Antitrust Enforcement as a Cause of Google’s Innovation (2001-2013)
Abstract
In this paper I consider the role of antitrust enforcement as a driver of innovation
at Google. My hypothesis is that President Obama increased antitrust enforcement
relative to his predecessor, George W. Bush, leading Google to increase its rate of
innovation. I review literature regarding the role of antitrust as a driver of high-tech
innovation, and use regression analysis to determine to what extent, if at all, Google’s
innovation can be linked to antitrust enforcement. A holistic appraisal of the data
finds mixed support for my hypothesis, varying by measurement method. This demonstrates
the importance of measures of enforcement and innovation, as well as measurement method
selection, which play a role in the outcome of the tests.
Type
Honors thesisDepartment
Political SciencePermalink
https://hdl.handle.net/10161/10238Citation
Fischer-Zernin, Maxime (2015). Antitrust Enforcement as a Cause of Google’s Innovation (2001-2013). Honors thesis, Duke University. Retrieved from https://hdl.handle.net/10161/10238.Collections
More Info
Show full item record
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 United States License.
Rights for Collection: Undergraduate Honors Theses and Student papers
Works are deposited here by their authors, and represent their research and opinions, not that of Duke University. Some materials and descriptions may include offensive content. More info