies (in this case, the absence of cultural requirements) as a 3, while countries with the most stringent requirements garner a score of 1. (Countries in the middle score a 2). This paper recoded this data to fit a -1, 0, +1 scale.

NOTE: Data on cultural and religious rights were lacking for the majority of the countries surveyed and were thus omitted from the analysis. However, in prior work by Koopmans et al, these data were found to be strongly aligned with data on affirmative action (presented below). Thus the data on affirmative action serve as a good proxy for the omitted variables. The reason that this may be the case is that both affirmative action and group cultural rights are policies involving the official recognition of enduring social groups with attendant social rights. A government which recognizes group rights on one front, therefore, would be likely to recognize rights on the other, in the interests of consistency.

2. <u>Political Rights:</u> The first component measures whether migrants are represented in local, regional, or national consultative and advisory councils. The second measures their ability to join political parties. Both of these were gathered from MIPEX data. Countries with strong representative bodies for immigrants garnered a score of 3 (recoded as +1), while countries lacking such bodies garnered a score of 1 (recoded as -1). Countries with limited representation (only at the local level, for example) scored a 2 (recoded as 0). Likewise, countries allowing migrants to join political parties scored a 3 (+1 on this study's scale), while countries forbidding this action scored a 1 (-1on this scale). Countries providing migrants with limited rights scored a 2 (0 on this scale).

5. <u>Affirmative action in the Labor Market:</u> The single component of this sub-indicator measures the use of affirmative action as a tool to promote cultural diversity in the workplace. Though the Koopmans framework measures both the private and public sector, data was only readily available on the public sector. MIPEX data was again used. Countries scored on a 1-2-3 scale with 3 representing the use of affirmative action and 1 representing the lack of such policies. Again, this scale was recoded as -1, 0, +1.

Just as with the individual equality dimension, the average of the sub-indicators scores comprises the score along the cultural difference dimension. The appendices provide the summary scores for both dimensions and all 25 countries. Based on the two scores, countries were classified into the four citizenship configurations. This final classification was treated as four separate dummy variables, i.e. one dummy variable was coded 1 for assimilationist, 0 otherwise; another was coded 1 for universalist, 0 otherwise; and so on for each classification. This variable was then applied to all individual observations made in the countries falling under that particular classification.

Individual Control Variables

This study made use of five control variables at the individual level in order to flesh out the model of public opinion. These included:

1) Self-identified leftist-rightist political orientation (D1): Political orientation has been showed in studies (Kessler et al, 2005) to be a strong individual level predictor of public opinion towards out-groups, and was thus important to include in this study. The data was coded as 1- Leftist, 2- Centrist and 3- Rightist. The few who responded "Don't Know" were excluded (this was a very small number), to preserve the simplicity of the model.

2) Gender (D10): Studies have shown that men are more likely to profess negative attitudes to out-groups than women. The data was coded as 1- Male, 2-Female, with no third option.

3) Age (D11): This was measured numerically in years (and is relevant to consider because of possible generation effects with respect to levels of public opinion).

4) Type of Community – this measures the locale in which the respondent lives. It was coded so that higher numbers reflected larger population centers – 1 for rural areas, 2 for small towns, and 3 for large towns/cities. The few who responded "Don't Know" were, again, left out of the dataset.

5) House ownership – Given that the survey did not ask respondents about their household income (a commonly studied variable in examinations of public opinion), house ownership (that the respondent was still paying for) is used as a rough proxy. This was coded as 1 if the respondent owned a house that they were paying for, 0 otherwise.

It is impossible to include all the previously studied individual variables that may have a possible impact on public opinion towards out-groups. Some variables that would

have been interesting to consider but were not feasible to examine include: racial, religious or cultural affiliation, immigration status (native, first generation, etc), level of education, actual income, party affiliation, and numerous others. The five controls picked for this study, however, represent factors previously found to be correlated with public opinion and therefore are valuable contributions to the studied model.

<u>Method of Analysis</u>

Because the dependent variables being studied are discrete and ordinal, an ordered logit model was employed to analyze the results, using assimilationist countries as the excluded category (since they represent the most restrictive position on both dimensions of the configuration). In addition, because the data consists of individuals nested within countries, a hierarchical model was employed. This allows for aggregation up to the higher level of analysis, which is a more fine-tuned method of extracting results. This was carried out using the *gllamm* command with the *ologit* link function in STATA. In addition, the *eform* command was used to return odds ratios.

This method was chosen because of the ease of interpreting the results compared to the probit models and the possibility of examining odds ratios. While it is true that this method cannot achieve the same depth of analysis as other procedures - such as nearest neighbor matching- it represents an important assessment of the relationships between the variables in question and allows us to notice important trends in sign and magnitude of the relationships in question. Indeed, given the non-experimental nature of the data, this method provides a handy first look at the relationship between citizenship configuration and public opinion towards out-groups.

VI. Results

The citizenship configurations for all 25 countries examined are provided in the appendices. 9 countries were classified as assimilationist, 8 as multiculturalist, 5 as segregationist and 3 as universalist. A total of 25,232 responses were analyzed (around 1000 per country). This section will recap the results of the ordered logit regressions performed for each of the DV questions and the next will go onto discuss these findings.

1. Responses to "People from other ethnic groups are enriching the cultural life of (OUR COUNTRY)"

Table 1: Results of regression on QA25 -1

Variable	Coefficient	Odds Ratio	P Value
Segregationism	1.1674	3.214	0.000
Universalism	.507	1.661	0.000
Multiculturalism	.253	1.288	0.000
Gender	-.092	.911	0.020
Age	-.0008	.999	0.455
Type of Community	.06139	1.063	0.015
Home ownership	-.1153	.891	0.016
Left-Right Political Orientation	.07743	1.080	0.010

Results from this regression generally supported the main hypothesis that segregationist, universalist and multiculturalist configurations would exhibit higher tendencies to positive public opinion versus the assimilationist configuration. For example, the coefficient for segregationist countries was 1.167 and the odds ratio was 3.2135, indicating a strong positive correlation between segregationism and positive opinions on this question, compared to assimilationist countries. More precisely, this means that a person in a segregationist country is 3.2135 times more likely to express a high level of positive opinion (a 4 on the Likert scale) versus the medium and lower levels (3,2,1). The coefficient of

universalism was .507 and the odds ratio was 1.6610, again indicating a positive association

compared to assimilationist countries, but not one as strong as that of segregationism.

Finally, the coefficient for multiculturalism was .25368, with an odds ratio of 1.288,

indicating a positive association with positive public opinion compared to assimilationist

countries, but (surprisingly) a lower one than either of the other configurations. These three

findings had extremely low p-values, indicating confidence in these results.

The control variables had more surprising results. Gender, home ownership and left-

right political orientation had opposite signs than originally hypothesized, with relatively low

p-values.

2. Responses to "The presence of people from other ethnic groups is a cause of insecurity"

Table 2: Results of regression on QA25 -2

Variable	Coefficient	Odds Ratio	P Value
Segregationism	.0985	2.679	0.000
Universalism	.326	1.385	0.000
Multiculturalism	.397	1.487	0.000
Gender	-.0414	.959	0.282
Age	-.006	.993	0.000
Type of Community	.109	1.115	0.000
Home ownership	-.081	.922	0.072
Left-Right Political Orientation	-.018	.982	0.530

In this regression, the main hypothesis was supported, as the coefficients for

segregationism, universalism and multiculturalism were all positive. For example, for

multiculturalist countries, a person is 1.48 times more likely to express a positive opinion

("agree") versus "disagree," "depends" and "don't know." In addition, the control variables

all had the same signs as in the previous regression, except for political orientation, which

has a negative sign (supporting the hypothesis), with two of them (gender and political orientation) having extremely high p-values, undermining confidence in those results.

3. Responses to "The presence of people from other ethnic groups increases unemployment in (OUR COUNTRY)"

Table 3: Results of regression on QA25 -3

Variable	Coefficient	Odds Ratio	P Value
Segregationism	1.292	3.639	0.000
Universalism	.531	1.701	0.000
Multiculturalism	.259	1.296	0.000
Gender	-.090	.914	0.041
Age	-.007	.992	0.000
Type of Community	.1953	1.215	0.000
Home ownership	-.158	.854	0.002
Left-Right Political Orientation	.044	1.046	0.18

Results from this regression also supported the main hypothesis, as the coefficients for segregationism, universalism and multiculturalism were all positive, indicating higher tendencies to express positive opinions versus assimilationist countries. These three variables also had very low p-values. Additionally, the control variables all follow the same pattern as the previous two regressions, with the variable for political orientation having a high p value.

4. Responses to "We need immigrants to work in certain sectors of our economy."

Table 4: Results of regression on QA25 -4

Variable	Coefficient	Odds Ratio	P Value
Segregationism	1.060	2.887	0.000
Universalism	-.262	.769	0.003
Multiculturalism	-.304	.737	0.025
Gender	-.060	.941	0.176
Age	-.006	.994	0.000

Type of Community	.127	1.135	0.000
Home ownership	-.132	.876	0.034
Left-Right Political Orientation	.036	1.037	0.281

This regression had findings which did not support the hypothesis – the coefficients of universalism and multiculturalism were both negative, with low p values. The control variables all kept the same signs as the previous regressions, with gender and political orientation having extremely high p values.

5. Responses to "The arrival of immigrants in Europe can efficiently solve the problem of Europe's ageing population."

Table 5: Results of regression on QA25 -5

Variable	Coefficient	Odds Ratio	P Value
Segregationism	1.265	3.542	0.000
Universalism	-.406	.666	0.000
Multiculturalism	.095	1.100	0.219
Gender	-.099	.905	0.022
Age	-.004	.995	0.000
Type of Community	.202	1.224	0.000
Home ownership	-.164	.848	0.002
Left-Right Political Orientation	.019	1.019	0.568

This regression had one finding which did not support the hypothesis – the coefficient for universalism was negative, with a low p value. Both multiculturalism and segregationism kept their positive coefficient, however. The control variables all retained the same signs as the previous regressions.

6. Responses to ""If on a television channel the televised news were presented…"

Table 6: Results of regression on QE -3

Variable	Coefficient	Odds Ratio	P Value
Segregationism	1.530	4.618	0.000
Universalism	-.221	.802	0.000
Multiculturalism	1.545	4.690	0.000
Gender	-.029	.971	0.316
Age	-.012	.988	0.000
Type of Community	.058	1.060	0.002
Home ownership	.1314	1.140	0.000
Left-Right Political Orientation	-.118	.888	0.000

Again, universalism has a negative coefficient in this regression, contrary to what was hypothesized. However, multiculturalism and segregationism both had strongly positive coefficients and very high odds ratios, as hypothesized. Also in this regression, the control variables kept the signs that they had in other regressions, except for home ownership and political orientation, which had a positive and a negative coefficient respectively (supporting the hypothesis).

VII. Discussion

In every regression, segregationism had a positive coefficient, adding support to the main hypothesis. Indeed the coefficient and odds ratios were most strongly positive for segregationism in every regression, with consistently low p-values. It is therefore possible that liberal policies along the cultural difference dimension are a sufficiently good predictor of tendencies to express positive opinion. On the other hand, only five countries out of the 25 were classified as segregationist and most were relatively rich Western European nations (Germany, Spain, Denmark). Therefore, these results may be biased since thus there may be national level variables at work in these cases that this model could not account for.

The coefficients for universalism were positive for half of the regressions and negative for the other half, with consistently low p values. This would indicate that even though universalist countries are liberal on one dimension, they are not consistently associated with positive opinions towards out-groups. This is a somewhat puzzling finding; however, only three countries of the 25 were classified as universalist, meaning that the results may be biased. Additionally, the three cases – France, Slovenia and Hungary – are very different on a whole host of other unaccounted-for national variables. Two particular questions which produced negative coefficients – asking about the economic need for migrants and the ageing problem in Europe – may have elicited responses grounded in the countries' different milieus. Given that France is a traditional importer of migrants unlike the other two, this may provide a very different context for these questions.

The coefficients for multiculturalism were positive in every regression but one, (with low p values) lending support to the hypothesis. This indicates that the fact of being more liberal on both dimensions (compared to assimilationist countries) is associated with a tendency to express more positive opinions towards out-groups. However, this effect seems to be less potent in the case of multiculturalist countries than segregationist countries (though this may be due to the small number of segregationist cases). The regression with the negative coefficient asked a question regarding the economic need for migrants. It is possible that uncertainty over economics, rather than a view of migrants themselves, motivated the responses to this question. In addition, the p value for this finding was 0.025, which is higher than for any of the other multiculturalism findings, undermining confidence in this result. Overall, the findings on multiculturalism may be said to support the general hypothesis.

Some of the hypotheses for the control variables were not borne out, however. These variables tended to have the same coefficients across the six regressions, but with differing p values (some were quite high, undermining confidence in those results). For example, the gender variable consistently produced a negative coefficient, but often with high p values. This is also true for left-right political orientation (which often had a positive coefficient) and home ownership. The high p values associated with these results undermine those findings. By contrast, the control variables which had findings supporting the hypothesis tended to have low p values.

It is also important to note that each of the six regressions had very low log likelihoods, indicating that the model was a relatively poor fit for the data. It is highly likely therefore, that more national and individual level variables can exert an influence, and more research could be done to clarify the same. Overall, therefore, the results seem quite mixed regarding the effect of citizenship configuration on public opinion towards out-groups.

VII. Conclusions

To recap, the results found that segregationism and multiculturalism were more positively associated with positive opinions towards out-groups, in comparison to out-groups. The results for universalism, by contrast, were more mixed. This could potentially mean that the one dimension that both multiculturalism and segregationism share (cultural difference) has a greater impact on the expression of positive public opinion towards out-groups. However, considering the low log likelihoods of the regression and several high p values in the regressions, the results are more mixed than they initially appear. It is definitely possible,

therefore, that other factors at both the national and individual levels have greater explanatory power than citizenship configuration.

In so far as there seem to be powerful positive correlations between positive public opinion towards out-groups and the segregationist and multiculturist configurations, this could point to important facets of national integration policy. It is an interesting fact that countries which embrace liberal policies regarding cultural difference experience seem to have higher associations with positive public opinion. If it is true that liberal policies can anticipate and shape liberal public opinion, then policymakers can take heart that the integrationist policies currently en vogue in much of Western Europe can have important transformative effects on society. The supposed remedial effects of national policy on xenophobia, therefore, are supported by these findings. Unfortunately the methods used in this study cannot definitively point to a causal link between policy and opinion, or grapple with the endogeneity bias of the model.

This study does, however, present new insights in dialogue with the work already carried out by Koopmans et al. While Koopmans et al hypothesized that citizenship configuration, by shaping political opportunities at the national level, ultimately had an effect on political claims-making, this study indicates that citizenship configuration (particularly configurations liberal on the cultural difference dimension) can also have an effect on society through the mechanism of influencing public opinion. Political movements arise not only because people have the opportunity to express their opinions, but, more fundamentally, because people feel a certain way. This study, by critically examining the latter half of this statement, breaks new theoretical ground, while building upon the Koopmans model. Additionally, this study also presents new insights in the field of public opinion studies in

general, as it presents a hitherto unexamined determinant of public opinion, with significant results. Therefore, it fills a gap in the literature, which has focused often on individual demographics as well as national economics in particular in order to explain how public opinion towards out-groups comes about.

In particular, it appears that the dimension of cultural difference is particularly important in shaping public opinion towards out-groups. This may have to do with the fundamental grouping of society into sub-groups with distinct characteristics, prompting individuals to evaluate outsiders on a group-level basis. Thus the normalization of difference on the group level may be more important to producing positive opinions than the normalizing of difference on the individual level. Given that xenophobic sentiment is generally couched in terms of foreign groups or cultures (Islamic, Arab, etc) invading the native land, there appears to be merit to this hypothesis.

This finding points towards the most important policy implications to be gleaned from this study. If cultural difference rights are the key to producing positive public opinion, then it is important that national policies make concessions for the right of groups to be different from the mainstream, rather than focusing simply on the civic rights of the individual. This would be of particular importance to universalist nations, already liberal on the individual dimension, but not the group dimension. It would also imply that anti-discrimination initiatives aimed at reducing inequalities on the individual level can only go so far in redressing negative public opinion. In order to truly address negative public opinion towards out-groups (who are perceived as just that, as *groups*), efforts must be made to legitimize the rights of these groups to exist as distinct cultural entities within the framework

of the nation. Bans on Islamic dress, therefore, would represent a step in the opposite direction.

Further research on this topic could proceed in several ways. It may be worthwhile to investigate the Eurobarometer data using a matching process (to mimic an experimental treatment) on published surveys. This method would compare individual similar across demographic lines, differing only in the citizenship configuration that they live under, to determine, in a quasi-experimental fashion, how citizenship configuration may affect their opinions towards out-groups. Additionally, experimental surveys could be use to better flesh out a link between configuration and opinion. Furthermore, it would be interesting to undertake a longitudinal study of the same question over a longer time period.

It would also be worthwhile to examine the relative weight of individual equality versus cultural difference in the effect of citizenship configuration on opinion, investigate instrumental variables through which citizenship configuration may influence opinions (media reporting, for example) as well as control for more national level variables in the analysis. Additionally, one could re-evaluate the scale used by Koopmans to better flesh out the country classifications, given the mixed results for universalist countries. Moreover, it would be illuminating to consider the case of a country or countries which experienced a shift in citizenship configuration as well as a shift in public opinion over a consequent time period, in order to better determine how changes in citizenship configuration can lead to changes in public opinion towards out-groups. Finally, more research would be needed to flesh out the underlying theory to its natural conclusion – i.e. the chain between citizenship configuration, public opinion, and finally, political claims-making.

This study has broken new ground in several ways. It is the first comprehensive attempt at classifying the citizenship configurations of nearly all the EU member nations. It presents an alternative to the causal chain presented by Koopmans et al, with respect to the links between citizenship configuration and political claims-making. This approach is particularly useful because it goes right to the heart of the question of how political movements arise. By examining motivations (public opinion) rather than opportunity, it fleshes out the literature on the rise of political movements focused on social issues by scrutinizing the main source for these movements. It also uses the most recent data on public opinion, capturing a time period involving rapid changes in the makeup and economy of the European Union. Having evaluated one particular national level predictor of public opinion, it also adds to a growing body of literature on the public opinion of Europeans towards out-groups as well as the politics of the European Union with respect to migration and diversity, an increasingly pressing topic.

Appendix One: Citizenship Configurations

Name	Indv Eq	Cul Dif	Assim	Segreg	Univ	Multi
France	0.666667	-0.25	0	0	1	0
Belgium	0.833333	0.75	0	0	0	1
Netherlands	1	0.5	0	0	0	1
Italy	-0.5	0.5	0	1	0	0
Luxembourg	0.166667	0.25	0	0	0	1
Denmark	-0.5	0.25	0	1	0	0
Ireland	0.666667	0.25	0	0	0	1
Greece	-0.5	-0.5	1	0	0	0
Spain	-0.33333	0.25	0	1	0	0
Portugal	0.5	0.75	0	0	0	1
Finland	0.666666	0.75	0	0	0	1
Sweden	1	0.75	0	0	0	1
Austria	-0.83333	-0.5	1	0	0	0
Czech	-0.33333	-0.25	1	0	0	0
Estonia	-0.66667	-0.25	1	0	0	0
Hungary	0.166667	-0.5	0	0	1	0
Latvia	-1	-1	1	0	0	0
Lithuania	-0.5	-1	1	0	0	0
Malta	-1	-0.25	1	0	0	0
Poland	-0.5	-0.25	1	0	0	0
Slovakia	-0.5	-0.75	1	0	0	0
Slovenia	0.333333	-0.25	0	0	1	0
Cyprus	-0.5	0.25	0	1	0	0
Germany	-0.33333	0.25	0	1	0	0
UK	0.666667	0.5	0	0	0	1
Totals			**9**	**5**	**3**	**8**

Graph 1: Citizenship Configurations for 25 EU countries

Appendix Two: Components and Sub-Indicators for Citizenship Configurations for 25 EU Countries

Criteria	Austria	Belgium	Czech	Cyprus	Denmark	Estonia	Finland	France	Germany	Greece
Nationality Acquisition MIPEX Score	22	71	50	36	33	26	44	54	38	25
Score	**-1**	**1**	**1**	**-1**	**-1**	**-1**	**0**	**1**	**0**	**-1**
Citizenship rights for foreigners										
Protection against expulsion	0	1	-1	0	0	0	1	1	1	0
voting rights	-1	0	-1	-1	1	0	1	-1	-1	-1
average score	**-0.5**	**0.5**	**-1**	**-0.5**	**0.5**	**0**	**1**	**0**	**0**	**-0.5**
Antidiscrimination rights MIPEX score	42	75	27	60	33	23	75	81	50	58
Score	-1	1	-1	0	-1	-1	1	1	-1	0
Overall Summary for Individual Equality	*-0.833333*	*0.8333333*	*-0.333333*	*-0.5*	*-0.5*	*-0.666667*	*0.6666667*	*0.6666667*	*-0.333333*	*-0.5*
Cultural Requirements for naturalization	**-1**	**1**	**0**	**1**	**-1**	**-1**	**0**	**-1**	**-1**	**-1**
right to political parties	1	1	-1	1	1	-1	1	1	1	1
political representation rights	**-1**	**1**	**1**	**-1**	**0**	**0**	**1**	**-1**	**0**	**-1**
affirmative action in the labor market	**-1**	**0**	**-1**	**0**	**1**	**1**	**1**	**0**	**1**	**-1**
Overall summary for cultural difference	*-0.5*	*0.75*	*-0.25*	*0.25*	*0.25*	*-0.25*	*0.75*	*-0.25*	*0.25*	*-0.5*

Criteria	Hungary	Ireland	Italy	Latvia	Lithuania	Luxembourg	Malta	Netherlands	Poland	Portugal
Nationality Acquisition MIPEX Score	36	62	33	25	38	45	29	51	45	69
Score	**-1**	**1**	**-1**	**-1**	**0**	**0**	**-1**	**1**	**0**	**1**
Citizenship rights for foreigners										
Protection against expulsion	0	1	0	-1	-1	0	-1	1	0	-1
voting rights	1	1	-1	-1	0	1	-1	1	-1	0
average score	**0.5**	**1**	**-0.5**	**-1**	**-0.5**	**0.5**	**-1**	**1**	**-0.5**	**-0.5**
Antidiscrimination rights MIPEX score	85	58	69	33	48	56	38	81	46	87
Score	1	0	0	-1	-1	0	-1	1	-1	1
Overall Summary for Individual Equality	*0.1666667*	*0.6666667*	*-0.5*	*-1*	*-0.5*	*0.1666667*	*-1*	*1*	*-0.5*	*0.5*
Cultural Requirements for naturalization	**-1**	**1**	**1**	**-1**	**-1**	**0**	**0**	**-1**	**1**	**0**
right to political parties	1	1	1	-1	-1	1	0	1	0	1
political representation rights	**-1**	**-1**	**0**	**-1**	**-1**	**1**	**0**	**1**	**-1**	**1**
affirmative action in the labor market	**-1**	**0**	**0**	**-1**	**-1**	**-1**	**-1**	**1**	**-1**	**1**
Overall summary for cultural difference	*-0.5*	*0.25*	*0.5*	*-1*	*-1*	*0.25*	*-0.25*	*0.5*	*-0.25*	*0.75*

Criteria	Slovakia	Slovenia	Spain	Sweden	UK
Nationality Acquisition MIPEX Score	40	41	41	71	62
Score	**0**	**0**	**0**	**1**	**1**
Citizenship rights for foreigners					
Protection against expulsion	-1	0	0	1	0
voting rights	0	0	0	1	0
average score	**-0.5**	**0**	**0**	**1**	**0**
Antidiscrimination rights MIPEX score	44	79	50	94	81
Score	-1	1	-1	1	1
Overall Summary for Individual Equality	*-0.5*	*0.3333333*	*-0.333333*	*1*	*0.6666667*
Cultural Requirements for naturalization	**0**	**0**	**-1**	**1**	**0**
right to political parties	-1	-1	1	1	1
political representation rights	**-1**	**0**	**1**	**0**	**1**
affirmative action in the labor market	**-1**	**0**	**0**	**1**	**0**
Overall summary for cultural difference	*-0.75*	*-0.25*	*0.25*	*0.75*	*0.5*

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